Pending: 32020R1217

January 16, 2026
26.8.2020 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 277/6
(1) Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 has repealed and replaced Council Directive 2000/29/EC(2), while Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2072(3)has replaced Annexes I to V to that Directive.
(2) Article 7 in conjunction with point 1 of Annex VI to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2072 prohibits the introduction into the Union of plants for planting ofChamaecyparisSpach,JuniperusL. andPinusL., other than fruit and seeds. Previously the respective prohibition was set out in Article 4(1) in conjunction with point 1, Part A of Annex III to Directive 2000/29/EC.
(3) Commission Decision 2002/887/EC(4)authorised the Member States to provide for derogations from Article 4(1) of Directive 2000/29/EC, with regard to the prohibitions referred to in point 1, Part A of Annex III to that Directive, for naturally or artificially dwarfed plants ofChamaecyparisSpach,JuniperusL. and certain species ofPinusL., other than fruit and seeds, originating in Japan.
(4) On 3 August 2017, Japan submitted a request for extending that authorisation also to naturally or artificially dwarfed plants of black pine bonsai (Pinus thunbergiiParl.) and provided a technical information in support of that request.
(5) In May 2019, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) delivered a scientific opinion evaluating the plant health risks from black pine bonsai imported from Japan(5). That scientific opinion was based on the available scientific and technical information provided by Japan, concluding on the likelihood of pest freedom as regards the pests that could be associated with that commodity if certain conditions are fulfilled.
(6) Some of the pests concerned are not yet listed as Union quarantine pests but might fulfil the criteria to be listed as such, thus they should be subject to provisional measures set out in Article 30(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031. On the basis of the EFSA scientific opinion, the conditions for import ofPinus thunbergiiParl. bonsai plants from Japan ensuring certain level of pest freedom are deemed to be acceptable and a derogation should be granted for their introduction into the Union, for an initial period until 31 December 2023, in order to allow for a review of those measures.
(7) In October 2019, Japan also submitted a request for prolongation of the derogation granted by Decision 2002/887/EC forChamaecyparisSpach,JuniperusL. and certain species ofPinusL. The circumstances justifying granting this derogation pursuant to Decision 2002/887/EC still apply and the phytosanitary risks from introduction of these commodities remain low. Since there is no new information giving cause for revision of the specific conditions therein, such prolongation of the derogation should be granted. However, the list of pests of concern forPinussp. should be updated to cover recent changes in taxonomy and the new scientific information in the EFSA scientific opinion.
(8) That derogation should be subject to the same requirements as set out in Decision 2002/887/EC. Those requirements should apply without prejudice to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2072, and especially the requirements set out in point 30 of Annex VII to that Regulation concerning the introduction into the Union of naturally or artificially dwarfed plants for planting other than seeds.
(9) As Directive 2000/29/EC has been repealed and replaced by Regulation (EU) 2016/2031, Decision 2002/887/EC should be repealed and replaced by this Regulation for reasons of clarity and legal consistency.
(10) The derogation provided for in this Regulation should apply until 31 December 2023 to allow for its review.
(11) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
— Chamaecyparissp. Spach,
— Juniperussp. L.,
— Pinus parvifloraSieb. & Zucc. (Pinus pentaphyllaMayr),
— Pinus thunbergiiParl.,
— Pinus parvifloraSieb. & Zucc., grafted on a rootstock of anotherPinusspecies, originating in Japan, and
— Pinus thunbergiiParl. grafted on a rootstock of anotherPinusspecies, originating in Japan.
(a) Chamaecyparis: from 1 October 2020 to 31 December 2023;
(b) Juniperus: from 1 November to 31 March each year until 31 December 2023;
(c) PinusL.: from 1 October 2020 to 31 December 2023.
(a) forJuniperusplants:(i)Aschistonyx eppoiInouye,(ii)Gymnosporangium asiaticumMiyabe ex Yamada and G. yamadae Miyabe ex Yamada,(iii)Oligonychus perditusPritchard et Baker,(iv)Popillia japonicaNewman,(v)any other quarantine pest or pest subject to the measures referred to in Article 30 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 which is not known to occur in the Union; (i) Aschistonyx eppoiInouye, (ii) Gymnosporangium asiaticumMiyabe ex Yamada and G. yamadae Miyabe ex Yamada, (iii) Oligonychus perditusPritchard et Baker, (iv) Popillia japonicaNewman, (v) any other quarantine pest or pest subject to the measures referred to in Article 30 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 which is not known to occur in the Union;
(i) Aschistonyx eppoiInouye,
(ii) Gymnosporangium asiaticumMiyabe ex Yamada and G. yamadae Miyabe ex Yamada,
(iii) Oligonychus perditusPritchard et Baker,
(iv) Popillia japonicaNewman,
(v) any other quarantine pest or pest subject to the measures referred to in Article 30 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 which is not known to occur in the Union;
(i) Aschistonyx eppoiInouye,
(ii) Gymnosporangium asiaticumMiyabe ex Yamada and G. yamadae Miyabe ex Yamada,
(iii) Oligonychus perditusPritchard et Baker,
(iv) Popillia japonicaNewman,
(v) any other quarantine pest or pest subject to the measures referred to in Article 30 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 which is not known to occur in the Union;
(b) forChamaecyparisplants:(i)Popillia japonicaNewman,(ii)any other quarantine pest or pest subject to the measures referred to in Article 30 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 which is not known to occur in the Union; (i) Popillia japonicaNewman, (ii) any other quarantine pest or pest subject to the measures referred to in Article 30 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 which is not known to occur in the Union;
(i) Popillia japonicaNewman,
(ii) any other quarantine pest or pest subject to the measures referred to in Article 30 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 which is not known to occur in the Union;
(i) Popillia japonicaNewman,
(ii) any other quarantine pest or pest subject to the measures referred to in Article 30 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 which is not known to occur in the Union;
(c) forPinus parvifloraSieb. & Zucc. (Pinus pentaphyllaMayr) plants:(i)Bursaphelenchus xylophilus(Steiner and Bührer) Nickle et al.,(ii)Coleosporium paederiaeDietel ex Hirats. f.,(iii)Crisicoccus pini(Kuwana),(iv)Cronartium kurilense(Dietel) Y. Ono,(v)Cronartiumquercuum(Berk.) Miyabe ex Shirai,(vi)Dendrolimus sibiricusChetverikov,(vii)Dendrolimus spectabilis(Butler),(viii)Dendrolimus superansButler,(ix)Monochamusspp. (non-European populations),(x)Pissodes nitidusRoelofs,(xi)Popillia japonicaNewman,(xii)Pseudocercospora pini‐densiflorae(Hori & Nambu) Deighton,(xiii)Thecodiplosis japonensisUchida & Inouye,(xiv)any other quarantine pest or pest subject to the measures referred to in Article 30 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 which is not known to occur in the Union; (i) Bursaphelenchus xylophilus(Steiner and Bührer) Nickle et al., (ii) Coleosporium paederiaeDietel ex Hirats. f., (iii) Crisicoccus pini(Kuwana), (iv) Cronartium kurilense(Dietel) Y. Ono, (v) Cronartiumquercuum(Berk.) Miyabe ex Shirai, (vi) Dendrolimus sibiricusChetverikov, (vii) Dendrolimus spectabilis(Butler), (viii) Dendrolimus superansButler, (ix) Monochamusspp. (non-European populations), (x) Pissodes nitidusRoelofs, (xi) Popillia japonicaNewman, (xii) Pseudocercospora pini‐densiflorae(Hori & Nambu) Deighton, (xiii) Thecodiplosis japonensisUchida & Inouye, (xiv) any other quarantine pest or pest subject to the measures referred to in Article 30 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 which is not known to occur in the Union;
(i) Bursaphelenchus xylophilus(Steiner and Bührer) Nickle et al.,
(ii) Coleosporium paederiaeDietel ex Hirats. f.,
(iii) Crisicoccus pini(Kuwana),
(iv) Cronartium kurilense(Dietel) Y. Ono,
(v) Cronartiumquercuum(Berk.) Miyabe ex Shirai,
(vi) Dendrolimus sibiricusChetverikov,
(vii) Dendrolimus spectabilis(Butler),
(viii) Dendrolimus superansButler,
(ix) Monochamusspp. (non-European populations),
(x) Pissodes nitidusRoelofs,
(xi) Popillia japonicaNewman,
(xii) Pseudocercospora pini‐densiflorae(Hori & Nambu) Deighton,
(xiii) Thecodiplosis japonensisUchida & Inouye,
(xiv) any other quarantine pest or pest subject to the measures referred to in Article 30 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 which is not known to occur in the Union;
(i) Bursaphelenchus xylophilus(Steiner and Bührer) Nickle et al.,
(ii) Coleosporium paederiaeDietel ex Hirats. f.,
(iii) Crisicoccus pini(Kuwana),
(iv) Cronartium kurilense(Dietel) Y. Ono,
(v) Cronartiumquercuum(Berk.) Miyabe ex Shirai,
(vi) Dendrolimus sibiricusChetverikov,
(vii) Dendrolimus spectabilis(Butler),
(viii) Dendrolimus superansButler,
(ix) Monochamusspp. (non-European populations),
(x) Pissodes nitidusRoelofs,
(xi) Popillia japonicaNewman,
(xii) Pseudocercospora pini‐densiflorae(Hori & Nambu) Deighton,
(xiii) Thecodiplosis japonensisUchida & Inouye,
(xiv) any other quarantine pest or pest subject to the measures referred to in Article 30 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 which is not known to occur in the Union;
(d) forPinus thunbergiiParl plants:(i)Bursaphelenchus xylophilus(Steiner and Bührer) Nickle et al.,(ii)Coleosporium asterum(Dietel) Sydow & P.Sydow,(iii)Coleosporium phellodendriKomarov,(iv)Crisicoccus pini(Kuwana),(v)Cronartium orientaleKaneko,(vi)Dendrolimus sibiricusChetverikov,(vii)Dendrolimus spectabilis(Butler),(viii)Dendrolimus superansButler,(ix)Dothistroma septosporum(Dorogin) Morelet,(x)Fusarium circinatumNirenberg & O’Donnell,(xi)Monochamusspp. (non-European populations),(xii)Pissodes nitidusRoelofs,(xiii)Popillia japonicaNewman,(xiv)Pseudocercospora pini‐densiflorae(Hori & Nambu) Deighton,(xv)Sirex nitobeiMats.,(xvi)Thecodiplosis japonensisUchida & Inouye,(xvii)Urocerus japonicus(F. Sm.),(xviii)any other quarantine pest or pest subject to the measures referred to in Article 30 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 which is not known to occur in the Union. (i) Bursaphelenchus xylophilus(Steiner and Bührer) Nickle et al., (ii) Coleosporium asterum(Dietel) Sydow & P.Sydow, (iii) Coleosporium phellodendriKomarov, (iv) Crisicoccus pini(Kuwana), (v) Cronartium orientaleKaneko, (vi) Dendrolimus sibiricusChetverikov, (vii) Dendrolimus spectabilis(Butler), (viii) Dendrolimus superansButler, (ix) Dothistroma septosporum(Dorogin) Morelet, (x) Fusarium circinatumNirenberg & O’Donnell, (xi) Monochamusspp. (non-European populations), (xii) Pissodes nitidusRoelofs, (xiii) Popillia japonicaNewman, (xiv) Pseudocercospora pini‐densiflorae(Hori & Nambu) Deighton, (xv) Sirex nitobeiMats., (xvi) Thecodiplosis japonensisUchida & Inouye, (xvii) Urocerus japonicus(F. Sm.), (xviii) any other quarantine pest or pest subject to the measures referred to in Article 30 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 which is not known to occur in the Union.
(i) Bursaphelenchus xylophilus(Steiner and Bührer) Nickle et al.,
(ii) Coleosporium asterum(Dietel) Sydow & P.Sydow,
(iii) Coleosporium phellodendriKomarov,
(iv) Crisicoccus pini(Kuwana),
(v) Cronartium orientaleKaneko,
(vi) Dendrolimus sibiricusChetverikov,
(vii) Dendrolimus spectabilis(Butler),
(viii) Dendrolimus superansButler,
(ix) Dothistroma septosporum(Dorogin) Morelet,
(x) Fusarium circinatumNirenberg & O’Donnell,
(xi) Monochamusspp. (non-European populations),
(xii) Pissodes nitidusRoelofs,
(xiii) Popillia japonicaNewman,
(xiv) Pseudocercospora pini‐densiflorae(Hori & Nambu) Deighton,
(xv) Sirex nitobeiMats.,
(xvi) Thecodiplosis japonensisUchida & Inouye,
(xvii) Urocerus japonicus(F. Sm.),
(xviii) any other quarantine pest or pest subject to the measures referred to in Article 30 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 which is not known to occur in the Union.
(i) Bursaphelenchus xylophilus(Steiner and Bührer) Nickle et al.,
(ii) Coleosporium asterum(Dietel) Sydow & P.Sydow,
(iii) Coleosporium phellodendriKomarov,
(iv) Crisicoccus pini(Kuwana),
(v) Cronartium orientaleKaneko,
(vi) Dendrolimus sibiricusChetverikov,
(vii) Dendrolimus spectabilis(Butler),
(viii) Dendrolimus superansButler,
(ix) Dothistroma septosporum(Dorogin) Morelet,
(x) Fusarium circinatumNirenberg & O’Donnell,
(xi) Monochamusspp. (non-European populations),
(xii) Pissodes nitidusRoelofs,
(xiii) Popillia japonicaNewman,
(xiv) Pseudocercospora pini‐densiflorae(Hori & Nambu) Deighton,
(xv) Sirex nitobeiMats.,
(xvi) Thecodiplosis japonensisUchida & Inouye,
(xvii) Urocerus japonicus(F. Sm.),
(xviii) any other quarantine pest or pest subject to the measures referred to in Article 30 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 which is not known to occur in the Union.
(a) be potted in pots which are placed either on shelves at least 50 cm above ground or onto concrete flooring, impenetrable for nematodes, which is well maintained and free from debris; and
(b) be found free, in the inspections referred to in point 4, from the pests of concern; and
(c) if they belong to the genusPinusL. and in the case of grafting on a rootstock of aPinusspecies other thanPinus parvifloraSieb. & Zucc. orPinus thunbergiiParl., have a rootstock derived from sources officially approved as healthy material; and
(d) be made recognisable with a marking or a traceability code, exclusive for each individual plant and notified to the NPPO of Japan, enabling the identification of the officially registered nursery and the year of potting.
(a) the name or the names of the officially registered nursery or officially registered nurseries;
(b) the markings or traceability codes referred to in point 6(d), as far as they enable identification of the registered nursery and the year of potting;
(c) the specification of the last treatment applied, prior to dispatch;
(d) under ‘Additional Declaration’, the statement ‘This consignment meets the conditions laid down in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1217’.
(a) the type of material,
(b) the quantity of material,
(c) the declared date of import,
(d) the officially approved site where the specified plants will be held under the post-entry detention referred to in point 10.
(a) in the case ofPinusandChamaecyparisplants, for a period of not less than three months of active growth; and
(b) in the case ofJuniperusplants, for a period from 1 April until 30 June of each year.
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2016 on protective measures against pests of plants, amending Regulations (EU) No 228/2013, (EU) No 652/2014 and (EU) No 1143/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 69/464/EEC, 74/647/EEC, 93/85/EEC, 98/57/EC, 2000/29/EC, 2006/91/EC and 2007/33/EC(1), and in particular Articles 30(1), 40(1) and 41(1) thereof,
(1) Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 has repealed and replaced Council Directive 2000/29/EC(2), while Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2072(3)has replaced Annexes I to V to that Directive.
(2) Article 7 in conjunction with point 1 of Annex VI to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2072 prohibits the introduction into the Union of plants for planting ofChamaecyparisSpach,JuniperusL. andPinusL., other than fruit and seeds. Previously the respective prohibition was set out in Article 4(1) in conjunction with point 1, Part A of Annex III to Directive 2000/29/EC.
(3) Commission Decision 2002/887/EC(4)authorised the Member States to provide for derogations from Article 4(1) of Directive 2000/29/EC, with regard to the prohibitions referred to in point 1, Part A of Annex III to that Directive, for naturally or artificially dwarfed plants ofChamaecyparisSpach,JuniperusL. and certain species ofPinusL., other than fruit and seeds, originating in Japan.
(4) On 3 August 2017, Japan submitted a request for extending that authorisation also to naturally or artificially dwarfed plants of black pine bonsai (Pinus thunbergiiParl.) and provided a technical information in support of that request.
(5) In May 2019, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) delivered a scientific opinion evaluating the plant health risks from black pine bonsai imported from Japan(5). That scientific opinion was based on the available scientific and technical information provided by Japan, concluding on the likelihood of pest freedom as regards the pests that could be associated with that commodity if certain conditions are fulfilled.
(6) Some of the pests concerned are not yet listed as Union quarantine pests but might fulfil the criteria to be listed as such, thus they should be subject to provisional measures set out in Article 30(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031. On the basis of the EFSA scientific opinion, the conditions for import ofPinus thunbergiiParl. bonsai plants from Japan ensuring certain level of pest freedom are deemed to be acceptable and a derogation should be granted for their introduction into the Union, for an initial period until 31 December 2023, in order to allow for a review of those measures.
(7) In October 2019, Japan also submitted a request for prolongation of the derogation granted by Decision 2002/887/EC forChamaecyparisSpach,JuniperusL. and certain species ofPinusL. The circumstances justifying granting this derogation pursuant to Decision 2002/887/EC still apply and the phytosanitary risks from introduction of these commodities remain low. Since there is no new information giving cause for revision of the specific conditions therein, such prolongation of the derogation should be granted. However, the list of pests of concern forPinussp. should be updated to cover recent changes in taxonomy and the new scientific information in the EFSA scientific opinion.
(8) That derogation should be subject to the same requirements as set out in Decision 2002/887/EC. Those requirements should apply without prejudice to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2072, and especially the requirements set out in point 30 of Annex VII to that Regulation concerning the introduction into the Union of naturally or artificially dwarfed plants for planting other than seeds.
(9) As Directive 2000/29/EC has been repealed and replaced by Regulation (EU) 2016/2031, Decision 2002/887/EC should be repealed and replaced by this Regulation for reasons of clarity and legal consistency.
(10) The derogation provided for in this Regulation should apply until 31 December 2023 to allow for its review.
(11) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Definition
Article 1
For the purposes of this Regulation, ‘specified plants’ shall mean naturally or artificially dwarfed plants for planting of the following species:
—
Chamaecyparissp. Spach,
—
Juniperussp. L.,
—
Pinus parvifloraSieb. & Zucc. (Pinus pentaphyllaMayr),
—
Pinus thunbergiiParl.,
—
Pinus parvifloraSieb. & Zucc., grafted on a rootstock of anotherPinusspecies, originating in Japan, and
—
Pinus thunbergiiParl. grafted on a rootstock of anotherPinusspecies, originating in Japan.

Derogation from the prohibition to introduce into the Union the specified plants
Article 2
By way of derogation from Article 7 and point 1 of Annex VI to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2072, the specified plants are allowed to be introduced in the Union, if they comply with the conditions set out in the Annex to this Regulation.

Periods of application of the derogation
Article 3
The derogation provided for in Article 2 applies to the specified plants imported into the Union in the following periods:
(a)
Chamaecyparis: from 1 October 2020 to 31 December 2023;
(b)
Juniperus: from 1 November to 31 March each year until 31 December 2023;
(c)
PinusL.: from 1 October 2020 to 31 December 2023.

Repeal of Decision 2002/887/EC
Article 4
Decision 2002/887/EC is repealed.

Entry into force and application
Article 5
This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2016 on protective measures against pests of plants, amending Regulations (EU) No 228/2013, (EU) No 652/2014 and (EU) No 1143/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 69/464/EEC, 74/647/EEC, 93/85/EEC, 98/57/EC, 2000/29/EC, 2006/91/EC and 2007/33/EC(1), and in particular Articles 30(1), 40(1) and 41(1) thereof,
(1) Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 has repealed and replaced Council Directive 2000/29/EC(2), while Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2072(3)has replaced Annexes I to V to that Directive.
(2) Article 7 in conjunction with point 1 of Annex VI to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2072 prohibits the introduction into the Union of plants for planting ofChamaecyparisSpach,JuniperusL. andPinusL., other than fruit and seeds. Previously the respective prohibition was set out in Article 4(1) in conjunction with point 1, Part A of Annex III to Directive 2000/29/EC.
(3) Commission Decision 2002/887/EC(4)authorised the Member States to provide for derogations from Article 4(1) of Directive 2000/29/EC, with regard to the prohibitions referred to in point 1, Part A of Annex III to that Directive, for naturally or artificially dwarfed plants ofChamaecyparisSpach,JuniperusL. and certain species ofPinusL., other than fruit and seeds, originating in Japan.
(4) On 3 August 2017, Japan submitted a request for extending that authorisation also to naturally or artificially dwarfed plants of black pine bonsai (Pinus thunbergiiParl.) and provided a technical information in support of that request.
(5) In May 2019, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) delivered a scientific opinion evaluating the plant health risks from black pine bonsai imported from Japan(5). That scientific opinion was based on the available scientific and technical information provided by Japan, concluding on the likelihood of pest freedom as regards the pests that could be associated with that commodity if certain conditions are fulfilled.
(6) Some of the pests concerned are not yet listed as Union quarantine pests but might fulfil the criteria to be listed as such, thus they should be subject to provisional measures set out in Article 30(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031. On the basis of the EFSA scientific opinion, the conditions for import ofPinus thunbergiiParl. bonsai plants from Japan ensuring certain level of pest freedom are deemed to be acceptable and a derogation should be granted for their introduction into the Union, for an initial period until 31 December 2023, in order to allow for a review of those measures.
(7) In October 2019, Japan also submitted a request for prolongation of the derogation granted by Decision 2002/887/EC forChamaecyparisSpach,JuniperusL. and certain species ofPinusL. The circumstances justifying granting this derogation pursuant to Decision 2002/887/EC still apply and the phytosanitary risks from introduction of these commodities remain low. Since there is no new information giving cause for revision of the specific conditions therein, such prolongation of the derogation should be granted. However, the list of pests of concern forPinussp. should be updated to cover recent changes in taxonomy and the new scientific information in the EFSA scientific opinion.
(8) That derogation should be subject to the same requirements as set out in Decision 2002/887/EC. Those requirements should apply without prejudice to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2072, and especially the requirements set out in point 30 of Annex VII to that Regulation concerning the introduction into the Union of naturally or artificially dwarfed plants for planting other than seeds.
(9) As Directive 2000/29/EC has been repealed and replaced by Regulation (EU) 2016/2031, Decision 2002/887/EC should be repealed and replaced by this Regulation for reasons of clarity and legal consistency.
(10) The derogation provided for in this Regulation should apply until 31 December 2023 to allow for its review.
(11) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Definition

For the purposes of this Regulation, ‘specified plants’ shall mean naturally or artificially dwarfed plants for planting of the following species:
—
Chamaecyparissp. Spach,
—
Juniperussp. L.,
—
Pinus parvifloraSieb. & Zucc. (Pinus pentaphyllaMayr),
—
Pinus thunbergiiParl.,
—
Pinus parvifloraSieb. & Zucc., grafted on a rootstock of anotherPinusspecies, originating in Japan, and
—
Pinus thunbergiiParl. grafted on a rootstock of anotherPinusspecies, originating in Japan.

Derogation from the prohibition to introduce into the Union the specified plants

By way of derogation from Article 7 and point 1 of Annex VI to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/2072, the specified plants are allowed to be introduced in the Union, if they comply with the conditions set out in the Annex to this Regulation.

Periods of application of the derogation

The derogation provided for in Article 2 applies to the specified plants imported into the Union in the following periods:
(a)
Chamaecyparis: from 1 October 2020 to 31 December 2023;
(b)
Juniperus: from 1 November to 31 March each year until 31 December 2023;
(c)
PinusL.: from 1 October 2020 to 31 December 2023.

Repeal of Decision 2002/887/EC

Decision 2002/887/EC is repealed.

Entry into force and application

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.
ANNEXConditions for the introduction into the Union of the specified plants in accordance with Article 2 1.
In the case where the specified plants are Pinus parviflora Sieb. & Zucc. or Pinus thunbergii Parl. grafted on a rootstock of another Pinus species, the rootstock shall not bear any shoots.
2.
The total number of the specified plants imported shall not exceed the quantities that have been determined for each year and notified to the Commission and the other Member States by the importing Member State, having regard to the available confinement facilities or quarantine stations.
3.
Prior to export to the Union, the specified plants shall have been grown, held and trained for at least two consecutive years in officially registered nurseries, which are subject to a control regime by the National Plant Protection Organisation (‘NPPO’) of Japan. The annual lists of the officially registered nurseries shall be made available to the Commission, by 31 October of each year. Those lists shall include the number of plants grown in each of these nurseries, as far as they are deemed suitable for introduction into the Union pursuant to this Regulation.
4.
In the case of Juniperus plants, the plants of the genera Chaenomeles Lindl., Crataegus L., Cydonia Mill., Juniperus L., Malus Mill., Photinia Ldl. and Pyrus L., which have been grown in the two last years prior to import in the naturally or artificially dwarfed plants nurseries mentioned in point 3 and in their immediate vicinity, shall have been officially inspected at least six times a year at appropriate intervals for the presence of the pests of concern. In the case of Chamaecyparis and Pinus plants, the plants of the genus Chamaecyparis Spach and of the genus Pinus L. which have been grown in those naturally or artificially dwarfed plants nurseries and in their immediate vicinity shall have been officially inspected at least six times a year at appropriate intervals, for the presence of pests of concern.
The pests of concern are:
(a) for Juniperus plants:
(i) Aschistonyx eppoi Inouye,
(ii) Gymnosporangium asiaticum Miyabe ex Yamada and G. yamadae Miyabe ex Yamada,
(iii) Oligonychus perditus Pritchard et Baker,
(iv) Popillia japonica Newman,
(v) any other quarantine pest or pest subject to the measures referred to in Article 30 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 which is not known to occur in the Union;
(b) for Chamaecyparis plants:
(i) Popillia japonica Newman,
(ii) any other quarantine pest or pest subject to the measures referred to in Article 30 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 which is not known to occur in the Union;
(c) for Pinus parviflora Sieb. & Zucc. (Pinus pentaphylla Mayr) plants:
(i) Bursaphelenchus xylophilus (Steiner and Bührer) Nickle et al.,
(ii) Coleosporium paederiae Dietel ex Hirats. f.,
(iii) Crisicoccus pini (Kuwana),
(iv) Cronartium kurilense (Dietel) Y. Ono,
(v) Cronartium
quercuum (Berk.) Miyabe ex Shirai,
(vi) Dendrolimus sibiricus Chetverikov,
(vii) Dendrolimus spectabilis (Butler),
(viii) Dendrolimus superans Butler,
(ix) Monochamus spp. (non-European populations),
(x) Pissodes nitidus Roelofs,
(xi) Popillia japonica Newman,
(xii) Pseudocercospora pini‐densiflorae (Hori & Nambu) Deighton,
(xiii) Thecodiplosis japonensis Uchida & Inouye,
(xiv) any other quarantine pest or pest subject to the measures referred to in Article 30 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 which is not known to occur in the Union;
(d) for Pinus thunbergii Parl plants:
(i) Bursaphelenchus xylophilus (Steiner and Bührer) Nickle et al.,
(ii) Coleosporium asterum (Dietel) Sydow & P.Sydow,
(iii) Coleosporium phellodendri Komarov,
(iv) Crisicoccus pini (Kuwana),
(v) Cronartium orientale Kaneko,
(vi) Dendrolimus sibiricus Chetverikov,
(vii) Dendrolimus spectabilis (Butler),
(viii) Dendrolimus superans Butler,
(ix) Dothistroma septosporum (Dorogin) Morelet,
(x) Fusarium circinatum Nirenberg & O’Donnell,
(xi) Monochamus spp. (non-European populations),
(xii) Pissodes nitidus Roelofs,
(xiii) Popillia japonica Newman,
(xiv) Pseudocercospora pini‐densiflorae (Hori & Nambu) Deighton,
(xv) Sirex nitobei Mats.,
(xvi) Thecodiplosis japonensis Uchida & Inouye,
(xvii) Urocerus japonicus (F. Sm.),
(xviii) any other quarantine pest or pest subject to the measures referred to in Article 30 of Regulation (EU) 2016/2031 which is not known to occur in the Union.
5.
The specified plants shall have been found free, in those inspections, from the pests of concern listed in points (a) to (d). Infested plants shall be removed by the NPPO, or the competent national bodies or professional operators under the official supervision of the NPPO of Japan. The remaining specified plants shall be effectively treated and held for an appropriate period and inspected to ensure freedom from such pests.
Any detection of pests of concern specified in point 4, during the inspections carried out pursuant to point 4, shall be officially recorded, and the records shall be made available to the Commission, upon request. Any detection of any of the pests of concern shall disqualify the nursery from the status of officially registered nursery. The Commission shall be informed immediately thereof. In such case, the registration may only be renewed in the following year at the earliest.
6.
The specified plants intended for export to the Union, shall at least during the period of two consecutive years referred to in point 3:
(a) be potted in pots which are placed either on shelves at least 50 cm above ground or onto concrete flooring, impenetrable for nematodes, which is well maintained and free from debris; and
(b) be found free, in the inspections referred to in point 4, from the pests of concern; and
(c) if they belong to the genus Pinus L. and in the case of grafting on a rootstock of a Pinus species other than Pinus parviflora Sieb. & Zucc. or Pinus thunbergii Parl., have a rootstock derived from sources officially approved as healthy material; and
(d) be made recognisable with a marking or a traceability code, exclusive for each individual plant and notified to the NPPO of Japan, enabling the identification of the officially registered nursery and the year of potting.
7.
The specified plants have been traceable from the time of their removal from the nursery until the time of loading for export, through sealing of transport vehicles or appropriate alternatives.
8.
The specified plants and the adhering or associated growing medium (‘the material’) shall be accompanied by a phytosanitary certificate, issued by the NPPO of Japan, attesting compliance with the requirements specified in points 1 to 7 of this Implementing Regulation, and in point 30 of Annex VII to Regulation (EU) 2019/2072. The certificate shall indicate:
(a) the name or the names of the officially registered nursery or officially registered nurseries;
(b) the markings or traceability codes referred to in point 6(d), as far as they enable identification of the registered nursery and the year of potting;
(c) the specification of the last treatment applied, prior to dispatch;
(d) under ‘Additional Declaration’, the statement ‘This consignment meets the conditions laid down in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1217’.
9.
The operator responsible for the consignment shall complete and submit the relevant part of the Common Health Entry Document (CHED) into the IMSOC, indicating at least the following information regarding each consignment of specified plants:
(a) the type of material,
(b) the quantity of material,
(c) the declared date of import,
(d) the officially approved site where the specified plants will be held under the post-entry detention referred to in point 10. Member States shall officially inform the importers, prior to the introduction, of the conditions laid down in points 1 to 12. 10.
Before the material is released, it shall be subject to official post-entry detention in a confinement facility or quarantine station.
(a) in the case of Pinus and Chamaecyparis plants, for a period of not less than three months of active growth; and
(b) in the case of Juniperus plants, for a period from 1 April until 30 June of each year.
The material shall also be found free, during this post-entry detention period, from any pests of concern listed in point 4. Particular attention shall be given by the competent authority or the professional operators to preserve for each plant the marking or traceability code, referred to in point 6(d).
11.
Any lot containing material which has not been found free from the pests of concern, during the post-entry detention period, referred to in point 10, shall be immediately destroyed by the competent authority or the professional operator under the official supervision of the competent authority.
12.
Member States shall notify, to the Commission and to the other Member States, any contamination by the pests of concern, which has been confirmed during the post-entry detention period, referred to in point 10. In such case, the relevant nursery in Japan shall be disqualified from the official registered nursery status. The Commission shall immediately inform Japan thereof.

Pending: 32020R1156

January 16, 2026
5.8.2020 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 255/36
(1) By Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/186(2)(‘the original Regulation’), the Commission imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain corrosion resistant steels originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘China’ or ‘the PRC’). The individual anti-dumping duties in force range from 17,2 % to 27,9 %. All non-sampled cooperating exporting producers listed in an Annex to that Regulation received a duty of 26,1 % and all other (non-cooperating) exporting producers are subject to the residual duty of 27,9 %.
(2) These measures will hereinafter be referred to as ‘the measures in force’ and the investigation that led to the measures imposed by the original Regulation will be hereinafter referred to as ‘the original investigation’.
(3) The Commission had at its disposal sufficient evidence that the measures in force were being circumvented by slight modifications of the product concerned. More specifically, statistics at 10-digit TARIC level showed that a significant change in the pattern of trade involving exports from the People’s Republic of China to the Union took place following the imposition of the definitive anti-dumping duty.
(4) The evidence pointed to the fact that this change stems from the importation of the slightly modified product concerned and that there was no due cause or economic justification other than the imposition of the duty for such practice, process or work.
(5) The evidence available to the Commission pointed to the fact that the remedial effects of the measures in force were being undermined both in terms of quantities and prices.
(6) The Commission also had sufficient evidence at its disposal showing that the exports of the slightly modified product were dumped in relation to the normal value previously established.
(7) Having thus determined, after having informed the Member States, that sufficient prima facie evidence existed for the initiation of an investigation pursuant to Articles 13(3) and 14(5) of the basic Regulation, the Commission decided to investigate the possible circumvention of the measures in force and to make imports of the slightly modified product subject to registration. As a result, the Commission adopted Regulation (EU) 2019/1948(3)(the ‘initiating Regulation’), launching on its own initiative an investigation.
(8) The product concerned by the possible circumvention is flat-rolled products of iron or alloy steel or non-alloy steel; aluminium killed; plated or coated by hot dip galvanisation with zinc and/or with aluminium, and no other metal; chemically passivated; containing by weight: 0,015 % or more but not more than 0,170 % of carbon, 0,015 % or more but not more than 0,100 % of aluminium, not more than 0,045 % of niobium, not more than 0,010 % of titanium and not more than 0,010 % of vanadium; presented in coils, cut-to-length sheets and narrow strips.The following products are excluded:—of stainless steel, of silicon-electrical steel, and of high-speed steel,—not further worked than hot-rolled or cold-rolled (cold-reduced). — of stainless steel, of silicon-electrical steel, and of high-speed steel, — not further worked than hot-rolled or cold-rolled (cold-reduced).
— of stainless steel, of silicon-electrical steel, and of high-speed steel,
— not further worked than hot-rolled or cold-rolled (cold-reduced).
— of stainless steel, of silicon-electrical steel, and of high-speed steel,
— not further worked than hot-rolled or cold-rolled (cold-reduced).
(9) The product concerned is currently falling under CN codes ex 7210 41 00, ex 7210 49 00, ex 7210 61 00, ex 7210 69 00, ex 7212 30 00, ex 7212 50 61, ex 7212 50 69, ex 7225 92 00, ex 7225 99 00, ex 7226 99 30 and ex 7226 99 70 (TARIC codes: 7210410020, 7210490020, 7210610020, 7210690020, 7212300020, 7212506120, 7212506920, 7225920020, 7225990022, 7225990092, 7226993010, 7226997094) and originating in the People’s Republic of China. This is the product to which the original measures apply.
(10) The product under investigation for possible circumvention is flat-rolled products of iron or alloy steel or non-alloy steel; plated or coated by hot dip galvanisation with zinc and/or aluminium and/or magnesium, whether or not alloyed with silicon; chemically passivated; with or without any additional surface treatment such as oiling or sealing; containing by weight: not more than 0,5 % of carbon, not more than 1,1 % of aluminium, not more than 0,12 % of niobium, not more than 0,17 % of titanium and not more than 0,15 % of vanadium; presented in coils, cut-to-length sheets and narrow strips.The following products are excluded:—of stainless steel, of silicon-electrical steel, and of high-speed steel,—not further worked than hot-rolled or cold-rolled (cold-reduced),—the product concerned as defined in recital 8 above. — of stainless steel, of silicon-electrical steel, and of high-speed steel, — not further worked than hot-rolled or cold-rolled (cold-reduced), — the product concerned as defined in recital 8 above.
— of stainless steel, of silicon-electrical steel, and of high-speed steel,
— not further worked than hot-rolled or cold-rolled (cold-reduced),
— the product concerned as defined in recital 8 above.
— of stainless steel, of silicon-electrical steel, and of high-speed steel,
— not further worked than hot-rolled or cold-rolled (cold-reduced),
— the product concerned as defined in recital 8 above.
(11) The product under investigation is currently falling under CN codes ex 7210 41 00, ex 7210 49 00, ex 7210 61 00, ex 7210 69 00, ex 7210 90 80, ex 7212 30 00, ex 7212 50 61, ex 7212 50 69, ex 7212 50 90, ex 7225 92 00, ex 7225 99 00, ex 7226 99 30, ex 7226 99 70 (TARIC codes: 7210410030, 7210490030, 7210610030, 7210690030, 7210908092, 7212300030, 7212506130, 7212506930, 7212509014, 7212509092, 7225920030, 7225990023, 7225990041, 7225990093, 7226993030, 7226997013, 7226997093), originating in the People’s Republic of China.
(12) The Commission duly informed the authorities of the PRC, the exporting producers in the PRC known to be concerned and an association of the Union industry of the initiation of the investigation.
(13) Pursuant to Article 3(1) of the initiating Regulation, questionnaires for the exporting producers in the PRC were made available on the website of DG TRADE(4).
(14) Interested parties were given the opportunity to make their views known in writing and to request a hearing within the time limit set in the initiating Regulation. All parties were informed that non-cooperation might lead to the application of Article 18 of the basic Regulation and to findings being based on facts available.
(15) Six groups of companies from the PRC and an association of the Union industry, representing the Union industry as defined in the original investigation, made themselves known.
(16) Of the above six groups, only two submitted complete replies to the questionnaires and requested an exemption from the possible extended measures in accordance with Article 13(4) of the basic Regulation:—Beijing Shougang Cold Rolling Co., Ltd., Shougang Jingtang United Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. and their related traders China Shougang International Trade & Engineering Corp., Shougang Holding Trade (Hong Kong) Limited, and Shougang International (Austria) GmbH (‘the Shougang group’);—Bengang Steel Plates Co., Ltd., BX Steel POSCO Cold Rolled Sheet Co. Ltd and their related traders Benxi Iron & Steel Hong Kong Limited, Benxi Iron and Steel Group Europe GmbH, Benxi Iron & Steel (Group) International Economic and Trading Co., Ltd., and Benxi Iron Steel America Limited (‘the BSP group’). — Beijing Shougang Cold Rolling Co., Ltd., Shougang Jingtang United Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. and their related traders China Shougang International Trade & Engineering Corp., Shougang Holding Trade (Hong Kong) Limited, and Shougang International (Austria) GmbH (‘the Shougang group’); — Bengang Steel Plates Co., Ltd., BX Steel POSCO Cold Rolled Sheet Co. Ltd and their related traders Benxi Iron & Steel Hong Kong Limited, Benxi Iron and Steel Group Europe GmbH, Benxi Iron & Steel (Group) International Economic and Trading Co., Ltd., and Benxi Iron Steel America Limited (‘the BSP group’).
— Beijing Shougang Cold Rolling Co., Ltd., Shougang Jingtang United Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. and their related traders China Shougang International Trade & Engineering Corp., Shougang Holding Trade (Hong Kong) Limited, and Shougang International (Austria) GmbH (‘the Shougang group’);
— Bengang Steel Plates Co., Ltd., BX Steel POSCO Cold Rolled Sheet Co. Ltd and their related traders Benxi Iron & Steel Hong Kong Limited, Benxi Iron and Steel Group Europe GmbH, Benxi Iron & Steel (Group) International Economic and Trading Co., Ltd., and Benxi Iron Steel America Limited (‘the BSP group’).
— Beijing Shougang Cold Rolling Co., Ltd., Shougang Jingtang United Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. and their related traders China Shougang International Trade & Engineering Corp., Shougang Holding Trade (Hong Kong) Limited, and Shougang International (Austria) GmbH (‘the Shougang group’);
— Bengang Steel Plates Co., Ltd., BX Steel POSCO Cold Rolled Sheet Co. Ltd and their related traders Benxi Iron & Steel Hong Kong Limited, Benxi Iron and Steel Group Europe GmbH, Benxi Iron & Steel (Group) International Economic and Trading Co., Ltd., and Benxi Iron Steel America Limited (‘the BSP group’).
(17) In line with the Notice on the consequences of the COVID-19 outbreak on anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations(5), the Commission decided not to carry out verification visits at the premises of the companies that requested an exemption due to the COVID-19 outbreak. Instead, the Commission organised a videoconference with the Shougang group to crosscheck the questionnaire replies submitted by the group.
(18) For the same reasons, another exporter made a written submission instead of attending the requested hearing.
(19) The investigation period covered the period from 1 January 2013 to 30 September 2019 (the ‘IP’). For the IP, data were collected to investigate, inter alia, the alleged change in the pattern of trade. For the period from 1 October 2018 to 30 September 2019 (the reporting period or ‘the RP’), more detailed data were collected in order to examine the possible undermining of the remedial effects of the measures in force and the existence of dumping.
(20) Pursuant to Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation, the Commission analysed whether there was a change in the pattern of trade between the product concerned and the slightly modified product originating in the PRC, whether this change stemmed from a practice, process or work for which there was insufficient due cause or economic justification other than avoiding the imposition of the duty, whether there was evidence of injury or that the remedial effects of the duty were being undermined in terms of prices and/or quantities of the product under investigation, and whether there was evidence of dumping, in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of the basic Regulation.
(21) In the notice of initiation, Chinese exporting producers were invited to cooperate and to reply to a questionnaire in order to demonstrate that their exports did not constitute circumvention.
(22) While 19 groups or companies were involved in the original anti-dumping investigation, only two groups of companies requested an exemption and provided the information requested in the current proceeding. These two groups accounted for 14 % of total imports from China declared by the exporting producers during the original anti-dumping investigation but less than 1 % of the total imports of the product under investigation during the RP. The level of cooperation was therefore low.
(23) Based on the questionnaire replies, the information provided by the BSP group was deemed incomplete and unreliable. Therefore, the Commission informed BSP of its intention to disregard the information provided and make its findings with regard to the group on the basis of facts available, pursuant to Article 18 of the basic Regulation.
(24) The BSP group submitted comments on the Commission’s intention to use facts available with regard to the group. It did not agree with the Commission conclusion that the group did not provide the necessary information and claimed that it had fully cooperated with the Commission by sending all questionnaire responses and answers to deficiency letters in time.
(25) The BSP group claimed that the application of fact available was not valid because, firstly, the Commission should have requested clarification beforehand on the discrepancy concerning the quantities exported during the original investigation. Secondly, the group claimed that the Product Control Number (‘PCN’) table would be impossible to establish and the product codes used by the companies could not correspond exactly with the PCN designated by the Commission. Finally, the BSP group claimed that it could not provide the exact chemical composition requested by the Commission, as this was not required by the industry standards and therefore only measured and booked upon specific customer request.
(26) As the BSP group did not bring any evidence altering the conclusions of the Commission, the Commission confirmed its intention to disregard the questionnaire reply of the BSP group and make its findings with regard to the group on the basis of facts available following Article 18 of the basic Regulation.
(27) The exports of the non-cooperating exporters were thus estimated at more than 99 % of the total Chinese exports of the product under investigation to the Union for the reporting period. Hence, for those exports the Commission used facts available in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation.
(28) The Shougang group cooperated and, as set out in section 4 below, was exempted from the extended anti-dumping duties.
(29) In order to establish whether there was a change in the pattern of trade, the Commission analysed the volume of imports of the product concerned and the volume of imports of the product under investigation during the investigation period.
(30) The product concerned and the product under investigation fall within the same CN codes, which also include other products (i.e. automotive grades). Specific TARIC codes allowing to determine the actual level of imports were attributed to both products only upon initiation of the respective investigations, i.e. in December 2016 for the product concerned (subject to anti-dumping measures) and in November 2019 for the product under investigation. The Commission had therefore to make estimations of the relevant imports.
(31) For the period from 2013 to 2016, the Commission established the import volume of products excluded from the scope of the anti-dumping measures (mostly automotive grades) falling within the same CN codes as the product concerned based on the evidence provided in the original anti-dumping investigation, i.e. that around 15 % of the imports under the CN codes consisted of products other than the product concerned(6).
(32) For the subsequent period, total imports were established on the basis of the full CN codes, imports of the product concerned were based on the specific TARIC codes, imports of the automotive grades were based on estimations submitted by the Union industry, and imports of the product under investigation were established by the difference.
(33) The table below compiles the information collected.Table 1 – Imports volume (tonnes) product concerned and product under investigation from the PRC into the EU201320142015201620172018RPProduct concerned755 238(7)907 319(7)1 176 071(7)1 981 490(7)820 017(8)754(8)204(8)Product under investigation30 000 – 35 000(9)40 000 – 45 000(9)5 000 – 10 000(9)15 000 – 20 000(9)977 932(11)913 226(11)988 937(11)Other products (automotive grades)100 000 – 105 000(9)115 000 – 120 000(9)200 000 – 205 000(9)330 000 – 335 000(9)350 000(12)450 000(12)550 000(12)Total(10)888 5151 067 4341 383 6132 331 1652 147 9491 363 9801 539 142Sources: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/186, Eurostat, and Industry estimations 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 RP Product concerned 755 238(7) 907 319(7) 1 176 071(7) 1 981 490(7) 820 017(8) 754(8) 204(8) Product under investigation 30 000 – 35 000(9) 40 000 – 45 000(9) 5 000 – 10 000(9) 15 000 – 20 000(9) 977 932(11) 913 226(11) 988 937(11) Other products (automotive grades) 100 000 – 105 000(9) 115 000 – 120 000(9) 200 000 – 205 000(9) 330 000 – 335 000(9) 350 000(12) 450 000(12) 550 000(12) Total(10) 888 515 1 067 434 1 383 613 2 331 165 2 147 949 1 363 980 1 539 142 Sources: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/186, Eurostat, and Industry estimations
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 RP
Product concerned 755 238(7) 907 319(7) 1 176 071(7) 1 981 490(7) 820 017(8) 754(8) 204(8)
Product under investigation 30 000 – 35 000(9) 40 000 – 45 000(9) 5 000 – 10 000(9) 15 000 – 20 000(9) 977 932(11) 913 226(11) 988 937(11)
Other products (automotive grades) 100 000 – 105 000(9) 115 000 – 120 000(9) 200 000 – 205 000(9) 330 000 – 335 000(9) 350 000(12) 450 000(12) 550 000(12)
Total(10) 888 515 1 067 434 1 383 613 2 331 165 2 147 949 1 363 980 1 539 142
Sources: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/186, Eurostat, and Industry estimations
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 RP
Product concerned 755 238(7) 907 319(7) 1 176 071(7) 1 981 490(7) 820 017(8) 754(8) 204(8)
Product under investigation 30 000 – 35 000(9) 40 000 – 45 000(9) 5 000 – 10 000(9) 15 000 – 20 000(9) 977 932(11) 913 226(11) 988 937(11)
Other products (automotive grades) 100 000 – 105 000(9) 115 000 – 120 000(9) 200 000 – 205 000(9) 330 000 – 335 000(9) 350 000(12) 450 000(12) 550 000(12)
Total(10) 888 515 1 067 434 1 383 613 2 331 165 2 147 949 1 363 980 1 539 142
Sources: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/186, Eurostat, and Industry estimations
(34) The total volume of imports of the product concerned from the PRC fell from 1 857 490 tonnes during the investigation period of the original anti-dumping investigation (October 2015 to September 2016) to 204 tonnes during the reporting period. The decrease was especially marked as from June 2017, when the Commission made imports of the product concerned subject to registration(13).
(35) In parallel, imports of the product under investigation started to grow only as from 2017. They fluctuated between 978 000 and 988 937 tonnes between 2017 and the RP, while they had been insignificant before the start of the original investigation.
(36) The quasi disappearance of imports of the product concerned since imposition of anti-dumping measures combined with a parallel increase of imports of the product under investigation constitutes a significant change in the pattern of trade, as required by Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation.
(37) Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation requires that the change in the pattern of trade stems from a practice, process or work for which there is insufficient due cause or economic justification other than the imposition of the duty. The practice, process or work includes, inter alia, the slight modification of the product concerned to make it fall under customs codes which are normally not subject to the measures, provided that the modification does not alter its essential characteristics.
(38) The product concerned and the product under investigation share the same essential characteristics. The product under investigation is obtained by making small modifications to the product concerned by, for example, slightly changing the chemical composition of the product or its coating. The producers of the product concerned can easily make these modifications and produce the product concerned and the product under investigation on the same production lines. The resulting products can be used for the same applications, i.e. in the construction industry or to produce home appliances. From the point of view of the producers and the users, the product concerned and the product under investigation should be considered the same product.
(39) Only two groups of Chinese exporting producers sent a request for exemption in order to demonstrate that they are genuine producers of the product under investigation and did not increase their Union sales of this product following the imposition of the original measures. These two producers only represented a fraction (less than 1 %) of the imports of the product under investigation in the RP. By contrast, 19 groups of Chinese exporters had cooperated to the original anti-dumping investigation. This low level of cooperation suggested that many of the Chinese exporters of the product under investigation were unwilling to provide evidence that they did not engage in slight modifications of the product concerned following the imposition of anti-dumping measures. The Commission therefore had to resort to other sources of information, to be used as facts available, in order to obtain positive evidence on the existence of circumvention.
(40) The Union industry provided examples of practices used by Chinese exporters to slightly modify the product concerned to make it fall under specific custom codes, which were not subject to the measures. This information confirmed the existence of different circumvention practices.
(41) The Union industry association provided a test certificate of an imported sample, indicating the addition of magnesium to the coating. By this slight modification, the product fell under a different TARIC code than the product concerned and was therefore not covered by the original measures.
(42) Furthermore, the Union industry association provided promotion material of a Chinese exporter promoting the sales of corrosion resistant steels with a coating to which magnesium was added, specifically indicating that no anti-dumping measures would be applicable on this product.
(43) The Union industry association also submitted information indicating that some importers tried to make their imports fall outside the scope of the measures in force, for example by importing a product that had a thin oil coating or that was oiled only for some meters at the head and the tail, including the eye of the coil, while the rest of the coil remained passivated and therefore subjected to the original measures.
(44) In light of all evidence above, that constitutes the facts available for the non-cooperating exporting producers, the Commission established the existence of a circumvention practice within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation at a country level for all imports of the product under investigation from the PRC. This circumvention practice takes the form of a slight modification of the product concerned to make it fall under customs codes, which are normally not subject to the measures.
(45) In addition to the above, other jurisdictions have also established Chinese practices of circumvention resulting from the imposition of anti-dumping measures on the product concerned.
(46) Australia concluded in 2016 an anti-circumvention investigation in which it found that the exported non-alloyed galvanized steel had been slightly modified through a minor change to the manufacturing process with the addition of alloying elements(14).
(47) In February 2020, The United States of America also concluded that circumvention of certain corrosion-resistant steel took place, where the product was shipped from China to a number of third countries (Costa Rica, Malaysia, and the United Arab Emirates) where it underwent minor processing.(15)
(48) The above practices indicate that Chinese exporters have put in place circumvention practices with regard to not only exports to the Union, but also to other export markets.
(49) As shown in Table 1 above, the imports of the product under investigation to Union by the Chinese exporters have increased significantly between 2016 and the RP. In the RP, the product under investigation accounted for 53 % of the injurious imports in the original anti-dumping investigation period.
(50) In terms of volume, during the RP, the Union industry reported their Union sales between 4 000 000 and 5 000 000 tonnes, while the total imports of the product concerned and the product under investigation accounted for 2 441 000 tonnes, resulting in a total Union consumption between 6 441 000 and 7 441 000 tonnes. Therefore, the market share of Chinese imports was estimated at a level of more than 13 %.
(51) In terms of prices, the Commission compared the export price of the slightly modified product with the sales price of the Union industry during the RP.
(52) As prices and costs have evolved since the original investigation, the target price of the product concerned in the original investigation did not reflect any more the price during the RP. Therefore, the Commission compared the export price of the slightly modified product with the price of the Union industry during the RP, as provided by the Union industry.
(53) The Chinese import price reported in Eurostat is a mix of the slightly modified product concerned and the more expensive automotive steel grades. Given the low level of cooperation of Chinese exporters, and in absence of any other reliable information, the Commission relied on an estimation submitted by the Union industry that the price of automotive steel grades is 20 % higher than the product concerned, which is also applicable for the Chinese imports of similar products.
(54) Applying the difference of price between the product concerned and the product under investigation to the import value of the product under investigation, provided in Eurostat, the Chinese import prices of the product under investigation did undercut the Union price during the RP by around 4 %. The Union industry also submitted data showing that it is still in a loss-making situation.
(55) Given the significant volume of imports of the product under investigation, which had substituted to a large extent the imports of the product concerned after the imposition of the original measures, and their low prices, it was concluded that the remedial effects of the duty were undermined both in terms of quantities and prices.
(56) In accordance with Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether export prices of the product under investigation were dumped.
(57) Given the negligible level of cooperation of exporting producers, the Commission based the export price on Eurostat data, adjusted following the estimation by the Union industry, as explained in recital 53.
(58) The Chinese average import price from Eurostat, adjusted to ex-works value using the sole cooperating exporter’s data on allowances, was compared to the weighted average normal value established in the original investigation.
(59) The comparison of normal value and export price showed a level of dumping of around 14 % during the reporting period by the non-cooperating exporting producers.
(60) Based on the findings above, the Commission concluded that the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed on the product concerned as defined in the original investigation were circumvented by imports of the slightly modified product originating in the PRC.
(61) The investigation showed that there was a change in the pattern of trade between the PRC and the Union which stemmed from a practice, process or work for which there was insufficient due cause or economic justification other than the imposition of the duty.
(62) The Commission found that the remedial effects of the duty are being undermined in terms of the prices and/or quantities of the like product. Evidence of dumping in relation to the normal values previously established for the like product was also found.
(63) In view of the findings above, it was concluded that the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed on certain corrosion resistant steels originating in the PRC are circumvented by imports of the product under investigation originating in the PRC.
(64) In accordance with Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation, the anti-dumping measures in force on imports of certain corrosion resistant steels originating in the PRC should therefore be extended to imports of the product under investigation originating in the PRC.
(65) Under Articles 13(3) and 14(5) of the basic Regulation, which provide that any extended measures should apply to imports which entered the Union under registration imposed by the initiating Regulation, the anti-dumping duty should be collected on those imports into the Union of the product under investigation originating in the PRC.
(66) Two groups of exporting producers from the PRC requested to be exempted from the possible extended measures and submitted an exemption request in accordance with Article 13(4) of the basic Regulation.
(67) As set out in recital 26, one group of Chinese exporting producers did not provide the necessary information in its exemption request and the Commission therefore disregarded the information submitted by this company group.
(68) The sole cooperating group of exporting producers and their related traders provided information that it already sold a small volume of the product under investigation before the imposition of the original measures and no change in the pattern of trade took place since then. Therefore, the group was not found to be involved in circumvention practices and the Commission concluded that an exemption to this group is warranted.
(69) As set out in recital 17, the Commission decided not to carry out any verification visits at the premises of the company groups that requested an exemption.
(70) The Commission may, pursuant to the Notice on the consequences of the COVID-19 outbreak on anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations, as soon as the areas where the exempted exporting producers are located are no longer considered unsafe for travelling, initiateex officioa review pursuant to Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation.
(71) All interested parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations leading to the above conclusions and were invited to comment. Only Eurofer, the complainant in the original investigation, commented on the final disclosure, supporting the conclusions reached by the Commission and calling on the Commission to follow the evolution of exports by the only exporting producer that received an exemption.
(72) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of the basic Regulation,
— of stainless steel, of silicon-electrical steel, and of high-speed steel,
— not further worked than hot-rolled or cold-rolled (cold-reduced).
— of stainless steel, of silicon-electrical steel, and of high-speed steel,
— not further worked than hot-rolled or cold-rolled (cold-reduced),
— the product concerned as defined in the beginning of this article,
Company name TARIC additional code
Beijing Shougang Cold Rolling Co., Ltd C229
Shougang Jingtang United Iron and Steel Co., Ltd C164
European Commission
Directorate-General for Trade
Office: CHAR 04/039
1049 Bruxelles/Brussel
BELGIQUE/BELGIË
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union(1), (‘the basic Regulation’) and in particular Articles 13(3) and 14(5) thereof,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1
1. The definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/186 on imports of flat-rolled products of iron or alloy steel or non-alloy steel; aluminium killed; plated or coated by hot dip galvanisation with zinc and/or with aluminium, and no other metal; chemically passivated; containing by weight: 0,015 % or more but not more than 0,170 % of carbon, 0,015 % or more but not more than 0,100 % of aluminium, not more than 0,045 % of niobium, not more than 0,010 % of titanium and not more than 0,010 % of vanadium; presented in coils, cut-to-length sheets and narrow strips originating in the People’s Republic of China
The following products are excluded:
—
of stainless steel, of silicon-electrical steel, and of high-speed steel,
—
not further worked than hot-rolled or cold-rolled (cold-reduced).
The product concerned is currently falling under CN codes ex 7210 41 00, ex 7210 49 00, ex 7210 61 00, ex 7210 69 00, ex 7212 30 00, ex 7212 50 61, ex 7212 50 69, ex 7225 92 00, ex 7225 99 00, ex 7226 99 30 and ex 7226 99 70 (TARIC codes: 7210410020, 7210490020, 7210610020, 7210690020, 7212300020, 7212506120, 7212506920, 7225920020, 7225990022, 7225990092, 7226993010, 7226997094) and originating in the People’s Republic of China. This is the product to which the original measures apply.
is hereby extended to imports of
flat-rolled products of iron or alloy steel or non-alloy steel; plated or coated by hot dip galvanisation with zinc and/or aluminium and/or magnesium, whether or not alloyed with silicon; chemically passivated; with or without any additional surface treatment such as oiling or sealing; containing by weight: not more than 0,5 % of carbon, not more than 1,1 % of aluminium, not more than 0,12 % of niobium, not more than 0,17 % of titanium and not more than 0,15 % of vanadium; presented in coils, cut-to-length sheets and narrow strips.
The following products are excluded:
—
of stainless steel, of silicon-electrical steel, and of high-speed steel,
—
not further worked than hot-rolled or cold-rolled (cold-reduced),
—
the product concerned as defined in the beginning of this article,
currently falling under CN codes ex 7210 41 00, ex 7210 49 00, ex 7210 61 00, ex 7210 69 00, ex 7210 90 80, ex 7212 30 00, ex 7212 50 61, ex 7212 50 69, ex 7212 50 90, ex 7225 92 00, ex 7225 99 00, ex 7226 99 30, ex 7226 99 70 (TARIC codes: 7210410030, 7210490030, 7210610030, 7210690030, 7210908092, 7212300030, 7212506130, 7212506930, 7212509014, 7212509092, 7225920030, 7225990023, 7225990041, 7225990093, 7226993030, 7226997013, 7226997093), originating in the People’s Republic of China.
2. This extension does not apply to imports referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article produced by the companies listed below:
3. The application of exemptions granted to the companies specifically mentioned in paragraph 2 of this Article shall be conditional upon presentation to the customs authorities of the Member States of a valid commercial invoice issued by the producer on which shall appear a declaration dated and signed by an official of the entity issuing such invoice, identified by his/her name and function. This declaration shall be drafted as follows: ‘I, the undersigned, certify that the (volume) of certain corrosion resistant steels sold for export to the European Union covered by this invoice was manufactured by (company name and address) (TARIC additional code) in (country concerned). I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct.’ If no such invoice is presented, the anti-dumping duty as imposed by paragraph 1 of this Article shall apply.
4. The duty extended by paragraph 1 of this Article shall be collected on imports into the Union of certain corrosion resistant steels, registered in accordance with Article 2 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1948 and Articles 13(3) and 14(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036.
5. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

Article 2
1. Requests for exemption from the duty extended by Article 1 shall be made in writing in one of the official languages of the European Union and must be signed by a person authorised to represent the entity requesting the exemption. The request must be sent to the following address:
2. In accordance with Article 13(4) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036, the Commission may authorise, by decision, the exemption of imports from companies which do not circumvent the anti-dumping measures imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/186, from the duty extended by Article 1 of this Regulation.

Article 3
Custom authorities are hereby directed to discontinue the registration of imports established in accordance with Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1948.

Article 4
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union(1), (‘the basic Regulation’) and in particular Articles 13(3) and 14(5) thereof,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
1. The definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/186 on imports of flat-rolled products of iron or alloy steel or non-alloy steel; aluminium killed; plated or coated by hot dip galvanisation with zinc and/or with aluminium, and no other metal; chemically passivated; containing by weight: 0,015 % or more but not more than 0,170 % of carbon, 0,015 % or more but not more than 0,100 % of aluminium, not more than 0,045 % of niobium, not more than 0,010 % of titanium and not more than 0,010 % of vanadium; presented in coils, cut-to-length sheets and narrow strips originating in the People’s Republic of China
The following products are excluded:
—
of stainless steel, of silicon-electrical steel, and of high-speed steel,
—
not further worked than hot-rolled or cold-rolled (cold-reduced).
The product concerned is currently falling under CN codes ex 7210 41 00, ex 7210 49 00, ex 7210 61 00, ex 7210 69 00, ex 7212 30 00, ex 7212 50 61, ex 7212 50 69, ex 7225 92 00, ex 7225 99 00, ex 7226 99 30 and ex 7226 99 70 (TARIC codes: 7210410020, 7210490020, 7210610020, 7210690020, 7212300020, 7212506120, 7212506920, 7225920020, 7225990022, 7225990092, 7226993010, 7226997094) and originating in the People’s Republic of China. This is the product to which the original measures apply.
is hereby extended to imports of
flat-rolled products of iron or alloy steel or non-alloy steel; plated or coated by hot dip galvanisation with zinc and/or aluminium and/or magnesium, whether or not alloyed with silicon; chemically passivated; with or without any additional surface treatment such as oiling or sealing; containing by weight: not more than 0,5 % of carbon, not more than 1,1 % of aluminium, not more than 0,12 % of niobium, not more than 0,17 % of titanium and not more than 0,15 % of vanadium; presented in coils, cut-to-length sheets and narrow strips.
The following products are excluded:
—
of stainless steel, of silicon-electrical steel, and of high-speed steel,
—
not further worked than hot-rolled or cold-rolled (cold-reduced),
—
the product concerned as defined in the beginning of this article,
currently falling under CN codes ex 7210 41 00, ex 7210 49 00, ex 7210 61 00, ex 7210 69 00, ex 7210 90 80, ex 7212 30 00, ex 7212 50 61, ex 7212 50 69, ex 7212 50 90, ex 7225 92 00, ex 7225 99 00, ex 7226 99 30, ex 7226 99 70 (TARIC codes: 7210410030, 7210490030, 7210610030, 7210690030, 7210908092, 7212300030, 7212506130, 7212506930, 7212509014, 7212509092, 7225920030, 7225990023, 7225990041, 7225990093, 7226993030, 7226997013, 7226997093), originating in the People’s Republic of China.
2. This extension does not apply to imports referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article produced by the companies listed below:
3. The application of exemptions granted to the companies specifically mentioned in paragraph 2 of this Article shall be conditional upon presentation to the customs authorities of the Member States of a valid commercial invoice issued by the producer on which shall appear a declaration dated and signed by an official of the entity issuing such invoice, identified by his/her name and function. This declaration shall be drafted as follows: ‘I, the undersigned, certify that the (volume) of certain corrosion resistant steels sold for export to the European Union covered by this invoice was manufactured by (company name and address) (TARIC additional code) in (country concerned). I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct.’ If no such invoice is presented, the anti-dumping duty as imposed by paragraph 1 of this Article shall apply.
4. The duty extended by paragraph 1 of this Article shall be collected on imports into the Union of certain corrosion resistant steels, registered in accordance with Article 2 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1948 and Articles 13(3) and 14(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036.
5. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.
1. Requests for exemption from the duty extended by Article 1 shall be made in writing in one of the official languages of the European Union and must be signed by a person authorised to represent the entity requesting the exemption. The request must be sent to the following address:
2. In accordance with Article 13(4) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036, the Commission may authorise, by decision, the exemption of imports from companies which do not circumvent the anti-dumping measures imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/186, from the duty extended by Article 1 of this Regulation.
Custom authorities are hereby directed to discontinue the registration of imports established in accordance with Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1948.
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.

Pending: 32020R0995

January 16, 2026
10.7.2020 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 221/84
(1) Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003 provides for the authorisation of additives for use in animal nutrition and for the grounds and procedures for granting such authorisation.
(2) In accordance with Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003, an application was submitted for the authorisation of a preparation of endo-1,4-beta-xylanase produced byAspergillus oryzae(DSM 26372). That application was accompanied by the particulars and documents required under Article 7(3) of that Regulation.
(3) That application concerns the authorisation of a preparation of endo-1,4-beta-xylanase produced byAspergillus oryzae(DSM 26372) as a feed additive for lactating sows, to be classified in the additive category ‘zootechnical additives’.
(4) The European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) concluded in its opinion of 3 July 2019(2)that, under the proposed conditions of use, the preparation of endo-1,4-beta-xylanase produced byAspergillus oryzae(DSM 26372) does not have an adverse effect on animal health, consumer safety or the environment. It was also concluded that the additive is considered as a potential respiratory sensitiser and that no conclusion could be drawn on dermal sensitisation potential of the additive. Therefore, appropriate protective measures should be taken to prevent adverse effects on human health, in particular as regards the users of the additive. The Authority also concluded that the preparation of endo-1,4-beta-xylanase produced byAspergillus oryzae(DSM 26372) showed an effect in improving the apparent faecal digestibility of the energy in lactating sows. The Authority does not consider that there is a need for specific requirements of post-market monitoring. It also verified the report on the method of analysis of the feed additive in feed submitted by the Reference Laboratory set up by Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003.
(5) The assessment of the preparation of endo-1,4-beta-xylanase produced byAspergillus oryzae(DSM 26372) shows that the conditions for authorisation, as provided for in Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003, are satisfied. Accordingly, the use of that preparation should be authorised as specified in the Annex to this Regulation.
(6) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
Identification number of the additive Name of the holder of authorisation Additive Composition, chemical formula, description, analytical method Species or category of animal Maximum age Minimum content Maximum content Other provisions End of period of authorisation
Units of activity/kg of complete feedingstuff with a moisture content of 12 %
Category of zootechnical additives. Functional group: digestibility enhancers.
4a1607i DSM Nutritional Products Ltd represented by DSM Nutritional Products Sp. Z o.o Endo-1,4-beta-xylanase(EC 3.2.1.8) Additive composition:Preparation of endo-1,4-beta-xylanase (EC 3.2.1.8) produced byAspergillus oryzae(DSM 26372) having a minimum activity of:Solid form: 1 000 FXU(1)/gLiquid form: 650 FXU/mlCharacterisation of active substance:Endo-1,4-beta-xylanase (EC 3.2.1.8) produced byAspergillus oryzae(DSM 26372)Analytical method(2):For quantification of endo-1,4-beta-xylanase produced byAspergillus oryzae(DSM 26372) in a feed additive:—colorimetric method measuring coloured compound produced by the dinitro salicylic acid (DNSA) and the xylosylic moieties released by the action of xylanase on arabinoxylan.For quantification of endo-1,4-beta-xylanase produced byAspergillus oryzae(DSM 26372) in premixtures and feedingstuffs:—colorimetric method measuring water soluble dye released by action of xylanase from dye-labelled oat spelt azo-xylan. — colorimetric method measuring coloured compound produced by the dinitro salicylic acid (DNSA) and the xylosylic moieties released by the action of xylanase on arabinoxylan. — colorimetric method measuring water soluble dye released by action of xylanase from dye-labelled oat spelt azo-xylan. Lactating sows – 200 FXU – 1.In the directions for use of the additive and premixture, the storage conditions and stability to heat treatment shall be indicated.2.For users of the additive and premixtures, feed business operators shall establish operational procedures and organisational measures to address potential risks resulting from their use. Where those risks cannot be eliminated or reduced to a minimum by such procedures and measures, the additive and premixtures shall be used with personal protective equipment, including skin, eyes and breathing protection. 1. In the directions for use of the additive and premixture, the storage conditions and stability to heat treatment shall be indicated. 2. For users of the additive and premixtures, feed business operators shall establish operational procedures and organisational measures to address potential risks resulting from their use. Where those risks cannot be eliminated or reduced to a minimum by such procedures and measures, the additive and premixtures shall be used with personal protective equipment, including skin, eyes and breathing protection. 30.7.2020
— colorimetric method measuring coloured compound produced by the dinitro salicylic acid (DNSA) and the xylosylic moieties released by the action of xylanase on arabinoxylan.
— colorimetric method measuring water soluble dye released by action of xylanase from dye-labelled oat spelt azo-xylan.
1. In the directions for use of the additive and premixture, the storage conditions and stability to heat treatment shall be indicated.
2. For users of the additive and premixtures, feed business operators shall establish operational procedures and organisational measures to address potential risks resulting from their use. Where those risks cannot be eliminated or reduced to a minimum by such procedures and measures, the additive and premixtures shall be used with personal protective equipment, including skin, eyes and breathing protection.
— colorimetric method measuring coloured compound produced by the dinitro salicylic acid (DNSA) and the xylosylic moieties released by the action of xylanase on arabinoxylan.
— colorimetric method measuring water soluble dye released by action of xylanase from dye-labelled oat spelt azo-xylan.
1. In the directions for use of the additive and premixture, the storage conditions and stability to heat treatment shall be indicated.
2. For users of the additive and premixtures, feed business operators shall establish operational procedures and organisational measures to address potential risks resulting from their use. Where those risks cannot be eliminated or reduced to a minimum by such procedures and measures, the additive and premixtures shall be used with personal protective equipment, including skin, eyes and breathing protection.
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on additives for use in animal nutrition(1), and in particular Article 9(2) thereof,
(1) Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003 provides for the authorisation of additives for use in animal nutrition and for the grounds and procedures for granting such authorisation.
(2) In accordance with Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003, an application was submitted for the authorisation of a preparation of endo-1,4-beta-xylanase produced byAspergillus oryzae(DSM 26372). That application was accompanied by the particulars and documents required under Article 7(3) of that Regulation.
(3) That application concerns the authorisation of a preparation of endo-1,4-beta-xylanase produced byAspergillus oryzae(DSM 26372) as a feed additive for lactating sows, to be classified in the additive category ‘zootechnical additives’.
(4) The European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) concluded in its opinion of 3 July 2019(2)that, under the proposed conditions of use, the preparation of endo-1,4-beta-xylanase produced byAspergillus oryzae(DSM 26372) does not have an adverse effect on animal health, consumer safety or the environment. It was also concluded that the additive is considered as a potential respiratory sensitiser and that no conclusion could be drawn on dermal sensitisation potential of the additive. Therefore, appropriate protective measures should be taken to prevent adverse effects on human health, in particular as regards the users of the additive. The Authority also concluded that the preparation of endo-1,4-beta-xylanase produced byAspergillus oryzae(DSM 26372) showed an effect in improving the apparent faecal digestibility of the energy in lactating sows. The Authority does not consider that there is a need for specific requirements of post-market monitoring. It also verified the report on the method of analysis of the feed additive in feed submitted by the Reference Laboratory set up by Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003.
(5) The assessment of the preparation of endo-1,4-beta-xylanase produced byAspergillus oryzae(DSM 26372) shows that the conditions for authorisation, as provided for in Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003, are satisfied. Accordingly, the use of that preparation should be authorised as specified in the Annex to this Regulation.
(6) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1
The preparation specified in the Annex, belonging to the additive category ‘zootechnical additives’ and to the functional group ‘digestibility enhancers’, is authorised as an additive in animal nutrition as set out in the Annex.

Article 2
This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on additives for use in animal nutrition(1), and in particular Article 9(2) thereof,
(1) Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003 provides for the authorisation of additives for use in animal nutrition and for the grounds and procedures for granting such authorisation.
(2) In accordance with Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003, an application was submitted for the authorisation of a preparation of endo-1,4-beta-xylanase produced byAspergillus oryzae(DSM 26372). That application was accompanied by the particulars and documents required under Article 7(3) of that Regulation.
(3) That application concerns the authorisation of a preparation of endo-1,4-beta-xylanase produced byAspergillus oryzae(DSM 26372) as a feed additive for lactating sows, to be classified in the additive category ‘zootechnical additives’.
(4) The European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) concluded in its opinion of 3 July 2019(2)that, under the proposed conditions of use, the preparation of endo-1,4-beta-xylanase produced byAspergillus oryzae(DSM 26372) does not have an adverse effect on animal health, consumer safety or the environment. It was also concluded that the additive is considered as a potential respiratory sensitiser and that no conclusion could be drawn on dermal sensitisation potential of the additive. Therefore, appropriate protective measures should be taken to prevent adverse effects on human health, in particular as regards the users of the additive. The Authority also concluded that the preparation of endo-1,4-beta-xylanase produced byAspergillus oryzae(DSM 26372) showed an effect in improving the apparent faecal digestibility of the energy in lactating sows. The Authority does not consider that there is a need for specific requirements of post-market monitoring. It also verified the report on the method of analysis of the feed additive in feed submitted by the Reference Laboratory set up by Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003.
(5) The assessment of the preparation of endo-1,4-beta-xylanase produced byAspergillus oryzae(DSM 26372) shows that the conditions for authorisation, as provided for in Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003, are satisfied. Accordingly, the use of that preparation should be authorised as specified in the Annex to this Regulation.
(6) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
The preparation specified in the Annex, belonging to the additive category ‘zootechnical additives’ and to the functional group ‘digestibility enhancers’, is authorised as an additive in animal nutrition as set out in the Annex.
This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.
ANNEX
Identification number of the additive | Name of the holder of authorisation | Additive | Composition, chemical formula, description, analytical method | Species or category of animal | Maximum age | Minimum content | Maximum content | Other provisions | End of period of authorisation
Units of activity/kg of complete feedingstuff with a moisture content of 12 %
Category of zootechnical additives. Functional group: digestibility enhancers.
4a1607i | DSM Nutritional Products Ltd represented by DSM Nutritional Products Sp. Z o.o | Endo-1,4-beta-xylanase(EC 3.2.1.8) | Additive composition:Preparation of endo-1,4-beta-xylanase (EC 3.2.1.8) produced byAspergillus oryzae(DSM 26372) having a minimum activity of:Solid form: 1 000 FXU(1)/gLiquid form: 650 FXU/mlCharacterisation of active substance:Endo-1,4-beta-xylanase (EC 3.2.1.8) produced byAspergillus oryzae(DSM 26372)Analytical method(2):For quantification of endo-1,4-beta-xylanase produced byAspergillus oryzae(DSM 26372) in a feed additive:—colorimetric method measuring coloured compound produced by the dinitro salicylic acid (DNSA) and the xylosylic moieties released by the action of xylanase on arabinoxylan.For quantification of endo-1,4-beta-xylanase produced byAspergillus oryzae(DSM 26372) in premixtures and feedingstuffs:—colorimetric method measuring water soluble dye released by action of xylanase from dye-labelled oat spelt azo-xylan. | — | colorimetric method measuring coloured compound produced by the dinitro salicylic acid (DNSA) and the xylosylic moieties released by the action of xylanase on arabinoxylan. | — | colorimetric method measuring water soluble dye released by action of xylanase from dye-labelled oat spelt azo-xylan. | Lactating sows | – | 200 FXU | – | 1.In the directions for use of the additive and premixture, the storage conditions and stability to heat treatment shall be indicated.2.For users of the additive and premixtures, feed business operators shall establish operational procedures and organisational measures to address potential risks resulting from their use. Where those risks cannot be eliminated or reduced to a minimum by such procedures and measures, the additive and premixtures shall be used with personal protective equipment, including skin, eyes and breathing protection. | 1. | In the directions for use of the additive and premixture, the storage conditions and stability to heat treatment shall be indicated. | 2. | For users of the additive and premixtures, feed business operators shall establish operational procedures and organisational measures to address potential risks resulting from their use. Where those risks cannot be eliminated or reduced to a minimum by such procedures and measures, the additive and premixtures shall be used with personal protective equipment, including skin, eyes and breathing protection. | 30.7.2020
— | colorimetric method measuring coloured compound produced by the dinitro salicylic acid (DNSA) and the xylosylic moieties released by the action of xylanase on arabinoxylan.
— | colorimetric method measuring water soluble dye released by action of xylanase from dye-labelled oat spelt azo-xylan.
1. | In the directions for use of the additive and premixture, the storage conditions and stability to heat treatment shall be indicated.
2. | For users of the additive and premixtures, feed business operators shall establish operational procedures and organisational measures to address potential risks resulting from their use. Where those risks cannot be eliminated or reduced to a minimum by such procedures and measures, the additive and premixtures shall be used with personal protective equipment, including skin, eyes and breathing protection.
(1) 1 FXU is the amount of enzyme which liberates 7,8 μmol of reducing sugars (xylose equivalents) from azo-wheat arabinoxylan per minute at pH 6,0 and 50 °C.
(2) Details of the analytical methods are available at the following address of the Reference Laboratory: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/eurl/feed-additives/evaluation-reports

Pending: 32020R0402

January 16, 2026
15.3.2020 EN Official Journal of the European Union LI 77/1
(1) Since the outbreak of the epidemiological crisis caused by the coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, the disease associated with it, the COVID-19, has been spreading fast across the world, reaching also the Union’s territory. According to the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, the risk associated with COVID-19 infections for people in the Union is currently considered to be moderate to high, based on the probability of transmission and the impact of the disease. The virus spreads rapidly within the Union, and might have an enormous public health impact with substantial fatal outcomes in high-risk groups and significant economic and societal disruption.
(2) In this context, the need for personal protective equipment, as detailed in Annex 1, has already increased significantly. Given its nature and the prevailing circumstances, such type of equipment is an essential product since it is necessary to prevent the further spreading of the disease, and safeguard the health of medical staff treating infected patients.
(3) In line with Council Conclusions of the Health Ministers Council on 13 February 2020, a procurement procedure for personal protective equipment has been launched under the Joint Procurement Agreement for medical countermeasures. According to an indicative time-line and depending on the market situation, it might be finalized as of beginning of April.
(4) The demand for medical protective equipment has been exacerbated in the last days and is expected to continue increasing significantly in the imminent future with accompanying shortages developing in several Member States. Constraints exist throughout the EU single market to meet customers demand for the relevant Personal Protective Equipment, in particular mouth protection masks. At this moment in time, there are on-going efforts to increase manufacturing capabilities. This may feed into review of the measure as necessary and as situation evolves.
(5) Production of personal protective equipment such as mouth protection masks in the Union is currently concentrated in a limited number of Member States, namely the Czech Republic, France, Germany, and Poland. Despite the fact that increased production has been encouraged, the current level of Union production and existing stocks will not be sufficient to meet the demand within the Union. This is particularly the case as this demand rises as a result of the epidemic situation and the personal protective equipment can be exported without restriction to other parts of the world.
(6) Some third countries have already officially decided to restrict exports of protective equipment. Others seems to have taken similar actions on a more informal basis. Some of these countries are also traditional suppliers to the Union market and this is further exerting pressure on the Union market.
(7) In order to remedy and prevent a critical situation, it is in the Union interest that the Commission takes an immediate action of a limited duration in order to ensure that exports of personal protective equipment are subject to an authorisation in order to ensure adequacy of supply in the Union in order to meet the vital demand.
(8) Exports of certain quantities of specific products may be authorised under specific circumstances such as to ensure assistance provided to third countries, and depending on the needs of the Member States. The administrative modalities for these authorisations should be left to the discretion of the Member States during the time of these temporary measures.
(9) There are vital needs of protective equipment within the Union with regard to hospitals, patients, field workers, civil protection authorities. Such vital needs are constantly monitored through the Union civil protection mechanism.
(10) Whereas this measure at present applies to personal protective equipment, as detailed in Annex 1, a need may arise to review the scope of the Annex and products covered by this Regulation.
(11) Due to the urgency of the situation, justified by the fast spreading of the COVID-19 infection, the measures provided for in this Regulation should be taken in accordance with Article 3(3) of Regulation (EU) 2015/479.
(12) In order to prevent speculative depletion of stocks, this implementing Regulation should enter into force on the day of its publication. In accordance with Article 5(5) of Regulation (EU) 2015/479, these measures should have a duration of six weeks,
— to fulfil supply obligations under a joint procurement procedure in accordance with Article 5 of Decision No 1082/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on serious cross-border threats to health(2);
— to support concerted support actions coordinated by the Integrated Political Crisis Response Mechanism (IPCR), the European Commission or other Union institutions;
— to respond to the requests of assistance addressed to and handled by the UPCM (Union Civil Protection Mechanism), by third countries or international organisations;
— to support the statutory activities of support companies abroad that enjoy protection under the Geneva Convention, and in so far as they do not impair the ability to work as a national support company;
— to support the activities of the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) Global Outbreak Alert & Response Network (GOARN);
— to supply foreign operations of EU Member States including, military operations, international police missions and/or civilian international peacekeeping missions;
— for the supply of EU and Member State delegations abroad.
Category Description CN Codes
Protective spectacles and visors —Protection against potentially infectious material,—Encircling the eyes and surroundings,—Compatible with different models of filtering facepiece (FFP) masks and facial masks,—Transparent lens,—Reusable (can be cleaned and disinfected) or single-use items — Protection against potentially infectious material, — Encircling the eyes and surroundings, — Compatible with different models of filtering facepiece (FFP) masks and facial masks, — Transparent lens, — Reusable (can be cleaned and disinfected) or single-use items ex 9004 90 10ex 9004 90 90
— Protection against potentially infectious material,
— Encircling the eyes and surroundings,
— Compatible with different models of filtering facepiece (FFP) masks and facial masks,
— Transparent lens,
— Reusable (can be cleaned and disinfected) or single-use items
Face shields —Equipment for the protection of the facial area and associated mucous membranes (ex: eyes, nose, mouth) against potentially infectious material,—Includes a visor of transparent material,—Usually includes fixations to secure over the face (e.g.: bands, temples)—Can include a mouth-nose protection equipment as described below,—Reusable (can be cleaned and disinfected) or disposable — Equipment for the protection of the facial area and associated mucous membranes (ex: eyes, nose, mouth) against potentially infectious material, — Includes a visor of transparent material, — Usually includes fixations to secure over the face (e.g.: bands, temples) — Can include a mouth-nose protection equipment as described below, — Reusable (can be cleaned and disinfected) or disposable ex 3926 90 97ex 9020 00 00
— Equipment for the protection of the facial area and associated mucous membranes (ex: eyes, nose, mouth) against potentially infectious material,
— Includes a visor of transparent material,
— Usually includes fixations to secure over the face (e.g.: bands, temples)
— Can include a mouth-nose protection equipment as described below,
— Reusable (can be cleaned and disinfected) or disposable
Mouth-nose-protection equipment —Masks for the protection of the wearer against potentially infectious material and for the protection of the environment against potentially infectious material spread by the wearer,—Can include a face shield as described above,—Whether or not equipped with a replaceable filter — Masks for the protection of the wearer against potentially infectious material and for the protection of the environment against potentially infectious material spread by the wearer, — Can include a face shield as described above, — Whether or not equipped with a replaceable filter ex 6307 90 98ex 9020 00 00
— Masks for the protection of the wearer against potentially infectious material and for the protection of the environment against potentially infectious material spread by the wearer,
— Can include a face shield as described above,
— Whether or not equipped with a replaceable filter
Protective garments Garment (e.g. gown, suit) for the protection of the wearer against potentially infectious material and for the protection of the environment against potentially infectious material spread by the wearer ex 3926 20 00ex 4015 90 00ex 6113 00ex 6114ex 6210 10 106210 10 92ex 6210 10 98ex 6210 20 00ex 6210 30 00ex 6210 40 00ex 6210 50 00ex 6211 32 10ex 6211 32 90ex 6211 33 10ex 6211 33 90ex 6211 39 00ex 6211 42 10ex 6211 42 90ex 6211 43 10ex 6211 43 90ex 6211 49 00ex 9020 00 00
Gloves Gloves for the protection of the wearer against potentially infectious material and for the protection of the environment against potentially infectious material spread by the wearer ex 3926 20 004015 11 00ex 4015 19 00ex 6116 10 20ex 6116 10 80ex 6216 00 00
— Protection against potentially infectious material,
— Encircling the eyes and surroundings,
— Compatible with different models of filtering facepiece (FFP) masks and facial masks,
— Transparent lens,
— Reusable (can be cleaned and disinfected) or single-use items
— Equipment for the protection of the facial area and associated mucous membranes (ex: eyes, nose, mouth) against potentially infectious material,
— Includes a visor of transparent material,
— Usually includes fixations to secure over the face (e.g.: bands, temples)
— Can include a mouth-nose protection equipment as described below,
— Reusable (can be cleaned and disinfected) or disposable
— Masks for the protection of the wearer against potentially infectious material and for the protection of the environment against potentially infectious material spread by the wearer,
— Can include a face shield as described above,
— Whether or not equipped with a replaceable filter
EUROPEAN UNION Export of personal protective equipment (Regulation (EU) 2020/402)
1.Exporter(EORI number if applicable) 1. Exporter(EORI number if applicable) 2.Authorisation number 2. Authorisation number 3.Expiry date 3. Expiry date
1. Exporter(EORI number if applicable)
2. Authorisation number
3. Expiry date
4.Issuing authority 4. Issuing authority 5.Destination country 5. Destination country 6.Final recipient 6. Final recipient
4. Issuing authority
5. Destination country
6. Final recipient
7.Commodity code 7. Commodity code 8.Quantity 8. Quantity 9.Unit 9. Unit 10.Description of the goods 10. Description of the goods
7. Commodity code
8. Quantity
9. Unit
10. Description of the goods
11.Location 11. Location
11. Location
7.Commodity code 7. Commodity code 8.Quantity 8. Quantity 9.Unit 9. Unit 10.Description of the goods 10. Description of the goods
7. Commodity code
8. Quantity
9. Unit
10. Description of the goods
11.Location 11. Location
11. Location
7.Commodity code 7. Commodity code 8.Quantity 8. Quantity 9.Unit 9. Unit 10.Description of the goods 10. Description of the goods
7. Commodity code
8. Quantity
9. Unit
10. Description of the goods
11.Location 11. Location
11. Location
7.Commodity code 7. Commodity code 8.Quantity 8. Quantity 9.Unit 9. Unit 10.Description of the goods 10. Description of the goods
7. Commodity code
8. Quantity
9. Unit
10. Description of the goods
11.Location 11. Location
11. Location
12.Signature, place and date, stamp 12. Signature, place and date, stamp
12. Signature, place and date, stamp
1. Exporter(EORI number if applicable)
2. Authorisation number
3. Expiry date
4. Issuing authority
5. Destination country
6. Final recipient
7. Commodity code
8. Quantity
9. Unit
10. Description of the goods
11. Location
7. Commodity code
8. Quantity
9. Unit
10. Description of the goods
11. Location
7. Commodity code
8. Quantity
9. Unit
10. Description of the goods
11. Location
7. Commodity code
8. Quantity
9. Unit
10. Description of the goods
11. Location
12. Signature, place and date, stamp
Box 1 Exporter Full name and address of the exporter for whom the authorisation is issued + EORI number if applicable.
Box 2 Authorisation number The authorisation number is completed by the authority issuing the export authorisation and has the following format: XXyyyy999999, where XX is the 2-letter geonomenclature code(1)of the issuing Member State, yyyy is the 4-digit year of issuance of the authorisation, 999999 is a 6-digit number unique within XXyyyy and attributed by the issuing authority.
Box 3 Expiry date The issuing authority can define an expiry date for the authorisation. This expiry date cannot be later than 6 weeks after the entry into force of this regulation.If no expiry date is defined by the issuing authority, the authorisation expires at the latest 6 weeks after the entry into force of this regulation.
Box 4 Issuing authority Full name and address of the Member State authority that issued the export authorisation.
Box 5 Destination country 2-letter geonomenclature code of the country of destination of the goods for which the authorisation is issued.
Box 6 Final recipient Full name and address of the final recipient of the goods, if known at the time of issuance + EORI number if applicable. If the final recipient is not known at the time of issuance, the field is left empty.
Box 7 Commodity code The numerical code from the Harmonised System or the Combined Nomenclature(2)under which the goods to export are classified when the authorisation is issued.
Box 8 Quantity The quantity of goods measured in the unit declared in box 9.
Box 9 Unit The measurement unit in which the quantity declared in box 8 is expressed. The units to use are "P/ST" for goods counted by number of pieces (e.g. masks), and "PA" for goods counted by pairs (e.g. gloves).
Box 10 Description of the goods Plain language description precise enough to allow identification the goods.
Box 11 Location The geonomenclature code of the Member State where the goods are located. If the goods are located in the Member State of the issuing authority, this box must be left empty.
Box 12 Signature, stamp, place and date, The signature and stamp of the issuing authority. The place and the date of issuance of the authorisation.
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2015/479 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 on common rules for exports(1), and in particular Article 5 thereof,
(1) Since the outbreak of the epidemiological crisis caused by the coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, the disease associated with it, the COVID-19, has been spreading fast across the world, reaching also the Union’s territory. According to the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, the risk associated with COVID-19 infections for people in the Union is currently considered to be moderate to high, based on the probability of transmission and the impact of the disease. The virus spreads rapidly within the Union, and might have an enormous public health impact with substantial fatal outcomes in high-risk groups and significant economic and societal disruption.
(2) In this context, the need for personal protective equipment, as detailed in Annex 1, has already increased significantly. Given its nature and the prevailing circumstances, such type of equipment is an essential product since it is necessary to prevent the further spreading of the disease, and safeguard the health of medical staff treating infected patients.
(3) In line with Council Conclusions of the Health Ministers Council on 13 February 2020, a procurement procedure for personal protective equipment has been launched under the Joint Procurement Agreement for medical countermeasures. According to an indicative time-line and depending on the market situation, it might be finalized as of beginning of April.
(4) The demand for medical protective equipment has been exacerbated in the last days and is expected to continue increasing significantly in the imminent future with accompanying shortages developing in several Member States. Constraints exist throughout the EU single market to meet customers demand for the relevant Personal Protective Equipment, in particular mouth protection masks. At this moment in time, there are on-going efforts to increase manufacturing capabilities. This may feed into review of the measure as necessary and as situation evolves.
(5) Production of personal protective equipment such as mouth protection masks in the Union is currently concentrated in a limited number of Member States, namely the Czech Republic, France, Germany, and Poland. Despite the fact that increased production has been encouraged, the current level of Union production and existing stocks will not be sufficient to meet the demand within the Union. This is particularly the case as this demand rises as a result of the epidemic situation and the personal protective equipment can be exported without restriction to other parts of the world.
(6) Some third countries have already officially decided to restrict exports of protective equipment. Others seems to have taken similar actions on a more informal basis. Some of these countries are also traditional suppliers to the Union market and this is further exerting pressure on the Union market.
(7) In order to remedy and prevent a critical situation, it is in the Union interest that the Commission takes an immediate action of a limited duration in order to ensure that exports of personal protective equipment are subject to an authorisation in order to ensure adequacy of supply in the Union in order to meet the vital demand.
(8) Exports of certain quantities of specific products may be authorised under specific circumstances such as to ensure assistance provided to third countries, and depending on the needs of the Member States. The administrative modalities for these authorisations should be left to the discretion of the Member States during the time of these temporary measures.
(9) There are vital needs of protective equipment within the Union with regard to hospitals, patients, field workers, civil protection authorities. Such vital needs are constantly monitored through the Union civil protection mechanism.
(10) Whereas this measure at present applies to personal protective equipment, as detailed in Annex 1, a need may arise to review the scope of the Annex and products covered by this Regulation.
(11) Due to the urgency of the situation, justified by the fast spreading of the COVID-19 infection, the measures provided for in this Regulation should be taken in accordance with Article 3(3) of Regulation (EU) 2015/479.
(12) In order to prevent speculative depletion of stocks, this implementing Regulation should enter into force on the day of its publication. In accordance with Article 5(5) of Regulation (EU) 2015/479, these measures should have a duration of six weeks,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Export authorisation
Article 1
1. An export authorisation established in accordance with the form set out in Annex II shall be required for the export outside the Union of personal protective equipment listed in Annex I, whether or not originating in the Union. Such authorisation shall be granted by the competent authorities of the Member State where the exporter is established and shall be issued in writing or by electronic means.
2. Without the production of such export authorisation, the exportation is prohibited.

Procedural aspects
Article 2
1. If the protective equipment is located in one or more Member States other than the one where the application for export authorisation has been made, that fact shall be indicated in the application. The competent authorities of the Member State to which the application for export authorisation has been made shall immediately consult the competent authorities of the Member State or States in question and provide the relevant information. The Member State or States consulted shall make known within 10 working days any objections it or they may have to the granting of such an authorisation, which shall bind the Member State in which the application has been made.
2. Member States shall process applications for export authorisations within a period of time to be determined by national law or practice, which shall not exceed 5 working days, from the date on which all required information has been provided to the competent authorities. Under exceptional circumstances and for duly justified reasons, that period may be extended by a further period of 5 working days.
3. In deciding whether to grant an export authorisation under this Regulation, Member States shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where appropriate, whether the export serves, inter alia:
—
to fulfil supply obligations under a joint procurement procedure in accordance with Article 5 of Decision No 1082/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on serious cross-border threats to health(2);
—
to support concerted support actions coordinated by the Integrated Political Crisis Response Mechanism (IPCR), the European Commission or other Union institutions;
—
to respond to the requests of assistance addressed to and handled by the UPCM (Union Civil Protection Mechanism), by third countries or international organisations;
—
to support the statutory activities of support companies abroad that enjoy protection under the Geneva Convention, and in so far as they do not impair the ability to work as a national support company;
—
to support the activities of the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) Global Outbreak Alert & Response Network (GOARN);
—
to supply foreign operations of EU Member States including, military operations, international police missions and/or civilian international peacekeeping missions;
—
for the supply of EU and Member State delegations abroad.
4. Member States may decide to make use of electronic documents for the purpose of processing the applications for export authorisation.

Final provisions
Article 3
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Unionand apply for a period of six weeks. It shall automatically cease to apply at the end of this six weeks period.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2015/479 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 on common rules for exports(1), and in particular Article 5 thereof,
(1) Since the outbreak of the epidemiological crisis caused by the coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, the disease associated with it, the COVID-19, has been spreading fast across the world, reaching also the Union’s territory. According to the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, the risk associated with COVID-19 infections for people in the Union is currently considered to be moderate to high, based on the probability of transmission and the impact of the disease. The virus spreads rapidly within the Union, and might have an enormous public health impact with substantial fatal outcomes in high-risk groups and significant economic and societal disruption.
(2) In this context, the need for personal protective equipment, as detailed in Annex 1, has already increased significantly. Given its nature and the prevailing circumstances, such type of equipment is an essential product since it is necessary to prevent the further spreading of the disease, and safeguard the health of medical staff treating infected patients.
(3) In line with Council Conclusions of the Health Ministers Council on 13 February 2020, a procurement procedure for personal protective equipment has been launched under the Joint Procurement Agreement for medical countermeasures. According to an indicative time-line and depending on the market situation, it might be finalized as of beginning of April.
(4) The demand for medical protective equipment has been exacerbated in the last days and is expected to continue increasing significantly in the imminent future with accompanying shortages developing in several Member States. Constraints exist throughout the EU single market to meet customers demand for the relevant Personal Protective Equipment, in particular mouth protection masks. At this moment in time, there are on-going efforts to increase manufacturing capabilities. This may feed into review of the measure as necessary and as situation evolves.
(5) Production of personal protective equipment such as mouth protection masks in the Union is currently concentrated in a limited number of Member States, namely the Czech Republic, France, Germany, and Poland. Despite the fact that increased production has been encouraged, the current level of Union production and existing stocks will not be sufficient to meet the demand within the Union. This is particularly the case as this demand rises as a result of the epidemic situation and the personal protective equipment can be exported without restriction to other parts of the world.
(6) Some third countries have already officially decided to restrict exports of protective equipment. Others seems to have taken similar actions on a more informal basis. Some of these countries are also traditional suppliers to the Union market and this is further exerting pressure on the Union market.
(7) In order to remedy and prevent a critical situation, it is in the Union interest that the Commission takes an immediate action of a limited duration in order to ensure that exports of personal protective equipment are subject to an authorisation in order to ensure adequacy of supply in the Union in order to meet the vital demand.
(8) Exports of certain quantities of specific products may be authorised under specific circumstances such as to ensure assistance provided to third countries, and depending on the needs of the Member States. The administrative modalities for these authorisations should be left to the discretion of the Member States during the time of these temporary measures.
(9) There are vital needs of protective equipment within the Union with regard to hospitals, patients, field workers, civil protection authorities. Such vital needs are constantly monitored through the Union civil protection mechanism.
(10) Whereas this measure at present applies to personal protective equipment, as detailed in Annex 1, a need may arise to review the scope of the Annex and products covered by this Regulation.
(11) Due to the urgency of the situation, justified by the fast spreading of the COVID-19 infection, the measures provided for in this Regulation should be taken in accordance with Article 3(3) of Regulation (EU) 2015/479.
(12) In order to prevent speculative depletion of stocks, this implementing Regulation should enter into force on the day of its publication. In accordance with Article 5(5) of Regulation (EU) 2015/479, these measures should have a duration of six weeks,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Export authorisation

1. An export authorisation established in accordance with the form set out in Annex II shall be required for the export outside the Union of personal protective equipment listed in Annex I, whether or not originating in the Union. Such authorisation shall be granted by the competent authorities of the Member State where the exporter is established and shall be issued in writing or by electronic means.
2. Without the production of such export authorisation, the exportation is prohibited.

Procedural aspects

1. If the protective equipment is located in one or more Member States other than the one where the application for export authorisation has been made, that fact shall be indicated in the application. The competent authorities of the Member State to which the application for export authorisation has been made shall immediately consult the competent authorities of the Member State or States in question and provide the relevant information. The Member State or States consulted shall make known within 10 working days any objections it or they may have to the granting of such an authorisation, which shall bind the Member State in which the application has been made.
2. Member States shall process applications for export authorisations within a period of time to be determined by national law or practice, which shall not exceed 5 working days, from the date on which all required information has been provided to the competent authorities. Under exceptional circumstances and for duly justified reasons, that period may be extended by a further period of 5 working days.
3. In deciding whether to grant an export authorisation under this Regulation, Member States shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where appropriate, whether the export serves, inter alia:
—
to fulfil supply obligations under a joint procurement procedure in accordance with Article 5 of Decision No 1082/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on serious cross-border threats to health(2);
—
to support concerted support actions coordinated by the Integrated Political Crisis Response Mechanism (IPCR), the European Commission or other Union institutions;
—
to respond to the requests of assistance addressed to and handled by the UPCM (Union Civil Protection Mechanism), by third countries or international organisations;
—
to support the statutory activities of support companies abroad that enjoy protection under the Geneva Convention, and in so far as they do not impair the ability to work as a national support company;
—
to support the activities of the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) Global Outbreak Alert & Response Network (GOARN);
—
to supply foreign operations of EU Member States including, military operations, international police missions and/or civilian international peacekeeping missions;
—
for the supply of EU and Member State delegations abroad.
4. Member States may decide to make use of electronic documents for the purpose of processing the applications for export authorisation.

Final provisions

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Unionand apply for a period of six weeks. It shall automatically cease to apply at the end of this six weeks period.
ANNEX IProtective EquipmentThe equipment listed in this Annex is in conformity with the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2016/425(1).

Category | Description | CN Codes
Protective spectacles and visors | —Protection against potentially infectious material,—Encircling the eyes and surroundings,—Compatible with different models of filtering facepiece (FFP) masks and facial masks,—Transparent lens,—Reusable (can be cleaned and disinfected) or single-use items | — | Protection against potentially infectious material, | — | Encircling the eyes and surroundings, | — | Compatible with different models of filtering facepiece (FFP) masks and facial masks, | — | Transparent lens, | — | Reusable (can be cleaned and disinfected) or single-use items | ex 9004 90 10ex 9004 90 90
— | Protection against potentially infectious material,
— | Encircling the eyes and surroundings,
— | Compatible with different models of filtering facepiece (FFP) masks and facial masks,
— | Transparent lens,
— | Reusable (can be cleaned and disinfected) or single-use items
Face shields | —Equipment for the protection of the facial area and associated mucous membranes (ex: eyes, nose, mouth) against potentially infectious material,—Includes a visor of transparent material,—Usually includes fixations to secure over the face (e.g.: bands, temples)—Can include a mouth-nose protection equipment as described below,—Reusable (can be cleaned and disinfected) or disposable | — | Equipment for the protection of the facial area and associated mucous membranes (ex: eyes, nose, mouth) against potentially infectious material, | — | Includes a visor of transparent material, | — | Usually includes fixations to secure over the face (e.g.: bands, temples) | — | Can include a mouth-nose protection equipment as described below, | — | Reusable (can be cleaned and disinfected) or disposable | ex 3926 90 97ex 9020 00 00
— | Equipment for the protection of the facial area and associated mucous membranes (ex: eyes, nose, mouth) against potentially infectious material,
— | Includes a visor of transparent material,
— | Usually includes fixations to secure over the face (e.g.: bands, temples)
— | Can include a mouth-nose protection equipment as described below,
— | Reusable (can be cleaned and disinfected) or disposable
Mouth-nose-protection equipment | —Masks for the protection of the wearer against potentially infectious material and for the protection of the environment against potentially infectious material spread by the wearer,—Can include a face shield as described above,—Whether or not equipped with a replaceable filter | — | Masks for the protection of the wearer against potentially infectious material and for the protection of the environment against potentially infectious material spread by the wearer, | — | Can include a face shield as described above, | — | Whether or not equipped with a replaceable filter | ex 6307 90 98ex 9020 00 00
— | Masks for the protection of the wearer against potentially infectious material and for the protection of the environment against potentially infectious material spread by the wearer,
— | Can include a face shield as described above,
— | Whether or not equipped with a replaceable filter
Protective garments | Garment (e.g. gown, suit) for the protection of the wearer against potentially infectious material and for the protection of the environment against potentially infectious material spread by the wearer | ex 3926 20 00ex 4015 90 00ex 6113 00ex 6114ex 6210 10 106210 10 92ex 6210 10 98ex 6210 20 00ex 6210 30 00ex 6210 40 00ex 6210 50 00ex 6211 32 10ex 6211 32 90ex 6211 33 10ex 6211 33 90ex 6211 39 00ex 6211 42 10ex 6211 42 90ex 6211 43 10ex 6211 43 90ex 6211 49 00ex 9020 00 00
Gloves | Gloves for the protection of the wearer against potentially infectious material and for the protection of the environment against potentially infectious material spread by the wearer | ex 3926 20 004015 11 00ex 4015 19 00ex 6116 10 20ex 6116 10 80ex 6216 00 00
(1) Regulation (EU) 2016/425 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on personal protective equipment and repealing Council Directive 89/686/EEC (OJ L 81, 31.3.2016, p. 51).

Explanatory notes to the export authorisation form

ANNEX IIModel for export authorisation forms referred to in Article 1When granting export authorisations, Member States will strive to ensure the visibility of the nature of the authorisation on the form issued. This is an export authorisation valid in all Member States of the European Union until its expiry date.
EUROPEAN UNION | Export of personal protective equipment (Regulation (EU) 2020/402)
1.Exporter(EORI number if applicable) | 1. | Exporter(EORI number if applicable) | 2.Authorisation number | 2. | Authorisation number | 3.Expiry date | 3. | Expiry date
1. | Exporter(EORI number if applicable)
2. | Authorisation number
3. | Expiry date
4.Issuing authority | 4. | Issuing authority | 5.Destination country | 5. | Destination country | 6.Final recipient | 6. | Final recipient
4. | Issuing authority
5. | Destination country
6. | Final recipient
7.Commodity code | 7. | Commodity code | 8.Quantity | 8. | Quantity | 9.Unit | 9. | Unit | 10.Description of the goods | 10. | Description of the goods
7. | Commodity code
8. | Quantity
9. | Unit
10. | Description of the goods
11.Location | 11. | Location
11. | Location
7.Commodity code | 7. | Commodity code | 8.Quantity | 8. | Quantity | 9.Unit | 9. | Unit | 10.Description of the goods | 10. | Description of the goods
7. | Commodity code
8. | Quantity
9. | Unit
10. | Description of the goods
11.Location | 11. | Location
11. | Location
7.Commodity code | 7. | Commodity code | 8.Quantity | 8. | Quantity | 9.Unit | 9. | Unit | 10.Description of the goods | 10. | Description of the goods
7. | Commodity code
8. | Quantity
9. | Unit
10. | Description of the goods
11.Location | 11. | Location
11. | Location
7.Commodity code | 7. | Commodity code | 8.Quantity | 8. | Quantity | 9.Unit | 9. | Unit | 10.Description of the goods | 10. | Description of the goods
7. | Commodity code
8. | Quantity
9. | Unit
10. | Description of the goods
11.Location | 11. | Location
11. | Location
12.Signature, place and date, stamp | 12. | Signature, place and date, stamp
12. | Signature, place and date, stampThe completion of all the boxes is mandatory except when stated otherwise.
Boxes 7 to 11 are repeated 4 times to allow requesting an authorisation for 4 different products.

Box 1 | Exporter | Full name and address of the exporter for whom the authorisation is issued + EORI number if applicable.
Box 2 | Authorisation number | The authorisation number is completed by the authority issuing the export authorisation and has the following format: XXyyyy999999, where XX is the 2-letter geonomenclature code(1)of the issuing Member State, yyyy is the 4-digit year of issuance of the authorisation, 999999 is a 6-digit number unique within XXyyyy and attributed by the issuing authority.
Box 3 | Expiry date | The issuing authority can define an expiry date for the authorisation. This expiry date cannot be later than 6 weeks after the entry into force of this regulation.If no expiry date is defined by the issuing authority, the authorisation expires at the latest 6 weeks after the entry into force of this regulation.
Box 4 | Issuing authority | Full name and address of the Member State authority that issued the export authorisation.
Box 5 | Destination country | 2-letter geonomenclature code of the country of destination of the goods for which the authorisation is issued.
Box 6 | Final recipient | Full name and address of the final recipient of the goods, if known at the time of issuance + EORI number if applicable. If the final recipient is not known at the time of issuance, the field is left empty.
Box 7 | Commodity code | The numerical code from the Harmonised System or the Combined Nomenclature(2)under which the goods to export are classified when the authorisation is issued.
Box 8 | Quantity | The quantity of goods measured in the unit declared in box 9.
Box 9 | Unit | The measurement unit in which the quantity declared in box 8 is expressed. The units to use are “P/ST” for goods counted by number of pieces (e.g. masks), and “PA” for goods counted by pairs (e.g. gloves).
Box 10 | Description of the goods | Plain language description precise enough to allow identification the goods.
Box 11 | Location | The geonomenclature code of the Member State where the goods are located. If the goods are located in the Member State of the issuing authority, this box must be left empty.
Box 12 | Signature, stamp, place and date, | The signature and stamp of the issuing authority. The place and the date of issuance of the authorisation.
(1) Commission Regulation (EU) No 1106/2012 of 27 November 2012 implementing Regulation (EC) No 471/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community statistics relating to external trade with non-member countries, as regards the update of the nomenclature of countries and territories (OJ L 328, 28.11.2012, p. 7).
(2) Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (OJ L 256, 7.9.1987, p. 1).

Pending: 32020R0003

January 16, 2026
6.1.2020 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 2/1
(1) Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 aims to progressively eliminate discards in Union fisheries through the introduction of a landing obligation for catches of species subject to catch limits and, in the Mediterranean, also catches of species subject to minimum sizes.
(2) According to Article 15(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013, the landing obligation applies for demersal fisheries in the Mediterranean Sea at the latest from 1 January 2017 to species that define the fisheries and at the latest from 1 January 2019 to all other species.
(3) Article 15(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 empowers the Commission to adopt discard plans by means of a delegated act, for a period of no more than three years that may be renewed for a further total period of three years, on the basis of joint recommendations developed by Member States in consultation with the relevant Advisory Councils. Discard plans may contain the specifications referred to in Article 15(5)(a) to (e) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013, including the fixing of minimum conservation reference sizes.
(4) Article 15a of Regulation (EC) No 1967/2006 and Article 15(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1241 empower the Commission to establish, for the purpose of adopting discard plans and for the species subject to the landing obligation, a minimum conservation reference size with the aim of ensuring the protection of juveniles of marine organisms. According to these Articles, minimum conservation reference sizes may derogate, where appropriate, from the sizes established in Annex III to that Regulation and, following the entry into force of Article 32 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1241 from the sizes established in Annex IX to Regulation (EU) 2019/1241.
(5) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/2376 established a discard plan for Venus shells (Venusspp.) in the Italian territorial waters from 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2019, following a recommendation submitted by Italy.
(6) Italy, as the single Member State with a direct management interest in the Venus shells (Venusspp.) fisheries, in the Italian territorial waters of GFCM Geographical Sub-Areas 9, 10, 17 and 18, submitted to the Commission, in line with the procedure of Article 18 of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013, a new joint recommendation for a discard plan for the Venus shells (Venusspp.) stock, after consultation of the Mediterranean Advisory Council (MEDAC).
(7) The new joint recommendation submitted by Italy was reviewed by the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) at its plenary session of 1-5 July 2019(4).
(8) The new joint recommendation suggests applying a high survivability exemption for Venus shells (Venusspp.) in the fishery carried out with hydraulic dredges in Italian territorial waters of GFCM Geographical Sub-Areas 9, 10, 17 and 18. The Member State provided scientific evidence in order to demonstrate high discard survival rates for Venus shells (Venusspp.) in that fishery and transmitted a scientific monitoring programme. The evidence was submitted to STECF, which concluded that discard survival is expected to be substantial. The STECF also concluded that the proposed scientific monitoring programme should provide robust data and information to allow evaluating the effects of the discard plan. In light of that assessment, it is appropriate to include that exemption in this Regulation for a period of 3 years.
(9) The new joint recommendation suggests furthermore that the reduced minimum conservation reference size for Venus shells (Venusspp.) established in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/2376 by way of derogation from Annex III to Council Regulation (EC) No 1967/2006 should continue to apply. The STECF noted that the reduced minimum conservation reference size is still larger than the defined size at first maturity and that there is no evidence to suggest that the reduction in the minimum conservation reference size has had a detrimental impact on the stock. The STECF concluded that the request for a continuation of the reduced minimum conservation reference size seems reasonable. However, the STECF also concluded that the past and the predicted future impacts of the reduced minimum size on exploitation rates and stock biomass cannot be fully assessed. Further studies and data on those impacts would be therefore needed. Regulation (EU) 2019/1241, which establishes regional technical measures for the Mediterranean Sea in Annex IX, came into force only on 14 August 2019, and does not provide for transitional measures as regards the procedure for the adoption of delegated acts amending such regional technical measures. The joint recommendation was submitted by Italy and assessed by the STECF before the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2019/1241 and therefore did not refer to Regulation (EU) 2019/1241. Nevertheless, in view of these exceptional circumstances, the Commission considers that on the basis of information available to it at this stage in the joint recommendation and STECF assessment there does not appear any element indicating that the proposed reduced minimum conservation reference size would fail to comply with the requirements established for technical measures in Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1241. In light of the above conclusions, it is appropriate to grant the requested derogation for one year only.
(10) The measures suggested in the joint recommendation are in line with Article 18(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013.
(11) In order to ensure appropriate control over the implementation of the landing obligation, the Member State should establish a list of vessels covered by the present Regulation.
(12) As the measures provided for in this Regulation have a direct impact on the economic activities linked to fisheries and the planning of the fishing season for Union vessels, it should enter into force immediately after its publication.
(13) It should apply from 1 January 2020 for a duration of three years. The application of a reduced minimum conservation reference size for Venus shells (Venusspp.) of 22 mm, should be limited to one year.
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC(1), and in particular Article 15(6) thereof,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/1241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on the conservation of fisheries resources and the protection of marine ecosystems through technical measures, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1967/2006, (EC) No 1224/2009 and Regulations (EU) No 1380/2013, (EU) No 2016/1139, (EU) 2018/973, (EU) 2019/472 and (EU) 2019/1022 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 894/97, (EC) No 850/98, (EC) No 2549/2000, (EC) No 254/2002, (EC) No 812/2004 and (EC) No 2187/2005(2), and in particular Article 15(2) thereof,
Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1967/2006 of 21 December 2006 concerning management measures for the sustainable exploitation of fishery resources in the Mediterranean Sea, amending Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1626/94(3), and in particular Article 15a thereof,
(1) Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 aims to progressively eliminate discards in Union fisheries through the introduction of a landing obligation for catches of species subject to catch limits and, in the Mediterranean, also catches of species subject to minimum sizes.
(2) According to Article 15(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013, the landing obligation applies for demersal fisheries in the Mediterranean Sea at the latest from 1 January 2017 to species that define the fisheries and at the latest from 1 January 2019 to all other species.
(3) Article 15(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 empowers the Commission to adopt discard plans by means of a delegated act, for a period of no more than three years that may be renewed for a further total period of three years, on the basis of joint recommendations developed by Member States in consultation with the relevant Advisory Councils. Discard plans may contain the specifications referred to in Article 15(5)(a) to (e) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013, including the fixing of minimum conservation reference sizes.
(4) Article 15a of Regulation (EC) No 1967/2006 and Article 15(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1241 empower the Commission to establish, for the purpose of adopting discard plans and for the species subject to the landing obligation, a minimum conservation reference size with the aim of ensuring the protection of juveniles of marine organisms. According to these Articles, minimum conservation reference sizes may derogate, where appropriate, from the sizes established in Annex III to that Regulation and, following the entry into force of Article 32 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1241 from the sizes established in Annex IX to Regulation (EU) 2019/1241.
(5) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/2376 established a discard plan for Venus shells (Venusspp.) in the Italian territorial waters from 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2019, following a recommendation submitted by Italy.
(6) Italy, as the single Member State with a direct management interest in the Venus shells (Venusspp.) fisheries, in the Italian territorial waters of GFCM Geographical Sub-Areas 9, 10, 17 and 18, submitted to the Commission, in line with the procedure of Article 18 of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013, a new joint recommendation for a discard plan for the Venus shells (Venusspp.) stock, after consultation of the Mediterranean Advisory Council (MEDAC).
(7) The new joint recommendation submitted by Italy was reviewed by the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) at its plenary session of 1-5 July 2019(4).
(8) The new joint recommendation suggests applying a high survivability exemption for Venus shells (Venusspp.) in the fishery carried out with hydraulic dredges in Italian territorial waters of GFCM Geographical Sub-Areas 9, 10, 17 and 18. The Member State provided scientific evidence in order to demonstrate high discard survival rates for Venus shells (Venusspp.) in that fishery and transmitted a scientific monitoring programme. The evidence was submitted to STECF, which concluded that discard survival is expected to be substantial. The STECF also concluded that the proposed scientific monitoring programme should provide robust data and information to allow evaluating the effects of the discard plan. In light of that assessment, it is appropriate to include that exemption in this Regulation for a period of 3 years.
(9) The new joint recommendation suggests furthermore that the reduced minimum conservation reference size for Venus shells (Venusspp.) established in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/2376 by way of derogation from Annex III to Council Regulation (EC) No 1967/2006 should continue to apply. The STECF noted that the reduced minimum conservation reference size is still larger than the defined size at first maturity and that there is no evidence to suggest that the reduction in the minimum conservation reference size has had a detrimental impact on the stock. The STECF concluded that the request for a continuation of the reduced minimum conservation reference size seems reasonable. However, the STECF also concluded that the past and the predicted future impacts of the reduced minimum size on exploitation rates and stock biomass cannot be fully assessed. Further studies and data on those impacts would be therefore needed. Regulation (EU) 2019/1241, which establishes regional technical measures for the Mediterranean Sea in Annex IX, came into force only on 14 August 2019, and does not provide for transitional measures as regards the procedure for the adoption of delegated acts amending such regional technical measures. The joint recommendation was submitted by Italy and assessed by the STECF before the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2019/1241 and therefore did not refer to Regulation (EU) 2019/1241. Nevertheless, in view of these exceptional circumstances, the Commission considers that on the basis of information available to it at this stage in the joint recommendation and STECF assessment there does not appear any element indicating that the proposed reduced minimum conservation reference size would fail to comply with the requirements established for technical measures in Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1241. In light of the above conclusions, it is appropriate to grant the requested derogation for one year only.
(10) The measures suggested in the joint recommendation are in line with Article 18(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013.
(11) In order to ensure appropriate control over the implementation of the landing obligation, the Member State should establish a list of vessels covered by the present Regulation.
(12) As the measures provided for in this Regulation have a direct impact on the economic activities linked to fisheries and the planning of the fishing season for Union vessels, it should enter into force immediately after its publication.
(13) It should apply from 1 January 2020 for a duration of three years. The application of a reduced minimum conservation reference size for Venus shells (Venusspp.) of 22 mm, should be limited to one year.
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Subject matter and scope
Article 1
1. This Regulation specifies the details for implementing the landing obligation established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 in Venus shells (Venusspp.) fisheries carried out in certain Italian territorial waters.
2. This Regulation shall apply to the Italian territorial waters of the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM) geographical subareas 9, 10, 17 and 18, as defined in Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 1343/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5).

Survivability exemption for Venus shells (Venus spp.)
Article 2
1. The survivability exemption referred to in Article 15(4)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 shall apply, in Italian territorial waters of GFCM Geographical Sub-Areas 9, 10, 17 and 18, to catches of Venus shells (Venusspp.) below the minimum conservation reference size made with hydraulic dredges.
2. When discarding Venus shells (Venusspp.) caught in the cases referred to in paragraph 1, the Venus shells (Venusspp.) shall be released immediately.

Minimum conservation reference size
Article 3
1. By way of derogation from the minimum conservation reference size established in Annex IX to Regulation (EU) 2019/1241, the minimum conservation reference size for Venus shells (Venusspp.) in Italian territorial waters of GFCM Geographical Sub-Areas 9, 10, 17 and 18 shall be of a total length of 22 mm.
2. The measurement of the size of the Venus shells (Venusspp.) shall take place in accordance with Annex IV to Regulation (EU) 2019/1241.

List of vessels
Article 4
By 31 December 2019, Member State authorities shall submit to the Commission, using the secure Union control website, the list of all vessels authorised to fish Venus shells (Venusspp.) using hydraulic dredges in Italian territorial waters of GFCM Geographical Sub-Areas 9, 10, 17 and 18. Member State authorities shall maintain this list updated at all times.

Entry into force
Article 5
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.
It shall apply from 1 January 2020 until 31 December 2022.
However, Article 3 shall apply until 31 December 2020.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC(1), and in particular Article 15(6) thereof,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/1241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on the conservation of fisheries resources and the protection of marine ecosystems through technical measures, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1967/2006, (EC) No 1224/2009 and Regulations (EU) No 1380/2013, (EU) No 2016/1139, (EU) 2018/973, (EU) 2019/472 and (EU) 2019/1022 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 894/97, (EC) No 850/98, (EC) No 2549/2000, (EC) No 254/2002, (EC) No 812/2004 and (EC) No 2187/2005(2), and in particular Article 15(2) thereof,
Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1967/2006 of 21 December 2006 concerning management measures for the sustainable exploitation of fishery resources in the Mediterranean Sea, amending Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1626/94(3), and in particular Article 15a thereof,
(1) Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 aims to progressively eliminate discards in Union fisheries through the introduction of a landing obligation for catches of species subject to catch limits and, in the Mediterranean, also catches of species subject to minimum sizes.
(2) According to Article 15(1)(d) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013, the landing obligation applies for demersal fisheries in the Mediterranean Sea at the latest from 1 January 2017 to species that define the fisheries and at the latest from 1 January 2019 to all other species.
(3) Article 15(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 empowers the Commission to adopt discard plans by means of a delegated act, for a period of no more than three years that may be renewed for a further total period of three years, on the basis of joint recommendations developed by Member States in consultation with the relevant Advisory Councils. Discard plans may contain the specifications referred to in Article 15(5)(a) to (e) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013, including the fixing of minimum conservation reference sizes.
(4) Article 15a of Regulation (EC) No 1967/2006 and Article 15(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1241 empower the Commission to establish, for the purpose of adopting discard plans and for the species subject to the landing obligation, a minimum conservation reference size with the aim of ensuring the protection of juveniles of marine organisms. According to these Articles, minimum conservation reference sizes may derogate, where appropriate, from the sizes established in Annex III to that Regulation and, following the entry into force of Article 32 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1241 from the sizes established in Annex IX to Regulation (EU) 2019/1241.
(5) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/2376 established a discard plan for Venus shells (Venusspp.) in the Italian territorial waters from 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2019, following a recommendation submitted by Italy.
(6) Italy, as the single Member State with a direct management interest in the Venus shells (Venusspp.) fisheries, in the Italian territorial waters of GFCM Geographical Sub-Areas 9, 10, 17 and 18, submitted to the Commission, in line with the procedure of Article 18 of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013, a new joint recommendation for a discard plan for the Venus shells (Venusspp.) stock, after consultation of the Mediterranean Advisory Council (MEDAC).
(7) The new joint recommendation submitted by Italy was reviewed by the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) at its plenary session of 1-5 July 2019(4).
(8) The new joint recommendation suggests applying a high survivability exemption for Venus shells (Venusspp.) in the fishery carried out with hydraulic dredges in Italian territorial waters of GFCM Geographical Sub-Areas 9, 10, 17 and 18. The Member State provided scientific evidence in order to demonstrate high discard survival rates for Venus shells (Venusspp.) in that fishery and transmitted a scientific monitoring programme. The evidence was submitted to STECF, which concluded that discard survival is expected to be substantial. The STECF also concluded that the proposed scientific monitoring programme should provide robust data and information to allow evaluating the effects of the discard plan. In light of that assessment, it is appropriate to include that exemption in this Regulation for a period of 3 years.
(9) The new joint recommendation suggests furthermore that the reduced minimum conservation reference size for Venus shells (Venusspp.) established in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/2376 by way of derogation from Annex III to Council Regulation (EC) No 1967/2006 should continue to apply. The STECF noted that the reduced minimum conservation reference size is still larger than the defined size at first maturity and that there is no evidence to suggest that the reduction in the minimum conservation reference size has had a detrimental impact on the stock. The STECF concluded that the request for a continuation of the reduced minimum conservation reference size seems reasonable. However, the STECF also concluded that the past and the predicted future impacts of the reduced minimum size on exploitation rates and stock biomass cannot be fully assessed. Further studies and data on those impacts would be therefore needed. Regulation (EU) 2019/1241, which establishes regional technical measures for the Mediterranean Sea in Annex IX, came into force only on 14 August 2019, and does not provide for transitional measures as regards the procedure for the adoption of delegated acts amending such regional technical measures. The joint recommendation was submitted by Italy and assessed by the STECF before the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2019/1241 and therefore did not refer to Regulation (EU) 2019/1241. Nevertheless, in view of these exceptional circumstances, the Commission considers that on the basis of information available to it at this stage in the joint recommendation and STECF assessment there does not appear any element indicating that the proposed reduced minimum conservation reference size would fail to comply with the requirements established for technical measures in Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1241. In light of the above conclusions, it is appropriate to grant the requested derogation for one year only.
(10) The measures suggested in the joint recommendation are in line with Article 18(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013.
(11) In order to ensure appropriate control over the implementation of the landing obligation, the Member State should establish a list of vessels covered by the present Regulation.
(12) As the measures provided for in this Regulation have a direct impact on the economic activities linked to fisheries and the planning of the fishing season for Union vessels, it should enter into force immediately after its publication.
(13) It should apply from 1 January 2020 for a duration of three years. The application of a reduced minimum conservation reference size for Venus shells (Venusspp.) of 22 mm, should be limited to one year.
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Subject matter and scope

1. This Regulation specifies the details for implementing the landing obligation established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 in Venus shells (Venusspp.) fisheries carried out in certain Italian territorial waters.
2. This Regulation shall apply to the Italian territorial waters of the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM) geographical subareas 9, 10, 17 and 18, as defined in Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 1343/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5).

Survivability exemption for Venus shells (Venus spp.)

1. The survivability exemption referred to in Article 15(4)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 shall apply, in Italian territorial waters of GFCM Geographical Sub-Areas 9, 10, 17 and 18, to catches of Venus shells (Venusspp.) below the minimum conservation reference size made with hydraulic dredges.
2. When discarding Venus shells (Venusspp.) caught in the cases referred to in paragraph 1, the Venus shells (Venusspp.) shall be released immediately.

Minimum conservation reference size

1. By way of derogation from the minimum conservation reference size established in Annex IX to Regulation (EU) 2019/1241, the minimum conservation reference size for Venus shells (Venusspp.) in Italian territorial waters of GFCM Geographical Sub-Areas 9, 10, 17 and 18 shall be of a total length of 22 mm.
2. The measurement of the size of the Venus shells (Venusspp.) shall take place in accordance with Annex IV to Regulation (EU) 2019/1241.

List of vessels

By 31 December 2019, Member State authorities shall submit to the Commission, using the secure Union control website, the list of all vessels authorised to fish Venus shells (Venusspp.) using hydraulic dredges in Italian territorial waters of GFCM Geographical Sub-Areas 9, 10, 17 and 18. Member State authorities shall maintain this list updated at all times.

Entry into force

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.
It shall apply from 1 January 2020 until 31 December 2022.
However, Article 3 shall apply until 31 December 2020.

Pending: 32019R0073

January 16, 2026
18.1.2019 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 16/108
(1) On 20 October 2017, the European Commission (‘the Commission’) initiated an anti-dumping investigation with regard to imports into the European Union (‘the Union’) of cycles, with pedal assistance, with an auxiliary electric motor (‘electric bicycles’) originating in the People's Republic of China (‘the PRC’) on the basis of Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘the basic Regulation’).
(2) The Commission published a Notice of initiation in theOfficial Journal of the European Union(2)(‘the Notice of initiation’).
(3) The Commission initiated the investigation following a complaint lodged on 8 September 2017 by the European Bicycle Manufacturers Association (‘the complainant’ or ‘EBMA’). The complainant represents more than 25 % of the total Union production of electric bicycles. The complaint contained evidence of dumping and of resulting material injury that was sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation.
(4) On 21 December 2017, the Commission initiated an anti-subsidy investigation with regard to imports into the Union of electric bicycles originating in the PRC and started a separate investigation. It published a Notice of initiation in theOfficial Journal of the European Union(3).
(5) On 31 January 2018, the complainant submitted a request for registration of imports of electric bicycles from the PRC under Article 14(5) of the basic Regulation. On 3 May 2018, the Commission published Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/671 (‘the registration Regulation’)(4)making imports of electric bicycles from the PRC subject to registration as of 4 May 2018 onwards.
(6) On 18 July 2018, the Commission imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Union of electric bicycles originating in the PRC by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1012(5)(‘the provisional Regulation’).
(7) As stated in recital (7) of the provisional Regulation, the investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 October 2016 to 30 September 2017 (‘the investigation period’ or ‘IP’) and the examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2014 to the end of the investigation period (‘the period considered’).
(8) Following the disclosure of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which a provisional anti-dumping duty was imposed (‘provisional disclosure’), the complainants, the China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products (‘the CCCME’), the Collective of European Importers of Electric Bicycles (‘CEIEB’), individual unrelated importers, and individual Chinese exporting producers made written submissions making their views known on the provisional findings.
(9) The parties who so requested were granted an opportunity to be heard. Hearings took place with the complainants, the CEIEB, unrelated importers, and one individual Chinese exporting producer. One hearing with the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings was held with that Chinese exporting producer.
(10) The Commission considered the comments submitted by interested parties and addressed them as detailed in this Regulation.
(11) The Commission continued seeking and verifying all information it deemed necessary for its final findings. In order to verify the questionnaire replies of unrelated importers, verification visits were carried out at the premises of the following parties:—BH BIKES EUROPE S.L. (Vitoria, Spain);—BIZBIKE BVBA (Wielsbeke, Belgium);—NEOMOUV SAS (La Flèche, France). — BH BIKES EUROPE S.L. (Vitoria, Spain); — BIZBIKE BVBA (Wielsbeke, Belgium); — NEOMOUV SAS (La Flèche, France).
— BH BIKES EUROPE S.L. (Vitoria, Spain);
— BIZBIKE BVBA (Wielsbeke, Belgium);
— NEOMOUV SAS (La Flèche, France).
— BH BIKES EUROPE S.L. (Vitoria, Spain);
— BIZBIKE BVBA (Wielsbeke, Belgium);
— NEOMOUV SAS (La Flèche, France).
(12) The Commission informed all interested parties of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to impose a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports into the Union of electric bicycles originating in the PRC (‘final disclosure’).
(13) The comments submitted by the interested parties were considered and taken into account where appropriate.
(14) The list of Chinese exporting producers included in the Annex 1 to this Regulation was modified to take account of the change of name of one Chinese exporting producer to Easy Electricity Technology Co., Ltd. and another exporting producer Wuxi Shengda Vehicle Technology Co., Ltd. was added to the Annex 1.
(15) Six non-sampled exporting producers formally requested individual examination under Article 17(3) of the basic Regulation. Three of those companies were groups of companies with a total of six related traders. Furthermore, two of the companies that formally requested individual examination also requested market economy treatment. Following provisional disclosure four of those companies reiterated their requests for individual examination.
(16) As explained in recital (47) of the provisional Regulation, the examination of such a high number of requests would have been unduly burdensome and would not have allowed the completion of the investigation within the time period established in the basic Regulation. Furthermore, the additional period of time between the provisional and definitive phases was not sufficient to allow the Commission to consider this large number of requests. The Commission therefore confirmed its decision not to grant any requests for individual examination.
(17) The CCCME, Bodo Vehicle, Suzhou Rununion and Jinhua Vision reiterated their claim that since subparagraph (a)(ii) of section 15 of the Protocol of Accession of the PRC to the World Trade Organisation (‘WTO’) had lapsed after 11 December 2016, the existence of dumping should be established on the basis of the domestic prices and costs of the Chinese exporting producers. The Commission addressed that claim as explained in section 3.1.1 of the provisional Regulation.
(18) The Commission applied the legislation in force and applicable to this investigation, namely Article 2(7)(a) and (b) of the basic Regulation.
(19) Giant Electric Vehicle ‘Giant’ responded to the provisional disclosure, restating its claims that the Commission should have granted Giant MET as, in Giant's view, it fulfilled the MET criteria in Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation, notably criteria 1 and 3. In particular, Giant challenged the Commission's interpretation of State interference, submitting that the possibility of State interference was not sufficient to reject an MET claim. In addition, it restated its arguments that the impact of the distortions on the price of aluminium was not significant.
(20) Concerning criterion 1, the Commission found significant State interference in relation to the aluminium market as described in detail in the MET disclosure document dated 3 May 2018, the letter of 29 May replying to Giant's comments on the MET disclosure and the provisional Regulation, in particular recitals (88) and (89). The Commission found that the Chinese government can exercise complete control over the aluminium market and regulates the aluminium market with the objective to prevent arbitrage in the economic sense. The Commission found that that situation results in a distorted aluminium market the PRC and constitutes significant State interference by the Chinese government. The distortion in the aluminium market is so strong that there is no arbitrage, lack of whichper seconstitutes significant distortion.
(21) Giant never challenged the Commission's findings of significant State interference in the PRC's aluminium market and of the Chinese government's complete control over it. It merely claimed that the effect of this State interference was not significant in value terms during the investigation period. The Commission cannot accept the proposed interpretation, which is not supported by the case-law cited by Giant(6). In fact, according to case-law, criterion 1 precludes the granting of MET where the State has significantly interfered with the operation of market forces. The significant State interference in that regard would not support the conclusion that market economy conditions prevail for a producer operating in such market.(7)
(22) Thus, the Commission's finding regarding criterion 1 in the provisional Regulation was confirmed.
(23) Concerning criterion 3, Giant claimed that the Commission did not address its claims that the financial incentives were insignificant and not carried over from the former non-market economy system but an expression of legitimate industrial policy. In addition, Giant resubmitted that the Commission should have considered the significance of the land-use rights being granted basically for free over their life of 50 years.
(24) The Commission notes that the claim regarding financial incentives as well as the methodology applied in relation to the land-use rights, was not only already extensively dealt with in the MET disclosure document, but were also addressed in the letter of 29 May 2018 replying to Giant's comments. In addition, the Commission's reasoning is also described in the provisional Regulation, in particular in recitals (91) and (92).
(25) Based on the reasoning described in those documents, the Commission concluded that the preferential tax rate was a financial incentive of a quasi-permanent open-ended character which could also serve the purpose of attracting capital at discounted rates, thereby significantly distorting competition over a long period of time. The Commission also concluded that the tax deduction for R&D expenses was recurrent and not limited in time and therefore would have similar effect. Finally, the Commission recalls that the Giant effectively did not pay for its land-use rights (see recital (21)). Giant did not present any new argument.
(26) Thus, criterion 3, that is, the requirement that there are no significant distortions carried over from the former non-market economy system, remains not fulfilled.
(27) The CEIEB claimed that the denial of MET to a Chinese exporting producer was discriminatory, as the Union industry purchases aluminium frames from the PRC and therefore also benefits from the distortions in the aluminium market in the PRC. The CEIEB also raised the issue of imports of aluminium frames from the PRC by the Union industry under a duty suspension scheme. Those claims were rejected. Purchases by the Union industry are irrelevant for the analysis under Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation which aims at examining whether an exporting producer is entitled to MET for the determination of the normal value. As a result, the Commission did not consider it relevant for the MET determination.
(28) In the absence of comments concerning the investigation period and period considered, recital (7) of the provisional Regulation is confirmed.
(29) After the publication of the provisional Regulation, three Chinese exporting producers, one importer and the CCCME reiterated their claim set out in recitals (57) to (63) of the provisional Regulation to exclude electric bicycles with an auxiliary motor pedal assistance of up to 45 km/h (‘speed electric bicycles’) from the product scope.
(30) Those parties argued that speed electric bicycles have significantly different characteristics and intended uses, are not subject to the same regulatory requirements, have significantly different prices and costs, and that, from the consumers' perspective, they are not interchangeable with the other electric bicycles with an auxiliary motor pedal assistance of up to 25 km/h covered by this investigation.
(31) The CCCME claimed that the Commission had failed to note that the consumer alteration of the software on cut-off speed mentioned by the complainant was illegal and added that this prospect could not be treated as a likely possibility.
(32) The complainant agreed that it was illegal for consumers to increase the auxiliary motor pedal assistance cut-off speed by making alterations to the software. However, it recalled that its claim was not related to such possibility but to the modifications by economic operators (importers, traders) before the electric bicycles were sold on the Union market. Indeed, when those changes to software programming involve a decrease in the cut-off speed of the auxiliary motor pedal assistance, they would be legal from a product type approval perspective. The complainant added that such changes to software programming created an obvious risk of circumvention of the anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures.
(33) The Commission points out that recital (65) of the provisional Regulation does not only refer to consumer alteration of the software but to software programming in general. In addition, the same recital clearly referred to both the possibility to change the cut-off speed upwards and downwards. While the CCCME notes that an increase by the consumer of the auxiliary motor pedal assistance cut-off speed would be illegal, it does not question other software programming changes, such as decreasing the cut-off speed of the auxiliary motor for pedal assistance by economic operators mentioned in recital (32) of this Regulation. The argument was therefore rejected.
(34) Following final disclosure, the CCCME argued that the Commission only presented the argument concerning economic operators rather than the consumers altering the software programming to increase or decrease the speed of the auxiliary motor assistance for the first time in the final disclosure. That statement is incorrect. As noted in the previous recital, recital (65) of the provisional Regulation referred to all types of software programming, irrespective of who carries out the software programming. There is no indication that recital (65) of the provisional Regulation only referred to software programming carried out by consumers and did not include software programming carried out by economic operators. In any event, the Commission observes that inclusion in the final disclosure is sufficient to allow all interested parties to comment.
(35) The CCCME claimed that the complainant's statement that all electric bicycles were subject to the same tests under the norm EN 15194 was inaccurate. The CCCME submitted that the norm EN 15194 subjects all electric bicycles to the same test procedures. That norm, however, has no bearing on the difference in speed which commands different requirements and makes speed electric bicycles not interchangeable with other electric bicycles. The CCCME further argued that speed electric bicycles, as opposed, to ordinary electric bicycles, did not fall under the scope of norm EN 15194.
(36) The CCCME submitted that speed electric bicycles are covered as moped vehicles for use on public roads by Regulation (EU) No 168/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(8). That Regulation excludes electric bicycles with an auxiliary motor pedal assistance of up to 25 km/h. Additional rules applying to speed electric bicycles cover taxes, licensing and insurance, license plates and moped compliant helmet and safety compliance checks.
(37) The CCCME submitted that the reasoning set out in recital (70) of the provisional Regulation that all electric bicycles share the same physical characteristics does not overcome the argument that there are distinct equipment and regulatory requirements associated with speed electric bicycles. The CCCME claimed that due to those distinct requirements, speed electric bicycles were not interchangeable with other electric bicycles and that consumers supported this view. In order to substantiate that argument, the CCCME mentioned the opposition of the European Cyclist Federation to the Commission's proposal to request third party liability insurance for all electric bicycles, not only speed electric bicycles.
(38) The complainant reiterated its claim that all electric bicycles share the same physical characteristics. In particular, the complainant submitted that all electric bicycles are made of the same bicycle parts and components, and that there are no bicycles' parts which are exclusively used for speed electric bicycles. This includes the motors manufactured by the major motor producers which can be used to power all types of electric bicycles with the adequate software programming. The difference between speed electric bicycles and other electric bicycles cannot therefore be reliably established on the basis of their physical appearance.
(39) The complainant submitted that consumer perception is not a determining factor for the determination of the product scope in trade defence proceedings and claimed that electric bicycles of all auxiliary motor pedal assistance levels are available in the different use categories (for example, for use in commuting, trekking, racing, and on mountains) and are marketed to all customer groups irrespective of their age and gender. Consumer perception and use therefore does not justify an exclusion of speed electric bicycles from the product scope.
(40) The complainant submitted that the criterion of type approval and more generally the classification under Regulation (EU) No 168/2013 are not suitable for the definition of the product scope in the present case. The complainant argued that not all speed electric bicycles are subject to type approval but only those intended for use on public roads. This would exclude, for instance, an electric mountain bike used exclusively for competitive events or off-road mountains which would also not be subject to the further requirements related to type approval (license plate, helmet and insurance).
(41) Furthermore, the complainant argued that electric bicycles which are not subject to type approval under the Regulation (EU) No 168/2013 are nevertheless subject to the exact same product safety requirements under the Union machinery directive. The complainant further added that the applicable norm setting specific requirements is the same for all electric bicycles, namely the harmonised norm EN 15194 and therefore restated the claim reflected in recital (64) of the provisional Regulation.
(42) The Commission assessed that the claims above made by the CCCME concerning interchangeability, regulatory requirements and consumer perception were a repetition of those already addressed in recitals (67) to (73) of the provisional Regulation.
(43) The Commission noted that its proposal to extend the requirement of third-party liability insurance to all electric bicycles, used by the CCCME to substantiate the claimed difference in consumer perception, equally showed that the differences in regulatory requirements were evolving and did not provide a suitable and stable basis to exclude speed electric bicycles from the product scope.
(44) The Commission concluded that the additional information submitted was not of a nature to alter its findings regarding the product scope, namely that electric bicycles share the same basic physical characteristics and properties and that consumer perception and uses overlap significantly. The arguments of the CCCME were therefore rejected.
(45) One interested party argued that the product scope of the investigation should be limited to low-end electric bicycles. Mid- and high-end electric bicycles should be removed from the product scope, since there is allegedly no dumping taking place in the mid-and high-end segment of electric bicycles. That interested party claimed that quality and performance, price, cost and profit margin of electric bicycles could be used to differentiate between those market segments.
(46) The Commission recalled that the product concerned and the like product were defined on the basis of their physical characteristics. Criteria such as price, cost and profit margin cannot be used to define the product concerned(9). As to quality and performance, beyond the fact that the interested party did not explain how to measure and quantify these elements in a systematic way, the Commission recalls that quality and performance can be taken into account through adjustments for physical characteristics. In any event, even if they were relevant for defining the product scope, quod non, the Commission notes that although several interested parties put forward similar claims during the investigation, none provided any pertinent information that would have justified or allowed for a possible segmentation of the market. In the absence of any evidence, the Commission in any event had to reject that argument and confirmed the findings laid out in recital (122) of the provisional Regulation.
(47) In the absence of any other comments with respect to the product scope, the Commission confirmed the conclusions set out in recitals (67) to (74) of the provisional Regulation.
(48) No comments were received regarding the choice of the Union industry as analogue country and no alternative analogue countries were suggested. Recital (103) of the provisional Regulation is therefore confirmed.
(49) As set out in recital (103) of the provisional Regulation, the normal value was based on the prices actually paid or payable in the Union for the like product. No comments on that point were received.
(50) Two Chinese exporting producers disputed the values used for the normal value, taking examples of product type (PCN) pairs where one should be, according to the common understanding in the electric bicycles industry, more expensive than the other, but were in fact cheaper. Those two exporting producers claimed that the Commission should adjust the normal value per PCN to be more ‘in line’ with the presumed cost of the materials and parts used.
(51) That claim was denied, as the normal value is based on actual prices paid in the Union for the like product. Each electric bicycle is composed of multiple components, which together with other factors determine the sales price. The combined effect of those components and factors can outweigh the impact of the price differences of one particular component as claimed by both exporting producers. Those two exporting producers did not claim an adjustment for physical differences under Article 2(10)(a) of the Regulation.
(52) Recitals (104) to (106) of the provisional Regulation are therefore confirmed.
(53) Following final disclosure, two exporting producers argued that the explanation provided in recital (51) would be insufficient. Those exporting producers gave an example of two PCNs differing only in the power level of the engine assistance. In that example, the PCN with the lower-powered engine assistance fell into the more expensive normal value range than the PCN with the higher-powered engine assistance.
(54) The Commission noted that such a situation was not typical for the normal value used in this investigation, as in most cases the more expensive PCN characteristics fell into more expensive normal value ranges. Indeed, the average normal value of PCNs with the higher assistance level is 60,8 % higher than the PCN's with the lower assistance level. The situation referred to in recital (53) can occur without compromising the reliability of this normal value for fair comparison purposes, as the normal value is based on the sales in the Union of multiple Union producers. Those sales inherently include price differences depending on the particular models influencing the price per PCN in the sales mix. Also, the normal value of the product concerned presented in ranges seemingly amplifies the price difference in some cases. This is because two PCNs with a very small price difference can be shown in two different ranges if their prices are close to the range limits.
(55) In the absence of any other claims regarding the normal value, recitals (104) to (106) of the provisional Regulation are therefore confirmed.
(56) In the absence of any comments regarding the export price, recitals (107) to (109) of the provisional Regulation are confirmed.
(57) One exporting producer claimed that the Commission should not deduct credit costs incurred between the producer and its related sales companies in Europe. That claim was accepted. This resulted in an adjustment to the export price of less than 1 %.
(58) The same exporting producer asked whether the normal value included packaging costs, and if so, whether the comparison with the export price was made ‘packed to packed’. That claim was accepted for all exporting producers as the normal value was determined on the basis of packed liked products. This resulted in an adjustment to the export price of less than 1 %.
(59) In recital (116) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission invited interested parties to provide reliable and verifiable quantification of costs for an adjustment under Article 2(10)(k) of the basic Regulation to account for the design, marketing and research and development (R&D) costs of brand-name importers.
(60) Two Chinese sampled exporting producers submitted claims for an adjustment under Article 2(10)(k) of the basic Regulation and provided evidence from their brand-name importers in the Union in this regard. The evidence provided consisted of data from the importers concerned regarding R&D and design costs. Those importers had been inspected as part of this investigation.
(61) The Commission considered the data submitted to justify the claims made and accepted that certain R&D and design costs were indeed required in the operations of the brand-name importers. It was however unable to accept the data of the importers selected by the exporting producers as that data covered issues wider than R&D and design costs of brand name importers. The significant differences in the reported cost categories expressed as a percentage of the two brand-name importers' turnover did not provide a representative basis for establishing the costs needed for the claimed adjustment.
(62) However, the Commission was able to identify those costs in the records of the sampled and verified Union producers, who provided the source of the data for the normal value in this investigation. The sampled and verified Union producers were therefore considered a reliable source of data for a normal value adjustment for R&D and design under Article 2(10)(k).
(63) On that basis, the Commission made an adjustment of 2,3 % to the normal value for the three Chinese exporting producers who sold only non-branded electric bicycles, that is to say that they produced electric bicycles in the PRC for brand holders in the Union.
(64) The Union industry noted the initial claims for R&D, design and other adjustments made by the two Chinese exporting producers and argued that such claims should not be accepted. They also argued that the 2,3 % adjustment made by the Commission should not be applied to another Chinese exporting producer, who had not claimed the adjustment.
(65) However, concerning the 2,3 % adjustment, the Commission based itself on financial data from the Union industry. Furthermore, in order to provide for a fair and reasonable comparison between the export price and the normal value, the adjustment had to be made for the three Chinese exporting producers concerned. The claim of the Union industry was, therefore, rejected.
(66) In their comments following final disclosure, the three Chinese exporting producers argued that the R&D and design adjustment should not have been based on the verified Union industry data, but on the data of two unrelated importers provided by the exporting producers following the provisional disclosure. Those importers also claimed that the Commission had failed to take into account all relevant cost differences needed for the price comparison. One exporting producer claimed the 2,3 % adjustment to the normal value is too low compared to its own costs relating to branding operations.
(67) The Commission sufficiently explained the source of that adjustment in recital (61) and notes that only the costs related to the operations of the brand holder importer which were additional to the operations of a standard importer could be taken into account for that adjustment.
(68) As to the claim that the Commission should have instead used the data from the two unrelated importers, the Commission would note the following points. The Commission notes that using the Union industry's data as the source for such an adjustment has been done before, in the proceeding concerning certain cast iron articles originating in the PRC(10), but the Commission has also used unrelated importers's data, as in the proceeding concerning certain footwear with uppers of leather originating in the PRC and Vietnam(11). In this case, the Commission found it appropriate to use the data of the Union producers who had incurred costs relating to branding.
(69) Firstly by using the Union producers's data, the Commission was able to collect a full dataset from all producers. Therefore, the data used is more representative than that from two unrelated importers.
(70) Secondly the Commission did not verify the datasets provided by the two unrelated importers, the reason being that data was submitted after the verification visits took place. By contrast, the data from the Union producers had been specifically verified.
(71) The Commission further notes that given that the data from the Union industry was used to calculate normal value, as well as to calculate the non-injurious price, using data from the same companies was more coherent.
(72) Following the final disclosure, Giant asked for the R&D and design 2.3 % adjustment to be applied to a part of its sales, where those activities were provided by their customer, namely the brand holder importer. That adjustment was granted, leading to a 1,2 % points decrease in its dumping margin. The result was disclosed and was not subject to further comment.
(73) Three Chinese exporting producers reiterated the claim made before provisional disclosure, set out in recitals (118) to (122) of the provisional Regulation, that the PCN used by the Commission throughout the investigation should be expanded to include other elements.
(74) Those three Chinese exporting producers did not provide any new information to allow that claim to be re-examined. The findings in recitals (121) to (122) of the provisional Regulation were, accordingly, upheld.
(75) Those three Chinese exporting producers reiterated the same claim following the final disclosure, without providing any new information. Contrary to the arguments put forward in their latest comments, the Commission carefully considered the evidence provided by the sampled Chinese exporting producers and all other available information and explained its conclusions in recitals (118) to (122) of the provisional Regulation.
(76) One Chinese exporting producer requested evidence as to the level of trade of the sales of the Union industry on the domestic market, used for normal value calculation purposes, in order to consider whether a claim for a level of trade adjustment under Article 2(10)(d)(i) of the basic Regulation was warranted. That information, which was considered confidential by all interested parties, including the Chinese exporting producer itself, was made available in ranges by interested parties in the open file. It showed that typically more than 85 % of the sampled Union producer's sales were to retailers.
(77) Following that new evidence being placed on the open file, the Chinese exporting producer submitted a level of trade adjustment claim. Because said Chinese exporting producer had related sales companies in the Union, it also considered that the adjustments made under Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation to its export price changed the level of trade of its sales from retailers to distributors. The same argument was made after final disclosure. The Commission noted that the adjustments under Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation are intended to remove the effect of related importers in the Union, not to change the level of trade of the sale, which remained essentially (typically above 85 %) to retailers. After review of the arguments presented, the Commission rejected that claim.
(78) As detailed in section 3, the Commission took into account interested parties' comments and recalculated the dumping margin of all Chinese exporting producers.
(79) The definitive dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:Table 1Definitive dumping marginsCompanyDefinitive dumping marginBodo Vehicle Group Co., Ltd.86,3 %Giant Electric Vehicle (Kunshan) Co.32,8 %Jinhua Vision Industry Co., Ltd and Yongkang Hulong Electric Vehicle Co., Ltd.39,6 %Suzhou Rununion Motivity Co., Ltd.100,3 %Other cooperating companies48,6 %All other companies100,3 % Company Definitive dumping margin Bodo Vehicle Group Co., Ltd. 86,3 % Giant Electric Vehicle (Kunshan) Co. 32,8 % Jinhua Vision Industry Co., Ltd and Yongkang Hulong Electric Vehicle Co., Ltd. 39,6 % Suzhou Rununion Motivity Co., Ltd. 100,3 % Other cooperating companies 48,6 % All other companies 100,3 %
Company Definitive dumping margin
Bodo Vehicle Group Co., Ltd. 86,3 %
Giant Electric Vehicle (Kunshan) Co. 32,8 %
Jinhua Vision Industry Co., Ltd and Yongkang Hulong Electric Vehicle Co., Ltd. 39,6 %
Suzhou Rununion Motivity Co., Ltd. 100,3 %
Other cooperating companies 48,6 %
All other companies 100,3 %
Company Definitive dumping margin
Bodo Vehicle Group Co., Ltd. 86,3 %
Giant Electric Vehicle (Kunshan) Co. 32,8 %
Jinhua Vision Industry Co., Ltd and Yongkang Hulong Electric Vehicle Co., Ltd. 39,6 %
Suzhou Rununion Motivity Co., Ltd. 100,3 %
Other cooperating companies 48,6 %
All other companies 100,3 %
(80) Following the publication of the provisional Regulation and comments received, the Commission further examined the situation of certain Union producers of the like product which had reported imports of the product concerned as referred to in recitals (130) to (132) of the provisional Regulation.
(81) In accordance with Article 4(1)(a) of the basic Regulation, the Commission established that six companies initially considered to be part of the Union industry should be excluded from the definition of the Union Industry. Following comments, the Commission reassessed the situation of those six companies and concluded that the interest represented by their import activity exceeded the interest represented by their production activity. As a result, it excluded those six companies from the definition of Union industry.
(82) Given that six Union producers were excluded from the Union industry definition, the remaining 31 producers constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.
(83) The injury indicators for market share, production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, employment and productivity were revised accordingly, as described under recitals (106), (113) and (121).
(84) In the absence of any comments with respect to the Union consumption, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (133) to (135) of the provisional Regulation.
(85) Following the publication of the provisional Regulation, the CCCME repeated its request that the source and the detailed exports statistics submitted by the Complainant be disclosed and reiterated its claim that the description of the methodology followed by the Complainant to identify the product concerned was not sufficiently detailed. The CCCME did not provide new nor additional arguments in support of those claims, which were already addressed in recitals (143) to (148) of the provisional Regulation. Those claims were therefore rejected.
(86) Following final disclosure, the CCCME questioned why – despite the removal of six producers from the definition of the Union industry referred to in recital (82), the market share of Chinese imports and imports from other third countries remained unchanged. In that respect, it is noted that the market share is calculated as a percentage of total Union consumption. As stated in recital (84), Union consumption was not revised since the publication of the provisional Regulation. Therefore, the market shares of Chinese imports and imports from other third countries remained unchanged as well.
(87) One unrelated importer claimed that the decrease in prices of imports from the PRC was not due to unfair trade practices but to the decrease in the cost of lithium and the intense competition to win market share in the Union. However, it did not explain how these developments would invalidate any of the findings laid out in the provisional Regulation, notably the finding of dumping. The claim has therefore to be rejected and the reasoning in recitals (151) to (158) of the provisional Regulation is upheld.
(88) The CCCME and some exporting producers claimed that the Commission had wrongly assessed the evolution of the average price of Chinese imports by observing that it was markedly below the average price of Union producers and third countries. Those parties claimed that the average price of Chinese imports disclosed nothing about potential undercutting in the absence of a ‘like-for-like analysis’, namely an analysis on the basis of the product type. They claimed that the Commission should acknowledge that a declining average price of Chinese imports may well just reflect a change in product mix.
(89) As indicated in recital (154) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission agrees that a change in product mix may influence the evolution of the average price of imports from the PRC. However, it remains that the average prices of imports from the PRC have been constantly and significantly below the average prices from any other source of supply despite a context in which the CCCME itself claims that the product concerned improved in quality and expanded to higher price segments. In addition, this declining trend has to be considered in relation with the like-for-like analyses which led to findings of substantial undercutting and dumping.
(90) With regard to undercutting calculations, one Chinese exporting producer with related importers in the Union claimed that the Commission should have used the reported CIF values of its imports instead of using a constructed CIF value. It claimed that the methodology used to determine the CIF value used in the undercutting calculations should be disclosed. It also claimed that by using such methodology, the Commission had artificially brought its prices to Union's border's level which is not the point where it competes with Union producers. It further submitted that such methodology introduced a difference in level of trade which made the price comparison unfair.
(91) First, the Commission notes that it has duly disclosed to all parties concerned, including the Chinese exporting producer in question, the methodology used for the undercutting calculation (the Union industry's unit price was compared with the unit price of each exporting producer per product type and the difference was multiplied by the exporting producer's exported quantity). Second, the same claim concerning the construction of the export price of that Chinese exporting producer for the dumping calculation was rejected as set out in recital (75). In fact, for the same reasons, namely the construction of the CIF price does not change the level of trade of the sale, which remains predominantly (typically above 85 %) to retailers, the Commission also has to reject the claim for the undercutting calculation. Finally, the Commission cannot use for the undercutting calculation the reported CIF prices because the underlying sales took place between related parties. In addition, the Chinese exporting producer in question did not establish how those prices could be reliable despite this relationship.
(92) Following final disclosure, the same interested party repeated the claim described in recital (90).
(93) The Commission recalls that, as far as the determination of the undercutting margin is concerned, the basic Regulation does not prescribe a specific methodology. The Commission therefore enjoys a wide margin of discretion in assessing that factor. That discretion is limited by the need to base conclusions on positive evidence and to make an objective examination, as required by Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation. It should also be recalled that Article 3(3) of the basic Regulation specifically provides that the existence of significant price undercutting has to be examined at the level of the dumped imports, and not at the level of any subsequent resales price on the Union market.
(94) On that basis, when it comes to the elements taken into account for calculation of undercutting (in particular the export price), the Commission has to identify the first point at which competition takes (or may take) place with Union producers in the Union market. That point is in fact the purchasing price of the first unrelated importer because that company has in principle the choice to source either from the Union industry or from overseas suppliers. That assessment should be based on the export price at the Union frontier level which is considered to be a level comparable to the Union industry ex-works price. In the case of export sales via related importers, the point of comparison should be right after the good crosses the Union border, and not at a later stage in the distribution chain, e.g. when selling to the final user of the good. Thus, by analogy with the approach followed for the dumping margin calculations, the export price is constructed on the basis of the resale price to the first independent customer duly adjusted pursuant to Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. As that article is the only article in the basic Regulation which gives guidance on the construction of the export price, the application thereof by analogy is justified.
(95) That approach also ensures coherence in cases where an exporting producer is selling the goods directly to an unrelated customer (whether importer or final user) because, under that scenario, resale prices would not be used by definition. A different approach would lead to discrimination between exporting producers based solely on the sales channel that they use. The Commission considers that the establishment of the relevant import price for undercutting calculations should not be influenced by whether the exports are made to related or independent operators in the Union. The methodology followed by the Commission ensures that both circumstances receive equal treatment.
(96) Therefore, in order to allow for a fair comparison, a deduction of SG&A and profit from the resale price to unrelated customers made by the related importer is warranted in order to arrive to a reliable CIF price. The Commission, therefore, rejected that claim.
(97) The CCCME and four Chinese exporting producers claimed that the rejection of their claim for a level of trade adjustment under recital (157) of the provisional Regulation did not address the difference of prices arising at the level of OEM customers. Those interested parties submitted that a fair price comparison required an upward adjustment to reflect the mark-up of OEM customers and brand owners post-importation. The same argument was also raised again after disclosure.
(98) The Commission considered, as already explained in recital (157) of the provisional Regulation, the claim for an adjustment of the level of trade and concluded that there is no consistent and distinct price difference for OEM and brand owner sales in the Union. Adjusting upwards the Chinese import price by the brand importers mark-up allegedly reflecting a difference in level of trade would undermine the investigation's finding that there is no consistent and distinct price difference for OEM and brand owner sales in the Union. Thus, the claim was rejected.
(99) Following provisional disclosure, Giant made a claim concerning the calculation of the conventional customs duty in case of imports by related companies acting as an importer. They argued that the amount for the conventional customs duty should be based on the actual CIF value, not the constructed CIF value. That claim was accepted. The revised undercutting margins ranged from 16,2 % to 43,2 % as indicated in Table 2.Table 2Undercutting marginsCompanyUndercutting marginBodo Vehicle Group Co., Ltd.41,4 %Giant Electric Vehicle (Kunshan) Co.19,4 %Jinhua Vision Industry Co., Ltd and Yongkang Hulong Electric Vehicle Co., Ltd.16,2 %Suzhou Rununion Motivity Co., Ltd.43,2 % Company Undercutting margin Bodo Vehicle Group Co., Ltd. 41,4 % Giant Electric Vehicle (Kunshan) Co. 19,4 % Jinhua Vision Industry Co., Ltd and Yongkang Hulong Electric Vehicle Co., Ltd. 16,2 % Suzhou Rununion Motivity Co., Ltd. 43,2 %
Company Undercutting margin
Bodo Vehicle Group Co., Ltd. 41,4 %
Giant Electric Vehicle (Kunshan) Co. 19,4 %
Jinhua Vision Industry Co., Ltd and Yongkang Hulong Electric Vehicle Co., Ltd. 16,2 %
Suzhou Rununion Motivity Co., Ltd. 43,2 %
Company Undercutting margin
Bodo Vehicle Group Co., Ltd. 41,4 %
Giant Electric Vehicle (Kunshan) Co. 19,4 %
Jinhua Vision Industry Co., Ltd and Yongkang Hulong Electric Vehicle Co., Ltd. 16,2 %
Suzhou Rununion Motivity Co., Ltd. 43,2 %
(100) In the absence of any other comments with respect to the imports from the PRC and further to the revision of the undercutting calculations set out in recital (99), the Commission confirmed all other conclusions set out in recitals (136) to (157) of the provisional Regulation.
(101) Following the publication of the provisional Regulation, one importer claimed that the Commission should explain how it obtained and estimated the performance indicators since those provided in the provisional Regulation did not align with the figures provided by the sampled Union producers. In particular, it pointed out that none of the sampled Union producers had reported a decline in production and sales.
(102) The Commission refers to recital (162) of the provisional Regulation where it explained that macro-indicators were not only based on information gathered from the sampled Union producers but also from the market information submitted by the Confederation of the European Bicycle Industries (‘CONEBI’) and import statistics.
(103) As explained in recital (163) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission used for consumption the figure submitted by CONEBI and verified by the Commission. The Union industry's sales volume was obtained by deducing imports from the total consumption figure. The production was estimated on the basis of the relevant ratios of sales and production verified at the sampled Union producers.
(104) As stated in recital (164) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission followed the methodology described in the complaint and which was not commented upon during this investigation.
(105) In the absence of other comments, the Commission confirmed recitals (159) to (166) of the provisional Regulation.
(106) Following the exclusion of certain companies from the definition of the Union industry as explained in recitals (80) to (83), the figures for production, production capacity and capacity utilisation in the Union were revised as indicated in Table 3.Table 3Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation201420152016IPProduction volume (pieces)831 142976 8591 095 6321 066 470Index100118132128Production capacity (pieces)1 110 6411 366 6181 661 5871 490 395Index100123150134Capacity utilisation75 %71 %66 %72 %Index100958896Source:CONEBI, sampled Union producers, interested parties' submissions 2014 2015 2016 IP Production volume (pieces) 831 142 976 859 1 095 632 1 066 470 Index 100 118 132 128 Production capacity (pieces) 1 110 641 1 366 618 1 661 587 1 490 395 Index 100 123 150 134 Capacity utilisation 75 % 71 % 66 % 72 % Index 100 95 88 96 Source:CONEBI, sampled Union producers, interested parties' submissions
2014 2015 2016 IP
Production volume (pieces) 831 142 976 859 1 095 632 1 066 470
Index 100 118 132 128
Production capacity (pieces) 1 110 641 1 366 618 1 661 587 1 490 395
Index 100 123 150 134
Capacity utilisation 75 % 71 % 66 % 72 %
Index 100 95 88 96
Source:CONEBI, sampled Union producers, interested parties' submissions
2014 2015 2016 IP
Production volume (pieces) 831 142 976 859 1 095 632 1 066 470
Index 100 118 132 128
Production capacity (pieces) 1 110 641 1 366 618 1 661 587 1 490 395
Index 100 123 150 134
Capacity utilisation 75 % 71 % 66 % 72 %
Index 100 95 88 96
Source:CONEBI, sampled Union producers, interested parties' submissions
(107) The production volume of the Union industry thus increased by 28 % over the period considered despite a decrease of 3 % between 2016 and the investigation period. The production capacity increased by 34 % between 2014 and the investigation period. Production capacity increased by 50 % between 2014 and 2016 and then declined by 9 % between 2016 and the investigation period. Capacity utilisation declined from 75 % in 2014 to 72 % during the investigation period, with a decrease from 75 % to 66 % between 2014 and 2016 and an increase from 66 % to 72 % between 2016 and the investigation period. The trends described in the provisional Regulation remained therefore the same for production, production capacity and capacity utilisation after the revision of the companies which constituted the Union Industry.
(108) The CCCME and four exporting producers claimed that the growth in production did not indicate injury. They further submitted that Union producers had increased their capacity from 2014 and 2016. These interested parties claimed that it was only possible because the Union industry did not face competition until 2016 as would have been acknowledged in their complaint. They submit that between 2014 and 2016, the Union industry built a large excess capacity until they realised that this surplus capacity was affecting their profitability and cut back on capacity to improve profitability when sales remained strong. They noted however that capacity utilisation remained strong and that the decline observed in 2015-16 corresponded to a significant increase in capacity.
(109) The Commission noted that the complaint never stated that the Union Industry did not face competition between 2014 and 2016. As stated in recital (169) of the provisional Regulation, the increase in production was driven by the increase in consumption. However, after 2015, production and consumption diverged markedly and increasingly, translating the pressure on sales and a continued loss of market share. Likewise, capacity increased at the same pace as consumption until 2016 and the deterioration of the capacity utilisation was therefore linked to the same pattern. In addition, as explained in recital (172) of the provisional Regulation, the indicators for capacity and capacity utilisation are of limited relevance with regards profitability.
(110) Following disclosure, the CEIEB claimed that there was no link between the deterioration of the capacity and capacity utilisation and dumped imports from the PRC since it was difficult to determine which part of the capacity was used for conventional, which part for electric bikes, and since the production of conventional bicycles decreased by 3.7 % in 2016 according to figures published by CONEBI.
(111) The Commission recalled that the capacity and capacity utilisation were verified in relation with the product under investigation and excluded conventional bicycles. The claim was therefore rejected.
(112) In the absence of any other comments with respect to production, production capacity and capacity utilisation and taking into account the correction made in recital (106), the Commission confirmed the conclusions set out in recitals (167) to (172) of the provisional Regulation.
(113) Following the exclusion of certain companies from the definition of the Union industry as outlined in recitals (80) to (83), the figures for sales volume and market share of the Union industry were revised.Table 4Sales volume and market share201420152016IPTotal Sales volume on the Union market (pieces)850 971932 8461 061 9751 019 001Index100110125120Market share75 %68 %64 %51 %Index100928569Source:CONEBI, sampled Union producers, interested parties' submissions 2014 2015 2016 IP Total Sales volume on the Union market (pieces) 850 971 932 846 1 061 975 1 019 001 Index 100 110 125 120 Market share 75 % 68 % 64 % 51 % Index 100 92 85 69 Source:CONEBI, sampled Union producers, interested parties' submissions
2014 2015 2016 IP
Total Sales volume on the Union market (pieces) 850 971 932 846 1 061 975 1 019 001
Index 100 110 125 120
Market share 75 % 68 % 64 % 51 %
Index 100 92 85 69
Source:CONEBI, sampled Union producers, interested parties' submissions
2014 2015 2016 IP
Total Sales volume on the Union market (pieces) 850 971 932 846 1 061 975 1 019 001
Index 100 110 125 120
Market share 75 % 68 % 64 % 51 %
Index 100 92 85 69
Source:CONEBI, sampled Union producers, interested parties' submissions
(114) The Union industry's sales volume thus increased by 20 % during the period considered. The Union industry's sales volume increased by 25 % between 2014 and 2016 and then declined by 4 % between 2016 and the investigation period. The market share of the Union industry decreased significantly, going from 75 % in 2014 to 51 % during the investigation period. The trends described in the provisional Regulation remained the same for sales volume and market share after the revision of the companies which constituted the Union Industry.
(115) Following final disclosure, the CCCME claimed that the overall increase in sales of 20 % of the period considered must be deemed a strong performance and cannot be indicative of material injury.
(116) However, the 20 % increase in sales of the Union industry has to be seen in the light of a 74 % increase in Union consumption during the same period, as stated in Table 2 of the provisional Regulation. The Commission found no indication that an increase in sales which was that much lower than the increase in consumption could be considered a strong performance, and indeed not be indicative of material injury.
(117) The CCCME also claimed that, according to information in the complaint, the Union producers supporting the complaint only suffered a minor decrease in market share of 2 percentage points during the period considered. That small decrease would allegedly confirm that the complainants have not suffered material injury from imports of the product concerned.
(118) Pursuant to Article 3(1) of the basic Regulation the term injury is defined as ‘material injury to the Union industry’. Thus, the Commission is required to assess injury to the Union industry as a whole, not only to the complainants. The Commission found that the Union industry suffered a significant loss of market share of 24 percentage points. The fact that some Union producers lost less (or more) market share than others does not question that finding.
(119) In the absence of any other comments with respect to sales volume and market share and further to the correction made in recital (113), the Commission confirms all other conclusions set out in recitals (173) to (176) of the provisional Regulation.
(120) In the absence of comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recital (177) of the provisional Regulation.
(121) Following the exclusion of certain companies from the definition of the Union industry as outlined in recitals (80) to (83), the figures for employment and productivity of the Union industry were revised.Table 5Employment and productivity201420152016IPNumber of employees2 4882 9583 4583 493Index100119139140Productivity (pieces/employee)334330317305Index100999591Source:CONEBI, sampled Union producers, interested parties' submissions 2014 2015 2016 IP Number of employees 2 488 2 958 3 458 3 493 Index 100 119 139 140 Productivity (pieces/employee) 334 330 317 305 Index 100 99 95 91 Source:CONEBI, sampled Union producers, interested parties' submissions
2014 2015 2016 IP
Number of employees 2 488 2 958 3 458 3 493
Index 100 119 139 140
Productivity (pieces/employee) 334 330 317 305
Index 100 99 95 91
Source:CONEBI, sampled Union producers, interested parties' submissions
2014 2015 2016 IP
Number of employees 2 488 2 958 3 458 3 493
Index 100 119 139 140
Productivity (pieces/employee) 334 330 317 305
Index 100 99 95 91
Source:CONEBI, sampled Union producers, interested parties' submissions
(122) The Union industry thus increased the level of employment by 40 % over the period considered. Most of this increase occurred between 2014 and 2016. Employment increased by 1 percentage point between 2016 and the investigation period. Productivity declined by 9 % as a result of employment increasing at a higher pace than production. The trends described in the provisional Regulation remain the same for employment and productivity after the revision.
(123) In the absence of any other comments with respect to employment and productivity and further to the correction made in recital (121), the Commission confirmed all other conclusions set out in recitals (178) to (180) of the provisional Regulation.
(124) In the absence of any other comments with respect to the magnitude of the dumping and the recovery from past dumping, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recital (181) and (182) of the provisional Regulation.
(125) Following the imposition of provisional measures, the CEIEB, the CCCME and four other exporting producers submitted that the increase of 15 % in the average prices of the Union industry contradicted the Commission's findings that Chinese imports caused price suppression or depression to the Union industry's ability to increase its prices.
(126) First, the Commission observes that the reference year to measure this increase was 2014, when the Union industry recorded a very low level of profitability and its lowest profit margin over the period considered. Second, in this context, the increase in the average prices reflected the evolution of the average costs of production and did not go beyond it. Third, as stated in recital (185) of the provisional Regulation, such evolution does not necessarily mean that the cost and price of a comparable product increased in the same way as the average cost and price since the product range changes every season. Considering these elements and the findings concerning undercutting, the Commission therefore disagrees with the claim that the increase in the average price of the products sold by the Union industry invalidates the existence of price suppression or depression.
(127) Following the imposition of provisional measures, no comments with respect to labour costs of the sampled Union producers were submitted. Therefore, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recital (186) and (187) of the provisional Regulation.
(128) Following the imposition of provisional measures, the CEIEB claimed that the Commission could not, at the same time, define the end of the selling season in mid-July when assessing the conditions for registration and at the end of September when assessing the significance of inventories in its injury analysis. It further submitted that the increase in inventory between 2016 and the investigation period was insignificant.
(129) The Commission considered that the selling season lasted from March to September. In the registration Regulation, the Commission considered that it was reasonable to assume that a further substantial rise in imports was likely to undermine the remedial effect of the duty given that the deadline for imposing provisional measures was 20 July. Indeed, in this context, it meant that an increase in stocks levels would allow importers to supply the product concerned until the end of the selling season. In the provisional Regulation, based on the same seasonal patterns, the Commission observed that the fact that stocks stood in September of the investigation period at a higher level than in December a year before reflected a continued and significant increase in stocks since stocks levels should normally be low at the end of the selling season. The Commission assessed that there was no contradiction between those two analyses and confirmed the findings outlined in recitals (188) to (191) of the provisional Regulation.
(130) Following the imposition of provisional measures, the CEIEB submitted that the profit margin of the Union industry declined by only 0,4 % between 2016 and the IP when the pace of growth of Chinese imports accelerated which would show that there was no injury. In the same vein, the CCCME and four exporting producers claimed that the level of the profit margin of the Union industry during the IP and its evolution over the period considered did not characterize a situation of material injury.
(131) Whilst the investigation established the existence of a significant volume of imports at dumped and undercutting prices, it also established the strength in demand in the electric bicycle market which somewhat limited the negative effects on the profit margin of the Union Industry. This observation includes the period between 2016 and the IP, pointed out by the CEIEB, where the sharp increase in imports from the PRC coincided with a relatively small decline in sales of the Union industry due to the continued strength in consumption. Nevertheless, the Commission observed that the profit margin of the Union industry declined in all years but one and was overall at depressed levels. Furthermore, the conclusion of material injury is not based on a single indicator. Other indicators, of which some of financial nature such as cash flow, were analysed together with the evolution of the profit margin to conclude to a situation of material injury. The claim had therefore to be rejected.
(132) The CCCME further submitted that that the most likely explanation of the decline in profit margin between 2015 and the investigation period was not due to the pressure from Chinese imports but the Union industry's investments to increase its production capacity. The CCCME claimed that that argument had not been considered by the Commission.
(133) That comment was analysed in section 5.2.3 of the provisional Regulation, notably under recital (221) where the Commission explained that capital expenditure did not have a material impact on the profitability of the Union Industry. In the absence of additional information, the claim was therefore rejected.
(134) Following final disclosure, the CEIEB assessed that the target profit margin of 4,3 % was not significantly higher than the profit margin during the investigation period of 3,4 % and submitted that the level of profitability of the Union's industry during the investigation period was not evidence of injury.
(135) As stated in recital (198) of the provisional Regulation, the electric bicycle industry is a structurally cash-intensive business. It is therefore important to see whether the profitability achieved can generate a sufficient cash-flow to sustain the operations of the Union industry. As demonstrated in Table 11 of the provisional Regulation, the cash flow of the Union industry was weak during the investigation period, accounting for a mere 0,6 % of sales turnover. Therefore, when assessing the financial performance of the Union industry as a whole, and not looking at the profitability in isolation, the finding concerning the poor financial performance of the Union industry is maintained.
(136) Following final disclosure, the CCCME noted that large investments and employment could entail substantially increased fixed costs for the Union producers and have a significant impact on profitability, especially if capacity utilisation was low.
(137) As regards investments, as shown in recital (197) of the provisional Regulation, during the period considered investments represented no more than 2 % of sales. The Commission considered therefore that the Union industry made no ‘large investments’ which could have had a significant impact on profitability during the period considered.
(138) As regards employment, the CCCME argued that the huge capacity increase was closely reflected in a substantial employee growth. It is, however, also clear that the increase in employment was also driven by a significant increase in production.
(139) The Commission found that, in particular between 2014 and 2016, the employment mirrored the production much more closely than the production capacity. During the investigation period, where the Union sales and production developed negatively despite a growing Union consumption, the Union industry was not able to decrease employment, leading to a decreasing productivity per employee. Such a decreasing productivity and the consequent negative impact on the profitability of the Union industry is however directly linked to the increasing quantities of dumped imports of Chinese electric bicycles during the period considered.
(140) In the absence of any other comments on profitability, cash flow, investment, return on investments and ability to raise capital, the conclusion set out in recitals (192) to (199) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.
(141) Following the imposition of provisional measures, the CCCME and four Chinese exporting producers submitted that competition factors had not been addressed in the injury analysis. They claimed that the complaint admitted that imports from the PRC had not been a market issue until 2016, as long as they focused on the low and mid-level segments of the Union market and that the injury analysis should have focused on these specific segments. One importer further claimed that injury, if proven, would essentially affect or focus on the low-end segment of electric bicycles and, based on its own experience, did not exist in the high-end segments of the market.
(142) Notwithstanding the fact that the CCCME's claims were made on an inaccurate reading of the complaint, the Commission recalls that its conclusions were not based on the complaint but on its own investigation and findings concerning dumping, injury and causality. As established in recital (249) of the provisional Regulation, the investigation has shown that the Union industry is active in all market segments. Such differentiation of the product concerned was therefore not warranted and the claim had to be rejected.
(143) Following final disclosure, the CCCME argued that the Commission had not described in the provisional Regulation how it characterised the ‘entry-level products’ mentioned in recital (249) of the provisional Regulation. It also claimed that the impact of any growth in imports from the PRC (also from third countries) in recent years must be assessed having regard to the specific market segments in which those imported electric bicycles were sold.
(144) In that respect, ‘entry-level products’ are those electric bicycles which have the basic characteristics in the PCN structure. The definition of ‘entry-level products’ is different from the alleged differentiation of the market in segments. As stated in recital (42), although several interested parties put forward similar claims concerning segmentation, no one provided evidence that would have justified or allowed for a possible segmentation of the market. In particular, no physical or other objective criteria were provided by any interested party, which would support an analysis based on a segmentation of the market, as described in recitals (45) and (46).
(145) The CCCME also argued that since the loss of market share of the Union industry mostly affected Union producers other than the complainants, as explained in recital (117), the imports from the PRC and the production of the complainants has allegedly been in largely distinct market segments. However, as already mentioned in recital (118), the injury analysis covers the Union industry as a whole, not only the complainants. It is undisputed that the Union industry suffered a significant loss of market share of 24 percentage points, mainly to Chinese imports, which gained 17 percentage points of market share during the period considered.
(146) The CEIEB disagreed with the Commission's conclusion on injury. It claimed that the Union industry had performed extremely well with the exception of retention of market share. The CEIEB further argued that indicators of capacity, utilisation, sales volumes and employment had developed positively throughout the period considered and that the Commission's negative findings were based on inconsistent and shorter periods of analysis. In particular, the CEIEB claimed that for sales the period analysed was 2016-IP, while for capacity utilisation the period was 2014-2016.
(147) The CCCME and four exporting producers submitted that the statement made in recital (205) of the provisional Regulation that all of the indicators cited there ‘developed negatively’ was false and misleading. Those interested parties claimed that the indicator of ‘growth’ in terms of both production and sales, and the sales in terms of both value and volume, was substantially positive over the period considered. Further, it was claimed that the Union industry ‘capacity’ increased substantially and that both profitability and prices had also increased during the period considered. The CCCME added that contrary to had been stated in recitals (204) and (205) of the provisional Regulation, performance indicators and notably profitability were not depressed during the period considered. Finally, the CCCME claimed that since the complainant itself had admitted that the imports from the PRC did not start to grow and become competitive until 2016, a low profit margin in 2014 could only have been the commercial fault of the Union producers themselves.
(148) The Commission recalls that the purpose of its injury analysis is to assess the level of injury suffered by the Union industry. It involves an assessment of the relevance of each performance indicator, their relationships and evolution in and within the period considered. A mere comparison of the end points of each indicator taken separately cannot reflect the economic trends at work in the Union industry. In that regard, the finding concerning the indicator of growth was explained in recitals (177) and (200) of the provisional Regulation and relied on the substantial and growing divergence between the evolution of consumption and the evolution of the sales of the Union industry which translated into a very significant loss of market share. As explained in recitals (201) to (203), the impact of this divergence spread over time on production, stocks, capacity, capacity utilisation, and employment level. In addition, as explained in recital (204), the profit margin remained at an admittedly low level and on a declining trend in all years but one. Furthermore, considering that the electric bicycles business is cash intensive and relies on bank financing, the analysis of the financial position must take into account the translation of profits into operating cash flows which was insufficient and well below profit margins. Overall, the Commission therefore confirmed that the trends referred to earlier in this recital characterised a depressed and negative situation and confirmed its conclusion that the Union industry suffered material injury.
(149) Finally, the Commission disagreed with the CCCME's claim that the low profit margin of the Union Industry in 2014 could only be its commercial fault since the complainant had admitted that imports from the PRC did not start to grow and become competitive until 2016. The Commission assessed that that claim was based on an inaccurate reading of the complaint and, in any case, that it was contradicted by the investigation's findings which showed that imports from the PRC had a significant market share of 18 % in 2014 and had already doubled in volume by 2016. The claims of the CCCME had therefore to be rejected.
(150) The CEIEB as well as two importers claimed that the findings of material injury centrally relied on the Commission's assessment that the Union industry had lost market share to imports without considering that such loss was attributable to structural flaws such as the failure to recognise potential opportunities at the right time, make earlier investments in production capacity, unappealing products and inadequate sales channels.
(151) First the Commission observed that those statements seemed to contradict the claims of the CCCME and Chinese exporting producers who stated that the market of electric bicycles in the Union was dominated by the Union industry, that imports of Chinese electric bicycles had just gradually caught up in quality and competitiveness and eventually that the most likely cause of injury was an excessive investment in production capacity of the Union's industry.
(152) The Commission's further noted that the CEIEB claimed both that the Union industry did extremely well during the period considered (as stated in recital (146)) and that its business model and management was affected by structural flaws and other shortcomings stated in recital (151) of such a scale that it would explain why the sales of the Union industry grew by only 20 % over the period considered when imports from the PRC increased by 250 %.
(153) In that context, the Commission assessed that in order to be considered, such claim should have been precisely specified and quantified. In any event, the Commission recalled that whilst the loss of market share was an important element of its injury analysis, the latter was not limited to it. In this regard, the Commission refers to the analysis of other injury indicators and its finding of undercutting, all of which play into its assessment of the overall injury analysis. The Commission therefore rejected that claim.
(154) Following final disclosure, the CEIEB submitted that the Commission had stated in recital (115) of the General Final Disclosure Document that the mere existence of undercutting was enough to satisfy the condition of materiality and expressed its disagreement. The Commission nevertheless fails to see such statement under recital (115), which refers to ‘the analysis of other injury indicators and its finding of undercutting, all of which play into its assessment of the overall injury analysis’. The argument was therefore dismissed.
(155) Further to the imposition of provisional measures, the CCCME and four exporting producers claimed that the evolution of the non-confidential indexed indicators of the sampled Union's producers substantially undermined the Commission's conclusion that the Union industry has suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation.
(156) As is the standard practice of the Commission and was set out in recital (166) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission considered the microeconomic injury indicators using the verified data of the sampled Union producers. Those indicators contributed to the finding of material injury but cannot be read as, in themselves, making up a complete material injury finding (or, for that matter, replace the overall injury determination carried out by the Commission). As for macroeconomic injury indicators, they were established for the whole Union industry. The argument was therefore rejected.
(157) In the absence of any further comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions on injury set out in recitals (200) to (206) of the provisional Regulation.
(158) In the absence of comments and taking into account the revision of the market share of the Union industry under recitals (113) to (114) and of the undercutting margins under recitals (99), the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (209) of the provisional Regulation.
(159) One unrelated importer claimed that while the absolute level of imports from the PRC during the period considered was well above the volume of imports from other countries, the relative increase of imports from each country should also be considered. In particular, that interested party pointed out that imports from Switzerland had increased by 3 000 % during the period considered. The importer claimed that imports from countries other than the PRC had an impact in the market that cannot be merely considered as marginal as stated in recital (215) of the provisional Regulation.
(160) The Commission observed that imports from Switzerland had a market share of 1 % during the investigation period. In addition, the importer did not explain how its observations could invalidate the Commission's finding that imports from all countries other than the PRC did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports from the PRC and the injury suffered by the Union industry as reasoned in recitals (210) to (214) of the provisional Regulation. The claim was therefore rejected.
(161) Following the imposition of provisional measures, the CCCME and four exporting producers submitted that many Union producers in Central Europe imported parts from the PRC, assembled and sold electric bicycles in the Union. It added that the price of electric bicycles produced by those companies appear to be relatively low, which might be another cause of the injury suffered by the Union producers who produce high-end electric bicycles.
(162) The Commission recalls that the geographic scope of its investigation is the Union's market, not parts thereof. The investigation showed that Union producers of electric bicycles were active in all segments and that some sampled producers had production units located in Member States situated in Central European countries. In any event, the claim was not substantiated and was rejected.
(163) Furthermore, the CCCME and four exporting producers submitted that the poor performance of the Union industry might have been caused by the management mistakes by the Union producers.
(164) The Commission refers to its reply under recital (151). That claim did not provide any new element or was further substantiated and was therefore rejected.
(165) The CCCME and four exporting producers claimed that subsidies on the Union market might have favoured the sales of cheaper Chinese electric bicycles and called on the Commission to further investigate the impact of subsidies on the purchase patterns of electric bicycles on the Union market.
(166) The impact of subsidies to promote the use of electric bicycles is a distinct matter from the finding of undercutting and injury from Chinese imports. Again, the investigation has shown that the Union industry is active in all market segments. Therefore, even if the alleged subsidies were relevant to this assessment, they would not explain the increase of Chinese bicycles to the detriment of the cheaper bicycles produced in the Union but for the fact the Chinese bicycles are dumped. That claim was therefore rejected.
(167) In the absence of any further comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (210) to (222) of the provisional Regulation.
(168) The Commission confirmed its conclusions on causation set out in recitals (223) to (226) of the provisional Regulation.
(169) In recital (228) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission mistakenly indicated that it had received a letter of support from CONEBI in favour of the measures, when the submission was made on behalf of the Association of the European Two-Wheeler Parts' and Accessories' Industry (‘COLIPED’) which brings together national associations of parts suppliers.
(170) In the absence of any other comment, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (228) to (230) of the provisional Regulation.
(171) In the absence of comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (231) to (234) of the provisional Regulation.
(172) Throughout the investigation, 31 importers, of which 19 belonged to the CEIEB, expressed their opposition to the imposition of measures. 13 of these companies (for which the volume of imports was known) represented altogether 10 % of the total imports from the PRC in the investigation period.
(173) As explained in recital (81), six companies manufacturing the like product were excluded from the definition of the Union industry and reclassified as unrelated importers. Those companies expressed their support for the measures. Their imports represented close to 12 % of the total imports from the PRC during the investigation period.
(174) After the imposition of provisional measures, the CEIEB submitted that the opening of the investigation had caused extensive and diverse injury to a large number of importers.
(175) Upon the publication of the registration Regulation, the CEIEB conducted a declarative survey with sixty-five importers. The survey found that 21 % would not continue operations if definitive duties were imposed, 33 % had already stopped imports of electric bikes from the PRC but had still not found an alternative solution, 39 % had to increase the price of their products as a result of the investigation and 37,5 % had been affected financially by the initiation of the dumping investigation.
(176) The Commission observed that this survey took place in May 2018. At the time, the information available in the complaint and in the registration Regulation indicated a potential duty of 189 %.
(177) Yet, the Commission noted that a majority of the importers surveyed indicated that they would continue their activity in case definitive duties were imposed. Likewise, a majority had found an alternative source of supply or continued to import from the PRC.
(178) In recital (238) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission had indicated that the largest importers had been able to source suitable electric bicycles and/or had potential alternative sources of supply outside the PRC, including the Union industry. That finding was corroborated by the survey of the CEIEB and further confirmed by subsequent hearings with the CEIEB and other importers.
(179) Furthermore, the Commission observed that six importers representing a large volume of imports supported the imposition of measures, which confirmed the capacity of importers to adapt their activity to the imposition of measures.
(180) On balance, the Commission therefore concluded that the imposition of measures could have an adverse effect on small importers, but that the negative impact of the imposition of duties would be mitigated by the availability to source suitable bicycles in the Union industry, in other third countries and in the PRC at fair prices.
(181) Following the final disclosure, the CEIEB made a correction to its initial submission and indicated that its survey was not conducted upon publication of the registration Regulation but was made available online as of 22 June 2018 and had remained accessible online since that date.
(182) The CEIEB further claimed that its survey did not confirm that the majority of importers would continue its business despite the imposition of duties and referred to the information submitted during the hearing held on 5 October 2018. The CEIEB also submitted that it never provided any evidence that the majority of them had successfully found alternative supply chains without any negative impact on their businesses.
(183) On the basis of the survey presented by CEIEB, the Commission observed that 21 % of respondents indicated that they would stop their activity if duties were imposed. This means that the majority of respondents believed, at the time, that it was not a likely outcome. Furthermore, during the hearing of 5 October 2018, the CEIEB submitted information on behalf of 15 importers, of which 4 declared that they would not continue their activity if definitive measures were imposed. Those 4 importers represented 8 % of the total turnover of the 15 importers presented. The Commission recalls that it sampled 5 unrelated importers on the basis of the largest volume of imports into the Union. On the basis of that representative sample, the Commission drew its conclusions in relation to the impact of measures on importers. In this particular regard, none of the sampled importers indicated that it would be forced to cease its activities in the event of the imposition of definitive measures.
(184) In the same logic, the Commission concluded that if 33 % of respondents to the CEIEB survey declared that they had stopped imports of electric bikes from the PRC but had still not found an alternative solution, the majority continued importing from the PRC or had found an alternative source of supply. In addition, during the hearing with the CEIEB on 5 October 2018, 12 importers (representing 96 % of the turnover of the 15 importers presented) had already adapted their supply chain or were in the process of doing so. The same observation applies to the sampled importers verified by the Commission and presumably to the importers who brought their support in favour of the imposition of measures.
(185) The Commission therefore confirmed its findings in recitals (177) to (179).
(186) The CEIEB further submitted that the Commission did not assess adequately the difficulty and cost involved in the adaptation of the supply chain of importers caused by the imposition of measures and disregarded the situation of small importers.
(187) The Commission disagrees with that claim and makes reference to recital (180) of this Regulation and recital (242) of the provisional Regulation where the adverse effect of the imposition of measures on small importers was clearly stated. In addition, in recital (243) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission concluded that the imposition of measures was not in the interest of importers. The Commission maintains, however, the finding that this negative impact is mitigated by the possibility to source suitable electric bicycles from the Union industry, from other third countries and from the PRC at fair, non-injurious prices, and that it does not outweigh the positive effect of measures on the Union Industry.
(188) In the absence of any further comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recital (243) of the provisional Regulation.
(189) The CCCME, four Chinese exporting producers and two importers claimed the imposition of measures would reduce consumer choice, increase prices and play against environmental policies designed to encourage the use of electric bicycles.
(190) The CCCME questioned the Commission's provisional conclusion that the Union industry is active in all segments of the market and claimed it was not supported by any evidence from the Commission.
(191) Two importers claimed that the Union industry did not have the production capacity to fill the demand and that it was unsure whether alternative sources of supply could fill the gap.
(192) The Commission recalled that the verification of sampled producers confirmed that the Union industry was active in all segments of the market, including entry-level products.
(193) In addition, as stated in recital (249) of the provisional Regulation, it is expected that the measures will amplify and diversify the supply of electric bicycles from the Union Industry and alternative sources of supply by restoring competition on a level playing field while preserving the supply of imports from the PRC at fair prices.
(194) Furthermore, the level of capacity utilisation of the Union industry, the possibility to easily convert existing production lines for traditional bicycles to electric bicycles, and the speed at which the Union industry was able to expand its production capacity between 2014 and 2016 in an adverse context show that it has the potential, resources and skills to adjust to potential gaps in supply.
(195) The Commission reiterates that the imposition of measures on conventional bicycles did not reduce consumer choice, but increased the diversity of suppliers and of their countries of origins. The same market development is expected in the case of electric bicycles.
(196) With regards to the impact of the measures on prices, the Commission refers to recitals (250) and (251) of the provisional Regulation and in particular that the interest of the consumer could not be reduced to the price impact of bringing imports from the PRC to non-injurious levels.
(197) The claims had therefore to be rejected.
(198) In the absence of any further comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (244) to (252) of the provisional Regulation.
(199) In the absence of any further comments, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recital (253) of the provisional Regulation.
(200) In summary, none of the arguments put forward by interested parties demonstrate that there are compelling reasons against the imposition of measures on imports of the product concerned.
(201) Any negative effects on the unrelated importers cannot be considered disproportionate and are mitigated by the availability of alternative sources of supply, whether from third countries or from the Union industry. The positive effects of the anti-dumping measures on the Union market, in particular on the Union industry, outweigh the potential negative effect on the other interest groups.
(202) In the absence of any further comments, the Commission confirms its conclusions set out in recitals (254) to (255) of the provisional Regulation.
(203) In view of the conclusions reached with regard to dumping, injury, causation and Union interest, definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed in order to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports of the product concerned.
(204) For the purpose of determining the level of these measures, account was taken of the dumping margins found and the amount of duty necessary to eliminate the injury sustained by the Union producers, without exceeding the dumping margins found.
(205) Following the imposition of provisional measures, an exporting producer submitted that the Commission's methodology to calculate the non-injurious price of the Union producers was flawed. It claimed that by deducing the average profit during the investigation period and adding the target profit, the Commission disregarded the different profit levels achieved by the Union producers for different models. This interested party claimed that the non-injurious price should be calculated by deducting from the actual prices the average profit per PCN before adding the target profit.
(206) The Commission recalls that the basic Regulation does not provide any specific methodology to calculate the injury elimination level. Furthermore, the Commission's determination concerns the like product sold by the Union industry. In this respect, it is perfectly acceptable to remove the average profit of the Union industry from its average sales prices to determine the average cost of production of the like product and then add the target profit to calculate the injury elimination level. The Commission has consistently used this methodology in the past and holds significant discretion when carrying out this assessment.
(207) In this investigation, the injury is assessed for all product types as a whole. Indeed, all injury indicators including the profitability and the target profit are expressed as an average for all product types of the product concerned. When establishing the non-injurious price, this is done with a view to remove the injury from the Union industry caused by the dumped imports as a whole. In order to remove that injury, it is sufficient if the non-injurious price is established by uniformly increasing the sales price of all product types by the difference between the actual profit during the investigation period and the target profit, thereby allowing the Union industry to achieve the target profit. It is not necessary to individually assess the profitability situation for each individual product type.
(208) The argument was therefore rejected.
(209) The complainant disagreed with the target profit used by the Commission for calculating the non-injurious price. It submitted that the target profit should not be the average profit from the Union industry but the average profit from the companies not injured by Chinese imports in 2015. The complainant argued since the target profit is the reasonable profit that the Union producers could achieve in the absence of injury caused by dumped/subsidised imports, the Commission could not by definition take as reference point the profitability of Union producers already materially injured by dumped/subsidised imports. As an alternative, the complainant submitted that the target profit could be determined by reference with the target profit of traditional bicycles (8 %) adjusted upwards by 1,5 % to reflect additional technology, higher added value and additional investment requirements.
(210) The Commission recalls that the target profit is the profit that the Union industry as a whole can achieve in the absence of injurious dumping. As a consequence, it cannot be established on the basis of the profit achieved by a selected number of Union producers. The argument had therefore to be rejected. As far as the alternative claim (target profit used in the investigation concerning traditional bicycles adjusted upwards), the Commission recalls that each investigation is carried out on the basis of the specific facts of the case concerning the product concerned and not on facts established in investigations concerning other products. In this particular case, the Commission confirmed that the target profit used was appropriate and that there was no reason for it to resort to a target profit of another product. Thus, the claim had to be rejected.
(211) After final disclosure, the complainant reiterated its claims and submitted that in other cases the Commission had deviated from its standard methodology to establish the target profit by reference to relevant circumstances. As already outlined in recital (210), the Commission recalls that each case is assessed on the basis of its specific facts. In this particular case, the Commission concluded that there was no particular circumstance which would justify the use of the profit achieved by certain producers only, as requested by the complainant. That claim was therefore rejected.
(212) Finally, the Commission notes that, as outlined in recitals (59) to (63), it took into account certain costs incurred by the sampled Union producers to adjust the non-injurious price of the Union industry. The injury elimination level was adjusted accordingly, leading to a reduction of 3 % – 5 % to the injury margin. As described in recital (72), said adjustment was subject to a claim from Giant following the final disclosure. That claim was accepted and the resulting decrease of the underselling margin was disclosed without any further comment.
(213) Taking into account the adjustment made under recital (212) and in the absence of other comments concerning the injury elimination level, the methodology described in recitals (257) to (262) to the provisional Regulation was confirmed.
(214) Following the disclosure one Chinese exporting producer, Wettsen Corporation, submitted a price undertaking offer.
(215) Wettsen Corporation was not sampled, and although it had requested individual examination, that request along with all other requests for individual examination was rejected.
(216) The price undertaking offer was rejected for a number of reasons, which was communicated to Wettsen Corporation in a separate letter. The reasons were as follows:—first, Wettsen Corporation has a related party outside the PRC who also manufactures electric bicycles;—second, the price undertaking offer fixed the Minimum Import Price (‘MIP’) only for three major types of electric bicycles which did not cover all the types exported to the Union during the investigation period; and,—third, as the proposed MIP per type was an average of sales prices within that type, it would have allowed sales of higher priced electric bicycles at injurious prices by Wettsen Corporation while seemingly complying with the MIP. — first, Wettsen Corporation has a related party outside the PRC who also manufactures electric bicycles; — second, the price undertaking offer fixed the Minimum Import Price (‘MIP’) only for three major types of electric bicycles which did not cover all the types exported to the Union during the investigation period; and, — third, as the proposed MIP per type was an average of sales prices within that type, it would have allowed sales of higher priced electric bicycles at injurious prices by Wettsen Corporation while seemingly complying with the MIP.
— first, Wettsen Corporation has a related party outside the PRC who also manufactures electric bicycles;
— second, the price undertaking offer fixed the Minimum Import Price (‘MIP’) only for three major types of electric bicycles which did not cover all the types exported to the Union during the investigation period; and,
— third, as the proposed MIP per type was an average of sales prices within that type, it would have allowed sales of higher priced electric bicycles at injurious prices by Wettsen Corporation while seemingly complying with the MIP.
— first, Wettsen Corporation has a related party outside the PRC who also manufactures electric bicycles;
— second, the price undertaking offer fixed the Minimum Import Price (‘MIP’) only for three major types of electric bicycles which did not cover all the types exported to the Union during the investigation period; and,
— third, as the proposed MIP per type was an average of sales prices within that type, it would have allowed sales of higher priced electric bicycles at injurious prices by Wettsen Corporation while seemingly complying with the MIP.
(217) In view of the conclusions reached with regard to dumping, injury, causation and Union interest, and in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation, definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed on the imports of the product concerned at the level of the lower of the dumping and the injury margins found, in accordance with the lesser duty rule. In this case, except for one Chinese exporting producer, the definitive anti-dumping duty rate should accordingly be set at the level of the injury margins found.
(218) It is noted that an anti-subsidy investigation was carried out in parallel with the anti-dumping investigation. Pursuant to Article 24(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Union(12), in view of the use of the lesser duty rule and the fact that the definitive subsidy rates are lower than the injury elimination level, it is appropriate to impose a definitive countervailing duty at the level of the established definitive subsidy rates and then impose a definitive anti-dumping duty up to the relevant injury elimination level.
(219) In case of Yadea Technology Group Co., Ltd (‘Yadea’), a company-specific injury margin(13)was established in the parallel anti-subsidy investigation on the basis of the information provided by Yadea. The Commission therefore considered it appropriate to use Yadea's company-specific injury margin as opposed to the injury margin for cooperating companies in the anti-dumping investigation when considering the combined effect of anti-dumping and countervailing duties.
(220) Also, in the case of Yadea, the exporting producer with a dumping margin lower than the injury elimination level, the definitive countervailing duty was established at the level of the established definitive subsidy rate and a definitive anti-dumping duty was imposed at the level of the relevant dumping margin reduced by the amount of the countervailing duty. That reduction was necessary because in a situation where the normal value is established on the basis of Article 2(7)(a) of the basic Regulation, the imposition of a cumulated duty reflecting the level of subsidisation and the full level of dumping may result in offsetting the effects of subsidisation twice (‘double-counting’). In accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, the non-cooperating companies in the anti-dumping investigation (although cooperating in the parallel anti-subsidy investigation), are subject to the residual dumping margin and injury margin.
(221) Following final disclosure, the acceptance of a claim from Giant described in recitals (72) and (212) as well as a change of the countervailing duties in the parallel anti-subsidy investigation led to a change in the anti-dumping duties. That change was disclosed to interested parties and was not subject to any further comments in the framework of the anti-dumping investigation.
(222) Therefore, the rates at which the definitive anti-dumping duty will be imposed are set as in Table 6 as follows:Table 6Definitive measuresCompanyDumping marginSubsidy rateInjury elimination levelCountervailing dutyAnti-dumping dutyBodo Vehicle Group Co., Ltd.86,3 %15,1 %73,4 %15,1 %58,3 %Giant Electric Vehicle (Kunshan) Co., Ltd;32,8 %3,9 %24,6 %3,9 %20,7 %Jinhua Vision Industry Co., Ltd and Yongkang Hulong Electric Vehicle Co., Ltd.39,6 %8,5 %18,8 %8,5 %10,3 %Suzhou Rununion Motivity Co., Ltd.100,3 %17,2 %79,3 %17,2 %62,1 %Yadea Technology Group Co., Ltd48,1 %10,7 %62,9 %10,7 %37,4 %Other co-operating companies in the anti-dumping investigation (with the exception of the companies subject to the parallel countervailing duty rate for all other companies Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/72(14)) (Annex I)48,1 %9,2 %33,4 %9,2 %24,2 %Other co-operating companies in the anti-dumping investigation, subject to the parallel countervailing duty for all other companies Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/72) (Annex II)48,1 %17,2 %33,4 %17,2 %16,2 %Non-cooperating companies in the anti-dumping investigation, but cooperating in the parallel anti-subsidy investigation and listed in the Annex I of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/72 (Annex III)100,3 %9,2 %79,3 %9,2 %70,1 %All other companies100,3 %17,2 %79,3 %17,2 %62,1 % Company Dumping margin Subsidy rate Injury elimination level Countervailing duty Anti-dumping duty Bodo Vehicle Group Co., Ltd. 86,3 % 15,1 % 73,4 % 15,1 % 58,3 % Giant Electric Vehicle (Kunshan) Co., Ltd; 32,8 % 3,9 % 24,6 % 3,9 % 20,7 % Jinhua Vision Industry Co., Ltd and Yongkang Hulong Electric Vehicle Co., Ltd. 39,6 % 8,5 % 18,8 % 8,5 % 10,3 % Suzhou Rununion Motivity Co., Ltd. 100,3 % 17,2 % 79,3 % 17,2 % 62,1 % Yadea Technology Group Co., Ltd 48,1 % 10,7 % 62,9 % 10,7 % 37,4 % Other co-operating companies in the anti-dumping investigation (with the exception of the companies subject to the parallel countervailing duty rate for all other companies Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/72(14)) (Annex I) 48,1 % 9,2 % 33,4 % 9,2 % 24,2 % Other co-operating companies in the anti-dumping investigation, subject to the parallel countervailing duty for all other companies Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/72) (Annex II) 48,1 % 17,2 % 33,4 % 17,2 % 16,2 % Non-cooperating companies in the anti-dumping investigation, but cooperating in the parallel anti-subsidy investigation and listed in the Annex I of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/72 (Annex III) 100,3 % 9,2 % 79,3 % 9,2 % 70,1 % All other companies 100,3 % 17,2 % 79,3 % 17,2 % 62,1 %
Company Dumping margin Subsidy rate Injury elimination level Countervailing duty Anti-dumping duty
Bodo Vehicle Group Co., Ltd. 86,3 % 15,1 % 73,4 % 15,1 % 58,3 %
Giant Electric Vehicle (Kunshan) Co., Ltd; 32,8 % 3,9 % 24,6 % 3,9 % 20,7 %
Jinhua Vision Industry Co., Ltd and Yongkang Hulong Electric Vehicle Co., Ltd. 39,6 % 8,5 % 18,8 % 8,5 % 10,3 %
Suzhou Rununion Motivity Co., Ltd. 100,3 % 17,2 % 79,3 % 17,2 % 62,1 %
Yadea Technology Group Co., Ltd 48,1 % 10,7 % 62,9 % 10,7 % 37,4 %
Other co-operating companies in the anti-dumping investigation (with the exception of the companies subject to the parallel countervailing duty rate for all other companies Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/72(14)) (Annex I) 48,1 % 9,2 % 33,4 % 9,2 % 24,2 %
Other co-operating companies in the anti-dumping investigation, subject to the parallel countervailing duty for all other companies Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/72) (Annex II) 48,1 % 17,2 % 33,4 % 17,2 % 16,2 %
Non-cooperating companies in the anti-dumping investigation, but cooperating in the parallel anti-subsidy investigation and listed in the Annex I of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/72 (Annex III) 100,3 % 9,2 % 79,3 % 9,2 % 70,1 %
All other companies 100,3 % 17,2 % 79,3 % 17,2 % 62,1 %
Company Dumping margin Subsidy rate Injury elimination level Countervailing duty Anti-dumping duty
Bodo Vehicle Group Co., Ltd. 86,3 % 15,1 % 73,4 % 15,1 % 58,3 %
Giant Electric Vehicle (Kunshan) Co., Ltd; 32,8 % 3,9 % 24,6 % 3,9 % 20,7 %
Jinhua Vision Industry Co., Ltd and Yongkang Hulong Electric Vehicle Co., Ltd. 39,6 % 8,5 % 18,8 % 8,5 % 10,3 %
Suzhou Rununion Motivity Co., Ltd. 100,3 % 17,2 % 79,3 % 17,2 % 62,1 %
Yadea Technology Group Co., Ltd 48,1 % 10,7 % 62,9 % 10,7 % 37,4 %
Other co-operating companies in the anti-dumping investigation (with the exception of the companies subject to the parallel countervailing duty rate for all other companies Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/72(14)) (Annex I) 48,1 % 9,2 % 33,4 % 9,2 % 24,2 %
Other co-operating companies in the anti-dumping investigation, subject to the parallel countervailing duty for all other companies Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/72) (Annex II) 48,1 % 17,2 % 33,4 % 17,2 % 16,2 %
Non-cooperating companies in the anti-dumping investigation, but cooperating in the parallel anti-subsidy investigation and listed in the Annex I of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/72 (Annex III) 100,3 % 9,2 % 79,3 % 9,2 % 70,1 %
All other companies 100,3 % 17,2 % 79,3 % 17,2 % 62,1 %
(223) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during that investigation with respect to those companies. Those duty rates (as opposed to the country-wide duty applicable to ‘all other companies’) are thus exclusively applicable to imports of the product concerned originating in the PRC and produced by those companies and thus by the specific legal entities mentioned. Imported products concerned produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation with its name and address, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, cannot benefit from those rates and shall be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’.
(224) Any claim requesting the application of those individual company anti-dumping duty rates (e.g.following a change in the name of the entity or following the setting up of new production or sales entities) should be addressed to the Commission(15)with all relevant information, in particular any modification in the company's activities linked to production, domestic and export sales associated with, for example, that name change or that change in the production and sales entities. If appropriate, this Regulation will accordingly be amended by updating the list of companies benefiting from individual anti-dumping duty rates.
(225) In cases where the countervailing duty has been subtracted from the anti-dumping duty in order to avoid double-counting, the collection of the countervailing duty aims at offsetting both the effects of the countervailable subsidy and the dumping margin (up to the level of the subsidy rate). As a consequence, a refund of duty paid can only be granted if it is shown that such duty exceeds the actual subsidy rate and the corresponding dumping margin. Therefore, refund investigations under Article 21 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 should also consider the particular situation of the exporting producer in relation to the actual dumping margin prevailing during the refund investigation period.
(226) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual anti-dumping duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13 (1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. That investigation may,inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rates and the consequent imposition of a countrywide duty.
(227) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the high difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The companies with individual anti-dumping duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) hereof. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other companies’.
(228) In order to ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duty, the ‘all other companies’ duty rate should not only apply to the non-cooperating exporting producers but also to those producers which did not have any exports to the Union during the investigation period unless the latter comply with the conditions set out in Article 3.
(229) In order to ensure equal treatment between any new exporters and the cooperating companies not included in the sample, mentioned in Annex I and Annex II to this Regulation, provision should be made for the weighted average duty imposed on the latter companies to be applied to any new exporters which would otherwise be entitled to a review pursuant to Article 11(4) of the basic Regulation.
(230) In view of the recent case-law of the Court of Justice(16), it is appropriate to provide for the rate of default interest to be paid in case of reimbursement of definitive duties, because the relevant provisions in force concerning customs duties do not provide for such an interest rate, and the application of national rules would lead to undue distortions between economic operators depending on which Member State is chosen for customs clearance.
(231) As specified in recital (5), on 3 May 2018 the Commission made imports of the product concerned originating in the PRC subject to registration on the basis of a request by the Union industry. That request has since been withdrawn and therefore the matter has not been further examined.
(232) In view of the dumping margins found and given the level of the injury caused to the Union industry, the amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty, imposed by the provisional Regulation, should be definitively collected.
(233) The definitive duty rates are lower than the provisional duty rates. Thus, the amounts secured in excess of the definitive anti-dumping duty rate should be released.
(234) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of the basic Regulation,
Country Company Definitive anti-dumping duty TARIC additional code
People's Republic of China Bodo Vehicle Group Co., Ltd. 58,3 % C382
Giant Electric Vehicle (Kunshan) Co., Ltd; 20,7 % C383
Jinhua Vision Industry Co., Ltd and Yongkang Hulong Electric Vehicle Co., Ltd 10,3 % C384
Suzhou Rununion Motivity Co., Ltd 62,1 % C385
Yadea Technology Group Co., Ltd 37,4 % C463
Other co-operating companies in the anti-dumping investigation (with the exception of the companies subject to the parallel countervailing duty rate for all other companies Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/72) (Annex I) 24,2 %
Other co-operating companies in the anti-dumping investigation, subject to the parallel countervailing duty rate for all other companies Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/72 (Annex II) 16,2 %
Non-cooperating companies in the anti-dumping investigation, but cooperating in the parallel anti-subsidy investigation and listed in the Annex I of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/72 (Annex III) 70,1 %
All other companies 62,1 % C999
— it did not export to the Union the product described in paragraph 1 during the investigation period between 1 October 2016 to 30 September 2017,
— it is not related to any of the exporters or producers in the People's Republic of China which are subject to the measures imposed by this Regulation, and
— it has actually exported to the Union the product concerned after the investigation period on which the measures are based, or it has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union.
Company Name Province TARIC additional code
Acetrikes Bicycles (Taicang) Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C386
Active Cycles Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C387
Aigeni Technology Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C388
Alco Electronics (Dongguan) Limited Guangdong C390
Changzhou Airwheel Technology Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C392
Changzhou Bisek Cycle Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C393
Changzhou Rich Vehicle Technology Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C395
Changzhou Sobowo Vehicle Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C397
Changzhou Steamoon Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C398
Cycleman E-Vehicle Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C400
Dongguan Benling Vehicle Technology Co., Ltd. Guangdong C401
Dongguan Honglin Industrial Co., Ltd and Melton Industrial (Dong Guan) Co., Ltd Guangdong C402
Foshan Lano Bike Co., Ltd. Guangdong C405
Foshan Zenith Sports Co., Ltd. Guangdong C406
Guangzhou Symbol Bicycle Co., Ltd. Guangdong C410
Hangzhou Fanzhou Technology Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C411
Jiangsu Imi Electric Vehicle Technology Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C415
Jiangsu Lvneng Electrical Bicycle Technology Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C416
Jiangsu Stareyes Bicycle Industrial Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C417
Jiaxing Onway Ev Tech Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C418
Jinhua Enjoycare Motive Technology Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C419
Jinhua Feirui Vehicle Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C420
Jinhua Jobo Technology Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C421
Jinhua Suntide Vehicle Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C422
Jinhua Zodin E-Vehicle Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C424
Kenstone Metal (Kunshan) Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C425
Komda Industrial (Dongguan) Co., Ltd. Guangdong C426
Kunshan Sevenone Cycle Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C427
Nantong Tianyuan Automatic Vehicle Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C429
Ningbo Bestar Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C430
Ningbo Lvkang Vehicle Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C431
Ningbo Nanyang Vehicle Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C432
Ningbo Oner Bike Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C433
Ningbo Roadsan New Energy Technology Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C435
Ningbo Zixin Bicycle Industry Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C437
Pronordic E-Bikes Limited Company Jiangsu C438
Shenzhen Shenling Car Co., Ltd. Guangdong C442
Sino Lithium (Suzhou) Electric Technology Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C443
Skyland Sport Tech Co., Ltd. Tianjin C444
Suzhou Guoxin Group Fengyuan Imp & Exp. Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C446
Tianjin Luodeshengda Bicycle Co., Ltd. Tianjin C449
Tianjin Upland Bicycle Co., Ltd. Tianjin C450
Easy Electricity Technology Co., Ltd. Tianjin C451
Ubchoice Co., Ltd. Guangdong C452
Wettsen Corporation Shandong C454
Wuxi Shengda Bicycle Co., Ltd. and Wuxi Shengda Vehicle Technology Co.,Ltd Jiangsu C458
Wuxi United Mobility Technology Inc Jiangsu C459
Xiangjin (Tianjin) Cycle Co., Ltd. Tianjin C462
Yong Qi (China) Bicycle Industrial Corp Jiangsu C464
Yongkang Juxiang Vehicle Co, Ltd. Zhejiang C466
Yongkang Lohas Vehicle Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C467
Yongkang Mars Vehicle Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C468
Zhejiang Apollo Motorcycle Manufacturer Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C469
Zhejiang Baoguilai Vehicle Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C470
Zhejiang Goccia Electric Technology Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C472
Zhejiang Jsl Vehicle Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C473
Zhejiang Kaiyi New Material Technology Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C474
Zhejiang Lianmei Industrial Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C475
Zhejiang Tuer Vehicle Industry Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C477
Zhejiang Xingyue Vehicle Co., Ltd., Zhejiang Xingyue Overfly Electric Vehicle Co., Ltd. and Zhejiang Xingyue Electric Vehicle Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C478
Zhongxin Power (Tianjin) Bicycle Co., Ltd. Tianjin C480
Company Name Province TARIC additional code
Aima Technology Group Co., Ltd. Tianjin C389
Beijing Tsinova Technology Co., Ltd. Beijing C391
Changzhou Hj Pedal Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C394
Changzhou Ristar Cycle Co., Ltd Jiangsu C396
Cutting Edge Power Vehicle Int'l TJ Co., Ltd. Tianjin C399
Eco International Elebike Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C403
Everestt International Industries Ltd. Jiangsu C404
Geoby Advance Technology Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C407
Guangdong Commercial Trading Imp. & Exp. Corp., Ltd. Guangdong C408
Guangdong Shunde Junhao Technology Development Co., Ltd. Guangdong C409
Hangzhou Morakot E-Bike Manufacture Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C412
Hangzhou TOP Mechanical And Electrical Technology, Co. Ltd. Zhejiang C413
Hua Chin Bicycle & Fitness (H.Z.) Co., Ltd. Guangdong C414
Jinhua Yifei Electric Science And Technology Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C423
Nanjing Jincheng Machinery Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C428
Ningbo Pugonying Vehicle Technology Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C434
Ningbo Shenchima Vehicle Industry Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C436
Shandong Eco Friendly Technology Co., Ltd. Shandong C439
Shanghai Promising Int'l Trade & Logistics Co., Ltd. Shanghai C440
Shenzhen SanDin Cycle Co., Ltd. Guangdong C441
Suzhou Dynavolt Intelligent Vehicle Technology Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C445
Suzhou Joydeer E-Bicycle Co., Ltd Jiangsu C447
Taioku Manufacturing (Jiangsu) Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C448
Universal Cycle Corporation (Guang Zhou) Guangdong C453
Wuxi Bashan E-Vehicle Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C455
Wuxi Merry Ebike Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C456
Wuxi METUO Vehicle Co., Ltd. Jiangsu C457
Wuyi Simino Industry & Trade Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C460
Wuyi Yuema Leisure Articles Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C461
Yongkang Aijiu Industry & Trade Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C465
Zhejiang Enze Vehicle Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C471
Zhejiang Luyuan Electric Vehicle Co., Ltd. Zhejiang C476
Zhongshan Qiangli Electronics Factory Guangdong C479
Company Name Province TARIC additional code
Changzhou Fujiang Vehicle Co. Ltd Jiangsu C484
Jinhua Lvbao Vehicles Co. Ltd Zhejiang C486
Suzhou Leisger Vehicle Co. Ltd Jiangsu C487
Zhejiang Hangpai Electric Vehicle Co. Ltd Zhejiang C488
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union(1), and in particular Article 9(4) thereof,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1
1. A definitive anti-dumping duty is imposed on imports of cycles, with pedal assistance, with an auxiliary electric motor, originating in the People’s Republic of China. The product concerned currently falls within CN codes 8711 60 10 and ex 8711 60 90 (TARIC code 8711609010).
2. The rate of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the products described in paragraph 1 and manufactured by the companies listed below shall be as follows:
3. The application of the individual anti-dumping duty rates specified for the companies mentioned in paragraph 2 shall be conditional upon presentation to the customs authorities of the Member States of a valid commercial invoice, on which shall appear a declaration dated and signed by an official of the entity issuing such invoice, identified by his/ her name and function, drafted as follows: ‘I, the undersigned, certify that the (volume) of electric bicycles sold for export to the European Union covered by this invoice was manufactured by (company name and address) (TARIC additional code) in the People’s Republic of China. I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct.’ If no such invoice is presented, the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’ shall apply.
4. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply. The default interest to be paid in case of reimbursement that gives rise to a right to payment of default interest shall be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Union, in force on the first calendar day of the month in which the deadline falls, increased by one percentage point.
5. In cases where the countervailing duty has been subtracted from the anti-dumping duty for certain exporting producers, refund requests under Article 21 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 shall also trigger the assessment of the dumping margin for that exporting producer prevailing during the refund investigation period.
6. Where any new exporting producer in the People’s Republic of China provides sufficient evidence to the Commission, paragraph 2 may be amended by adding the new exporting producer to the appropriate annex with the cooperating companies not included in the sample and thus subject to the appropriate weighted average anti-dumping duty rate. A new exporting producer shall provide evidence that:
—
it did not export to the Union the product described in paragraph 1 during the investigation period between 1 October 2016 to 30 September 2017,
—
it is not related to any of the exporters or producers in the People’s Republic of China which are subject to the measures imposed by this Regulation, and
—
it has actually exported to the Union the product concerned after the investigation period on which the measures are based, or it has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union.

Article 2
The amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty under Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1012 shall be definitively collected. The amounts secured in excess of the definitive rates of the anti-dumping duty shall be released.

Article 3
Registration of imports resulting from Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/671 making imports of electric bicycles originating in the People’s Republic of China subject to registration shall be discontinued. No definitive anti-dumping duty will be levied retroactively for registered imports.

Article 4
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union(1), and in particular Article 9(4) thereof,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
1. A definitive anti-dumping duty is imposed on imports of cycles, with pedal assistance, with an auxiliary electric motor, originating in the People’s Republic of China. The product concerned currently falls within CN codes 8711 60 10 and ex 8711 60 90 (TARIC code 8711609010).
2. The rate of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the products described in paragraph 1 and manufactured by the companies listed below shall be as follows:
3. The application of the individual anti-dumping duty rates specified for the companies mentioned in paragraph 2 shall be conditional upon presentation to the customs authorities of the Member States of a valid commercial invoice, on which shall appear a declaration dated and signed by an official of the entity issuing such invoice, identified by his/ her name and function, drafted as follows: ‘I, the undersigned, certify that the (volume) of electric bicycles sold for export to the European Union covered by this invoice was manufactured by (company name and address) (TARIC additional code) in the People’s Republic of China. I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct.’ If no such invoice is presented, the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’ shall apply.
4. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply. The default interest to be paid in case of reimbursement that gives rise to a right to payment of default interest shall be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Union, in force on the first calendar day of the month in which the deadline falls, increased by one percentage point.
5. In cases where the countervailing duty has been subtracted from the anti-dumping duty for certain exporting producers, refund requests under Article 21 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 shall also trigger the assessment of the dumping margin for that exporting producer prevailing during the refund investigation period.
6. Where any new exporting producer in the People’s Republic of China provides sufficient evidence to the Commission, paragraph 2 may be amended by adding the new exporting producer to the appropriate annex with the cooperating companies not included in the sample and thus subject to the appropriate weighted average anti-dumping duty rate. A new exporting producer shall provide evidence that:
—
it did not export to the Union the product described in paragraph 1 during the investigation period between 1 October 2016 to 30 September 2017,
—
it is not related to any of the exporters or producers in the People’s Republic of China which are subject to the measures imposed by this Regulation, and
—
it has actually exported to the Union the product concerned after the investigation period on which the measures are based, or it has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union.
The amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty under Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1012 shall be definitively collected. The amounts secured in excess of the definitive rates of the anti-dumping duty shall be released.
Registration of imports resulting from Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/671 making imports of electric bicycles originating in the People’s Republic of China subject to registration shall be discontinued. No definitive anti-dumping duty will be levied retroactively for registered imports.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
ANNEX I
Company Name | Province | TARIC additional code
Acetrikes Bicycles (Taicang) Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C386
Active Cycles Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C387
Aigeni Technology Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C388
Alco Electronics (Dongguan) Limited | Guangdong | C390
Changzhou Airwheel Technology Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C392
Changzhou Bisek Cycle Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C393
Changzhou Rich Vehicle Technology Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C395
Changzhou Sobowo Vehicle Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C397
Changzhou Steamoon Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C398
Cycleman E-Vehicle Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C400
Dongguan Benling Vehicle Technology Co., Ltd. | Guangdong | C401
Dongguan Honglin Industrial Co., Ltd and Melton Industrial (Dong Guan) Co., Ltd | Guangdong | C402
Foshan Lano Bike Co., Ltd. | Guangdong | C405
Foshan Zenith Sports Co., Ltd. | Guangdong | C406
Guangzhou Symbol Bicycle Co., Ltd. | Guangdong | C410
Hangzhou Fanzhou Technology Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C411
Jiangsu Imi Electric Vehicle Technology Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C415
Jiangsu Lvneng Electrical Bicycle Technology Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C416
Jiangsu Stareyes Bicycle Industrial Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C417
Jiaxing Onway Ev Tech Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C418
Jinhua Enjoycare Motive Technology Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C419
Jinhua Feirui Vehicle Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C420
Jinhua Jobo Technology Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C421
Jinhua Suntide Vehicle Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C422
Jinhua Zodin E-Vehicle Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C424
Kenstone Metal (Kunshan) Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C425
Komda Industrial (Dongguan) Co., Ltd. | Guangdong | C426
Kunshan Sevenone Cycle Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C427
Nantong Tianyuan Automatic Vehicle Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C429
Ningbo Bestar Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C430
Ningbo Lvkang Vehicle Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C431
Ningbo Nanyang Vehicle Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C432
Ningbo Oner Bike Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C433
Ningbo Roadsan New Energy Technology Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C435
Ningbo Zixin Bicycle Industry Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C437
Pronordic E-Bikes Limited Company | Jiangsu | C438
Shenzhen Shenling Car Co., Ltd. | Guangdong | C442
Sino Lithium (Suzhou) Electric Technology Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C443
Skyland Sport Tech Co., Ltd. | Tianjin | C444
Suzhou Guoxin Group Fengyuan Imp & Exp. Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C446
Tianjin Luodeshengda Bicycle Co., Ltd. | Tianjin | C449
Tianjin Upland Bicycle Co., Ltd. | Tianjin | C450
Easy Electricity Technology Co., Ltd. | Tianjin | C451
Ubchoice Co., Ltd. | Guangdong | C452
Wettsen Corporation | Shandong | C454
Wuxi Shengda Bicycle Co., Ltd. and Wuxi Shengda Vehicle Technology Co.,Ltd | Jiangsu | C458
Wuxi United Mobility Technology Inc | Jiangsu | C459
Xiangjin (Tianjin) Cycle Co., Ltd. | Tianjin | C462
Yong Qi (China) Bicycle Industrial Corp | Jiangsu | C464
Yongkang Juxiang Vehicle Co, Ltd. | Zhejiang | C466
Yongkang Lohas Vehicle Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C467
Yongkang Mars Vehicle Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C468
Zhejiang Apollo Motorcycle Manufacturer Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C469
Zhejiang Baoguilai Vehicle Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C470
Zhejiang Goccia Electric Technology Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C472
Zhejiang Jsl Vehicle Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C473
Zhejiang Kaiyi New Material Technology Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C474
Zhejiang Lianmei Industrial Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C475
Zhejiang Tuer Vehicle Industry Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C477
Zhejiang Xingyue Vehicle Co., Ltd., Zhejiang Xingyue Overfly Electric Vehicle Co., Ltd. and Zhejiang Xingyue Electric Vehicle Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C478
Zhongxin Power (Tianjin) Bicycle Co., Ltd. | Tianjin | C480
ANNEX II
Company Name | Province | TARIC additional code
Aima Technology Group Co., Ltd. | Tianjin | C389
Beijing Tsinova Technology Co., Ltd. | Beijing | C391
Changzhou Hj Pedal Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C394
Changzhou Ristar Cycle Co., Ltd | Jiangsu | C396
Cutting Edge Power Vehicle Int’l TJ Co., Ltd. | Tianjin | C399
Eco International Elebike Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C403
Everestt International Industries Ltd. | Jiangsu | C404
Geoby Advance Technology Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C407
Guangdong Commercial Trading Imp. & Exp. Corp., Ltd. | Guangdong | C408
Guangdong Shunde Junhao Technology Development Co., Ltd. | Guangdong | C409
Hangzhou Morakot E-Bike Manufacture Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C412
Hangzhou TOP Mechanical And Electrical Technology, Co. Ltd. | Zhejiang | C413
Hua Chin Bicycle & Fitness (H.Z.) Co., Ltd. | Guangdong | C414
Jinhua Yifei Electric Science And Technology Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C423
Nanjing Jincheng Machinery Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C428
Ningbo Pugonying Vehicle Technology Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C434
Ningbo Shenchima Vehicle Industry Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C436
Shandong Eco Friendly Technology Co., Ltd. | Shandong | C439
Shanghai Promising Int’l Trade & Logistics Co., Ltd. | Shanghai | C440
Shenzhen SanDin Cycle Co., Ltd. | Guangdong | C441
Suzhou Dynavolt Intelligent Vehicle Technology Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C445
Suzhou Joydeer E-Bicycle Co., Ltd | Jiangsu | C447
Taioku Manufacturing (Jiangsu) Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C448
Universal Cycle Corporation (Guang Zhou) | Guangdong | C453
Wuxi Bashan E-Vehicle Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C455
Wuxi Merry Ebike Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C456
Wuxi METUO Vehicle Co., Ltd. | Jiangsu | C457
Wuyi Simino Industry & Trade Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C460
Wuyi Yuema Leisure Articles Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C461
Yongkang Aijiu Industry & Trade Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C465
Zhejiang Enze Vehicle Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C471
Zhejiang Luyuan Electric Vehicle Co., Ltd. | Zhejiang | C476
Zhongshan Qiangli Electronics Factory | Guangdong | C479
ANNEX III
Company Name | Province | TARIC additional code
Changzhou Fujiang Vehicle Co. Ltd | Jiangsu | C484
Jinhua Lvbao Vehicles Co. Ltd | Zhejiang | C486
Suzhou Leisger Vehicle Co. Ltd | Jiangsu | C487
Zhejiang Hangpai Electric Vehicle Co. Ltd | Zhejiang | C488

Pending: 32018R1579

January 16, 2026
22.10.2018 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 263/3
(1) On 4 May 2018, the European Commission (‘the Commission’) adopted Commission Regulation (EU) 2018/683(2)(‘the provisional Regulation’) imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the European Union (‘the Union’) of certain pneumatic tyres, new or retreaded, of rubber, of a kind used for buses or lorries, with a load index exceeding 121 (‘the product concerned’) originating in the People's Republic of China (‘PRC’).
(2) The Commission had initiated the investigation on 11 August 2017 by publishing a Notice of Initiation in theOfficial Journal of the European Union(‘the Notice of Initiation’) following a complaint lodged on 30 June 2017 by the coalition against unfair tyres imports (‘the complainant’) on behalf of producers representing more than 25 % of the total Union production of new and retreaded tyres for buses or lorries.
(3) The Commission made imports of the product concerned originating in the PRC subject to registration by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/163(3). The registration of imports ceased with the entry into force of the provisional measures on 8 May 2018.
(4) As stated in recital (10) of the provisional Regulation, the investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017 (‘the investigation period’) and the examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2014 to the end of the investigation period (‘the period considered’).
(5) Following the imposition of provisional anti-dumping duties, the complainant, the ‘China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers and Exporters’ (‘the CCCMC’), the China Rubber Industry Association (‘the CRIA’), five Chinese exporting producers, five unrelated importers, a Union importers association l'Association Française des Importateurs de Pneumatiques (‘AFIP’) and one Union supplier (‘Kraiburg’) made written submissions commenting on the provisional findings.
(6) One interested party, Hämmerling The Tyre Company GmbH (‘Hämmerling’), submitted additional comments on the provisional findings on 2 July 2018, well after the deadline to submit comments on the provisional disclosure. The Commission addressed them together with other comments received on the General Disclosure Document at the definitive stage.
(7) Interested parties who so requested were granted an opportunity to be heard. Hearings took place with the CCCMC and the CRIA; all the sampled exporting producers: the Aeolus Group(4), Pirelli Tyre Co., Ltd (‘Pirelli’) and the related importer Prometeon Tyre Group S.r.l. (‘Prometeon’), the Giti Group(5), the Hankook Group(6), and the Xingyuan Group(7); two unrelated importers and Union producers, associations and Union tread and repairing material suppliers supporting the measures.
(8) The Commission considered the comments submitted by interested parties, analysed them, and, where appropriate, modified the provisional findings.
(9) The Commission continued seeking and verifying all information it deemed necessary for its final findings. In order to verify the questionnaires replies which were not verified at the provisional stage of the procedure, verification visits were carried out at the premises of the following parties:(a)Unrelated importers in the Union:—Heuver Bandengroothandel BV, the Netherlands (‘Heuver’)—Hämmerling The Tyre Company GmbH, Germany;(b)Related importers in the Union:—Hankook Tire Italia S.r.l.—Hankook España SA—Prometeon Tyre Group S.r.l.—Prometeon Tyre Group España y Portugal, S.L.U.—Pneumobil Reifen und KFZ-Technik GmbH—Prometeon Tyre Deutschland GmbH. (a) Unrelated importers in the Union:—Heuver Bandengroothandel BV, the Netherlands (‘Heuver’)—Hämmerling The Tyre Company GmbH, Germany; — Heuver Bandengroothandel BV, the Netherlands (‘Heuver’) — Hämmerling The Tyre Company GmbH, Germany; (b) Related importers in the Union:—Hankook Tire Italia S.r.l.—Hankook España SA—Prometeon Tyre Group S.r.l.—Prometeon Tyre Group España y Portugal, S.L.U.—Pneumobil Reifen und KFZ-Technik GmbH—Prometeon Tyre Deutschland GmbH. — Hankook Tire Italia S.r.l. — Hankook España SA — Prometeon Tyre Group S.r.l. — Prometeon Tyre Group España y Portugal, S.L.U. — Pneumobil Reifen und KFZ-Technik GmbH — Prometeon Tyre Deutschland GmbH.
(a) Unrelated importers in the Union:—Heuver Bandengroothandel BV, the Netherlands (‘Heuver’)—Hämmerling The Tyre Company GmbH, Germany; — Heuver Bandengroothandel BV, the Netherlands (‘Heuver’) — Hämmerling The Tyre Company GmbH, Germany;
— Heuver Bandengroothandel BV, the Netherlands (‘Heuver’)
— Hämmerling The Tyre Company GmbH, Germany;
(b) Related importers in the Union:—Hankook Tire Italia S.r.l.—Hankook España SA—Prometeon Tyre Group S.r.l.—Prometeon Tyre Group España y Portugal, S.L.U.—Pneumobil Reifen und KFZ-Technik GmbH—Prometeon Tyre Deutschland GmbH. — Hankook Tire Italia S.r.l. — Hankook España SA — Prometeon Tyre Group S.r.l. — Prometeon Tyre Group España y Portugal, S.L.U. — Pneumobil Reifen und KFZ-Technik GmbH — Prometeon Tyre Deutschland GmbH.
— Hankook Tire Italia S.r.l.
— Hankook España SA
— Prometeon Tyre Group S.r.l.
— Prometeon Tyre Group España y Portugal, S.L.U.
— Pneumobil Reifen und KFZ-Technik GmbH
— Prometeon Tyre Deutschland GmbH.
(a) Unrelated importers in the Union:—Heuver Bandengroothandel BV, the Netherlands (‘Heuver’)—Hämmerling The Tyre Company GmbH, Germany; — Heuver Bandengroothandel BV, the Netherlands (‘Heuver’) — Hämmerling The Tyre Company GmbH, Germany;
— Heuver Bandengroothandel BV, the Netherlands (‘Heuver’)
— Hämmerling The Tyre Company GmbH, Germany;
— Heuver Bandengroothandel BV, the Netherlands (‘Heuver’)
— Hämmerling The Tyre Company GmbH, Germany;
(b) Related importers in the Union:—Hankook Tire Italia S.r.l.—Hankook España SA—Prometeon Tyre Group S.r.l.—Prometeon Tyre Group España y Portugal, S.L.U.—Pneumobil Reifen und KFZ-Technik GmbH—Prometeon Tyre Deutschland GmbH. — Hankook Tire Italia S.r.l. — Hankook España SA — Prometeon Tyre Group S.r.l. — Prometeon Tyre Group España y Portugal, S.L.U. — Pneumobil Reifen und KFZ-Technik GmbH — Prometeon Tyre Deutschland GmbH.
— Hankook Tire Italia S.r.l.
— Hankook España SA
— Prometeon Tyre Group S.r.l.
— Prometeon Tyre Group España y Portugal, S.L.U.
— Pneumobil Reifen und KFZ-Technik GmbH
— Prometeon Tyre Deutschland GmbH.
— Hankook Tire Italia S.r.l.
— Hankook España SA
— Prometeon Tyre Group S.r.l.
— Prometeon Tyre Group España y Portugal, S.L.U.
— Pneumobil Reifen und KFZ-Technik GmbH
— Prometeon Tyre Deutschland GmbH.
(10) Following final disclosure, a verification visit was carried out at the premises of Roline NV, a Union producer in the Netherlands.
(11) The Commission informed all interested parties of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to impose a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain tyres for buses and lorries (‘the final disclosure’) and to definitively collect the amounts secured by way of provisional duty.
(12) All interested parties were granted a period within which they could make comments on the final disclosure. The complainant, the Chinese exporting producers (Aeolus Group, Giti Group, Hankook Group, Pirelli and its related importer Prometeon), industry associations (the CRIA, the CCCMC, the Associazione Italiana Ricostruttori Pneumatici, the Assoiaçao Nacional de Industriais de Recauchtagem de Pneus, Bipaver, Bundesverband Reifenhandel und Vulkaniseur-Handwerk, the Czech Retread Tire Manufacturers Association, the Retread Manufacturing Association), importers (Hämmerling and Kirkby Tyres Ltd), retreader producer (Rula-BRW) and retreaders raw material suppliers (Vipal, Kraiburg, RemaTipTop) submitted written submissions.
(13) Following final disclosure, hearings were held with the CRIA and the CCCMC, the Aeolus Group, the Giti Group, Prometeon, the complainant and Bipaver.
(14) The Hearing Officer organised hearings at the request of Hankook Group on 16 August 2018 and Hämmerling on 29 August 2018.
(15) On 10 September 2018, the Commission submitted to all interested parties an additional final disclosure limited to the specific issue of the level of the tier 3 target profit.
(16) All interested parties were granted a period of three days within which they could make comments on the additional final disclosure document. The complainant, the Chinese exporting producers (Aeolus Group, Giti Group, Pirelli and its related importer Prometeon, Xingyuan), industry associations (the CRIA, the CCCMC, the Associazione Italiana Ricostruttori Pneumatici, Bipaver, Bundesverband Reifenhandel und Vulkaniseur-Handwerk, the Czech Retread Tire Manufacturers Association, ITMA Europe, the Retread Manufacturing Association), importers (Hämmerling, Heuver and Kirkby Tyres Ltd), a retreader (Rula-BRW), an association of users (Lithuanian National Road Carriers' Association LINAVA) and a raw material supplier to retreaders (Kraiburg) submitted written comments.
(17) Following the additional final disclosure, a hearing was held with Prometeon on 14 September 2018.
(18) The comments submitted by interested parties were considered and taken into account where appropriate.
(19) Following the publication of the provisional Regulation, Pirelli pointed out that Pirelli Tyre Co., Ltd was not a subsidiary of the Aeolus Group as incorrectly stated in recital (119) of the provisional Regulation. It explained that Pirelli Tyre Co., Ltd is an autonomous company from Aeolus Tyre Co., Ltd and the Aeolus Group.
(20) Acknowledging its error, the Commission issued a corrigendum on 10 July 2018(8).
(21) Concerning the reference to the Aeolus Group, the Commission noted that its investigation deals with companies or groups of related companies. The relationship between exporting producers is analysed in accordance with Article 127 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447(9). Therefore, in the context of this investigation, Pirelli Tyre Co., Ltd and Aeolus Tyre Co., Ltd are considered to be related since both had a common shareholder during the investigation period — namely China National Tire & Rubber Co., Ltd (‘CNRC’). The use of shortened form ‘the Aeolus Group’ was for ease of reference to related companies throughout the provisional Regulation. The shortened form ‘the Aeolus Group’ was chosen because Aeolus Tyre Co., Ltd is the biggest producing entity within the related companies. Despite the use of the short form to reference the Aeolus Group in the provisional Regulation, the dumping margin was calculated separately for each related exporting producer and then a single weighted average dumping margin was established for all the related companies.
(22) Following final disclosure, Pirelli claimed that it should not be considered as a related company of CNRC and the Aeolus Group. Pirelli disagreed with the application of Article 127 of Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 for the purpose of calculating a weighted average dumping margin established for the related companies. Pirelli proposed the use of Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 (the ‘basic Regulation’) to establish the relation between companies.
(23) The Commission recalled that Article 4 of the basic Regulation concerns the definition of the Union industry and the relationship of Union producers to exporting producers. In that context, a Union producer is not considered part of the Union industry, if it is controlled by an exporting producer(10). However, Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation explicitly refers to Article 127 of Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 in order to determine whether two parties are associated for the purpose of establishing a dumping margin. Examining whether parties are associated ensures that anti-dumping measures are enforced effectively. In particular, it avoids the risk that exports are channelled through a related company with a lower anti-dumping duty. In addition, the Notice of Initiation(11)clearly referred to Article 127 of Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 at the start of the proceeding.
(24) According to Article 127(d) of Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 two persons are deemed to be related if: a third party directly or indirectly owns, controls or holds 5 % or more of the outstanding voting stock or shares of both of them. CNRC is the largest shareholder of Pirelli. During the investigation period, CNRC owned 65 % of Pirelli's shares. As of September 2018, it still held 46 % of Pirelli's shares. Therefore, in the context of this investigation, Pirelli and the Aeolus Group are considered to be related through a common parent company (CNRC). Pirelli 's claim that it should not be considered as a related company of CNRC or to the Aeolus Group was thus rejected.
(25) Following final disclosure, Pirelli further claimed that it should be considered only as a cooperating party, and not as exporting producer, since it stopped producing the product concerned in November 2017.
(26) The Commission established that Pirelli was an exporting producer during the period under investigation. The fact that subsequently Pirelli ceased the production does not alter that fact. That claim was therefore rejected.
(27) Several interested parties claimed that the Commission's provisional disclosure was insufficient, thus affecting their rights of defence and asked the Commission to make further clarifications and disclosure and reiterated the same concerns following final disclosure.
(28) The Commission considered that the open file and the provisional Regulation already contained sufficient information allowing all interested parties to fully exercise their rights of defence. Nevertheless, a note for the file(12)providing clarifications on the provisional Regulation was included in the open file before the definitive disclosure and some additional clarifications concerning the data underlying the individual dumping calculations were provided to two exporting producers.
(29) The Commission noted that the CRIA and the CCCMC stated that the Commission failed to disclose detailed information on the undercutting and underselling calculations to them and to the Chinese exporters, thereby depriving them of any possibility to check potential mistakes made by the Commission or to comment on certain aspects of those calculations.
(30) The CRIA, the CCCMC, and the Chinese exporters received all information respecting their procedural rights. The Chinese sampled exporters received the list of the product control numbers (‘PCNs’) sold, the unit sales price and a range(13)of the total sales volume involved. As stated in recitals (45) to (49), the Commission must not reveal any information which is deemed confidential upon good cause being shown without the specific permission from the supplier of such information.
(31) The Aeolus Group claimed that a determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994 should be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products; and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products. It considered that the Commission should not base its decisions on vague elements or on confidential data supplied by the parties but on all the information and objective facts available. The requirement of ‘objective examination’ implies that the domestic industry and the effects of dumped imports must be investigated in an unbiased manner, without favouring the interests of any interested party, or group of interested parties, in the investigation(14). According to the Aeolus Group, most of the data in the proceedings remained confidential, thus hindering the exercise of the right of defence by interested parties. However, the Aeolus Group submitted that the initiation of the investigation was clearly to protect the interests of a specific segment of the Union industry (namely the retreading industry), without taking into consideration that most of the large European tyre manufacturers also import the product concerned from the PRC and resell it on the Union market.
(32) In reply to those comments the Commission noted that Article 19 of the basic Regulation specifically provides that interested parties can supply information on a confidential basis upon good cause being shown. In addition, a meaningful summary of the confidential information was included in the open file for inspection by interested parties. The fact that the identity of certain cooperating Union producers was kept confidential did not prevent the Commission from performing an objective examination of the facts, nor did it hinder interested parties from exercising their rights of defence. Furthermore, the rights of defence of interested parties were safeguarded as explained in recital (37) through the intervention of the Hearing Officer.
(33) The CRIA and the CCCMC claimed that Chinese small and medium-sized (SMEs) producers were discriminated against compared with Union SMEs producers as Union SMEs were entitled to complete a less detailed (and thus less reliable) questionnaire. Those parties claimed that Chinese SME producers may have been discouraged from participating in the investigation because of the significant burden that completing a full questionnaire response entails.
(34) Furthermore, the CRIA and the CCCMC claimed that, given that the Commission was (allegedly erroneously) basing its injury determination predominantly on the data of the small volume of SME' sales, the underrepresentation of Chinese SMEs producers was further aggravated by the fact that Union SMEs producers could provide a less complete and thus less reliable response. A similar claim was reiterated after the final disclosure. Moreover, the CRIA and the CCCMC requested that the Commission disclose the specific data on Union producers sampling, in particular to verify the representativity of the Union industry sample for both new and retreaded tyres. That claim was reiterated after the final disclosure.
(35) The statement that the injury determination was predominantly based on the data of Union SME producers is incorrect as the Commission established a representative sample to accurately analyse the injury situation of the Union producers. The Commission weighted the Union sales to ensure the proper representation of the SMEs' sales on the Union market. Moreover, it is the constant practice of the Commission to send a simplified questionnaire to SME producers in the Union, but this fact has no impact on the correctness of the data provided or thoroughness of the investigation. Therefore, that claim was rejected.
(36) As mentioned in recital (15) of the provisional Regulation, two exporting producers argued that confidentiality hindered them from verifying whether the complainant represents more than 25 % of the total Union production. They also maintained that they could not verify whether the sample for the Union industry was sufficiently representative.
(37) The Commission services requested the intervention of the Hearing Officer in order to guarantee the rights of defence of the interested parties in light of those claims. By note of 12 July 2018, the Hearing Officer added a note to the open file with the following two findings:‘1.The data in the confidential file support the conclusion that Commission services have correctly reflected the data received in the calculation of the standing requirements. The complainant, including the two Union producers having requested anonymity, represents more than 25 % of total Union production of the product under investigation.2.The data in the confidential file support the conclusion that the sampling conducted by the Commission services responsible for the investigation has been accurately described in their relevant note for the file of 18 October 2017 on the subject of sampling, which is included in the file for inspection by the interested parties’(15). ‘1. The data in the confidential file support the conclusion that Commission services have correctly reflected the data received in the calculation of the standing requirements. The complainant, including the two Union producers having requested anonymity, represents more than 25 % of total Union production of the product under investigation. 2. The data in the confidential file support the conclusion that the sampling conducted by the Commission services responsible for the investigation has been accurately described in their relevant note for the file of 18 October 2017 on the subject of sampling, which is included in the file for inspection by the interested parties’(15).
‘1. The data in the confidential file support the conclusion that Commission services have correctly reflected the data received in the calculation of the standing requirements. The complainant, including the two Union producers having requested anonymity, represents more than 25 % of total Union production of the product under investigation.
2. The data in the confidential file support the conclusion that the sampling conducted by the Commission services responsible for the investigation has been accurately described in their relevant note for the file of 18 October 2017 on the subject of sampling, which is included in the file for inspection by the interested parties’(15).
‘1. The data in the confidential file support the conclusion that Commission services have correctly reflected the data received in the calculation of the standing requirements. The complainant, including the two Union producers having requested anonymity, represents more than 25 % of total Union production of the product under investigation.
2. The data in the confidential file support the conclusion that the sampling conducted by the Commission services responsible for the investigation has been accurately described in their relevant note for the file of 18 October 2017 on the subject of sampling, which is included in the file for inspection by the interested parties’(15).
(38) Therefore, the Commission considered that the rights of defence of the interested parties were respected.
(39) Finally, some exporting producers alleged that the lack of knowledge of potential links between anonymous complainants and Chinese exporting producers impeded their rights of defence. However, it was not substantiated how knowledge about such a potential link would help them in defending their case. Even if, hypothetically, there were a link between one or several anonymous Union producers and one or several Chinese exporting producers, the analysis for dumping and injury would not be materially affected.
(40) The Giti Group submitted that the Commission should have taken the share of each tier in total Union sales into consideration when selecting the sample of Union producers. Such an approach would have been more objective compared to the current approach where the weight of most injured tier 3 data is inflated in the Giti Group's view.
(41) As explained in recital (24) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission indeed took into account the tiers for the selection of the sample of Union producers. In addition, the provisional Regulation in recitals (157) and (158) and further clarifications in the note for the file mentioned in recital (28) of this Regulation contained a thorough explanation of the methodology used to reflect all tiers appropriately in the microeconomic indicators (see further Section 4.5.1.2 below).
(42) The CRIA and the CCCMC requested that full access should be granted to its legal representatives to the dumping margin, price effects and injury margin calculations carried out by the Commission, including access to any confidential information from other interested parties on which such calculations are based (subject to appropriate non-disclosure commitments). The CRIA and the CCCMC pointed out that the requirements of Article 19 of the basic Regulation should be balanced against the rights of defence, which are guaranteed by Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
(43) The CRIA and the CCCMC argued that the lawyers that would be granted the access are registered at a European bar association and are subject to strict bar rules and disclosing confidential information to their clients would result in severe disciplinary actions, including disbarment and potential criminal action. Therefore, the CRIA and the CCCMC argued that the access to the confidential file would not breach the Commission's obligation to protect confidential information whilst allowing an effective exercise of the rights of defence. Moreover, those parties considered that the intervention of the Hearing Officer to access the confidential information and report its conclusion to interested parties cannot be considered as a substitute for the review of these calculations.
(44) At the earing with the Hearing Officer on 16 August 2018 the Hankook Group claimed that the Commission had breached its rights of defence by denying it access to data which the Hankook Group considered as unjustly confidential. The Hankook Group made a general request for a policy change with respect of handling of confidential data and invited the Commission services to change the current practice regarding disclosure of calculations and, in the future, to allow the legal representatives of the interested parties to access the calculations to the fullest extent. In the Hankook's Group view, the protection of confidential data should only apply to an extent that such protection is necessary to prevent possible harm to concerned companies. Such harm would not arise if the legal representatives were to operate under a confidentiality agreement with the Commission services. In respect to the current investigation, the Hankook Group also requested access for their legal representatives to all dumping and injury margins calculations, including the full normal value data.
(45) Article 19 of the basic Regulation stipulates that the Commission must not reveal any information which is by nature confidential, or which is provided on a confidential basis by parties and for which a good cause is shown, without the specific permission from the supplier of such information. It does not envisage that any other party, including lawyers registered at a European bar association, is granted such access. It should also be noted that, on 9 January 2018, the CRIA and the CCCMC submitted power of attorneys signed by cooperating and sampled exporting producers. The Commission found that some of the power of attorneys given by sampled Chinese exporting producers to the CRIA and the CCCMC did not cover access to confidential information but only covered attending hearings, submitting comments and lodging submissions.
(46) Furthermore, the case-law of the Court of Justice stipulates that the protection of rights of the defence must, where necessary, be reconciled with the principle of confidentiality, which is specifically laid down in Article 19 of the basic Regulation. In this particular case, good cause was shown because several interested parties requested that their names be kept confidential for fear that they could face retaliation by customers or competitors. The Commission assessed those claims and deemed them warranted. Therefore, it concluded that the disclosure of such confidential information would have a significant adverse effect for these parties.
(47) That reconciliation permits the receipt of non-confidential summaries of confidential information (provided, for instance, in the form of ranges and/or indexed elements of information) where that non-confidential information would not lead to a disclosure of business secrets. However, full disclosure of the confidential information was not deemed reconcilable with the duty to protect such information. In the same vein, because the Union legislator did not provide for such an exception in the basic Regulation, the Commission considered that the fact that the lawyers registered with a European bar association are subject to strict bar rules and are potentially subject to sanctions in case of breach of these rules does not allow the Commission to grant access to confidential information in breach of the legislation in force. The Commission thus concluded that the access to confidential information could not be granted to lawyers registered at a European bar association. In any event, an additional element for safeguarding the rights of defence of interested parties is the possibility of having recourse to the Hearing Officer in Trade Proceedings under Article 15 of Decision of the President of the European Commission of 29 February 2012 on the function and terms of reference of the Hearing Officer in certain trade proceedings(16). Since the interested parties did not seek the Hearing Officer's opinion on that point, that claim must, accordingly, be rejected.
(48) Furthermore the Commission considered that the open file available to interested parties, including to the CRIA and the CCCMC and the Hankook Group, contained all the relevant case information used in the investigation. If the information was deemed confidential, the open file contained meaningful summaries thereof. All interested parties, including the CRIA and the CCCMC, had access to the open file and could consult it.
(49) In view of those considerations, the Commission deemed the information provided in the disclosure documents and in the open file sufficient to satisfy the rights of defence of all interested parties. Therefore, that claim was rejected. Nonetheless, after the hearing with the Hearing Officer, the Commission disclosed certain additional data on dumping and injury calculations as set out in recitals (77) and (178).
(50) Hämmerling requested a hearing with the Hearing Officer to raise legal concerns related to the current investigation and certain horizontal issues concerning data protection of confidential and non-confidential information as included in the TRON TDI database and the current practice of granting access to the non-confidential files to interested parties outside the territory of the Union through that database.
(51) The Commission observed that the new General Data Protection Regulation(17)was not applicable to this case. Moreover, Hämmerling confirmed that the personal data protection issue was not directly linked to a possible specific hampering of its rights of defence under trade defence law. The Commission therefore concluded that Hämmerling's individual position in the proceeding and its rights of defence were not affected by the new General Data Protection Regulation.
(52) Several interested parties reiterated their claim that new and retreaded tyres could not be a single product concerned or be part of one single segment. Moreover, several interested parties claimed that the Union market should be divided into at least four tiers: three tiers for new tyres and a fourth, new category for retreaded tyres should be established. Alternatively a new tier for cheap imported tyres should be introduced. The CRIA and the CCCMC also claimed that an additional segmentation should be made for original equipment and replacement tyres.
(53) As mentioned in recitals (72) to (74) of the provisional Regulation, new (retreadable or non-retreadable) and retreaded tyres have no different technical, basic physical and chemical characteristics. After provisional disclosure, no additional evidence was provided by the interested parties to the contrary. Therefore, the Commission rejected the claim of the CRIA and the CCCMC that new and retreaded tyres cannot be the same product concerned. Concerning the request to establish a fourth tier for retreaded tyres, the Commission stressed that new and retreaded tyres share the same basic characteristics and are largely interchangeable. Furthermore, as explained in the recitals (55) to (57) of the provisional Regulation, retreaded tyres mostly fall into tier 3. There is hence no need to create a fourth tier for them. The Commission thus rejected that claim as well.
(54) The Aeolus Group claimed that the Commission should exclude new tyres from the scope of the investigation. It referred to the WTO Appellate Body Report inEuropean Communities — Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos(18), according to which the determination of whether two products are alike is fundamentally a determination as to whether the products are in competition with one another. The Aeolus Group claimed that that approach should be taken into consideration by the Commission in determining whether two products may or may not be considered alike.
(55) The Commission considered that there is a competitive relationship between new and retreaded tyres. As will be shown below under Section 4.6 in the analysis of the interconnection between tiers, imported (new) tier 3 tyres are in competition with tyres that are retreaded in the Union and are currently taking over the market share of tier 3 retreaded tyres. That, in turn, has a reverse cascading effect also on tier 2 and tier 1 tyres, and so affected the competitive position of Union tyre producers in tiers 1 and 2. That claim was therefore rejected.
(56) The Hankook Group claimed that its brand Hankook should be classified as tier 2 as all three criteria used by the Commission lead to the same result: (i) brand recognition; (ii) retreadability; and (iii) the sales of tyres directly to manufacturers of buses and lorries, i.e. Original Equipment (‘OE’) sales.
(57) With respect to the first criterion — brand recognition, the Hankook Group maintained that not only ETRMA (in its reports of 2017 and 2018), but also the Global Tire Intelligence report of June 2016 and the US International Trade Commission in March 2016 treated Hankook as a tier 2 brand(19). The Commission accepted that the recognition of Hankook in the four reports pointed to it as a tier 2 brand. At the same time, the Hankook Group markets itself as a ‘premium’ brand on its group website. In addition, as already noted in recital (63) of the provisional Regulation, the company's internal document provided to the Commission during the verification visit indicated that the brand has moved into tier 1. Hence, the Commission found that the market perception and the self-perception of the Hankook Group do not fully coincide.
(58) The Hankook Group also presented confidential internal surveys done in 2017 for Hankook's Global Marketing Strategy Team in the UK, Germany, Spain and Italy on passenger car tyres. According to the company, these documents show that other tier 1 brands have higher brand awareness among customers in these countries. The Commission found that two main conclusions could be distilled from these data. First, the Hankook Group itself acknowledged that the classification of brands into tiers is a dynamic concept for all brands. For example, in the UK, one of its competitors was regarded as a tier 2 brand, while the same competitor ranks among the ‘top players’ or ‘tier 1’ in Germany, Spain and Italy. Second, the Hankook Group seems to be ‘in between’ the two tiers according to customer perceptions on passenger cars: ‘Aided awareness(20)’ for Hankook was generally lower than for tier 1 brands, while ‘unaided awareness(21)’ was — with the exception of the UK — on the same level or even slightly higher than other competitor brands classified by the Commission as falling into tier 1.
(59) The Commission then turned to the second criterion. It recalled that tier 1 tyres are designed to be ‘multi-life’ tyres, further increasing the significantly higher mileage of the original product (up to three retreadings for a normal use), as laid down in recital (55) of the provisional Regulation. In that respect, the Hankook Group submitted that it takes a contractual warranty that Hankook tyres can be retreaded no more than once and that the market share of its own retreaded brand Alphatread is negligible and decreasing. Moreover, the pricing of its casings is below the one for casings of the market leaders.
(60) On the one hand, the Commission took note of Alphatread's position in the market, but found that this fact may be more a question of the company's decision whether or not to operate a vertically integrated retreading business itself. The Commission also accepted that the legal guarantee for Hankook tyres only covers one retreading operation. On the other hand, the retreadability does not only depend on the retreading of Alphatread or a legal warranty issued by the Hankook Group, which is by its nature conservative. Rather, it is more important for the classification how often the tyres are actually retreaded in the market and are thus in competition with other tier 1 tyres on that account.
(61) The Commission hence inquired with the retreading operators in the Union whether Hankook tyres can be retreaded only once, twice or more than twice. The Association of retreaders BIPAVER informed the Commission that all seven consulted retreaders (three from Germany, one from Portugal, one from Spain, one from Italy, and one from the UK) replied that Hankook tyres can be retreaded twice. Moreover, for tyres of a certain dimension, Hankook tyres can also be retreaded more than twice by the consulted retreaders in Portugal, Spain and in the UK which replied to BIPAVER. Another retreader from Italy responded individually that low aspect ratio tyres from Hankook are retreaded only once, but bigger aspect ratios are retreaded twice. A French retreader answered individually that Hankook tyres are retreaded twice or more than twice. Another Spanish retreader informed that the casings of Hankook have the same quality as premium tyres such as Michelin, Continental, Goodyear and Bridgestone. Against this background, the Commission established that Hankook tyres are predominantly retreaded twice in the Union, while the quality of their casings allows even further retreading for certain dimensions.
(62) With respect to the third criterion, the Hankook Group argued that its OE sales in the Union constituted only 1,6 % of all OE sales in 2017. Such a small market share is not sufficient to qualify them into tier 1. The Commission disagreed with this assessment. It noted that the Hankook's trend of OE sales was going upwards. While the Hankook Group had no OE sales contracts in 2014, its OE business has so far grown every year until 2017. Moreover, while the 1,6 % appears small in absolute terms, it includes a more significant share of [7-12] % with one of the European leading lorry manufacturers. The Commission found that the very fact that this important lorry producer trusts in the premium quality of the Hankook brand is significant. At a hearing held on 20 June 2018, the Hankook Group further argued that the tyres for OE sales were delivered from South Korea rather than from the PRC. Hence, the OE sales could not be attributed to the Chinese exported tyres. The Commission did not verify that statement. However, even if it is factually correct, it does not explain why the Hankook Group would be unable to apply its know-how also in the Chinese production facilities and have OE sales of the tyres manufactured in the PRC in the near future. The Commission hence established that the Hankook Group was able to establish OE sales with well-known European lorry makers with a potential to increase this business in the near future.
(63) In light of all three criteria taken into account together, the Commission confirmed its finding at provisional stage that Hankook brand has moved from tier 2 into tier 1. While the predominant market recognition still puts it into tier 2, two elements of the Hankook Group's self-assessment found during the investigation and an analysis of the branding surveys indicate that Hankook tyres belong rather to tier 1. Hence the Hankook Group's perception is ‘in between’ the tiers. However, the responses from retreaders show that Hankook tyres are nowadays retreaded at least twice in the Union and the quality of its tyres have enabled it to develop OE sales with well-known European lorry makers as well. The Commission therefore classified the Hankook Group as a tier 1 producer for the purpose of this investigation.
(64) The Hankook Group also asserted that its brand Aurora should be classified as tier 3. However, as the difference between the brands Aurora and Hankook is not so enormous, and as the Commission confirmed its classification for Hankook as a tier 1 brand, it also maintained its classification for Aurora as tier 2.
(65) The Giti Group claimed that its Primewell brand should be classified as tier 3. The Commission accepted that claim since the brand Primewell fulfilled the tier 3 criteria: it is a lower quality brand with a very limited retreadability and there are no OE sales of this brand.
(66) Several interested parties claimed that the competition cases referred to in recitals (68) to (83) of the provisional Regulation and investigations carried out by third countries should not be dismissed and reiterated the same concerns following final disclosure. Rather than dismissing those decisions on procedural grounds, the Commission should have analysed their findings on the substance. Those parties reiterated that the investigations carried-out by the US, India, the Eurasian Economic Commission and Egypt should be considered and also that the competition proceeding initiated in May 1996 was relevant for the current proceeding(22). Moreover, the CRIA and the CCCMC claimed that the Commission cannot simply dismiss the Commission's findings in a merger case(23)that low-budget new replacement tyres are not substitutes for retreaded tyres. Those parties considered that those findings were highly relevant for the Commission's segmentation and more generally, for the injury analysis.
(67) With respect to those claims, the Commission reiterated that competition and anti-dumping investigations differ substantially with respect to how the relevant product concerned is defined. Furthermore, under the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement members enjoy a wide discretion when defining the product concerned and the like product. Therefore, neither the competition cases nor other anti-dumping cases in third countries are directly applicable to the investigation at hand. Accordingly, those claims were rejected.
(68) Several interested parties claimed that there are differences in terms of essential physical, chemical and technical characteristics, applications and sales channels between new and retreaded tyres and reiterated a similar claim following the final disclosure. Those parties claimed that the raw materials for the production of new tyres differ significantly from those needed to manufacture retreaded tyres. Retreadable or multi-life tyres should therefore be excluded from the definition of the product concerned
(69) As mentioned in recital (72) of the provisional Regulation, the new and retreaded tyres have the same technical characteristics, components, and the structure of a new tyre. A new tyre provides the casing used by the retreading industry. The tread is similar to a new tyre. Therefore, the Commission rejected that claim.
(70) Moreover, the CRIA and the CCCMC claimed that retreaded and new tyres do not have the same applications because the retreaded tyres' safety performance is significantly worse than that of new tyres and reiterated the same concerns following final disclosure. They provided as evidence a quote from US law(24). Moreover, they claimed that the Union institutions also consider retreaded tyres to be separate from new tyres in other spheres. Indeed, Regulation (EC) No 1222/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council(25). They would thus not subject to the same legislation, contrary to the suggestion in recital (75) of the provisional Regulation.
(71) The Commission rejected that claim. In recital (73) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission addressed how tyres were perceived in terms of safety performance and concluded that exactly the same technical, quality and safety perception differences arise between two new tyres from different tiers. In addition, Council Decision of 13 March 2006 amending Decisions 2001/507/EC and 2001/509/EC with a view to making United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE) Regulation Nos 109 and 108 on retreaded tyres compulsory(26)lays down that the provisions of UN/ECE Regulations 108 and 109 are to apply as a compulsory condition for the placing on the market of retreaded tyres on the Union market, to ensure that retreaded tyres fulfil similar safety and quality control requirements as new tyres(27).
(72) Following final disclosure, the CRIA and the CCCMC claimed that the new tyres production process is essentially different from the process for retreaded tyres. While the Commission agrees with those parties that the production process is different, the use of new and retreaded tyres is the same — they are mounted on the wheels of either buses or lorries to form a soft contact with the road. Therefore, that claim was rejected.
(73) All the Chinese sampled exporting producers, the CRIA and the CCCMC requested the Commission to disclose more information on the tyre types that were used for comparison purposes. They claimed that it was highly likely that certain differences were not reflected in the PCN/product types and adjustments should be made. The Chinese exporters and the CRIA and the CCCMC claimed that they were unable to identify such differences as they did not have information on the products sold by the sampled Union producers. Those parties reiterated similar claims following final disclosure.
(74) The Commission found that the open file already contained sufficient information regarding the definition of the PCN/product types. The product type definition is rather complex involving seven characteristics (including the section width, the aspect ratio, construction type, the rimwheel diameter, tyre position, winter tyre (yes or no), tubeless tyre (yes or no)). The Commission, accordingly, concluded that the PCN characteristics were detailed enough to take account of all product characteristics found on the Union market. Indeed, no other interested party claimed that the PCNs would not reflect all the differences between the different product types, and that the same product type produced in the Union differed from the same product type produced in the PRC. Nor did any interested party provide any information as to which other characteristics would be necessary to ensure an even more complete or greater comparison between imported and domestic types of the product concerned. Therefore, the Commission maintained its finding that the characteristics of the PCNs were detailed enough to capture all relevant differences between the different product types, allowing a fair product (and price) comparison. Therefore, the Commission rejected that claim.
(75) The CRIA and the CCCMC claimed that it was unclear whether the notions of product types and PCNs differ and requested the Commission to clarify that issue. For the purpose of this proceeding, the Commission confirmed that the two notions are interchangeable.
(76) The CRIA and the CCCMC, the Aeolus Group and Pirelli, the Hankook Group and the Giti Group objected to the fact that not only the identity of the analogue country producer has been kept confidential but also the detailed normal value calculations. They claimed that made it impossible for them to exercise their due process rights and meaningfully comment on the calculation of the normal value. The Giti Group and the Hankook Group reiterated this claim following final disclosure.
(77) The Commission reminded that the analogue country producer requested the confidential treatment of its identity and provided a justification for it. The Commission examined the merits of the anonymity request and established that there was evidence of a significant possibility of retaliation, and accepted that the name of the company should not be disclosed. In addition, the analogue country producer provided evidence that on the basis of its sales and costs data, in particular its sales by tier, its competitors could assess its identity and so threaten retaliation in case of continued cooperation. Therefore, the Commission agreed with the producer that the detailed normal value calculations had to be kept either confidential or in ranges. Following the hearing with the Hearing Officer mentioned in recital (14) the Commission disclosed additional information on the analogue country producer's Cost of Manufacturing (‘COM’) and General and Administrative expenses (‘SG&A’).
(78) Following provisional disclosure, the Giti Group, the CRIA and the CCCMC claimed that the Commission's approach of continuing to apply Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation (prior to the amendment adopted on 19 December 2017(28)) constituted a violation of the Union's commitments made in China's WTO Accession Protocol and was therefore illegal. In this context, the Giti Group disagreed with the Commission's claim that the burden of proof is on the Giti Group and noted as a final point that there was nothing legally precluding the Commission from determining normal value on the basis of the Giti Group's own costs and (domestic) sales data.
(79) As noted in recital (88) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission followed in its investigation the applicable law at the time of the investigation, including Articles 2(7)(b) and 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation. In this respect, the claim that the burden of proof is not on the Giti Group is not reconcilable with the applicable Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation which provides that ‘A claim under point (b) must be made in writing and contain sufficient evidence that the producer operates under market-economy conditions …’. Moreover, for determining normal value, Article 2(7)(a) of the basic Regulation provides that the normal value can be determined ‘on the basis of the price or constructed value in a market economy third country, or the price from such a third country to other countries, including the Union …’.
(80) Following provisional disclosure, the Giti Group also alleged that the Commission had violated its rights of defence in two ways by rejecting its MET claim:(a)the Giti Group had been given insufficient time to meaningfully comment on the MET disclosure as the deadline to submit comments on the MET disclosure had been inadequate and unreasonable; and(b)the Commission only disclosed its report on the MET verification (on 3 May 2018), or about one month after the final MET decision was made (on 9 April 2018). (a) the Giti Group had been given insufficient time to meaningfully comment on the MET disclosure as the deadline to submit comments on the MET disclosure had been inadequate and unreasonable; and (b) the Commission only disclosed its report on the MET verification (on 3 May 2018), or about one month after the final MET decision was made (on 9 April 2018).
(a) the Giti Group had been given insufficient time to meaningfully comment on the MET disclosure as the deadline to submit comments on the MET disclosure had been inadequate and unreasonable; and
(b) the Commission only disclosed its report on the MET verification (on 3 May 2018), or about one month after the final MET decision was made (on 9 April 2018).
(a) the Giti Group had been given insufficient time to meaningfully comment on the MET disclosure as the deadline to submit comments on the MET disclosure had been inadequate and unreasonable; and
(b) the Commission only disclosed its report on the MET verification (on 3 May 2018), or about one month after the final MET decision was made (on 9 April 2018).
(81) The Commission disagreed with those allegations for the following reasons:(a)The Commission had shared its MET assessment on 15 March 2018 with a deadline to comment by 27 March 2018 close of business. Such a deadline of 12 days is reasonable and allowed the Giti Group to properly defend its interest.(b)The MET disclosure document of 15 March 2018 contained not only the essential facts, but also the results of the on-the-spot investigation. In this specific document, the Commission services detailed in a transparent way all relevant elements thus allowing the Giti Group to defend its interests with respect to the MET assessment. Moreover, verification visits at the Giti Group took place during a time span of three weeks during which at least one legal counsel representing the Giti Group was present. During the verification visits, the Commission services kept the representatives of the company informed, both orally and by e-mails, of the information which had been successfully verified and which still had to be verified or provided. An identical list of all exhibits collected during the verification process had been provided to the legal counsel of the Giti Group at the end of each verification visit. Hence, even without a mission report, which only takes stock of the factual findings which had already been disclosed in the MET disclosure document, the Giti Group had ample opportunity to comment on the essential considerations for the MET assessment. (a) The Commission had shared its MET assessment on 15 March 2018 with a deadline to comment by 27 March 2018 close of business. Such a deadline of 12 days is reasonable and allowed the Giti Group to properly defend its interest. (b) The MET disclosure document of 15 March 2018 contained not only the essential facts, but also the results of the on-the-spot investigation. In this specific document, the Commission services detailed in a transparent way all relevant elements thus allowing the Giti Group to defend its interests with respect to the MET assessment. Moreover, verification visits at the Giti Group took place during a time span of three weeks during which at least one legal counsel representing the Giti Group was present. During the verification visits, the Commission services kept the representatives of the company informed, both orally and by e-mails, of the information which had been successfully verified and which still had to be verified or provided. An identical list of all exhibits collected during the verification process had been provided to the legal counsel of the Giti Group at the end of each verification visit. Hence, even without a mission report, which only takes stock of the factual findings which had already been disclosed in the MET disclosure document, the Giti Group had ample opportunity to comment on the essential considerations for the MET assessment.
(a) The Commission had shared its MET assessment on 15 March 2018 with a deadline to comment by 27 March 2018 close of business. Such a deadline of 12 days is reasonable and allowed the Giti Group to properly defend its interest.
(b) The MET disclosure document of 15 March 2018 contained not only the essential facts, but also the results of the on-the-spot investigation. In this specific document, the Commission services detailed in a transparent way all relevant elements thus allowing the Giti Group to defend its interests with respect to the MET assessment. Moreover, verification visits at the Giti Group took place during a time span of three weeks during which at least one legal counsel representing the Giti Group was present. During the verification visits, the Commission services kept the representatives of the company informed, both orally and by e-mails, of the information which had been successfully verified and which still had to be verified or provided. An identical list of all exhibits collected during the verification process had been provided to the legal counsel of the Giti Group at the end of each verification visit. Hence, even without a mission report, which only takes stock of the factual findings which had already been disclosed in the MET disclosure document, the Giti Group had ample opportunity to comment on the essential considerations for the MET assessment.
(a) The Commission had shared its MET assessment on 15 March 2018 with a deadline to comment by 27 March 2018 close of business. Such a deadline of 12 days is reasonable and allowed the Giti Group to properly defend its interest.
(b) The MET disclosure document of 15 March 2018 contained not only the essential facts, but also the results of the on-the-spot investigation. In this specific document, the Commission services detailed in a transparent way all relevant elements thus allowing the Giti Group to defend its interests with respect to the MET assessment. Moreover, verification visits at the Giti Group took place during a time span of three weeks during which at least one legal counsel representing the Giti Group was present. During the verification visits, the Commission services kept the representatives of the company informed, both orally and by e-mails, of the information which had been successfully verified and which still had to be verified or provided. An identical list of all exhibits collected during the verification process had been provided to the legal counsel of the Giti Group at the end of each verification visit. Hence, even without a mission report, which only takes stock of the factual findings which had already been disclosed in the MET disclosure document, the Giti Group had ample opportunity to comment on the essential considerations for the MET assessment.
(82) In conclusion, following provisional disclosure, the comments on the MET did not put into question the factual findings and were not such as to alter the Commission's findings on MET. In accordance with Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation, the Commission has made its determination whether the Giti Group met the MET criteria — within seven months of, but in any event not later than eight months — after the initiation of the investigation, after the Union industry has been given an opportunity to comment. Consequently, the Commission considered that the rights of defence of the Giti Group have been fully respected with regards to its findings on MET.
(83) In the provisional Regulation, the Commission selected Brazil as the analogue country in accordance with Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation.
(84) Following provisional disclosure, the Giti Group claimed that Brazil did not constitute an appropriate analogue country because: (1) there are less favourable conditions of access to raw materials in Brazil, as China is a bigger producer of natural rubber and is closer to the main sources of production in South-East Asia; (2) Brazil has anti-dumping duties in place against several countries; (3) Brazil has high regular import duties of 16 % on certain bus and lorry tyres.
(85) The Commission recalled that Brazil is a competitive market where five large producers are active in production of bus and lorry tyres. It is a large market in terms of consumption and it has significant imports and exports, in spite of the anti-dumping duties and the regular customs duties in place. The Commission also recalled that it did not have any other viable alternative. The only Thai producer that had been willing to cooperate was active only in tube type tyres, which made it unsuitable as more than 95 % of the exports to the Union are tubeless type tyres. Finally, South Africa was much smaller in terms of production and consumption and had even higher regular anti-dumping duties, which made it less suitable than Brazil. Therefore, the Commission confirmed that Brazil was the most appropriate analogue country among the proposed alternatives.
(86) The Commission also looked in-depth at the cost of natural rubber in the analogue country producer's COM. The cost of natural rubber per kilo of bus and lorry tyres produced by the analogue country producer was [4,1-4,5] RMB, which was in line with the cost of the Chinese exporting producers reported in their questionnaire reply. Overall, the analogue country producer's COM/kg of output is higher than the COM/kg of the Chinese exporting producers. However the main difference in the level of COM in Brazil stems from higher labour cost, direct depreciation cost and other direct and indirect manufacturing costs. Therefore, the claim to make an adjustment for the difference in price of the raw materials in the analogue country and in the PRC was rejected.
(87) Following provisional disclosure, the Giti Group, the Hankook Group, the Aeolus Group and Pirelli asserted that the normal value had to be constructed for most of their sales volume to the Union and claimed that this cast serious doubt on the comparability of the product types sold on the analogue country domestic market. Following final disclosure the Giti Group reiterated that claim.
(88) The product concerned includes a large range of product types with many different sizes and other characteristics. The fact that certain sizes and tyre types were not produced in Brazil does not mean that the Brazilian product types were not comparable. Indeed, the product types produced by the Brazilian producer belong to the same product group and could to a certain extent be matched with those exported by the sampled Chinese exporting producers to the Union. The Commission thus dismissed this argument.
(89) In the absence of any further comments regarding the suitability of the analogue country, the Commission's provisional conclusion to use Brazil as analogue country, as set out in recital (112) of the provisional Regulation is confirmed.
(90) The details for the calculation of the normal value are set out in recitals (113) to (115) of the provisional Regulation.
(91) All sampled exporting producers claimed that the method for constructing the normal value, which the Commission applied at the provisional stage resulted in extraordinarily high dumping margins and produced results that did not appear to correspond to reality, that is the normal value did not go down for tier 2 and tier 3, although in reality tier 2 and 3 tyres are always cheaper. The exporting producers urged the Commission to make adjustments to the normal value, which would reflect the decreasing cost of production of tier 2 and 3. The Giti Group also requested an adjustment which would reflect a decreasing COM of tyres with a larger section width.
(92) The Commission accepted the claim that the method it provisionally used for constructing the normal value for non-matching PCNs might have not sufficiently accounted for the tier segmentation. The Commission analysed the product types, which the analogue country producer manufactured in all three tiers and observed that tier 2 COM/item was on average [83-87] % of the tier 1 COM/item and the tier 3 COM/item was on average [77-82] % of the tier 1 COM/item. The Commission, therefore, decided to refine the method for constructing the normal value in order to take into account these differences in COM/item for each tier as follows. First, it calculated the average COM/kg for all tier 1 tyres produced by the analogue country producer: [19-21] RMB per kg. Second, it reduced the tier 2's COM/kg used in the construction of the normal value by the average difference of COM/item between tier 1 and tier 2 namely [83-87] %, which gave tier 2's COM/kg: [16-18] RMB/kg; the tier 3 COM/kg was reduced by the average difference in COM/item between tier 1 and tier 3 namely [77-82] %, which gave [15-17] RMB/item. The product types, which the analogue country producer manufactured in all three tiers, accounted for [70-80] % of the analogue country's production in volume and was therefore considered representative to be used as a basis for the adjustment.
(93) The Commission constructed the normal value of each non-matching product type exported by the Chinese producers by multiplying its weight by the respective COM/kg for each tier. The Commission then added a reasonable amount of SG&A and a reasonable amount of profit to each product type.
(94) On the basis of the above adjustments, the Commission constructed the normal value for the non-matching product types (‘PCNs’) taking into account the differences identified in the costs of manufacturing between the three tiers.
(95) Following the claims that the analogue country producer's SG&A is unreasonably high, the Commission re-investigated in detail the producer's SG&A expenses and noticed that the domestic transport expense was double-counted at the provisional stage. The Commission, therefore, removed this expense from the normal value calculations, which resulted in reducing the SG&A used for the construction of normal value from [35-45] % of the analogue country producer's COM to [20-30] % of its COM. This revision has no impact on the provisional duty levels, as it did not decrease the provisional dumping margin below the level of the injury margin. The revised SG&A is in line with the Union Industry's average SG&A for all the sampled producers in all three tiers. Therefore, the Commission considered this revised level of SG&A reasonable.
(96) Following final disclosure, the Giti Group claimed that the Commission did not make adjustments for the fact that tier 1 producers typically have much higher marketing expenses (when establishing the SG&A) and that the profitability of tier 1 producers is much higher than for tier 2 and tier 3 producers (when establishing the profit). It therefore submitted that when constructing the normal value, the Commission should use a lower profit margin for tier 2 tyres than for tier 1 tyres and an even lower profit margin for tier 3 tyres.
(97) The Commission recalled that it had revised its methodology after provisional stage to take into account the differences between tiers when constructing the normal value (see recital (92)). The data from the analogue country producer did not warrant any further adjustment. Therefore, that claim was rejected.
(98) As regards the request to adjust the normal value for the decreasing COM of larger tyres, the Commission noted that the Giti Group did not provide any detailed analysis quantifying to what extent larger tyres are less expensive to produce and if there is any clear pattern of decrease in the COM. Finally, the Giti Group did not put forward any potential methodology to make such an adjustment. Following final disclosure the Giti Group claimed that it had not received sufficient data to be able to put forward any potential methodology for tyre size adjustments. The Commission considered that Giti Group could use its own data to demonstrate that there are significant differences in the COM for larger and smaller tyre sizes and on this basis suggest a methodology for adjustment. However, no such submission was made. Those claims were therefore rejected.
(99) The Giti Group also pointed out that during the investigation period, the interest rates published by the Central Bank of Brazil ranged between 14,25 % and 11,25 % whereas, during the same period, the interest rate published by the People's Bank of China was 4,35 %. The Giti Group claimed that, if a large part of the SG&A expenses were related to financial expenses, these expenses should be adjusted downward to reflect the higher interest rates on lending in Brazil compared to the PRC.
(100) The Commission recalled that it had to use the analogue country's costs because of the presence of important competitive distortions linked to high state intervention in the PRC. As the access of Chinese companies to bank financing is one of those competitive distortions, the Commission considered that it was appropriate to use the analogue country's interest rate. Therefore, that claim was rejected.
(101) Following final disclosure, the Giti Group reiterated its claim that the Commission should make an adjustment for the difference in financing costs in the PRC and Brazil, namely between the interest rates applied by the People's Bank of China and the Central Bank of Brazil. The Giti Group also made a request to make downward adjustments to the analogue country producer's COM to compensate its higher overhead expenses and SG&A to compensate other costs and higher taxes.
(102) The Commission recalled that, pursuant to Article 2(7)(a) and (b) of the basic Regulation, in the case of the PRC, the normal value is to be determined on the basis of the price or constructed normal value in a market economy third country. As mentioned in recital (100) there are important competitive distortions in the PRC having an effect on Chinese financing costs. Therefore, the fact that there might be differences in the financing cost between the PRC and the analogue country does not justify the requested adjustment. With regard to the additional claim that the analogue country producer's COM should be adjusted downwards to compensate for higher overhead costs and taxes in Brazil, the Commission recalled that it had rejected the MET request by the Giti group. One reason for this rejection was that its accounting records had not properly reflected the full SG&A expenses. Accordingly, the Commission could not rely on the Giti group's company specific cost data and had neither used, nor verified them. It follows that it could not make a comparison with the allegedly higher overhead and taxation costs in Brazil. Since accepting the requested adjustment would have had the effect of reintroducing such unreliable Chinese data, the Commission rejected this claim as well.
(103) The details for the calculation of the export price are set out in recitals (116) to (119) of the provisional Regulation.
(104) The Hankook Group claimed that it should be treated as a single economic entity and consequently no adjustments under Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation are needed or otherwise warranted. It submitted that the elimination of the SG&A expenses and profit of the related companies in the Union under Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation had the effect of removing from the export price all costs and expenses incurred by an export sales department, and a share of the profit. Following final disclosure, the Hankook Group reiterated its claim that it is a single economic entity and, in their view, the Commission should neither adjust the SG&A expenses nor the profit of the related traders in the Union. Instead the Commission should use the actual price to the first independent customer in the Union, as in its view, this price is reliable.
(105) Concerning the construction of the export price under Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation, it is settled case law that the existence of a single economic entity does not preclude the Commission from constructing the export price under Article 2(9)(29). Pursuant to Article 2(9) first and second subparagraph of the basic Regulation, the Commission is entitled to construct the export price where it appears that the export price is unreliable because of an association between the exporter and the importer. In such a case adjustments for all costs, including duties and taxes, incurred between the importation and resale, and for profits accruing are made to establish a reliable export price, at the Union frontier level. Pursuant to Article 2(9) third subparagraph of the basic Regulation the items for which adjustments are to be made include those normally borne by an importer but paid by any party, including a reasonable margin for SG&A costs and profit. In this case, the Commission established that this association exists since the exporting producers and the importers belong to the same group of companies i.e. the Hankook Group. Therefore, the Commission is entitled to make adjustments to SG&A costs incurred by and profits of the related importers of the Hankook Group. The Commission also considered that the verified profits made by cooperating unrelated importers constitute a reasonable basis for the construction of the export price. Therefore, that claim was rejected.
(106) The Hankook Group submitted that, if the Commission rejected its claim against adjustments under Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation to the Hankook Group's export price, it should have adjusted the analogue country producer's normal value by deducting the sales costs and reasonable profit in accordance with Article 2(10)(d) of the basic Regulation. In its view, including the sales expenses and profit margin made by the analogue country producer creates an asymmetry affecting price comparability, which must be adjusted. Following additional disclosure, the Hankook Group quantified the adjustments that, in its view, needed to be made to the analogue country producer's SG&A and profit to remove the asymmetry affecting price comparability.
(107) The Commission clarified that the purpose of the adjustments made pursuant to Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation is to establish a reliable export price unaffected by the association between the exporter and the importer in the Union as recalled in recital (105). At the same time, the Court held that determination of the normal value and determination of the export price are governed by separate rules and therefore SG&A expenses need not necessarily be treated in the same way in both cases(30). The Commission reaffirmed its position that the analogue country producer's final sales price was brought down to the same ex-works level of trade by adjusting it with duly verified allowances reported in its transaction by transaction table. Accordingly, that claim was rejected.
(108) Recitals (120) and (121) of the provisional Regulation explain how the comparison between the normal value and the export price was made.
(109) In their comments on the provisional and definitive findings, the Giti Group, the Hankook Group and the CCCMC and the CRIA contested the methodology for the VAT adjustment on several grounds as detailed in recitals (110) to (117).
(110) Those parties considered that, having rejected Chinese prices and costs for the determination of the normal value, the Commission subsequently reintroduced the Chinese VAT tax rates in the calculation of the normal value. In addition, those parties claimed the methodology inflated the dumping margin upwards, in particular due to the fact that adjustment is made to the normal value, instead of the export price.
(111) The Commission rejected those claims. The purpose of adjustments made under Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation is to ensure that the dumping margin is established on the basis of a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price. That requirement applies irrespective of the basis on which the normal value is established, including when the normal value is established in an analogue country in situations where companies are not granted MET. In relation to the VAT adjustment made pursuant to Article 2(10)(b), the Commission ensured that the normal value and the export price were compared at the same level of taxation, as further explained in recitals (115) and (116) in accordance with settled case-law(31).
(112) The Giti Group claimed that, in their view, the situation in the case law quoted by the Commission i.e. Dashiqiao judgment(32)was different than the Giti Group's situation as the company concerned by that judgment had obtained MET and no adjustment was made pursuant to Article 2(10)(b) of the basic Regulation.
(113) The Commission acknowledged that the circumstances in the investigation examined in the Dashiqiao judgment were different. In that case, export sales were subject to a VAT liability at the full rate of 17 % during the investigation period and hence no adjustment was necessary to the normal value to ensure a fair comparison with a normal value reflecting the same rate of VAT. By contrast, in the current investigation, export sales were liable to a reduced VAT liability and an adjustment was therefore necessary to bring the normal value price inclusive of VAT down to the same level of taxation as that affecting export sales. As set out in recital (111), it is not relevant whether a Chinese exporting producer is granted MET or not. What is relevant is whether the export price and the normal value are compared at the same level of taxation in order to ensure a fair price comparison.
(114) The Giti Group also claimed that the burden of proof for the need of an adjustment falls on the Commission. The Hankook Group stressed that no VAT was levied on export sales at all according to Chinese legislation and that therefore no adjustment was warranted. Alternatively, the Hankook Group claimed that even if an adjustment for VAT liability was necessary, the adjustment ought to be done on the export price and not on the normal value. The Giti Group also claimed that any adjustment for VAT liability should rather be made to offset any difference in VAT eventually paid by the Group after offsetting the VAT or other taxes paid on purchases of raw materials and other input against the VAT liability on export sales and domestic sales respectively. In other words, Giti argued that any VAT adjustment should reflect the difference in costs between exported and domestically sold materials.
(115) The arguments submitted by the Giti Group and the Hankook Group are based on a misunderstanding of the rationale underpinning the adjustment made for VAT liability. First, as to the merits of an adjustment, both parties do not contest the fact that export sales of the product concerned trigger a VAT liability for the exporting producer. Indeed, the parties submitted that the adjustment should either be made to the export price or that the adjustment should be made to offset the difference in costs between domestic and export sales (i.e. the costs resulting from the inability to recuperate all VAT paid on the purchase of raw materials or other input because of the VAT liability triggered by export sales of the product concerned). While the Commission disagreed with those arguments for the reasons developed in recitals (116) and (117), it notes that those arguments confirm that export sales lead to VAT liability (contrary to what the Hankook Group also argued) equivalent to the so-called ‘non-refundable rate’ on exports which is a flat rate applied to the FOB export price of the product concerned. Second, as to the adjustment itself, the Commission reiterated that the purpose of the adjustment is to ensure that the normal value and the export price are compared at the same level of VAT rate.
(116) On that basis, the Commission first established a normal value on a VAT inclusive basis at a rate of 17 %, which is the normal rate of VAT for domestic sales in the PRC. Subsequently, the Commission adjusted that normal value downwards to match the lower rate of VAT liability observed for export sales of the product concerned (i.e. the so-called non-refundable rate). That ensured the required symmetry between the normal value and the export price for the level of indirect taxation. In response to the arguments made by the Hankook Group that the adjustment should be made to the export price, the Commission noted that Article 2(10)(b) of the basic Regulation makes it clear that any difference in the level of indirect taxation is a matter to be addressed in the normal value, not in the export price.
(117) In relation to the argument that the adjustment should be made to neutralise any difference in costs of raw materials or inputs between export and domestic sales resulting from residual VAT liability on such cost items, the Commission recalled that the purpose of the adjustment performed in this context is not meant to deal with any alleged difference in costs of raw materials or other inputs. Rather, the adjustment ensures that prices used in the comparison are at the same level of taxation. Lastly, as to the Giti Group's argument on the burden of proof, the Commission recalled that the fact that export sales of the product concerned trigger a VAT liability was established as a matter of fact in the investigation and is, in reality, not contested by either Group which rather offer a different approach to address this fact (adjustment to the export price or adjustments for differences in costs). These claims were therefore rejected.
(118) Following final disclosure, the Hankook Group reiterated that it is a single economic entity and therefore the Commission should not make adjustments for the commissions under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation.
(119) The Commission reaffirmed its position that under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation it is entitled to make adjustments for commissions paid in respect of the sales under consideration. In this case, the Commission established that the commissions were provided for in a contract between the parties andde factopaid by the exporting producers to the related parties. The payments were reported, acknowledged by the exporting producer and verified during the investigation. They have been found to affect the price comparison. The Commission was therefore required to make adjustments for the commissions irrespective whether the companies formed a single economic entity or not. The Commission also recalled that the concept of single economic entity in the context of adjustments under Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation was developed in the Court's case law(33)on ‘notional commissions’ including the mark-up received by a trader as referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 2(10)(i) and not for situations were actual commissions are clearly defined andde factopaid. Therefore, that claim was rejected.
(120) Following final disclosure, the Hankook Group reiterated its claim that the royalties paid to the Korean headquarters for the use of Hankook's technology and brand should not be deducted from the export price. The Commission re-examined the claim, found that it was warranted and re-calculated the dumping margin accordingly.
(121) As set out in Sections 3.1 to 3.3, the Commission took into account a number of comments from interested parties received after provisional disclosure and recalculated the dumping margins of all the sampled exporting producers. This led to the decrease of the provisionally established dumping margins. This change also had an impact on the dumping margin of all other cooperating and non-cooperating companies since these margins are based on the margins of the sampled companies.
(122) The definitive dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:Table 1Definitive Dumping MarginsCompanyDefinitive dumping marginXingyuan Group106,7 %Giti Group56,8 %Aeolus Group and Pirelli85 %Hankook Group60,1 %Other Cooperating Companies71,5 %All other companies106,7 % Company Definitive dumping margin Xingyuan Group 106,7 % Giti Group 56,8 % Aeolus Group and Pirelli 85 % Hankook Group 60,1 % Other Cooperating Companies 71,5 % All other companies 106,7 %
Company Definitive dumping margin
Xingyuan Group 106,7 %
Giti Group 56,8 %
Aeolus Group and Pirelli 85 %
Hankook Group 60,1 %
Other Cooperating Companies 71,5 %
All other companies 106,7 %
Company Definitive dumping margin
Xingyuan Group 106,7 %
Giti Group 56,8 %
Aeolus Group and Pirelli 85 %
Hankook Group 60,1 %
Other Cooperating Companies 71,5 %
All other companies 106,7 %
(123) As described in the provisional Regulation in recitals (127) to (129), the like product was manufactured by more than 380 producers in the Union, producing both new and retreaded tyres. Together, they were defined as the Union industry.
(124) Following final disclosure, the CRIA and the CCCMC claimed that the retreaders operating or not under tolling arrangements cannot form part of the Union industry. They considered that retreading is an after service market which cannot be protected by anti-dumping measures as the retreaders take an existing tyre that is part-worn and reprocess it so it can be used. Moreover, retreaders operating on a tolling basis cannot own the casing. Customers retain ownership of the casing while the casing is serviced and a new tread applied to a worn tyre before it is returned to the owner.
(125) The Commission noted the retreading industry provides a second life (or more as the same casing can be retreaded several times) to a casing originating from a worn-tyre. A worn-tyre is no longer safe to be used on public road and cannot be put back into circulation. Without the retreading process, the fate of a worn-tyre is to end in a scrap heap; though part of the worn tyre can be pyrolysed to produce tyre-derived fuel. As described in recital (49) of the provisional Regulation, retreading is a recycling process whereby a worn tyre is refurbished through a replacement of the tread on an old casing. Therefore, retreading is not merely a service, but a production process. Irrespective of ownership arrangements, the retreaders are Union producers whose production process starts from a casing and who are producing a tyre.
(126) In addition, the life cycle of worn tyres ends in one of two way: they are either discarded as a waste or used as a good casing to be retreaded. If considered waste, the owner of the worn tyre may have pay a fee to dump the worn tyre. In the second scenario, the worn tyre becomes a source of revenue. Retreaders may purchase the worn tyre from a service garage or retread a worn tyre under a tolling agreement. All verified retreaders use two sources of supply (namely either stock casing or tolling agreement) produce tyres. The purchase price of a worn tyre was around 10 % in average of the overall cost of production of a retreaded tyre. The Commission considered that the difference in costs of production or in the added-value between the two ways of retreading casings, was not significant, and regarded those as two different business models of retreading. Therefore, the Commission concluded that the retreaders were part of the Union industry.
(127) As a result, data provided by the retreaders and verified by the Commission (including actual costs and sales prices) were used for the establishment of the injury indicators and the injury margin calculation.
(128) As explained in recital (162) of the provisional Regulation, the economic situation of the Union industry was analysed on an aggregated basis and, in certain microeconomic indicators at the level of tiers given the Union market segmentation. Certain interested parties reiterated the same concerns following the final disclosure that the injury analysis by segment should consider all injury indicators and causation indicators. They referred to the Appellate Body Report in United States — Hot Rolled Steel Products from Japan(34). Moreover, these parties requested that the Commission should also distinguish between new and retreaded tyres, original equipment and replacement tyres as the original equipment market was shielded from Chinese competition, again by reference to the Appellate Body report in United States — Hot Rolled Steel Products from Japan(35). The CRIA and the CCCMC reiterated the same concerns following the final disclosure.
(129) The jurisprudence mentioned above indicates that the investigating authorities who undertake an examination of one part of a domestic industry ‘should, in principle, examine, in like manner, all of the other parts that make up the industry, as well as examine the industry as a whole’(36). However, the Appellate Body Report does not impose on the investigating authorities an obligation to provide all injury indicators by segment.
(130) Moreover, the facts in that case were different. In the Appellate Body report in United States — Hot Rolled Steel Products from Japan, a significant part of the domestic production in the United States — captive production — was shielded by the structure of the domestic market from direct competition from subject imports. In that specific situation, the Appellate Body took issue with ‘comparative examination’ of each part of the domestic market — which ‘juxtaposed’ the merchant market and captive market. For the Appellate Body, this ‘enhanced’ the ability of the investigating authorities to make an appropriate determination about the state of the domestic industry as a whole. In the present case, though, there is no protection of the tier 1 and 2 segments of the Union market. The Chinese imports' sales are concentrated mainly in the replacement market; this is a factual situation which is not imposed by the structure of the Union market. Moreover, the product concerned was also sold to original equipment manufacturers. Therefore, the claim that Union original equipment market was shielded from the Chinese competition and should thus be analysed separately was rejected.
(131) Moreover, as noted in recital (160) of the provisional Regulation, case-law also confirms that, when examining whether there is injury for the Union industry as a whole, such analysis may focus on the segment most affected by dumped imports. In the present case, around 65 % of Chinese imports of tyres relate to tier 3. Therefore, a proper injury analysis cannot disregard the impact of the dumped imports especially in a market situation where tier 3 tyre sales are continuously growing, and where all tiers that make up the Union tyre market are interrelated.
(132) For these reasons, the Commission resolved to have conducted a proper examination of the industry as a whole.
(133) As mentioned in the recital (9), the Commission carried out verification visits at the premises of two unrelated importers. It was found that the imports of the product concerned were also declared during the period considered under the CN codes 4011 90 00 and 4011 99 00. These imports concerned tier 3 tyres. However, it was not possible to establish whether there was a systemic problem with the declaration of the product concerned, or whether the issue was limited to this particular importer.
(134) In addition, the total volume reported by the cooperating Chinese exporting producers in the investigation period exceeded the total of imports originating from the People's Republic of China provided by Eurostat Comext. However, as there is no data reported by these exporting producers concerning the preceding years the Commission decided to follow a conservative approach and not to revise the import volumes from the PRC.
(135) Following the provisional disclosure, it was found that the sales of tread suppliers not members of ETRMA Europool had been omitted when establishing the Union consumption. Therefore, the Commission revised the Union consumption for the period considered.
(136) During the period considered the Union consumption(37)developed as follows:Table 2Union consumption (in items)201420152016Investigation periodTotal Union consumption20 499 60320 962 78221 600 22321 748 781Index 2014 = 100100102,3105,4106,1Source:ETRMA and tread suppliers not members of ETRMA Europool. 2014 2015 2016 Investigation period Total Union consumption 20 499 603 20 962 782 21 600 223 21 748 781 Index 2014 = 100 100 102,3 105,4 106,1 Source:ETRMA and tread suppliers not members of ETRMA Europool.
2014 2015 2016 Investigation period
Total Union consumption 20 499 603 20 962 782 21 600 223 21 748 781
Index 2014 = 100 100 102,3 105,4 106,1
Source:ETRMA and tread suppliers not members of ETRMA Europool.
2014 2015 2016 Investigation period
Total Union consumption 20 499 603 20 962 782 21 600 223 21 748 781
Index 2014 = 100 100 102,3 105,4 106,1
Source:ETRMA and tread suppliers not members of ETRMA Europool.
(137) Accordingly, the Union consumption increased over the period considered. Overall over the period considered the consumption increased by 6,1 % from around 20,5 million tyres to around 21,7 million tyres in the investigation period.
(138) A number of interested parties challenged the provisional findings on the interconnection between new and retreaded tyres and among tiers and reiterated the same concerns following the final disclosure. The Commission compiled all information on this matter in a note for the file on interconnection(38).
(139) Regarding recital (140) of the provisional Regulation, the CRIA and the CCCMC claimed that there was no value attribution to tiers 1 and 2 tyres from the existence of the retreading industry.
(140) Information regarding the importance of the retreading business is well spread out and publicly available. As mentioned in recital (58) of the provisional Regulation, the producers of new tyres are also producing retreaded tyres. Some Chinese exporting producers have their own brands for retreaded tyres such as Hankook Alphatread or Giti Genesis. As explained in the note for the file on interconnection, the Commission found that the main tyre producers including Chinese exporting producers were engaged in the retreading business. Hankook Group relies on Union retreaders such as Vacu-Lug in the United Kingdom or B.R.P. Pneumatici in Italy for its retreading activity. Giti Genesis previously known as GT Ree Tread relies on Vacu-Lug in the United Kingdom.
(141) Moreover, Pirelli Italy declared in 2009 concerning a contract signed with Marangoni (a Union provider of retread solutions) that this project, which is part of the strategy of strengthening and enlarging the supply of services by Pirelli Truck, aims to add value in particular to the new products in the 88 Series and the 01 Series, launched on the European market in 2009, characterised, among other qualities, by their high suitability for retreading(39). Other producers are also marketing that their tyres are retreadable, for instance Athos brand importer providing that Athos tyres are regroovable and suitable for cold and hot retreading as well as the Aeolus brand(40)(reported both as tier 3). This shows that retreadability is a significant value factor both in the European Union and in the country concerned. Indeed, the Commission's investigation has shown that ‘upper tier’ producers rely heavily on the existence and availability of a retreading industry to not only create high value market perception, but also for their consumer and business continuity strategies. As the note for the file on interconnection in addition shows, retreadability is viewed by the production industry in the Union and the country concerned as more than a mere marketing asset, but a real value driver for the upper tiers. Accordingly, the value and sales price of the upper tiers are indissolubly linked to a healthy retreading industry ‘downstream’. It is for those reasons that the Commission, at recital (140) of the provisional Regulation, stated that ‘a large value attributed to tiers 1 and tier 2 tyres originate, in fact, from the existence of a retreading industry in tier 3’.
(142) On that basis, the Commission confirmed its initial findings on the interconnection between new and retreaded tyres and among tiers.
(143) Regarding recital (141) of the provisional Regulation, the CRIA and the CCCMC considered that the Commission did not disclose the source of the high interchangeability of retreaded tyres that in turn, established price as a determining factor in the customer's decision to purchase a retreaded or tier 3 new tyres.
(144) The Commission accepted that claim. Accordingly, in its note for the file on interconnection, it showed examples of tyres of different tiers having common sales channels.
(145) The Aeolus Group and Pirelli claimed that the Commission should have considered for its analysis the increase in the Union consumption and should have provided a separate analysis for the three tiers. The parties claimed that, with reference to tier 1 and tier 2, Chinese imports decreased by 2,7 % and 2 % respectively, whereas tier 3 imports increased by 3,9 % from 2015 and 2016. In conclusion, they claimed that any alleged rise in imports (in absolute or relative terms) during the investigation period was not substantial and did not injure the Union industry.
(146) As explained in recitals (128) and (132), the economic situation of the Union industry was analysed on an aggregated basis, and this included the analysis of imports. It was only in certain key microeconomic indicators that the additional analysis at the level of tiers was performed, given the Union market segmentation. The import volumes of the product concerned from the PRC increased. On the basis of the import statistics from Eurostat Comext (which as explained in recitals (133) and (134) could be underestimated), such increase in the volume of imports from the PRC was substantial, both in absolute and relative terms.
(147) The Aeolus Group and Pirelli claimed that the Commission's analysis lacks any reference to the market segmentation and reports only Eurostat figures, without any reference to import figures collected from the sampled exporting producers.
(148) As explained in recitals (128) and (132), the economic situation of the Union industry was analysed on an aggregated basis and, in certain key microeconomic indicators, was also analysed at the level of tiers given the Union market segmentation. However, in the undercutting calculations the prices from the sampled exporting producers were indeed compared to the prices of the Union producers taking into account the specific tier where they belonged.
(149) The Aeolus Group and Pirelli further claimed that import prices were significantly affected by currency rate fluctuations. The Commission failed to see the relevance of the currency exchange rate as all prices used for the comparison purposes in the injury margin calculation are denominated in euros. Hence, the fluctuation between USD and EUR did not play a role in determining either the undercutting or level of the measures. Therefore, that claim was rejected.
(150) Some interested parties (Pirelli, the Giti Group) claimed that according to Eurostat Chinese import prices (mainly related to tier 3 tyres) have decreased over the past three years only due to declining raw material prices (by EUR 15,6 per item). The parties stated that the prices of raw materials (natural rubber and oil) significantly decreased, with a consistent impact on import prices during the period of investigation.
(151) The evolution of the average price of imports into in the Union from the country concerned with the evolution of main raw materials prices developed as follows:Table 3Evolution of import and main raw materials prices201420152016Investigation periodPRC import price (EUR/item)144,4144,3127,7128,8Index 2014 = 1001001008889Natural Rubber:SGX RSS3 USD/tonne1 9571 5601 6412 050Index 2014 = 1001008084105SGX TSR20 USD/tonne1 7101 3701 3781 660Index 2014 = 100100808197Butadiene US cents per lb59,034,037,262,5Index 2014 = 1001005863106Brent indicator USD per barrel99,753,443,649,6Index 2014 = 100100544450Source:Eurostat Comext and the Complaint 2014 2015 2016 Investigation period PRC import price (EUR/item) 144,4 144,3 127,7 128,8 Index 2014 = 100 100 100 88 89 Natural Rubber: SGX RSS3 USD/tonne 1 957 1 560 1 641 2 050 Index 2014 = 100 100 80 84 105 SGX TSR20 USD/tonne 1 710 1 370 1 378 1 660 Index 2014 = 100 100 80 81 97 Butadiene US cents per lb 59,0 34,0 37,2 62,5 Index 2014 = 100 100 58 63 106 Brent indicator USD per barrel 99,7 53,4 43,6 49,6 Index 2014 = 100 100 54 44 50 Source:Eurostat Comext and the Complaint
2014 2015 2016 Investigation period
PRC import price (EUR/item) 144,4 144,3 127,7 128,8
Index 2014 = 100 100 100 88 89
Natural Rubber:
SGX RSS3 USD/tonne 1 957 1 560 1 641 2 050
Index 2014 = 100 100 80 84 105
SGX TSR20 USD/tonne 1 710 1 370 1 378 1 660
Index 2014 = 100 100 80 81 97
Butadiene US cents per lb 59,0 34,0 37,2 62,5
Index 2014 = 100 100 58 63 106
Brent indicator USD per barrel 99,7 53,4 43,6 49,6
Index 2014 = 100 100 54 44 50
Source:Eurostat Comext and the Complaint
2014 2015 2016 Investigation period
PRC import price (EUR/item) 144,4 144,3 127,7 128,8
Index 2014 = 100 100 100 88 89
Natural Rubber:
SGX RSS3 USD/tonne 1 957 1 560 1 641 2 050
Index 2014 = 100 100 80 84 105
SGX TSR20 USD/tonne 1 710 1 370 1 378 1 660
Index 2014 = 100 100 80 81 97
Butadiene US cents per lb 59,0 34,0 37,2 62,5
Index 2014 = 100 100 58 63 106
Brent indicator USD per barrel 99,7 53,4 43,6 49,6
Index 2014 = 100 100 54 44 50
Source:Eurostat Comext and the Complaint
(152) Over the period considered, the Chinese import prices have not reflected the evolution of raw material prices. While the Chinese import prices remained stable between 2014 and 2015, the price of main raw materials have decreased significantly by 20 % for natural rubber and by around 45 % of butadiene and Brent indicators. While the Chinese import prices decreased by 12 % between 2015 and 2016, the raw material prices remained rather stable. Finally, for the period 2016 and the investigation period where most of raw material prices have significantly increased as from the second quarter 2016 until first quarter 2017, the Chinese import prices remained stable. The Commission concluded that the Chinese import prices were disconnected from the evolution of raw material prices. Therefore, that claim was rejected.
(153) Several interested parties claimed that the price undercutting calculations should be established by analogy with the methodology used for the calculation of the dumping margin on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average sales prices per product type and segment of the sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers with a weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions. Moreover, the CRIA and the CCCMC claimed that the Commission should adjust the Chinese prices upwards or the Union prices for retreaded tyres downwards to ensure that the prices compared reflect a similar mileage and for after sales and warranty services provided by the Union producers selling retreaded tyres, in particular for tier 3 as the Chinese producers did not provide such services. The parties reiterated similar claims after the final disclosure.
(154) As explained in recitals (149) and (150) of the provisional Regulation, the methodology of the price undercutting comparison considered the average sales price per product type (PCN) and per segment. The price undercutting was calculated on the basis of comparable transactions by reference to the product type or type-by-type. As within each tier, the tyres are considered similar in terms of mileage, no overall adjustment is thus needed. The same is true for warranty services, with the exception of tier 3, whereby by contrast to the Chinese producers, the Union may indeed provide after sales and warranty services. Consequently, the Commission adjusted the prices of the sampled Union producers for after sales and warranty services for tier 3 when necessary. The undercutting and the underselling margins were established without any weighting. Therefore, that claim was rejected.
(155) Regarding the claim on the analogy between dumping and injury calculations, the Commission noted that the dumping calculations indeed require to take ‘all comparable export transactions’ into account when calculating dumping margins for the like product as a whole(41). By contrast, ‘an investigating authority is not required […] to establish the existence of price undercutting for each of the product types under investigation, or with respect to the entire range of goods making up the domestic like product. That said, an investigating authority is under an obligation to examine objectively the effect of the dumped imports on domestic prices’(42). In the case at hand, the Commission was satisfied with the very high level of matching between the Union producers' and the exporting producers' product types sold on the Union market (the overall matching is ranging between 80 % and 90 %). Therefore, that claim was rejected.
(156) The CRIA and the CCCMC claimed that the Commission should disclose further information about the physical characteristics of the tyre types that were used for comparison purposes as it is highly likely that there are differences, which are not reflected in the PCNs that merit an adjustment, but the Chinese exporters and the CRIA and the CCCMC are simply unable to identify such differences as they have no information about the products sold by the sampled Union producers. The parties claimed that the WTO Appellate Body Report inEC — Fasteners(43)supports this approach. The parties reiterated similar claims after the final disclosure.
(157) The Commission did not accept this argument. It pointed out that the Appellate Body Report mentioned above is about a failure to provide the necessary information regarding the characteristics of a given product which was used in determining the normal value. This led to a situation in which the producers were not in a position to decide about the necessity to request level of trade adjustments or not in order to ensure a fair comparison under Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation in the context of dumping calculations. However, the Panel report in the same case stated that ‘while it is clear that the general requirements of objective examination and positive evidence of Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation limit an investigating authority's discretion in the conduct of a price undercutting analysis, this does not mean that the requirements of Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation with respect to due allowance for differences affecting price comparability are applicable’(44). Therefore, this jurisprudence cannot be relied upon in the present case where the CRIA and the CCCMC make speculations about the absence of disclosure of information about ‘any other relevant characteristics’ and differences not reflected in the PCNs for the purpose of undercutting and injury calculations. Furthermore, the Commission carried out the undercutting calculation in line with its usual practice to ensure a fair comparison whereby PCNs sufficiently reflect physical and all other differences between the product types sold by the Union producers and the exporting producers. Moreover, should the exporting producers consider that their products have specific features which are normally different to the characteristics of the Union products and which, in their view, are not captured by the PCN, they should have raised them in due course. Therefore, that claim was rejected.
(158) Certain interested parties claimed the Commission did not establish undercutting for the whole period considered. A detailed undercutting calculation was only made for the investigation period. While average Chinese import prices in previous periods can be compared with sales prices by the Union industry, such a comparison is essentially meaningless as (1) no separate data are available for Chinese import prices by tier; and (2) these average prices do not take into account the possibility that the product mix may have changed during the period.
(159) The WTO Appellate Body Report inChina — HP-SSST (EU)(45)requested that an investigating authority has to assess the significance of the price undercutting by the dumped imports in relation to the proportion of domestic production for which no price undercutting was found. The parties considered that the Commission did not carry out such assessment. The parties reiterated similar claims after the final disclosure.
(160) As stated in recital (149) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission performed in accordance with the applicable jurisprudence the customary calculations on the basis of the verified data for the investigation period, per PCN and tiers. All relevant calculations were disclosed to the interested parties respecting their procedural rights. The overall level of price undercutting during the investigation period was around 21 %, which the Commission considers significant. Therefore, that claim was rejected.
(161) The CRIA and the CCCMC, however, considered that it is likely that the Commission only found undercutting for a small subset of sales by the sampled Union producers. In their view, the Commission has to assess the price pressure, if any, that could be exercised by the Chinese imports on the remaining Union industry sales for which it did not find undercutting.
(162) That claim was rejected because the volume of sales of the sampled Union producers that matched the imports of the Chinese exporting producers is significant (between 80 % and 90 %). Moreover, the weighted average undercutting margin in the three tiers was found to be significant, between 18 % and 24 %.
(163) The Aeolus Group and Heuver requested that the Aeolus' CIF prices should be revised in order to reflect Heuver's post-importation costs. Pirelli claimed that the Commission must take its additional costs into account when comparing the Pirelli tyres to other tyres produced and sold by the Union industry and to the (independent) retailers.
(164) The Commission found that Heuver was not related to the Aeolus Group. Therefore, no adjustment was warranted. Regarding Pirelli, the CIF weighted average price was established in accordance with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation as described in recital (118) of the provisional Regulation. Therefore, that claim was rejected.
(165) Several parties claimed that the Commission cannot rely on constructed export prices when making the price undercutting analysis and the determination of the injury level and that the methodology used is contrary of Article 3(2)(a) and Article 3(3) of the basic Regulation. Moreover, Hankook Group claimed that it should be treated as a single economic entity for both the dumping and the injury margin calculations.
(166) Firstly, Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation refers to the effect of dumped imports that may cause injury to the Union producers and not to the resale price of a company (related importer) within the Union to another customer.
(167) Secondly, as far as undercutting is concerned, the basic Regulation does not provide any specific methodology of that concept. The institutions therefore enjoy a wide margin of discretion in assessing this injury factor. That discretion is limited by the need to base conclusions on positive evidence and to make an objective examination, as requested by Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation.
(168) When it comes to the elements taken into account for calculation of undercutting (in particular the export price), the Commission has to identify the first point at which competition takes (or may take) place with Union producers in the Union market. This point is in fact the purchasing price of the first unrelated importer because that company has in principle the choice to source either from the Union industry or from overseas customers. By contrast, to look at resale prices of unrelated importers does not reflect the point where real competition takes place. This is only the point where the established sales structure of the exporter tries to find customers but it is already after the point where the decision to import has been taken. Indeed, once the exporter has established its system of related companies in the Union, they have already decided that the source of their merchandise will be from overseas. Hence, the point of comparison should be right after the good crosses the Union border, and not at a later stage in the distribution chain, e.g. when selling to the final user of the good.
(169) This approach also ensures coherence in cases where an exporting producer is selling the goods directly to an unrelated customer (whether importer or final user) because under this scenario, resale prices would not be used by definition. A different approach would lead to a discrimination between exporting producers based solely on the sales channel that they use.
(170) In this case, the import price cannot be taken at its face value because the exporting producer and the importer are related. Therefore, in order to establish a reliable import price at arm's length basis, such price has to be reconstructed by using the resale price of the related importer as a starting point. In order to carry out this reconstruction, the rules on the construction of the export price as contained in Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation are pertinent, just as they are pertinent for the determination of the export price for dumping purposes. The application of Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation allows arriving at a price that is fully comparable to the CIF price (Union border) that is used when examining sales made to unrelated customers.
(171) Therefore, in order to allow for a fair comparison, a deduction of SG&A and profit from the resale price to unrelated customers made by the related importer is warranted in order to arrive to a reliable CIF price.
(172) Certain parties requested the Commission to disclose the nature of certain post-importation costs and the percentage applied, with an indication of the source. Moreover, the Xingyuan Group claimed that these fixed costs should be allocated as a fixed amount per tyre instead of a percentage which will unfairly penalise exporters whose prices are at the lower end of the scale.
(173) The Commission noted that it increased the CIF value by 3,2 % for post-importation costs (of which transport represented 60 %, handling 32 % and customs expenses 8 %). The percentages were calculated on the basis of verified post-importation costs per piece and were subsequently expressed into a percentage of the CIF price of the verified unrelated importers.
(174) Following final disclosure, the CCCMC and the CRIA claimed that the differences between new tyres and retreaded tyres should be taken into account for the fair comparison in the investigation for the purposes of the undercutting and underselling determination.
(175) As stated in the recital (84) of the provisional Regulation new tyres and retreaded tyres have the same basic physical characteristics as well as the same basic uses. Therefore, that claim was rejected.
(176) Following final disclosure, the Hankook Group found a discrepancy between the profit margin reported for tier 1 and the target profit margin used to establish the underselling margin.
(177) The Commission reviewed the underselling margins and found a clerical error when establishing the underselling margin for tier 1 and tier 2. Therefore, the Commission corrected the underselling margin calculation.
(178) After the hearing with Hankook, mentioned in recital (14), the Commission disclosed additional information on the SG&A items deducted from the price to the first independent customer in order to reach an ex-works level. The Commission confirmed that the costs deducted were: transport, insurance costs, handling, loading and ancillary, packing, credit, discounts and commissions. The Commission did not deduct from the Union producers' prices indirect sales expenses, R & D, finance, marketing nor profit.
(179) Several parties requested more detailed information regarding the methodology used at provisional stage to weight the different categories of companies (large or SME) and by tiers as described in the provisional Regulation in recitals (157) and (158).
(180) The weighting process was based on the sales as this is the relevant parameter when considering the sales price in the Union for establishing the cost of production or the profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers.
(181) One of the criteria for the selection of the sample of Union producers was the representativity of the Union producers in terms of size, namely between SMEs and larger companies (recital (24) of the provisional Regulation). Five SMEs were sampled. One SME decided to stop cooperating with the investigation. Four replied to the sampling questionnaire. As mentioned in recital (10), the Commission verified the questionnaire of the SME for which the verification visit had not been carried out before the imposition of the provisional measures.
(182) In addition, the Commission took into consideration comments from interested parties that considered that the market segmentation into three tiers had to be reflected in the sample of Union producers (recital (20) of the provisional Regulation). Additional information was provided by the cooperating producers as explained in recital (21) of the provisional Regulation. Union producers were requested to provide information regarding the sales value and volume concerning production and Union sales per tier and in case of retreaded tyres the source of the casings (tolling/stock casings). The sampling questionnaire or the Union producer's questionnaire did not provide information regarding the origin/the brand of the casings used by retreaders.
(183) The Commission sampled 11 Union producers. This is an unusually large number of Union producers to be investigated. However, despite this effort, the performance of the SMEs and per tier required a weighting for a proper analysis of the resulting aggregation of the microeconomic injury indicators.
(184) The split per tier of the sales of the cooperating Union producers and of the sampled Union producers were similar: in the range of 60 % to 70 % for tier 1, in the range of 15 % to 25 % in tier 2 and in the range of 10 % to 20 % in tier 3. SMEs represented in the range of 7 % to 10 % of the total Union sales reported by cooperating Union producers. Moreover, sampled Union producers are producing new and retreaded tyres in tier 2 and tier 3. Around half of the sales of the sample in tier 3 are retreaded tyres.
(185) The first step was to estimate the split between the sales of large companies and SMEs. The estimation of SME sales was based on the information provided by ETRMA (for cold process) and by tread suppliers not members of ETRMA Europool. For the purpose of this investigation, it was considered that cold process sales are made by SMEs and hot process by large producers. This is a conservative approach to estimate the sales of SMEs as the Commission verified one SME producer with both techniques. The estimation of the sales of the large companies is the difference between the total Union sales of the Union producers minus the estimation of SME sales. At a provisional stage, the Commission found that SME sales represented around 15 % of the total Union sales of the Union industry in 2016 (as mentioned above this was a conservative estimate since some SMEs also use hot retreading processes). As a result, the ratio was established at around 85 % for large companies and around 15 % for SMEs.
(186) The second step was to compare the ratio of 85 %/15 % with the ratio of the sample (in which large companies weighed over 95 %). Moreover, the sales data of the sampled SMEs represented around 4 % of the estimated total Union sales of Union SMEs producers. To ensure a proper reflection of the relative importance of the two categories of Union producers in the microeconomic indicators, the Commission weighted the individual company indicators when aggregating on the basis of the 85 %/15 % ratio mentioned above. The methodology resulted in an increase of the weight of tier 3 sales used to establish the microeconomic indicators.
(187) At provisional stage, both weightings, the weighting of the category of companies and the weighting of the tiers, were applied equally throughout the period considered, on the basis of 2016. The Commission considered this approach reasonable in view of the available evidence.
(188) Following final disclosure, the CRIA and the CCCMC claimed that the Commission should not use a fixed ratio (namely a ratio calculated for 2016) over the period considered but rather a ratio for each period of the period considered. Moreover, they claimed that some large producers of tread were producing retreaded tyres by using the cold process and that two producers of retreaded tyres were part of a larger group qualifying them as large company. Therefore, the parties claimed that the methodology used could not be considered as conservative and that the volume of SMEs sales was overestimated. Bipaver claimed that the hot process is not only used by one retreader but by several Union retreaders(46).
(189) Firstly, the Commission examined the claims made and the evidence provided by the parties. It found that indeed some large suppliers of treads have related subsidiaries producing retreaded tyres by using the cold process. Moreover, the two producers initially considered as SMEs mentioned by the parties were part of a larger groups, hence they cannot be considered as SMEs. The Commission hence adjusted the ratios used in the weighting. The large suppliers and SMEs provided their sales over the period considered. The total volume reported is between 227 000 and 254 000 retreaded tyres, representing around 5,5 % of the estimated retreaded tyres sales during the period considered.
(190) Secondly, regarding SMEs hot production sales, the Commission found that more than one SME is producing retreaded tyres using the hot process. It requested from a few producers to provide the volume of the hot process production for the period considered. The total volume reported is between 132 000 and 150 000 retreaded tyres, representing around 3,2 % of the estimated retreaded tyres sales during the period considered.
(191) Thirdly, the Commission recalculated the estimation of the SMEs sales during the period considered by adding the SMEs hot production sales and deducting the large companies' cold production sales.
(192) Finally, the Commission calculated the share of SMEs sales in the total Union sales for each period of the period considered:Table 4Share of SMEs' sales in the total Union sales (in %)201420152016Investigation periodShare of SMEs' sales in the total Union sales16,915,313,713,2Ratio used at provisional stage for SMEs sales in the total Union sales14,614,614,614,6 2014 2015 2016 Investigation period Share of SMEs' sales in the total Union sales 16,9 15,3 13,7 13,2 Ratio used at provisional stage for SMEs sales in the total Union sales 14,6 14,6 14,6 14,6
2014 2015 2016 Investigation period
Share of SMEs' sales in the total Union sales 16,9 15,3 13,7 13,2
Ratio used at provisional stage for SMEs sales in the total Union sales 14,6 14,6 14,6 14,6
2014 2015 2016 Investigation period
Share of SMEs' sales in the total Union sales 16,9 15,3 13,7 13,2
Ratio used at provisional stage for SMEs sales in the total Union sales 14,6 14,6 14,6 14,6
(193) As shown in Table 4, the weight of SMEs in the total Union sales during the period considered has been increased by 2,3 percentage points in 2014, 0,7 percentage points in 2015 and decreased by 0,9 percentage points in 2016 and 1,4 percentage points in the investigation period. The Commission concluded that the establishment of a ratio per year has a marginal impact on the overall outcome of the analysis. On the basis of the above, the conclusions based on the trends of the provisional Regulation remain valid.
(194) Regarding the second adjustment by tiers, the Commission relied at the provisional stage on the information provided by the Complaint (Annex 15) which provides the estimation of the weight of each tier for the Union consumption for 2016. However, as mentioned in recital (188), the CRIA and the CCCMC claimed that the Commission should use a ratio for each period of the period considered.
(195) The investigation did not reveal any data that would have been more appropriate which in turn could have been could be used for the calculation of the weighting of the tiers throughout the period considered, nor have interested parties been able to present such data. Therefore, the Commission decided not to apply the second adjustment by tiers at definitive stage. This approach has increased the weight of tier 1 and tier 2 used to establish the microeconomic indicators.
(196) As shown in Table 5, with the revised weighting the conclusions based on the trends of the provisional Regulation remain valid for all the microeconomic indicators analysed on aggregated basis:Table 5Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turn-over)201420152016Investigation periodProfit margin as in Table 13 of the provisional regulation (% of sales turn-over)15,616,715,213,7Index 2014 = 100100106,997,788,1Profit margin with revised weighting (% of sales turn-over)15,416,915,313,7Index 2014 = 100100109,599,588,6 2014 2015 2016 Investigation period Profit margin as in Table 13 of the provisional regulation (% of sales turn-over) 15,6 16,7 15,2 13,7 Index 2014 = 100 100 106,9 97,7 88,1 Profit margin with revised weighting (% of sales turn-over) 15,4 16,9 15,3 13,7 Index 2014 = 100 100 109,5 99,5 88,6
2014 2015 2016 Investigation period
Profit margin as in Table 13 of the provisional regulation (% of sales turn-over) 15,6 16,7 15,2 13,7
Index 2014 = 100 100 106,9 97,7 88,1
Profit margin with revised weighting (% of sales turn-over) 15,4 16,9 15,3 13,7
Index 2014 = 100 100 109,5 99,5 88,6
2014 2015 2016 Investigation period
Profit margin as in Table 13 of the provisional regulation (% of sales turn-over) 15,6 16,7 15,2 13,7
Index 2014 = 100 100 106,9 97,7 88,1
Profit margin with revised weighting (% of sales turn-over) 15,4 16,9 15,3 13,7
Index 2014 = 100 100 109,5 99,5 88,6
(197) As shown in Table 6, with the revised weighting the conclusions based on the trends of the provisional Regulation remain valid for tier 3:Table 6Tier 3 profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turn-over)201420152016Investigation periodProfit margin as in Table 16 of the provisional regulation (% of sales turn-over)6,10,62,7– 0,4Index 2014 = 1001001045– 7Profit margin with revised weighting (% of sales turn-over)5,90,52,7– 0,7Index 2014 = 100100945– 12 2014 2015 2016 Investigation period Profit margin as in Table 16 of the provisional regulation (% of sales turn-over) 6,1 0,6 2,7 – 0,4 Index 2014 = 100 100 10 45 – 7 Profit margin with revised weighting (% of sales turn-over) 5,9 0,5 2,7 – 0,7 Index 2014 = 100 100 9 45 – 12
2014 2015 2016 Investigation period
Profit margin as in Table 16 of the provisional regulation (% of sales turn-over) 6,1 0,6 2,7 – 0,4
Index 2014 = 100 100 10 45 – 7
Profit margin with revised weighting (% of sales turn-over) 5,9 0,5 2,7 – 0,7
Index 2014 = 100 100 9 45 – 12
2014 2015 2016 Investigation period
Profit margin as in Table 16 of the provisional regulation (% of sales turn-over) 6,1 0,6 2,7 – 0,4
Index 2014 = 100 100 10 45 – 7
Profit margin with revised weighting (% of sales turn-over) 5,9 0,5 2,7 – 0,7
Index 2014 = 100 100 9 45 – 12
(198) The CRIA and the CCCMC claimed that the weighting process was illegal, as the basic Regulation did not allow for amendments to the sampling of the Union producers that is supposed to be representative for the entire Union industry. Moreover, they argued that the Commission's methodology did not comply with the requirement to base the injury determination on positive evidence to carry out an objective examination since a very limited number of companies eventually determined the whole outcome of the injury assessment, to the detriment of a much larger dataset the importance of which is downgraded. The parties reiterated similar claims after the final disclosure. Moreover, after the final disclosure the CRIA and the CCCMC claimed that the Commission cannot rely on the information provided by four sampled SMEs which would be the basis for the weighting of the injury indicators.
(199) The Commission recalled the methodology used in recitals (179) to (195).
(200) Furthermore, the Commission reiterated that as a result of the weighting, the selected sample became statistically more representative of the Union industry as a whole, in accordance with the applicable WTO and EU case-law(47). In addition, this allowed the Commission to better take into account the performance of the non-sampled Union producers (SMEs and large producers), which would otherwise be not sufficiently reflected in the injury indicators had the Commission based its findings on the sample without applying the weighting in the case at hand. Given the fragmented character of the Union industry, the Commission could not simply disregard the significance of the SMEs producers on the Union market. As mentioned in recital (186), the sales data provided by the sampled SMEs represented around 4 % of the estimated total Union sales of Union SMEs producers. To reflect the relative importance of the two categories of companies, the Commission based its findings on the verified data of the sampled companies and applied the weighting. The information relied on was available on the open file, duly verified where needed. The Commission accordingly considered that it had carried out an objective examination of the existence of injury based on positive evidence. Therefore, those claims were rejected.
(201) The CRIA and the CCCMC claimed that they had doubts about the reliability of some of the information relied on concerning the macroeconomic indicators.
(202) As mentioned in recital (28), a document providing clarifications on the provisional Regulation was included in the open file before the final disclosure.
(203) Regarding the establishment of the macroeconomic indicators, the Commission relied on various sources, including data provided by the European Tyre & Rubber Manufacturers' Association (‘ETRMA’). ETRMA publishes market analysis that is publicly available on its website. The open version of the complaint included a document originating from ETRMA (Annex 16 — ETRMA booklet for 2016(48)). The Commission noted that some of the exporting producers as well as certain Union producers are members of ETRMA and were also providing submissions supported by data from ETRMA (such as the Hankook Group and Pirelli).
(204) As implied in recital (135), the Union production in the provisional Regulation did not contain the sales of tread suppliers not members of ETRMA Europool. Moreover, a clerical error was found when establishing the production capacity.
(205) The estimated total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation were revised accordingly and developed over the period considered as follows:Table 7Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation201420152016Investigation periodProduction volume (in items)20 973 08920 360 05520 619 72521 111 923Index 2014 = 10010097,198,3100,7Production capacity (in items)29 038 11728 225 98527 115 95026 525 214Index 2014 = 10010097,293,491,3Capacity utilisation72,2 %72,1 %76,0 %79,6 %Index 2014 = 100100100105110Source:ETRMA, tread suppliers not members of ETRMA Europool, Eurostat Comext and information submitted by the complainant. 2014 2015 2016 Investigation period Production volume (in items) 20 973 089 20 360 055 20 619 725 21 111 923 Index 2014 = 100 100 97,1 98,3 100,7 Production capacity (in items) 29 038 117 28 225 985 27 115 950 26 525 214 Index 2014 = 100 100 97,2 93,4 91,3 Capacity utilisation 72,2 % 72,1 % 76,0 % 79,6 % Index 2014 = 100 100 100 105 110 Source:ETRMA, tread suppliers not members of ETRMA Europool, Eurostat Comext and information submitted by the complainant.
2014 2015 2016 Investigation period
Production volume (in items) 20 973 089 20 360 055 20 619 725 21 111 923
Index 2014 = 100 100 97,1 98,3 100,7
Production capacity (in items) 29 038 117 28 225 985 27 115 950 26 525 214
Index 2014 = 100 100 97,2 93,4 91,3
Capacity utilisation 72,2 % 72,1 % 76,0 % 79,6 %
Index 2014 = 100 100 100 105 110
Source:ETRMA, tread suppliers not members of ETRMA Europool, Eurostat Comext and information submitted by the complainant.
2014 2015 2016 Investigation period
Production volume (in items) 20 973 089 20 360 055 20 619 725 21 111 923
Index 2014 = 100 100 97,1 98,3 100,7
Production capacity (in items) 29 038 117 28 225 985 27 115 950 26 525 214
Index 2014 = 100 100 97,2 93,4 91,3
Capacity utilisation 72,2 % 72,1 % 76,0 % 79,6 %
Index 2014 = 100 100 100 105 110
Source:ETRMA, tread suppliers not members of ETRMA Europool, Eurostat Comext and information submitted by the complainant.
(206) As shown in Table 7, production remained relatively stable, with 21,1 million units in the investigation period, while the capacity utilisation rate increased by 7,4 percentage points (from 72,2 % to 79,6 %) over the period considered given the decrease in production capacity.
(207) As implied in recital (135), the total sales volume in the Union market in the provisional Regulation did not contain the sales of tread suppliers not members of ETRMA Europool.
(208) The Union industry's sales volume and market share were revised accordingly and developed over the period considered as follows:Table 8Sales volume and market share201420152016Investigation periodTotal sales volume on the Union market (in items)14 835 08214 738 67714 533 19914 584 885Index 2014 = 10010099,498,098,3Market share72,4 %70,3 %67,3 %67,1 %Index 2014 = 10010097,293,092,7Source:ETRMA, tread suppliers not members of ETRMA Europool and Eurostat Comext. 2014 2015 2016 Investigation period Total sales volume on the Union market (in items) 14 835 082 14 738 677 14 533 199 14 584 885 Index 2014 = 100 100 99,4 98,0 98,3 Market share 72,4 % 70,3 % 67,3 % 67,1 % Index 2014 = 100 100 97,2 93,0 92,7 Source:ETRMA, tread suppliers not members of ETRMA Europool and Eurostat Comext.
2014 2015 2016 Investigation period
Total sales volume on the Union market (in items) 14 835 082 14 738 677 14 533 199 14 584 885
Index 2014 = 100 100 99,4 98,0 98,3
Market share 72,4 % 70,3 % 67,3 % 67,1 %
Index 2014 = 100 100 97,2 93,0 92,7
Source:ETRMA, tread suppliers not members of ETRMA Europool and Eurostat Comext.
2014 2015 2016 Investigation period
Total sales volume on the Union market (in items) 14 835 082 14 738 677 14 533 199 14 584 885
Index 2014 = 100 100 99,4 98,0 98,3
Market share 72,4 % 70,3 % 67,3 % 67,1 %
Index 2014 = 100 100 97,2 93,0 92,7
Source:ETRMA, tread suppliers not members of ETRMA Europool and Eurostat Comext.
(209) In a growing market, sales in the Union decreased slightly over the period considered. This resulted in a decrease by 5,3 percentage points of market share (from 72,4 % to 67,1 %) while import volume from the PRC increased by over 1,1 million of tyres, or an increase of 4,2 percentage points of market share (from 17,1 % to 21,3 %).
(210) The Aeolus Group and Pirelli claimed that the sales volume in the Union market remained stable over the previous three years and the market share of the Union industry decreased by 5 percentage points from 2014 to 2017, which is an insignificant decrease.
(211) Moreover, they also claimed that the volume of Union sales reported by the complaints for the period 2013 and 2016 showed a strong decline for tier 3 (– 30 %), a decline in sales for tier 2 (– 7 %) and a slight decline in sales for tier 1 (– 1 %). As such, it was clear that the only injury could be found in the tier 3 segment and that the injury analysis must take into consideration the market segmentation.
(212) The Commission noted that the figures mentioned in the previous recital relate to the sales of the complainants only, and not to the Union industry as a whole. They also relate to a different period in time. Therefore, it is not possible to transpose the evolution of the complainants' sales volume to the Union industry. As explained in recitals (128) and (132), the Commission considered that the existence of material injury must be determined with regard to the product concerned and the Union industry as a whole, and not only for certain parts thereof. Therefore, the Commission did not examine the trends in isolation, namely per tier, since it followed an aggregated approach.
(213) The Union consumption increased by 6,1 % during the period considered. The sales volumes of the Union industry decreased by 1,7 % in spite of the growing consumption, which resulted in the Union industry losing market share. The market share of the imports from the country concerned increased during the period considered (by more than 4 percentage points).
(214) The Giti Group claimed that the Union consumption had to be analysed in value instead of in volume. On this basis, Union consumption decreased by 5 % in value, and only started to slowly increase between 2016 and the Investigation Period.
(215) The Commission rejected that claim. The Union consumption gave a snap-shot of the number of tyres available on the Union market at a given moment. Union consumption is customarily calculated in volume precisely to avoid that the pricing behaviour of the market players may affect the trends over the period considered.
(216) Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:Table 9Employment and productivity201420152016Investigation periodNumber of employees38 44536 47834 95934 188Index 2014 = 100100959189Productivity (unit/employee)546558590618Index 2014 = 100100102108113Source:Verified questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers, submissions from tread suppliers and ETRMA. 2014 2015 2016 Investigation period Number of employees 38 445 36 478 34 959 34 188 Index 2014 = 100 100 95 91 89 Productivity (unit/employee) 546 558 590 618 Index 2014 = 100 100 102 108 113 Source:Verified questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers, submissions from tread suppliers and ETRMA.
2014 2015 2016 Investigation period
Number of employees 38 445 36 478 34 959 34 188
Index 2014 = 100 100 95 91 89
Productivity (unit/employee) 546 558 590 618
Index 2014 = 100 100 102 108 113
Source:Verified questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers, submissions from tread suppliers and ETRMA.
2014 2015 2016 Investigation period
Number of employees 38 445 36 478 34 959 34 188
Index 2014 = 100 100 95 91 89
Productivity (unit/employee) 546 558 590 618
Index 2014 = 100 100 102 108 113
Source:Verified questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers, submissions from tread suppliers and ETRMA.
(217) The Aeolus Group and Pirelli stated that the employment, for which the Commission found a decrease of 11 %, exclusively relates to the retreading industry. The development of productivity can instead be explained by the fact that the Union industry has recently gone through a period of restructuring and rationalisation.
(218) The statement of interested parties regarding the decrease in employment is factually incorrect, since around half of it is from large manufacturers. Therefore, that claim was rejected.
(219) Heuver requested the names of the 85 retreaders mentioned in recital (171) of the provisional Regulation.
(220) The Commission concluded in the provisional Regulation that there were at least 85 producers that stopped production based on the list of customers that tread suppliers had provided in this investigation. The Commission granted confidential treatment to the identity of the customers and the volume of sales per customers since this is sensitive business information. Moreover, interested parties are not requested to provide a summary for this type of document. That being said, exceptionally, the tread suppliers provided a summary of their submissions which can be found in the open file.
(221) Following final disclosure, the CRIA and the CCCMC claimed that the Commission's assumption that all cold process sales are made by SMEs is erroneous as many large companies are using the cold process retreading methodology. The parties concluded that the resulting estimation of employment and productivity were therefore unreliable.
(222) As mentioned in recital (189), the Commission found that the production of large companies using the cold process is rather limited and cannot as such dismiss the estimation made by the Commission regarding the employment and productivity. Moreover, the productivity relates mostly to the type of production (namely retreading or new). Therefore, that claim was rejected.
(223) In addition, the CRIA and the CCCMC claimed that the list of customers provided by one tread supplier show that one customer was mentioned inactive while its financial statements lodged to the local authorities showed that the company was still active in 2017. The Commission in its note for the file(49)explained that the list was built by aggregating the information on sales provided by eight tread suppliers. For the purposes of the investigation a retreader was considered as having stopped production when it did not purchase treads any longer. Therefore, it is not possible to conclude positively on whether a retreader is active or inactive solely on the basis of the list of unique supplier and/or on the basis of filed financial statements. Moreover, while it is true that the company mentioned by the CCCMC had not closed down, it confirmed to the Commission that it does not operate any longer its retreading workshop. Therefore, the Commission continued to use the list as established.
(224) All dumping margins were revised as mentioned in recital (122) and all remain significant. The impact of the magnitude of the actual margins of dumping on the Union industry was substantial, given the volume and prices of imports from the country concerned.
(225) The Giti Group requested the Commission to also disclose the evolution in the microeconomic factors without the weighting adopted by the Commission to allow it to analyse whether such unmanipulated data would result in a different injury picture. After the final disclosure, the CRIA, the CCCMC and the Giti Group reiterated the claim.
(226) The Commission rejected that claim, as disclosing the injury indicators without the weighting would not reflect the real situation of the Union industry given that it is not possible to sample as many SMEs as it would be necessary to reflect their real weight among the Union producers.
(227) The CRIA and the CCCMC requested the Commission to clarify whether transfer prices between related companies had been considered when establishing the injury indicators.
(228) When related companies were involved in the sales, the sampled producers were requested to provide the sales to the first independent customers. Regarding the purchases of raw materials through related companies, the transfer price policy was examined by the Commission and did not result in any adjustments.
(229) The Aeolus Group and Pirelli claimed that the Commission should consider analysing not only the overall industry but also the distinction between new and retreaded tyres or between different categories of tiers. They argued that according to the complaint, no increase in stock has taken place for tier 1 or 2 tyres. On the contrary, tier 1 and 2 stocks decreased by 15 % and 21 %, respectively, between 2013 and 2016. Conversely, the complaint reported a 17 % stock increase for tier 3 tyres. For them, the reported increase in stocks relates only to the retreading industry. Furthermore, stock fluctuations can be explained by various factors. For instance, stock increases can be triggered by increased sales, which are made on anticipated orders. Specifically, Prometeon Tyre Group S.r.l. recorded an increase in stock due to several factors, all related to the European economic crisis. Tyre production is strictly connected to transportation, and transportation depends mainly on trade in general. A trade crisis results in low transportation and this, logically, means fewer tyre sales.
(230) The Commission first noted that the increase of the stocks of the sampled Union producers had occurred between 2016 and the investigation period. Therefore, it was not directly concerned by the financial crisis of 2011. Furthermore, the figures quoted by the interested parties only concerned the complainant and did not reflect the situation of the sampled Union producers. Thus drawing any conclusions from them cannot be considered representative of the Union industry for the investigation. On this basis, that claim was rejected.
(231) Regarding the investments, the Aeolus Group and Pirelli claimed that the investigation contradicted the figures provided by the complainant. The Giti Group claimed that the profitability of the Union industry as a whole was understated because the Commission tinkered with the data of the sampled Union producers to increase the importance of tier 3 data. The Giti Group also claimed that the only segment of the industry with deteriorating (and low) profit margins was the tier 3 segment. This segment of the market, however, accounted for only 20 % of the total Union sales/consumption. The Aeolus Group and Pirelli considered that the Union industry is in general very profitable, clearly positive in tier 1 and positive in the tier 2 segment.
(232) Regarding the comment on the methodology for calculating the profitability, the Commission explained in recitals (179) to (195) the methodology applied for the weighting of the microeconomic indicators to reflect the economic reality of the Union producers. It also noted that the profitability of all tiers deteriorated from 2014 to the end of the investigation period and that the absolute figures on profitability had to be read in conjunction with its findings on the interconnection between tiers.
(233) Interested parties generally accepted the principle of the market segmentation into three tiers. As described in recitals (54) to (59) of the provisional Regulation, in the Union market, the brands were positioned in one of the three tiers. All tiers were generally sold through common sales channels.
(234) There were a number of interested parties that challenged the provisional findings on the interconnection between the tiers and reiterated the same concerns following final disclosure. The Commission compiled the information on this matter in a note for the file on interconnection between new and retreaded tyres and between the tiers(50).
(235) The CRIA and the CCCMC claimed that the idea that the prices in tier 3 would drive the pricing in tiers 1 and 2 (recitals (203) and (207) of the provisional Regulation) is baseless and that the Commission failed to give any reason for this alleged impact. Even assuming that the aforementioned findings were correct, none of these could lead to the conclusion that prices in tier 3 would impact prices in tiers 1 and 2. They also claimed that the prices of tyres are led by the cost of raw materials and that it was incorrect that competition takes place across the different segments. They contended that the Commission simply refers to ‘the impact of the prices in the lower tiers on the pricing in the higher tier’ (recital (203) of the provisional Regulation), echoing the complainant without any supporting evidence. The Giti Group submitted that the Commission's reverse-cascading theory was not supported (and was in fact contradicted) by the facts on the record. In this connection, the Giti Group also recalled that the Complaint itself had stated that: ‘Actors, pricing, competition and strategies vary significantly from one segment to the other and a decisive factor on one segment might be irrelevant on another. While direct competition may exist between extremities of segments, intersegment competition is mostly the result of a strategic choice between quality and price’(51).
(236) As mentioned in recital (234), the Commission produced a note for the file containing the basis for concluding that there is interconnection between tiers. This conclusion was based on a number of elements. The first one is that competition across tiers takes place at the moment a purchase is decided. The purchaser then has the option to choose:—a tier 1 tyre, with greater durability, the latest technology and the best performance, at a higher initial price, or—a tier 2 tyre, often made by premium tyre makers, with a greater durability than tier 3 brands and lower cost than premium brands, at a higher initial price than tier 3 tyres, or—tier 3 tyre, with the lowest upfront cost, but the least durability and lowest performance. — a tier 1 tyre, with greater durability, the latest technology and the best performance, at a higher initial price, or — a tier 2 tyre, often made by premium tyre makers, with a greater durability than tier 3 brands and lower cost than premium brands, at a higher initial price than tier 3 tyres, or — tier 3 tyre, with the lowest upfront cost, but the least durability and lowest performance.
— a tier 1 tyre, with greater durability, the latest technology and the best performance, at a higher initial price, or
— a tier 2 tyre, often made by premium tyre makers, with a greater durability than tier 3 brands and lower cost than premium brands, at a higher initial price than tier 3 tyres, or
— tier 3 tyre, with the lowest upfront cost, but the least durability and lowest performance.
— a tier 1 tyre, with greater durability, the latest technology and the best performance, at a higher initial price, or
— a tier 2 tyre, often made by premium tyre makers, with a greater durability than tier 3 brands and lower cost than premium brands, at a higher initial price than tier 3 tyres, or
— tier 3 tyre, with the lowest upfront cost, but the least durability and lowest performance.
(237) This decision, translated into prices, results in a two-fold analysis: the upfront payment and overall cost per tyre. Regarding the upfront payment, the tier 1 tyres are the ones that involve a higher investment. At the same time, on a cost per tyre per km basis, they have the lowest cost. The variables are exactly opposite for tier 3 tyres, where the upfront payment is the lowest, but the cost per tyre per km is the highest(52).
(238) Another element that played a critical role was the common sales channels, which usually display the tyres of different tiers together for sale, facilitating the dynamic of the interconnection between tiers(53).
(239) The Commission also noted that the claim regarding the cost of raw materials was not supported by evidence.
(240) In the final disclosure document, the Commission referred to the development in Union sales of the different tiers, relying, in this regard, on a table provided by interested parties (Prometeon/Pirelli). This table was labelled as ‘Estimated evolution of Union sales for Union producers members of ETRMA’. Following final disclosure, the CRIA and the CCCMC claimed that the figures differed from the Table 4 of the final disclosure document. The Commission examined the claim and requested a clarification from ETRMA. ETRMA explained that the data in the Table 6 of the final disclosure document was erroneously labelled. The data contained in Table 6 of the final disclosure document in fact concerned the evolution of the Union replacement market of new tyres (Table 10 below). According to that data, there was a clear and rapidly growing interest of Union producers in the lower price, tier 3 segment of the market.Table 10Estimated evolution of Union replacement market of new tyresIn million2014201520162017estimate 2018Tier 1 + Tier 28,79,09,19,09,2Index 2014 = 100100103105103106Tier 33,64,05,05,45,5Index 2014 = 100100111139150153Share of ETRMA producers on T3 segment12,5 %12,4 %13,1 %14,1 %18,9 %Source:Prometeon Tyre Group and Pirelli(54) In million 2014 2015 2016 2017 estimate 2018 Tier 1 + Tier 2 8,7 9,0 9,1 9,0 9,2 Index 2014 = 100 100 103 105 103 106 Tier 3 3,6 4,0 5,0 5,4 5,5 Index 2014 = 100 100 111 139 150 153 Share of ETRMA producers on T3 segment 12,5 % 12,4 % 13,1 % 14,1 % 18,9 % Source:Prometeon Tyre Group and Pirelli(54)
In million 2014 2015 2016 2017 estimate 2018
Tier 1 + Tier 2 8,7 9,0 9,1 9,0 9,2
Index 2014 = 100 100 103 105 103 106
Tier 3 3,6 4,0 5,0 5,4 5,5
Index 2014 = 100 100 111 139 150 153
Share of ETRMA producers on T3 segment 12,5 % 12,4 % 13,1 % 14,1 % 18,9 %
Source:Prometeon Tyre Group and Pirelli(54)
In million 2014 2015 2016 2017 estimate 2018
Tier 1 + Tier 2 8,7 9,0 9,1 9,0 9,2
Index 2014 = 100 100 103 105 103 106
Tier 3 3,6 4,0 5,0 5,4 5,5
Index 2014 = 100 100 111 139 150 153
Share of ETRMA producers on T3 segment 12,5 % 12,4 % 13,1 % 14,1 % 18,9 %
Source:Prometeon Tyre Group and Pirelli(54)
(241) On the basis of the above table, estimated 2018 sales of tier 3 new tyres are expected to increase by more than 53 % in comparison with their 2014 levels, while the volumes of sales of tier 1 and 2 tyres remain similar, and are expected to increase by only 6 % compared with their 2014 levels. This development must be viewed against the background of a drastic increase of tier 3 competition from exporting producers in the country concerned during the period 2014-2018 as well as financially unviable profit levels in tier 3 for Union producers of the product concerned.
(242) The Commission observed that this shift in Union replacement market has affected the Union producers who would have yielded far higher profit levels in tiers 1 and 2. This can only be understood in light of the reasons set out in recital (141) et seq., namely as a move to protect the main value driver for higher tiers distinguishing Union tier 1 and 2 sales from imports of tier 1 and 2 imports from the country concerned. The increase in low-profit tier 3 sales and, thereby, competition in the tier 3 sales segment, showcases that pressure from the reverse-cascading effect to tier 1 and 2 sales was felt by Union producers of the product concerned during the investigation period and beforehand, and that this pressure will increase even during the post-investigation period.
(243) The CRIA and the CCCMC noted that the Commission stated that it became less possible to retread a high-quality worn-out tyre (recital (202) of the provisional Regulation). However, no figures were provided. The fact that there might be closures of plants and workshops of retreaders does not necessarily mean that there are less possibilities to retread high-quality worn-out tyres, as the demand for such high-quality tyres dropped after the economic crisis according to the Commission itself (recital (200) of the provisional Regulation). The CRIA and the CCCMC requested the Commission to disclose the sales figures of tier 1 tyres and the actual capacity of retreading, to allow to assess to which extent the availability of retreading facilities really dropped taking into account the decreasing sales of tier 1 tyres. The Giti Group noted that the Commission did not present data on market share by tier that would be necessary information to check whether the Commission's reverse-cascading theory is supported by facts. This theory was built on the assumption that cheap tier 3 imports put price pressure on and took market share away from Union producers in tier 2 (and tier 1). However, should market share data by tier show that tier 1 and/or tier 2 Union producers actually managed to maintain (or even increase) their market share, this would fatally undermine this theory. It is not clear to the Giti Group whether the Commission has opted to not disclose information on market share or whether this information has simply not been collected. In any event, the Giti Group urged the Commission to disclose (and if necessary collect) this information to check the correctness of the Commission's reverse-cascading theory.
(244) Concerning the macro-indicators The Giti Group requested to have analysed per tier, the Commission explained in recitals (128) and (132), that it was appropriate to analyse the economic situation of the Union industry as a whole. There was capacity, production and imports in all tiers. Tier 3 where most of Chinese imports take place were dragging down the industry as a whole, as shown in the provisional Regulation. Chinese dumped prices significantly undercut the prices of the Union industry in all tiers during the investigation period. Over the period considered, the overall performance of the Union industry deteriorated. Some plants that produced different tiers had to close(55)and many retreaders had to stop production. The Commission established that at least 85 SMEs stopped production, which reduced the retreading capacity, as explained in recital (202) of the provisional Regulation.
(245) The CRIA and the CCCMC claimed that the Commission's allegation that ‘Union producers of new tyres have no option but to strengthen their presence in tier 3, too’ (recital (202) of the provisional Regulation) was difficult to understand as the Commission itself explained that all integrated retreaders (thus, producers of new tyres who also do retreading) would be part of tier 2 (recital (58) of the provisional Regulation).
(246) The Commission noted that in the Note with the mapping of new and retreaded tyres by brand, there were brands of Union producers of new tyres classified in tier 3.
(247) The Commission stated that ‘information available to the Commission showed’ that the pricing trend changed and that now allegedly tier 3 prices inversely affect tier 1 prices (recital (206) of the provisional Regulation). The CRIA and the CCCMC requested that this information was made available to interested parties.
(248) The Commission considered that the interconnection between tiers also encompassed a rationale of price setting across tiers. In fact, Union new tyre manufacturers following a multi-brand strategy agreed that a price change on one tier necessarily triggered an adjustment of the price on the overall portfolio and one of the sampled Union producer provided a substantiated explanation, which were also considered by the Commission for the conclusion on the price pressure across tiers(56).
(249) Certain interested parties claimed that the evolution of profitability of tier 1, tier 2 and tier 3 did not correlate with the interconnection between the tiers. They pointed out that the profitability of tier 1 of Union producers during the investigation period (at 17,5 %) is higher than the target profit (namely the profit that could be expected in the absence of dumped imports) established by the Commission (at 15,6 %) (as described in recital (196) the profitability was revised after the Final Disclosure at 15,4 %). Similarly, the profitability of tier 2 Union producers during the investigation period (at 15,3 %) was essentially the same as that target profit. Moreover, if profitability of Union producers in tier 1 and tier 2 was (indirectly) affected by cheap tier 3 imports, one would expect to see a similar evolution in profitability as for tier 3 Union producers. That is not the case. While profitability of tier 3 dropped from 6,1 % to 0,6 % in 2015 (as described in recital (197) the profitability was revised after the Final Disclosure from 5,9 % to 0,5 %), between 2014 and 2015, the profitability of tier 1 producers actually increased from 17,9 % to 21,8 %. Conversely, while profitability of tier 1 and 2 dropped between 2015 and 2016, during the same period profitability of tier 3 producers quadrupled from 0,5 % to 2,7 %. In short, those parties claim that there was no correlation in the development of the profitability of tier 3 and the profitability of tier 1 and tier 2. The only period in which there was a correlation in the development of profitability was between 2016 and the investigation period. The slight decrease in profitability during the investigation period can be, however, allegedly explained by a sudden increase in raw material costs that had not translated yet into higher sales prices. As concerns the development of sales prices, even if it was correct that the data provided in the provisional Regulation showed a decrease in sales prices of 9 % (for tier 1) and 12 % (for tier 2) over the period considered. This downward trend cannot be attributed to tier 3 Chinese imports for the following reasons. First, as the Commission acknowledged in other sections of the provisional Regulation — but appeared to have ignored when developing its reverse-cascading theory — the cost of production (because of a decline in raw material prices) decreased during the investigation period. For tier 1, the cost of production decreased by 9 %, exactly the same decrease as the one observed for the sales prices. Similarly, for tier 2, the cost of production dropped by 9 %. In other words, those interested parties alleged that the decrease in prices that the Commission observed is fully (for tier 1) and for 75 % (for tier 2) explained by the drop in the cost of production. They claim that that is also evident from the fact that once the cost of production increased between 2016 and the investigation period, so did sales prices. Second, there was a shift towards smaller tyres on the Union market. The unit price of smaller tyres is lower than for bigger tyres and this explains part of the decrease in the sales prices over the period considered. Those interested parties claim that the Commission did not take this development in consideration.
(250) The Commission considered that the lack of correlation on the development of the profitability of the different tiers can be explained by the way the purchasing decisions were taken. There is a time lag given the nature of the product and the range of options the user has depending on the situation. Indeed, the range of options the user has will depend on whether it has a tyre, and if so, whether the tyre it has could be further retreadable or not, the relative price of the available options, etc. For example, if the user needs to purchase a tyre, it will probably decide based on the whole range available. However, if the user has a retreadable tyre already, the cost of retreading the tyre it has will probably compete with the cost of purchasing a new tier 3 net of the income of selling the carcass.
(251) Additionally, the information gathered by the Commission concerning different sizes commercialised in the Union market over the period considered did not support the argument that prices and costs were lower because of the relatively stronger presence of smaller tyres on the market(57). The data showed indeed that the product mix on the market was stable and remains concentrated on the main dimensions. Moreover, such a reduction of the average size of the product could not be found in the Eurostat data for Chinese imports, revealing that, on the contrary the weight of the imported tyres from China increased by 3 % between 2014 and the investigation period. Conversely, the Commission noted overall structural adaptations made by the Union industry in order to reduce costs, as a result of the ‘knock-on effect’ on the different tiers at play.
(252) Certain interested parties claimed that there were substantial imports (accounting for a market share of 11,9 %; up by more than 1 % compared to 2014) from other countries and these were made at decreasing prices (over the period considered, the average import price dropped by 17 %). Their pricing also indicated that these imports were aimed at the tier 1 and/or tier 2 segment of the market. The imports from Turkey, Thailand, Japan, South Korea as well as other countries (excluding Russia) have consistently undercut prices of Union producers in tier 1 in a range between 10 %-25 %. At provisional stage and after the final disclosure, the Giti Group claimed that the price decreases in tier 1 and tier 2 may have been caused by imports of tier 1 and tier 2 tyres from other countries and not by price pressure from Chinese tier 3 tyres. Again, such a situation would fatally undermine the Commission's theory. In any case, that party noted, in the absence of an examination of import volumes (and import prices) of tier 1 and tier 2 tyres from other countries, it would be impossible to determine whether the Commission's theory is factually correct.
(253) With regard to that claim, the Commission found that the analysis advanced by the Giti Group was flawed as it was considering that all imports were sold directly to the first independent customers in the Union. That theory disregards that average prices may be affected by the fact that of some of these imports are sold to interested related parties. Moreover, imports statistics did not provide an average price per tier, so that the Commission was not in a position to examine import prices on a tier basis, as was requested by the Giti Group. Therefore, the analysis proposed cannot be carried out with the information that the Commission was able to collect so far during the investigation, or that which was received from interested parties, and was rejected accordingly.
(254) Therefore, the Commission rejected the claims brought forward by interested parties and confirmed its initial findings.
(255) In view of the considerations above the Commission confirmed its initial findings in recitals (208) and (209) of the provisional Regulation. The Union industry as a whole was under intense pressure. There was a reduction of production capacity, investment and employment over the period considered and a remarkable loss of market share despite the ongoing decrease in sales prices. Chinese imports were substantially undercutting Union industry prices. Profitability of the Union industry as a whole also declined, and even faster toward the end of the period considered. In addition, stocks of all types of tyres increased, in particular during the investigation period, negatively impacting the financial situation of the Union industry. Many SMEs retreaders stopped production and could not benefit from the economic recovery. The Commission also attached importance to the submissions of AIRP, Bundesverband Reifenhandel und Vulkaniseur-Handwerk (respectively the Italian and German retreaders association) or Banden Plan Europa BV (Union retreader) or Vipal Europe (tread supplier) noting that the imposition of provisional measures has already triggered a positive momentum in the sector. In particular, retreaders in several Union Member States have seen increased orders since May 2018 and believe this optimistic outlook would continue should the provisional measures be confirmed.
(256) Following final disclosure, the Giti Group claimed that the improved performance of retreaders may have much to do with increasing raw materials costs rather than the imposition of provisional measures. The Commission did not see evidence linking the evolution of the raw material costs with the increase of the commercial orders reported by the retreaders. Therefore, that claim was rejected.
(257) With respect to the profitability of the Union industry, the Commission acknowledged the critical comments received from the Aeolus Group that tier 3 is loss-making in the investigation period (-0,7 %) while the profitability of tiers 1 and 2 are in the double digits. However, the Commission did not share the conclusion that this indicator, showing a difference in profitability depending on the tiers, could negate a finding of material injury for the Union industry as a whole.
(258) All relevant indicators show that the Union industry has suffered material injury in tier 3. In addition to the negative profit margin, there was a significant decrease in employment, in particular for the retreading business. The level of undercutting of 31 % is significant in tier 3, where the volume effect of Chinese competition is also felt the most. As shown in Table 9, there is a noticeable and constant (year after year) shift of new tyre sales by Union producers towards tier 3. In 2016, Union sales shown in Table 9 stood at 5 million tyres in tier 3. That development continued in 2017. The forecast for 2018 shows an even higher increase in that shift of sales to tier 3 thus clearly demonstrating the price pressure that Union producers in tiers 1 and 2 find themselves under.
(259) In that regard, as laid down in recitals (210) and (211) of the provisional Regulation and further substantiated in Section 4.6 of this Regulation, the Commission maintained that there is a strong interconnection between tiers with a reverse-cascading effect. Contrary to the comments from many interested parties, there is only one market for tyres from the Union producers' point of view, who divide it into three tiers mainly for reasons of marketing strategy and differences in quality. This means that Union producers take into account the developments in all three tiers. Hence, the price and volume pressure in tier 3 has a direct impact on the other two tiers as well, as is set out in recital (234) et seq. Moreover, consumers of tyres chose between tyres from all three tiers: they balance their willingness to pay a higher price with the expected lifetime of the tyres and the associated costs. Accordingly, the behaviour of producers and consumers confirms that there is a strong interconnection between the tiers. It follows that the observed shift towards tier 3 exercises an ongoing pressure on the other two tiers as well. In that respect, the Commission further noted that the dumped imports concern mainly tier 3. In view of the interconnection between tiers and the growing importance of tier 3, the Commission considered that the negative trends already observed for the Union industry as a whole can only but continue in the near future.
(260) Furthermore, despite the express invitation to comment in recitals (213) and (214) of the provisional Regulation, none of the Chinese exporting producers refuted the allegation from the Union industry that there is a risk of further aggravation of injury. The Commission hence accepted that unused capacities in the PRC represent about 40 % of current Chinese exports.
(261) Following final disclosure, the CRIA and the CCCMC claimed they had no need to comment on the assertions about the level of unused capacities in the PRC as these are irrelevant to the case.
(262) The Commission disagrees. The risk of further aggravation of injury is also evidenced by the 13th Five-Year Plan for the Development of the Chemical and the Petrochemical industry in China, which aims at technological innovation, structural adjustment and green development. This plan applies to the tyres industry, and in the parallel anti-subsidy investigation the Commission has already found an important number of subsidies. They underpin that Chinese exporting producers have the structural advantage to climb up the value chain with continued access to cheap financing. If higher-quality tyres from the PRC were competing more and more with Union tyres at dumped prices, this would reduce the Union tyre industry margins and hence its capacity to invest and innovate. This, in turn, would likely force the Union industry to rely on lower quality tyres requiring limited investment in R & D, further affecting their retreadability, and so causing injury to all three tiers.
(263) Because of the injurious situation in tier 3 and the presently-felt reverse-cascading effect on tiers 2 and 1, the Commission hence maintained its conclusion that the industry as a whole suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation.
(264) Certain interested parties claimed that the Commission did not demonstrate how the volume and price levels of the imports of Chinese tyres have materially affected the Union industry, either individually or jointly. Although imports from Chinese exporters into the Union increased by 1 124 101 items during the period considered, the consumption in the Union also increased by 1 249 178 items. Thus, the increase in Chinese imports at competitive prices could not by itself harm the Union industry's sales in the market. Further, the fact that some Union producers had to exit a segment of the market and that the price setting changed in the Union market does not necessarily mean that Chinese imports are responsible for causing material injury to the Union industry. The fact that Chinese exporters' prices were lower than those of the Union industry and that Union producers could not capture the consumption increase and had to reduce their prices to be more competitive is not sufficient to prove that Chinese imports are responsible for the injury suffered by the Union industry.
(265) The Commission reiterated that the Chinese dumped prices significantly undercut the prices of the Union industry in all tiers during the investigation period. They were on average significantly lower during the whole period considered. Moreover, the fact that import prices remained stable between 2014 and 2015, dropped in 2016 and remained at the same low level during the investigation period (see recital (147) of the provisional Regulation) cannot be explained by the evolution in the raw material prices. The latter decreased at the beginning of the period considered, but increased during the investigation period. Nevertheless, the Chinese exporting producers did not revise their prices upwards. This showed that they wished to gain further market share to the detriment of the Union industry.
(266) One exporting producer claimed that there is no causal link between the Chinese imports and the injury caused to the Union industry as the Chinese exports are predominantly present on tier 3 market while the majority of the Union producers sell tier 1 and 2 products. This statement is factually incorrect. Products falling under tier 1 and 2 represent around 35 % of the total Chinese imports. Furthermore, as explained in Section 4.7 above regarding the interconnection between new and retreaded tyres and between the different tiers there is a symbiotic relationship between the different tiers. Price and volume pressure from cheap, the dumped Chinese tyres in tier 3 also affect the price in the other tiers. Therefore that claim was rejected.
(267) The same exporting producer claimed that injury analysis and thus the causation analysis should be performed taking into consideration that tier 3 tyres were lower priced since they have a significantly shorter lifespan than tier 1 and tier 2 tyres. The evaluation of the market share should be made by comparing the market share in value and not in quantity. If one takes this into account the decrease in the market share of the Union industry and the increase in the market share of the Chinese exporting producer are much less pronounced.
(268) The Commission acknowledged that the lifespan of tyres is an important aspect of the analysis, which demonstrates the interconnection between tiers. However, it did not accept that this aspect would negate the finding of causality. Even if, admittedly, the market share of Chinese tyres in the Union is lower in value due to ‘shorter lifespan’ than ‘per unit’, it does not change the fact that it is precisely because of the growing attractiveness for consumers to buy Chinese ‘low-price — low-mileage’ tyres that the Union industry has become under pressure and suffered material injury.
(269) One interested party claimed that the decrease in price of Chinese imports is caused by a change in product mix triggered by the growing demand for smaller tyres. There was no evidence supporting that claim. In any event, even if the size had an impact on the evolution of the average prices, Chinese imports were undercutting the Union industry's prices also for the same sizes as the comparison is always made per product type. Therefore, the Commission rejected that claim.
(270) Several interested parties claimed that the Commission should provide further analysis of the impact of the Russian imports, which were priced at the level of the Chinese imports.
(271) The Commission found that there is a crucial difference between the volumes imported. While Chinese imports increased from 3,5 million tyres in 2014 to 4,6 million tyres (namely by 1 100 000 items) in the investigation period, Russian imports increased from 0,2 million tyres to 0,3 million tyres (namely with only 100 000 items) in the same period. Given the limited quantities originating from Russia (they constitute only 6 % of the total volumes of import from the PRC and have only 1,29 % market share of the Union market) at a similar price, these imports cannot weaken the causal link between the Chinese imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry.
(272) Other interested parties claimed that imports from other countries such as Japan, South Korea and Turkey took place at significant quantities and at lower prices than that of the Union industry. Due to their price and quantity they allegedly severed the causal link between the Chinese imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry.
(273) The Commission observed that the import prices from Japan, South Korea and Turkey were well above the Chinese import prices. Moreover, they are mostly transfer prices to related importers. Therefore, those import prices cannot serve as a basis for a comparison with the prices of the Union industry. Finally, the Japanese, South Korean and Turkish tyres were sold at a price corresponding to their respective tier in the Union market. Therefore, those imports should not cause injury to the Union industry. As far as the quantities are concerned their market shares remained stable (the volume decreased for South Korea by 50 000 items, remained stable for Japan and increased for Turkey by 170 000 items) and represented around half of the volume of imports originating in the PRC. Therefore that claim was rejected.
(274) Certain interested parties claimed that the Union industry suffered losses as they are exporting at a loss throughout the period considered which impacted their return on investment and the ability to invest. As indicated in recital (226) of the provisional Regulation, average export prices are affected by transfer values to related companies. Moreover, the costs of production reported in recital (176) of the provisional Regulation were calculated for the sales by the sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers. This does not allow drawing meaningful conclusions on the basis of comparing these two sets of data. Moreover, the micro-indicators showed that the exports of the sampled Union producers were found profitable. Therefore, that claim was rejected.
(275) The Commission reiterated that the volumes remained stable during the period considered. Furthermore, these prices are transfer prices between related parties, and therefore no conclusion can be drawn from the fact that these prices show a downward trend during period considered. Those claims were therefore rejected. Thus, the Commission confirms that there is no evidence that the export activity of the Union industry could attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury found.
(276) The Giti Group claimed that the new tyres have become cheaper as costs dropped, but the retreaders could not benefit from this decrease as the proportion of raw materials in their cost of production is significantly lower compared to new tyres. This explains the loss suffered by the retreading industry in tier 3, which is mainly due to the evolution of raw material prices as they have been continuously declining since 2012 and only started to recover in 2017.
(277) As mentioned in recital (152), the Chinese import prices did not follow the evolution of the raw materials prices while the cost of production of the Union industry reflected this evolution(58). The losses were due to the fact that Chinese imports are substantially undercutting the Union industry prices over the period considered. Therefore, that claim was rejected.
(278) The Aeolus Group and Pirelli claimed that the Commission did not take into consideration that two major producers have invested heavily in their retreading business. This could allegedly explain why other Union producers had to exit tier 3 of the market. According to these parties, the economic crisis pushed two major producers (Goodyear and Continental) to invest in their retreading business and they opened their own retreading plants. According to the information available, the production capacity of each plant is equivalent to the annual production of ten small retreaders. The Aeolus Group believes that these investments have led to self-inflicted injury. These investments are said to have created over-capacity and artificially increased the unit costs and as a result caused profit reduction. The effect of the investments on the overall Union industry is allegedly sufficient to attenuate any potential causal link between the dumped Chinese imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry, whether considered individually or jointly with the other known factors.
(279) According to information provided by ETRMA and by some large manufacturers as described in recitals (189) to (191), the production of large manufacturers (using mainly hot cured retread process) actually decreased during the period considered (the output went from around 2,4 million in 2014 to 2,2 million in the investigation period). These figures did thus not support the claim that the investment of the two major producers had produced an overcapacity. Therefore, that claim about self-inflicted injury was rejected.
(280) Some interested parties submitted that a growing demand for smaller tyres probably affected the product mix in different years in such a way that proportionally more small-sized tyres were sold towards the end of the investigation period. Due to inner-city weight and size restrictions on vehicles and the growth of the e-commerce business (which requires loads to be broken down into smaller quantities, which in turn requires more light trucks and light commercial vans), there has been a shift towards increased demand for smaller tyres. This observation did not only apply to sales by the Union producers. Chinese imports also catered to the increased demand for smaller tyres and this, therefore, (partly) explained the decrease in sales prices of the Chinese imports.
(281) With regard to the claim on the evolution of the product mix, the information gathered by the Commission concerning sizes commercialised in the Union market over the period considered does not support the argument that prices and costs are lower because of the relatively stronger presence of smaller tyres on the market(59). The data for the investigation period rather shows that the product mix on the market is stable and remains concentrated on the main dimensions. Moreover, such a reduction of the average size of the product cannot be found in the Eurostat data for Chinese imports, revealing that, on the contrary the weight of the imported tyres from China increased by 3 % between 2014 and the investigation period(60). Conversely, the Commission noted that the industry had made overall structural adaptations in order to reduce costs in view of the ‘knock-on’ effect on the different tiers at play. Therefore, that claim was rejected.
(282) Neither the Russian imports (because of their small volume), nor the imports from Japan, South Korea and Turkey (because of their transfer prices which were even higher than the Chinese prices) had been the main cause of injury to the Union industry. Also the Union's export performance and its cost evolution were not at the root of the Union's injurious situation. The latter can also not be explained by other facts, such as the investment into the retreading business by two major producers and the evolution of the product mix.
(283) Therefore, the Commission confirmed its findings in recitals (229) and (232) of the provisional Regulation that the material injury to the Union industry was caused by the dumped imports from the PRC and that the other factors, considered individually and collectively did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry.
(284) The Commission confirmed its provisional findings in recitals (234) and (235) of the provisional Regulation that the imposition of measures will be in the interest of the Union manufacturers.
(285) The Aeolus Group and Pirelli, the Giti Group and Kirkby considered that the retreading industry in the Union would be negatively affected by a decreased supply and an increased price of casings. In their view, the anti-dumping measures on tier 1 and 2 tyres would negatively impact the independent Union retreaders, which use the casings of those tiers in its production line. The Giti Group reiterated similar claims following the final disclosure.
(286) The Commission disagreed with this assessment. In spite of the fact that large Union producers have integrated retreading operations, many of their casings are still retreaded by independent Union retreaders. In addition, independent Union retreaders indicated to the Commission that there is an oversupply of casings at present. In their assessment, many consumers find it cheaper to buy low tier Chinese tyres than to retread the existing ones. This means that many casings that could be retreaded had to be discarded. Most importantly, while independent retreaders and associations supported the measures, no single Union retreader came forward opposing the measures. This indicates that the measures are in the interest of the retreading Union industry.
(287) Following the final disclosure, the CRIA and the CCCMC claimed that one Union retreader stated that the measures were not in its interest. However, as it was not supported by any evidence, that claim was disregarded.
(288) The Aeolus Group and Pirelli, the Giti Group, and Heuver claimed that if measures were adopted, there would be a decrease in Chinese imports leading to a general decline in supply. This, in turn would lead to a speculative increase in prices, to the detriment of end-users. Measures protecting the Union industry would also imply that final consumers would have less product choice.
(289) The Commission considered that there was sufficient overall capacity in the Union to supply the internal market as indicated in Table 4. Moreover, there are many producers located in third countries (Turkey, South Korea, Japan, Russia, Thailand, and many other countries) who are already selling to the Union market. Their combined sales volumes during the period considered were relatively stable, with a market share of around 10 %. The Commission recalled that the Chinese prices were well below the prices of all other major importing countries. According to Eurostat the average import price from the People's Republic of China was 128,8 EUR/item, (as indicated in Table 3 of the provisional Regulation) while the import prices from all other countries were 189 EUR/item in the investigation period (as indicated in Table 18 of the provisional Regulation). Therefore, it can be reasonably expected that once the level playing field is restored in the Union market, imports from all countries will provide for the necessary supply.
(290) The Commission also recalled that the Union market is a competitive market in which many producers active in all tiers are fiercely competing. Therefore, the imports at a fair level of prices will keep exerting an additional competitive pressure on the Union industry's prices.
(291) Several importers claimed that they might exit the market altogether if the measures are imposed. The Commission recalled that the purpose of imposing anti-dumping measures is to restore a level playing field so that Union producers and third country producers compete on a level playing field. Accordingly, the duties are only set at a level that would still enable the Chinese imports to continue competing with the Union producers, but at fair prices. In addition, given that the high difference between dumped Chinese prices and the import prices from all other countries will be reduced through the measures, the importers will have increased business opportunities to sell bus and lorry tyres from other countries.
(292) Following final disclosure, the Retread Manufacturing Association claimed that the supply is secured. According to the Association there is no product shortage as trade data show that manufacturers are switching their sourcing from the People's Republic of China to other countries, such as South Korea. The party claimed that since the announcement of provisional duties the local demand has increased between 5 and 10 %.
(293) The Commission concluded that measures would not be in the interest of importers who predominantly rely on the import of very cheap Chinese tyres. However, importers with a broader portfolio are unlikely to be severely affected by the restoration of fair competition.
(294) In the absence of any comments on the matter, the Commission confirmed its finding in recital (242) of the provisional Regulation that measures are in the interest of treads suppliers.
(295) In the absence of comments to the contrary provided within the deadline set for submitting comments on the Final Disclosure Document(61), the Commission confirmed its findings in recitals (243) to (249) of the provisional Regulation that measures are in the interest of the Union's policy to reduce waste and to manage raw materials in a sustainable way. Moreover, given that it is mostly SMEs which are active in the retreading business, the imposition of measures would also be in line with the important Commission objective to support SMEs.
(296) Therefore, the Commission confirmed its conclusion in recitals (234) to (249) of the provisional Regulation. There are no compelling reasons under Article 21 of the basic Regulation that it would not be in the interest of the Union to impose measures.
(297) As mentioned in recital (4), imports of the product concerned were subject to registration from 3 February 2018 until the date of entry into force of the provisional measures on 8 May 2018 with a view of the possible retroactive collection of duties on the registered imports.
(298) During the definitive stage of the investigation, the data collected in the context of the registration was assessed. The Commission analysed whether the criteria under Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation were met for the retroactive collection of definitive duties.
(299) The data available at the time of registration had shown that a substantial rise in imports had taken place on a CN code level. However, newer data demonstrates that no further substantial rise in imports took place as compared to the level of imports during the investigation period. Therefore, that condition under Article 10(4)(d) of the basic Regulation is not met.
(300) Therefore, the Commission concluded that the retroactive collection of the definitive duties was not justified in this case.
(301) Following provisional disclosure, several interested parties asserted that there was broad agreement on the segmentation of the Union market into three tiers, and that in the provisional Regulation there was extensive analyses and data provided per segment. However, the approach used at the provisional stage of one target profit for all tiers had the effect of overprotecting the Union producers from the dumped imports of tier 3 tyres, which could not reach the stipulated target profit for the industry as a whole. Therefore, the Commission should use the profitability of each tier to calculate the non-injurious price and the injury margin for a proper application of the lesser duty rule.
(302) The Commission accepted the claim. It considered that is more appropriate to establish target profits per tier in this particular case because the form of the measures is a fixed duty per tyre, which in turn is based on an injury margin derived from a product control number per tier. Therefore, it revised the target profit to 17,9 % for tier 1, 17,9 % for tier 2 and 6,1 % for tier 3.
(303) Following final disclosure, the Giti Group claimed that 2014, which is used as a basis for the target profit, was an abnormal year because the profitability for tier 1 and tier 2 were the same whereas they differed in the next two years.
(304) The Commission recalled that it is bound to establish a target profit by identifying a year which resembles most to normal conditions of competition undistorted by dumped imports. Against that yardstick, 2014 amounts to the year with lowest volumes and market share of dumped imports, as compared to 2015 or 2016 and the latter should therefore be excluded. Likewise, the Commission could not resort to years prior to 2014 as no verified information existed for those years. Therefore, that claim was rejected.
(305) Some interested parties (the complainant, Tyre Specialists of Finland, Italian Tyre Retreaders Association, Bipaver, VIPAL, Portuguese Association of Retreading Industries, Bundesverband Reifenhandel und Vulkaniseur-Handwerk) considered that the target profit of 6,1 % for tier 3 used in the final disclosure was too low to address the injury suffered by the retreaders and that a profit rate of around 10 % achieved before the surge of imports was warranted.
(306) The Commission recalled that the tier 3 tyre market is identifiable by the particular presence of retreaded and new tyres, which actively compete against each other for market share. As preliminarily established in recital (209) of the provisional Regulation, unsustainable levels of losses in the retreading industry put the survival of the entire retreading activity in the Union at risk. As further preliminarily established in recital (230) of the provisional Regulation, these losses also affect the profitability that the companies active in tiers 1 and 2 can achieve. These findings are to be seen in light of the clear Union interest for the existence of a strong retreading industry, as established in recitals (243) to (249) of the provisional Regulation and (232) of the Final Disclosure Document.
(307) The Commission accordingly decided to assess the claim that the profitability of 6,1 % reached in 2014 for tier 3, as noted in the Final Disclosure Document, would not adequately ensure the survival of the retreading activity in the Union.
(308) For that, it decided to look at the profitability levels achieved by companies active in that tier for year 2014, on the basis of the data received in the verified questionnaire replies. For sampled large companies active in the tier 3 retreading business, the profitability figure for 2014 was – 6,04 %. For sampled SMEs, this figure was 2,71 %. These figures show that the retreading industry, representing a significant part of the Union industry as a whole, was already affected by Chinese imports in 2014.
(309) The Commission accordingly sought to determine what target profit Union producers in tier 3 should achieve under normal conditions of competition with due attention given to retreaders. For this assessment, it also turned to the information available on the file. In the complaint, the target profit for tier 3 producers of the product concerned was set at 9,2 %, which, according to the complainants, would ensure adequate operations for all producers active in tier 3 (including retreaders of the product concerned). This figure was also in line with comments made by retreaders of the product concerned, in reply to the Final Disclosure Document, which argued that the Commission should look at profitability levels of around 9 % for tier 3 producers. Their argument principally centred around 2014 figures already showing an injured state of the retreading industry in the Union. Similarly, the Commission considered the submitted data from the sampled Union retreaders for the years 2006 and 2007, which, according to Union retreaders, represented the last years during which normal conditions of competition took place. For those years, profitability of Union retreaders was 9,4 %.
(310) The Commission compared these figures with aggregated tier 3 profitability figures for the sampled Union producers in 2014. Without reflecting the weight of the performance of SMEs in the entire Union industry, the profitability in tier 3 in that year stood at 9,2 %. This unweighted figure was more appropriate than the previously weighted figure of 6,1 %. SMEs in tier 3 were already heavily affected in 2014 by Chinese imports, so that the weighted figures for that year do not fully reflect normal conditions of competition in the retreading industry.
(311) As a result, the Commission considered it more appropriate to calculate the target profit in year 2014 in a manner which attenuates the injurious impact of the Chinese imports already observed in that year also for the Union retreading industry. In light of the above information, the Commission decided to set the target profit for tier 3 producers of the product concerned at 9,2 %. This accounts for the minimum non-injurious price that Union tier 3 producers need to achieve under normal conditions of competition, with due respect given to the needs of the retreading industry.
(312) As mentioned in recital (16), the Commission disclosed this additional finding and invited interested parties to comment.
(313) Heuver claimed that the Commission cannot distinguish between retreaded tyres and new tyres as it was consistently considered as the same products in view of their interchangeability. Moreover, the entire injury and causality analysis was made without making any distinction whatsoever.
(314) That party claimed that the Commission did not provide a valid basis for departing from the period considered of this investigation and that the Union industry as a whole was already affected by the Chinese imports in 2014. Moreover, that party claimed that the fact they have not reached this target profit level at times when the imports from the PRC did not cause injury to the Union industry (2008-2014) clearly means that there are other causes of injury.
(315) Hämmerling also claimed that the deadline of three days provided to submit comments to substantial changes made to the document and final conclusions reached by the Commission was too short and amounted to a breach of its rights of defence.
(316) The Xingyuan Group claimed that the target profit of 9,2 % was inappropriate because it was unverified. The years 2006 and 2007 were too distant from the current situation and there was no evidence that the Union industry was suffering injury in 2014. In addition, that party claimed that the aim of the target profit was not to ensure the survival of the industry, but to remove the effect of injurious dumping. It claimed that using an unweighted profitability was inappropriate.
(317) The Aeolus Group claimed that the Commission did not conduct an analysis on the causal link between the Chinese imports and the performance of the Union retreading industry. Moreover, that party claimed that the profit margin must be limited to the profit margin that the Union industry could reasonably count on under normal market conditions of competition. It claimed that the Commission must not differentiate between new tyres and retreaded tyres when evaluating the appropriate target profit for tier 3. Finally, it claimed that the Commission had not justified why it had set the target profit for tier 3 at 9,2 %.
(318) The CCCMC and CRIA claimed that setting the target profit at 9,2 % for tier 3 did not reflect normal conditions of competition and the years 2006 and 2007 are no proper benchmarks for identifying injury. As the Commission had overly paid attention to tier 3 retreaders it had also undermined its injury analysis for the Union industry as a whole.
(319) Prometeon claimed that the revised injury margin calculation reinforces the conclusion that the alleged injury is marginal. The total loss attributable to tier 3 would be around 54 million EURO representing 91 % of the total injury suffered by the Union industry, whereas tier 1 and tier 2 tyres are not affected. It also reiterated its claim that another form of the measure should be used.
(320) The Commission rejected those claims for the following reasons.
(321) First, the target profit for tier 3 at a level of 9,2 % is based on the actual profitability of the sampled Union producers in tier 3 in 2014 before the weighting of companies per tier. It is not improper to unweigh the figures for that purpose in order to lessen the impact of the performance of the SMEs which were already affected by the significant level of Chinese imports.
(322) Second, the Commission's reference to the years 2006-2007 does not alter that assessment. Rather, it confirmed the findings on the basis of unweighted figures for 2014 as a reasonable benchmark. None of the interested parties has alleged that the conditions of competition in the years 2006-2007 were distorted. The sampled retreaders have substantiated with financial statements the claim that their normal profitability stood on average between 9 and 10 % in the years 2006-2007.
(323) Third, the target profit for tier 3 found on the basis of unweighted figures for 2014 also conformed to the level of target profit suggested in the complaint. Already at initiation phase the Union industry thus considered this figure (namely 9,2 %) to be an appropriate target profit — i.e. long before the Commission had engaged in the weighting process.
(324) The Commission therefore rejected those claims and confirmed its choice of a target profit set at 9,2 % for tier 3 tyres.
(325) Finally, pursuant to Article 20(5) of the basic Regulation, parties should be given 10 days for comments on final disclosure. In this instance, the Commission granted two full weeks for that purpose. When an additional final disclosure is necessary, a shorter period may be set. Contrary to what Hämmerling alleges, the additional final disclosure was neither complex nor fundamental. Rather, it only concerned a specific aspect, namely the target profit, explained in a two-page document. In this situation, granting three days for comments was sufficient for all parties to exercise their rights of defence.
(326) Definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed on imports of the product concerned originating in the PRC, in accordance with the lesser duty rule stipulated in Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation. The Commission compared the injury margins and the dumping margins. The amount of the duties should be set at the level of the lower of the dumping and the injury margins.
(327) Therefore, the definitive anti-dumping duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows:Table 11Definitive anti-dumping duty ratesCompanyDumping margin (%)Injury margin (%)Definitive anti-dumping duty (%)Xingyuan Group106,755,0755,07Giti Group56,829,5629,56Aeolus Group and Pirelli8537,2937,29Hankook Group60,123,4123,41Other cooperating companies71,532,3932,39All other companies106,755,0755,07 Company Dumping margin (%) Injury margin (%) Definitive anti-dumping duty (%) Xingyuan Group 106,7 55,07 55,07 Giti Group 56,8 29,56 29,56 Aeolus Group and Pirelli 85 37,29 37,29 Hankook Group 60,1 23,41 23,41 Other cooperating companies 71,5 32,39 32,39 All other companies 106,7 55,07 55,07
Company Dumping margin (%) Injury margin (%) Definitive anti-dumping duty (%)
Xingyuan Group 106,7 55,07 55,07
Giti Group 56,8 29,56 29,56
Aeolus Group and Pirelli 85 37,29 37,29
Hankook Group 60,1 23,41 23,41
Other cooperating companies 71,5 32,39 32,39
All other companies 106,7 55,07 55,07
Company Dumping margin (%) Injury margin (%) Definitive anti-dumping duty (%)
Xingyuan Group 106,7 55,07 55,07
Giti Group 56,8 29,56 29,56
Aeolus Group and Pirelli 85 37,29 37,29
Hankook Group 60,1 23,41 23,41
Other cooperating companies 71,5 32,39 32,39
All other companies 106,7 55,07 55,07
(328) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation with respect to those companies. Those individual anti-dumping duty rates (as opposed to the country-wide duty applicable to ‘all other companies’) are thus exclusively applicable to imports of the product concerned originating in the country concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of product concerned produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.
(329) A company may request the application of those individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission. The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a notice informing about the change of name will be published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.
(330) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the high difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The companies with individual anti-dumping duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) hereof. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other companies’.
(331) To ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duties, the anti-dumping duty for all other companies should apply not only to the non-cooperating exporting producers in this investigation, but to the producers which did not have exports to the Union during the investigation period.
(332) In view of the recent case-law of the Court of Justice(62), it is appropriate to provide for the rate of default interest to be paid in case of reimbursement of definitive duties, because the relevant provisions in force concerning customs duties do not provide for such an interest rate, and the application of national rules would lead to undue distortions between economic operators depending on which Member State is chosen for customs clearance.
(333) As mentioned in recital (263) of the provisional Regulation, there is a risk that operators use the import of wheels fitted with Chinese tyres to circumvent the measures. Therefore, the Commission considered it appropriate to monitor imports of road, trailer and semi-trailer wheels fitted with pneumatic tyres, new or retreaded, of rubber, of a kind used for buses or lorries, with a load index exceeding 121 in order to minimise the risk.
(334) Hämmerling claimed that the basic Regulation does not provide the Commission a legal basis to classify goods for customs purposes and that therefore Article 1(5) of the provisional Regulation was illegal. As mentioned in recital (263) of the provisional Regulation, according to the Harmonised System Explanatory Notes (HSEN) to headings 8708 and 8716, road, trailer and semi-trailer wheels fitted with tyres are to be classified in headings 8708 and 8716. That recital explained the Commission's intention to monitor imports of pneumatic tyres, new or retreaded, of rubber, of a kind used for buses or lorries, with a load index exceeding 121 that were fitted in a wheel and are correctly classified according to customs law in Chapter 87 of the Combined Nomenclature(63). To clarify that the Commission did not intend to classify goods for customs purposes on the basis of the basic Regulation but intended to monitor imports, the relevant wording of the corresponding article in this Regulation, namely Article 1(4), was drafted accordingly.
(335) The Aeolus Group claimed that the anti-dumping measure should take the form of anad valoremduty. In its view, a fixed duty would violate Articles 7(2) and 9(4) of the basic Regulation, which require that the provisional and definitive anti-dumping duty imposed may not exceed the margin that is adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry. Accordingly, the most suitable solution would be that the Commission implements differentad valoremduties based on the market segmentation, namely tier 1, 2 and 3. The Aeolus Group claimed that this would be in line with the Commission's considerations regarding the importance of avoiding disproportionate measures for high-quality tyres and the need to remove the injury to the Union industry for tyres with different physical characteristics — thus creating a much healthier market.
(336) As mentioned in recital (302), the Commission revised the injury margin and established a target profit per tier. Therefore, it considered that the resulting fixed duty properly removed the injury to the Union industry while being proportionally applied to the different tiers.
(337) The CRIA and the CCCMC claimed that the fixed duties are inappropriate, in particular for tier 3 and proposed that the Commission should consider imposingad valoremduties or, in the alternative, fixed duties for high quality products andad valoremduties for low quality products. Moreover, some parties claimed that the Commission should take into consideration the size of tyres as the size difference is reflected in the price of the tyre. The CRIA and the CCCMC also claimed anad valoremduty was more appropriate.
(338) The Giti Group and Prometeon claimed that the duty should take the form of a variable duty whereby tyres above a certain minimum import price (‘MIP’) or a MIP per tier were not subject to duties. Moreover, the Giti Group claimed that non-cooperating producers should remain subject to the residualad valoremduty, to exclude tier 1 and tier 2 from the scope of the final measures.
(339) As mentioned in recital (302), the Commission revised the injury margin and established a target profit per tier. Therefore, it considered that the resulting fixed duty properly removed the injury to the Union industry while being proportionally applied to the different tiers.
(340) Regarding the claims that one MIP for all tiers or a MIP per tier would be more appropriate to remove the injury caused by dumped imports, the Commission considered the following:—There is no acceptable definition of quality differences stemming from physical characteristics alone; the differences per tier also stem from branding, customer perception and retreadability. Therefore, it is not possible to draw a borderline, with which customs can operate.—The distribution of the imported tyres mainly through related subsidiaries and through unrelated importers but with very close and longstanding business relationship is very complex. To monitor this vast net of activities is practically impossible.—The importers usually also import other tyres that are not under investigation (such as car tyres). This poses a high risk of kickbacks and compensation agreements. — There is no acceptable definition of quality differences stemming from physical characteristics alone; the differences per tier also stem from branding, customer perception and retreadability. Therefore, it is not possible to draw a borderline, with which customs can operate. — The distribution of the imported tyres mainly through related subsidiaries and through unrelated importers but with very close and longstanding business relationship is very complex. To monitor this vast net of activities is practically impossible. — The importers usually also import other tyres that are not under investigation (such as car tyres). This poses a high risk of kickbacks and compensation agreements.
— There is no acceptable definition of quality differences stemming from physical characteristics alone; the differences per tier also stem from branding, customer perception and retreadability. Therefore, it is not possible to draw a borderline, with which customs can operate.
— The distribution of the imported tyres mainly through related subsidiaries and through unrelated importers but with very close and longstanding business relationship is very complex. To monitor this vast net of activities is practically impossible.
— The importers usually also import other tyres that are not under investigation (such as car tyres). This poses a high risk of kickbacks and compensation agreements.
— There is no acceptable definition of quality differences stemming from physical characteristics alone; the differences per tier also stem from branding, customer perception and retreadability. Therefore, it is not possible to draw a borderline, with which customs can operate.
— The distribution of the imported tyres mainly through related subsidiaries and through unrelated importers but with very close and longstanding business relationship is very complex. To monitor this vast net of activities is practically impossible.
— The importers usually also import other tyres that are not under investigation (such as car tyres). This poses a high risk of kickbacks and compensation agreements.
(341) Regarding the claims that the form of the measures had to bead valorem, the Commission maintained that anad valoremduty would provide an incentive to continue importing the lower-end of the product mix, as motivated in recitals (270) and (271) of the provisional Regulation. Regarding the sizes, the Commission found that small tyres represented around 15 % of the volume of exports of the sampled Chinese producers, and that importers normally import all sizes. Therefore, the Commission concluded that this consideration did not override the benefits of imposing a fixed duty.
(342) Therefore, the Commission maintained the fixed duties as the form of the definitive measures.
(343) The Xingyuan Group claimed that the import price used as a basis to calculate the fixed duty erroneously contained post-importation costs. The Commission accepted the claim and adjusted the calculations accordingly.
(344) In view of the dumping margins found and given the level of the injury caused to the Union industry, the amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty, imposed by the provisional Regulation, should be definitively collected. The amounts secured in excess of the definitive duty rate determined pursuant to Article 1(2) of this Regulation should be released.
(345) The Commission was informed that the company Chonche Auto Double Happiness Tyre Corp., Ltd (additional TARIC code C333), changed its name to Aeolus Tyre (Taiyuan) Co., Ltd as of 13 August 2018. Therefore, any measures that provisionally applied to Chonche Auto Double Happiness Tyre Corp., Ltd are to apply to Aeolus Tyre (Taiyuan) Co., Ltd.
(346) The Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 did not deliver an opinion,
Company Definitive anti-dumping duty (in EUR per item) TARIC additional code
Xingyuan Tire Group Co. Ltd; Guangrao Xinhongyuan Tyre Co., Ltd 61,76 C331
Giti Tire (Anhui) Company Ltd; Giti Tire (Fujian) Company Ltd; Giti Tire (Hualin) Company Ltd; Giti Tire (Yinchuan) Company, Ltd 47,96 C332
Aeolus Tyre Co., Ltd; Aeolus Tyre (Taiyuan) Co., Ltd; Qingdao Yellow Sea Rubber Co., Ltd; Pirelli Tyre Co., Ltd 49,44 C333
Chongqing Hankook Tire Co., Ltd; Jiangsu Hankook Tire Co., Ltd 42,73 C334
Other cooperating companies listed in the Annex 49,31
All other companies 61,76 C999
— it did not export to the Union the product described in Article 1(1) in the period between 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017,
— it is not related to any exporter or producer in the People's Republic of China which is subject to the anti-dumping measures imposed by this Regulation,
— it has actually exported to the Union the product concerned after the investigation period on which the measures are based, or it has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union,
Name of the Company TARIC additional code
Bayi Rubber Co., Ltd C335
Bridgestone (Huizhou) Tire Co., Ltd C336
Briway Tire Co., Ltd C337
Chaoyang Long March Tyre Co., Ltd C338
Goodyear Dalian Tire Company Limited C339
Guizhou Tyre Co., Ltd C340
Jiangsu General Science Technology Co., Ltd C341
Megalith Industrial Group Co., Ltd C342
Michelin Shenyang Tire Co., Ltd C343
Nanjing Kumho Tire Co., Ltd C344
Ningxia Shenzhou Tire Co., Ltd C345
Prinx Chengshan (Shandong) Tire Co., Ltd C346
Qingdao Doublestar Tire Industrial Co., Ltd C347
Qingdao Fudong Tyre Co., Ltd C348
Qingdao Hairunsen Tyre Co., Ltd C349
Qingdao GRT Rubber Co., Ltd C350
Sailun Jinyu Group Co., Ltd C351
Shaanxi Yanchang Petroleum Group Rubber Co., Ltd C352
Shandong Kaixuan Rubber Co., Ltd C353
Shandong Changfeng Tyres Co., Ltd C354
Shandong Haohua Tire Co., Ltd C355
Shandong Hawk International Rubber Industry Co., Ltd C356
Shandong Hengfeng Rubber & Plastic Co., Ltd C357
Shandong Hengyu Science & Technology Co., Ltd C358
Shandong Homerun Tires Co., Ltd C359
Shandong Huasheng Rubber Co., Ltd C360
Shandong Hugerubber Co., Ltd C361
Shandong Jinyu Tire Co., Ltd C362
Shandong Linglong Tyre Co., Ltd C363
Shandong Mirage Tyres Co., Ltd C364
Shandong Vheal Group Co., Ltd C365
Shandong Wanda Boto Tyre Co., Ltd C366
Shandong Wosen Rubber Co., Ltd C367
Shandong Yongfeng Tyres Co., Ltd C368
Shandong Yongsheng Rubber Group Co., Ltd; Shandong Santai Rubber Co., Ltd C369
Shandong Yongtai Group Co., Ltd C370
Shanghai Huayi Group Corp. Ltd; Double Coin Group (Jiang Su) Tyre Co., Ltd C371
Shengtai Group Co., Ltd C372
Sichuan Kalevei Technology Co., Ltd C373
Toyo Tire (Zhucheng) Co., Ltd C374
Triangle Tyre Co., Ltd C375
Weifang Goldshield Tire Co., Ltd C376
Weifang Shunfuchang Rubber And Plastic Products Co., Ltd C377
Xuzhou Armour Rubber Company Ltd C378
Zhongce Rubber Group Co., Ltd C379
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union(1), and in particular Article 9(4) thereof,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1
1. A definitive anti-dumping duty is imposed on imports of certain pneumatic tyres, new or retreaded, of rubber, of a kind used for buses or lorries, with a load index exceeding 121, currently falling within CN codes 4011 20 90 and ex 4012 12 00 (TARIC code 4012120010) and originating in the People’s Republic of China.
2. The definitive anti-dumping duties applicable in euros per item of the product described in paragraph 1 and produced by the companies listed below shall be as follows:
3. The application of the individual duty rates specified for the companies listed in paragraph 2 or in the Annex shall be conditional upon presentation to the Member States’ customs authorities of a valid commercial invoice, on which shall appear a declaration dated and signed by an official of the entity issuing such invoice, identified by name and function, drafted as follows: ‘I, the undersigned, certify that the (item(s)) of (product concerned) sold for export to the European Union covered by this invoice was manufactured by (company name and address) (TARIC additional code) in the People’s Republic of China. I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct.’ If no such invoice is presented, the duty applicable to all other companies shall apply.
4. The Commission shall monitor imports of road, trailer and semi-trailer wheels fitted with pneumatic tyres, new or retreaded, of rubber, of a kind used for buses or lorries, with a load index exceeding 121, under TARIC codes 8708701015, 8708701080, 8708705015, 8708705080, 8708709115, 8708709915, 8716909015 and 8716909080.
5. Unless otherwise specified, the relevant provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply. The default interest to be paid in case of reimbursement that gives rise to a right to payment of default interest shall be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Union, in force on the first calendar day of the month in which the deadline falls, increased by three and a half percentage points.
6. In cases where goods have been damaged before entry into free circulation and, therefore, the price actually paid or payable is apportioned for the determination of the customs value pursuant to Article 131 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447, the amount of anti-dumping duty laid down in paragraph 2 shall be reduced by a percentage which corresponds to the apportioning of the price actually paid or payable.

Article 2
Where any new exporting producer in the People’s Republic of China provides sufficient evidence to the Commission that:
—
it did not export to the Union the product described in Article 1(1) in the period between 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017,
—
it is not related to any exporter or producer in the People’s Republic of China which is subject to the anti-dumping measures imposed by this Regulation,
—
it has actually exported to the Union the product concerned after the investigation period on which the measures are based, or it has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union,
the Commission may amend Article 1(2) by adding the new exporting producer to the cooperating companies not included in the sample and thus subject to the weighted average duty of not exceeding 49,31 EUR per item.

Article 3
The amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duties pursuant to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/683 shall be definitively collected. The amounts secured in excess of the definitive amount of euros per item of the anti-dumping duties contained in Article 1(2) of this Regulation shall be released.

Article 4
The Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/163 is repealed.

Article 5
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union(1), and in particular Article 9(4) thereof,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
1. A definitive anti-dumping duty is imposed on imports of certain pneumatic tyres, new or retreaded, of rubber, of a kind used for buses or lorries, with a load index exceeding 121, currently falling within CN codes 4011 20 90 and ex 4012 12 00 (TARIC code 4012120010) and originating in the People’s Republic of China.
2. The definitive anti-dumping duties applicable in euros per item of the product described in paragraph 1 and produced by the companies listed below shall be as follows:
3. The application of the individual duty rates specified for the companies listed in paragraph 2 or in the Annex shall be conditional upon presentation to the Member States’ customs authorities of a valid commercial invoice, on which shall appear a declaration dated and signed by an official of the entity issuing such invoice, identified by name and function, drafted as follows: ‘I, the undersigned, certify that the (item(s)) of (product concerned) sold for export to the European Union covered by this invoice was manufactured by (company name and address) (TARIC additional code) in the People’s Republic of China. I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct.’ If no such invoice is presented, the duty applicable to all other companies shall apply.
4. The Commission shall monitor imports of road, trailer and semi-trailer wheels fitted with pneumatic tyres, new or retreaded, of rubber, of a kind used for buses or lorries, with a load index exceeding 121, under TARIC codes 8708701015, 8708701080, 8708705015, 8708705080, 8708709115, 8708709915, 8716909015 and 8716909080.
5. Unless otherwise specified, the relevant provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply. The default interest to be paid in case of reimbursement that gives rise to a right to payment of default interest shall be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Union, in force on the first calendar day of the month in which the deadline falls, increased by three and a half percentage points.
6. In cases where goods have been damaged before entry into free circulation and, therefore, the price actually paid or payable is apportioned for the determination of the customs value pursuant to Article 131 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447, the amount of anti-dumping duty laid down in paragraph 2 shall be reduced by a percentage which corresponds to the apportioning of the price actually paid or payable.
Where any new exporting producer in the People’s Republic of China provides sufficient evidence to the Commission that:
—
it did not export to the Union the product described in Article 1(1) in the period between 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017,
—
it is not related to any exporter or producer in the People’s Republic of China which is subject to the anti-dumping measures imposed by this Regulation,
—
it has actually exported to the Union the product concerned after the investigation period on which the measures are based, or it has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union,
the Commission may amend Article 1(2) by adding the new exporting producer to the cooperating companies not included in the sample and thus subject to the weighted average duty of not exceeding 49,31 EUR per item.
The amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duties pursuant to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/683 shall be definitively collected. The amounts secured in excess of the definitive amount of euros per item of the anti-dumping duties contained in Article 1(2) of this Regulation shall be released.
The Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/163 is repealed.
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.
ANNEXCooperating Chinese exporting producers not sampled:

Name of the Company | TARIC additional code
Bayi Rubber Co., Ltd | C335
Bridgestone (Huizhou) Tire Co., Ltd | C336
Briway Tire Co., Ltd | C337
Chaoyang Long March Tyre Co., Ltd | C338
Goodyear Dalian Tire Company Limited | C339
Guizhou Tyre Co., Ltd | C340
Jiangsu General Science Technology Co., Ltd | C341
Megalith Industrial Group Co., Ltd | C342
Michelin Shenyang Tire Co., Ltd | C343
Nanjing Kumho Tire Co., Ltd | C344
Ningxia Shenzhou Tire Co., Ltd | C345
Prinx Chengshan (Shandong) Tire Co., Ltd | C346
Qingdao Doublestar Tire Industrial Co., Ltd | C347
Qingdao Fudong Tyre Co., Ltd | C348
Qingdao Hairunsen Tyre Co., Ltd | C349
Qingdao GRT Rubber Co., Ltd | C350
Sailun Jinyu Group Co., Ltd | C351
Shaanxi Yanchang Petroleum Group Rubber Co., Ltd | C352
Shandong Kaixuan Rubber Co., Ltd | C353
Shandong Changfeng Tyres Co., Ltd | C354
Shandong Haohua Tire Co., Ltd | C355
Shandong Hawk International Rubber Industry Co., Ltd | C356
Shandong Hengfeng Rubber & Plastic Co., Ltd | C357
Shandong Hengyu Science & Technology Co., Ltd | C358
Shandong Homerun Tires Co., Ltd | C359
Shandong Huasheng Rubber Co., Ltd | C360
Shandong Hugerubber Co., Ltd | C361
Shandong Jinyu Tire Co., Ltd | C362
Shandong Linglong Tyre Co., Ltd | C363
Shandong Mirage Tyres Co., Ltd | C364
Shandong Vheal Group Co., Ltd | C365
Shandong Wanda Boto Tyre Co., Ltd | C366
Shandong Wosen Rubber Co., Ltd | C367
Shandong Yongfeng Tyres Co., Ltd | C368
Shandong Yongsheng Rubber Group Co., Ltd; Shandong Santai Rubber Co., Ltd | C369
Shandong Yongtai Group Co., Ltd | C370
Shanghai Huayi Group Corp. Ltd; Double Coin Group (Jiang Su) Tyre Co., Ltd | C371
Shengtai Group Co., Ltd | C372
Sichuan Kalevei Technology Co., Ltd | C373
Toyo Tire (Zhucheng) Co., Ltd | C374
Triangle Tyre Co., Ltd | C375
Weifang Goldshield Tire Co., Ltd | C376
Weifang Shunfuchang Rubber And Plastic Products Co., Ltd | C377
Xuzhou Armour Rubber Company Ltd | C378
Zhongce Rubber Group Co., Ltd | C379

Pending: 32018R0886

January 16, 2026
21.6.2018 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 158/5
(1) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/724(2)mandated the Commission to give written notice, no later than 18 May 2018, to the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’) Council for Trade in Goods that, absent disapproval by the Council for Trade in Goods, the Union suspends the application to the trade of the United States of America (‘United States’) of import duty concessions under the GATT 1994 in respect of the products listed in Annex I and Annex II to that Regulation, so as to allow for an application of additional customs duties on the importation of these products originating in the United States.
(2) On 18 May 2018 the Commission gave the above written notice and the WTO Council for Trade in Goods did not disapprove within 30 days. The Union thereby suspended, in the WTO, the application of import duty concessions to the trade with the United States under GATT 1994 in respect of these products.
(3) On 8 March 2018 the United States adopted safeguard measures in the form of a tariff increase on imports of certain steel and aluminium products, effective from 23 March 2018 and with an unlimited duration. After two deferrals of the effective date of the tariff increase with respect to the European Union, the tariff increase became effective with respect to the European Union on 1 June 2018, with an unlimited duration.
(4) Consequently, having regard to Article 2 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/724, the Commission should impose additional customs duties on the products listed in Annex I and Annex II, as set out in recitals 6 and 12 to 15 of that Regulation, and having regard to the modalities set out in recitals 7 and 16 to 19 of that Regulation, and reflecting the timing requirements as set out in recital 5 of that Regulation, to the effect that:(a)the additional ad valorem duties of a rate of 10 % and 25 % on imports of the products listed in Annex I, should be applied from the date of entry into force of this Regulation and until the United States ceases to apply its safeguard measures to products from the Union;(b)the additional ad valorem duties of a rate of 10 %, 25 %, 35 % and 50 % on imports of the products listed in Annex II, should be applied from 1 June 2021 or upon the adoption by, or notification to, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of a ruling that the United States' safeguard measures are inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, if that is earlier, until the United States ceases to apply its safeguard measures to the Union. (a) the additional ad valorem duties of a rate of 10 % and 25 % on imports of the products listed in Annex I, should be applied from the date of entry into force of this Regulation and until the United States ceases to apply its safeguard measures to products from the Union; (b) the additional ad valorem duties of a rate of 10 %, 25 %, 35 % and 50 % on imports of the products listed in Annex II, should be applied from 1 June 2021 or upon the adoption by, or notification to, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of a ruling that the United States' safeguard measures are inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, if that is earlier, until the United States ceases to apply its safeguard measures to the Union.
(a) the additional ad valorem duties of a rate of 10 % and 25 % on imports of the products listed in Annex I, should be applied from the date of entry into force of this Regulation and until the United States ceases to apply its safeguard measures to products from the Union;
(b) the additional ad valorem duties of a rate of 10 %, 25 %, 35 % and 50 % on imports of the products listed in Annex II, should be applied from 1 June 2021 or upon the adoption by, or notification to, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of a ruling that the United States' safeguard measures are inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, if that is earlier, until the United States ceases to apply its safeguard measures to the Union.
(a) the additional ad valorem duties of a rate of 10 % and 25 % on imports of the products listed in Annex I, should be applied from the date of entry into force of this Regulation and until the United States ceases to apply its safeguard measures to products from the Union;
(b) the additional ad valorem duties of a rate of 10 %, 25 %, 35 % and 50 % on imports of the products listed in Annex II, should be applied from 1 June 2021 or upon the adoption by, or notification to, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of a ruling that the United States' safeguard measures are inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, if that is earlier, until the United States ceases to apply its safeguard measures to the Union.
(5) Due to a clerical error, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/724 should be amended. The clerical error concerns the maximum additional duty for CN 9504 40 00 in Annex I, which should be 10 % instead of 25 %. Recital 12, Article 2(a) and Annex I of that Regulation should be amended accordingly. The products and level of additional duties listed in Annex I and Annex II are identical in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/724, as amended, and this Regulation.
(6) This Regulation is without prejudice to the question of the consistency of the United States' safeguard measures with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement.
(7) The Commission may amend this Regulation, should it deem that appropriate, to account for any modification of or amendment to the United States' safeguard measures, including through product or company exclusion.
(8) Article 4 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/724 provides that products listed in the Annexes to that Regulation for which an import licence with an exemption from or a reduction of duty has been issued prior to the date of entry into force of that Regulation shall not be subject to additional duty. That Regulation also provides that products listed in the Annexes to that Regulation for which the importers can prove that they have been exported from the United States to the Union prior to the date on which an additional duty is applied with respect to that product shall not be subject to the additional duty.
(9) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Trade Barriers Committee, established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1843 of the European Parliament and of the Council(3),
(a) at the first stage, additional ad valorem duty of a rate of 10 % and 25 % shall be applied on imports of products listed in Annex I, as specified therein, from the date of entry into force of this Regulation;
(b) at the second stage, further additional ad valorem duty of a rate of 10 %, 25 %, 35 % and 50 % shall be applied on imports of products listed in Annex II as specified therein:—from 1 June 2021, or—from the fifth day following the date of the adoption by, or notification to, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of a ruling that the United States' safeguard measures are inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, if that is earlier. In the latter event, the Commission shall publish in theOfficial Journal of the European Uniona notice indicating the date on which such ruling is adopted or notified. — from 1 June 2021, or — from the fifth day following the date of the adoption by, or notification to, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of a ruling that the United States' safeguard measures are inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, if that is earlier. In the latter event, the Commission shall publish in theOfficial Journal of the European Uniona notice indicating the date on which such ruling is adopted or notified.
— from 1 June 2021, or
— from the fifth day following the date of the adoption by, or notification to, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of a ruling that the United States' safeguard measures are inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, if that is earlier. In the latter event, the Commission shall publish in theOfficial Journal of the European Uniona notice indicating the date on which such ruling is adopted or notified.
— from 1 June 2021, or
— from the fifth day following the date of the adoption by, or notification to, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of a ruling that the United States' safeguard measures are inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, if that is earlier. In the latter event, the Commission shall publish in theOfficial Journal of the European Uniona notice indicating the date on which such ruling is adopted or notified.
(1) recital 12 is replaced by the following:‘Reflecting the timing requirements described in recital 5, the additional customs duties should apply, if necessary or to the extent necessary, in two stages. At the first stage, ad valorem duties of a maximum rate of 10 % and 25 % on imports of the products listed in Annex I, may be applied immediately and until the United States ceases to apply its safeguard measures to products from the Union.’;
(2) in Article 2, paragraph (a) is replaced by the following:‘At the first stage, additional ad valorem duty of a maximum rate of 10 % and 25 % shall be applied on imports of products listed in Annex I from 20 June 2018 ’;
(3) in Annex I, the additional duty for CN 9504 40 00 is amended as follows:‘25 %’ is replaced by ‘10 %’.
CN 2018(1) Additional duty
0710 40 00 25 %
0711 90 30 25 %
0713 33 90 25 %
1005 90 00 25 %
1006 30 21 25 %
1006 30 23 25 %
1006 30 25 25 %
1006 30 27 25 %
1006 30 42 25 %
1006 30 44 25 %
1006 30 46 25 %
1006 30 48 25 %
1006 30 61 25 %
1006 30 63 25 %
1006 30 65 25 %
1006 30 67 25 %
1006 30 92 25 %
1006 30 94 25 %
1006 30 96 25 %
1006 30 98 25 %
1006 40 00 25 %
1904 10 30 25 %
1904 90 10 25 %
2001 90 30 25 %
2004 90 10 25 %
2005 80 00 25 %
2008 11 10 25 %
2009 12 00 25 %
2009 19 11 25 %
2009 19 19 25 %
2009 19 91 25 %
2009 19 98 25 %
2009 81 11 25 %
2009 81 19 25 %
2009 81 31 25 %
2009 81 59 25 %
2009 81 95 25 %
2009 81 99 25 %
2208 30 11 25 %
2208 30 19 25 %
2208 30 82 25 %
2208 30 88 25 %
2402 10 00 25 %
2402 20 10 25 %
2402 20 90 25 %
2402 90 00 25 %
2403 11 00 25 %
2403 19 10 25 %
2403 19 90 25 %
2403 91 00 25 %
2403 99 10 25 %
2403 99 90 25 %
3304 20 00 25 %
3304 30 00 25 %
3304 91 00 25 %
6109 10 00 25 %
6109 90 20 25 %
6109 90 90 25 %
6203 42 31 25 %
6203 42 90 25 %
6203 43 11 25 %
6204 62 31 25 %
6204 62 90 25 %
6302 31 00 25 %
6403 59 95 25 %
7210 12 20 25 %
7210 12 80 25 %
7219 12 10 25 %
7219 12 90 25 %
7219 13 10 25 %
7219 13 90 25 %
7219 32 10 25 %
7219 32 90 25 %
7219 33 10 25 %
7219 33 90 25 %
7219 34 10 25 %
7219 34 90 25 %
7219 35 90 25 %
7222 20 11 25 %
7222 20 21 25 %
7222 20 29 25 %
7222 20 31 25 %
7222 20 81 25 %
7222 20 89 25 %
7222 40 10 25 %
7222 40 50 25 %
7222 40 90 25 %
7223 00 11 25 %
7223 00 19 25 %
7223 00 91 25 %
7226 92 00 25 %
7228 30 20 25 %
7228 30 41 25 %
7228 30 49 25 %
7228 30 61 25 %
7228 30 69 25 %
7228 30 70 25 %
7228 30 89 25 %
7228 50 20 25 %
7228 50 40 25 %
7228 50 69 25 %
7228 50 80 25 %
7229 90 20 25 %
7229 90 50 25 %
7229 90 90 25 %
7301 20 00 25 %
7304 31 20 25 %
7304 31 80 25 %
7304 41 00 25 %
7306 30 11 25 %
7306 30 19 25 %
7306 30 41 25 %
7306 30 49 25 %
7306 30 72 25 %
7306 30 77 25 %
7306 30 80 25 %
7306 40 20 25 %
7306 40 80 25 %
7307 11 10 25 %
7307 11 90 25 %
7307 19 10 25 %
7307 19 90 25 %
7308 30 00 25 %
7308 40 00 25 %
7308 90 51 25 %
7308 90 59 25 %
7308 90 98 25 %
7309 00 10 25 %
7309 00 51 25 %
7309 00 59 25 %
7310 29 10 25 %
7310 29 90 25 %
7311 00 13 25 %
7311 00 19 25 %
7311 00 99 25 %
7314 14 00 25 %
7314 19 00 25 %
7314 49 00 25 %
7315 11 10 25 %
7315 11 90 25 %
7315 12 00 25 %
7315 19 00 25 %
7315 89 00 25 %
7315 90 00 25 %
7318 14 10 25 %
7318 14 91 25 %
7318 14 99 25 %
7318 16 40 25 %
7318 16 60 25 %
7318 16 92 25 %
7318 16 99 25 %
7321 11 10 25 %
7321 11 90 25 %
7322 90 00 25 %
7323 93 00 25 %
7323 99 00 25 %
7324 10 00 25 %
7325 10 00 25 %
7325 99 10 25 %
7325 99 90 25 %
7326 90 30 25 %
7326 90 40 25 %
7326 90 50 25 %
7326 90 60 25 %
7326 90 92 25 %
7326 90 96 25 %
7606 11 10 25 %
7606 11 91 25 %
7606 12 20 25 %
7606 12 92 25 %
7606 12 93 25 %
8711 40 00 25 %
8711 50 00 25 %
8903 91 10 25 %
8903 91 90 25 %
8903 92 10 25 %
8903 92 91 25 %
8903 92 99 25 %
8903 99 10 25 %
8903 99 91 25 %
8903 99 99 25 %
9504 40 00 10 %
CN 2018(1) Additional duty
2008 93 11 25 %
2008 93 19 25 %
2008 93 29 25 %
2008 93 91 25 %
2008 93 93 25 %
2008 93 99 25 %
2208 30 11 25 %
2208 30 19 25 %
2208 30 82 25 %
2208 30 88 25 %
3301 12 10 10 %
3301 13 10 10 %
3301 90 10 10 %
3301 90 30 10 %
3301 90 90 10 %
3302 90 10 10 %
3302 90 90 10 %
3304 10 00 10 %
3305 30 00 10 %
4818 20 10 25 %
4818 20 91 35 %
4818 20 99 25 %
4818 30 00 25 %
4818 50 00 35 %
4818 90 10 25 %
4818 90 90 35 %
5606 00 91 10 %
5606 00 99 10 %
5907 00 00 10 %
5911 10 00 10 %
5911 20 00 10 %
5911 31 11 10 %
5911 31 19 10 %
5911 31 90 10 %
5911 32 11 10 %
5911 32 19 10 %
5911 32 90 10 %
6203 42 11 50 %
6203 42 33 50 %
6203 42 35 50 %
6203 42 51 50 %
6203 42 59 50 %
6203 43 19 50 %
6203 43 31 50 %
6203 43 39 50 %
6203 43 90 50 %
6204 62 11 50 %
6204 62 33 50 %
6204 62 39 50 %
6204 62 51 50 %
6204 62 59 50 %
6205 30 00 50 %
6301 30 10 50 %
6301 30 90 50 %
6402 19 00 25 %
6402 99 10 50 %
6402 99 31 25 %
6402 99 39 25 %
6402 99 50 25 %
6402 99 91 25 %
6402 99 93 25 %
6402 99 96 25 %
6402 99 98 25 %
6403 59 05 25 %
6403 59 11 25 %
6403 59 31 25 %
6403 59 35 25 %
6403 59 39 25 %
6403 59 50 25 %
6403 59 91 25 %
6403 59 99 25 %
6601 10 00 50 %
6911 10 00 50 %
6911 90 00 50 %
6912 00 21 50 %
6912 00 23 50 %
6912 00 25 50 %
6912 00 29 50 %
6912 00 81 50 %
6912 00 83 50 %
6912 00 85 50 %
6912 00 89 50 %
6913 10 00 50 %
6913 90 10 50 %
6913 90 93 50 %
6913 90 98 50 %
6914 10 00 50 %
6914 90 00 50 %
7005 21 25 25 %
7005 21 30 25 %
7005 21 80 25 %
7007 19 10 10 %
7007 19 20 10 %
7007 19 80 10 %
7007 21 20 10 %
7007 21 80 10 %
7007 29 00 10 %
7009 10 00 25 %
7009 91 00 10 %
7013 28 10 10 %
7013 28 90 10 %
7102 31 00 10 %
7113 11 00 25 %
7113 19 00 25 %
7113 20 00 25 %
7228 50 61 25 %
7326 90 98 10 %
7604 29 90 25 %
7606 11 93 25 %
7606 11 99 25 %
8422 11 00 50 %
8450 11 11 50 %
8450 11 19 50 %
8450 11 90 50 %
8450 12 00 50 %
8450 19 00 50 %
8506 10 11 10 %
8506 10 18 10 %
8506 10 91 10 %
8506 10 98 10 %
8506 90 00 10 %
8543 70 01 50 %
8543 70 02 50 %
8543 70 03 50 %
8543 70 04 50 %
8543 70 05 50 %
8543 70 06 50 %
8543 70 07 50 %
8543 70 08 50 %
8543 70 09 50 %
8543 70 10 50 %
8543 70 30 50 %
8543 70 50 50 %
8543 70 60 50 %
8543 70 90 25 %
8704 21 10 10 %
8704 21 31 10 %
8704 21 39 10 %
8704 21 91 10 %
8704 21 99 10 %
8711 40 00 25 %
8711 50 00 25 %
8901 90 10 50 %
8901 90 90 50 %
8902 00 10 50 %
8902 00 90 50 %
8903 10 10 10 %
8903 10 90 10 %
8903 92 91 25 %
8903 92 99 25 %
9401 61 00 50 %
9401 69 00 50 %
9401 71 00 50 %
9401 79 00 50 %
9401 80 00 50 %
9404 90 10 25 %
9404 90 90 25 %
9405 99 00 25 %
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 concerning the exercise of the Union’s rights for the application and enforcement of international trade rules(1), and in particular Article 4(1) thereof,
(1) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/724(2)mandated the Commission to give written notice, no later than 18 May 2018, to the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’) Council for Trade in Goods that, absent disapproval by the Council for Trade in Goods, the Union suspends the application to the trade of the United States of America (‘United States’) of import duty concessions under the GATT 1994 in respect of the products listed in Annex I and Annex II to that Regulation, so as to allow for an application of additional customs duties on the importation of these products originating in the United States.
(2) On 18 May 2018 the Commission gave the above written notice and the WTO Council for Trade in Goods did not disapprove within 30 days. The Union thereby suspended, in the WTO, the application of import duty concessions to the trade with the United States under GATT 1994 in respect of these products.
(3) On 8 March 2018 the United States adopted safeguard measures in the form of a tariff increase on imports of certain steel and aluminium products, effective from 23 March 2018 and with an unlimited duration. After two deferrals of the effective date of the tariff increase with respect to the European Union, the tariff increase became effective with respect to the European Union on 1 June 2018, with an unlimited duration.
(4) Consequently, having regard to Article 2 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/724, the Commission should impose additional customs duties on the products listed in Annex I and Annex II, as set out in recitals 6 and 12 to 15 of that Regulation, and having regard to the modalities set out in recitals 7 and 16 to 19 of that Regulation, and reflecting the timing requirements as set out in recital 5 of that Regulation, to the effect that:(a)the additional ad valorem duties of a rate of 10 % and 25 % on imports of the products listed in Annex I, should be applied from the date of entry into force of this Regulation and until the United States ceases to apply its safeguard measures to products from the Union;(b)the additional ad valorem duties of a rate of 10 %, 25 %, 35 % and 50 % on imports of the products listed in Annex II, should be applied from 1 June 2021 or upon the adoption by, or notification to, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of a ruling that the United States’ safeguard measures are inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, if that is earlier, until the United States ceases to apply its safeguard measures to the Union.
(5) Due to a clerical error, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/724 should be amended. The clerical error concerns the maximum additional duty for CN 9504 40 00 in Annex I, which should be 10 % instead of 25 %. Recital 12, Article 2(a) and Annex I of that Regulation should be amended accordingly. The products and level of additional duties listed in Annex I and Annex II are identical in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/724, as amended, and this Regulation.
(6) This Regulation is without prejudice to the question of the consistency of the United States’ safeguard measures with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement.
(7) The Commission may amend this Regulation, should it deem that appropriate, to account for any modification of or amendment to the United States’ safeguard measures, including through product or company exclusion.
(8) Article 4 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/724 provides that products listed in the Annexes to that Regulation for which an import licence with an exemption from or a reduction of duty has been issued prior to the date of entry into force of that Regulation shall not be subject to additional duty. That Regulation also provides that products listed in the Annexes to that Regulation for which the importers can prove that they have been exported from the United States to the Union prior to the date on which an additional duty is applied with respect to that product shall not be subject to the additional duty.
(9) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Trade Barriers Committee, established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1843 of the European Parliament and of the Council(3),
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1
The Union shall apply additional customs duties on imports into the Union of the products listed in Annex I and Annex II to this Regulation and originating in the United States of America (‘United States’).

Article 2
The application of additional customs duties on these products shall be as follows:
(a)
at the first stage, additional ad valorem duty of a rate of 10 % and 25 % shall be applied on imports of products listed in Annex I, as specified therein, from the date of entry into force of this Regulation;
(b)
at the second stage, further additional ad valorem duty of a rate of 10 %, 25 %, 35 % and 50 % shall be applied on imports of products listed in Annex II as specified therein:
—
from 1 June 2021, or
—
from the fifth day following the date of the adoption by, or notification to, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of a ruling that the United States’ safeguard measures are inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, if that is earlier. In the latter event, the Commission shall publish in theOfficial Journal of the European Uniona notice indicating the date on which such ruling is adopted or notified.

Article 3
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/724 is amended as follows:
(1)
recital 12 is replaced by the following:
‘Reflecting the timing requirements described in recital 5, the additional customs duties should apply, if necessary or to the extent necessary, in two stages. At the first stage, ad valorem duties of a maximum rate of 10 % and 25 % on imports of the products listed in Annex I, may be applied immediately and until the United States ceases to apply its safeguard measures to products from the Union.’;
(2)
in Article 2, paragraph (a) is replaced by the following:
‘At the first stage, additional ad valorem duty of a maximum rate of 10 % and 25 % shall be applied on imports of products listed in Annex I from 20 June 2018
’;
(3)
in Annex I, the additional duty for CN 9504 40 00 is amended as follows:
‘25 %’ is replaced by ‘10 %’.

Article 4
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 concerning the exercise of the Union’s rights for the application and enforcement of international trade rules(1), and in particular Article 4(1) thereof,
(1) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/724(2)mandated the Commission to give written notice, no later than 18 May 2018, to the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’) Council for Trade in Goods that, absent disapproval by the Council for Trade in Goods, the Union suspends the application to the trade of the United States of America (‘United States’) of import duty concessions under the GATT 1994 in respect of the products listed in Annex I and Annex II to that Regulation, so as to allow for an application of additional customs duties on the importation of these products originating in the United States.
(2) On 18 May 2018 the Commission gave the above written notice and the WTO Council for Trade in Goods did not disapprove within 30 days. The Union thereby suspended, in the WTO, the application of import duty concessions to the trade with the United States under GATT 1994 in respect of these products.
(3) On 8 March 2018 the United States adopted safeguard measures in the form of a tariff increase on imports of certain steel and aluminium products, effective from 23 March 2018 and with an unlimited duration. After two deferrals of the effective date of the tariff increase with respect to the European Union, the tariff increase became effective with respect to the European Union on 1 June 2018, with an unlimited duration.
(4) Consequently, having regard to Article 2 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/724, the Commission should impose additional customs duties on the products listed in Annex I and Annex II, as set out in recitals 6 and 12 to 15 of that Regulation, and having regard to the modalities set out in recitals 7 and 16 to 19 of that Regulation, and reflecting the timing requirements as set out in recital 5 of that Regulation, to the effect that:(a)the additional ad valorem duties of a rate of 10 % and 25 % on imports of the products listed in Annex I, should be applied from the date of entry into force of this Regulation and until the United States ceases to apply its safeguard measures to products from the Union;(b)the additional ad valorem duties of a rate of 10 %, 25 %, 35 % and 50 % on imports of the products listed in Annex II, should be applied from 1 June 2021 or upon the adoption by, or notification to, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of a ruling that the United States’ safeguard measures are inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, if that is earlier, until the United States ceases to apply its safeguard measures to the Union.
(5) Due to a clerical error, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/724 should be amended. The clerical error concerns the maximum additional duty for CN 9504 40 00 in Annex I, which should be 10 % instead of 25 %. Recital 12, Article 2(a) and Annex I of that Regulation should be amended accordingly. The products and level of additional duties listed in Annex I and Annex II are identical in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/724, as amended, and this Regulation.
(6) This Regulation is without prejudice to the question of the consistency of the United States’ safeguard measures with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement.
(7) The Commission may amend this Regulation, should it deem that appropriate, to account for any modification of or amendment to the United States’ safeguard measures, including through product or company exclusion.
(8) Article 4 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/724 provides that products listed in the Annexes to that Regulation for which an import licence with an exemption from or a reduction of duty has been issued prior to the date of entry into force of that Regulation shall not be subject to additional duty. That Regulation also provides that products listed in the Annexes to that Regulation for which the importers can prove that they have been exported from the United States to the Union prior to the date on which an additional duty is applied with respect to that product shall not be subject to the additional duty.
(9) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Trade Barriers Committee, established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1843 of the European Parliament and of the Council(3),
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
The Union shall apply additional customs duties on imports into the Union of the products listed in Annex I and Annex II to this Regulation and originating in the United States of America (‘United States’).
The application of additional customs duties on these products shall be as follows:
(a)
at the first stage, additional ad valorem duty of a rate of 10 % and 25 % shall be applied on imports of products listed in Annex I, as specified therein, from the date of entry into force of this Regulation;
(b)
at the second stage, further additional ad valorem duty of a rate of 10 %, 25 %, 35 % and 50 % shall be applied on imports of products listed in Annex II as specified therein:
—
from 1 June 2021, or
—
from the fifth day following the date of the adoption by, or notification to, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of a ruling that the United States’ safeguard measures are inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, if that is earlier. In the latter event, the Commission shall publish in theOfficial Journal of the European Uniona notice indicating the date on which such ruling is adopted or notified.
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/724 is amended as follows:
(1)
recital 12 is replaced by the following:
‘Reflecting the timing requirements described in recital 5, the additional customs duties should apply, if necessary or to the extent necessary, in two stages. At the first stage, ad valorem duties of a maximum rate of 10 % and 25 % on imports of the products listed in Annex I, may be applied immediately and until the United States ceases to apply its safeguard measures to products from the Union.’;
(2)
in Article 2, paragraph (a) is replaced by the following:
‘At the first stage, additional ad valorem duty of a maximum rate of 10 % and 25 % shall be applied on imports of products listed in Annex I from 20 June 2018
’;
(3)
in Annex I, the additional duty for CN 9504 40 00 is amended as follows:
‘25 %’ is replaced by ‘10 %’.
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.

Products subject to additional duties at the first stage

ANNEX I
CN 2018(1) | Additional duty
0710 40 00 | 25 %
0711 90 30 | 25 %
0713 33 90 | 25 %
1005 90 00 | 25 %
1006 30 21 | 25 %
1006 30 23 | 25 %
1006 30 25 | 25 %
1006 30 27 | 25 %
1006 30 42 | 25 %
1006 30 44 | 25 %
1006 30 46 | 25 %
1006 30 48 | 25 %
1006 30 61 | 25 %
1006 30 63 | 25 %
1006 30 65 | 25 %
1006 30 67 | 25 %
1006 30 92 | 25 %
1006 30 94 | 25 %
1006 30 96 | 25 %
1006 30 98 | 25 %
1006 40 00 | 25 %
1904 10 30 | 25 %
1904 90 10 | 25 %
2001 90 30 | 25 %
2004 90 10 | 25 %
2005 80 00 | 25 %
2008 11 10 | 25 %
2009 12 00 | 25 %
2009 19 11 | 25 %
2009 19 19 | 25 %
2009 19 91 | 25 %
2009 19 98 | 25 %
2009 81 11 | 25 %
2009 81 19 | 25 %
2009 81 31 | 25 %
2009 81 59 | 25 %
2009 81 95 | 25 %
2009 81 99 | 25 %
2208 30 11 | 25 %
2208 30 19 | 25 %
2208 30 82 | 25 %
2208 30 88 | 25 %
2402 10 00 | 25 %
2402 20 10 | 25 %
2402 20 90 | 25 %
2402 90 00 | 25 %
2403 11 00 | 25 %
2403 19 10 | 25 %
2403 19 90 | 25 %
2403 91 00 | 25 %
2403 99 10 | 25 %
2403 99 90 | 25 %
3304 20 00 | 25 %
3304 30 00 | 25 %
3304 91 00 | 25 %
6109 10 00 | 25 %
6109 90 20 | 25 %
6109 90 90 | 25 %
6203 42 31 | 25 %
6203 42 90 | 25 %
6203 43 11 | 25 %
6204 62 31 | 25 %
6204 62 90 | 25 %
6302 31 00 | 25 %
6403 59 95 | 25 %
7210 12 20 | 25 %
7210 12 80 | 25 %
7219 12 10 | 25 %
7219 12 90 | 25 %
7219 13 10 | 25 %
7219 13 90 | 25 %
7219 32 10 | 25 %
7219 32 90 | 25 %
7219 33 10 | 25 %
7219 33 90 | 25 %
7219 34 10 | 25 %
7219 34 90 | 25 %
7219 35 90 | 25 %
7222 20 11 | 25 %
7222 20 21 | 25 %
7222 20 29 | 25 %
7222 20 31 | 25 %
7222 20 81 | 25 %
7222 20 89 | 25 %
7222 40 10 | 25 %
7222 40 50 | 25 %
7222 40 90 | 25 %
7223 00 11 | 25 %
7223 00 19 | 25 %
7223 00 91 | 25 %
7226 92 00 | 25 %
7228 30 20 | 25 %
7228 30 41 | 25 %
7228 30 49 | 25 %
7228 30 61 | 25 %
7228 30 69 | 25 %
7228 30 70 | 25 %
7228 30 89 | 25 %
7228 50 20 | 25 %
7228 50 40 | 25 %
7228 50 69 | 25 %
7228 50 80 | 25 %
7229 90 20 | 25 %
7229 90 50 | 25 %
7229 90 90 | 25 %
7301 20 00 | 25 %
7304 31 20 | 25 %
7304 31 80 | 25 %
7304 41 00 | 25 %
7306 30 11 | 25 %
7306 30 19 | 25 %
7306 30 41 | 25 %
7306 30 49 | 25 %
7306 30 72 | 25 %
7306 30 77 | 25 %
7306 30 80 | 25 %
7306 40 20 | 25 %
7306 40 80 | 25 %
7307 11 10 | 25 %
7307 11 90 | 25 %
7307 19 10 | 25 %
7307 19 90 | 25 %
7308 30 00 | 25 %
7308 40 00 | 25 %
7308 90 51 | 25 %
7308 90 59 | 25 %
7308 90 98 | 25 %
7309 00 10 | 25 %
7309 00 51 | 25 %
7309 00 59 | 25 %
7310 29 10 | 25 %
7310 29 90 | 25 %
7311 00 13 | 25 %
7311 00 19 | 25 %
7311 00 99 | 25 %
7314 14 00 | 25 %
7314 19 00 | 25 %
7314 49 00 | 25 %
7315 11 10 | 25 %
7315 11 90 | 25 %
7315 12 00 | 25 %
7315 19 00 | 25 %
7315 89 00 | 25 %
7315 90 00 | 25 %
7318 14 10 | 25 %
7318 14 91 | 25 %
7318 14 99 | 25 %
7318 16 40 | 25 %
7318 16 60 | 25 %
7318 16 92 | 25 %
7318 16 99 | 25 %
7321 11 10 | 25 %
7321 11 90 | 25 %
7322 90 00 | 25 %
7323 93 00 | 25 %
7323 99 00 | 25 %
7324 10 00 | 25 %
7325 10 00 | 25 %
7325 99 10 | 25 %
7325 99 90 | 25 %
7326 90 30 | 25 %
7326 90 40 | 25 %
7326 90 50 | 25 %
7326 90 60 | 25 %
7326 90 92 | 25 %
7326 90 96 | 25 %
7606 11 10 | 25 %
7606 11 91 | 25 %
7606 12 20 | 25 %
7606 12 92 | 25 %
7606 12 93 | 25 %
8711 40 00 | 25 %
8711 50 00 | 25 %
8903 91 10 | 25 %
8903 91 90 | 25 %
8903 92 10 | 25 %
8903 92 91 | 25 %
8903 92 99 | 25 %
8903 99 10 | 25 %
8903 99 91 | 25 %
8903 99 99 | 25 %
9504 40 00 | 10 %
(1) The nomenclature codes are taken from the Combined Nomenclature as defined in Article 1(2) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (OJ L 256, 7.9.1987, p. 1) and as set out in Annex I thereto, which are valid at the time of publication of this Regulation and mutatis mutandis as amended by subsequent legislation, including most recently Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1925 of 12 October 2017 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (OJ L 282, 31.10.2017, p. 1).

Products subject to further additional duties at the second stage

ANNEX II
CN 2018(1) | Additional duty
2008 93 11 | 25 %
2008 93 19 | 25 %
2008 93 29 | 25 %
2008 93 91 | 25 %
2008 93 93 | 25 %
2008 93 99 | 25 %
2208 30 11 | 25 %
2208 30 19 | 25 %
2208 30 82 | 25 %
2208 30 88 | 25 %
3301 12 10 | 10 %
3301 13 10 | 10 %
3301 90 10 | 10 %
3301 90 30 | 10 %
3301 90 90 | 10 %
3302 90 10 | 10 %
3302 90 90 | 10 %
3304 10 00 | 10 %
3305 30 00 | 10 %
4818 20 10 | 25 %
4818 20 91 | 35 %
4818 20 99 | 25 %
4818 30 00 | 25 %
4818 50 00 | 35 %
4818 90 10 | 25 %
4818 90 90 | 35 %
5606 00 91 | 10 %
5606 00 99 | 10 %
5907 00 00 | 10 %
5911 10 00 | 10 %
5911 20 00 | 10 %
5911 31 11 | 10 %
5911 31 19 | 10 %
5911 31 90 | 10 %
5911 32 11 | 10 %
5911 32 19 | 10 %
5911 32 90 | 10 %
6203 42 11 | 50 %
6203 42 33 | 50 %
6203 42 35 | 50 %
6203 42 51 | 50 %
6203 42 59 | 50 %
6203 43 19 | 50 %
6203 43 31 | 50 %
6203 43 39 | 50 %
6203 43 90 | 50 %
6204 62 11 | 50 %
6204 62 33 | 50 %
6204 62 39 | 50 %
6204 62 51 | 50 %
6204 62 59 | 50 %
6205 30 00 | 50 %
6301 30 10 | 50 %
6301 30 90 | 50 %
6402 19 00 | 25 %
6402 99 10 | 50 %
6402 99 31 | 25 %
6402 99 39 | 25 %
6402 99 50 | 25 %
6402 99 91 | 25 %
6402 99 93 | 25 %
6402 99 96 | 25 %
6402 99 98 | 25 %
6403 59 05 | 25 %
6403 59 11 | 25 %
6403 59 31 | 25 %
6403 59 35 | 25 %
6403 59 39 | 25 %
6403 59 50 | 25 %
6403 59 91 | 25 %
6403 59 99 | 25 %
6601 10 00 | 50 %
6911 10 00 | 50 %
6911 90 00 | 50 %
6912 00 21 | 50 %
6912 00 23 | 50 %
6912 00 25 | 50 %
6912 00 29 | 50 %
6912 00 81 | 50 %
6912 00 83 | 50 %
6912 00 85 | 50 %
6912 00 89 | 50 %
6913 10 00 | 50 %
6913 90 10 | 50 %
6913 90 93 | 50 %
6913 90 98 | 50 %
6914 10 00 | 50 %
6914 90 00 | 50 %
7005 21 25 | 25 %
7005 21 30 | 25 %
7005 21 80 | 25 %
7007 19 10 | 10 %
7007 19 20 | 10 %
7007 19 80 | 10 %
7007 21 20 | 10 %
7007 21 80 | 10 %
7007 29 00 | 10 %
7009 10 00 | 25 %
7009 91 00 | 10 %
7013 28 10 | 10 %
7013 28 90 | 10 %
7102 31 00 | 10 %
7113 11 00 | 25 %
7113 19 00 | 25 %
7113 20 00 | 25 %
7228 50 61 | 25 %
7326 90 98 | 10 %
7604 29 90 | 25 %
7606 11 93 | 25 %
7606 11 99 | 25 %
8422 11 00 | 50 %
8450 11 11 | 50 %
8450 11 19 | 50 %
8450 11 90 | 50 %
8450 12 00 | 50 %
8450 19 00 | 50 %
8506 10 11 | 10 %
8506 10 18 | 10 %
8506 10 91 | 10 %
8506 10 98 | 10 %
8506 90 00 | 10 %
8543 70 01 | 50 %
8543 70 02 | 50 %
8543 70 03 | 50 %
8543 70 04 | 50 %
8543 70 05 | 50 %
8543 70 06 | 50 %
8543 70 07 | 50 %
8543 70 08 | 50 %
8543 70 09 | 50 %
8543 70 10 | 50 %
8543 70 30 | 50 %
8543 70 50 | 50 %
8543 70 60 | 50 %
8543 70 90 | 25 %
8704 21 10 | 10 %
8704 21 31 | 10 %
8704 21 39 | 10 %
8704 21 91 | 10 %
8704 21 99 | 10 %
8711 40 00 | 25 %
8711 50 00 | 25 %
8901 90 10 | 50 %
8901 90 90 | 50 %
8902 00 10 | 50 %
8902 00 90 | 50 %
8903 10 10 | 10 %
8903 10 90 | 10 %
8903 92 91 | 25 %
8903 92 99 | 25 %
9401 61 00 | 50 %
9401 69 00 | 50 %
9401 71 00 | 50 %
9401 79 00 | 50 %
9401 80 00 | 50 %
9404 90 10 | 25 %
9404 90 90 | 25 %
9405 99 00 | 25 %
(1) The nomenclature codes are taken from the Combined Nomenclature as defined in Article 1(2) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (OJ L 256, 7.9.1987, p. 1) and as set out in Annex I thereto, which are valid at the time of publication of this Regulation and mutatis mutandis as amended by subsequent legislation, including most recently Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1925 of 12 October 2017 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (OJ L 282, 31.10.2017, p. 1).

Pending: 32018R0724

January 16, 2026
17.5.2018 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 122/14
(1) On 8 March 2018 the United States of America (‘United States’) adopted safeguard measures in the form of a tariff increase on imports of certain steel and aluminium products, effective from 23 March 2018 and with an unlimited duration. On 22 March the effective date of the tariff increase with respect to the European Union was deferred to 1 May 2018.
(2) Notwithstanding the United States' characterisation of these measures as security measures, they are in essence safeguard measures. They consist of remedial action that disturbs the balance of concessions and obligations resulting from the World Trade Organisation (‘WTO’) Agreement and restricts imports for the purpose of protecting domestic industry against foreign competition, for the sake of that industry's commercial prosperity. The security exceptions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (‘GATT 1994’) do not apply to or justify such safeguard measures, and have no bearing on the right of rebalancing under the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement.
(3) The WTO Agreement on Safeguards provides for the right of any exporting Member affected by a safeguard measure to suspend the application of substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations to the trade of the WTO Member applying the safeguard measure, provided that no satisfactory solution is reached in consultations and the WTO Council for Trade in Goods does not disapprove.
(4) Consultations between the United States and the Union as envisaged in Articles 8 and 12.3 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards did not reach any satisfactory solution(2).
(5) The suspension by the Union of substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations should take effect following the expiration of 30 days after its notification to the Council for Trade in Goods, unless the Council for Trade in Goods disapproves. The WTO Agreement allows for the right of suspension to be exercised (a) immediately, provided that the safeguard measure has not been taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports, or does not conform to the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement; or (b) after the expiry of a period of three years as from the application of the safeguard measure.
(6) The Commission exercises the right to suspend the application of substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations with the intention of rebalancing concessions or other obligations in the trade relations with third countries, on the basis of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 654/2014. The appropriate action takes the form of commercial policy measures which may consist of, inter alia, the suspension of tariff concessions and the imposition of new or increased customs duties.
(7) In designing and selecting appropriate commercial policy measures, the Commission applies objective criteria in accordance with Article 4(2)(c) and Article 4(3) of Regulation (EU) No 654/2014, including as relevant the proportionality of any measures, their potential to provide relief to the Union industries affected by the safeguard measures, and the aim of minimising negative economic impact on the Union, including with regard to essential raw materials.
(8) In accordance with Article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 654/2014, the Commission provided an opportunity for stakeholders to express their views and submit information regarding the Union's economic interests in this respect(3).
(9) The United States' safeguard measures are capable of having a considerable negative economic impact on the Union industries concerned. They would significantly limit Union exports of the steel and aluminium products concerned to the United States. The affected Union imports of the relevant steel and aluminium products into the United States are worth at least EUR 6,41 billion in 2017 (of which EUR 5,30 billion is total steel imports and EUR 1,11 billion is total aluminium imports).
(10) Therefore, a suspension of trade concessions on certain products up to a level which reflects and does not exceed the amount that would result from the application of the United States' duties to the imports of the steel and aluminium products from the Union into the United States represents an appropriate suspension of the application of substantially equivalent trade concessions in line with the WTO Agreement on Safeguards.
(11) Subsequently, with a separate implementing act, the Commission may decide to implement the suspension of the application of trade concessions, if necessary or to the extent necessary, through the application of additional customs duties on certain products originating in the United States imported into the Union. The Commission should decide on the scope of the application, and reflecting the timing requirements described in recital (5), depending on whether the United States excludes certain products or companies from the safeguard measures.
(12) Reflecting the timing requirements described in recital (5), the additional customs duties should apply, if necessary or to the extent necessary, in two stages. At the first stage,ad valoremduties of a maximum rate of 25 % on imports of the products listed in Annex I, may be applied immediately and until the United States ceases to apply its safeguard measures to products from the Union.
(13) The total amount ofad valoremduties at the first stage reflects the United States' tariff increase of 25 % on imports of ‘carbon and alloy flat products’ and ‘carbon and alloy long products’(4)from the Union into the United States (EUR 2,83 billion total value of Union imports into the United States in 2017). These are the steel products for which the United States' safeguard measures have not been taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports.
(14) At the second stage, further additionalad valoremduties of a maximum rate of 10 %, 25 %, 35 % and 50 % on imports of the products listed in Annex II, may be applied as from 23 March 2021 or upon the adoption by, or notification to, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of a ruling that the United States' safeguard measures are inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, if that is earlier, until the United States' safeguard measures cease to apply.
(15) The total amount ofad valoremduties at the second stage reflects the United States' tariff increase of 10 % on imports of the aluminium products(5)and of 25 % on imports of ‘carbon and alloy pipe and tube products’, ‘carbon and alloy semi-finished products’ and ‘stainless steel products’(6)from the Union into the United States (EUR 3,58 billion total value of Union imports into the United States in 2017 of which EUR 2,47 billion is steel imports and EUR 1,11 billion is aluminium imports). These are the products for which there appears to have been an absolute increase in imports.
(16) The commercial policy measures and the products concerned have been selected in accordance with the criteria of Article 4(2)(c) and (3) of Regulation (EU) No 654/2014.
(17) By not exceeding the value of the Union imports affected by the United States' safeguard measures as described in recitals (9) and (10), the commercial policy measures are proportionate to the effect of the United States' safeguard measures and not excessive. It is also noted that only a fraction of the total value available will be initially exercised, as described in recitals (12) and (13).
(18) The commercial policy measures should provide some relief to the steel and aluminium Union industries affected by the United States' safeguard measures.
(19) The commercial policy measures should apply to imports of products originating in the United States on which the Union is not substantially dependent for its supply. The commercial policy measures may also apply with respect to the steel and aluminium sectors. This approach avoids as much as possible a negative impact on the various actors on the Union market, including consumers.
(20) Products for which an import licence with an exemption from or a reduction of duty has been issued prior to the date entry into force of this regulation should not be subject to these additional customs duties.
(21) Products for which the importers can prove that they have been exported from the United States to the Union prior to the date of application of the additional customs duties should not be subject to the additional customs duties.
(22) This Regulation is without prejudice to the question of the consistency of the United States' safeguard measures with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement.
(23) In light of the applicable WTO time limits and the preliminary nature of this act, it is appropriate that it should enter into force on the day on which it is published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.
(24) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Trade Barriers Committee, established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1843 of the European Parliament and of the Council(7),
(a) At the first stage, additionalad valoremduty of a maximum rate of 25 % may be applied on imports of products listed in Annex I from 20 June 2018.
(b) At the second stage, further additionalad valoremduty of a maximum rate of 10 %, 25 %, 35 % or 50 % may be applied on imports of products listed in Annex II:—from 23 March 2021, or—from the fifth day following the date of the adoption by, or notification to, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of a ruling that the United States' safeguard measures are inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, if that is earlier. In the latter event, the Commission shall publish in theOfficial Journal of the European Uniona notice indicating the date on which such ruling is adopted or notified. — from 23 March 2021, or — from the fifth day following the date of the adoption by, or notification to, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of a ruling that the United States' safeguard measures are inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, if that is earlier. In the latter event, the Commission shall publish in theOfficial Journal of the European Uniona notice indicating the date on which such ruling is adopted or notified.
— from 23 March 2021, or
— from the fifth day following the date of the adoption by, or notification to, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of a ruling that the United States' safeguard measures are inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, if that is earlier. In the latter event, the Commission shall publish in theOfficial Journal of the European Uniona notice indicating the date on which such ruling is adopted or notified.
— from 23 March 2021, or
— from the fifth day following the date of the adoption by, or notification to, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of a ruling that the United States' safeguard measures are inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, if that is earlier. In the latter event, the Commission shall publish in theOfficial Journal of the European Uniona notice indicating the date on which such ruling is adopted or notified.
CN 2018(1) Additional duty
0710 40 00 25 %
0711 90 30 25 %
0713 33 90 25 %
1005 90 00 25 %
1006 30 21 25 %
1006 30 23 25 %
1006 30 25 25 %
1006 30 27 25 %
1006 30 42 25 %
1006 30 44 25 %
1006 30 46 25 %
1006 30 48 25 %
1006 30 61 25 %
1006 30 63 25 %
1006 30 65 25 %
1006 30 67 25 %
1006 30 92 25 %
1006 30 94 25 %
1006 30 96 25 %
1006 30 98 25 %
1006 40 00 25 %
1904 10 30 25 %
1904 90 10 25 %
2001 90 30 25 %
2004 90 10 25 %
2005 80 00 25 %
2008 11 10 25 %
2009 12 00 25 %
2009 19 11 25 %
2009 19 19 25 %
2009 19 91 25 %
2009 19 98 25 %
2009 81 11 25 %
2009 81 19 25 %
2009 81 31 25 %
2009 81 59 25 %
2009 81 95 25 %
2009 81 99 25 %
2208 30 11 25 %
2208 30 19 25 %
2208 30 82 25 %
2208 30 88 25 %
2402 10 00 25 %
2402 20 10 25 %
2402 20 90 25 %
2402 90 00 25 %
2403 11 00 25 %
2403 19 10 25 %
2403 19 90 25 %
2403 91 00 25 %
2403 99 10 25 %
2403 99 90 25 %
3304 20 00 25 %
3304 30 00 25 %
3304 91 00 25 %
6109 10 00 25 %
6109 90 20 25 %
6109 90 90 25 %
6203 42 31 25 %
6203 42 90 25 %
6203 43 11 25 %
6204 62 31 25 %
6204 62 90 25 %
6302 31 00 25 %
6403 59 95 25 %
7210 12 20 25 %
7210 12 80 25 %
7219 12 10 25 %
7219 12 90 25 %
7219 13 10 25 %
7219 13 90 25 %
7219 32 10 25 %
7219 32 90 25 %
7219 33 10 25 %
7219 33 90 25 %
7219 34 10 25 %
7219 34 90 25 %
7219 35 90 25 %
7222 20 11 25 %
7222 20 21 25 %
7222 20 29 25 %
7222 20 31 25 %
7222 20 81 25 %
7222 20 89 25 %
7222 40 10 25 %
7222 40 50 25 %
7222 40 90 25 %
7223 00 11 25 %
7223 00 19 25 %
7223 00 91 25 %
7226 92 00 25 %
7228 30 20 25 %
7228 30 41 25 %
7228 30 49 25 %
7228 30 61 25 %
7228 30 69 25 %
7228 30 70 25 %
7228 30 89 25 %
7228 50 20 25 %
7228 50 40 25 %
7228 50 69 25 %
7228 50 80 25 %
7229 90 20 25 %
7229 90 50 25 %
7229 90 90 25 %
7301 20 00 25 %
7304 31 20 25 %
7304 31 80 25 %
7304 41 00 25 %
7306 30 11 25 %
7306 30 19 25 %
7306 30 41 25 %
7306 30 49 25 %
7306 30 72 25 %
7306 30 77 25 %
7306 30 80 25 %
7306 40 20 25 %
7306 40 80 25 %
7307 11 10 25 %
7307 11 90 25 %
7307 19 10 25 %
7307 19 90 25 %
7308 30 00 25 %
7308 40 00 25 %
7308 90 51 25 %
7308 90 59 25 %
7308 90 98 25 %
7309 00 10 25 %
7309 00 51 25 %
7309 00 59 25 %
7310 29 10 25 %
7310 29 90 25 %
7311 00 13 25 %
7311 00 19 25 %
7311 00 99 25 %
7314 14 00 25 %
7314 19 00 25 %
7314 49 00 25 %
7315 11 10 25 %
7315 11 90 25 %
7315 12 00 25 %
7315 19 00 25 %
7315 89 00 25 %
7315 90 00 25 %
7318 14 10 25 %
7318 14 91 25 %
7318 14 99 25 %
7318 16 40 25 %
7318 16 60 25 %
7318 16 92 25 %
7318 16 99 25 %
7321 11 10 25 %
7321 11 90 25 %
7322 90 00 25 %
7323 93 00 25 %
7323 99 00 25 %
7324 10 00 25 %
7325 10 00 25 %
7325 99 10 25 %
7325 99 90 25 %
7326 90 30 25 %
7326 90 40 25 %
7326 90 50 25 %
7326 90 60 25 %
7326 90 92 25 %
7326 90 96 25 %
7606 11 10 25 %
7606 11 91 25 %
7606 12 20 25 %
7606 12 92 25 %
7606 12 93 25 %
8711 40 00 25 %
8711 50 00 25 %
8903 91 10 25 %
8903 91 90 25 %
8903 92 10 25 %
8903 92 91 25 %
8903 92 99 25 %
8903 99 10 25 %
8903 99 91 25 %
8903 99 99 25 %
9504 40 00 25 %
CN 2018(1) Additional duty
2008 93 11 25 %
2008 93 19 25 %
2008 93 29 25 %
2008 93 91 25 %
2008 93 93 25 %
2008 93 99 25 %
2208 30 11 25 %
2208 30 19 25 %
2208 30 82 25 %
2208 30 88 25 %
3301 12 10 10 %
3301 13 10 10 %
3301 90 10 10 %
3301 90 30 10 %
3301 90 90 10 %
3302 90 10 10 %
3302 90 90 10 %
3304 10 00 10 %
3305 30 00 10 %
4818 20 10 25 %
4818 20 91 35 %
4818 20 99 25 %
4818 30 00 25 %
4818 50 00 35 %
4818 90 10 25 %
4818 90 90 35 %
5606 00 91 10 %
5606 00 99 10 %
5907 00 00 10 %
5911 10 00 10 %
5911 20 00 10 %
5911 31 11 10 %
5911 31 19 10 %
5911 31 90 10 %
5911 32 11 10 %
5911 32 19 10 %
5911 32 90 10 %
6203 42 11 50 %
6203 42 33 50 %
6203 42 35 50 %
6203 42 51 50 %
6203 42 59 50 %
6203 43 19 50 %
6203 43 31 50 %
6203 43 39 50 %
6203 43 90 50 %
6204 62 11 50 %
6204 62 33 50 %
6204 62 39 50 %
6204 62 51 50 %
6204 62 59 50 %
6205 30 00 50 %
6301 30 10 50 %
6301 30 90 50 %
6402 19 00 25 %
6402 99 10 50 %
6402 99 31 25 %
6402 99 39 25 %
6402 99 50 25 %
6402 99 91 25 %
6402 99 93 25 %
6402 99 96 25 %
6402 99 98 25 %
6403 59 05 25 %
6403 59 11 25 %
6403 59 31 25 %
6403 59 35 25 %
6403 59 39 25 %
6403 59 50 25 %
6403 59 91 25 %
6403 59 99 25 %
6601 10 00 50 %
6911 10 00 50 %
6911 90 00 50 %
6912 00 21 50 %
6912 00 23 50 %
6912 00 25 50 %
6912 00 29 50 %
6912 00 81 50 %
6912 00 83 50 %
6912 00 85 50 %
6912 00 89 50 %
6913 10 00 50 %
6913 90 10 50 %
6913 90 93 50 %
6913 90 98 50 %
6914 10 00 50 %
6914 90 00 50 %
7005 21 25 25 %
7005 21 30 25 %
7005 21 80 25 %
7007 19 10 10 %
7007 19 20 10 %
7007 19 80 10 %
7007 21 20 10 %
7007 21 80 10 %
7007 29 00 10 %
7009 10 00 25 %
7009 91 00 10 %
7013 28 10 10 %
7013 28 90 10 %
7102 31 00 10 %
7113 11 00 25 %
7113 19 00 25 %
7113 20 00 25 %
7228 50 61 25 %
7326 90 98 10 %
7604 29 90 25 %
7606 11 93 25 %
7606 11 99 25 %
8422 11 00 50 %
8450 11 11 50 %
8450 11 19 50 %
8450 11 90 50 %
8450 12 00 50 %
8450 19 00 50 %
8506 10 11 10 %
8506 10 18 10 %
8506 10 91 10 %
8506 10 98 10 %
8506 90 00 10 %
8543 70 01 50 %
8543 70 02 50 %
8543 70 03 50 %
8543 70 04 50 %
8543 70 05 50 %
8543 70 06 50 %
8543 70 07 50 %
8543 70 08 50 %
8543 70 09 50 %
8543 70 10 50 %
8543 70 30 50 %
8543 70 50 50 %
8543 70 60 50 %
8543 70 90 25 %
8704 21 10 10 %
8704 21 31 10 %
8704 21 39 10 %
8704 21 91 10 %
8704 21 99 10 %
8711 40 00 25 %
8711 50 00 25 %
8901 90 10 50 %
8901 90 90 50 %
8902 00 10 50 %
8902 00 90 50 %
8903 10 10 10 %
8903 10 90 10 %
8903 92 91 25 %
8903 92 99 25 %
9401 61 00 50 %
9401 69 00 50 %
9401 71 00 50 %
9401 79 00 50 %
9401 80 00 50 %
9404 90 10 25 %
9404 90 90 25 %
9405 99 00 25 %
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 concerning the exercise of the Union’s rights for the application and enforcement of international trade rules(1), and in particular Article 4(1) thereof,
(1) On 8 March 2018 the United States of America (‘United States’) adopted safeguard measures in the form of a tariff increase on imports of certain steel and aluminium products, effective from 23 March 2018 and with an unlimited duration. On 22 March the effective date of the tariff increase with respect to the European Union was deferred to 1 May 2018.
(2) Notwithstanding the United States’ characterisation of these measures as security measures, they are in essence safeguard measures. They consist of remedial action that disturbs the balance of concessions and obligations resulting from the World Trade Organisation (‘WTO’) Agreement and restricts imports for the purpose of protecting domestic industry against foreign competition, for the sake of that industry’s commercial prosperity. The security exceptions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (‘GATT 1994’) do not apply to or justify such safeguard measures, and have no bearing on the right of rebalancing under the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement.
(3) The WTO Agreement on Safeguards provides for the right of any exporting Member affected by a safeguard measure to suspend the application of substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations to the trade of the WTO Member applying the safeguard measure, provided that no satisfactory solution is reached in consultations and the WTO Council for Trade in Goods does not disapprove.
(4) Consultations between the United States and the Union as envisaged in Articles 8 and 12.3 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards did not reach any satisfactory solution(2).
(5) The suspension by the Union of substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations should take effect following the expiration of 30 days after its notification to the Council for Trade in Goods, unless the Council for Trade in Goods disapproves. The WTO Agreement allows for the right of suspension to be exercised (a) immediately, provided that the safeguard measure has not been taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports, or does not conform to the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement; or (b) after the expiry of a period of three years as from the application of the safeguard measure.
(6) The Commission exercises the right to suspend the application of substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations with the intention of rebalancing concessions or other obligations in the trade relations with third countries, on the basis of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 654/2014. The appropriate action takes the form of commercial policy measures which may consist of, inter alia, the suspension of tariff concessions and the imposition of new or increased customs duties.
(7) In designing and selecting appropriate commercial policy measures, the Commission applies objective criteria in accordance with Article 4(2)(c) and Article 4(3) of Regulation (EU) No 654/2014, including as relevant the proportionality of any measures, their potential to provide relief to the Union industries affected by the safeguard measures, and the aim of minimising negative economic impact on the Union, including with regard to essential raw materials.
(8) In accordance with Article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 654/2014, the Commission provided an opportunity for stakeholders to express their views and submit information regarding the Union’s economic interests in this respect(3).
(9) The United States’ safeguard measures are capable of having a considerable negative economic impact on the Union industries concerned. They would significantly limit Union exports of the steel and aluminium products concerned to the United States. The affected Union imports of the relevant steel and aluminium products into the United States are worth at least EUR 6,41 billion in 2017 (of which EUR 5,30 billion is total steel imports and EUR 1,11 billion is total aluminium imports).
(10) Therefore, a suspension of trade concessions on certain products up to a level which reflects and does not exceed the amount that would result from the application of the United States’ duties to the imports of the steel and aluminium products from the Union into the United States represents an appropriate suspension of the application of substantially equivalent trade concessions in line with the WTO Agreement on Safeguards.
(11) Subsequently, with a separate implementing act, the Commission may decide to implement the suspension of the application of trade concessions, if necessary or to the extent necessary, through the application of additional customs duties on certain products originating in the United States imported into the Union. The Commission should decide on the scope of the application, and reflecting the timing requirements described in recital (5), depending on whether the United States excludes certain products or companies from the safeguard measures.
(12) Reflecting the timing requirements described in recital (5), the additional customs duties should apply, if necessary or to the extent necessary, in two stages. At the first stage,ad valoremduties of a maximum rate of 25 % on imports of the products listed in Annex I, may be applied immediately and until the United States ceases to apply its safeguard measures to products from the Union.
(13) The total amount ofad valoremduties at the first stage reflects the United States’ tariff increase of 25 % on imports of ‘carbon and alloy flat products’ and ‘carbon and alloy long products’(4)from the Union into the United States (EUR 2,83 billion total value of Union imports into the United States in 2017). These are the steel products for which the United States’ safeguard measures have not been taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports.
(14) At the second stage, further additionalad valoremduties of a maximum rate of 10 %, 25 %, 35 % and 50 % on imports of the products listed in Annex II, may be applied as from 23 March 2021 or upon the adoption by, or notification to, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of a ruling that the United States’ safeguard measures are inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, if that is earlier, until the United States’ safeguard measures cease to apply.
(15) The total amount ofad valoremduties at the second stage reflects the United States’ tariff increase of 10 % on imports of the aluminium products(5)and of 25 % on imports of ‘carbon and alloy pipe and tube products’, ‘carbon and alloy semi-finished products’ and ‘stainless steel products’(6)from the Union into the United States (EUR 3,58 billion total value of Union imports into the United States in 2017 of which EUR 2,47 billion is steel imports and EUR 1,11 billion is aluminium imports). These are the products for which there appears to have been an absolute increase in imports.
(16) The commercial policy measures and the products concerned have been selected in accordance with the criteria of Article 4(2)(c) and (3) of Regulation (EU) No 654/2014.
(17) By not exceeding the value of the Union imports affected by the United States’ safeguard measures as described in recitals (9) and (10), the commercial policy measures are proportionate to the effect of the United States’ safeguard measures and not excessive. It is also noted that only a fraction of the total value available will be initially exercised, as described in recitals (12) and (13).
(18) The commercial policy measures should provide some relief to the steel and aluminium Union industries affected by the United States’ safeguard measures.
(19) The commercial policy measures should apply to imports of products originating in the United States on which the Union is not substantially dependent for its supply. The commercial policy measures may also apply with respect to the steel and aluminium sectors. This approach avoids as much as possible a negative impact on the various actors on the Union market, including consumers.
(20) Products for which an import licence with an exemption from or a reduction of duty has been issued prior to the date entry into force of this regulation should not be subject to these additional customs duties.
(21) Products for which the importers can prove that they have been exported from the United States to the Union prior to the date of application of the additional customs duties should not be subject to the additional customs duties.
(22) This Regulation is without prejudice to the question of the consistency of the United States’ safeguard measures with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement.
(23) In light of the applicable WTO time limits and the preliminary nature of this act, it is appropriate that it should enter into force on the day on which it is published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.
(24) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Trade Barriers Committee, established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1843 of the European Parliament and of the Council(7),
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1
The Commission shall immediately, and in any event no later than 18 May 2018, give written notice to the WTO Council for Trade in Goods that, absent disapproval by the Council for Trade in Goods, the Union suspends, from 20 June 2018, the application to the trade of the United States of import duty concessions under the GATT 1994 in respect of the products listed in Annex I and Annex II, so as to allow for an application of additional customs duties on the importation of these products originating in the United States.

Article 2
The application of additional customs duties on these products, through a subsequent Commission implementing act, shall be effected within the following parameters, and take into account any subsequent exclusion of certain products or companies from the safeguard measures by the United States:
(a)
At the first stage, additionalad valoremduty of a maximum rate of 25 % may be applied on imports of products listed in Annex I from 20 June 2018.
(b)
At the second stage, further additionalad valoremduty of a maximum rate of 10 %, 25 %, 35 % or 50 % may be applied on imports of products listed in Annex II:
—
from 23 March 2021, or
—
from the fifth day following the date of the adoption by, or notification to, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of a ruling that the United States’ safeguard measures are inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, if that is earlier. In the latter event, the Commission shall publish in theOfficial Journal of the European Uniona notice indicating the date on which such ruling is adopted or notified.

Article 3
The suspension provided for in Article 1 may be exercised as long as, and to the extent that, the United States applies or re-applies its safeguard measures in a manner that would affect products from the Union. The Commission shall publish in theOfficial Journal of the European Uniona notice indicating the date on which the United States has ceased to apply its safeguard measures.

Article 4
1. Products listed in the Annexes for which an import licence with an exemption from or a reduction of duty has been issued prior to the date of entry into force of this regulation shall not be subject to additional duty.
2. Products listed in the Annexes for which the importers can prove that they have been exported from the United States to the Union prior to the date on which an additional duty is applied with respect to that product shall not be subject to the additional duty.

Article 5
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 concerning the exercise of the Union’s rights for the application and enforcement of international trade rules(1), and in particular Article 4(1) thereof,
(1) On 8 March 2018 the United States of America (‘United States’) adopted safeguard measures in the form of a tariff increase on imports of certain steel and aluminium products, effective from 23 March 2018 and with an unlimited duration. On 22 March the effective date of the tariff increase with respect to the European Union was deferred to 1 May 2018.
(2) Notwithstanding the United States’ characterisation of these measures as security measures, they are in essence safeguard measures. They consist of remedial action that disturbs the balance of concessions and obligations resulting from the World Trade Organisation (‘WTO’) Agreement and restricts imports for the purpose of protecting domestic industry against foreign competition, for the sake of that industry’s commercial prosperity. The security exceptions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (‘GATT 1994’) do not apply to or justify such safeguard measures, and have no bearing on the right of rebalancing under the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement.
(3) The WTO Agreement on Safeguards provides for the right of any exporting Member affected by a safeguard measure to suspend the application of substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations to the trade of the WTO Member applying the safeguard measure, provided that no satisfactory solution is reached in consultations and the WTO Council for Trade in Goods does not disapprove.
(4) Consultations between the United States and the Union as envisaged in Articles 8 and 12.3 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards did not reach any satisfactory solution(2).
(5) The suspension by the Union of substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations should take effect following the expiration of 30 days after its notification to the Council for Trade in Goods, unless the Council for Trade in Goods disapproves. The WTO Agreement allows for the right of suspension to be exercised (a) immediately, provided that the safeguard measure has not been taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports, or does not conform to the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement; or (b) after the expiry of a period of three years as from the application of the safeguard measure.
(6) The Commission exercises the right to suspend the application of substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations with the intention of rebalancing concessions or other obligations in the trade relations with third countries, on the basis of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 654/2014. The appropriate action takes the form of commercial policy measures which may consist of, inter alia, the suspension of tariff concessions and the imposition of new or increased customs duties.
(7) In designing and selecting appropriate commercial policy measures, the Commission applies objective criteria in accordance with Article 4(2)(c) and Article 4(3) of Regulation (EU) No 654/2014, including as relevant the proportionality of any measures, their potential to provide relief to the Union industries affected by the safeguard measures, and the aim of minimising negative economic impact on the Union, including with regard to essential raw materials.
(8) In accordance with Article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 654/2014, the Commission provided an opportunity for stakeholders to express their views and submit information regarding the Union’s economic interests in this respect(3).
(9) The United States’ safeguard measures are capable of having a considerable negative economic impact on the Union industries concerned. They would significantly limit Union exports of the steel and aluminium products concerned to the United States. The affected Union imports of the relevant steel and aluminium products into the United States are worth at least EUR 6,41 billion in 2017 (of which EUR 5,30 billion is total steel imports and EUR 1,11 billion is total aluminium imports).
(10) Therefore, a suspension of trade concessions on certain products up to a level which reflects and does not exceed the amount that would result from the application of the United States’ duties to the imports of the steel and aluminium products from the Union into the United States represents an appropriate suspension of the application of substantially equivalent trade concessions in line with the WTO Agreement on Safeguards.
(11) Subsequently, with a separate implementing act, the Commission may decide to implement the suspension of the application of trade concessions, if necessary or to the extent necessary, through the application of additional customs duties on certain products originating in the United States imported into the Union. The Commission should decide on the scope of the application, and reflecting the timing requirements described in recital (5), depending on whether the United States excludes certain products or companies from the safeguard measures.
(12) Reflecting the timing requirements described in recital (5), the additional customs duties should apply, if necessary or to the extent necessary, in two stages. At the first stage,ad valoremduties of a maximum rate of 25 % on imports of the products listed in Annex I, may be applied immediately and until the United States ceases to apply its safeguard measures to products from the Union.
(13) The total amount ofad valoremduties at the first stage reflects the United States’ tariff increase of 25 % on imports of ‘carbon and alloy flat products’ and ‘carbon and alloy long products’(4)from the Union into the United States (EUR 2,83 billion total value of Union imports into the United States in 2017). These are the steel products for which the United States’ safeguard measures have not been taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports.
(14) At the second stage, further additionalad valoremduties of a maximum rate of 10 %, 25 %, 35 % and 50 % on imports of the products listed in Annex II, may be applied as from 23 March 2021 or upon the adoption by, or notification to, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of a ruling that the United States’ safeguard measures are inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, if that is earlier, until the United States’ safeguard measures cease to apply.
(15) The total amount ofad valoremduties at the second stage reflects the United States’ tariff increase of 10 % on imports of the aluminium products(5)and of 25 % on imports of ‘carbon and alloy pipe and tube products’, ‘carbon and alloy semi-finished products’ and ‘stainless steel products’(6)from the Union into the United States (EUR 3,58 billion total value of Union imports into the United States in 2017 of which EUR 2,47 billion is steel imports and EUR 1,11 billion is aluminium imports). These are the products for which there appears to have been an absolute increase in imports.
(16) The commercial policy measures and the products concerned have been selected in accordance with the criteria of Article 4(2)(c) and (3) of Regulation (EU) No 654/2014.
(17) By not exceeding the value of the Union imports affected by the United States’ safeguard measures as described in recitals (9) and (10), the commercial policy measures are proportionate to the effect of the United States’ safeguard measures and not excessive. It is also noted that only a fraction of the total value available will be initially exercised, as described in recitals (12) and (13).
(18) The commercial policy measures should provide some relief to the steel and aluminium Union industries affected by the United States’ safeguard measures.
(19) The commercial policy measures should apply to imports of products originating in the United States on which the Union is not substantially dependent for its supply. The commercial policy measures may also apply with respect to the steel and aluminium sectors. This approach avoids as much as possible a negative impact on the various actors on the Union market, including consumers.
(20) Products for which an import licence with an exemption from or a reduction of duty has been issued prior to the date entry into force of this regulation should not be subject to these additional customs duties.
(21) Products for which the importers can prove that they have been exported from the United States to the Union prior to the date of application of the additional customs duties should not be subject to the additional customs duties.
(22) This Regulation is without prejudice to the question of the consistency of the United States’ safeguard measures with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement.
(23) In light of the applicable WTO time limits and the preliminary nature of this act, it is appropriate that it should enter into force on the day on which it is published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.
(24) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Trade Barriers Committee, established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1843 of the European Parliament and of the Council(7),
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
The Commission shall immediately, and in any event no later than 18 May 2018, give written notice to the WTO Council for Trade in Goods that, absent disapproval by the Council for Trade in Goods, the Union suspends, from 20 June 2018, the application to the trade of the United States of import duty concessions under the GATT 1994 in respect of the products listed in Annex I and Annex II, so as to allow for an application of additional customs duties on the importation of these products originating in the United States.
The application of additional customs duties on these products, through a subsequent Commission implementing act, shall be effected within the following parameters, and take into account any subsequent exclusion of certain products or companies from the safeguard measures by the United States:
(a)
At the first stage, additionalad valoremduty of a maximum rate of 25 % may be applied on imports of products listed in Annex I from 20 June 2018.
(b)
At the second stage, further additionalad valoremduty of a maximum rate of 10 %, 25 %, 35 % or 50 % may be applied on imports of products listed in Annex II:
—
from 23 March 2021, or
—
from the fifth day following the date of the adoption by, or notification to, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of a ruling that the United States’ safeguard measures are inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, if that is earlier. In the latter event, the Commission shall publish in theOfficial Journal of the European Uniona notice indicating the date on which such ruling is adopted or notified.
The suspension provided for in Article 1 may be exercised as long as, and to the extent that, the United States applies or re-applies its safeguard measures in a manner that would affect products from the Union. The Commission shall publish in theOfficial Journal of the European Uniona notice indicating the date on which the United States has ceased to apply its safeguard measures.
1. Products listed in the Annexes for which an import licence with an exemption from or a reduction of duty has been issued prior to the date of entry into force of this regulation shall not be subject to additional duty.
2. Products listed in the Annexes for which the importers can prove that they have been exported from the United States to the Union prior to the date on which an additional duty is applied with respect to that product shall not be subject to the additional duty.
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.

Products that may be subject to additional duties from 20 June 2018

ANNEX I
CN 2018(1) | Additional duty
0710 40 00 | 25 %
0711 90 30 | 25 %
0713 33 90 | 25 %
1005 90 00 | 25 %
1006 30 21 | 25 %
1006 30 23 | 25 %
1006 30 25 | 25 %
1006 30 27 | 25 %
1006 30 42 | 25 %
1006 30 44 | 25 %
1006 30 46 | 25 %
1006 30 48 | 25 %
1006 30 61 | 25 %
1006 30 63 | 25 %
1006 30 65 | 25 %
1006 30 67 | 25 %
1006 30 92 | 25 %
1006 30 94 | 25 %
1006 30 96 | 25 %
1006 30 98 | 25 %
1006 40 00 | 25 %
1904 10 30 | 25 %
1904 90 10 | 25 %
2001 90 30 | 25 %
2004 90 10 | 25 %
2005 80 00 | 25 %
2008 11 10 | 25 %
2009 12 00 | 25 %
2009 19 11 | 25 %
2009 19 19 | 25 %
2009 19 91 | 25 %
2009 19 98 | 25 %
2009 81 11 | 25 %
2009 81 19 | 25 %
2009 81 31 | 25 %
2009 81 59 | 25 %
2009 81 95 | 25 %
2009 81 99 | 25 %
2208 30 11 | 25 %
2208 30 19 | 25 %
2208 30 82 | 25 %
2208 30 88 | 25 %
2402 10 00 | 25 %
2402 20 10 | 25 %
2402 20 90 | 25 %
2402 90 00 | 25 %
2403 11 00 | 25 %
2403 19 10 | 25 %
2403 19 90 | 25 %
2403 91 00 | 25 %
2403 99 10 | 25 %
2403 99 90 | 25 %
3304 20 00 | 25 %
3304 30 00 | 25 %
3304 91 00 | 25 %
6109 10 00 | 25 %
6109 90 20 | 25 %
6109 90 90 | 25 %
6203 42 31 | 25 %
6203 42 90 | 25 %
6203 43 11 | 25 %
6204 62 31 | 25 %
6204 62 90 | 25 %
6302 31 00 | 25 %
6403 59 95 | 25 %
7210 12 20 | 25 %
7210 12 80 | 25 %
7219 12 10 | 25 %
7219 12 90 | 25 %
7219 13 10 | 25 %
7219 13 90 | 25 %
7219 32 10 | 25 %
7219 32 90 | 25 %
7219 33 10 | 25 %
7219 33 90 | 25 %
7219 34 10 | 25 %
7219 34 90 | 25 %
7219 35 90 | 25 %
7222 20 11 | 25 %
7222 20 21 | 25 %
7222 20 29 | 25 %
7222 20 31 | 25 %
7222 20 81 | 25 %
7222 20 89 | 25 %
7222 40 10 | 25 %
7222 40 50 | 25 %
7222 40 90 | 25 %
7223 00 11 | 25 %
7223 00 19 | 25 %
7223 00 91 | 25 %
7226 92 00 | 25 %
7228 30 20 | 25 %
7228 30 41 | 25 %
7228 30 49 | 25 %
7228 30 61 | 25 %
7228 30 69 | 25 %
7228 30 70 | 25 %
7228 30 89 | 25 %
7228 50 20 | 25 %
7228 50 40 | 25 %
7228 50 69 | 25 %
7228 50 80 | 25 %
7229 90 20 | 25 %
7229 90 50 | 25 %
7229 90 90 | 25 %
7301 20 00 | 25 %
7304 31 20 | 25 %
7304 31 80 | 25 %
7304 41 00 | 25 %
7306 30 11 | 25 %
7306 30 19 | 25 %
7306 30 41 | 25 %
7306 30 49 | 25 %
7306 30 72 | 25 %
7306 30 77 | 25 %
7306 30 80 | 25 %
7306 40 20 | 25 %
7306 40 80 | 25 %
7307 11 10 | 25 %
7307 11 90 | 25 %
7307 19 10 | 25 %
7307 19 90 | 25 %
7308 30 00 | 25 %
7308 40 00 | 25 %
7308 90 51 | 25 %
7308 90 59 | 25 %
7308 90 98 | 25 %
7309 00 10 | 25 %
7309 00 51 | 25 %
7309 00 59 | 25 %
7310 29 10 | 25 %
7310 29 90 | 25 %
7311 00 13 | 25 %
7311 00 19 | 25 %
7311 00 99 | 25 %
7314 14 00 | 25 %
7314 19 00 | 25 %
7314 49 00 | 25 %
7315 11 10 | 25 %
7315 11 90 | 25 %
7315 12 00 | 25 %
7315 19 00 | 25 %
7315 89 00 | 25 %
7315 90 00 | 25 %
7318 14 10 | 25 %
7318 14 91 | 25 %
7318 14 99 | 25 %
7318 16 40 | 25 %
7318 16 60 | 25 %
7318 16 92 | 25 %
7318 16 99 | 25 %
7321 11 10 | 25 %
7321 11 90 | 25 %
7322 90 00 | 25 %
7323 93 00 | 25 %
7323 99 00 | 25 %
7324 10 00 | 25 %
7325 10 00 | 25 %
7325 99 10 | 25 %
7325 99 90 | 25 %
7326 90 30 | 25 %
7326 90 40 | 25 %
7326 90 50 | 25 %
7326 90 60 | 25 %
7326 90 92 | 25 %
7326 90 96 | 25 %
7606 11 10 | 25 %
7606 11 91 | 25 %
7606 12 20 | 25 %
7606 12 92 | 25 %
7606 12 93 | 25 %
8711 40 00 | 25 %
8711 50 00 | 25 %
8903 91 10 | 25 %
8903 91 90 | 25 %
8903 92 10 | 25 %
8903 92 91 | 25 %
8903 92 99 | 25 %
8903 99 10 | 25 %
8903 99 91 | 25 %
8903 99 99 | 25 %
9504 40 00 | 25 %
(1) The nomenclature codes are taken from the Combined Nomenclature as defined in Article 1(2) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (OJ L 256, 7.9.1987, p. 1) and as set out in Annex I thereto, which are valid at the time of publication of this Regulation and mutatis mutandis as amended by subsequent legislation, including most recently Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1925 of 12 October 2017 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (OJ L 282, 31.10.2017, p. 1).

Products that may be subject to further additional duties from 23 March 2021 or upon determination of WTO inconsistency of the US safeguard measures

ANNEX II
CN 2018(1) | Additional duty
2008 93 11 | 25 %
2008 93 19 | 25 %
2008 93 29 | 25 %
2008 93 91 | 25 %
2008 93 93 | 25 %
2008 93 99 | 25 %
2208 30 11 | 25 %
2208 30 19 | 25 %
2208 30 82 | 25 %
2208 30 88 | 25 %
3301 12 10 | 10 %
3301 13 10 | 10 %
3301 90 10 | 10 %
3301 90 30 | 10 %
3301 90 90 | 10 %
3302 90 10 | 10 %
3302 90 90 | 10 %
3304 10 00 | 10 %
3305 30 00 | 10 %
4818 20 10 | 25 %
4818 20 91 | 35 %
4818 20 99 | 25 %
4818 30 00 | 25 %
4818 50 00 | 35 %
4818 90 10 | 25 %
4818 90 90 | 35 %
5606 00 91 | 10 %
5606 00 99 | 10 %
5907 00 00 | 10 %
5911 10 00 | 10 %
5911 20 00 | 10 %
5911 31 11 | 10 %
5911 31 19 | 10 %
5911 31 90 | 10 %
5911 32 11 | 10 %
5911 32 19 | 10 %
5911 32 90 | 10 %
6203 42 11 | 50 %
6203 42 33 | 50 %
6203 42 35 | 50 %
6203 42 51 | 50 %
6203 42 59 | 50 %
6203 43 19 | 50 %
6203 43 31 | 50 %
6203 43 39 | 50 %
6203 43 90 | 50 %
6204 62 11 | 50 %
6204 62 33 | 50 %
6204 62 39 | 50 %
6204 62 51 | 50 %
6204 62 59 | 50 %
6205 30 00 | 50 %
6301 30 10 | 50 %
6301 30 90 | 50 %
6402 19 00 | 25 %
6402 99 10 | 50 %
6402 99 31 | 25 %
6402 99 39 | 25 %
6402 99 50 | 25 %
6402 99 91 | 25 %
6402 99 93 | 25 %
6402 99 96 | 25 %
6402 99 98 | 25 %
6403 59 05 | 25 %
6403 59 11 | 25 %
6403 59 31 | 25 %
6403 59 35 | 25 %
6403 59 39 | 25 %
6403 59 50 | 25 %
6403 59 91 | 25 %
6403 59 99 | 25 %
6601 10 00 | 50 %
6911 10 00 | 50 %
6911 90 00 | 50 %
6912 00 21 | 50 %
6912 00 23 | 50 %
6912 00 25 | 50 %
6912 00 29 | 50 %
6912 00 81 | 50 %
6912 00 83 | 50 %
6912 00 85 | 50 %
6912 00 89 | 50 %
6913 10 00 | 50 %
6913 90 10 | 50 %
6913 90 93 | 50 %
6913 90 98 | 50 %
6914 10 00 | 50 %
6914 90 00 | 50 %
7005 21 25 | 25 %
7005 21 30 | 25 %
7005 21 80 | 25 %
7007 19 10 | 10 %
7007 19 20 | 10 %
7007 19 80 | 10 %
7007 21 20 | 10 %
7007 21 80 | 10 %
7007 29 00 | 10 %
7009 10 00 | 25 %
7009 91 00 | 10 %
7013 28 10 | 10 %
7013 28 90 | 10 %
7102 31 00 | 10 %
7113 11 00 | 25 %
7113 19 00 | 25 %
7113 20 00 | 25 %
7228 50 61 | 25 %
7326 90 98 | 10 %
7604 29 90 | 25 %
7606 11 93 | 25 %
7606 11 99 | 25 %
8422 11 00 | 50 %
8450 11 11 | 50 %
8450 11 19 | 50 %
8450 11 90 | 50 %
8450 12 00 | 50 %
8450 19 00 | 50 %
8506 10 11 | 10 %
8506 10 18 | 10 %
8506 10 91 | 10 %
8506 10 98 | 10 %
8506 90 00 | 10 %
8543 70 01 | 50 %
8543 70 02 | 50 %
8543 70 03 | 50 %
8543 70 04 | 50 %
8543 70 05 | 50 %
8543 70 06 | 50 %
8543 70 07 | 50 %
8543 70 08 | 50 %
8543 70 09 | 50 %
8543 70 10 | 50 %
8543 70 30 | 50 %
8543 70 50 | 50 %
8543 70 60 | 50 %
8543 70 90 | 25 %
8704 21 10 | 10 %
8704 21 31 | 10 %
8704 21 39 | 10 %
8704 21 91 | 10 %
8704 21 99 | 10 %
8711 40 00 | 25 %
8711 50 00 | 25 %
8901 90 10 | 50 %
8901 90 90 | 50 %
8902 00 10 | 50 %
8902 00 90 | 50 %
8903 10 10 | 10 %
8903 10 90 | 10 %
8903 92 91 | 25 %
8903 92 99 | 25 %
9401 61 00 | 50 %
9401 69 00 | 50 %
9401 71 00 | 50 %
9401 79 00 | 50 %
9401 80 00 | 50 %
9404 90 10 | 25 %
9404 90 90 | 25 %
9405 99 00 | 25 %
(1) The nomenclature codes are taken from the Combined Nomenclature as defined in Article 1(2) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (OJ L 256, 7.9.1987, p. 1) and as set out in Annex I thereto, which are valid at the time of publication of this Regulation and mutatis mutandis as amended by subsequent legislation, including most recently Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1925 of 12 October 2017 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff (OJ L 282, 31.10.2017, p. 1).

Pending: 32018R0607

January 16, 2026
20.4.2018 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 101/40
(1) By Regulation (EC) No 1796/1999(2), the Council imposed an anti-dumping duty on imports of steel ropes and cables originating in the People's Republic of China (‘PRC’), Hungary, India, Mexico, Poland, South Africa and Ukraine. Those measures will hereinafter be referred to as ‘the original measures’ and the investigation that led to the measures imposed by Regulation (EC) No 1796/1999 will hereinafter be referred to as ‘the original investigation’.
(2) Thereafter, it was found that circumvention of the original measures concerning imports from Ukraine and the PRC took place via respectively Moldova and via Morocco following investigations pursuant to Article 13 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96(3). Consequently, by Regulation (EC) No 760/2004(4), the Council extended the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed on imports of steel ropes and cables originating in the Ukraine to imports of the same products consigned from Moldova. Similarly, the anti-dumping duty imposed on imports of steel ropes and cables originating in the PRC was extended, by Council Regulation (EC) No 1886/2004(5), to imports of the same products consigned from Morocco.
(3) By Regulation (EC) No 1858/2005(6), the Council, following an expiry review in accordance with Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96, maintained the original measures imposed on imports of steel ropes and cables originating in the PRC, India, South Africa and Ukraine. The measures applicable to imports originating in Mexico expired on 18 August 2004(7). As Hungary and Poland became members of the European Union on 1 May 2004, the measures were terminated on that date.
(4) In May 2010, by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 400/2010(8)the Council extended the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EC) No 1858/2005 on imports of steel ropes and cables, originating in the PRC, to imports of steel ropes and cables, consigned from the Republic of Korea, whether declared as originating in the Republic of Korea or not, as a result of an anti-circumvention investigation in accordance with Article 13 of (‘the basic Regulation’). Certain Korean exporting producers were granted an exemption from the extended duty as they were not found to circumvent the definitive anti-dumping duties.
(5) The measures applicable to imports originating in India expired on 17 November 2010(9).
(6) In January 2012, by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 102/2012(10), the Council, following an expiry review in accordance with Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009(11), maintained the anti-dumping duty regarding the PRC as extended to Morocco and the Republic of Korea and in Ukraine as extended to Moldova. Those measures will hereinafter be referred to as ‘the measures in force’ and the expiry review investigation, concluded by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 102/2012, will be hereinafter referred to as ‘the previous expiry review’.
(7) By the same regulation the Council also terminated the proceeding with regard to South Africa. The measures applicable to imports originating in South Africa expired on 9 February 2012.
(8) Following the publication of a notice of impending expiry(12)the Commission received a request for review pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation (‘request for review’).
(9) The request for review was lodged on 7 November 2016 by the Liaison Committee of E.U. Wire Rope Industries (‘the applicant’) on behalf of producers representing more than 25 % of the total Union production of steel ropes and cables (‘SRC’). The request was based on the grounds that the expiry of the measures with regard to the PRC would be likely to result in continuation of dumping and recurrence of injury to the Union industry. The applicant did not provide sufficient evidence that the expiry of measures in force against Ukraine would likely result in a continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury.
(10) Having determined, after consulting the Committee established by Article 15(1) of the basic Regulation, that sufficient evidence existed for the initiation of an expiry review, the Commission announced on 8 February 2017, by a notice published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union(13)(‘Notice of initiation’), the initiation of an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation.
(11) In the absence of a duly substantiated request for an expiry review concerning imports of SRC originating in Ukraine, the Commission gave notice that the anti-dumping measure with regard to Ukraine would expire. Consequently, the anti-dumping duty imposed on imports of steel ropes and cables originating in Ukraine expired on 10 February 2017(14).
(12) The investigation of continuation or recurrence of dumping covered the period from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2016 (‘review investigation period’ or ‘RIP’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of the likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2013 to the end of the review investigation period – 31 December 2016 (‘the period considered’).
(13) In the Notice of initiation, the Commission invited all interested parties to participate in the investigation. In addition, the Commission officially advised the applicant, the other known Union producers, the exporting producers in the PRC, importers/users which were known to be concerned, as well as the authorities of the PRC the initiation of the expiry review.
(14) All interested parties were invited to make their views known, submit information and provide supporting evidence within the time-limits set out in the Notice of initiation. Interested parties were also granted the opportunity to request in writing a hearing by the Commission investigation services and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings.
(15) In its Notice of initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the interested parties in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.
(16) In view of the apparent large number of exporting producers in the PRC, sampling was envisaged in the Notice of initiation.
(17) To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked the 21 known exporting producers in the PRC to provide the information specified in the Notice of initiation. The information requested included production volume and production capacity. In addition, the Commission requested the Mission of the PRC to the European Union to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation.
(18) Only one group of exporting producers replied that it was willing to cooperate. That group, while covering 100 % of all SRC exports from the PRC to the Union, only accounted for less than 2 % of total SRC Chinese production. Given that only one group of exporting producers was willing to cooperate, it was not necessary to apply sampling.
(19) In the Notice of initiation, the Commission stated that it had provisionally selected a sample of Union producers. Pursuant to Article 17 of the basic Regulation, the sample was selected on the basis of sales volume of the like product. The sample consisted of six Union producers. The sampled Union producers accounted for 50,5 % of the total Union industry's production during the RIP. The Commission invited interested parties to comment on the provisional sample. No comments were received within the deadline and the provisional sample was thus confirmed. The sample was considered representative for the Union industry.
(20) In order to enable the Commission to decide whether sampling is necessary and, if so, to select a sample, all unrelated importers or representatives acting on their behalf, were invited to participate in this investigation. Those parties were requested to make themselves known by providing the Commission with the information on their company(ies) requested in Annex II of the Notice of initiation.
(21) In addition, 44 importers identified in the review request were contacted by the Commission at initiation stage and were invited to explain their activity and to fill in the above mentioned Annex.
(22) Only seven importers came forward, but according to their replies six of them did not import SRC during the RIP. Therefore, no sampling was necessary.
(23) The Commission sent questionnaires to the cooperating group of exporting producers that replied to the sampling form, the six sampled Union producers, one importer, ten users that made themselves known following the initiation of the investigation and 50 known producers in potential market economy third countries (Canada, India, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine and the United States of America (‘USA’ or ‘US’)).
(24) The group of exporting producers and five Union producers submitted a questionnaire reply. No importer and none of the users provided a questionnaire reply.
(25) Two market economy third country producers provided a questionnaire reply, one located in Turkey and one in the USA.
(26) The Commission sought and verified all the information deemed necessary for the determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury and Union interest. Verification visits pursuant to Article 16 of the basic Regulation were carried out at the premises of the following companies:Union producers—Bridon International Ltd, Doncaster, United Kingdom—Casar Drahtseilwerk Saar GmbH, Kirkel, Germany—Drumet Liny i Druty sp z o.o., Wloclawek, Poland—Gustav Wolf GmbH, Guetersloh, Germany—Redaelli Tecna Spa, Milano, ItalyExporting producer in the PRC—Fasten Group Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd, Jiangyin City, Wuxi, Jiangsu ProvinceProducer in the market economy third country—WireCo World Group, Prairie Village, KS, USA. Union producers—Bridon International Ltd, Doncaster, United Kingdom—Casar Drahtseilwerk Saar GmbH, Kirkel, Germany—Drumet Liny i Druty sp z o.o., Wloclawek, Poland—Gustav Wolf GmbH, Guetersloh, Germany—Redaelli Tecna Spa, Milano, Italy — Bridon International Ltd, Doncaster, United Kingdom — Casar Drahtseilwerk Saar GmbH, Kirkel, Germany — Drumet Liny i Druty sp z o.o., Wloclawek, Poland — Gustav Wolf GmbH, Guetersloh, Germany — Redaelli Tecna Spa, Milano, Italy Exporting producer in the PRC—Fasten Group Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd, Jiangyin City, Wuxi, Jiangsu Province — Fasten Group Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd, Jiangyin City, Wuxi, Jiangsu Province Producer in the market economy third country—WireCo World Group, Prairie Village, KS, USA. — WireCo World Group, Prairie Village, KS, USA.
Union producers—Bridon International Ltd, Doncaster, United Kingdom—Casar Drahtseilwerk Saar GmbH, Kirkel, Germany—Drumet Liny i Druty sp z o.o., Wloclawek, Poland—Gustav Wolf GmbH, Guetersloh, Germany—Redaelli Tecna Spa, Milano, Italy — Bridon International Ltd, Doncaster, United Kingdom — Casar Drahtseilwerk Saar GmbH, Kirkel, Germany — Drumet Liny i Druty sp z o.o., Wloclawek, Poland — Gustav Wolf GmbH, Guetersloh, Germany — Redaelli Tecna Spa, Milano, Italy
— Bridon International Ltd, Doncaster, United Kingdom
— Casar Drahtseilwerk Saar GmbH, Kirkel, Germany
— Drumet Liny i Druty sp z o.o., Wloclawek, Poland
— Gustav Wolf GmbH, Guetersloh, Germany
— Redaelli Tecna Spa, Milano, Italy
Exporting producer in the PRC—Fasten Group Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd, Jiangyin City, Wuxi, Jiangsu Province — Fasten Group Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd, Jiangyin City, Wuxi, Jiangsu Province
— Fasten Group Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd, Jiangyin City, Wuxi, Jiangsu Province
Producer in the market economy third country—WireCo World Group, Prairie Village, KS, USA. — WireCo World Group, Prairie Village, KS, USA.
— WireCo World Group, Prairie Village, KS, USA.
Union producers—Bridon International Ltd, Doncaster, United Kingdom—Casar Drahtseilwerk Saar GmbH, Kirkel, Germany—Drumet Liny i Druty sp z o.o., Wloclawek, Poland—Gustav Wolf GmbH, Guetersloh, Germany—Redaelli Tecna Spa, Milano, Italy — Bridon International Ltd, Doncaster, United Kingdom — Casar Drahtseilwerk Saar GmbH, Kirkel, Germany — Drumet Liny i Druty sp z o.o., Wloclawek, Poland — Gustav Wolf GmbH, Guetersloh, Germany — Redaelli Tecna Spa, Milano, Italy
— Bridon International Ltd, Doncaster, United Kingdom
— Casar Drahtseilwerk Saar GmbH, Kirkel, Germany
— Drumet Liny i Druty sp z o.o., Wloclawek, Poland
— Gustav Wolf GmbH, Guetersloh, Germany
— Redaelli Tecna Spa, Milano, Italy
— Bridon International Ltd, Doncaster, United Kingdom
— Casar Drahtseilwerk Saar GmbH, Kirkel, Germany
— Drumet Liny i Druty sp z o.o., Wloclawek, Poland
— Gustav Wolf GmbH, Guetersloh, Germany
— Redaelli Tecna Spa, Milano, Italy
Exporting producer in the PRC—Fasten Group Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd, Jiangyin City, Wuxi, Jiangsu Province — Fasten Group Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd, Jiangyin City, Wuxi, Jiangsu Province
— Fasten Group Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd, Jiangyin City, Wuxi, Jiangsu Province
— Fasten Group Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd, Jiangyin City, Wuxi, Jiangsu Province
Producer in the market economy third country—WireCo World Group, Prairie Village, KS, USA. — WireCo World Group, Prairie Village, KS, USA.
— WireCo World Group, Prairie Village, KS, USA.
— WireCo World Group, Prairie Village, KS, USA.
(27) The product subject to this review is steel ropes and cables including locked coil ropes, excluding ropes and cables of stainless steel, with a maximum cross-sectional dimension exceeding 3 mm originating in the PRC (‘SRC’ or ‘product under review’), currently falling within CN codes ex 7312 10 81, ex 7312 10 83, ex 7312 10 85, ex 7312 10 89 and ex 7312 10 98.
(28) SRC produced in the PRC and exported to the Union, SRC produced and sold on the domestic market of the market economy third country USA, and SRC produced and sold in the Union by the Union producers have the same end uses, basic physical and technical characteristics and are therefore considered to be like products within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation.
(29) In accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the expiry of the measures in force would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of dumping from the PRC.
(30) In accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the expiry of the measures in force would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of dumping from the PRC.
(31) As indicated in recital 18, only one group of exporting producers accounting for less than 2 % of total production of SRC in the PRC cooperated in this investigation. That group is composed of seven related companies involved in the production and sale of SRC. Since that group covered 100 % of SRC exports from the PRC to the Union during the RIP, the Commission considered that it has sufficient information to assess the export price and the dumping margin during the RIP (section 3.2).
(32) However, the data provided by the sole cooperating group of exporting producers with regard to export sales to other third countries, was found to be deficient: four companies related to the group and involved in the production and sale of SRC had not provided a separate questionnaire reply as required. By failing to reply as required they did not provide any information about their export sales to other third countries. Furthermore, one related company from the group, though it had provided a questionnaire reply, failed to report its export sales to other third countries on a product type basis per transaction.
(33) As a result the Commission informed the sole cooperating group of exporting producers that it intended to apply Article 18 of the basic Regulation with regard to export sales to third countries and that group was given an opportunity to comment in accordance with Article 18(4) of that Regulation.
(34) In its comments, the cooperating group of exporting producers did not deny that it had failed to provide a questionnaire reply for its four related companies. However, it claimed that it was unreasonable to request export sales information to third countries on Product Control Number (‘PCN’) per transaction basis. That argument cannot be accepted. The requested information was considered necessary because, in order to predict future behaviour of producers in the PRC, should the measures expire, it is important to have precise and full knowledge of their current behaviour when exporting SCR to other third countries. When, as in this case, a party does not make its best effort to provide the full set of data requested but provides only part of it, which in addition is not sufficiently detailed and cannot be verified, such partial information cannot be regarded as sufficiently precise and complete to enable the Commission to properly assess, in full knowledge, the behaviour of the Chinese producers when exporting SRC to other third countries.
(35) The findings in section 3.3.2 were thus based on facts available. For that purpose, the information provided by the sole cooperating group of exporting producers except for sales to third countries, the request for the expiry review, the submission made by the applicants, on information from the Chinese Export Statistics(15)(‘PRC database’), on information from the World Bank and on other publicly available information in order to establish a full picture of anti-dumping measures in place in other important third countries markets for SRC as explained in recital 68 were used.
(36) Dumping during the RIP for exports from the PRC was established on the information provided by the sole cooperating group of exporting producers that represented the totality of the exports of SRC from the PRC to the Union during the RIP (see recital 18).
(37) None of the exporting producers from the PRC was granted market economy treatment in the original investigation. According to Article 2(7)(a) and (b) of the basic Regulation, normal value for all exporting producers is therefore to be determined on the basis of the price or constructed value in a market economy third country. For that purpose, a market economy third country had to be selected.
(38) In the Notice of initiation the Commission envisaged using Turkey as a market economy third country. The Notice of initiation also indicated that there may be production of the like product in other market economy third countries such as Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia. The Commission invited all interested parties to comment on the choice of a market economy third country for the purpose of establishing normal value in respect of the PRC. No comments were received in the timeframe specified in the Notice of initiation.
(39) As indicated in the Notice of initiation the Commission examined whether there was production and sales of the like product in those market economy third countries for which there were indications that production is taking place. In addition, based on information of the request for review and statistical information available (Eurostat), the Commission identified other potential market economy third countries: Canada, India, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine and the USA. The Commission identified 50 potential producers in those countries which were contacted and invited to provide the necessary information.
(40) However, only one producer in Turkey and one in the USA came forward and provided the information requested.
(41) In total, there were 15 potential producers of the like product in the USA. The US market was also found to be an open market with significant import and export volumes of SRC during the RIP. There were no import duties or anti-dumping/countervailing duties on imports in force on imports of SRC in the USA. The production volume of the cooperating producer in the US was substantial in comparison to the estimated total production in the USA (accounting for approximately 15 % to 25 % of the total estimated US domestic production).
(42) It was therefore considered that the USA was an open and large market with many domestic producers and imports competing with each other. The degree of competition was found to be higher in the USA than in Turkey. In addition, the data provided by the producer in Turkey was largely deficient and essential elements for the determination of normal value were missing whereas the quality of the reply of the producer in the USA was sufficiently complete to establish a reliable normal value on this basis. Therefore, the Commission selected the USA as an appropriate market economy third country.
(43) Interested parties were given the opportunity to comment on the appropriateness of the selection of the USA as a market economy third country. No comments were received within the deadline.
(44) On that basis the Commission decided to select the USA as market economy third country for this review.
(45) In accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission first examined whether the total volume of sales of the market economy third country producer of the like product in the domestic market was representative during the review investigation period. The sales of the cooperating US producer of the like product were found to be made in representative quantities on the domestic market compared to the product under review exported to the Union by the Chinese exporting producer.
(46) The Commission subsequently examined whether those sales could be considered as made in the ordinary course of trade pursuant to Article 2(4) of the basic Regulation. This was done by establishing the proportion of profitable sales to independent customers. The sales transactions were considered profitable where the unit price was equal or above the cost of production of the US producer during the investigation period.
(47) The Commission identified those product types for which more than 80 % by volume of sales on the domestic market were above cost and the weighted average sales price of that type was equal to or above the unit cost of production. In those cases, normal value, by product type, was calculated as the weighted average of the actual domestic prices of all sales of the type in question, irrespectively of whether those sales were profitable or not. That was the case for about 50 % of the product types exported to the Union.
(48) Where the volume of profitable sales of a product type represented 80 % or less of the total sales volume of that type, normal value was based on the actual domestic price, which was calculated as a weighted average price of only the profitable domestic sales of that type made during the investigation period. That was the case for about 50 % of the product types exported to the EU.
(49) Therefore, for all product types, normal value was established on the domestic sales prices.
(50) Normal value was established on the basis of the prices for sales of SRC of the cooperating producer in the USA in accordance with Article 2(7)(a) and (b) as well as Articles 2(1) to 2(6) of the basic Regulation.
(51) The export price was based on the information provided by the cooperating group of exporting producers from the PRC in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation, namely on the basis of export prices actually paid or payable to the first independent customer in the Union, which was an unrelated importer.
(52) In the absence of matching at the level of the full PCN between the product types exported by the group of cooperating exporting producers and domestic sales in the market economy third country, the normal value was determined on the basis of the domestic price in that market economy third country of the most closely resembling product type. In order to reflect the differences between product types, the normal value determination took into account the characteristics of the product type as defined by the PCN: product category, wire characteristics, type of rope, external diameter and tensile strength. Adjustments were made in the range of 5 % to 15 % so as to take into consideration differences between the product types in accordance with Article 2(10)(a) of the basic Regulation.
(53) The exports from the PRC are subject to a partly refundable export value added tax (VAT) whereas in the USA all taxes pertaining to domestic sales are refunded. Therefore, the Commission made an adjustment under Article 2(10)(b) of the basic Regulation for the difference in VAT between export sales from the PRC to the Union (where 17 % VAT is charged on export and 5 % of it is then refunded) to ensure a fair comparison and in line with settled case law(16).
(54) Furthermore, adjustments were also made to the normal value for differences in packaging costs (less than 2 %) and domestic freight (in a range of 2 % to 10 %) under Article 2(10)(e) and (f) of the basic Regulation. Adjustments were also made to the export price for handling and loading (less than 1 %), domestic freight in the PRC (in a range of 1 % to 5 %, ocean freight (in a range of 1 % to 5 %) and insurance (less than 1 %), costs under Article 2(10)(e) of the basic Regulation. Additionally credit costs (less than 1 %) and bank charges (less than 1 %) were also deducted from the export price according to Article 2(10)(g) and (k) of the basic Regulation.
(55) Finally, export sales to the Union were made via related sales companies in China. The Commission did not examine whether for those sales an adjustment would be warranted under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation. The reason being that the purpose of an expiry review is not to establish precise dumping margins, but to establish whether dumping continued during the review investigation period.
(56) The Commission compared the normal value and the export prices, as calculated in recitals 45 to 51 in order to ensure price comparability, for each product type. As provided by Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation, the weighted average normal value of each product type of the like product in the market economy third country was compared with the weighted average export price of the corresponding product type of the product under review.
(57) On that basis, the weighted average dumping margin expressed as a percentage of the CIF (Cost, Insurance, Freight) Union frontier price, duty unpaid, was 16,7 %.
(58) Further to the finding of dumping during the review investigation period, the Commission analysed whether there was a likelihood of continuation of dumping should measures be repealed. The following elements were analysed: production, production capacity and spare capacity in the PRC, Chinese export behaviour in other third countries, circumvention practices and the attractiveness of the Union market.
(59) The sole cooperating group of exporting producers represented less than 3 % of the total production capacity and less than 2 % of the total production of SRC in the PRC. Considering that no other producers of SRC in the PRC cooperated, the examination of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping in order to assess the development of imports should measures be repealed was based on the information available to the Commission, that is information provided by the sole cooperating group of exporting producers, the expiry review request, the information from the PRC database, the information from the World Bank and other publicly available information as explained in recital 68 in order to establish a full picture of anti-dumping measures in place in other important markets for SRC.
(60) In the absence of any other information on the file, the Commission based its findings on the expiry review request which contained a study analysing the ‘Supply and Demand-side Developments in the Chinese Steel Wire Rope Industry 2012-2016 as well as in the Near Future’ (‘the study’). Based on that information, the production capacity for SRC in the PRC was estimated at 5,8 million tonnes per year, actual production was estimated at around 4,0 million tonnes per year and, as a result, the spare capacity in the PRC was estimated at around 1,8 million tonnes in 2016, which largely exceeds the total Union consumption of SRC during the RIP as shown in recital 75 by more than 10 times.
(61) The study indicated that the domestic consumption in the PRC amounted to around 3,8 million tonnes per year. The investigation did not bring into light any elements that could indicate any significant increase of domestic demand in China in the near future. The same is true for Chinese exports to other third countries as there is no information available that would indicate any significant increase of demand for SRC worldwide.
(62) Regarding the expiry review request and more specifically the study, it should be noted that the information contained therein was not contested by any interested party. Furthermore, as indicated in recitals 17 and 18, it is also recalled that most of the Chinese exporting producers of SRC did not provide the necessary information as requested and that the sole cooperating group of exporting producers accounting for less than 3 % of the total Chinese production capacity cooperated and provided relevant information as requested.
(63) Therefore, in the absence of any other information, it is considered that neither domestic demand, nor worldwide demand of SRC will be able to absorb the significant spare capacity available in China.
(64) As explained in recitals 32 to 35, the information submitted by the sole cooperating group of exporting producers could not be used to properly assess the export behaviour of Chinese exporting producers to other third countries. Therefore, the Commission had to rely on facts available in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation to assess that behaviour. To do so, the Commission used the PRC database as it was done in the previous expiry review(17).
(65) It should however be noted that, the PRC database covers a broader product scope than the product under review as it also includes stranded wire, ropes and cables of stainless steel and steel ropes and cables with a maximum cross-sectional dimension not exceeding 3 mm. Therefore, no meaningful analysis of quantities exported to other markets could be made on the basis of the information found in the PRC database. Nevertheless, the PRC database could be used for the price analysis. The price analysis is based on reasonable estimations given the similar characteristics of the other products possibly included in the analysis.
(66) On that basis, the Commission found that when comparing Chinese export prices to their five main export markets other than the Union (which are India, South Korea, Thailand, USA and Vietnam), to the normal value established in the market economy third country as described in recitals 45 to 50 the dumping margins ranged from 129 % to 314 % during the RIP. Chinese SRC exports to those five other markets account for an estimated 40 % of total Chinese SRC exports worldwide. On the same basis, the dumping margin for sales to the Union amounted to 97 %.
(67) Therefore, SRC exports to other third countries from the PRC were likely dumped at even higher levels than the export sales to the Union during the RIP. In the absence of any other information, the export price level to other third countries can be seen as an indicator of the likely price level for export sales to the Union should measures be repealed. Given the low price levels to third country markets, it was also concluded that there is a considerable margin to reduce export prices to the Union, potentially resulting in increased dumping.
(68) Furthermore, according to publicly available data(18), anti-dumping measures on imports of SRC originating in the PRC are also in force in Turkey(19), Mexico(20)and Brazil(21). Colombia recently initiated an anti-dumping investigation on imports of SRC originating in China(22)and in December 2017 provisional anti-dumping measures of 15 % were imposed. That clearly indicates that SRC from Chinese exporting producers have also been exported to other markets at dumped prices. It also indicates that Chinese SRC exports to those markets are or will be restricted and that Chinese SRC exporting producers have to find alternative markets for their spare capacity.
(69) On the basis of the available information, as explained in recital 66, it was found that exporting producers from the PRC can achieve higher prices in the Union market than in other third countries. According to the PRC database, in the RIP the average FOB (free on board) export price to the Union was EUR 1 688/tonne while it amounted on average to only EUR 1 191/tonne when destined to the five main third country markets. Therefore, Chinese export prices to third countries were around 30 % lower than export prices to the Union (not taking into account anti-dumping duties paid in the Union market). That indicates that the Union market is an attractive market given that Chinese exporting producers can generate higher profits on sales to the Union than on their sales to other export markets.
(70) In conclusion, the dumping margin established in the RIP, the significant spare capacity available in the PRC, the established attractiveness of the Union market and the export behaviour in other third countries, indicate that a repeal of the measures would likely result in a continuation of dumping, and that dumped exports will enter the Union market in significant quantities. It is therefore considered that there is a likelihood of continuation of dumping should the current anti-dumping measures be allowed to lapse.
(71) Within the Union, SRC were manufactured by over 22 producers/producer groups during the RIP. They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Articles 4(1) and 5(4) of the basic Regulation.
(72) Total Union production during the RIP was established at 168 701 tonnes on the basis of the review request, additional data provided by the applicant and the questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.
(73) As indicated in recital 19, a sample consisting of six producers/producer groups was selected. The Commission received and verified questionnaire replies from five Union producers. The five producers represented 43 % of the total Union production during the RIP. The sample was therefore regarded as sufficiently representative for the Union industry.
(74) Union consumption was established on the basis of sales volume of the Union industry in the Union market and the volume of imports from third countries into the Union based on the data reported to the Commission by the Member States in accordance with Article 14(6) of the basic Regulation (‘Article 14(6) database’) and verified data from the cooperating Chinese exporting producer group.
(75) Table 1 sets out how Union consumption developed during the period considered.Table 1Union consumption201320142015RIPTotal consumption (in tonnes)175 589175 675170 454164 446Index (2013 = 100)1001009794Source:Article 14(6) database, verified data. 2013 2014 2015 RIP Total consumption (in tonnes) 175 589 175 675 170 454 164 446 Index (2013 = 100) 100 100 97 94 Source:Article 14(6) database, verified data.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Total consumption (in tonnes) 175 589 175 675 170 454 164 446
Index (2013 = 100) 100 100 97 94
Source:Article 14(6) database, verified data.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Total consumption (in tonnes) 175 589 175 675 170 454 164 446
Index (2013 = 100) 100 100 97 94
Source:Article 14(6) database, verified data.
(76) Union consumption remained stable from 2013 to 2014 and decreased by 6 % from 2014 to the RIP.
(77) The Commission established the volume of imports from the PRC on the basis of the verified questionnaire reply of the cooperating group of exporting producers and the data from Article 14(6) database during the period considered.
(78) On that basis, imports into the Union from the PRC and its market share developed as follows:Table 2Import volume and market share201320142015RIPImports (in tonnes)2 6971 7803 2072 005Index (2013 = 100)1006611974Market share (%)1,51,01,91,2Index (2013 = 100)1006612279Source:Article 14(6) database, verified data. 2013 2014 2015 RIP Imports (in tonnes) 2 697 1 780 3 207 2 005 Index (2013 = 100) 100 66 119 74 Market share (%) 1,5 1,0 1,9 1,2 Index (2013 = 100) 100 66 122 79 Source:Article 14(6) database, verified data.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Imports (in tonnes) 2 697 1 780 3 207 2 005
Index (2013 = 100) 100 66 119 74
Market share (%) 1,5 1,0 1,9 1,2
Index (2013 = 100) 100 66 122 79
Source:Article 14(6) database, verified data.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Imports (in tonnes) 2 697 1 780 3 207 2 005
Index (2013 = 100) 100 66 119 74
Market share (%) 1,5 1,0 1,9 1,2
Index (2013 = 100) 100 66 122 79
Source:Article 14(6) database, verified data.
(79) During the period considered, the import volume of SRC from the PRC fluctuated from year to year. A drop by 34 % between the years 2013-2014, was followed by an increase of 80 % during the years 2014-2015(23). Finally in the RIP, the volume of imports decreased from 2 697 in 2013 to 2 005 tonnes. Overall, the import volume decreased by 26 % during the period considered.
(80) The market share of imports from the PRC followed a similar trend. Overall, it decreased from 1,5 % to 1,2 % during the period considered.
(81) The Commission established the prices of imports on the basis of the verified questionnaire reply of the cooperating Chinese group of exporting producers and the data from Article 14(6) database during the period considered. The average price of imports into the Union from the PRC developed as follows:Table 3Average price of imports from the PRC201320142015RIPAverage price without duty (EUR/ton)1 7121 3601 6692 474Index (2013 = 100)1007998145Source:Article 14(6) database, verified data. 2013 2014 2015 RIP Average price without duty (EUR/ton) 1 712 1 360 1 669 2 474 Index (2013 = 100) 100 79 98 145 Source:Article 14(6) database, verified data.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Average price without duty (EUR/ton) 1 712 1 360 1 669 2 474
Index (2013 = 100) 100 79 98 145
Source:Article 14(6) database, verified data.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Average price without duty (EUR/ton) 1 712 1 360 1 669 2 474
Index (2013 = 100) 100 79 98 145
Source:Article 14(6) database, verified data.
(82) During the period considered, the average price of the product imported from the PRC fluctuated from year to year. Initially, the prices decreased by 21 % in 2014. In 2015 the prices increased, reaching almost the level of 2013 and increased further in the RIP. Overall, the prices increased by 45 % during the period considered.
(83) The Commission determined the price undercutting during the investigation period by comparing:(a)the weighted average sales prices per product type of the sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers on the Union market, adjusted to an ex-works level; and(b)the corresponding weighted average prices per product type of the imports from the cooperating Chinese group of exporting producers to the first independent customer on the Union market, established on a Cost, Insurance, Freight (CIF) basis. None of the eight product types exported by the sole cooperating group of exporting producers to the Union were sold by the Union industry. In order to have matching, product types were simplified by suppressing the tensile strength(24)and by averaging the price component of differences in diameter(25). By applying this method, a 100 % match was established. (a) the weighted average sales prices per product type of the sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers on the Union market, adjusted to an ex-works level; and (b) the corresponding weighted average prices per product type of the imports from the cooperating Chinese group of exporting producers to the first independent customer on the Union market, established on a Cost, Insurance, Freight (CIF) basis. None of the eight product types exported by the sole cooperating group of exporting producers to the Union were sold by the Union industry. In order to have matching, product types were simplified by suppressing the tensile strength(24)and by averaging the price component of differences in diameter(25). By applying this method, a 100 % match was established.
(a) the weighted average sales prices per product type of the sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers on the Union market, adjusted to an ex-works level; and
(b) the corresponding weighted average prices per product type of the imports from the cooperating Chinese group of exporting producers to the first independent customer on the Union market, established on a Cost, Insurance, Freight (CIF) basis. None of the eight product types exported by the sole cooperating group of exporting producers to the Union were sold by the Union industry. In order to have matching, product types were simplified by suppressing the tensile strength(24)and by averaging the price component of differences in diameter(25). By applying this method, a 100 % match was established.
(a) the weighted average sales prices per product type of the sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers on the Union market, adjusted to an ex-works level; and
(b) the corresponding weighted average prices per product type of the imports from the cooperating Chinese group of exporting producers to the first independent customer on the Union market, established on a Cost, Insurance, Freight (CIF) basis. None of the eight product types exported by the sole cooperating group of exporting producers to the Union were sold by the Union industry. In order to have matching, product types were simplified by suppressing the tensile strength(24)and by averaging the price component of differences in diameter(25). By applying this method, a 100 % match was established.
(84) The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the Union industry's average weighted price during the RIP. The lack of undercutting indicates the effectiveness of the measures. Should the measures be allowed to lapse and the Chinese SRC exporting producers maintain their export prices at a similar level, the undercutting margin could be calculated by deducting the anti-dumping duty from the import price. The thus established undercutting margin would amount to 36,3 %. This is considered to be a reasonable indication of possible future export price levels to the Union should measures be allowed to lapse.
(85) The imports from third countries other than the PRC mainly come from the Republic of Korea, Turkey, Thailand, Russia and Malaysia.
(86) The volume of imports into the Union of those imports is shown in Table 4 as well as their market share and the average prices:Table 4Imports from third countries other than the PRC201320142015RIPImports (in tonnes)63 38165 33663 74763 798Index (2013 = 100)100103101101Market share (%)36,137,237,438,8Average price (EUR/tonne)1 7121 5881 6241 488Index (2013 = 100)100939587Source:Article 14(6) database, verified data. 2013 2014 2015 RIP Imports (in tonnes) 63 381 65 336 63 747 63 798 Index (2013 = 100) 100 103 101 101 Market share (%) 36,1 37,2 37,4 38,8 Average price (EUR/tonne) 1 712 1 588 1 624 1 488 Index (2013 = 100) 100 93 95 87 Source:Article 14(6) database, verified data.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Imports (in tonnes) 63 381 65 336 63 747 63 798
Index (2013 = 100) 100 103 101 101
Market share (%) 36,1 37,2 37,4 38,8
Average price (EUR/tonne) 1 712 1 588 1 624 1 488
Index (2013 = 100) 100 93 95 87
Source:Article 14(6) database, verified data.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Imports (in tonnes) 63 381 65 336 63 747 63 798
Index (2013 = 100) 100 103 101 101
Market share (%) 36,1 37,2 37,4 38,8
Average price (EUR/tonne) 1 712 1 588 1 624 1 488
Index (2013 = 100) 100 93 95 87
Source:Article 14(6) database, verified data.
(87) Overall, the import volume from the other third countries remained fairly stable over the period considered with a slight increase of 1 %.
(88) Since the total Union consumption decreased over the period considered, this increase translated in an increase of their market share from 36,1 % to 38,8 % during this period.
(89) During the period considered, the average price of the product imported from third countries other than the PRC fluctuated from year to year. Initially, the prices decreased by 7 % in 2014. In 2015 the prices increased by 2 %, to decrease again by 8 % during the RIP. Overall, the prices decreased by 13 % during the period considered.
(90) The Republic of Korea has the second largest market share in the Union market after the Union industry during the period considered.
(91) As mentioned in recital 4, circumvention of the original measures on imports of SRC from the PRC took place via the Republic of Korea. Consequently, in 2010, the anti-dumping duty imposed on imports originating in the PRC was extended to imports of the same product consigned from the Republic of Korea, with the exception of those produced by 15 genuine Korean exporting producers.
(92) Practically all imports of SRC from the Republic of Korea into the Union during the RIP were coming from the exporting producers exempted from the extended anti-dumping duty, namely 99,98 % of all Korean imports.
(93) Table 5 sets out how the volume, market share and average prices of Korean imports into the Union developed during the period considered:Table 5Import volume, market share and average price from Korea201320142015RIPImports (in tonnes)36 80034 15730 27432 928Index (2013 = 100)100938289Market share (%)21,019,417,820,0Index (2013 = 100)100938596Average price (EUR/tonne)1 5591 6211 6461 506Index (2013 = 100)10010410697Source:Article 14(6) database. 2013 2014 2015 RIP Imports (in tonnes) 36 800 34 157 30 274 32 928 Index (2013 = 100) 100 93 82 89 Market share (%) 21,0 19,4 17,8 20,0 Index (2013 = 100) 100 93 85 96 Average price (EUR/tonne) 1 559 1 621 1 646 1 506 Index (2013 = 100) 100 104 106 97 Source:Article 14(6) database.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Imports (in tonnes) 36 800 34 157 30 274 32 928
Index (2013 = 100) 100 93 82 89
Market share (%) 21,0 19,4 17,8 20,0
Index (2013 = 100) 100 93 85 96
Average price (EUR/tonne) 1 559 1 621 1 646 1 506
Index (2013 = 100) 100 104 106 97
Source:Article 14(6) database.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Imports (in tonnes) 36 800 34 157 30 274 32 928
Index (2013 = 100) 100 93 82 89
Market share (%) 21,0 19,4 17,8 20,0
Index (2013 = 100) 100 93 85 96
Average price (EUR/tonne) 1 559 1 621 1 646 1 506
Index (2013 = 100) 100 104 106 97
Source:Article 14(6) database.
(94) Import volume from the Republic of Korea decreased over the period considered by 11 %, at a slightly higher rate than the downward trend of consumption.
(95) Since the decrease rate of imports volume was higher than the decrease rate of the consumption, the market share only slightly decreased from 21,0 % to 20,0 % during the period considered.
(96) The average price of the imports increased from 2013 to 2015 by 6 % and decreased in the RIP by 9 %, representing an overall a decrease of 3 % during the period considered. The average price (CIF, no duty included) was 48 % lower than the average price (EXW) of the Union industry.
(97) Imports originating in or consigned from Morocco were found to be close to zero during the period considered. Hence, no further analysis was deemed necessary.
(98) During the period considered, an anti-dumping duty of 51,8 %, was still in force on imports of SRC originating in Ukraine as extended to imports of the same product consigned from Moldova, whether declared as originating in Moldova or not.
(99) Those measures expired on 10 February 2017, as explained in recital 11.
(100) Imports originating in or consigned from the Ukraine and Moldova were found to be close to zero during the period considered. Hence, no further analysis was deemed necessary for the period considered.
(101) Imports from the remaining third countries were mainly from Turkey, Thailand, Russia and Malaysia. Table 6 sets out how those imports developed:Table 6Imports from other third countries201320142015RIPTurkeyImports (in tonnes)6 8148 6087 5087 028Index (2013 = 100)100126110103Market share (%)3,94,94,44,3Average price (EUR/tonne)1 3841 3221 3281 255Index (2013 = 100)100959691ThailandImports (in tonnes)5 2066 5146 2686 122Index (2013 = 100)100125120118Market share (%)3,03,73,73,7Average price (EUR/tonne)1 4451 3911 6561 468Index (2013 = 100)10096115102RussiaImports (in tonnes)1 6393 5415 0634 838Index (2013 = 100)100216309295Market share (%)0,92,03,02,9Average price (EUR/tonne)1 3411 1501 1351 057Index (2013 = 100)100868579MalaysiaImports (in tonnes)4 5254 3775 9324 530Index (2013 = 100)10097131100Market share (%)2,62,53,52,8Average price (EUR/tonne)1 5521 4161 4371 343Index (2013 = 100)100919387Other countriesImports (in tonnes)8 2578 0618 7018 294Index (2013 = 100)10098105100Market share (%)4,74,65,15,0Average price (EUR/tonne)2 9512 1802 1961 967Index (2013 = 100)10096108100TotalImports (in tonnes)26 44131 10233 47230 812Index (2013 = 100)100118127117Market share (%)15182019Average price (EUR/tonne)1 9121 5521 6051 471Index (2013 = 100)100818477Source:14.6 database. 2013 2014 2015 RIP Turkey Imports (in tonnes) 6 814 8 608 7 508 7 028 Index (2013 = 100) 100 126 110 103 Market share (%) 3,9 4,9 4,4 4,3 Average price (EUR/tonne) 1 384 1 322 1 328 1 255 Index (2013 = 100) 100 95 96 91 Thailand Imports (in tonnes) 5 206 6 514 6 268 6 122 Index (2013 = 100) 100 125 120 118 Market share (%) 3,0 3,7 3,7 3,7 Average price (EUR/tonne) 1 445 1 391 1 656 1 468 Index (2013 = 100) 100 96 115 102 Russia Imports (in tonnes) 1 639 3 541 5 063 4 838 Index (2013 = 100) 100 216 309 295 Market share (%) 0,9 2,0 3,0 2,9 Average price (EUR/tonne) 1 341 1 150 1 135 1 057 Index (2013 = 100) 100 86 85 79 Malaysia Imports (in tonnes) 4 525 4 377 5 932 4 530 Index (2013 = 100) 100 97 131 100 Market share (%) 2,6 2,5 3,5 2,8 Average price (EUR/tonne) 1 552 1 416 1 437 1 343 Index (2013 = 100) 100 91 93 87 Other countries Imports (in tonnes) 8 257 8 061 8 701 8 294 Index (2013 = 100) 100 98 105 100 Market share (%) 4,7 4,6 5,1 5,0 Average price (EUR/tonne) 2 951 2 180 2 196 1 967 Index (2013 = 100) 100 96 108 100 Total Imports (in tonnes) 26 441 31 102 33 472 30 812 Index (2013 = 100) 100 118 127 117 Market share (%) 15 18 20 19 Average price (EUR/tonne) 1 912 1 552 1 605 1 471 Index (2013 = 100) 100 81 84 77 Source:14.6 database.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Turkey
Imports (in tonnes) 6 814 8 608 7 508 7 028
Index (2013 = 100) 100 126 110 103
Market share (%) 3,9 4,9 4,4 4,3
Average price (EUR/tonne) 1 384 1 322 1 328 1 255
Index (2013 = 100) 100 95 96 91
Thailand
Imports (in tonnes) 5 206 6 514 6 268 6 122
Index (2013 = 100) 100 125 120 118
Market share (%) 3,0 3,7 3,7 3,7
Average price (EUR/tonne) 1 445 1 391 1 656 1 468
Index (2013 = 100) 100 96 115 102
Russia
Imports (in tonnes) 1 639 3 541 5 063 4 838
Index (2013 = 100) 100 216 309 295
Market share (%) 0,9 2,0 3,0 2,9
Average price (EUR/tonne) 1 341 1 150 1 135 1 057
Index (2013 = 100) 100 86 85 79
Malaysia
Imports (in tonnes) 4 525 4 377 5 932 4 530
Index (2013 = 100) 100 97 131 100
Market share (%) 2,6 2,5 3,5 2,8
Average price (EUR/tonne) 1 552 1 416 1 437 1 343
Index (2013 = 100) 100 91 93 87
Other countries
Imports (in tonnes) 8 257 8 061 8 701 8 294
Index (2013 = 100) 100 98 105 100
Market share (%) 4,7 4,6 5,1 5,0
Average price (EUR/tonne) 2 951 2 180 2 196 1 967
Index (2013 = 100) 100 96 108 100
Total
Imports (in tonnes) 26 441 31 102 33 472 30 812
Index (2013 = 100) 100 118 127 117
Market share (%) 15 18 20 19
Average price (EUR/tonne) 1 912 1 552 1 605 1 471
Index (2013 = 100) 100 81 84 77
Source:14.6 database.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Turkey
Imports (in tonnes) 6 814 8 608 7 508 7 028
Index (2013 = 100) 100 126 110 103
Market share (%) 3,9 4,9 4,4 4,3
Average price (EUR/tonne) 1 384 1 322 1 328 1 255
Index (2013 = 100) 100 95 96 91
Thailand
Imports (in tonnes) 5 206 6 514 6 268 6 122
Index (2013 = 100) 100 125 120 118
Market share (%) 3,0 3,7 3,7 3,7
Average price (EUR/tonne) 1 445 1 391 1 656 1 468
Index (2013 = 100) 100 96 115 102
Russia
Imports (in tonnes) 1 639 3 541 5 063 4 838
Index (2013 = 100) 100 216 309 295
Market share (%) 0,9 2,0 3,0 2,9
Average price (EUR/tonne) 1 341 1 150 1 135 1 057
Index (2013 = 100) 100 86 85 79
Malaysia
Imports (in tonnes) 4 525 4 377 5 932 4 530
Index (2013 = 100) 100 97 131 100
Market share (%) 2,6 2,5 3,5 2,8
Average price (EUR/tonne) 1 552 1 416 1 437 1 343
Index (2013 = 100) 100 91 93 87
Other countries
Imports (in tonnes) 8 257 8 061 8 701 8 294
Index (2013 = 100) 100 98 105 100
Market share (%) 4,7 4,6 5,1 5,0
Average price (EUR/tonne) 2 951 2 180 2 196 1 967
Index (2013 = 100) 100 96 108 100
Total
Imports (in tonnes) 26 441 31 102 33 472 30 812
Index (2013 = 100) 100 118 127 117
Market share (%) 15 18 20 19
Average price (EUR/tonne) 1 912 1 552 1 605 1 471
Index (2013 = 100) 100 81 84 77
Source:14.6 database.
(102) Total imports from other third countries increased by 27 % during the period 2013-2015. In the RIP, imports decreased by 10 %. Overall imports increased by 17 % during the period considered. Since the consumption decreased during the period considered as described in recital 76 the market share of the other third countries increased from 15 % to 19 % over the same period.
(103) Imports from Turkey fluctuated during the period considered but in the RIP they reached a similar level as in 2013 (at the beginning of the period considered), namely 7 028 tonnes. Overall, their market share remained fairly stable with only a slight increase of 0,4 percentage points over the period considered, namely from 3,9 % in 2013 to 4,3 % during the RIP. The average price decreased by 9 %.
(104) Imports from Thailand increased by 25 % from 2013 to 2014, but continuously decreased afterwards and in the RIP reached 6 122 tonnes, up from 5 206 in 2013. Overall, imports increased by 18 % in the period considered. The market share increased also in 2014 and remained stable until the RIP. The average import price fluctuated during the period 2014-2015 (– 4 %, + 15 %) and reached in the RIP a level of 2 % above the level in 2013.
(105) Imports from Russia significantly increased during the period considered, but remained at relatively low levels throughout the period considered. The market share also increased from 0,9 % to 2,9 %. The average price decreased by 21 % over the period considered.
(106) Imports from Malaysia fluctuated since the beginning of the period considered but in the RIP they reached almost the same level as in 2013, namely 4 530 tonnes. During the period considered, despite fluctuation the market share of Malaysian imports of SRC increased only slightly overall, namely by 0,2 percentage points. The average import price decreased by 13 % during the period considered.
(107) During the RIP, prices of SRC imports from Turkey, Thailand, Russia and Malaysia were on average lower than the Union industry's average price (by 49 %-63 %). They were also lower than import prices from the PRC (by 41 %-57 %).
(108) In accordance with Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.
(109) For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission assessed macroeconomic indicators relating to the whole Union industry on the basis of data obtained from the applicant, cross-checked with the information provided by a number of Union producers at pre-initiation stage and the verified questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers. The Commission assessed the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers, which were verified. Both sets of data were found representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.
(110) The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity and magnitude of the dumping margin.
(111) The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, average unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital.
(112) Table 7 sets out the total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered:Table 7Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation201320142015RIPProduction (tonnes)206 053203 763193 757168 701Index (2013 = 100)100999482Production capacity (tonnes)290 092299 773301 160305 550Index (2013 = 100)100103104105Capacity utilisation (%)71686455Index (2013 = 100)100969178Source:Applicant, information at pre-initiation stage and verified questionnaire replies. 2013 2014 2015 RIP Production (tonnes) 206 053 203 763 193 757 168 701 Index (2013 = 100) 100 99 94 82 Production capacity (tonnes) 290 092 299 773 301 160 305 550 Index (2013 = 100) 100 103 104 105 Capacity utilisation (%) 71 68 64 55 Index (2013 = 100) 100 96 91 78 Source:Applicant, information at pre-initiation stage and verified questionnaire replies.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Production (tonnes) 206 053 203 763 193 757 168 701
Index (2013 = 100) 100 99 94 82
Production capacity (tonnes) 290 092 299 773 301 160 305 550
Index (2013 = 100) 100 103 104 105
Capacity utilisation (%) 71 68 64 55
Index (2013 = 100) 100 96 91 78
Source:Applicant, information at pre-initiation stage and verified questionnaire replies.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Production (tonnes) 206 053 203 763 193 757 168 701
Index (2013 = 100) 100 99 94 82
Production capacity (tonnes) 290 092 299 773 301 160 305 550
Index (2013 = 100) 100 103 104 105
Capacity utilisation (%) 71 68 64 55
Index (2013 = 100) 100 96 91 78
Source:Applicant, information at pre-initiation stage and verified questionnaire replies.
(113) The total production volume remained relatively stable during the period 2013-2014 and decreased by 5 % in 2015. In the RIP though, the production volume decreased further by 12 %. Overall, production volume decreased by 18 % during the period considered.
(114) The production capacity slightly increased during the period considered and overall only by 5 %.
(115) Consequently, the capacity utilisation rate decreased from 71 % in 2013, to 55 % in the RIP. Overall, the capacity utilisation rate decreased by 22 % during the period considered, following the decrease of production volume.
(116) The Union industry's sales volume and market share developed over the period considered as follows:Table 8Sales volume and market share201320142015RIPSales volume (tonnes)109 511108 559103 49998 643Index (2013 = 100)100999590Market share (%)62,461,860,760,0Index (2013 = 100)100999796Source:Applicant, information at pre-initiation stage and verified questionnaire replies. 2013 2014 2015 RIP Sales volume (tonnes) 109 511 108 559 103 499 98 643 Index (2013 = 100) 100 99 95 90 Market share (%) 62,4 61,8 60,7 60,0 Index (2013 = 100) 100 99 97 96 Source:Applicant, information at pre-initiation stage and verified questionnaire replies.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Sales volume (tonnes) 109 511 108 559 103 499 98 643
Index (2013 = 100) 100 99 95 90
Market share (%) 62,4 61,8 60,7 60,0
Index (2013 = 100) 100 99 97 96
Source:Applicant, information at pre-initiation stage and verified questionnaire replies.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Sales volume (tonnes) 109 511 108 559 103 499 98 643
Index (2013 = 100) 100 99 95 90
Market share (%) 62,4 61,8 60,7 60,0
Index (2013 = 100) 100 99 97 96
Source:Applicant, information at pre-initiation stage and verified questionnaire replies.
(117) Sales volume followed the trend of the production volume. It remained relatively stable during the period 2013-2014 and decreased by 5 % in 2015. In the RIP, the production volume decreased further by 5 %. Overall, sales volume decreased by 10 % during the period considered.
(118) The market share of the Union industry decreased by 2,4 percentage points from 62,4 % to 60,0 % during the period considered.
(119) During the period considered, the Union consumption decreased by 6 %. Sales volume of the Union industry decreased by an even higher degree, namely 10 %. As a consequence, the Union industry experienced a loss of 2,4 percentage points in market share. The drop in sales volume was also reflected in the capacity utilisation which decreased by 22 %.
(120) Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:Table 9Employment and productivity201320142015RIPNumber of employees3 3293 3093 2383 026Index (2013 = 100)100999791Productivity (tonnes/employee)62626056Index (2013 = 100)100999790Source:Applicant, information at pre-initiation stage and verified questionnaire replies. 2013 2014 2015 RIP Number of employees 3 329 3 309 3 238 3 026 Index (2013 = 100) 100 99 97 91 Productivity (tonnes/employee) 62 62 60 56 Index (2013 = 100) 100 99 97 90 Source:Applicant, information at pre-initiation stage and verified questionnaire replies.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Number of employees 3 329 3 309 3 238 3 026
Index (2013 = 100) 100 99 97 91
Productivity (tonnes/employee) 62 62 60 56
Index (2013 = 100) 100 99 97 90
Source:Applicant, information at pre-initiation stage and verified questionnaire replies.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Number of employees 3 329 3 309 3 238 3 026
Index (2013 = 100) 100 99 97 91
Productivity (tonnes/employee) 62 62 60 56
Index (2013 = 100) 100 99 97 90
Source:Applicant, information at pre-initiation stage and verified questionnaire replies.
(121) The number of employees in the Union industry decreased over the period considered by 9 %, the main reduction took place during the RIP. It followed the decrease of production and sales volume as described in recitals 113 and 117.
(122) As a result of a higher rate of decrease in production as compared to the decrease in number of employees, the productivity decreased over the period considered by 10 %.
(123) The investigation established in recital 57 that imports of the product under review from the PRC continued to be dumped on the Union market at a dumping rate of 16,7 %. The volume of the imports was low due to the effectiveness of the anti-dumping measures in force. Nevertheless, the Chinese remained present on the Union market keeping a market share of 1,2 % during the RIP (see Table 2).
(124) In the previous expiry review the Union industry showed signs of recovery from the effects of past dumping. During the period considered, the recovery process slowed down, with the main injury indicators showing a decreasing trend. Furthermore, a lower demand for bulk commodities and reductions in the oil price led to a reduced activity in the sectors of mining and oil & gas. Subsequently, a negative impact in the demand for SRC followed, causing consumption to decline by 6 % during the period considered (see Table 1).
(125) Due to the gradual decline of Union prices during the period considered, the Union industry could not continue to recover from the effects of past dumping.
(126) The average sales prices of the Union industry to unrelated customers in the Union developed over the period considered as follows:Table 10Average sales prices and unit costs201320142015RIPAverage unit selling price in the Union (EUR/tonne)3 2973 1332 9502 887Index (2013 = 100)100958988Unit cost of production in the Union (EUR/tonne)2 7742 8663 0723 138Index (2013 = 100)100103111113Source:Verified questionnaire replies. 2013 2014 2015 RIP Average unit selling price in the Union (EUR/tonne) 3 297 3 133 2 950 2 887 Index (2013 = 100) 100 95 89 88 Unit cost of production in the Union (EUR/tonne) 2 774 2 866 3 072 3 138 Index (2013 = 100) 100 103 111 113 Source:Verified questionnaire replies.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Average unit selling price in the Union (EUR/tonne) 3 297 3 133 2 950 2 887
Index (2013 = 100) 100 95 89 88
Unit cost of production in the Union (EUR/tonne) 2 774 2 866 3 072 3 138
Index (2013 = 100) 100 103 111 113
Source:Verified questionnaire replies.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Average unit selling price in the Union (EUR/tonne) 3 297 3 133 2 950 2 887
Index (2013 = 100) 100 95 89 88
Unit cost of production in the Union (EUR/tonne) 2 774 2 866 3 072 3 138
Index (2013 = 100) 100 103 111 113
Source:Verified questionnaire replies.
(127) The Union industry's average unit sales price to unrelated customers in the Union decreased by 12 % over the period considered.
(128) At the same time the average unit cost of production increased by 13 % over the period considered. That increase in unit cost was mainly caused by the decrease in the production and sales volume (18 % and 10 %, respectively over the period considered recitals 113 (see Table 7) and 117 (see Table 8)). It should be noted that this increase in unit cost occurred despite the decrease in the total production cost during the period considered. Thus, although the Union industry managed to reduce the total production cost, they were not able to reduce the cost per unit due to the extensive decrease in the production and sales volume.
(129) The average labour costs of the Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:Table 11Average labour costs per employee201320142015RIPAverage labour costs per employee48 70848 27751 58650 021Index (2013 = 100)10099106103Source:Verified questionnaire replies. 2013 2014 2015 RIP Average labour costs per employee 48 708 48 277 51 586 50 021 Index (2013 = 100) 100 99 106 103 Source:Verified questionnaire replies.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Average labour costs per employee 48 708 48 277 51 586 50 021
Index (2013 = 100) 100 99 106 103
Source:Verified questionnaire replies.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Average labour costs per employee 48 708 48 277 51 586 50 021
Index (2013 = 100) 100 99 106 103
Source:Verified questionnaire replies.
(130) Overall, the average labour costs increased slightly by 3 % during the period considered after small fluctuations during the period considered.
(131) Stock levels of the Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:Table 12Inventories201320142015RIPClosing stocks (tonnes)15 19115 88915 26014 796Index (2013 = 100)10010510097Closing stocks as a percentage of production (%)16,717,417,423,0Index (2013 = 100)100104105138Source:Verified questionnaire replies. 2013 2014 2015 RIP Closing stocks (tonnes) 15 191 15 889 15 260 14 796 Index (2013 = 100) 100 105 100 97 Closing stocks as a percentage of production (%) 16,7 17,4 17,4 23,0 Index (2013 = 100) 100 104 105 138 Source:Verified questionnaire replies.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Closing stocks (tonnes) 15 191 15 889 15 260 14 796
Index (2013 = 100) 100 105 100 97
Closing stocks as a percentage of production (%) 16,7 17,4 17,4 23,0
Index (2013 = 100) 100 104 105 138
Source:Verified questionnaire replies.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Closing stocks (tonnes) 15 191 15 889 15 260 14 796
Index (2013 = 100) 100 105 100 97
Closing stocks as a percentage of production (%) 16,7 17,4 17,4 23,0
Index (2013 = 100) 100 104 105 138
Source:Verified questionnaire replies.
(132) The level of inventories decreased slightly by 3 % over the period considered. Since the Union industry has to maintain a minimum stock level of the most common types of SRC for immediate coverage of demand, inventories could not decrease further and as a result their value as a percentage of the production increased by 38 %.
(133) Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the Union industry developed over the period considered as follows:Table 13Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments201320142015RIPProfitability of total sales in the Union to unrelated customers (%)7,56,12,6– 1,6Index (2013 = 100)1008134– 21Cash flow ('000 EUR)42 88136 69233 6318 885Index (2013 = 100)100867821Investments ('000 EUR)12 0148 8439 0035 950Index (2013 = 100)100747550Return on investments (%)33,320,88,6– 5,2Index (2013 = 100)1006226– 16Source:Verified questionnaire replies. 2013 2014 2015 RIP Profitability of total sales in the Union to unrelated customers (%) 7,5 6,1 2,6 – 1,6 Index (2013 = 100) 100 81 34 – 21 Cash flow ('000 EUR) 42 881 36 692 33 631 8 885 Index (2013 = 100) 100 86 78 21 Investments ('000 EUR) 12 014 8 843 9 003 5 950 Index (2013 = 100) 100 74 75 50 Return on investments (%) 33,3 20,8 8,6 – 5,2 Index (2013 = 100) 100 62 26 – 16 Source:Verified questionnaire replies.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Profitability of total sales in the Union to unrelated customers (%) 7,5 6,1 2,6 – 1,6
Index (2013 = 100) 100 81 34 – 21
Cash flow ('000 EUR) 42 881 36 692 33 631 8 885
Index (2013 = 100) 100 86 78 21
Investments ('000 EUR) 12 014 8 843 9 003 5 950
Index (2013 = 100) 100 74 75 50
Return on investments (%) 33,3 20,8 8,6 – 5,2
Index (2013 = 100) 100 62 26 – 16
Source:Verified questionnaire replies.
2013 2014 2015 RIP
Profitability of total sales in the Union to unrelated customers (%) 7,5 6,1 2,6 – 1,6
Index (2013 = 100) 100 81 34 – 21
Cash flow ('000 EUR) 42 881 36 692 33 631 8 885
Index (2013 = 100) 100 86 78 21
Investments ('000 EUR) 12 014 8 843 9 003 5 950
Index (2013 = 100) 100 74 75 50
Return on investments (%) 33,3 20,8 8,6 – 5,2
Index (2013 = 100) 100 62 26 – 16
Source:Verified questionnaire replies.
(134) Profitability of the Union industry decreased over the period considered starting with 7,5 % profit in 2013 and ending in the RIP with a loss of 1,6 %.
(135) The cash flow, decreased dramatically during the period considered by 79 %. It is an additional indicator of Union industry's poor performance on the operating activities and the liquidity shortage they had to face.
(136) Subsequently the investments decreased to 50 % during the period considered. Due to the decreasing profit margins and the high pressure on prices, investments were mostly limited to those prompted by environmental or security requirements. At the same time, there were only few investments on operation and technology of production in order to raise efficiency and productivity during the investigation period.
(137) The return on investments measures the gain or loss generated on an investment relative to the amount of money invested. During the period considered it decreased from 33,3 % into a negative – 5,2 %.
(138) Due to the anti-dumping duties in place, the Union industry continued to recover from the effect of past injurious dumping for the first two years 2013-2014 of the period considered and managed to retain a profit margin exceeding the target profit of 5 %.
(139) Nevertheless, lower demand for bulk commodities and reductions in the oil price led to a reduced activity in the sectors of mining and oil & gas. Consequently, the demand for SRC was reduced during the period considered. The Union industry was directly affected by this contraction in demand which translated into a decrease in its production and sales volume as well as its market share. At the same time the share of the low priced SRC increased and led to a decline of the Union price and further impairment of its financial performance. Therefore, almost all the injury indicators have deteriorated. On that basis, it is concluded that the Union industry has suffered material injury.
(140) SRC imports from the PRC had a limited negative impact on the Union industry's injurious situation. Due to the measures in force, their market share was low throughout the period considered. Nevertheless, Chinese SRC imports remained present in the Union market.
(141) At the same time imports from other third countries had an overall market share of 38,8 % with a slightly increasing trend during the period considered (see Table 4). Average import prices from other third countries had a decreasing trend with levels largely below the level of the Union industry sales price on the Union market. Those imports therefore affected the injurious situation of the Union industry considerably. As already analysed in recitals 85-89, during the period considered, they managed not only to maintain their market share but to increase it. In addition, during the same period, the average import price decreased (recital 89) causing a further downward pressure on the Union price, leading to a decrease of Union prices of 12 % throughout the period considered (see recital 127) and further impairment of its financial performance.
(142) The Commission thus concluded that the Union Industry has benefitted from the original measures, as it continued to recover from the effect of past injurious dumping for the first two years 2013-2014 of the period considered. However, the recovery process stalled due to the abovementioned factors.
(143) In accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether material injury from Chinese imports would recur should measures against the PRC be allowed to lapse. The investigation has shown that the imports from the PRC were made at dumped price levels during the RIP (recital 57) and that there was a likelihood of continuation of dumping should measures be allowed to lapse (recital 70).
(144) To establish the likelihood of recurrence of injury the following elements were analysed: (i) the production capacity and spare capacity available in the PRC, (ii) possible price levels of Chinese imports should measures be allowed to lapse, (iii) the behaviour of Chinese exporting producers in other third countries, (iv) the attractiveness of the Union market and (v) the impact of Chinese imports on the situation of the Union industry should measures be allowed to lapse.
(145) As explained in recital 60, producers in the PRC have significant production capacity in China and, as a result spare capacity which largely exceeds not only the export quantity to the Union during the RIP but the total Union consumption during the RIP.
(146) In addition, as stated in recital 63 there were no elements found that could indicate any significant increase of domestic demand of SRC in the PRC or in any other third country market in the near future. The Commission therefore concluded that domestic demand in China or in other third country markets could not absorb the available spare capacity.
(147) As mentioned in recital 18, the only cooperating exporting producer group in the PRC did not however report its export sales to other third country markets. Therefore, in the absence of any other information, the PRC database was used to establish Chinese export prices to other third country markets.
(148) Price levels of those exports were also considered as a reasonable estimate on possible future price levels to the Union should measures be allowed to lapse.
(149) As explained in recital 69, export prices from the PRC to other export markets were, on average, significantly below the export prices to the Union, namely by around 30 %. On that basis, it was concluded that there is a considerable margin for the producers in the PRC to reduce export prices to the Union.
(150) In addition, the import price of the cooperating exporting producer group without taking into account the anti-dumping duties, undercut the Union industry sales prices by 36,3 % during the RIP as mentioned in recital 84. This is considered to be a reasonable indication of possible future price levels to the Union should measures be allowed to lapse.
(151) In the absence of other available information, the PRC database was used to establish the Chinese export prices to other third markets, as explained under recitals 64 and 65.
(152) According to that information the Chinese SRC export prices to other third markets were found on average between around 40 % to up to around 80 % lower than the Union industry's sales prices depending on the export market.
(153) The top three Chinese SRC export destinations in terms of volume during the RIP, were the Republic of Korea (123 891 tonnes or 11 % of their total exports), the USA (97 936 tonnes or 9 % of their total exports) and Vietnam (76 344 tonnes or 7 % of their total exports). The average export prices to those markets were of 1 107 EUR/tonne, 1 444 EUR/tonne and 781 EUR/tonne respectively. The average prices to those countries were thus between 50 % to around 80 % lower than the average price of the Union industry.
(154) Taking under consideration the price analysis in the previous recital, if the measures are allowed to lapse the Chinese exporting producers would have significant capacity to lower their import prices to the Union market while still realising higher prices on the Union market than on other third country markets. There is therefore a high incentive for Chinese exporting producers to divert their exports to the Union where they would achieve higher prices, while still being able to significantly undercut the Union industry sales price. In addition, they would have an incentive to export at least part of their spare capacities at low prices to the Union market.
(155) Another indication of the Union market's attractiveness is the fact that since the beginning of the imposition of the measures, there were attempts for circumvention from Chinese exporters which were identified and neutralised as explained in recitals 2 and 4.
(156) Also the presence of the dumped imports from the PRC despite the measures in force since 1999 confirms the attractiveness of the Union market.
(157) It is therefore concluded that the exporting producers in the PRC have the potential and incentive to substantially raise the volume of their exports of SRC to the Union at dumped prices substantially undercutting the prices of the Union industry, should measures be allowed to lapse.
(158) The Union industry, under the scenario that it keeps the current price level, will not be able to maintain their sales volume and market share against the low priced imports from China. It is highly likely that the Chinese market share would increase rapidly if the measures are allowed to lapse. This would be most likely at the expense of the Union industry since their price level is the highest. Losing sales volume would lead to an even lower utilisation rate and an increase in the average cost of production. This would lead to a further deterioration of the financial situation of the Union industry and of the loss making situation that already materialised during the RIP.
(159) However, should the Union industry decide to lower its price levels in an attempt to keep its sales volume and market share, the deterioration of its financial situation will almost immediately occur and the loss-making situation observed during the RIP will significantly worsen.
(160) Under both scenarios, the impact of the expiry of the measures is likely to have a negative impact on the Union industry, especially for employment. During the period considered the Union industry was already forced to reduce the product-related employment by 9 % (see Table 9). Further deterioration of the Union industry's situation might cause the shutdown of whole producing units.
(161) Therefore, it can be concluded that there is a strong likelihood that the expiry of the existing measures would lead to a recurrence of injury from Chinese imports of SRC and that the already injurious situation of the Union industry will be likely to further deteriorate.
(162) During the period considered 2007-2010 of the previous expiry review, the economic situation of the Union industry developed positively. It has managed to retain its profitability close to the target profit of 5 % even during the first two years 2013-2014 of the current period considered. Therefore, the Union industry has proven to be a structurally viable industry and capable of reversing a loss-making situation. However, during the period considered in the current expiry review, the Union industry returned to a fragile financial situation which is expected to deteriorate even further should the measures expire. It would then not be able to recover from the current injurious situation and, instead, would suffer further injury due to very likely increase in Chinese SRC imports at dumped prices.
(163) It is acknowledged that SRC imports from the Republic of Korea and other third countries, given their volume and low price levels, are factors contributing to the injury suffered by the Union industry. However, this investigation was, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, limited to assessing whether there is a likelihood of recurrence of injury from injuriously-priced Chinese SRC imports should the current anti-dumping measures expire. Given the fragile situation of the Union industry, any significant increase in Chinese imports would worsen that situation due to the significant spare capacities in the PRC, the attractiveness of the Union market and the possible low price levels of Chinese SRC exports to the Union.
(164) The fact that Chinese SRC imports are currently entering the Union market in much lower numbers than before the imposition of measures shows that the current anti-dumping duties successfully re-established undistorted competitive conditions between Chinese exporters of the product under review and the Union industry. The fact that imports from the Republic of Korea and other third countries undercut Chinese imports, does not undermine the Commission's obligations to remain within the framework of this investigation. As set out in recital 165, the Commission has demonstrated that strong likelihood that the expiry of the measures would lead to recurrence of injury.
(165) The Commission concluded that repeal of the measures would in all likelihood result in a significant increase of Chinese dumped SRC imports at prices undercutting the Union industry prices, therefore further aggravating the injury suffered by the Union industry. As a consequence, the viability of the Union industry would be at serious risk.
(166) In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the maintenance of the existing anti-dumping measures would be against the interest of the Union as a whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and users.
(167) All interested parties were given the opportunity to make their views known pursuant to Article 21(2) of the basic Regulation.
(168) It should be recalled that, in the previous expiry review, the adoption of measures was considered not to be against the interest of the Union. Furthermore, the fact that the present investigation is an expiry review, thus analysing a situation in which anti-dumping measures have already been in place, allows the assessment of any undue negative impact on the parties concerned by the current anti-dumping measures.
(169) On that basis, it was examined whether, despite the conclusions on the likelihood of a continuation of dumping and recurrence of injury, compelling reasons existed which would lead to the conclusion that it is not in the Union interest to maintain measures in this particular case.
(170) The investigation has also shown that should the measures expire, this would likely have a significant negative effect on the Union industry and its currently fragile financial situation would deteriorate further. The expiry of the measures would seriously threaten the viability of the Union industry forcing the Union producers to close their operations rendering the Union market fully dependent on SRC imports.
(171) In the past, the Union industry proved to be a viable industry with positive economic and financial results. It managed to remain profitable with profit margin exceeding the target profit.
(172) Therefore, maintaining the anti-dumping measures in force is in the interest of the Union industry.
(173) As indicated in recitals 20 to 22 and 24, no importer cooperated in this investigation nor provided the requested information. It is recalled that in the previous investigations it was found that the impact of the imposition of measures on importers would not be significant. In the absence of evidence suggesting otherwise, it can accordingly be confirmed that the measures currently in force had no substantial negative effect on their financial situation and that the continuation of the measures would not unduly affect importers.
(174) SRC are used in a wide variety of applications such as fishing, maritime/shipping, oil and gas industries, mining, forestry, aerial transport, civil engineering, construction, and elevators.
(175) As indicated in recitals 23 and 24, no user cooperated in this investigation nor provided the requested information. Some of the users that made themselves known stated that they only marginally use SRC. Therefore it was concluded, as in the previous investigations, that the measures currently in force did not have any substantial negative effect on the economic situation of users, and that thus the continuation of measures would not unduly affect the situation of the user industries.
(176) Therefore, the Commission concluded that there are no compelling reasons of Union interest against the maintenance of the definitive anti-dumping measures on imports of SRC originating in the PRC.
(177) All interested parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend that the existing measures be maintained on imports of SRC originating in the PRC. They were also granted a period to make representations subsequent to this disclosure. No comments were received from any of the parties.
(178) As outlined in recital 6, the anti- dumping duties in force on imports of SRC from the PRC were extended to cover, in addition, imports of SRC consigned from Morocco and the Republic of Korea, whether declared as originating in Morocco or the Republic of Korea or not. The anti- dumping duty to be maintained on imports of the SRC originating in the PRC should continue to be extended to imports of SRC consigned from Morocco and the Republic of Korea, whether declared as originating in Morocco and the Republic of Korea or not. The exporting producer in Morocco exempted from the measures as extended by Regulation (EC) No 1886/2004 should also be exempted from the measures imposed by this Regulation. The 15 exporting producers in the Republic of Korea exempted from the measures as extended by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 400/2010 should also be exempted from the measures imposed by this Regulation.
(179) In view of the recent case-law of the Court of Justice(26)it is appropriate to provide for the rate of default interest to be paid in case of reimbursement of definitive duties, because the relevant provisions in force concerning customs duties do not provide for such an interest rate, and the application of national rules would lead to undue distortions between economic operators depending on which Member State is chosen for customs clearance.
(180) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,
Country Company TARIC additional code
The Republic of Korea Bosung Wire Rope Co., Ltd, 568,Yongdeok-ri, Hallim-myeon, Gimae-si, Gyeongsangnam-do, 621-872 A969
Chung Woo Rope Co., Ltd, 1682-4, Songjung-Dong, Gangseo- Gu, Busan A969
CS Co., Ltd, 31-102, Junam maeul 2-gil, Yangsan, Gyeongsangnam-do A969
Cosmo Wire Ltd, 4-10, Koyeon-Ri, Woong Chon-Myon Ulju- Kun, Ulsan A969
Dae Heung Industrial Co., Ltd, 185 Pyunglim — Ri, Daesan- Myun, Haman — Gun, Gyungnam A969
Daechang Steel Co., Ltd, 1213, Aam-daero, Namdong-gu, Incheon C057
DSR Wire Corp., 291, Seonpyong-Ri, Seo-Myon, Suncheon-City, Jeonnam A969
Goodwire MFG. Co. Ltd, 984-23, Maegok-Dong, Yangsan-City, Kyungnam B955
Kiswire Ltd, 37, Gurak-Ro, 141 Beon-Gil, Suyeong-Gu, Busan, Korea 48212 A969
Manho Rope & Wire Ltd, Dongho Bldg, 85-2 4 Street Joongang- Dong, Jong-gu, Busan A969
Line Metal Co. Ltd, 1259 Boncho-ri, Daeji-Myeon, Changnyeong-gun, Gyeongnam B926
Seil Wire and Cable, 47-4, Soju-Dong, Yangsan-Si, Kyungsangnamdo A994
Shin Han Rope Co., Ltd, 715-8, Gojan-Dong, Namdong-gu, Incheon A969
Ssang Yong Cable Mfg. Co., Ltd, 1559-4 Song-Jeong Dong, Gang-Seo Gu, Busan A969
Young Heung Iron & Steel Co., Ltd, 71-1 Sin-Chon Dong, Changwon City, Gyungnam A969
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union(1)(‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 11(2) thereof,
Market economy third country
Choice of the market economy third country
Normal value
Export price
Comparison
Dumping margin
Republic of Korea
Morocco
Ukraine and Moldova
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1
1. A definitive anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of steel ropes and cables including locked coil ropes, excluding ropes and cables of stainless steel, with a maximum cross-sectional dimension exceeding 3 mm, currently falling within CN codes ex 7312 10 81, ex 7312 10 83, ex 7312 10 85, ex 7312 10 89 and ex 7312 10 98 (TARIC codes 7312108112, 7312108113, 7312108119, 7312108312, 7312108313, 7312108319, 7312108512, 7312108513, 7312108519, 7312108912, 7312108913, 7312108919, 7312109812, 7312109813 and 7312109819).
2. The rate of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the CIF net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the product described in paragraph 1 and originating in the PRC shall be 60,4 %.
3. The definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to imports originating in the PRC, as set out in paragraph 2, is hereby extended to imports of the same steel ropes and cables consigned from Morocco, whether declared as originating in Morocco or not (TARIC codes 7312108112, 7312108312, 7312108512, 7312108912 and 7312109812) with the exception of those produced by Remer Maroc SARL, Zone Industrielle, Tranche 2, Lot 10, Settat, Morocco (TARIC additional code A567) and to imports of the same steel ropes and cables consigned from the Republic of Korea, whether declared as originating in the Republic of Korea or not (TARIC codes 7312108113, 7312108313, 7312108513, 7312108913 and 7312109813), with the exception of those produced by the companies listed below:

Article 2
Unless otherwise specified, the relevant provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply. The default interest to be paid in case of reimbursement that gives rise to a right to payment of default interest shall be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Union, in force on the first calendar day of the month in which the deadline falls, increased by one percentage point.

Article 3
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union(1)(‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 11(2) thereof,
Market economy third country
Choice of the market economy third country
Normal value
Export price
Comparison
Dumping margin
Republic of Korea
Morocco
Ukraine and Moldova
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
1. A definitive anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of steel ropes and cables including locked coil ropes, excluding ropes and cables of stainless steel, with a maximum cross-sectional dimension exceeding 3 mm, currently falling within CN codes ex 7312 10 81, ex 7312 10 83, ex 7312 10 85, ex 7312 10 89 and ex 7312 10 98 (TARIC codes 7312108112, 7312108113, 7312108119, 7312108312, 7312108313, 7312108319, 7312108512, 7312108513, 7312108519, 7312108912, 7312108913, 7312108919, 7312109812, 7312109813 and 7312109819).
2. The rate of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the CIF net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the product described in paragraph 1 and originating in the PRC shall be 60,4 %.
3. The definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to imports originating in the PRC, as set out in paragraph 2, is hereby extended to imports of the same steel ropes and cables consigned from Morocco, whether declared as originating in Morocco or not (TARIC codes 7312108112, 7312108312, 7312108512, 7312108912 and 7312109812) with the exception of those produced by Remer Maroc SARL, Zone Industrielle, Tranche 2, Lot 10, Settat, Morocco (TARIC additional code A567) and to imports of the same steel ropes and cables consigned from the Republic of Korea, whether declared as originating in the Republic of Korea or not (TARIC codes 7312108113, 7312108313, 7312108513, 7312108913 and 7312109813), with the exception of those produced by the companies listed below:
Unless otherwise specified, the relevant provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply. The default interest to be paid in case of reimbursement that gives rise to a right to payment of default interest shall be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Union, in force on the first calendar day of the month in which the deadline falls, increased by one percentage point.
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.