Pending: 32018D0320

5.3.2018 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 62/18
(1) Since 2013,Batrachochytrium salamandrivorans(Bsal), which is an emerging pathogen fungus of salamanders, has been occuring in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. It affects kept and wild salamander populations, and it can cause significant morbidity and mortality in those populations. Bsal is lethal to certain species of salamanders, while other species are fully or partly resistant to it, but may carry Bsal on their skin and therefore act as a reservoir and source of infection or contamination for other species of salamanders.
(2) According to current scientific knowledge concerning Bsal, compiled by a scientific opinion(3)of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) about Bsal within its Assessment of listing and categorisation of animal diseases in the framework of Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and of the Council(4), Bsal seems to be endemic at least in Japan, Thailand and Vietnam with around a 3 % prevalence rate in wild salamander populations. It is generally thought to have originated in East Asia and to be widespread and endemic there. At the same time, there is a lack of information on how widespread it is in other parts of the world. It is also generally thought that trade in infected or carrier salamanders contributes to the spread of Bsal.
(3) According to available data, both resistant and susceptible salamander species are traded. Council Directive 92/65/EEC(5)lays down the animal health requirements governing trade in and imports into the Union of animals not subject to the animal health requirements laid down in the specific Union acts listed in Annex F thereto. Union animal health legislation, including Directive 92/65/EEC, currently lays down no specific animal health requirements for trade in salamanders or for their imports into the Union that would be effective in protecting animal health against the spread of Bsal in the Union.
(4) The EFSA, in its scientific and technical assistance concerning the survival, establishment and spread of Batrachochytrium salamandrivorans (Bsal) in the EU(6)(the EFSA Assistance), assessed the potential of Bsal to affect the health of wild and kept salamanders in the Union, the effectiveness and feasibility of a movement ban on traded salamanders, the validity, reliability and robustness of available diagnostic methods for Bsal detection and possible alternative methods and feasible risk mitigation measures to ensure safe international and intra-Union trade in salamanders.
(5) According to the EFSA Assistance, quarantining salamanders, the testing of salamanders to demonstrate that they are free of infection from Bsal, restricting movements of salamanders, hygienic procedures and biosecurity measures or treating salamanders against Bsal are important risk mitigation measures in preventing the spread of that disease.
(6) The EFSA Assistance also highlighted many gaps and uncertainties in the current state of knowledge as regards Bsal. In particular, it concluded, that due to the complexity of the taxonomy as well as the lack of current evidence concerning which species are susceptible to Bsal, rules at the level of the taxonomic order are likely to be both more effective and more feasible than species-specific rules.
(7) It is therefore appropriate to lay down animal health protection measures for intra-Union trade in consignments of salamanders and the introduction of such consignments into the Union on the taxonomic order of Caudata, in order to ensure that Bsal is not spread by intra-Union trade in those animals and the introduction of such animals into the Union. These measures should take into account the risk mitigation measures referred to in the EFSA Assistance and in particular provide for the appropriate quarantine, diagnostic testing and treatment of salamanders as well as for certification of their health status for their trade in and introduction into the Union. These measures are of an emergency nature and are not deemed specific measures within the meaning of Article 18(2) of Council Directive 92/65/EEC.
(8) Regulation (EU) No 576/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(7)lays down the animal health requirements applicable to the non-commercial movements of pet animals listed in Annex I thereto, and amphibia are included in the animals listed in that Annex. The animal health protection measures laid down in this Decision should not apply to the non-commercial movements of pet salamanders which fall within the scope of Regulation (EU) No 576/2013, due the specificities of those movements and given the lack of information concerning such movements.
(9) These measures should apply regardless of other Union rules potentially relevant for trade in and introduction of salamanders, in particular Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97(8).
(10) The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) listed infection with Bsal in its Aquatic Animal Health Code during its 85th General Session on 21-26 May 2017. But detailed international standards are not yet available and there is a lack of information on the technical capabilities of veterinary services and laboratories around the world to test for Bsal, while various concerned stakeholders in the European Union are in the forefront of progress on the diagnosis and treatment of Bsal and the safe handling of traded salamanders. It is therefore appropriate that most risk-mitigating measures, in particular the quarantining in an appropriate establishment, testing and treatment of traded and introduced salamanders are to be done by competent veterinary authorities, operators and laboratories located within the Union.
(11) According to the EFSA Assistance, it is possible that Bsal is transmitted between salamander species native to different areas and cross-contamination may take place in various establishments breeding, collecting or distributing salamanders. This makes the risk of Bsal occurring in traded salamanders independent from their place of origin and from the situation in the wild. Therefore all consignments of salamanders destined for intra-Union trade or introduced into the Union should be subject to risk mitigation measures.
(12) Minimum conditions for appropriate establishments to be used for quarantining salamanders should be laid down to ensure their biosecurity, while the handling of salamanders which die in those establishments should be done according to existing specific rules laid down in the Animal by-products Regulation(9).
(13) As regards the size of the quarantined epidemiological units, a minimum size eligible for certification for negative diagnostic test results should be specified due to the limited sensitivity of the best available real-time quantitative polymerase chain reaction (qPCR) assay which is sufficiently reliable to be used only if the epidemiological units comprise at least 62 salamanders.
(14) Salamanders which have undergone quarantine with testing with negative results or satisfactory treatment in the Union should not be subjected to quarantine or testing again, provided that they have been kept isolated from salamanders of a different health status in an appropriate establishment.
(15) As regards treatments, these should be specified and be in line with the protocols already described in peer-reviewed scientific literature as highlighted by the EFSA Assistance or with comparable ones.
(16) A list of third countries approved for issuing animal health certificates for the introduction into the Union of consignments of salamanders should be established and limited to those countries which have already provided sufficient guarantees for issuing certificates to prevent misleading and fraudulent certification, at least equivalent to Council Directive 96/93/EC(10). Therefore, it is appropriate to refer to already available lists existing in the context of introduction into the Union of other commodities. Such third countries are listed in Annex I to Commission Decision 2004/211/EC(11), Part 2 of Annex II to Commission Decision 2007/777/EC(12), Annex I to Commission Regulation (EC) No 798/2008(13), Part 1 of Annex I to Commission Regulation (EC) No 119/2009(14), Part 1 of Annex II to Commission Regulation (EU) No 206/2010(15), or Annex I to Commission Regulation (EU) No 605/2010(16), respectively.
(17) Consignments of salamanders should be introduced in the Union only if they comply with all the requirements and the competent veterinary authority of the border inspection post of entry can also ascertain that the consignments will be accepted by an operator responsible for an appropriate establishment of destination to be duly quarantined.
(18) The actual arrival of consignments of salamanders introduced into the Union from third countries at their place of quarantine in the Union should be recorded in the electronic version of the common veterinary entry document set out in Annex I to Commission Regulation (EC) No 282/2004(17)and managed by the integrated computerised veterinary system known as Traces, so that the competent veterinary authority of the border inspection post of entry can be reliably informed of their arrival.
(19) This Decision should provide for a transitional period in order to give the Member States, the competent authorities and economic operators time to put in place the necessary procedures so that they are in a position to comply with the rules laid down in this Decision. The length of this period should be limited to a few months. At the same time, risk mitigation measures based on the required level of protection by the Member States of destination should already apply.
(20) It is expected that more information will be available in the coming years about Bsal from scientific sources and from results of official controls carried out by the Member States, supplementing the current knowledge concerning that disease. Therefore, the animal health protection measures laid down in this Decision should be of a temporary nature. Nevertheless, they should apply at least until 31 December 2019 to allow for 1 year of implementation by the Member States and subsequent annual reporting and consideration thereof, while permanent EU animal health rules may be laid down under the new Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases to apply from the date of application of that Regulation.
(21) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
(a) ‘salamanders’ means all amphibians of the orderCaudata;
(b) ‘Bsal’ means the fungusBatrachochytrium salamandrivorans(kingdom fungi,Phylum Chytridiomycota,orderRhizophydiales);
(c) ‘epidemiological unit’ means a group of salamanders with the same likelihood of exposure to Bsal;
(d) ‘quarantine’ means the keeping of salamanders in isolation with no direct or indirect contact with salamanders outside their epidemiological unit, for the purposes of ensuring that there is no spread of Bsal while the animals in isolation are undergoing observation for a specified length of time and testing and, if appropriate, treatment;
(e) ‘operator’ means any natural or legal person having salamanders under its responsibility, including for a limited duration of time, but excluding pet keepers;
(f) ‘appropriate establishment’ means premises:(i)where salamanders are kept in quarantine before being dispatched to another Member State or after their introduction into the Union; and(ii)which are registered by the competent authority prior to the date of commencement of any quarantine; (i) where salamanders are kept in quarantine before being dispatched to another Member State or after their introduction into the Union; and (ii) which are registered by the competent authority prior to the date of commencement of any quarantine;
(i) where salamanders are kept in quarantine before being dispatched to another Member State or after their introduction into the Union; and
(ii) which are registered by the competent authority prior to the date of commencement of any quarantine;
(i) where salamanders are kept in quarantine before being dispatched to another Member State or after their introduction into the Union; and
(ii) which are registered by the competent authority prior to the date of commencement of any quarantine;
(g) ‘appropriate diagnostic test’ means a real-time quantitative polymerase chain reaction (qPCR) assay containing species-specific STerF and STerR primers amplifying a 119 nucleotide long fragment of Bsal DNA;
(h) ‘common veterinary entry document’ or ‘CVED’ means the document notifying the arrival of animals into the Union as provided for in Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 282/2004 and drawn up in accordance with the model set out in Annex I thereto and managed by the integrated computerised veterinary system known as Traces;
(i) ‘confirmed case of Bsal’ means the confirmation of the presence of Bsal or its genetic material on or in the tissues of salamanders by the appropriate diagnostic test;
(a) they are accompanied by an animal health certificate which complies with the model animal health certificate set out in Part A of Annex I;
(b) the salamanders must not show clinical signs of Bsal, in particular they must show no skin lesions and ulcers at the time of examination by the official veterinarian; that examination must be carried out within a period of 24 hours prior to the time of dispatch of the consignment to the Member State of destination;
(c) the salamanders must come from a population where there have been no mortalities due to Bsal and no clinical signs of Bsal, in particular skin lesions and ulcers must not have been observed by the operator;
(d) the consignment must consist of:(i)at least 62 salamanders which have undergone quarantine as one epidemiological unit in an appropriate establishment which complies with the minimum conditions set out in Annex II for a period of at least 6 weeks immediately prior to the date of the issuing of the animal health certificate set out in Part A of Annex I and skin swab samples from the salamanders in the consignment must have been tested for Bsal with negative results during the fifth week of the period of quarantine with the appropriate diagnostic test, in accordance with the sample sizes set out in point 1(a) of Annex III; or(ii)salamanders which have been treated to the satisfaction of the competent authority against Bsal in accordance with point 1(b) of Annex III. (i) at least 62 salamanders which have undergone quarantine as one epidemiological unit in an appropriate establishment which complies with the minimum conditions set out in Annex II for a period of at least 6 weeks immediately prior to the date of the issuing of the animal health certificate set out in Part A of Annex I and skin swab samples from the salamanders in the consignment must have been tested for Bsal with negative results during the fifth week of the period of quarantine with the appropriate diagnostic test, in accordance with the sample sizes set out in point 1(a) of Annex III; or (ii) salamanders which have been treated to the satisfaction of the competent authority against Bsal in accordance with point 1(b) of Annex III.
(i) at least 62 salamanders which have undergone quarantine as one epidemiological unit in an appropriate establishment which complies with the minimum conditions set out in Annex II for a period of at least 6 weeks immediately prior to the date of the issuing of the animal health certificate set out in Part A of Annex I and skin swab samples from the salamanders in the consignment must have been tested for Bsal with negative results during the fifth week of the period of quarantine with the appropriate diagnostic test, in accordance with the sample sizes set out in point 1(a) of Annex III; or
(ii) salamanders which have been treated to the satisfaction of the competent authority against Bsal in accordance with point 1(b) of Annex III.
(i) at least 62 salamanders which have undergone quarantine as one epidemiological unit in an appropriate establishment which complies with the minimum conditions set out in Annex II for a period of at least 6 weeks immediately prior to the date of the issuing of the animal health certificate set out in Part A of Annex I and skin swab samples from the salamanders in the consignment must have been tested for Bsal with negative results during the fifth week of the period of quarantine with the appropriate diagnostic test, in accordance with the sample sizes set out in point 1(a) of Annex III; or
(ii) salamanders which have been treated to the satisfaction of the competent authority against Bsal in accordance with point 1(b) of Annex III.
(a) the animal health conditions laid down in paragraph 1(a), (b) and (c);
(b) the salamanders have been kept in quarantine in the appropriate establishment which complies with the minimum conditions set out in Annex II, between the end of the period of quarantine following their introduction into the Union and the issuing of the animal health certificate set out in Part A of Annex I.
(a) they come from third countries listed in one of the following:(i)Annex I to Decision 2004/211/EC;(ii)Part 2 of Annex II to Decision 2007/777/EC;(iii)Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 798/2008;(iv)Part 1 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 119/2009;(v)Part 1 of Annex II to Regulation (EU) No 206/2010;or(vi)Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 605/2010; (i) Annex I to Decision 2004/211/EC; (ii) Part 2 of Annex II to Decision 2007/777/EC; (iii) Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 798/2008; (iv) Part 1 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 119/2009; (v) Part 1 of Annex II to Regulation (EU) No 206/2010;or (vi) Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 605/2010;
(i) Annex I to Decision 2004/211/EC;
(ii) Part 2 of Annex II to Decision 2007/777/EC;
(iii) Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 798/2008;
(iv) Part 1 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 119/2009;
(v) Part 1 of Annex II to Regulation (EU) No 206/2010;or
(vi) Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 605/2010;
(i) Annex I to Decision 2004/211/EC;
(ii) Part 2 of Annex II to Decision 2007/777/EC;
(iii) Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 798/2008;
(iv) Part 1 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 119/2009;
(v) Part 1 of Annex II to Regulation (EU) No 206/2010;or
(vi) Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 605/2010;
(b) they are accompanied by an animal health certificate which complies with the model animal health certificate set out in Part B of Annex I;
(c) the salamanders must not show clinical signs of Bsal, in particular there must be no signs of skin lesions and ulcers at the time of examination by the official veterinarian; and that examination must have been carried out within a period of 24 hours prior to the time of dispatch of the consignment to the Union;
(d) before issuing the animal health certificate referred to in point (b), the epidemiological unit comprising the salamanders in the consignment must have been isolated from other salamanders at the latest at the time of the examination for the purposes of issuing of animal health certificate and they must not have been in contact with other salamanders since that time.
(a) the name and address of the appropriate establishment of destination;
(b) that the appropriate establishment of destination complies with the minimum conditions set out in Annex II;
(c) that the consignment of salamanders will be accepted for quarantine.
1. The official or approved veterinarian responsible for the appropriate establishment of destination records the arrival of the consignment of salamanders introduced into the Union from a third country in Box 45 of Part 3 in the electronic version of the common veterinary entry document.
2. The official or approved veterinarian ensures that the operator keeps the consignment of salamanders in quarantine in the appropriate establishment of destination as one epidemiological unit.
3. The official or approved veterinarian inspects the conditions of quarantine for each consignment of salamanders, including an examination of the mortality records and a clinical inspection of the salamanders in the appropriate establishment of destination, checking in particular for skin lesions and ulcers.
4. Where a consignment comprises 62 or more salamanders, the official or approved veterinarian carries out the examination, sampling, testing and treatment procedures for Bsal in accordance with the procedures referred to in points 1 and 2 of Annex III, following the arrival of the consignment of salamanders at the appropriate establishment of destination.
5. Where the consignment comprises less than 62 salamanders, the official or approved veterinarian ensures that the consignment is treated to the satisfaction of the competent authority against Bsal in accordance with point 3 of Annex III.
6. The official or approved veterinarian releases the consignment of salamanders from the appropriate establishment of destination by a written authorisation:(a)in case of testing as referred to in point 1(a) of Annex III, provided that at least 6 weeks has elapsed since the date of the the commencement of the period of quarantine and not before the receipt of the negative test results, whichever is later; or(b)in the case of treatment as referred to in point 1(b) of Annex III, only after satisfactory completion of the treatment. (a) in case of testing as referred to in point 1(a) of Annex III, provided that at least 6 weeks has elapsed since the date of the the commencement of the period of quarantine and not before the receipt of the negative test results, whichever is later; or (b) in the case of treatment as referred to in point 1(b) of Annex III, only after satisfactory completion of the treatment.
(a) in case of testing as referred to in point 1(a) of Annex III, provided that at least 6 weeks has elapsed since the date of the the commencement of the period of quarantine and not before the receipt of the negative test results, whichever is later; or
(b) in the case of treatment as referred to in point 1(b) of Annex III, only after satisfactory completion of the treatment.
(a) in case of testing as referred to in point 1(a) of Annex III, provided that at least 6 weeks has elapsed since the date of the the commencement of the period of quarantine and not before the receipt of the negative test results, whichever is later; or
(b) in the case of treatment as referred to in point 1(b) of Annex III, only after satisfactory completion of the treatment.
(a) all salamanders in the same epidemiological unit are either:(i)treated to the satisfaction of the competent authority against Bsal in accordance with point 3 of Annex III; or(ii)killed and disposed of as animal by-products in accordance with Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009. (i) treated to the satisfaction of the competent authority against Bsal in accordance with point 3 of Annex III; or (ii) killed and disposed of as animal by-products in accordance with Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009.
(i) treated to the satisfaction of the competent authority against Bsal in accordance with point 3 of Annex III; or
(ii) killed and disposed of as animal by-products in accordance with Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009.
(i) treated to the satisfaction of the competent authority against Bsal in accordance with point 3 of Annex III; or
(ii) killed and disposed of as animal by-products in accordance with Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009.
(b) following completion of the measures referred to in point (a), the area of the appropriate establishment of destination where the epidemiological unit had been kept is cleaned and disinfected to the satisfaction of the competent authority.
(a) the number of epidemiological units with at least one confirmed case of Bsal;
(b) the number of epidemiological units treated without a confirmed case;
(c) any further information they deem relevant on testing, treating or handling the consignments and on the implementation of this Decision.
(1) The appropriate establishment of destination:(a)has a system that ensures adequate surveillance of the salamanders;(b)is under the control of an official or approved veterinarian;(c)is cleaned and disinfected in accordance with instructions by the competent authority. (a) has a system that ensures adequate surveillance of the salamanders; (b) is under the control of an official or approved veterinarian; (c) is cleaned and disinfected in accordance with instructions by the competent authority.
(a) has a system that ensures adequate surveillance of the salamanders;
(b) is under the control of an official or approved veterinarian;
(c) is cleaned and disinfected in accordance with instructions by the competent authority.
(a) has a system that ensures adequate surveillance of the salamanders;
(b) is under the control of an official or approved veterinarian;
(c) is cleaned and disinfected in accordance with instructions by the competent authority.
(2) The operator of the appropriate establishment ensures that:(a)cleaning and disinfection of the tanks, crates or other fomites used for the transport of the salamanders is carried out unless those are destroyed, in a way to prevent the spread of Bsal.(b)waste material and waste water is collected regularly, stored and subsequently treated in a way to prevent the spread of Bsal.(c)carcases of quarantined salamanders are examined in a laboratory indicated by the competent authority.(d)the necessary tests and treatments of salamanders are carried out in consultation with and under the control of the official or approved veterinarian. (a) cleaning and disinfection of the tanks, crates or other fomites used for the transport of the salamanders is carried out unless those are destroyed, in a way to prevent the spread of Bsal. (b) waste material and waste water is collected regularly, stored and subsequently treated in a way to prevent the spread of Bsal. (c) carcases of quarantined salamanders are examined in a laboratory indicated by the competent authority. (d) the necessary tests and treatments of salamanders are carried out in consultation with and under the control of the official or approved veterinarian.
(a) cleaning and disinfection of the tanks, crates or other fomites used for the transport of the salamanders is carried out unless those are destroyed, in a way to prevent the spread of Bsal.
(b) waste material and waste water is collected regularly, stored and subsequently treated in a way to prevent the spread of Bsal.
(c) carcases of quarantined salamanders are examined in a laboratory indicated by the competent authority.
(d) the necessary tests and treatments of salamanders are carried out in consultation with and under the control of the official or approved veterinarian.
(a) cleaning and disinfection of the tanks, crates or other fomites used for the transport of the salamanders is carried out unless those are destroyed, in a way to prevent the spread of Bsal.
(b) waste material and waste water is collected regularly, stored and subsequently treated in a way to prevent the spread of Bsal.
(c) carcases of quarantined salamanders are examined in a laboratory indicated by the competent authority.
(d) the necessary tests and treatments of salamanders are carried out in consultation with and under the control of the official or approved veterinarian.
(3) The operator of the appropriate establishments of destination informs the official or approved veterinarian of diseases and deaths of salamanders during the quarantine.
(4) The operator of the appropriate establishments of destination keeps a record of:(a)the date, number and species of salamanders entering and leaving for each consignment;(b)copies of the animal health certificates and the common veterinary entry documents accompanying the consignment of salamanders;(c)cases of illness and the number of deaths on a daily basis;(d)dates and results of testing;(e)types and dates of treatment and the number of animals subjected to it. (a) the date, number and species of salamanders entering and leaving for each consignment; (b) copies of the animal health certificates and the common veterinary entry documents accompanying the consignment of salamanders; (c) cases of illness and the number of deaths on a daily basis; (d) dates and results of testing; (e) types and dates of treatment and the number of animals subjected to it.
(a) the date, number and species of salamanders entering and leaving for each consignment;
(b) copies of the animal health certificates and the common veterinary entry documents accompanying the consignment of salamanders;
(c) cases of illness and the number of deaths on a daily basis;
(d) dates and results of testing;
(e) types and dates of treatment and the number of animals subjected to it.
(a) the date, number and species of salamanders entering and leaving for each consignment;
(b) copies of the animal health certificates and the common veterinary entry documents accompanying the consignment of salamanders;
(c) cases of illness and the number of deaths on a daily basis;
(d) dates and results of testing;
(e) types and dates of treatment and the number of animals subjected to it.
(1) During quarantine, the salamanders are subjected to the following procedures:(a)If the size of the epidemiological unit is 62 or more, skin swab samples from quarantined salamanders must be examined under the control of the official or approved veterinarian with the appropriate diagnostic test during the fifth week following the date of their entry into the appropriate establishment, in accordance with the sample sizes set out in the reference table, unless the operator opts for treatment in accordance with point (b).Reference Table(1):Size of the epidemiological unit62186200250300350400450Sample size629698102106108110111(b)If the operator opts for one of the treatments listed in point (3) or in all cases where the size of the epidemiological unit is less than 62, all salamanders in the consignment must be treated by the operator against Bsal under the control of the official or approved veterinarian to the satisfaction of the competent authority.(c)In cases referred to in point (b) the official or approved veterinarian may require representative testing of the epidemiological unit with the appropriate diagnostic test before the treatment to monitor the presence of Bsal or after treatment to verify the absence of Bsal.(d)Skin swab samples from all dead or clinically sick salamanders, in particular those with skin lesions, must be examined under the control of the official or approved veterinarian with the appropriate diagnostic test at the time they show lesions or other clinical signs or at the time of death, whichever is sooner.(e)All salamanders which die in the appropriate establishment must be subjected to a post mortem examination under the control of the official or approved veterinarian, in particular to check for signs of Bsal, to confirm or to exclude Bsal as cause of death, to the extent possible. (a) If the size of the epidemiological unit is 62 or more, skin swab samples from quarantined salamanders must be examined under the control of the official or approved veterinarian with the appropriate diagnostic test during the fifth week following the date of their entry into the appropriate establishment, in accordance with the sample sizes set out in the reference table, unless the operator opts for treatment in accordance with point (b).Reference Table(1):Size of the epidemiological unit62186200250300350400450Sample size629698102106108110111 Size of the epidemiological unit 62 186 200 250 300 350 400 450 Sample size 62 96 98 102 106 108 110 111 (b) If the operator opts for one of the treatments listed in point (3) or in all cases where the size of the epidemiological unit is less than 62, all salamanders in the consignment must be treated by the operator against Bsal under the control of the official or approved veterinarian to the satisfaction of the competent authority. (c) In cases referred to in point (b) the official or approved veterinarian may require representative testing of the epidemiological unit with the appropriate diagnostic test before the treatment to monitor the presence of Bsal or after treatment to verify the absence of Bsal. (d) Skin swab samples from all dead or clinically sick salamanders, in particular those with skin lesions, must be examined under the control of the official or approved veterinarian with the appropriate diagnostic test at the time they show lesions or other clinical signs or at the time of death, whichever is sooner. (e) All salamanders which die in the appropriate establishment must be subjected to a post mortem examination under the control of the official or approved veterinarian, in particular to check for signs of Bsal, to confirm or to exclude Bsal as cause of death, to the extent possible.
(a) If the size of the epidemiological unit is 62 or more, skin swab samples from quarantined salamanders must be examined under the control of the official or approved veterinarian with the appropriate diagnostic test during the fifth week following the date of their entry into the appropriate establishment, in accordance with the sample sizes set out in the reference table, unless the operator opts for treatment in accordance with point (b).Reference Table(1):Size of the epidemiological unit62186200250300350400450Sample size629698102106108110111 Size of the epidemiological unit 62 186 200 250 300 350 400 450 Sample size 62 96 98 102 106 108 110 111
Size of the epidemiological unit 62 186 200 250 300 350 400 450
Sample size 62 96 98 102 106 108 110 111
(b) If the operator opts for one of the treatments listed in point (3) or in all cases where the size of the epidemiological unit is less than 62, all salamanders in the consignment must be treated by the operator against Bsal under the control of the official or approved veterinarian to the satisfaction of the competent authority.
(c) In cases referred to in point (b) the official or approved veterinarian may require representative testing of the epidemiological unit with the appropriate diagnostic test before the treatment to monitor the presence of Bsal or after treatment to verify the absence of Bsal.
(d) Skin swab samples from all dead or clinically sick salamanders, in particular those with skin lesions, must be examined under the control of the official or approved veterinarian with the appropriate diagnostic test at the time they show lesions or other clinical signs or at the time of death, whichever is sooner.
(e) All salamanders which die in the appropriate establishment must be subjected to a post mortem examination under the control of the official or approved veterinarian, in particular to check for signs of Bsal, to confirm or to exclude Bsal as cause of death, to the extent possible.
(a) If the size of the epidemiological unit is 62 or more, skin swab samples from quarantined salamanders must be examined under the control of the official or approved veterinarian with the appropriate diagnostic test during the fifth week following the date of their entry into the appropriate establishment, in accordance with the sample sizes set out in the reference table, unless the operator opts for treatment in accordance with point (b).Reference Table(1):Size of the epidemiological unit62186200250300350400450Sample size629698102106108110111 Size of the epidemiological unit 62 186 200 250 300 350 400 450 Sample size 62 96 98 102 106 108 110 111
Size of the epidemiological unit 62 186 200 250 300 350 400 450
Sample size 62 96 98 102 106 108 110 111
Size of the epidemiological unit 62 186 200 250 300 350 400 450
Sample size 62 96 98 102 106 108 110 111
(b) If the operator opts for one of the treatments listed in point (3) or in all cases where the size of the epidemiological unit is less than 62, all salamanders in the consignment must be treated by the operator against Bsal under the control of the official or approved veterinarian to the satisfaction of the competent authority.
(c) In cases referred to in point (b) the official or approved veterinarian may require representative testing of the epidemiological unit with the appropriate diagnostic test before the treatment to monitor the presence of Bsal or after treatment to verify the absence of Bsal.
(d) Skin swab samples from all dead or clinically sick salamanders, in particular those with skin lesions, must be examined under the control of the official or approved veterinarian with the appropriate diagnostic test at the time they show lesions or other clinical signs or at the time of death, whichever is sooner.
(e) All salamanders which die in the appropriate establishment must be subjected to a post mortem examination under the control of the official or approved veterinarian, in particular to check for signs of Bsal, to confirm or to exclude Bsal as cause of death, to the extent possible.
(2) All testing of samples taken and post mortem examination during quarantine must be carried out in laboratories indicated by the official or approved veterinarian.
(3) The following treatments are considered to be satisfactory:(a)keeping salamanders at a temperature of at least 25 °C for at least 12 days;(b)keeping salamanders at a temperature of at least 20 °C for at least 10 days combined with a treatment with polymyxin E submersion baths (2 000 IU/ml) for 10 minutes twice per day, followed by applying voriconazole spray (12,5 μg/ml);(c)any other treatment with comparable results in eliminating Bsal as reported in a peer-reviewed article published in a scientific journal. (a) keeping salamanders at a temperature of at least 25 °C for at least 12 days; (b) keeping salamanders at a temperature of at least 20 °C for at least 10 days combined with a treatment with polymyxin E submersion baths (2 000 IU/ml) for 10 minutes twice per day, followed by applying voriconazole spray (12,5 μg/ml); (c) any other treatment with comparable results in eliminating Bsal as reported in a peer-reviewed article published in a scientific journal.
(a) keeping salamanders at a temperature of at least 25 °C for at least 12 days;
(b) keeping salamanders at a temperature of at least 20 °C for at least 10 days combined with a treatment with polymyxin E submersion baths (2 000 IU/ml) for 10 minutes twice per day, followed by applying voriconazole spray (12,5 μg/ml);
(c) any other treatment with comparable results in eliminating Bsal as reported in a peer-reviewed article published in a scientific journal.
(a) keeping salamanders at a temperature of at least 25 °C for at least 12 days;
(b) keeping salamanders at a temperature of at least 20 °C for at least 10 days combined with a treatment with polymyxin E submersion baths (2 000 IU/ml) for 10 minutes twice per day, followed by applying voriconazole spray (12,5 μg/ml);
(c) any other treatment with comparable results in eliminating Bsal as reported in a peer-reviewed article published in a scientific journal.
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Council Directive 90/425/EEC of 26 June 1990 concerning veterinary and zootechnical checks applicable in intra-Community trade in certain live animals and products with a view to the completion of the internal market(1), and in particular Article 10(4) thereof,
Having regard to Council Directive 91/496/EEC of 15 July 1991 laying down the principles governing the organisation of veterinary checks on animals entering the Community from third countries and amending Directives 89/662/EEC, 90/425/EEC and 90/675/EEC(2), and in particular Article 18(1) thereof,
(1) Since 2013,Batrachochytrium salamandrivorans(Bsal), which is an emerging pathogen fungus of salamanders, has been occuring in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. It affects kept and wild salamander populations, and it can cause significant morbidity and mortality in those populations. Bsal is lethal to certain species of salamanders, while other species are fully or partly resistant to it, but may carry Bsal on their skin and therefore act as a reservoir and source of infection or contamination for other species of salamanders.
(2) According to current scientific knowledge concerning Bsal, compiled by a scientific opinion(3)of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) about Bsal within its Assessment of listing and categorisation of animal diseases in the framework of Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and of the Council(4), Bsal seems to be endemic at least in Japan, Thailand and Vietnam with around a 3 % prevalence rate in wild salamander populations. It is generally thought to have originated in East Asia and to be widespread and endemic there. At the same time, there is a lack of information on how widespread it is in other parts of the world. It is also generally thought that trade in infected or carrier salamanders contributes to the spread of Bsal.
(3) According to available data, both resistant and susceptible salamander species are traded. Council Directive 92/65/EEC(5)lays down the animal health requirements governing trade in and imports into the Union of animals not subject to the animal health requirements laid down in the specific Union acts listed in Annex F thereto. Union animal health legislation, including Directive 92/65/EEC, currently lays down no specific animal health requirements for trade in salamanders or for their imports into the Union that would be effective in protecting animal health against the spread of Bsal in the Union.
(4) The EFSA, in its scientific and technical assistance concerning the survival, establishment and spread of Batrachochytrium salamandrivorans (Bsal) in the EU(6)(the EFSA Assistance), assessed the potential of Bsal to affect the health of wild and kept salamanders in the Union, the effectiveness and feasibility of a movement ban on traded salamanders, the validity, reliability and robustness of available diagnostic methods for Bsal detection and possible alternative methods and feasible risk mitigation measures to ensure safe international and intra-Union trade in salamanders.
(5) According to the EFSA Assistance, quarantining salamanders, the testing of salamanders to demonstrate that they are free of infection from Bsal, restricting movements of salamanders, hygienic procedures and biosecurity measures or treating salamanders against Bsal are important risk mitigation measures in preventing the spread of that disease.
(6) The EFSA Assistance also highlighted many gaps and uncertainties in the current state of knowledge as regards Bsal. In particular, it concluded, that due to the complexity of the taxonomy as well as the lack of current evidence concerning which species are susceptible to Bsal, rules at the level of the taxonomic order are likely to be both more effective and more feasible than species-specific rules.
(7) It is therefore appropriate to lay down animal health protection measures for intra-Union trade in consignments of salamanders and the introduction of such consignments into the Union on the taxonomic order of Caudata, in order to ensure that Bsal is not spread by intra-Union trade in those animals and the introduction of such animals into the Union. These measures should take into account the risk mitigation measures referred to in the EFSA Assistance and in particular provide for the appropriate quarantine, diagnostic testing and treatment of salamanders as well as for certification of their health status for their trade in and introduction into the Union. These measures are of an emergency nature and are not deemed specific measures within the meaning of Article 18(2) of Council Directive 92/65/EEC.
(8) Regulation (EU) No 576/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(7)lays down the animal health requirements applicable to the non-commercial movements of pet animals listed in Annex I thereto, and amphibia are included in the animals listed in that Annex. The animal health protection measures laid down in this Decision should not apply to the non-commercial movements of pet salamanders which fall within the scope of Regulation (EU) No 576/2013, due the specificities of those movements and given the lack of information concerning such movements.
(9) These measures should apply regardless of other Union rules potentially relevant for trade in and introduction of salamanders, in particular Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97(8).
(10) The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) listed infection with Bsal in its Aquatic Animal Health Code during its 85th General Session on 21-26 May 2017. But detailed international standards are not yet available and there is a lack of information on the technical capabilities of veterinary services and laboratories around the world to test for Bsal, while various concerned stakeholders in the European Union are in the forefront of progress on the diagnosis and treatment of Bsal and the safe handling of traded salamanders. It is therefore appropriate that most risk-mitigating measures, in particular the quarantining in an appropriate establishment, testing and treatment of traded and introduced salamanders are to be done by competent veterinary authorities, operators and laboratories located within the Union.
(11) According to the EFSA Assistance, it is possible that Bsal is transmitted between salamander species native to different areas and cross-contamination may take place in various establishments breeding, collecting or distributing salamanders. This makes the risk of Bsal occurring in traded salamanders independent from their place of origin and from the situation in the wild. Therefore all consignments of salamanders destined for intra-Union trade or introduced into the Union should be subject to risk mitigation measures.
(12) Minimum conditions for appropriate establishments to be used for quarantining salamanders should be laid down to ensure their biosecurity, while the handling of salamanders which die in those establishments should be done according to existing specific rules laid down in the Animal by-products Regulation(9).
(13) As regards the size of the quarantined epidemiological units, a minimum size eligible for certification for negative diagnostic test results should be specified due to the limited sensitivity of the best available real-time quantitative polymerase chain reaction (qPCR) assay which is sufficiently reliable to be used only if the epidemiological units comprise at least 62 salamanders.
(14) Salamanders which have undergone quarantine with testing with negative results or satisfactory treatment in the Union should not be subjected to quarantine or testing again, provided that they have been kept isolated from salamanders of a different health status in an appropriate establishment.
(15) As regards treatments, these should be specified and be in line with the protocols already described in peer-reviewed scientific literature as highlighted by the EFSA Assistance or with comparable ones.
(16) A list of third countries approved for issuing animal health certificates for the introduction into the Union of consignments of salamanders should be established and limited to those countries which have already provided sufficient guarantees for issuing certificates to prevent misleading and fraudulent certification, at least equivalent to Council Directive 96/93/EC(10). Therefore, it is appropriate to refer to already available lists existing in the context of introduction into the Union of other commodities. Such third countries are listed in Annex I to Commission Decision 2004/211/EC(11), Part 2 of Annex II to Commission Decision 2007/777/EC(12), Annex I to Commission Regulation (EC) No 798/2008(13), Part 1 of Annex I to Commission Regulation (EC) No 119/2009(14), Part 1 of Annex II to Commission Regulation (EU) No 206/2010(15), or Annex I to Commission Regulation (EU) No 605/2010(16), respectively.
(17) Consignments of salamanders should be introduced in the Union only if they comply with all the requirements and the competent veterinary authority of the border inspection post of entry can also ascertain that the consignments will be accepted by an operator responsible for an appropriate establishment of destination to be duly quarantined.
(18) The actual arrival of consignments of salamanders introduced into the Union from third countries at their place of quarantine in the Union should be recorded in the electronic version of the common veterinary entry document set out in Annex I to Commission Regulation (EC) No 282/2004(17)and managed by the integrated computerised veterinary system known as Traces, so that the competent veterinary authority of the border inspection post of entry can be reliably informed of their arrival.
(19) This Decision should provide for a transitional period in order to give the Member States, the competent authorities and economic operators time to put in place the necessary procedures so that they are in a position to comply with the rules laid down in this Decision. The length of this period should be limited to a few months. At the same time, risk mitigation measures based on the required level of protection by the Member States of destination should already apply.
(20) It is expected that more information will be available in the coming years about Bsal from scientific sources and from results of official controls carried out by the Member States, supplementing the current knowledge concerning that disease. Therefore, the animal health protection measures laid down in this Decision should be of a temporary nature. Nevertheless, they should apply at least until 31 December 2019 to allow for 1 year of implementation by the Member States and subsequent annual reporting and consideration thereof, while permanent EU animal health rules may be laid down under the new Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases to apply from the date of application of that Regulation.
(21) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Subject and scope
Article 1
This Decision lays down the animal health protection measures for intra-Union trade in consignments of salamanders and the introduction of such consignments into the Union.

Definitions
Article 2
For the purposes of this Decision, the following definitions shall apply:
(a)
‘salamanders’ means all amphibians of the orderCaudata;
(b)
‘Bsal’ means the fungusBatrachochytrium salamandrivorans(kingdom fungi,Phylum Chytridiomycota,orderRhizophydiales);
(c)
‘epidemiological unit’ means a group of salamanders with the same likelihood of exposure to Bsal;
(d)
‘quarantine’ means the keeping of salamanders in isolation with no direct or indirect contact with salamanders outside their epidemiological unit, for the purposes of ensuring that there is no spread of Bsal while the animals in isolation are undergoing observation for a specified length of time and testing and, if appropriate, treatment;
(e)
‘operator’ means any natural or legal person having salamanders under its responsibility, including for a limited duration of time, but excluding pet keepers;
(f)
‘appropriate establishment’ means premises:
(i)
where salamanders are kept in quarantine before being dispatched to another Member State or after their introduction into the Union; and
(ii)
which are registered by the competent authority prior to the date of commencement of any quarantine;
(g)
‘appropriate diagnostic test’ means a real-time quantitative polymerase chain reaction (qPCR) assay containing species-specific STerF and STerR primers amplifying a 119 nucleotide long fragment of Bsal DNA;
(h)
‘common veterinary entry document’ or ‘CVED’ means the document notifying the arrival of animals into the Union as provided for in Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 282/2004 and drawn up in accordance with the model set out in Annex I thereto and managed by the integrated computerised veterinary system known as Traces;
(i)
‘confirmed case of Bsal’ means the confirmation of the presence of Bsal or its genetic material on or in the tissues of salamanders by the appropriate diagnostic test;

Animal health conditions for intra-Union trade in salamanders
Article 3
1. Member States shall prohibit the dispatch of consignments of salamanders to another Member State, except where such consignments comply with the following animal health conditions:
(a)
they are accompanied by an animal health certificate which complies with the model animal health certificate set out in Part A of Annex I;
(b)
the salamanders must not show clinical signs of Bsal, in particular they must show no skin lesions and ulcers at the time of examination by the official veterinarian; that examination must be carried out within a period of 24 hours prior to the time of dispatch of the consignment to the Member State of destination;
(c)
the salamanders must come from a population where there have been no mortalities due to Bsal and no clinical signs of Bsal, in particular skin lesions and ulcers must not have been observed by the operator;
(d)
the consignment must consist of:
(i)
at least 62 salamanders which have undergone quarantine as one epidemiological unit in an appropriate establishment which complies with the minimum conditions set out in Annex II for a period of at least 6 weeks immediately prior to the date of the issuing of the animal health certificate set out in Part A of Annex I and skin swab samples from the salamanders in the consignment must have been tested for Bsal with negative results during the fifth week of the period of quarantine with the appropriate diagnostic test, in accordance with the sample sizes set out in point 1(a) of Annex III; or
(ii)
salamanders which have been treated to the satisfaction of the competent authority against Bsal in accordance with point 1(b) of Annex III.
2. Where consignments of salamanders have been introduced into the Union from a third country and they have already undergone quarantine in an appropriate establishment of destination in accordance with Article 6, Member States shall only authorise their dispatch to another Member State where such consignments comply with the following conditions:
(a)
the animal health conditions laid down in paragraph 1(a), (b) and (c);
(b)
the salamanders have been kept in quarantine in the appropriate establishment which complies with the minimum conditions set out in Annex II, between the end of the period of quarantine following their introduction into the Union and the issuing of the animal health certificate set out in Part A of Annex I.

Animal health conditions for the introduction into the Union of consignments of salamanders
Article 4
Member States shall prohibit the introduction into the Union of consignments of salamanders from a third country, except where such consignments comply with the following conditions:
(a)
they come from third countries listed in one of the following:
(i)
Annex I to Decision 2004/211/EC;
(ii)
Part 2 of Annex II to Decision 2007/777/EC;
(iii)
Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 798/2008;
(iv)
Part 1 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 119/2009;
(v)
Part 1 of Annex II to Regulation (EU) No 206/2010;
or
(vi)
Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 605/2010;
(b)
they are accompanied by an animal health certificate which complies with the model animal health certificate set out in Part B of Annex I;
(c)
the salamanders must not show clinical signs of Bsal, in particular there must be no signs of skin lesions and ulcers at the time of examination by the official veterinarian; and that examination must have been carried out within a period of 24 hours prior to the time of dispatch of the consignment to the Union;
(d)
before issuing the animal health certificate referred to in point (b), the epidemiological unit comprising the salamanders in the consignment must have been isolated from other salamanders at the latest at the time of the examination for the purposes of issuing of animal health certificate and they must not have been in contact with other salamanders since that time.

Attestation regarding the appropriate establishment of destination
Article 5
Member States shall ensure that border inspection posts do not accept the entry into the Union of consignments of salamanders unless importers or their agents provide a written attestation, in an official language of the Member State of the border inspection post of entry into the Union, which is signed by the natural or legal person responsible for the appropriate establishment of destination, stating:
(a)
the name and address of the appropriate establishment of destination;
(b)
that the appropriate establishment of destination complies with the minimum conditions set out in Annex II;
(c)
that the consignment of salamanders will be accepted for quarantine.

Quarantine rules for consignments of salamanders introduced into the Union
Article 6
Member States shall ensure that:
1.
The official or approved veterinarian responsible for the appropriate establishment of destination records the arrival of the consignment of salamanders introduced into the Union from a third country in Box 45 of Part 3 in the electronic version of the common veterinary entry document.
2.
The official or approved veterinarian ensures that the operator keeps the consignment of salamanders in quarantine in the appropriate establishment of destination as one epidemiological unit.
3.
The official or approved veterinarian inspects the conditions of quarantine for each consignment of salamanders, including an examination of the mortality records and a clinical inspection of the salamanders in the appropriate establishment of destination, checking in particular for skin lesions and ulcers.
4.
Where a consignment comprises 62 or more salamanders, the official or approved veterinarian carries out the examination, sampling, testing and treatment procedures for Bsal in accordance with the procedures referred to in points 1 and 2 of Annex III, following the arrival of the consignment of salamanders at the appropriate establishment of destination.
5.
Where the consignment comprises less than 62 salamanders, the official or approved veterinarian ensures that the consignment is treated to the satisfaction of the competent authority against Bsal in accordance with point 3 of Annex III.
6.
The official or approved veterinarian releases the consignment of salamanders from the appropriate establishment of destination by a written authorisation:
(a)
in case of testing as referred to in point 1(a) of Annex III, provided that at least 6 weeks has elapsed since the date of the the commencement of the period of quarantine and not before the receipt of the negative test results, whichever is later; or
(b)
in the case of treatment as referred to in point 1(b) of Annex III, only after satisfactory completion of the treatment.

Measures to be taken in the event of a confirmed case of Bsal in an appropriate establishment of destination
Article 7
1. Member States shall ensure that where during quarantine it is confirmed that at least one salamander of an epidemiological unit is infected with Bsal, the following measures are taken by the appropriate establishment of destination:
(a)
all salamanders in the same epidemiological unit are either:
(i)
treated to the satisfaction of the competent authority against Bsal in accordance with point 3 of Annex III; or
(ii)
killed and disposed of as animal by-products in accordance with Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009.
(b)
following completion of the measures referred to in point (a), the area of the appropriate establishment of destination where the epidemiological unit had been kept is cleaned and disinfected to the satisfaction of the competent authority.
2. The competent authority may require testing of the treated salamanders to verify the effectiveness of the treatment referred to in point 1(a)(i) and may require repeated treatments, as appropriate, to prevent the spread of Bsal.

Costs
Article 8
Member States shall ensure that all quarantine costs, testing costs and, where necessary, the costs of risk mitigation measures and treatments are borne by the operator or the importer.

Annual reporting requirements
Article 9
At the latest by 30 June each year, starting from 2019, those Member States which have handled salamander consignments in the previous year, shall submit to the Commission the following information concerning the previous year, differentiating between information related to the intra-Union trade or to introductions of salamander consignments into the Union:
(a)
the number of epidemiological units with at least one confirmed case of Bsal;
(b)
the number of epidemiological units treated without a confirmed case;
(c)
any further information they deem relevant on testing, treating or handling the consignments and on the implementation of this Decision.

Transitional measures
Article 10
1. For a transitional period until 6 September 2018, the Member States of destination may accept on their territory consignments of salamanders from other Member States which do not comply with the animal health conditions laid down in Article 3, under appropriate risk mitigation conditions to be determined by the competent authority after consulting the operators and, if necessary, the Member State of origin.
2. For a transitional period until 6 September 2018, the Member States of destination may accept on their territory consignments of salamanders introduced into the Union from a third country which do not comply with the animal health conditions laid down in Article 4, provided that they are handled in accordance with Articles 5 to 7.

Applicability
Article 11
This Decision shall apply until 31 December 2019.

Addressees
Article 12
This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Council Directive 90/425/EEC of 26 June 1990 concerning veterinary and zootechnical checks applicable in intra-Community trade in certain live animals and products with a view to the completion of the internal market(1), and in particular Article 10(4) thereof,
Having regard to Council Directive 91/496/EEC of 15 July 1991 laying down the principles governing the organisation of veterinary checks on animals entering the Community from third countries and amending Directives 89/662/EEC, 90/425/EEC and 90/675/EEC(2), and in particular Article 18(1) thereof,
(1) Since 2013,Batrachochytrium salamandrivorans(Bsal), which is an emerging pathogen fungus of salamanders, has been occuring in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. It affects kept and wild salamander populations, and it can cause significant morbidity and mortality in those populations. Bsal is lethal to certain species of salamanders, while other species are fully or partly resistant to it, but may carry Bsal on their skin and therefore act as a reservoir and source of infection or contamination for other species of salamanders.
(2) According to current scientific knowledge concerning Bsal, compiled by a scientific opinion(3)of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) about Bsal within its Assessment of listing and categorisation of animal diseases in the framework of Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and of the Council(4), Bsal seems to be endemic at least in Japan, Thailand and Vietnam with around a 3 % prevalence rate in wild salamander populations. It is generally thought to have originated in East Asia and to be widespread and endemic there. At the same time, there is a lack of information on how widespread it is in other parts of the world. It is also generally thought that trade in infected or carrier salamanders contributes to the spread of Bsal.
(3) According to available data, both resistant and susceptible salamander species are traded. Council Directive 92/65/EEC(5)lays down the animal health requirements governing trade in and imports into the Union of animals not subject to the animal health requirements laid down in the specific Union acts listed in Annex F thereto. Union animal health legislation, including Directive 92/65/EEC, currently lays down no specific animal health requirements for trade in salamanders or for their imports into the Union that would be effective in protecting animal health against the spread of Bsal in the Union.
(4) The EFSA, in its scientific and technical assistance concerning the survival, establishment and spread of Batrachochytrium salamandrivorans (Bsal) in the EU(6)(the EFSA Assistance), assessed the potential of Bsal to affect the health of wild and kept salamanders in the Union, the effectiveness and feasibility of a movement ban on traded salamanders, the validity, reliability and robustness of available diagnostic methods for Bsal detection and possible alternative methods and feasible risk mitigation measures to ensure safe international and intra-Union trade in salamanders.
(5) According to the EFSA Assistance, quarantining salamanders, the testing of salamanders to demonstrate that they are free of infection from Bsal, restricting movements of salamanders, hygienic procedures and biosecurity measures or treating salamanders against Bsal are important risk mitigation measures in preventing the spread of that disease.
(6) The EFSA Assistance also highlighted many gaps and uncertainties in the current state of knowledge as regards Bsal. In particular, it concluded, that due to the complexity of the taxonomy as well as the lack of current evidence concerning which species are susceptible to Bsal, rules at the level of the taxonomic order are likely to be both more effective and more feasible than species-specific rules.
(7) It is therefore appropriate to lay down animal health protection measures for intra-Union trade in consignments of salamanders and the introduction of such consignments into the Union on the taxonomic order of Caudata, in order to ensure that Bsal is not spread by intra-Union trade in those animals and the introduction of such animals into the Union. These measures should take into account the risk mitigation measures referred to in the EFSA Assistance and in particular provide for the appropriate quarantine, diagnostic testing and treatment of salamanders as well as for certification of their health status for their trade in and introduction into the Union. These measures are of an emergency nature and are not deemed specific measures within the meaning of Article 18(2) of Council Directive 92/65/EEC.
(8) Regulation (EU) No 576/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(7)lays down the animal health requirements applicable to the non-commercial movements of pet animals listed in Annex I thereto, and amphibia are included in the animals listed in that Annex. The animal health protection measures laid down in this Decision should not apply to the non-commercial movements of pet salamanders which fall within the scope of Regulation (EU) No 576/2013, due the specificities of those movements and given the lack of information concerning such movements.
(9) These measures should apply regardless of other Union rules potentially relevant for trade in and introduction of salamanders, in particular Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97(8).
(10) The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) listed infection with Bsal in its Aquatic Animal Health Code during its 85th General Session on 21-26 May 2017. But detailed international standards are not yet available and there is a lack of information on the technical capabilities of veterinary services and laboratories around the world to test for Bsal, while various concerned stakeholders in the European Union are in the forefront of progress on the diagnosis and treatment of Bsal and the safe handling of traded salamanders. It is therefore appropriate that most risk-mitigating measures, in particular the quarantining in an appropriate establishment, testing and treatment of traded and introduced salamanders are to be done by competent veterinary authorities, operators and laboratories located within the Union.
(11) According to the EFSA Assistance, it is possible that Bsal is transmitted between salamander species native to different areas and cross-contamination may take place in various establishments breeding, collecting or distributing salamanders. This makes the risk of Bsal occurring in traded salamanders independent from their place of origin and from the situation in the wild. Therefore all consignments of salamanders destined for intra-Union trade or introduced into the Union should be subject to risk mitigation measures.
(12) Minimum conditions for appropriate establishments to be used for quarantining salamanders should be laid down to ensure their biosecurity, while the handling of salamanders which die in those establishments should be done according to existing specific rules laid down in the Animal by-products Regulation(9).
(13) As regards the size of the quarantined epidemiological units, a minimum size eligible for certification for negative diagnostic test results should be specified due to the limited sensitivity of the best available real-time quantitative polymerase chain reaction (qPCR) assay which is sufficiently reliable to be used only if the epidemiological units comprise at least 62 salamanders.
(14) Salamanders which have undergone quarantine with testing with negative results or satisfactory treatment in the Union should not be subjected to quarantine or testing again, provided that they have been kept isolated from salamanders of a different health status in an appropriate establishment.
(15) As regards treatments, these should be specified and be in line with the protocols already described in peer-reviewed scientific literature as highlighted by the EFSA Assistance or with comparable ones.
(16) A list of third countries approved for issuing animal health certificates for the introduction into the Union of consignments of salamanders should be established and limited to those countries which have already provided sufficient guarantees for issuing certificates to prevent misleading and fraudulent certification, at least equivalent to Council Directive 96/93/EC(10). Therefore, it is appropriate to refer to already available lists existing in the context of introduction into the Union of other commodities. Such third countries are listed in Annex I to Commission Decision 2004/211/EC(11), Part 2 of Annex II to Commission Decision 2007/777/EC(12), Annex I to Commission Regulation (EC) No 798/2008(13), Part 1 of Annex I to Commission Regulation (EC) No 119/2009(14), Part 1 of Annex II to Commission Regulation (EU) No 206/2010(15), or Annex I to Commission Regulation (EU) No 605/2010(16), respectively.
(17) Consignments of salamanders should be introduced in the Union only if they comply with all the requirements and the competent veterinary authority of the border inspection post of entry can also ascertain that the consignments will be accepted by an operator responsible for an appropriate establishment of destination to be duly quarantined.
(18) The actual arrival of consignments of salamanders introduced into the Union from third countries at their place of quarantine in the Union should be recorded in the electronic version of the common veterinary entry document set out in Annex I to Commission Regulation (EC) No 282/2004(17)and managed by the integrated computerised veterinary system known as Traces, so that the competent veterinary authority of the border inspection post of entry can be reliably informed of their arrival.
(19) This Decision should provide for a transitional period in order to give the Member States, the competent authorities and economic operators time to put in place the necessary procedures so that they are in a position to comply with the rules laid down in this Decision. The length of this period should be limited to a few months. At the same time, risk mitigation measures based on the required level of protection by the Member States of destination should already apply.
(20) It is expected that more information will be available in the coming years about Bsal from scientific sources and from results of official controls carried out by the Member States, supplementing the current knowledge concerning that disease. Therefore, the animal health protection measures laid down in this Decision should be of a temporary nature. Nevertheless, they should apply at least until 31 December 2019 to allow for 1 year of implementation by the Member States and subsequent annual reporting and consideration thereof, while permanent EU animal health rules may be laid down under the new Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases to apply from the date of application of that Regulation.
(21) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Subject and scope

This Decision lays down the animal health protection measures for intra-Union trade in consignments of salamanders and the introduction of such consignments into the Union.

Definitions

For the purposes of this Decision, the following definitions shall apply:
(a)
‘salamanders’ means all amphibians of the orderCaudata;
(b)
‘Bsal’ means the fungusBatrachochytrium salamandrivorans(kingdom fungi,Phylum Chytridiomycota,orderRhizophydiales);
(c)
‘epidemiological unit’ means a group of salamanders with the same likelihood of exposure to Bsal;
(d)
‘quarantine’ means the keeping of salamanders in isolation with no direct or indirect contact with salamanders outside their epidemiological unit, for the purposes of ensuring that there is no spread of Bsal while the animals in isolation are undergoing observation for a specified length of time and testing and, if appropriate, treatment;
(e)
‘operator’ means any natural or legal person having salamanders under its responsibility, including for a limited duration of time, but excluding pet keepers;
(f)
‘appropriate establishment’ means premises:
(i)
where salamanders are kept in quarantine before being dispatched to another Member State or after their introduction into the Union; and
(ii)
which are registered by the competent authority prior to the date of commencement of any quarantine;
(g)
‘appropriate diagnostic test’ means a real-time quantitative polymerase chain reaction (qPCR) assay containing species-specific STerF and STerR primers amplifying a 119 nucleotide long fragment of Bsal DNA;
(h)
‘common veterinary entry document’ or ‘CVED’ means the document notifying the arrival of animals into the Union as provided for in Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 282/2004 and drawn up in accordance with the model set out in Annex I thereto and managed by the integrated computerised veterinary system known as Traces;
(i)
‘confirmed case of Bsal’ means the confirmation of the presence of Bsal or its genetic material on or in the tissues of salamanders by the appropriate diagnostic test;

Animal health conditions for intra-Union trade in salamanders

1. Member States shall prohibit the dispatch of consignments of salamanders to another Member State, except where such consignments comply with the following animal health conditions:
(a)
they are accompanied by an animal health certificate which complies with the model animal health certificate set out in Part A of Annex I;
(b)
the salamanders must not show clinical signs of Bsal, in particular they must show no skin lesions and ulcers at the time of examination by the official veterinarian; that examination must be carried out within a period of 24 hours prior to the time of dispatch of the consignment to the Member State of destination;
(c)
the salamanders must come from a population where there have been no mortalities due to Bsal and no clinical signs of Bsal, in particular skin lesions and ulcers must not have been observed by the operator;
(d)
the consignment must consist of:
(i)
at least 62 salamanders which have undergone quarantine as one epidemiological unit in an appropriate establishment which complies with the minimum conditions set out in Annex II for a period of at least 6 weeks immediately prior to the date of the issuing of the animal health certificate set out in Part A of Annex I and skin swab samples from the salamanders in the consignment must have been tested for Bsal with negative results during the fifth week of the period of quarantine with the appropriate diagnostic test, in accordance with the sample sizes set out in point 1(a) of Annex III; or
(ii)
salamanders which have been treated to the satisfaction of the competent authority against Bsal in accordance with point 1(b) of Annex III.
2. Where consignments of salamanders have been introduced into the Union from a third country and they have already undergone quarantine in an appropriate establishment of destination in accordance with Article 6, Member States shall only authorise their dispatch to another Member State where such consignments comply with the following conditions:
(a)
the animal health conditions laid down in paragraph 1(a), (b) and (c);
(b)
the salamanders have been kept in quarantine in the appropriate establishment which complies with the minimum conditions set out in Annex II, between the end of the period of quarantine following their introduction into the Union and the issuing of the animal health certificate set out in Part A of Annex I.

Animal health conditions for the introduction into the Union of consignments of salamanders

Member States shall prohibit the introduction into the Union of consignments of salamanders from a third country, except where such consignments comply with the following conditions:
(a)
they come from third countries listed in one of the following:
(i)
Annex I to Decision 2004/211/EC;
(ii)
Part 2 of Annex II to Decision 2007/777/EC;
(iii)
Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 798/2008;
(iv)
Part 1 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 119/2009;
(v)
Part 1 of Annex II to Regulation (EU) No 206/2010;
or
(vi)
Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 605/2010;
(b)
they are accompanied by an animal health certificate which complies with the model animal health certificate set out in Part B of Annex I;
(c)
the salamanders must not show clinical signs of Bsal, in particular there must be no signs of skin lesions and ulcers at the time of examination by the official veterinarian; and that examination must have been carried out within a period of 24 hours prior to the time of dispatch of the consignment to the Union;
(d)
before issuing the animal health certificate referred to in point (b), the epidemiological unit comprising the salamanders in the consignment must have been isolated from other salamanders at the latest at the time of the examination for the purposes of issuing of animal health certificate and they must not have been in contact with other salamanders since that time.

Attestation regarding the appropriate establishment of destination

Member States shall ensure that border inspection posts do not accept the entry into the Union of consignments of salamanders unless importers or their agents provide a written attestation, in an official language of the Member State of the border inspection post of entry into the Union, which is signed by the natural or legal person responsible for the appropriate establishment of destination, stating:
(a)
the name and address of the appropriate establishment of destination;
(b)
that the appropriate establishment of destination complies with the minimum conditions set out in Annex II;
(c)
that the consignment of salamanders will be accepted for quarantine.

Quarantine rules for consignments of salamanders introduced into the Union

Member States shall ensure that:
1.
The official or approved veterinarian responsible for the appropriate establishment of destination records the arrival of the consignment of salamanders introduced into the Union from a third country in Box 45 of Part 3 in the electronic version of the common veterinary entry document.
2.
The official or approved veterinarian ensures that the operator keeps the consignment of salamanders in quarantine in the appropriate establishment of destination as one epidemiological unit.
3.
The official or approved veterinarian inspects the conditions of quarantine for each consignment of salamanders, including an examination of the mortality records and a clinical inspection of the salamanders in the appropriate establishment of destination, checking in particular for skin lesions and ulcers.
4.
Where a consignment comprises 62 or more salamanders, the official or approved veterinarian carries out the examination, sampling, testing and treatment procedures for Bsal in accordance with the procedures referred to in points 1 and 2 of Annex III, following the arrival of the consignment of salamanders at the appropriate establishment of destination.
5.
Where the consignment comprises less than 62 salamanders, the official or approved veterinarian ensures that the consignment is treated to the satisfaction of the competent authority against Bsal in accordance with point 3 of Annex III.
6.
The official or approved veterinarian releases the consignment of salamanders from the appropriate establishment of destination by a written authorisation:
(a)
in case of testing as referred to in point 1(a) of Annex III, provided that at least 6 weeks has elapsed since the date of the the commencement of the period of quarantine and not before the receipt of the negative test results, whichever is later; or
(b)
in the case of treatment as referred to in point 1(b) of Annex III, only after satisfactory completion of the treatment.

Measures to be taken in the event of a confirmed case of Bsal in an appropriate establishment of destination

1. Member States shall ensure that where during quarantine it is confirmed that at least one salamander of an epidemiological unit is infected with Bsal, the following measures are taken by the appropriate establishment of destination:
(a)
all salamanders in the same epidemiological unit are either:
(i)
treated to the satisfaction of the competent authority against Bsal in accordance with point 3 of Annex III; or
(ii)
killed and disposed of as animal by-products in accordance with Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009.
(b)
following completion of the measures referred to in point (a), the area of the appropriate establishment of destination where the epidemiological unit had been kept is cleaned and disinfected to the satisfaction of the competent authority.
2. The competent authority may require testing of the treated salamanders to verify the effectiveness of the treatment referred to in point 1(a)(i) and may require repeated treatments, as appropriate, to prevent the spread of Bsal.

Costs

Member States shall ensure that all quarantine costs, testing costs and, where necessary, the costs of risk mitigation measures and treatments are borne by the operator or the importer.

Annual reporting requirements

At the latest by 30 June each year, starting from 2019, those Member States which have handled salamander consignments in the previous year, shall submit to the Commission the following information concerning the previous year, differentiating between information related to the intra-Union trade or to introductions of salamander consignments into the Union:
(a)
the number of epidemiological units with at least one confirmed case of Bsal;
(b)
the number of epidemiological units treated without a confirmed case;
(c)
any further information they deem relevant on testing, treating or handling the consignments and on the implementation of this Decision.

Transitional measures

1. For a transitional period until 6 September 2018, the Member States of destination may accept on their territory consignments of salamanders from other Member States which do not comply with the animal health conditions laid down in Article 3, under appropriate risk mitigation conditions to be determined by the competent authority after consulting the operators and, if necessary, the Member State of origin.
2. For a transitional period until 6 September 2018, the Member States of destination may accept on their territory consignments of salamanders introduced into the Union from a third country which do not comply with the animal health conditions laid down in Article 4, provided that they are handled in accordance with Articles 5 to 7.

Applicability

This Decision shall apply until 31 December 2019.

Addressees

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

PART A

ANNEX I
ANIMAL HEALTH CERTIFICATE

for intra-Union trade in salamanders

EUROPEAN UNION
Intra-Union trade certificate
Part I: Details of consignment presented
I.1. Consignor
Name
Address
Postal code
I.2. Certificate reference No
I.2.a. Local reference No
I.3. Central competent authority
I.4. Local competent authority
I.5. Consignee
Name
Address
Postal code
I.6. I.7. I.8. Country of origin
ISO code
I.9. I.10. Country of destination
ISO code
I.11. I.12. Place of origin
Other (registered quarantine)
Name Registration number
Address
Postal code
I.13. Place of destination
Holding
Other
Name Approval number
Address
Postal code
I.14. Place of loading
Postal code
I.15. Date and time of departure
I.16. Means of transport
Aeroplane Ship Railway wagon
Road vehicle Other
Identification
I.17. Transporter
Name Approval number
Address
Postal code Member State
I.18. Animal species
I.19. Commodity code (HS code)
01069000
I.20. Quantity
I.21. I.22. Number of packages

I.23. Seal/Container No
I.24. Type of packaging
I.25. Animals certified for:
Breeding Other
I.26. Transit through third country
Third country ISO code
Exit point Code
Entry point BIP No
I.27. Transit through Member States
Member State ISO code
Member State ISO code
Member State ISO code
I.28. Export
Third country ISO code
Exit point Code
I.29. I.30. I.31. Identification of the animals
Species (Scientific name) Quantity

European Union
Salamanders
II. Health information
II.a. Certificate reference number
II.b. Local reference number
I, the undersigned official veterinarian, hereby certify that the animals described in Part I meet the following requirements:
II.1. The salamanders (1) have been examined and do not show clinical signs of infection with the fungus Batrachochytrium salamandrivorans (Bsal), and in particular skin lesions and ulcers at the time of the examination which took place within a period of 24 hours prior to the planned time of dispatch of the consignment;
II.2. According to the operator, they come from a population where no mortalities due to Bsal or signs of Bsal, in particular skin lesions and ulcers have been observed by the operator;
II.3. The consignment consists of:
(2) either [(i) one epidemiological unit of at least 62 specimens of salamanders which has been quarantined from other salamanders in an appropriate establishment for a period of at least 6 weeks immediately prior to the date of the issuing of this certificate; and
(ii) skin swab samples from the salamanders taken during the fifth week of the quarantine have been tested for Bsal with negative results with the appropriate diagnostic test, in accordance with the sample sizes laid down in point 1(a) of Annex III to Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/320;]
(2) or [salamanders which have been treated to the satisfaction of the competent authority against Bsal in accordance with point 1(b) of Annex III to Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/320;]
(2) or [salamanders which have been introduced into the European Union and have undergone quarantine or treatment and have been kept in the appropriate establishment of destination isolated from other salamanders between the end of the quarantine period following their introduction into the European Union and the issuing of this certificate;]
Notes
(1) ‘salamanders’ means all amphibians of the order Caudata.
(2) Delete as applicable.
— The required details of this certificate must be entered into Traces on the date of issuing of this certificate and at the latest within a period of 24 hours thereof.
— The colour of the stamp and the signature must be different from that of the other particulars in this certificate.
— This certificate is valid for a period of 10 days from the date of issue.
Part II: Certification
Official veterinarian
Name (in capital letters): Qualification and title:
Local Veterinary Unit (LVU): LVU No:
Date: Signature:
Stamp:
PART B
ANIMAL HEALTH CERTIFICATE

for the introduction of consignments of salamanders into the European Union

COUNTRY:
Veterinary certificate to EU
Part I: Details of dispatched consignment
I.1. Consignor
Name
Address
Country
Tel.
I.2. Certificate reference number
I.2.a.
I.3. Central Competent Authority
I.4. Local Competent authority
I.5. Consignee
Name
Address
Country
Tel.
I.6. I.7. Country of origin
ISO code
I.8. Region of origin
Code
I.9. Country of destination
ISO code
I.10. I.11. Place of origin
Name
Address
Name
Address
Name
Address
I.12. I.13. Place of loading
Address
I.14. Date of departure Time of departure
I.15. Means of transport
Aeroplane Ship Railway wagon
Road vehicle Other
Identification
Document:
I.16. Entry BIP in EU
I.17. No.(s) of CITES (1) I.18. Description of commodity
I.19. Commodity code (01069000) I.20. Quantity
I.21. I.22. Number of packages

I.23. Seal/Container No
I.24. I.25. Commodities certified for:
Other Breeding Approved bodies
I.26. I.27. For import or admission into EU
I.28. Identification of the commodity
Species Quantity
(scientific name)

COUNTRY
Salamanders
II. Health information
II.a. Certificate reference number
II.b.
I, the undersigned official veterinarian, hereby certify that the animals described in Part I meet the following requirements:
II.1. The consignment of salamanders (2) comes from a third country of origin which is listed in Annex I to Commission Decision 2004/211/EC, in Part 2 of Annex II to Commission Decision 2007/777/EC, in Annex I to Commission Regulation (EC) No 798/2008, in Part 1 of Annex I to Commission Regulation (EC) No 119/2009, in Part 1 of Annex II to Commission Regulation (EU) No 206/2010 or in Annex I to Commission Regulation (EU) No 605/2010. II.2. The salamanders have been examined and do not show clinical signs of infection with the fungus Batrachochytrium salamandrivorans (Bsal), and in particular skin lesions and ulcers, at the time of the examination which took place within a period of 24 hours prior to the planned time of dispatch of the consignment to the European Union.
II.3. The consignment of salamanders has been isolated from other salamanders at the latest at the time of the examination referred to in point II.2 and the consignment has not been in contact with other salamanders since that time.
Notes:
Part I:
(1) complete or cross out as appropriate: CITES authorisation number is relevant only for animals listed in the Washington Convention on protected species.
Part II:
(2) ‘salamanders’ means all amphibians of the order Caudata.
— The colour of the stamp and the signature must be different from that of the other particulars in this certificate.
— This certificate is valid for a period of 10 days from the date of examination in the third country of origin.
Part II: Certification
Official veterinarian
Name (in capital letters): Qualification and title:
Date: Signature:
Stamp:

MINIMUM CONDITIONS FOR APPROPRIATE ESTABLISHMENTS OF DESTINATION

ANNEX II
| (1) | The appropriate establishment of destination:(a)has a system that ensures adequate surveillance of the salamanders;(b)is under the control of an official or approved veterinarian;(c)is cleaned and disinfected in accordance with instructions by the competent authority. | (a) | has a system that ensures adequate surveillance of the salamanders; | (b) | is under the control of an official or approved veterinarian; | (c) | is cleaned and disinfected in accordance with instructions by the competent authority.
(a) | has a system that ensures adequate surveillance of the salamanders;
(b) | is under the control of an official or approved veterinarian;
(c) | is cleaned and disinfected in accordance with instructions by the competent authority.
| (2) | The operator of the appropriate establishment ensures that:(a)cleaning and disinfection of the tanks, crates or other fomites used for the transport of the salamanders is carried out unless those are destroyed, in a way to prevent the spread of Bsal.(b)waste material and waste water is collected regularly, stored and subsequently treated in a way to prevent the spread of Bsal.(c)carcases of quarantined salamanders are examined in a laboratory indicated by the competent authority.(d)the necessary tests and treatments of salamanders are carried out in consultation with and under the control of the official or approved veterinarian. | (a) | cleaning and disinfection of the tanks, crates or other fomites used for the transport of the salamanders is carried out unless those are destroyed, in a way to prevent the spread of Bsal. | (b) | waste material and waste water is collected regularly, stored and subsequently treated in a way to prevent the spread of Bsal. | (c) | carcases of quarantined salamanders are examined in a laboratory indicated by the competent authority. | (d) | the necessary tests and treatments of salamanders are carried out in consultation with and under the control of the official or approved veterinarian.
(a) | cleaning and disinfection of the tanks, crates or other fomites used for the transport of the salamanders is carried out unless those are destroyed, in a way to prevent the spread of Bsal.
(b) | waste material and waste water is collected regularly, stored and subsequently treated in a way to prevent the spread of Bsal.
(c) | carcases of quarantined salamanders are examined in a laboratory indicated by the competent authority.
(d) | the necessary tests and treatments of salamanders are carried out in consultation with and under the control of the official or approved veterinarian.
| (3) | The operator of the appropriate establishments of destination informs the official or approved veterinarian of diseases and deaths of salamanders during the quarantine.
| (4) | The operator of the appropriate establishments of destination keeps a record of:(a)the date, number and species of salamanders entering and leaving for each consignment;(b)copies of the animal health certificates and the common veterinary entry documents accompanying the consignment of salamanders;(c)cases of illness and the number of deaths on a daily basis;(d)dates and results of testing;(e)types and dates of treatment and the number of animals subjected to it. | (a) | the date, number and species of salamanders entering and leaving for each consignment; | (b) | copies of the animal health certificates and the common veterinary entry documents accompanying the consignment of salamanders; | (c) | cases of illness and the number of deaths on a daily basis; | (d) | dates and results of testing; | (e) | types and dates of treatment and the number of animals subjected to it.
(a) | the date, number and species of salamanders entering and leaving for each consignment;
(b) | copies of the animal health certificates and the common veterinary entry documents accompanying the consignment of salamanders;
(c) | cases of illness and the number of deaths on a daily basis;
(d) | dates and results of testing;
(e) | types and dates of treatment and the number of animals subjected to it.

EXAMINATION, SAMPLING, TESTING AND TREATMENT PROCEDURES FOR BSAL

ANNEX III
| (1) | During quarantine, the salamanders are subjected to the following procedures:(a)If the size of the epidemiological unit is 62 or more, skin swab samples from quarantined salamanders must be examined under the control of the official or approved veterinarian with the appropriate diagnostic test during the fifth week following the date of their entry into the appropriate establishment, in accordance with the sample sizes set out in the reference table, unless the operator opts for treatment in accordance with point (b).Reference Table(1):Size of the epidemiological unit62186200250300350400450Sample size629698102106108110111(b)If the operator opts for one of the treatments listed in point (3) or in all cases where the size of the epidemiological unit is less than 62, all salamanders in the consignment must be treated by the operator against Bsal under the control of the official or approved veterinarian to the satisfaction of the competent authority.(c)In cases referred to in point (b) the official or approved veterinarian may require representative testing of the epidemiological unit with the appropriate diagnostic test before the treatment to monitor the presence of Bsal or after treatment to verify the absence of Bsal.(d)Skin swab samples from all dead or clinically sick salamanders, in particular those with skin lesions, must be examined under the control of the official or approved veterinarian with the appropriate diagnostic test at the time they show lesions or other clinical signs or at the time of death, whichever is sooner.(e)All salamanders which die in the appropriate establishment must be subjected to a post mortem examination under the control of the official or approved veterinarian, in particular to check for signs of Bsal, to confirm or to exclude Bsal as cause of death, to the extent possible. | (a) | If the size of the epidemiological unit is 62 or more, skin swab samples from quarantined salamanders must be examined under the control of the official or approved veterinarian with the appropriate diagnostic test during the fifth week following the date of their entry into the appropriate establishment, in accordance with the sample sizes set out in the reference table, unless the operator opts for treatment in accordance with point (b).Reference Table(1):Size of the epidemiological unit62186200250300350400450Sample size629698102106108110111 | Size of the epidemiological unit | 62 | 186 | 200 | 250 | 300 | 350 | 400 | 450 | Sample size | 62 | 96 | 98 | 102 | 106 | 108 | 110 | 111 | (b) | If the operator opts for one of the treatments listed in point (3) or in all cases where the size of the epidemiological unit is less than 62, all salamanders in the consignment must be treated by the operator against Bsal under the control of the official or approved veterinarian to the satisfaction of the competent authority. | (c) | In cases referred to in point (b) the official or approved veterinarian may require representative testing of the epidemiological unit with the appropriate diagnostic test before the treatment to monitor the presence of Bsal or after treatment to verify the absence of Bsal. | (d) | Skin swab samples from all dead or clinically sick salamanders, in particular those with skin lesions, must be examined under the control of the official or approved veterinarian with the appropriate diagnostic test at the time they show lesions or other clinical signs or at the time of death, whichever is sooner. | (e) | All salamanders which die in the appropriate establishment must be subjected to a post mortem examination under the control of the official or approved veterinarian, in particular to check for signs of Bsal, to confirm or to exclude Bsal as cause of death, to the extent possible.
(a) | If the size of the epidemiological unit is 62 or more, skin swab samples from quarantined salamanders must be examined under the control of the official or approved veterinarian with the appropriate diagnostic test during the fifth week following the date of their entry into the appropriate establishment, in accordance with the sample sizes set out in the reference table, unless the operator opts for treatment in accordance with point (b).Reference Table(1):Size of the epidemiological unit62186200250300350400450Sample size629698102106108110111 | Size of the epidemiological unit | 62 | 186 | 200 | 250 | 300 | 350 | 400 | 450 | Sample size | 62 | 96 | 98 | 102 | 106 | 108 | 110 | 111
Size of the epidemiological unit | 62 | 186 | 200 | 250 | 300 | 350 | 400 | 450
Sample size | 62 | 96 | 98 | 102 | 106 | 108 | 110 | 111
(b) | If the operator opts for one of the treatments listed in point (3) or in all cases where the size of the epidemiological unit is less than 62, all salamanders in the consignment must be treated by the operator against Bsal under the control of the official or approved veterinarian to the satisfaction of the competent authority.
(c) | In cases referred to in point (b) the official or approved veterinarian may require representative testing of the epidemiological unit with the appropriate diagnostic test before the treatment to monitor the presence of Bsal or after treatment to verify the absence of Bsal.
(d) | Skin swab samples from all dead or clinically sick salamanders, in particular those with skin lesions, must be examined under the control of the official or approved veterinarian with the appropriate diagnostic test at the time they show lesions or other clinical signs or at the time of death, whichever is sooner.
(e) | All salamanders which die in the appropriate establishment must be subjected to a post mortem examination under the control of the official or approved veterinarian, in particular to check for signs of Bsal, to confirm or to exclude Bsal as cause of death, to the extent possible.
| (2) | All testing of samples taken and post mortem examination during quarantine must be carried out in laboratories indicated by the official or approved veterinarian.
| (3) | The following treatments are considered to be satisfactory:(a)keeping salamanders at a temperature of at least 25 °C for at least 12 days;(b)keeping salamanders at a temperature of at least 20 °C for at least 10 days combined with a treatment with polymyxin E submersion baths (2 000 IU/ml) for 10 minutes twice per day, followed by applying voriconazole spray (12,5 μg/ml);(c)any other treatment with comparable results in eliminating Bsal as reported in a peer-reviewed article published in a scientific journal. | (a) | keeping salamanders at a temperature of at least 25 °C for at least 12 days; | (b) | keeping salamanders at a temperature of at least 20 °C for at least 10 days combined with a treatment with polymyxin E submersion baths (2 000 IU/ml) for 10 minutes twice per day, followed by applying voriconazole spray (12,5 μg/ml); | (c) | any other treatment with comparable results in eliminating Bsal as reported in a peer-reviewed article published in a scientific journal.
(a) | keeping salamanders at a temperature of at least 25 °C for at least 12 days;
(b) | keeping salamanders at a temperature of at least 20 °C for at least 10 days combined with a treatment with polymyxin E submersion baths (2 000 IU/ml) for 10 minutes twice per day, followed by applying voriconazole spray (12,5 μg/ml);
(c) | any other treatment with comparable results in eliminating Bsal as reported in a peer-reviewed article published in a scientific journal.
(1) Assuming 3 % prevalence of Bsal in the epidemiological unit and ensuring its detection with a 95 % confidence rate with the sensitivity of the appropriate diagnostic test calculated to be at 80 %.

Pending: 32018D0299

28.2.2018 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 56/46
(1) On 12 December 2003 the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (the ‘EU WMD Non-proliferation Strategy’), Chapter III of which contains a list of measures that need to be taken both within the Union and in third countries to combat such proliferation.
(2) The Union is actively implementing the EU WMD Non-proliferation Strategy and giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, such as developing the necessary structures within the Union.
(3) On 8 December 2008 the Council adopted its conclusions and a document entitled ‘New lines for action by the European Union in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems’ (the ‘New Lines for Action’), which states that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (‘WMD’) continues to constitute one of the greatest security challenges and that non-proliferation policy constitutes an essential part of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP).
(4) In the New Lines for Action, the Council calls on competent Council formations and bodies, the Commission, other institutions and Member States to give a concrete follow-up to that document.
(5) In the New Lines for Action, the Council underlines that action by the Union to prevent proliferation could benefit from the support provided by a non-governmental non-proliferation network, bringing together foreign-policy institutions and research centres specialising in the Union's strategic areas while building on useful networks which already exist. Such a network could be extended to institutions in third countries with which the Union is conducting specific dialogues in connection with non-proliferation.
(6) On 15 and 16 December 2005 the European Council adopted the EU Strategy to combat the illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition (the ‘EU SALW Strategy’), which sets the guidelines for action by the Union in the field of small arms and light weapons (‘SALW’). The EU SALW Strategy states that the illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition pose a serious threat to international peace and security.
(7) The EU SALW Strategy identifies among its objectives the need to foster effective multilateralism so as to forge mechanisms, whether international, regional or within the Union and its Member States, for countering the supply and destabilising spread of SALW and their ammunition.
(8) On 26 July 2010 the Council adopted Decision 2010/430/CFSP(1), which established the European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks and provided that the technical implementation of that Decision is to be carried out by the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium (the ‘Consortium’).
(9) The choice of the Consortium as sole beneficiary of a grant in this case is justified because of the will of the Union, as supported by the Member States, to continue its fruitful cooperation with the European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks, which is contributing to the creation of a common European culture with regard to non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as helping the Union to develop and shape its policies in those areas and increase Union visibility. The very nature of the Consortium, which owes its existence to the Union and depends entirely on Union support, makes 100 % financing necessary in this case. The Consortium has no independent financial resources or legal authority to raise other funds. Moreover, the Consortium has established, beyond the four managing think tanks, a network bringing together more than 70 think tanks and research centres combining almost the entire non-governmental expertise on non-proliferation and disarmament in the Union.
(10) On 10 March 2014 the Council adopted Decision 2014/129/CFSP(2), which extended for 3 years the Union's continued promotion and financial support of the activities of the European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks and entrusted the Consortium with the technical implementation of that Decision.
(11) On 3 April 2017 the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2017/632(3), which provides for the extension of the duration of Decision 2014/129/CFSP in order to allow for the continued implementation of the activities until 2 July 2017.
(12) On 4 July 2017 the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2017/1195(4), extending the implementation period of Decision 2014/129/CFSP from 3 July until 31 December 2017 to allow for the organisation of one major annual conference on non-proliferation and disarmament in 2017 as well as for the continued maintenance and updating of the internet platform of the Consortium.
(13) The names of the European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks and the Consortium will be adjusted to include ‘disarmament’ in line with the recommendations laid down in the European Parliament resolution of 27 October 2016 on nuclear security and non-proliferation,
(a) to encourage political and security-related dialogue and long-term discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems within civil societies and, in particular, among experts, researchers and academics;
(b) to provide those participating in the relevant preparatory bodies of the Council with the opportunity to consult the network on issues related to non-proliferation and disarmament and to enable the representatives of Member States to participate in the network's meetings;
(c) to constitute a useful stepping stone for non-proliferation and disarmament action by the Union and the international community, in particular by providing reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘HR’);
(d) to contribute to enhancing third countries' awareness of proliferation and disarmament challenges and of the need to work in cooperation with the Union and in the context of multilateral fora, in particular the United Nations, to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of worldwide concern;
(e) to contribute to the development of expertise and institutional capacity in non-proliferation and disarmament matters in think tanks and governments in the Union and third countries.
(a) providing means for the holding of major annual conferences with third countries and civil society on non-proliferation and disarmament to discuss and identify further measures to combat the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems and interrelated disarmament objectives, as well as to address challenges related to conventional weapons, including countering the illicit trade and excessive accumulation of SALW and their ammunition. The conferences will also promote internationally the EU WMD Non-proliferation Strategy and the EU SALW Strategy, and the role, in this field, of Union institutions and think tanks in the Union, with a view to raising the visibility of Union policies in this area and submitting reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the HR;
(b) providing means for the organisation of annual consultative meetings between representatives of Union institutions, representatives of Member States and academic experts to exchange views on major issues and critical developments in the fields of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms export control with a view to submitting reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the HR;
(c) providing means for the organisation of up to nine ad-hoc seminars for experts and practitioners on the full range of non-proliferation and disarmament issues, covering both unconventional and conventional arms, with a view to submitting reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the HR;
(d) providing means for the preparation and publication of up to 20 policy papers covering topics under the mandate of the Consortium and putting forward political and/or operational policy options;
(e) providing means for the continued management and further development of a help-desk facility within the Consortium to provide ad-hoc expertise on questions related to the full range of non-proliferation and disarmament issues, covering both unconventional and conventional arms, for responses within a 2- to 3-week timeframe, including the preparation of up to 18 expert papers;
(f) providing means for continued awareness-raising, education and development of expertise and institutional capacity in the area of non-proliferation and disarmament in think tanks and governments in the Union and third countries through:—the maintenance and further development of an e-learning course covering all relevant aspects of non-proliferation and disarmament,—the setting-up of up to 36 non-proliferation and disarmament internships for graduate students or young diplomats from the Union and third countries,—the organisation of annual Brussels study visits for the participants in the UN Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament in order to promote and raise the visibility of Union policies in the fields of non-proliferation, disarmament and arms export control,—the development of a pilot training course to raise awareness of proliferation risks, including those stemming from science and technology developments, among graduate and post-graduate students of the natural sciences; — the maintenance and further development of an e-learning course covering all relevant aspects of non-proliferation and disarmament, — the setting-up of up to 36 non-proliferation and disarmament internships for graduate students or young diplomats from the Union and third countries, — the organisation of annual Brussels study visits for the participants in the UN Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament in order to promote and raise the visibility of Union policies in the fields of non-proliferation, disarmament and arms export control, — the development of a pilot training course to raise awareness of proliferation risks, including those stemming from science and technology developments, among graduate and post-graduate students of the natural sciences;
— the maintenance and further development of an e-learning course covering all relevant aspects of non-proliferation and disarmament,
— the setting-up of up to 36 non-proliferation and disarmament internships for graduate students or young diplomats from the Union and third countries,
— the organisation of annual Brussels study visits for the participants in the UN Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament in order to promote and raise the visibility of Union policies in the fields of non-proliferation, disarmament and arms export control,
— the development of a pilot training course to raise awareness of proliferation risks, including those stemming from science and technology developments, among graduate and post-graduate students of the natural sciences;
— the maintenance and further development of an e-learning course covering all relevant aspects of non-proliferation and disarmament,
— the setting-up of up to 36 non-proliferation and disarmament internships for graduate students or young diplomats from the Union and third countries,
— the organisation of annual Brussels study visits for the participants in the UN Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament in order to promote and raise the visibility of Union policies in the fields of non-proliferation, disarmament and arms export control,
— the development of a pilot training course to raise awareness of proliferation risks, including those stemming from science and technology developments, among graduate and post-graduate students of the natural sciences;
(g) providing means for further maintaining, managing and developing an internet platform and related social networks to facilitate contacts, provide a unique forum for European disarmament and non-proliferation research, promote the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks, reach out to the global non-proliferation and disarmament community and promote the educational offers of the Consortium both with respect to on-site training courses and e-learning.
— through organising three major annual conferences and — as a side-event — ‘next generation workshops’, with a view to submitting reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘HR’),
— through organising three consultative meetings between representatives of Union institutions, representatives of Member States and academic experts to exchange views on major issues and critical developments in the fields of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms export control with a view to submitting reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the HR,
— through the organisation of up to nine ad-hoc seminars for experts and practitioners on the full range of non-proliferation and disarmament issues covering both unconventional and conventional arms, with a view to submitting reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the HR,
— through the preparation and publication of up to 20 policy papers, which will cover topics under the mandate of the Consortium and put forward political and/or operational policy options,
— through continued management and further development of a help-desk facility within the Consortium, to provide ad-hoc expertise on questions related to the full range of non-proliferation and disarmament issues covering both unconventional and conventional arms, for responses within a 2- to 3-week time frame, including the preparation of up to 18 expert papers,
— through the maintenance and further development of an e-learning course covering all relevant aspects of non-proliferation and disarmament,
— through the setting-up of up to 36 non-proliferation and disarmament internships for graduate students or young diplomats from the Union and third countries,
— through the organisation of annual Brussels study visits for the participants in the UN Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament in order to promote and raise the visibility of Union policies in the fields of non-proliferation, disarmament and arms export control,
— through the development of a pilot training course to raise awareness of proliferation risks, including these stemming from science and technology developments, among graduate and post-graduate students of the natural sciences,
— through further maintaining, managing and developing an internet platform and related social networks to facilitate contacts, provide a unique forum for European disarmament and non-proliferation research, promote the Network, reach out to the global non-proliferation and disarmament community and promote the educational offers of the Consortium both with respect to on-site training courses and e-learning.
— maintain a major European-led international non-proliferation and disarmament conference that will continue to be the key venue for promoting strategic discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems and interrelated disarmament objectives to address challenges related to conventional weapons, including countering the illicit trade and excessive accumulation of SALW and their ammunition,
— increase the visibility and awareness of Union policies in the field of WMD and SALW non-proliferation and in the field of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) action among the government officials, academia and civil society of third countries,
— promote the role and cohesion of the Network and the Union's role in this field, and build up non-proliferation expertise in countries where it is insufficient, including in third countries,
— submit policy-oriented reports and/or action-oriented recommendations that would enhance the implementation of the EU WMD Non-proliferation and SALW Strategies and constitute a useful stepping stone for non-proliferation and conventional weapons-related action by the Union and the international community,
— increase the awareness and knowledge of the institutions of the Union, of Member States, civil society and third countries about threats related to WMD and their means of delivery, allowing them to improve anticipation.
— a yearly conference of 1,5 days held in Brussels, with the participation of up to 300 experts from think tanks and academia and governments from the Union and associated states and third countries, specialised in non-proliferation, disarmament, arms control and conventional weapons issues, including SALW,
— attention to development of ‘next generation’ specialists, including from countries outside Europe and North America, who will be invited to an extra day before or after the conference for specialised training and exposure to relevant Union institutions,
— policy-oriented reports and/or action-oriented recommendations that would boost the implementation of the EU WMD and SALW Strategies.
— exchange of information and analysis regarding current proliferation trends among policy practitioners and academic experts from the Member States, as well as specialised staff from the EEAS and institutions of the Union,
— discussion on the best ways and means to implement Union policies against proliferation,
— provide constructive feedback to the Union on its strategies against the proliferation of WMD and SALW by independent Union think tanks, and suggestions from practitioners to the think tanks on most policy-relevant topics for further research,
— identify relevant issues in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament for policy-oriented reports,
— produce policy-oriented reports together with a set of action-oriented recommendations to the representatives of the HR.
— Exchange of information and analysis regarding current proliferation trends among policy practitioners and academic experts from the Member States, as well as specialised staff from the EEAS and institutions of the Union.
— Discussion on the best ways and means to implement Union policies against proliferation.
— Provide constructive feedback to the Union on its strategies against the proliferation of WMD and SALW by independent Union think tanks, and suggestions from practitioners to the think tanks on most policy-relevant topics for further research.
— Identify relevant issues in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament for policy-oriented reports.
— Produce policy-oriented reports together with a set of action-oriented recommendations to the representatives of the HR. These reports will be disseminated to the relevant institutions of the Union and the Member States.
— to provide information and analysis on topics related to non-proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, conventional arms, including SALW, and disarmament that feed a political and security-related dialogue on these issues, primarily by experts, researchers and academics,
— to provide a resource that the participants in the relevant preparatory bodies of the Council can use to inform their discussion of Union non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament policy and practice,
— to provide ideas, information and analysis that can assist in the development of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament actions at Union level.
— enhanced political and security-related dialogue on measures to combat the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems, arms control and disarmament, primarily by experts, researchers and academics,
— increased awareness, knowledge and understanding within civil society, particularly the broader Union network of independent non-proliferation think tanks, and governments of issues related to Union non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament policies,
— political and/or operational policy options provided to the HR, the Union's institutions and the Member States,
— development of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament actions at Union level assisted through ideas, information and analysis.
— manage ad-hoc research requests, with responses within a 2- to 3-week time frame, on specific issues requested by the EEAS,
— promote ad-hoc topic-specific dialogue between the Consortium think tanks and the EEAS,
— thus strengthen the knowledge basis for evolving discussions on non-proliferation issues in the Union,
— allow the EEAS comprehensive access to the expertise and research-dedicated resources of the Consortium for short-time and occasional requests.
— to build capacity in the next generation of scholars and practitioners in the fields of non-proliferation and disarmament,
— to enhance the in-depth knowledge of Union non-proliferation and disarmament policies across the Union and in third countries,
— to contribute to global initiatives aimed at advancing non-proliferation and disarmament education,
— to renew and expand the expertise on WMD and SALW issues within the Union and in partner countries,
— to provide the institutions of the Union, the Member States and the European think-tank network with tailored and updated knowledge on the whole spectrum of non-conventional and conventional arms control.
— maintenance and optimisation of a complete e-learning course covering all relevant aspects of non-proliferation and disarmament,
— outreach and assistance to educators and trainers to use the Union non-proliferation and disarmament educational resources,
— support for integration of the Union e-learning resources into university master's programmes,
— combination of e-learning and classroom training for Consortium-designed proliferation awareness training (‘blended learning’),
— increased in-depth knowledge of Union non-proliferation and disarmament policies across the Union and in third countries,
— provision of a constantly updated open educational resource for all stakeholders involved in non-proliferation research and programming,
— development of further online content to improve course syllabus and to provide critical supportive knowledge for non-proliferation practitioners and scholars.
(a) Advanced Learning Unit, elaborating on existing course content and providing more in-depth knowledge;
(b) Practical Learning Unit, focusing on practical implementation issues of non-proliferation or export control regimes;
(c) Academic Learning Unit, providing theoretical reflections on non-proliferation and disarmament;
(d) Supportive Learning Unit, providing critical knowledge to better understand the broad problematique of non-proliferation and disarmament (e.g. legal, financial or ethical aspects);
(e) Customised Learning Unit, supporting specific classroom training courses and used in combination with those courses (‘blended learning’).
— to build capacity in the next generation of scholars and practitioners in non-proliferation policy and programming,
— to enhance the understanding and the ownership of Union non-proliferation and disarmament policies across the Union,
— to disseminate and enhance the knowledge of Union SALW and WMD policies in third countries,
— to build networks of emerging experts at the regional levels where the Union has a strong interest in non-proliferation,
— to strengthen capacity-building within the Network,
— to renew and expand the expertise on WMD and SALW issues within the Union and in partner countries.
— enhanced capacity in the next generation of scholars and practitioners in non-proliferation policy and programming,
— increased in-depth knowledge of Union non-proliferation and disarmament policies across the Union,
— better understanding of Union strategies, policies and non-proliferation approaches in third countries,
— the creation of networks of young practitioners and academics and the facilitation of practical cooperation,
— strengthened capacity-building on Union policies in the fields of WMD and SALW within the Network.
— to enhance the in-depth knowledge and ensure visibility of Union non-proliferation and disarmament policies in third countries,
— to renew and expand the expertise on WMD and SALW issues in third countries, in particular by raising awareness of possibilities created by the Union programmes for capacity-building in areas such as arms export control, non-proliferation and disarmament and CBRN risks mitigation,
— to support UN efforts to enhance disarmament education and promote multilateralism.
— increased in-depth knowledge and visibility of Union non-proliferation and disarmament policies in third countries,
— enhanced expertise on WMD and SALW issues in partner countries,
— enhanced UN disarmament education.
— to build awareness among the natural sciences and other relevant fields of WMD proliferation risks associated with certain materials, software and technology, and the relevant international treaties and mechanisms,
— to build capacity among these groups to establish internal compliance mechanisms in their institutions to control sensitive technology flows as well as materials safety and security,
— to provide the institutions of the Union, Member States and the Union non-proliferation network with fresh ideas on technological developments and their potential impact on non-proliferation.
— enhanced capacity in the next generation of scholars of the natural sciences and other relevant fields in non-proliferation instruments and policies,
— contribution to the goals of Union non-proliferation policy through enhanced awareness of proliferation risks among disciplines with major proliferation risks and technological developments,
— combination of distance learning (e-learning) and on-site training (‘blended learning’).
— managing of a platform where non-proliferation think tanks can continuously share their independent views and analysis on WMD proliferation and conventional weapons issues, including SALW,
— expanding, managing and updating the existing network of independent think tanks,
— promoting of a better understanding of the EU WMD Non-proliferation and SALW Strategies within civil society and ensuring an interface between the Union and the network of think tanks,
— permanent and free downloading of documents from the Network's meetings and from independent think tanks who may wish to share their research results without financial compensation,
— increased awareness and knowledge of the institutions of the Union, the Member States, civil society and third countries about threats related to conventional weapons, WMD and their means of delivery, allowing them to improve anticipation.
— The use of a social-network type of technology, when feasible and appropriate, could be developed in order to allow active online communication and information exchange between the Network participants in a familiar environment.
— The Consortium, in charge of the project, will be responsible for web hosting, web design and technical maintenance of the website.
— Union policies relating to WMD proliferation and conventional weapons issues, including SALW will be followed and supported by appropriate documentation on a regular basis.
— Publications of the Consortium will be promoted and supported by specific historical records.
— Conferences organised by the Consortium will be promoted and relayed on the website (background papers, agenda, presentations, video recording of open meeting when appropriate).
— The e-learning course of the Consortium will be made available through the website. An intranet access will be specifically developed for Network members and Union officials (integrated tool for the e-learning course).
— Special focus pages will be published on a bimonthly basis on topical subjects relating to WMD proliferation and conventional weapons issues, including SALW.
(a) independent think tanks and academics specialised in non-proliferation, disarmament and conventional weapons issues, including SALW, from the Union and third countries;
(b) institutions of the Union, including educational institutions, students and all other recipients of the e-learning course;
(c) Member States;
(d) third countries.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and 31(1) thereof,
(1) On 12 December 2003 the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (the ‘EU WMD Non-proliferation Strategy’), Chapter III of which contains a list of measures that need to be taken both within the Union and in third countries to combat such proliferation.
(2) The Union is actively implementing the EU WMD Non-proliferation Strategy and giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, such as developing the necessary structures within the Union.
(3) On 8 December 2008 the Council adopted its conclusions and a document entitled ‘New lines for action by the European Union in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems’ (the ‘New Lines for Action’), which states that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (‘WMD’) continues to constitute one of the greatest security challenges and that non-proliferation policy constitutes an essential part of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP).
(4) In the New Lines for Action, the Council calls on competent Council formations and bodies, the Commission, other institutions and Member States to give a concrete follow-up to that document.
(5) In the New Lines for Action, the Council underlines that action by the Union to prevent proliferation could benefit from the support provided by a non-governmental non-proliferation network, bringing together foreign-policy institutions and research centres specialising in the Union’s strategic areas while building on useful networks which already exist. Such a network could be extended to institutions in third countries with which the Union is conducting specific dialogues in connection with non-proliferation.
(6) On 15 and 16 December 2005 the European Council adopted the EU Strategy to combat the illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition (the ‘EU SALW Strategy’), which sets the guidelines for action by the Union in the field of small arms and light weapons (‘SALW’). The EU SALW Strategy states that the illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition pose a serious threat to international peace and security.
(7) The EU SALW Strategy identifies among its objectives the need to foster effective multilateralism so as to forge mechanisms, whether international, regional or within the Union and its Member States, for countering the supply and destabilising spread of SALW and their ammunition.
(8) On 26 July 2010 the Council adopted Decision 2010/430/CFSP(1), which established the European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks and provided that the technical implementation of that Decision is to be carried out by the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium (the ‘Consortium’).
(9) The choice of the Consortium as sole beneficiary of a grant in this case is justified because of the will of the Union, as supported by the Member States, to continue its fruitful cooperation with the European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks, which is contributing to the creation of a common European culture with regard to non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as helping the Union to develop and shape its policies in those areas and increase Union visibility. The very nature of the Consortium, which owes its existence to the Union and depends entirely on Union support, makes 100 % financing necessary in this case. The Consortium has no independent financial resources or legal authority to raise other funds. Moreover, the Consortium has established, beyond the four managing think tanks, a network bringing together more than 70 think tanks and research centres combining almost the entire non-governmental expertise on non-proliferation and disarmament in the Union.
(10) On 10 March 2014 the Council adopted Decision 2014/129/CFSP(2), which extended for 3 years the Union’s continued promotion and financial support of the activities of the European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks and entrusted the Consortium with the technical implementation of that Decision.
(11) On 3 April 2017 the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2017/632(3), which provides for the extension of the duration of Decision 2014/129/CFSP in order to allow for the continued implementation of the activities until 2 July 2017.
(12) On 4 July 2017 the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2017/1195(4), extending the implementation period of Decision 2014/129/CFSP from 3 July until 31 December 2017 to allow for the organisation of one major annual conference on non-proliferation and disarmament in 2017 as well as for the continued maintenance and updating of the internet platform of the Consortium.
(13) The names of the European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks and the Consortium will be adjusted to include ‘disarmament’ in line with the recommendations laid down in the European Parliament resolution of 27 October 2016 on nuclear security and non-proliferation,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
1. For the purposes of contributing to the enhanced implementation of the EU WMD Non-proliferation Strategy, which is based on the principles of effective multilateralism, prevention and cooperation with third countries, the continued promotion and support of the activities of the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks is hereby extended for 42 months in order to further the following objectives:
(a)
to encourage political and security-related dialogue and long-term discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems within civil societies and, in particular, among experts, researchers and academics;
(b)
to provide those participating in the relevant preparatory bodies of the Council with the opportunity to consult the network on issues related to non-proliferation and disarmament and to enable the representatives of Member States to participate in the network’s meetings;
(c)
to constitute a useful stepping stone for non-proliferation and disarmament action by the Union and the international community, in particular by providing reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘HR’);
(d)
to contribute to enhancing third countries’ awareness of proliferation and disarmament challenges and of the need to work in cooperation with the Union and in the context of multilateral fora, in particular the United Nations, to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of worldwide concern;
(e)
to contribute to the development of expertise and institutional capacity in non-proliferation and disarmament matters in think tanks and governments in the Union and third countries.
2. In the light of the EU SALW Strategy, the scope of activities of the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks shall not be limited to addressing questions related to the threats posed by the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems, but shall also cover issues related to conventional weapons, including SALW. The inclusion of conventional weapons issues in the field of activity of the network will offer an outstanding tool for dialogue and recommendation on action of the Union in this area within the framework of the implementation of the EU SALW Strategy and the Union’s policy on conventional weapons.
3. The projects to be supported by the Union shall cover the following specific activities:
(a)
providing means for the holding of major annual conferences with third countries and civil society on non-proliferation and disarmament to discuss and identify further measures to combat the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems and interrelated disarmament objectives, as well as to address challenges related to conventional weapons, including countering the illicit trade and excessive accumulation of SALW and their ammunition. The conferences will also promote internationally the EU WMD Non-proliferation Strategy and the EU SALW Strategy, and the role, in this field, of Union institutions and think tanks in the Union, with a view to raising the visibility of Union policies in this area and submitting reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the HR;
(b)
providing means for the organisation of annual consultative meetings between representatives of Union institutions, representatives of Member States and academic experts to exchange views on major issues and critical developments in the fields of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms export control with a view to submitting reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the HR;
(c)
providing means for the organisation of up to nine ad-hoc seminars for experts and practitioners on the full range of non-proliferation and disarmament issues, covering both unconventional and conventional arms, with a view to submitting reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the HR;
(d)
providing means for the preparation and publication of up to 20 policy papers covering topics under the mandate of the Consortium and putting forward political and/or operational policy options;
(e)
providing means for the continued management and further development of a help-desk facility within the Consortium to provide ad-hoc expertise on questions related to the full range of non-proliferation and disarmament issues, covering both unconventional and conventional arms, for responses within a 2- to 3-week timeframe, including the preparation of up to 18 expert papers;
(f)
providing means for continued awareness-raising, education and development of expertise and institutional capacity in the area of non-proliferation and disarmament in think tanks and governments in the Union and third countries through:
—
the maintenance and further development of an e-learning course covering all relevant aspects of non-proliferation and disarmament,
—
the setting-up of up to 36 non-proliferation and disarmament internships for graduate students or young diplomats from the Union and third countries,
—
the organisation of annual Brussels study visits for the participants in the UN Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament in order to promote and raise the visibility of Union policies in the fields of non-proliferation, disarmament and arms export control,
—
the development of a pilot training course to raise awareness of proliferation risks, including those stemming from science and technology developments, among graduate and post-graduate students of the natural sciences;
(g)
providing means for further maintaining, managing and developing an internet platform and related social networks to facilitate contacts, provide a unique forum for European disarmament and non-proliferation research, promote the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks, reach out to the global non-proliferation and disarmament community and promote the educational offers of the Consortium both with respect to on-site training courses and e-learning.
A detailed description of the projects is set out in the Annex.

Article 2
1. The HR shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.
2. Technical implementation of the projects covering the activities referred to in Article 1(3) shall be carried out by the Consortium, based on the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS), the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (HSFK/PRIF), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the International Affairs Institute (IAI) in Rome and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP). The Consortium shall perform this task under the responsibility of the HR. For this purpose, the HR shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the Consortium.
3. Member States and the European External Action Service (EEAS) shall propose priorities and topics of specific interest for assessment in the Consortium’s research programmes, to be addressed in working documents and seminars, in accordance with the policies of the Union.

Article 3
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the projects covering the activities referred to in Article 1(3) shall be EUR 4 507 004,70.
2. The expenditure financed by the amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.
3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure referred to in paragraph 1. For this purpose, it shall conclude a financing agreement with the Consortium. The agreement shall stipulate that the Consortium is to ensure visibility of the Union’s contribution, appropriate to its size.
4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the agreement.

Article 4
1. The HR shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular reports prepared by the Consortium. Those reports shall form the basis for the evaluation carried out by the Council.
2. The Commission shall report on the financial aspects of the projects referred to in Article 1(3).

Article 5
1. This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
2. This Decision shall expire 42 months after the date of conclusion of the financing agreement referred to in Article 3(3).
However, it shall expire 6 months after its entry into force if that financing agreement has not been concluded by that time.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and 31(1) thereof,
(1) On 12 December 2003 the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (the ‘EU WMD Non-proliferation Strategy’), Chapter III of which contains a list of measures that need to be taken both within the Union and in third countries to combat such proliferation.
(2) The Union is actively implementing the EU WMD Non-proliferation Strategy and giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, such as developing the necessary structures within the Union.
(3) On 8 December 2008 the Council adopted its conclusions and a document entitled ‘New lines for action by the European Union in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems’ (the ‘New Lines for Action’), which states that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (‘WMD’) continues to constitute one of the greatest security challenges and that non-proliferation policy constitutes an essential part of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP).
(4) In the New Lines for Action, the Council calls on competent Council formations and bodies, the Commission, other institutions and Member States to give a concrete follow-up to that document.
(5) In the New Lines for Action, the Council underlines that action by the Union to prevent proliferation could benefit from the support provided by a non-governmental non-proliferation network, bringing together foreign-policy institutions and research centres specialising in the Union’s strategic areas while building on useful networks which already exist. Such a network could be extended to institutions in third countries with which the Union is conducting specific dialogues in connection with non-proliferation.
(6) On 15 and 16 December 2005 the European Council adopted the EU Strategy to combat the illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition (the ‘EU SALW Strategy’), which sets the guidelines for action by the Union in the field of small arms and light weapons (‘SALW’). The EU SALW Strategy states that the illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition pose a serious threat to international peace and security.
(7) The EU SALW Strategy identifies among its objectives the need to foster effective multilateralism so as to forge mechanisms, whether international, regional or within the Union and its Member States, for countering the supply and destabilising spread of SALW and their ammunition.
(8) On 26 July 2010 the Council adopted Decision 2010/430/CFSP(1), which established the European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks and provided that the technical implementation of that Decision is to be carried out by the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium (the ‘Consortium’).
(9) The choice of the Consortium as sole beneficiary of a grant in this case is justified because of the will of the Union, as supported by the Member States, to continue its fruitful cooperation with the European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks, which is contributing to the creation of a common European culture with regard to non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as helping the Union to develop and shape its policies in those areas and increase Union visibility. The very nature of the Consortium, which owes its existence to the Union and depends entirely on Union support, makes 100 % financing necessary in this case. The Consortium has no independent financial resources or legal authority to raise other funds. Moreover, the Consortium has established, beyond the four managing think tanks, a network bringing together more than 70 think tanks and research centres combining almost the entire non-governmental expertise on non-proliferation and disarmament in the Union.
(10) On 10 March 2014 the Council adopted Decision 2014/129/CFSP(2), which extended for 3 years the Union’s continued promotion and financial support of the activities of the European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks and entrusted the Consortium with the technical implementation of that Decision.
(11) On 3 April 2017 the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2017/632(3), which provides for the extension of the duration of Decision 2014/129/CFSP in order to allow for the continued implementation of the activities until 2 July 2017.
(12) On 4 July 2017 the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2017/1195(4), extending the implementation period of Decision 2014/129/CFSP from 3 July until 31 December 2017 to allow for the organisation of one major annual conference on non-proliferation and disarmament in 2017 as well as for the continued maintenance and updating of the internet platform of the Consortium.
(13) The names of the European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks and the Consortium will be adjusted to include ‘disarmament’ in line with the recommendations laid down in the European Parliament resolution of 27 October 2016 on nuclear security and non-proliferation,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
1. For the purposes of contributing to the enhanced implementation of the EU WMD Non-proliferation Strategy, which is based on the principles of effective multilateralism, prevention and cooperation with third countries, the continued promotion and support of the activities of the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks is hereby extended for 42 months in order to further the following objectives:
(a)
to encourage political and security-related dialogue and long-term discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems within civil societies and, in particular, among experts, researchers and academics;
(b)
to provide those participating in the relevant preparatory bodies of the Council with the opportunity to consult the network on issues related to non-proliferation and disarmament and to enable the representatives of Member States to participate in the network’s meetings;
(c)
to constitute a useful stepping stone for non-proliferation and disarmament action by the Union and the international community, in particular by providing reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘HR’);
(d)
to contribute to enhancing third countries’ awareness of proliferation and disarmament challenges and of the need to work in cooperation with the Union and in the context of multilateral fora, in particular the United Nations, to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of worldwide concern;
(e)
to contribute to the development of expertise and institutional capacity in non-proliferation and disarmament matters in think tanks and governments in the Union and third countries.
2. In the light of the EU SALW Strategy, the scope of activities of the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks shall not be limited to addressing questions related to the threats posed by the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems, but shall also cover issues related to conventional weapons, including SALW. The inclusion of conventional weapons issues in the field of activity of the network will offer an outstanding tool for dialogue and recommendation on action of the Union in this area within the framework of the implementation of the EU SALW Strategy and the Union’s policy on conventional weapons.
3. The projects to be supported by the Union shall cover the following specific activities:
(a)
providing means for the holding of major annual conferences with third countries and civil society on non-proliferation and disarmament to discuss and identify further measures to combat the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems and interrelated disarmament objectives, as well as to address challenges related to conventional weapons, including countering the illicit trade and excessive accumulation of SALW and their ammunition. The conferences will also promote internationally the EU WMD Non-proliferation Strategy and the EU SALW Strategy, and the role, in this field, of Union institutions and think tanks in the Union, with a view to raising the visibility of Union policies in this area and submitting reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the HR;
(b)
providing means for the organisation of annual consultative meetings between representatives of Union institutions, representatives of Member States and academic experts to exchange views on major issues and critical developments in the fields of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms export control with a view to submitting reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the HR;
(c)
providing means for the organisation of up to nine ad-hoc seminars for experts and practitioners on the full range of non-proliferation and disarmament issues, covering both unconventional and conventional arms, with a view to submitting reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the HR;
(d)
providing means for the preparation and publication of up to 20 policy papers covering topics under the mandate of the Consortium and putting forward political and/or operational policy options;
(e)
providing means for the continued management and further development of a help-desk facility within the Consortium to provide ad-hoc expertise on questions related to the full range of non-proliferation and disarmament issues, covering both unconventional and conventional arms, for responses within a 2- to 3-week timeframe, including the preparation of up to 18 expert papers;
(f)
providing means for continued awareness-raising, education and development of expertise and institutional capacity in the area of non-proliferation and disarmament in think tanks and governments in the Union and third countries through:
—
the maintenance and further development of an e-learning course covering all relevant aspects of non-proliferation and disarmament,
—
the setting-up of up to 36 non-proliferation and disarmament internships for graduate students or young diplomats from the Union and third countries,
—
the organisation of annual Brussels study visits for the participants in the UN Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament in order to promote and raise the visibility of Union policies in the fields of non-proliferation, disarmament and arms export control,
—
the development of a pilot training course to raise awareness of proliferation risks, including those stemming from science and technology developments, among graduate and post-graduate students of the natural sciences;
(g)
providing means for further maintaining, managing and developing an internet platform and related social networks to facilitate contacts, provide a unique forum for European disarmament and non-proliferation research, promote the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks, reach out to the global non-proliferation and disarmament community and promote the educational offers of the Consortium both with respect to on-site training courses and e-learning.
A detailed description of the projects is set out in the Annex.
1. The HR shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.
2. Technical implementation of the projects covering the activities referred to in Article 1(3) shall be carried out by the Consortium, based on the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS), the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (HSFK/PRIF), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the International Affairs Institute (IAI) in Rome and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP). The Consortium shall perform this task under the responsibility of the HR. For this purpose, the HR shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the Consortium.
3. Member States and the European External Action Service (EEAS) shall propose priorities and topics of specific interest for assessment in the Consortium’s research programmes, to be addressed in working documents and seminars, in accordance with the policies of the Union.
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the projects covering the activities referred to in Article 1(3) shall be EUR 4 507 004,70.
2. The expenditure financed by the amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.
3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure referred to in paragraph 1. For this purpose, it shall conclude a financing agreement with the Consortium. The agreement shall stipulate that the Consortium is to ensure visibility of the Union’s contribution, appropriate to its size.
4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the agreement.
1. The HR shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular reports prepared by the Consortium. Those reports shall form the basis for the evaluation carried out by the Council.
2. The Commission shall report on the financial aspects of the projects referred to in Article 1(3).
1. This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
2. This Decision shall expire 42 months after the date of conclusion of the financing agreement referred to in Article 3(3).
However, it shall expire 6 months after its entry into force if that financing agreement has not been concluded by that time.

THE EUROPEAN NETWORK OF INDEPENDENT NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT THINK TANKS IN SUPPORT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU STRATEGY AGAINST PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (EU WMD NON-PROLIFERATION STRATEGY)

ANNEX1. Objectives
The objective of this Decision is to further implement the new lines for action by the European Union in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems (the ‘New Lines for Action’), laid down in the Council Conclusions of 8 December 2008, as an elaboration of the 2003 EU WMD Non-proliferation Strategy. According to the New Lines for Action, the Union could benefit from the support provided by a network of non-governmental non-proliferation think tanks in its fight against the proliferation of WMD. The network should bring together foreign policy institutions and research centres specialising in the Union’s strategic areas. Such a network could be extended to institutions in third countries with which the Union is conducting specific dialogues in connection with disarmament and non-proliferation.
This network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks (the ‘Network’) would continue to encourage political and security-related dialogue and the long-term discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems and the interrelated issues of disarmament within civil societies, and more particularly among experts, researchers and academics.
The work of the Network is extended to issues related to conventional weapons, including SALW, with a special emphasis on measures to ensure the continuous implementation of the EU SALW Strategy. The Network will help to provide fresh ideas on the Union’s actions related to conventional weapons, including the illicit trade and excessive accumulation of SALW and their ammunition. This includes not only the reactive dimension of security issues, but also its preventive dimension. Preventing the illegal and unregulated trade of conventional weapons, including SALW, has been recognised as a priority of the Union within the framework of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).
The Network shall also address all aspects of export control linked to WMD or conventional weapons, including dual use goods, as well as space security issues.
The Network aims at enhancing the awareness of third countries of challenges related to WMD and conventional weapons proliferation, including the illicit trade and excessive accumulation of SALW and their ammunition, through publications, meetings, conferences, and dedicated education and outreach projects. It aims furthermore at raising awareness of the need to work in cooperation with the Union and in the context of multilateral fora, in particular the United Nations, in order to prevent, deter, halt and where possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of concern worldwide and the illicit trade and excessive accumulation of SALW and their ammunition.
The Union wishes to support this Network as follows:

— | through organising three major annual conferences and — as a side-event — ‘next generation workshops’, with a view to submitting reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘HR’),
— | through organising three consultative meetings between representatives of Union institutions, representatives of Member States and academic experts to exchange views on major issues and critical developments in the fields of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms export control with a view to submitting reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the HR,
— | through the organisation of up to nine ad-hoc seminars for experts and practitioners on the full range of non-proliferation and disarmament issues covering both unconventional and conventional arms, with a view to submitting reports and/or recommendations to the representatives of the HR,
— | through the preparation and publication of up to 20 policy papers, which will cover topics under the mandate of the Consortium and put forward political and/or operational policy options,
— | through continued management and further development of a help-desk facility within the Consortium, to provide ad-hoc expertise on questions related to the full range of non-proliferation and disarmament issues covering both unconventional and conventional arms, for responses within a 2- to 3-week time frame, including the preparation of up to 18 expert papers,
— | through the maintenance and further development of an e-learning course covering all relevant aspects of non-proliferation and disarmament,
— | through the setting-up of up to 36 non-proliferation and disarmament internships for graduate students or young diplomats from the Union and third countries,
— | through the organisation of annual Brussels study visits for the participants in the UN Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament in order to promote and raise the visibility of Union policies in the fields of non-proliferation, disarmament and arms export control,
— | through the development of a pilot training course to raise awareness of proliferation risks, including these stemming from science and technology developments, among graduate and post-graduate students of the natural sciences,
— | through further maintaining, managing and developing an internet platform and related social networks to facilitate contacts, provide a unique forum for European disarmament and non-proliferation research, promote the Network, reach out to the global non-proliferation and disarmament community and promote the educational offers of the Consortium both with respect to on-site training courses and e-learning.2. Organisation of the network
The Network is open to all relevant think tanks and research institutes from the Union and associated states and is fully respectful of the diversity of opinion within the Union. It will be involved in all activities of the Consortium to the highest possible extent, in order to grant its members ownership and visibility.
The Network will continue to promote contacts within the European non-proliferation and disarmament research community, and especially reach out to natural scientists working in the field of CBRN security. It will continue to facilitate contacts between non-governmental experts, Member States’ representatives and the institutions of the Union. The Network will stand ready to engage with non-governmental actors from third countries in line with the EU WMD Non-proliferation and SALW Strategies.
The Network’s mandate covers non-proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, disarmament, and issues related to conventional weapons, including SALW, as well as arms export control and space security.
The participants in relevant preparatory bodies of the Council (such as CONOP/CODUN and COARM) will be able to consult the Network on issues related to disarmament and non-proliferation of non-conventional and conventional weapons, including SALW, and its representatives may attend the Network’s meetings. The Network’s meetings may be organised back to back with the working group meetings, if feasible.
The Network will continue to be led by the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, which has been formed by the FRS, HSFK/PRIF, the IISS, SIPRI, the IAI and the VCDNP, and which will be entrusted with the management of the projects, in close cooperation with the representatives of the HR.
The Consortium, in consultation with the representatives of the HR and Member States, will invite participants who have expertise in non-proliferation and disarmament policies of WMD and conventional weapons to expert seminars and annual major conferences and to share their publications and activities on the dedicated website. The Consortium will also contribute to the competence development on non-proliferation and disarmament affairs of both officials and scholars within the Union and beyond.
3. Description of the projects
3.1. Project 1: Organisation of an annual major conference with a report and/or recommendations
3.1.1. Purpose of the project
The annual major non-proliferation and disarmament conferences, with the participation of governmental experts and independent think tanks and other specialists from academia from the Union and associated states as well as third countries, will discuss and identify further measures to combat the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems and interrelated disarmament objectives, as well as address challenges related to conventional weapons, including countering the illicit trade and excessive accumulation of SALW and their ammunition. As the flagship event of the project, the annual conference will continue to enhance awareness of the EU WMD Non-proliferation and SALW Strategies and the New Lines for Action and associated implementation efforts by the institutions.
The annual conferences will also serve to foster the role and cohesion of European think tanks specialising in fields related to non-proliferation and disarmament and will help to enhance capacity in these and other institutions, including in areas of the world without great depth of expertise in disarmament and non-proliferation.
The annual conferences and any preparatory meetings will address issues related to disarmament and non-proliferation that are of topical relevance to the work of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Based on these discussions and other work overseen by the Consortium, policy-oriented reports will be produced together with a set of action-oriented recommendations to the representatives of the HR. The report will be disseminated to the relevant institutions of the Union and the Member States and made available online.
3.1.2. Results of the project:

— | maintain a major European-led international non-proliferation and disarmament conference that will continue to be the key venue for promoting strategic discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems and interrelated disarmament objectives to address challenges related to conventional weapons, including countering the illicit trade and excessive accumulation of SALW and their ammunition,
— | increase the visibility and awareness of Union policies in the field of WMD and SALW non-proliferation and in the field of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) action among the government officials, academia and civil society of third countries,
— | promote the role and cohesion of the Network and the Union’s role in this field, and build up non-proliferation expertise in countries where it is insufficient, including in third countries,
— | submit policy-oriented reports and/or action-oriented recommendations that would enhance the implementation of the EU WMD Non-proliferation and SALW Strategies and constitute a useful stepping stone for non-proliferation and conventional weapons-related action by the Union and the international community,
— | increase the awareness and knowledge of the institutions of the Union, of Member States, civil society and third countries about threats related to WMD and their means of delivery, allowing them to improve anticipation.3.1.3. Description of the project
The project provides for the organisation of three annual major conferences, with preparatory meetings as necessary, and the preparation of associated reports and/or recommendations:

— | a yearly conference of 1,5 days held in Brussels, with the participation of up to 300 experts from think tanks and academia and governments from the Union and associated states and third countries, specialised in non-proliferation, disarmament, arms control and conventional weapons issues, including SALW,
— | attention to development of ‘next generation’ specialists, including from countries outside Europe and North America, who will be invited to an extra day before or after the conference for specialised training and exposure to relevant Union institutions,
— | policy-oriented reports and/or action-oriented recommendations that would boost the implementation of the EU WMD and SALW Strategies.3.2. Project 2: Organisation of annual Union consultative meetings
3.2.1. Purpose of the project
The project provides for the organisation of three annual consultative meetings with the preparation of associated reports and/or recommendations. The seminars should address both short- and mid-term challenges for the Union in the fields of non-proliferation and disarmament, in particular WMD and their delivery vehicles, conventional weapons including SALW, new types of weapons and delivery systems. They should also provide an opportunity for Union decision-makers to focus on longer-range challenges and trends in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament as well as of other relevant issues which go beyond their ordinary day-to-day business.
The consultative meetings will also serve to strengthen the cohesion of European think tanks specialising in fields related to non-proliferation and disarmament and will help to enhance capacity in these fields, especially in those regions of the Union where disarmament and non-proliferation expertise is improvable.
3.2.2. Results of the project:

— | exchange of information and analysis regarding current proliferation trends among policy practitioners and academic experts from the Member States, as well as specialised staff from the EEAS and institutions of the Union,
— | discussion on the best ways and means to implement Union policies against proliferation,
— | provide constructive feedback to the Union on its strategies against the proliferation of WMD and SALW by independent Union think tanks, and suggestions from practitioners to the think tanks on most policy-relevant topics for further research,
— | identify relevant issues in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament for policy-oriented reports,
— | produce policy-oriented reports together with a set of action-oriented recommendations to the representatives of the HR.3.2.3. Description of the project
The project provides for the organisation of three annual consultative meetings with the preparation of associated reports and/or recommendations. The agenda of these events shall be prepared in close cooperation with the Council’s CFSP working groups in the fields of non-proliferation and disarmament (CODUN/CONOP) and arms export control (COARM). The meetings should address both short- and mid-term challenges for the Union in the fields of non-proliferation and disarmament in the following weapon categories: WMD and their delivery vehicles, conventional weapons, including SALW, new types of weapons and delivery systems.
The annual consultative meetings shall last 1,5 days and allow for the participation of up to 100 individuals from Union think tanks, Member States and Union institutions, specialised in non-proliferation and conventional weapons issues, including SALW. These seminars should serve mainly a consultative purpose between the Union non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks, the Union and its Member States. The annual consultative meetings should be held in Brussels.
3.3. Project 3: Organisation of ad-hoc seminars
3.3.1. Purpose of the project
The project provides for the organisation of up to nine ad hoc expert seminars with the preparation of associated reports and/or recommendations. These seminars should, in particular, serve a consultative purpose between the Union non-proliferation think tanks, the Union and its Member States, on an ad hoc basis, in order to address salient events and Union policy options, as well as provide an opportunity for the Union think tanks, Member States and Union institutions to reach out to target audiences inside and outside the Union.
3.3.2. Results of the project

— | Exchange of information and analysis regarding current proliferation trends among policy practitioners and academic experts from the Member States, as well as specialised staff from the EEAS and institutions of the Union.
— | Discussion on the best ways and means to implement Union policies against proliferation.
— | Provide constructive feedback to the Union on its strategies against the proliferation of WMD and SALW by independent Union think tanks, and suggestions from practitioners to the think tanks on most policy-relevant topics for further research.
— | Identify relevant issues in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament for policy-oriented reports.
— | Produce policy-oriented reports together with a set of action-oriented recommendations to the representatives of the HR. These reports will be disseminated to the relevant institutions of the Union and the Member States.3.3.3. Description of the project
The project provides for the organisation of up to nine ad hoc expert seminars with the preparation of associated reports and/or recommendations. The ad hoc seminars shall last up to 2 days and allow for the participation of up to 45 individuals, to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
3.4. Project 4: Publications
3.4.1. Purpose of the project:

— | to provide information and analysis on topics related to non-proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, conventional arms, including SALW, and disarmament that feed a political and security-related dialogue on these issues, primarily by experts, researchers and academics,
— | to provide a resource that the participants in the relevant preparatory bodies of the Council can use to inform their discussion of Union non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament policy and practice,
— | to provide ideas, information and analysis that can assist in the development of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament actions at Union level.3.4.2. Results of the project:

— | enhanced political and security-related dialogue on measures to combat the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems, arms control and disarmament, primarily by experts, researchers and academics,
— | increased awareness, knowledge and understanding within civil society, particularly the broader Union network of independent non-proliferation think tanks, and governments of issues related to Union non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament policies,
— | political and/or operational policy options provided to the HR, the Union’s institutions and the Member States,
— | development of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament actions at Union level assisted through ideas, information and analysis.3.4.3. Description of the project
The project provides for the preparation and publication of up to 20 policy papers. The policy papers will be prepared or commissioned by the Consortium and do not necessarily represent the views of the Union’s institutions or the Member States. The policy papers will cover the topics under the mandate of the Consortium. Every paper will frame political and/or operational policy options. All policy papers will be published on the website of the Consortium.
3.5. Project 5: Managing and further developing the help-desk facility
3.5.1. Purpose of the project
The continued management and further development of the help-desk facility within the Consortium, to provide ad-hoc expertise in relation to questions related to the full range of non-proliferation and disarmament issues, covering both unconventional and conventional arms, will inform and facilitate the shaping of Union policy action in relation to specific and urgent topics.
3.5.2. Results of the project:

— | manage ad-hoc research requests, with responses within a 2- to 3-week time frame, on specific issues requested by the EEAS,
— | promote ad-hoc topic-specific dialogue between the Consortium think tanks and the EEAS,
— | thus strengthen the knowledge basis for evolving discussions on non-proliferation issues in the Union,
— | allow the EEAS comprehensive access to the expertise and research-dedicated resources of the Consortium for short-time and occasional requests.3.5.3. Description of the project
The project will provide the EEAS and the relevant Council working groups with up to 18 5-to-10-page expert papers on current non-proliferation and disarmament issues within 2 to 3 weeks of being requested by the EEAS. The papers will be based on a review of existing academic literature and primary documents (not original research). Potential topics in light of the international agenda, forthcoming Union events and Union policy documents will be identified through discussions with the EEAS. The EEAS can request this function (a) through a paper; and/or (b) through a briefing to CONOP or COARM; and/or (c) in form of remote expert input when urgent advice is required.
3.6. Project 6: E-learning
3.6.1. Purpose of the project:

— | to build capacity in the next generation of scholars and practitioners in the fields of non-proliferation and disarmament,
— | to enhance the in-depth knowledge of Union non-proliferation and disarmament policies across the Union and in third countries,
— | to contribute to global initiatives aimed at advancing non-proliferation and disarmament education,
— | to renew and expand the expertise on WMD and SALW issues within the Union and in partner countries,
— | to provide the institutions of the Union, the Member States and the European think-tank network with tailored and updated knowledge on the whole spectrum of non-conventional and conventional arms control.3.6.2. Results of the project:

— | maintenance and optimisation of a complete e-learning course covering all relevant aspects of non-proliferation and disarmament,
— | outreach and assistance to educators and trainers to use the Union non-proliferation and disarmament educational resources,
— | support for integration of the Union e-learning resources into university master’s programmes,
— | combination of e-learning and classroom training for Consortium-designed proliferation awareness training (‘blended learning’),
— | increased in-depth knowledge of Union non-proliferation and disarmament policies across the Union and in third countries,
— | provision of a constantly updated open educational resource for all stakeholders involved in non-proliferation research and programming,
— | development of further online content to improve course syllabus and to provide critical supportive knowledge for non-proliferation practitioners and scholars.3.6.3. Description of the project
The project will focus on the worldwide dissemination and use of the e-learning tool, which was developed under Decision 2014/129/CFSP.
For this purpose the user-friendliness of the e-learning site and the associated Certificate Section will be enhanced continuously, based on participant feedback and on the evaluation of user behaviour through various statistical tools. Special attention will be devoted to the upgrade of the e-learning offer for users with visual or hearing impairments, in order to facilitate the barrier-free usage of the course and allow for a maximum of potential participants. Also, the intelligibility of the whole course will be enhanced through a comprehensive language review provided by specialised English native speakers.
All 15 Learning Units will be updated in order to provide students with the most actual facts and figures. Outreach and support to educational institutions will allow easy integration of the e-learning into university master’s programmes and other educational offers, and encourage worldwide usage of the e-learning course.
Up to five additional Learning Units will be developed and launched between 2018 and 2020. The additional e-learning content will be developed in close consultation with the EEAS and the Member States and can fall in one of the following categories:

(a) | Advanced Learning Unit, elaborating on existing course content and providing more in-depth knowledge;
(b) | Practical Learning Unit, focusing on practical implementation issues of non-proliferation or export control regimes;
(c) | Academic Learning Unit, providing theoretical reflections on non-proliferation and disarmament;
(d) | Supportive Learning Unit, providing critical knowledge to better understand the broad problematique of non-proliferation and disarmament (e.g. legal, financial or ethical aspects);
(e) | Customised Learning Unit, supporting specific classroom training courses and used in combination with those courses (‘blended learning’).3.7. Project 7: Internships
3.7.1. Purpose of the project:

— | to build capacity in the next generation of scholars and practitioners in non-proliferation policy and programming,
— | to enhance the understanding and the ownership of Union non-proliferation and disarmament policies across the Union,
— | to disseminate and enhance the knowledge of Union SALW and WMD policies in third countries,
— | to build networks of emerging experts at the regional levels where the Union has a strong interest in non-proliferation,
— | to strengthen capacity-building within the Network,
— | to renew and expand the expertise on WMD and SALW issues within the Union and in partner countries.3.7.2. Results of the project:

— | enhanced capacity in the next generation of scholars and practitioners in non-proliferation policy and programming,
— | increased in-depth knowledge of Union non-proliferation and disarmament policies across the Union,
— | better understanding of Union strategies, policies and non-proliferation approaches in third countries,
— | the creation of networks of young practitioners and academics and the facilitation of practical cooperation,
— | strengthened capacity-building on Union policies in the fields of WMD and SALW within the Network.3.7.3. Description of the project
The project provides for European non-proliferation and disarmament internships for up to 36 graduate students or young diplomats, each for a period up to 3 months. The internships will be set up, supervised and documented by the Consortium, and combine lectures, discussion sessions, structured reading, and project integration.
All institutes belonging to the Network are eligible as host institutes. 30 out of 36 internships shall be reserved for European candidates, whereas the remaining six internships are reserved for non-European candidates, ideally from South Asia, East Asia, the Middle East and North Africa.
All interns will be invited — to the extent possible — to the conferences and seminars organised by the Consortium taking place during their internship.
3.8. Project 8: Union study visit for the participants in the UN Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament
3.8.1. Purpose of the project:

— | to enhance the in-depth knowledge and ensure visibility of Union non-proliferation and disarmament policies in third countries,
— | to renew and expand the expertise on WMD and SALW issues in third countries, in particular by raising awareness of possibilities created by the Union programmes for capacity-building in areas such as arms export control, non-proliferation and disarmament and CBRN risks mitigation,
— | to support UN efforts to enhance disarmament education and promote multilateralism.3.8.2. Results of the project:

— | increased in-depth knowledge and visibility of Union non-proliferation and disarmament policies in third countries,
— | enhanced expertise on WMD and SALW issues in partner countries,
— | enhanced UN disarmament education.3.8.3. Description of the project
The project will include an annual 2- to 3-day Brussels study visit for the UN Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament, including a seminar with speakers from the Union institutions and experts from the Consortium network, and a field trip to relevant locations. The visit will be scheduled to fit into the European component of the fellowship programme, typically in advance of the UN General Assembly.
3.9. Project 9: Proliferation awareness training
3.9.1. Purpose of the project:

— | to build awareness among the natural sciences and other relevant fields of WMD proliferation risks associated with certain materials, software and technology, and the relevant international treaties and mechanisms,
— | to build capacity among these groups to establish internal compliance mechanisms in their institutions to control sensitive technology flows as well as materials safety and security,
— | to provide the institutions of the Union, Member States and the Union non-proliferation network with fresh ideas on technological developments and their potential impact on non-proliferation.3.9.2. Results of the project:

— | enhanced capacity in the next generation of scholars of the natural sciences and other relevant fields in non-proliferation instruments and policies,
— | contribution to the goals of Union non-proliferation policy through enhanced awareness of proliferation risks among disciplines with major proliferation risks and technological developments,
— | combination of distance learning (e-learning) and on-site training (‘blended learning’).3.9.3. Description of the project
This project will develop a pilot course to raise awareness of proliferation risks for graduate and post-graduate students of the natural sciences and other relevant fields. This will include the development of a dedicated curriculum for two distinct audiences (such as biomedical, engineering or nuclear) and delivery of one pilot course for each of these target groups.
3.10. Project 10: Management of an internet platform
3.10.1. Purpose of the project
The maintenance and the development of an internet website will facilitate inter-sessional contacts between meetings of the Network and foster research dialogue among the non-proliferation think tanks. The institutions of the Union and Member States could also benefit from a dedicated website where Network participants are free to exchange information, share their ideas and to publish their studies on non-proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery and conventional weapons issues, including SALW. The project will provide an online follow-up to the events and a window for European research. It will contribute to efficient dissemination of research results among the think tank community and to governmental circles. This will lead to better anticipation and knowledge of threats linked to the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, and conventional weapons, including the illicit trade and excessive accumulation of SALW and their ammunition.
3.10.2. Results of the project:

— | managing of a platform where non-proliferation think tanks can continuously share their independent views and analysis on WMD proliferation and conventional weapons issues, including SALW,
— | expanding, managing and updating the existing network of independent think tanks,
— | promoting of a better understanding of the EU WMD Non-proliferation and SALW Strategies within civil society and ensuring an interface between the Union and the network of think tanks,
— | permanent and free downloading of documents from the Network’s meetings and from independent think tanks who may wish to share their research results without financial compensation,
— | increased awareness and knowledge of the institutions of the Union, the Member States, civil society and third countries about threats related to conventional weapons, WMD and their means of delivery, allowing them to improve anticipation.3.10.3. Description of the project

— | The use of a social-network type of technology, when feasible and appropriate, could be developed in order to allow active online communication and information exchange between the Network participants in a familiar environment.
— | The Consortium, in charge of the project, will be responsible for web hosting, web design and technical maintenance of the website.
— | Union policies relating to WMD proliferation and conventional weapons issues, including SALW will be followed and supported by appropriate documentation on a regular basis.
— | Publications of the Consortium will be promoted and supported by specific historical records.
— | Conferences organised by the Consortium will be promoted and relayed on the website (background papers, agenda, presentations, video recording of open meeting when appropriate).
— | The e-learning course of the Consortium will be made available through the website. An intranet access will be specifically developed for Network members and Union officials (integrated tool for the e-learning course).
— | Special focus pages will be published on a bimonthly basis on topical subjects relating to WMD proliferation and conventional weapons issues, including SALW.4. Duration
The total estimated duration of the implementation of the projects is 42 months.
5. Beneficiaries
5.1. Direct beneficiaries
The suggested projects serve the purposes of the CFSP and contribute to meeting the strategic objectives laid down in the EU WMD Non-proliferation and SALW Strategies.
5.2. Indirect beneficiaries
The indirect beneficiaries of the projects are:

(a) | independent think tanks and academics specialised in non-proliferation, disarmament and conventional weapons issues, including SALW, from the Union and third countries;
(b) | institutions of the Union, including educational institutions, students and all other recipients of the e-learning course;
(c) | Member States;
(d) | third countries.6. Third-party participants
The projects will be financed in their entirety by this Decision. Experts from the Network may be considered third-party participants. They will work in accordance with their standard rules.
7. Steering Committee
The Steering Committee for this project will be composed of representatives of the HR and of the implementing entity referred to in paragraph 8 of this Annex. The Steering Committee will review the implementation of this Decision regularly, at least once a year, including by the use of electronic means of communication.
8. Implementing entity
Technical implementation of this Decision will be entrusted to the Consortium, which will perform its task under the control of the HR. In carrying out its activities, the Consortium will cooperate with the HR, the Member States, other State Parties, and international organisations, as appropriate.

Pending: 32018D0298

28.2.2018 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 56/34
(1) On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Strategy), Chapter III of which contains a list of measures that need to be taken both within the Union and in third countries to combat such proliferation.
(2) The Union is actively implementing the Strategy and is giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, in particular through releasing financial resources to support specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions, such as the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).
(3) On 17 November 2003, the Council adopted Common Position 2003/805/CFSP(1). That Common Position calls, inter alia, for the promotion of the signing and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
(4) The States Signatories of the CTBT have decided to establish a Preparatory Commission (‘the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO’), endowed with legal capacity, and which has standing as an international organisation, for the purpose of carrying out the effective implementation of the CTBT, pending the establishment of the CTBTO.
(5) The early entry into force and universalisation of the CTBT and the strengthening of the monitoring and verification system of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO are important objectives of the Strategy. In this context, the nuclear tests carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has further underlined the importance of the early entry into force of the CTBT and the need for an accelerated building-up and strengthening of the CTBT monitoring and verification system.
(6) The Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO is engaged in identifying how its verification system could best be strengthened, including through the development of noble gas monitoring capabilities and efforts aimed at fully involving States Signatories of the CTBT in the implementation of the verification regime.
(7) In the framework of the implementation of the Strategy, the Council adopted three Joint Actions and three Decisions on support for activities of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO, namely Joint Action 2006/243/CFSP(2), and Joint Actions 2007/468/CFSP(3)and 2008/588/CFSP(4), Council Decisions 2010/461/CFSP(5), 2012/699/CFSP(6)and (CFSP) 2015/1837(7).
(8) That Union support should be continued.
(9) The technical implementation of this Decision should be entrusted to the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO which, on the basis of its unique expertise and capabilities through the network of the International Monitoring System (IMS), comprising over 337 facilities around the globe, and the International Data Centre, is the sole international organisation having the ability and legitimacy to implement this Decision. The projects as supported by the Union can only be financed through an extra-budgetary contribution to the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO,
(a) strengthen the capabilities of the CTBT monitoring and verification system, including in the field of radionuclide detection;
(b) strengthen the capabilities of the States Signatories of the CTBT to fulfil their verification responsibilities under the CTBT and to enable them to benefit fully from participation in the CTBT regime.
(a) certified auxiliary seismic (AS) stations that are part of the CTBTO International Monitoring System (IMS);
(b) the development of noble gas sampling systems through study of materials for improved adsorption of xenon;
(c) continuing the radio-xenon background measurement campaigns in different regions of the world;
(d) the Ensemble Prediction System to quantify uncertainties and confidence level in Atmospheric Transport Modelling (ATM) simulations;
(e) the scientific evaluation of the increase in resolution for ATM tools;
(f) the development of new software;
(g) enhancing the on-site inspection noble gas processing and detection;
(h) enhancing the automatic processing and integration capabilities in seismic, hydro-acoustic and infrasound National Data Centre-in-a-Box;
(i) integrated outreach and capacity-building targeting State Signatories and Non-Signatories.
— improve our understanding in the regional radio-xenon background of equatorial regions, where the dispersion of noble gases is made very complex by many intense phenomena,
— further refine atmospheric and dispersion models to better represent air masses movements in that region of the globe.
— develop a validated prototype to estimate uncertainties and confidence level in ATM simulations,
— define the needs in collaboration with users,
— identify meteorological EPS data to use,
— build a dataset of ATM simulations,
— develop tools to estimate uncertainties and confidence levels,
— validate tools,
— adapt the new launching interface to produce uncertainties and confidence level,
— make the validated prototype available for testing on real cases.
— demonstrate the added-value of the increase resolution using observations and model comparisons,
— develop a launching interface to quickly produce forward and backward ATM simulations, HR meteorological fields, and ATM guidance based on HR meteorological fields at any location.
— enhanced user interface flexibility for analyst tools, enhanced analyst review workflow, event management, event cross-correlation and comparison, map tool and map integration, visualisation and editing of waveform quality control masks, frequency-wavenumber (FK) display, support for analyst training,
— comprehensive capturing of data provenance in order to understand how processing results were arrived at and investigate the evolution of a result as the available information changes,
— extensibility as a major feature built in all components,
— flexible seismic, hydro-acoustic and infrasound (SHI) pipeline configuration supported by graphical tools,
— facilitates a new model for collaborative software development following best practices in open source software development,
— enhanced monitoring and testing capabilities — Test Data Set Replay.
— two cross-correlation based approaches,
— an approach based on auto-regressive AIC methods.
— For each of the three approaches above, experimental automatic processing pipelines will be setup, integrating the three algorithms under consideration (each in a separate pipeline). This implies automation of some manual steps in these methods.
— Each pipeline will run on the same set of representative events that cause aftershocks.
— A set of automatic tests will be designed and implemented allowing collecting statistical information on the three algorithms when run on a representative set of events, for performance comparison purposes.
— Statistical data collected as a result of automatic tests will be used to compare the performance of the algorithms on representative data sets.
— SHI MDA analysts will also assess the results produced by the three algorithms from the point of view of their quality as a starting point for analyst review.
— The final deliverables should be a report and recommendation summarising the findings above establishing which of the three approaches (if any) should be pursued for further development and implementation in an operational system. This should include estimates for the remaining effort needed to complete development.
— detector stand and lead shield, in order to facilitate installation and adjust the centre of gravity,
— gas separation, in order to reduce power consumption and switch the carrier gas from helium to more readily available materials in remote locations,
— software, in order to simplify processes suitable for an inspector-operated system,
— overall engineering design, in order to maximise integration in line with the OSI rapid deployment concept.
— Integrate the IDC signal detector for hydro-acoustic data in NDC-in-a-Box, including determination of features specific to hydro-acoustic detections. This would allow NDCs to detect arrivals from IMS hydro-acoustic stations using the same software that is used in IDC processing.
— Integrate the NET-VISA detector used at the IDC into the SeisComP processing pipeline, and offer the end-user an interface to configure NET-VISA as the default associator to be used in SeisComP. This would help NDCs that process IMS data using the SeisComP automatic pipeline to create an event set that is closer to the one built at the IDC.
— Enhance capabilities of integrating IMS data into other open source seismic analysis software such as SEISAN.
— existing NDC-in-a-Box scdfx module integrated into SeisComP enhanced to allow it to process hydro-acoustic data and to store all features that hydro-acoustic detections at the IDC possess,
— IDC HASE module for azimuth and slowness determination of hydro-acoustic arrivals integrated into a SeisComP module,
— NET-VISA associator integrated into SeisComP, as an optional associator that can be configured to be used in lieu of the SeisComP default associator,
— SeisComP enhanced to enable it to store additional features for hydro-acoustic detections, as well as pixels and pixel families for infrasound detections,
— SeisComP export modules enhanced, such that detections and their features for hydro-acoustic and infrasound software can be exported to the Open Source Database,
— current software enhanced to allow complete IMS seismic station configuration and IMS data to be imported into SAEISAN for processing in combination with non-IMS data of interest to NDCs.
— The first workshop will introduce the project and will provide NDC representatives the opportunity to present use cases relevant to their own NDC that may benefit from running an automatic associator (NET-VISA) as part of SeisComP, to form SHI events. NDCs are also expected to provide test data from networks of interest to them to the IDC, for testing purposes.
— The second workshop should serve as the start of a testing period for the software completed during the project. This software will likely include the NET-VISA associator integrated in SeisComP and AS station processing tools for hydro processing integrated into SeisComP.
— support the evolution of the station processing system to continuously meet IMS and IDC operations sustainment needs,
— support the NDC requests for software, software update and functionalities for performing NDC activities,
— continue the implementation of state-of-the-art functionalities to better analyse infrasound signals in order to maintain the scientific credibility of the infrasound technology at the CTBTO,
— working on the inclusion of infrasound wave propagation models with uncertainty quantification, combined with high-resolution atmospheric specifications during infrasound phase association, event formation and in-depth event analysis to meet mid-term strategy objectives.
— to continue building the technical and scientific credibility of the IDC infrasound system and to ensure the sustainment of IDC and IMS operations;
— to continue building on the efforts for NDC-in-a-Box software started under Decision 2012/699/CFSP and continued under Decision (CFSP) 2015/1837 in allowing NDCs to process the data available from the IMS for both CTBT monitoring purposes and for national purposes. These efforts have created a strong NDC user base and the proposed project results will help gaining NDC trust in the credibility of the verification system;
— to collaborate with NDCs to build a state-of-the-art infrasound system as part of IDC re-engineering efforts.
(a) contribute to the universalisation of the CTBT;
(b) advance prospects for the CTBT's entry into force; and
(c) strengthen and maintain support for the CTBT's verification regime.
— development of online educational materials and tools,
— training, scientific and diplomatic workshops and conferences,
— participation in major events on non-proliferation and disarmament issues.
— software and infrastructure development,
— technical workshops,
— systematic training for Extended NDC-in-a-box (eNIAB) software,
— support for integrating the processing of IMS data with national and regional seismic networks,
— provision of remedial technical assistance in the form of CBS equipment and its maintenance or replacement.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and Article 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Strategy), Chapter III of which contains a list of measures that need to be taken both within the Union and in third countries to combat such proliferation.
(2) The Union is actively implementing the Strategy and is giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, in particular through releasing financial resources to support specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions, such as the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).
(3) On 17 November 2003, the Council adopted Common Position 2003/805/CFSP(1). That Common Position calls, inter alia, for the promotion of the signing and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
(4) The States Signatories of the CTBT have decided to establish a Preparatory Commission (‘the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO’), endowed with legal capacity, and which has standing as an international organisation, for the purpose of carrying out the effective implementation of the CTBT, pending the establishment of the CTBTO.
(5) The early entry into force and universalisation of the CTBT and the strengthening of the monitoring and verification system of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO are important objectives of the Strategy. In this context, the nuclear tests carried out by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has further underlined the importance of the early entry into force of the CTBT and the need for an accelerated building-up and strengthening of the CTBT monitoring and verification system.
(6) The Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO is engaged in identifying how its verification system could best be strengthened, including through the development of noble gas monitoring capabilities and efforts aimed at fully involving States Signatories of the CTBT in the implementation of the verification regime.
(7) In the framework of the implementation of the Strategy, the Council adopted three Joint Actions and three Decisions on support for activities of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO, namely Joint Action 2006/243/CFSP(2), and Joint Actions 2007/468/CFSP(3)and 2008/588/CFSP(4), Council Decisions 2010/461/CFSP(5), 2012/699/CFSP(6)and (CFSP) 2015/1837(7).
(8) That Union support should be continued.
(9) The technical implementation of this Decision should be entrusted to the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO which, on the basis of its unique expertise and capabilities through the network of the International Monitoring System (IMS), comprising over 337 facilities around the globe, and the International Data Centre, is the sole international organisation having the ability and legitimacy to implement this Decision. The projects as supported by the Union can only be financed through an extra-budgetary contribution to the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
1. For the purpose of ensuring the continuous and practical implementation of certain elements of the Strategy, the Union shall support the activities of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO in order to further the following objectives:
(a)
strengthen the capabilities of the CTBT monitoring and verification system, including in the field of radionuclide detection;
(b)
strengthen the capabilities of the States Signatories of the CTBT to fulfil their verification responsibilities under the CTBT and to enable them to benefit fully from participation in the CTBT regime.
2. The projects to be financed by the Union shall support:
(a)
certified auxiliary seismic (AS) stations that are part of the CTBTO International Monitoring System (IMS);
(b)
the development of noble gas sampling systems through study of materials for improved adsorption of xenon;
(c)
continuing the radio-xenon background measurement campaigns in different regions of the world;
(d)
the Ensemble Prediction System to quantify uncertainties and confidence level in Atmospheric Transport Modelling (ATM) simulations;
(e)
the scientific evaluation of the increase in resolution for ATM tools;
(f)
the development of new software;
(g)
enhancing the on-site inspection noble gas processing and detection;
(h)
enhancing the automatic processing and integration capabilities in seismic, hydro-acoustic and infrasound National Data Centre-in-a-Box;
(i)
integrated outreach and capacity-building targeting State Signatories and Non-Signatories.
In the implementation of the projects, providing support to the activities referred to in this paragraph, Union visibility will be ensured as well as the proper programme management in the execution of this Decision.
These projects shall be carried out for the benefit of all States Signatories of the CTBT.
All project components shall be flanked by proactive and innovative public outreach activities, and resources be allocated accordingly.
A detailed description of the projects is set out in the Annex.

Article 2
1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the High Representative) shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.
2. The technical implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be carried out by the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO. It shall perform this task under the control of the High Representative. For this purpose, the High Representative shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO.

Article 3
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 4 594 752.
2. The expenditure financed by the amount stipulated in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the Union budget.
3. The European Commission shall supervise the proper management of the financial reference amount referred to in paragraph 1. For that purpose, it shall conclude a financing agreement with the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO. The financing agreement shall stipulate that the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO is to ensure visibility of the Union contribution, commensurate with its size.
4. The European Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after 26 February 2018. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.

Article 4
1. The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular reports prepared by the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO. Those reports shall form the basis for the evaluation carried out by the Council.
2. The European Commission shall provide information on the financial aspects of the implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2).

Article 5
This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.
This Decision shall expire 24 months after the date of the conclusion of the financing agreement referred to in Article 3(3). However, it shall expire 6 months after its entry into force if no financing agreement has been concluded by that time.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and Article 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Strategy), Chapter III of which contains a list of measures that need to be taken both within the Union and in third countries to combat such proliferation.
(2) The Union is actively implementing the Strategy and is giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, in particular through releasing financial resources to support specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions, such as the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).
(3) On 17 November 2003, the Council adopted Common Position 2003/805/CFSP(1). That Common Position calls, inter alia, for the promotion of the signing and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
(4) The States Signatories of the CTBT have decided to establish a Preparatory Commission (‘the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO’), endowed with legal capacity, and which has standing as an international organisation, for the purpose of carrying out the effective implementation of the CTBT, pending the establishment of the CTBTO.
(5) The early entry into force and universalisation of the CTBT and the strengthening of the monitoring and verification system of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO are important objectives of the Strategy. In this context, the nuclear tests carried out by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has further underlined the importance of the early entry into force of the CTBT and the need for an accelerated building-up and strengthening of the CTBT monitoring and verification system.
(6) The Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO is engaged in identifying how its verification system could best be strengthened, including through the development of noble gas monitoring capabilities and efforts aimed at fully involving States Signatories of the CTBT in the implementation of the verification regime.
(7) In the framework of the implementation of the Strategy, the Council adopted three Joint Actions and three Decisions on support for activities of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO, namely Joint Action 2006/243/CFSP(2), and Joint Actions 2007/468/CFSP(3)and 2008/588/CFSP(4), Council Decisions 2010/461/CFSP(5), 2012/699/CFSP(6)and (CFSP) 2015/1837(7).
(8) That Union support should be continued.
(9) The technical implementation of this Decision should be entrusted to the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO which, on the basis of its unique expertise and capabilities through the network of the International Monitoring System (IMS), comprising over 337 facilities around the globe, and the International Data Centre, is the sole international organisation having the ability and legitimacy to implement this Decision. The projects as supported by the Union can only be financed through an extra-budgetary contribution to the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
1. For the purpose of ensuring the continuous and practical implementation of certain elements of the Strategy, the Union shall support the activities of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO in order to further the following objectives:
(a)
strengthen the capabilities of the CTBT monitoring and verification system, including in the field of radionuclide detection;
(b)
strengthen the capabilities of the States Signatories of the CTBT to fulfil their verification responsibilities under the CTBT and to enable them to benefit fully from participation in the CTBT regime.
2. The projects to be financed by the Union shall support:
(a)
certified auxiliary seismic (AS) stations that are part of the CTBTO International Monitoring System (IMS);
(b)
the development of noble gas sampling systems through study of materials for improved adsorption of xenon;
(c)
continuing the radio-xenon background measurement campaigns in different regions of the world;
(d)
the Ensemble Prediction System to quantify uncertainties and confidence level in Atmospheric Transport Modelling (ATM) simulations;
(e)
the scientific evaluation of the increase in resolution for ATM tools;
(f)
the development of new software;
(g)
enhancing the on-site inspection noble gas processing and detection;
(h)
enhancing the automatic processing and integration capabilities in seismic, hydro-acoustic and infrasound National Data Centre-in-a-Box;
(i)
integrated outreach and capacity-building targeting State Signatories and Non-Signatories.
In the implementation of the projects, providing support to the activities referred to in this paragraph, Union visibility will be ensured as well as the proper programme management in the execution of this Decision.
These projects shall be carried out for the benefit of all States Signatories of the CTBT.
All project components shall be flanked by proactive and innovative public outreach activities, and resources be allocated accordingly.
A detailed description of the projects is set out in the Annex.
1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the High Representative) shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.
2. The technical implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be carried out by the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO. It shall perform this task under the control of the High Representative. For this purpose, the High Representative shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO.
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 4 594 752.
2. The expenditure financed by the amount stipulated in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the Union budget.
3. The European Commission shall supervise the proper management of the financial reference amount referred to in paragraph 1. For that purpose, it shall conclude a financing agreement with the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO. The financing agreement shall stipulate that the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO is to ensure visibility of the Union contribution, commensurate with its size.
4. The European Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after 26 February 2018. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.
1. The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular reports prepared by the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO. Those reports shall form the basis for the evaluation carried out by the Council.
2. The European Commission shall provide information on the financial aspects of the implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2).
This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.
This Decision shall expire 24 months after the date of the conclusion of the financing agreement referred to in Article 3(3). However, it shall expire 6 months after its entry into force if no financing agreement has been concluded by that time.

Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities, enhance the prospects for early entry into force and support the universalisation of the CTBT and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

ANNEX1. Support to the verification technologies and monitoring system

Project 1: Improving sustainment of targeted certified IMS Auxiliary Seismic (AS) stations
BackgroundThe main focus will be to continue addressing AS stations which need urgent maintenance action specifically those located in countries facing financial hardship including when geographical density of AS stations in operations is poor in regions of interest, while proceeding with preventive maintenance. This is done by addressing equipment obsolescence, and upgrades as well as improvement of equipment sparing.
As in previous programs, there is a need for a full-time dedicated staff to plan and execute work projects at the relevant AS stations as well as funds for spare parts and travel.
ObjectivesThe principal objective is to bring target AS stations to a technical level compatible with the IMS requirements in a sustainable manner. AS stations are the backbone of the IMS seismic infrastructure and need continuing maintenance. Adequate preventive maintenance and associated equipment sparing can help achieve this objective. This is achieved in conjunction with other tasks such as AS station operator training. Priority will be given to AS stations where there is a strong need for technical and financial support, such as those in Africa, developing Asian and central Asian countries.
OutcomesIncreased data availability and data quality of the AS network: the AS network helps to improve the location accuracy targeted AS stations, including in regions of seismic events detected by the primary network leading to an enhanced seismic coverage of nuclear explosions. A strengthened sustainment structure for AS stations leads to increased visibility for the Union.

Project 2: Contribution to the development of noble gas sampling systems through a study of materials for improved adsorption of xenon
BackgroundThe efficient concentration of radioactive xenon isotopes (133Xe,135Xe,133mXe and131mXe) in small volumes under different physical conditions and the efficient and complete release of these xenon isotopes out of adsorption materials are of utmost importance in improving nuclear explosion monitoring and verifying the worldwide compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The above mentioned xenon isotopes are key fission radionuclides monitored by the noble gas component of the radionuclide network of the IMS and any improvements that can be introduced into future systems will be invaluable.
ObjectivesThe objective of this proposal is to gain a better understanding of the adsorption mechanisms, desorption conditions and properties of relevant materials over a range of conditions important for highly effective xenon concentration in the CTBT verification framework. A laboratory study will be undertaken to investigate which parameters are important and to determine fundamental information on how materials can be modified to optimise their characteristics, including, inter alia, adsorption and desorption capacity, density and durability.
OutcomeA laboratory report detailing these results and recommendations for implementation across IMS facilities will be produced, which improves the understanding of how current adsorption materials can be optimised and newer materials identified for improved radio-xenon detection capabilities in IMS facilities.

Project 3: Continuing the radio-xenon background measurement campaigns in different regions of the world
BackgroundThe Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is carrying out radio-xenon measurements with very sensitive systems. With the contribution received from the Union within the framework of Joint Action 2008/588/CFSP, the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO developed and purchased two transportable systems for measuring133Xe,135Xe,133mXe and131mXe. Within the framework of Decision 2012/699/CFSP, the two measurement systems operated in Kuwait City, Jakarta, Mutsu and Manado. They provided considerable amount of information regarding the radio-xenon background.
In the framework of Decision (CFSP) 2015/1837, both measurement campaigns in Kuwait and Indonesia were extended. Contacts were initiated with possible next host countries and cooperation agreements are currently under discussion.
ObjectivesThe CTBTO is planning to relocate the two mobile systems purchased under Joint Action 2008/588/CFSP and currently operating in Kuwait and Indonesia. Cooperation agreements with future host countries are under discussion.
From a network coverage point of view, the Southeast Asian region is of great importance for the CTBTO as no IMS noble gas system is currently operating there. In addition to a significant reinforcement of the coverage in that region of the world, operating a mobile system for a background campaign will allow to:

— | improve our understanding in the regional radio-xenon background of equatorial regions, where the dispersion of noble gases is made very complex by many intense phenomena,
— | further refine atmospheric and dispersion models to better represent air masses movements in that region of the globe.The CTBTO is planning to run a measurement campaign in the Southeast Asian region for at least 12 months to cover the whole seasonal variation.
The CTBTO aims at operating another mobile system in the East Asian region. Considerable insights on the characterisation of the radio-xenon background were previously provided by a short Union-funded measurement campaign. A longer measurement campaign is crucial to complement and refine our knowledge of the regional radio-xenon background. The main objective of this complementary campaign is to allow the characterisation of the East Asian region throughout an entire 12-month cycle covering all seasonal conditions. The location will be selected with the goal of running an intensified regional network of sensors (i.e. with higher density as compared to the current IMS noble gas network). This will be the first occurrence of having at least two systems very close to each other, allowing more scientific studies on cross-validation of the systems, cross-correlation of the detections, small scale Atmospheric Transport Modelling (ATM) developments, etc. This study could benefit of a partnership with States in the region that also plan for voluntary contributions on this subject.
After the end of these campaigns, the CTBTO is planning to perform additional measurements in areas where the global radio-xenon background is not sufficiently known and understood. Preferred locations are equatorial sites in Latin America, Asia and Africa.
To continue the measurement campaigns, funds are required for the shipment to new locations, operation and maintenance of the two mobile noble gas systems for 2 years.
OutcomeThe benefits are a better understanding of the global noble gas background variation and better coverage of the noble gas monitoring network. Following these measurement campaigns, the systems will be available for use by the CTBTO for follow-up studies of the noble gas background on different geographical scales and as backup and/or training systems.

Project 4: Ensemble Prediction System (EPS) to quantify uncertainties and confidence level in ATM simulations
BackgroundReferring to the Part I, paragraph 18(a), of the Protocol to the CTBT, the International Data Centre (‘IDC’) should provide values and associated uncertainties calculated for each event located by the IDC. Since ATM contributes to the location of events, associated uncertainties should be provided.
It is recognised that uncertainties can be estimated using a set of equivalent simulations, an ensemble, rather than a single simulation. This project will use meteorological EPS data (European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts, National Centres for Environmental Predictions or others) to generate a dataset containing multiple simulations for the same cases. This dataset will then be used to develop tools to estimate uncertainties and confidence levels in ATM simulations. An independent dataset will serve to validate and demonstrate the new tools.
Objectives:
— | develop a validated prototype to estimate uncertainties and confidence level in ATM simulations,
— | define the needs in collaboration with users,
— | identify meteorological EPS data to use,
— | build a dataset of ATM simulations,
— | develop tools to estimate uncertainties and confidence levels,
— | validate tools,
— | adapt the new launching interface to produce uncertainties and confidence level,
— | make the validated prototype available for testing on real cases.OutcomeEPS-based products will help in taking important decisions by providing objective information to quantify uncertainties and confidence level in ATM simulations for any particular case. It will also provide a scientific basis to demonstrate how to extract valuable information from ATM guidance in spite of the inherent uncertainties associated with atmospheric simulations.

Project 5: Scientific evaluation of the benefits of increase in resolution for IDC’s ATM tools
BackgroundGuidance resulting from ATMs usually benefits from an increase in resolution of the driving meteorological fields and of the ATM itself, especially for shorter time range. Two projects in that direction are nearing completion at IDC; operationally producing Source Receptor Sensitivity (SRS) fields at higher resolution (1 hour, 0,5 o) and generating high resolution (HR) meteorological fields on an on-demand basis for specific events (on-site inspections (OSI), nuclear tests, nuclear incidents, etc.) anywhere on the globe. These HR meteorological fields will be ingested by Flexpart a software tool using a Lagrangian transport and dispersion model to produce ATM products of a very high resolution (~ 0,05 o) as required. A scientific validation will be performed to demonstrate and quantify the benefits from these two projects on ATM products.
Objectives:
— | demonstrate the added-value of the increase resolution using observations and model comparisons,
— | develop a launching interface to quickly produce forward and backward ATM simulations, HR meteorological fields, and ATM guidance based on HR meteorological fields at any location.OutcomeThe scientific demonstration of the benefits of increasing the resolution on the ATM guidance will help confirming the utility of the new capacities (operational SRS at higher resolution, HR meteorological fields) in the operational system.
The launching interface will make possible the production of detailed guidance during OSIs or during other exceptional events (nuclear tests, nuclear incidents, etc.).

Project 6: Activities in Preparation for Phase 3 of IDC Reengineering
BackgroundFrom January 2014 to April 2017, the CTBTO has undertaken the IDC Reengineering Phase 2 (RP2) project, aiming to develop comprehensive software architecture to guide new software development and updates to existing systems over the next decade.
The resulting architecture brings notable improvements over the existing one, among others:

— | enhanced user interface flexibility for analyst tools, enhanced analyst review workflow, event management, event cross-correlation and comparison, map tool and map integration, visualisation and editing of waveform quality control masks, frequency-wavenumber (FK) display, support for analyst training,
— | comprehensive capturing of data provenance in order to understand how processing results were arrived at and investigate the evolution of a result as the available information changes,
— | extensibility as a major feature built in all components,
— | flexible seismic, hydro-acoustic and infrasound (SHI) pipeline configuration supported by graphical tools,
— | facilitates a new model for collaborative software development following best practices in open source software development,
— | enhanced monitoring and testing capabilities — Test Data Set Replay.RP2 was carried out with support through a contribution-in-kind from the USA and funds under Decision (CFSP) 2015/1837. Those funds were used in particular to sustain technical meetings with experts from Member States in order to ensure a wide participation in RP2. These funds also supported prototyping activities, to show how software contributed by National Data Centres (NDCs) can be integrated into the reengineered architecture.
In preparation for a third phase of IDC reengineering that will implement codes based on the RP2 architecture, the IDC is seeking to raise the technology readiness level for several algorithms that could be considered for inclusion into the reengineered software. This proposal specifically addresses algorithms that provide better ways to process seismic aftershocks sequences in automatic or semi-automatic mode.
ObjectivesThe objective of this project is to prototype and compare the performance of up to three approaches at improving the processing of aftershock sequences.
The algorithms under consideration are:

— | two cross-correlation based approaches,
— | an approach based on auto-regressive AIC methods.Deliverables
— | For each of the three approaches above, experimental automatic processing pipelines will be setup, integrating the three algorithms under consideration (each in a separate pipeline). This implies automation of some manual steps in these methods.
— | Each pipeline will run on the same set of representative events that cause aftershocks.
— | A set of automatic tests will be designed and implemented allowing collecting statistical information on the three algorithms when run on a representative set of events, for performance comparison purposes.
— | Statistical data collected as a result of automatic tests will be used to compare the performance of the algorithms on representative data sets.
— | SHI MDA analysts will also assess the results produced by the three algorithms from the point of view of their quality as a starting point for analyst review.
— | The final deliverables should be a report and recommendation summarising the findings above establishing which of the three approaches (if any) should be pursued for further development and implementation in an operational system. This should include estimates for the remaining effort needed to complete development.The project will be executed over a duration of 1,5 years, starting in the second quarter of 2018. It is estimated that about 60 % of the total effort, mainly in the first year of the project, will be spent on setting up the experimental pipelines. The remainder of the total effort will be dedicated to designing automatic tests, collecting their results and analysing results.
OutcomeThe main benefit of the project is to raise the technical readiness level of an algorithm that has great potential in reducing analyst workload. Software with sufficiently high technology readiness can be implemented in a reengineered system with less risk. On the basis of this work, a more robust effort estimate for the work remaining to be done to implement the selected algorithm in operations can be done.
Some of the prototype code developed in the course of this project may be integrated in the final operational software.
2. Strengthening OSI capabilities

Project: OSI noble gas processing and detection enhancement
BackgroundThe Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS)-owned OSI noble gas (NG) system for processing and detection of radio-xenon (OSI NG system) has been developed with funding from the European Union (Decision 2010/461/CFSP). The system was delivered early in 2014 and successfully used later that year during IFE14, an Integrated Field Exercise organised in 2014 by the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO to simulate an almost entire OSI in Jordan. During this exercise, the OSI NG system reliably and accurately determined the ratio of131mXe to133Xe. Furthermore, the system met the technical requirements on the minimum detectable activity for these isotopes.
While the exercise has shown that the OSI NG system meets the key performance parameters of radio-xenon detection, the Technical Report of the IFE14 External Evaluation Team also identified a number of operational parameters which need to be addressed in the further development of capabilities for noble gas processing and detection. Likewise, in 2016, OSI-Workshop 23 on Further Development of the OSI Equipment List concluded that the capabilities for radio-xenon purification and measurement need improving in terms of robustness, simplicity and engineering as a matter of priority in order to enhance their operational performance. The enhanced OSI NG system is required to finalise the design and operationalisation of the OSI field laboratory which has direct implications on the required rapid deployment and in-field support capabilities.
ObjectivesIn accordance with recommendations from the review and follow-up process of IFE14, the objective of this proposal is to enhance the existing OSI NG system. The project aims to tailor the system for air transport and easy movement to, from and within the Base of Operations as well as for reliable and simple operation in a field laboratory environment. In support of OSI Action Plan project 3.11 Noble Gas Laboratory, which aims, inter alia, at increased user friendliness, modularity and system reliability, the following system components need to be redesigned and/or developed:

— | detector stand and lead shield, in order to facilitate installation and adjust the centre of gravity,
— | gas separation, in order to reduce power consumption and switch the carrier gas from helium to more readily available materials in remote locations,
— | software, in order to simplify processes suitable for an inspector-operated system,
— | overall engineering design, in order to maximise integration in line with the OSI rapid deployment concept.OutcomeAn improved and more efficient and effective PTS-owned OSI noble gas laboratory with simplified user interaction and improved reliability and robustness will enhance the work of inspectors during an OSI; consequently, this supports Union policy and determination for the CTBT to enter into force.
3. Integrated capacity building and outreach activities
A. Further development in the roll-out of the NDC-in-a-Box

Project 1: Enhancing automatic processing and integration capabilities in SHI NDC-in-a-Box
BackgroundIn July 2016, the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO released version 4.0 of NDC-in-a-Box which includes new modules developed during the ‘Extended NDC-in-a-Box’ project. The release significantly improved NDC processing capabilities, with tools for automatic and interactive analysis for infrasound data and through integration with the SeisComP3 software suite for automatic processing of seismo-acoustic data. The IDC STA/LTA detector and the DTK-PMCC detector were integrated with the SeisComP automatic processing pipeline. Following this release, the IDC locator can be called from the SeisComP interactive review tool scolv. Several conversion modules support integration of IDC data and products into a SeisComP-based processing pipeline and facilitate synchronisation of station configuration information between NDCs and the IDC, through data retrieval and import modules or through database replication.
While the new modules allow NDCs to reproduce results of the IDC detectors for seismic and infrasound data, processing of hydro-acoustic data has not been considered yet. In addition, the events produced by the Seiscomp-based automatic processing pipeline differ significantly from those generated at the IDC. This is due to differences between the software used to build events in the IDC and SeisComP pipelines.
ObjectivesThe objective of this project is to expand the capabilities of the SeisComP and the SeisComP modules being made available in NDC-in-a-Box to:

— | Integrate the IDC signal detector for hydro-acoustic data in NDC-in-a-Box, including determination of features specific to hydro-acoustic detections. This would allow NDCs to detect arrivals from IMS hydro-acoustic stations using the same software that is used in IDC processing.
— | Integrate the NET-VISA detector used at the IDC into the SeisComP processing pipeline, and offer the end-user an interface to configure NET-VISA as the default associator to be used in SeisComP. This would help NDCs that process IMS data using the SeisComP automatic pipeline to create an event set that is closer to the one built at the IDC.
— | Enhance capabilities of integrating IMS data into other open source seismic analysis software such as SEISAN.Deliverables:All deliverables for this project consist in enhancements to the software modules that are part of NDC-in-a-Box as well as new software modules to be made available in future versions of NDC-in-a-Box. These new and enhanced software modules are as follows:

— | existing NDC-in-a-Box scdfx module integrated into SeisComP enhanced to allow it to process hydro-acoustic data and to store all features that hydro-acoustic detections at the IDC possess,
— | IDC HASE module for azimuth and slowness determination of hydro-acoustic arrivals integrated into a SeisComP module,
— | NET-VISA associator integrated into SeisComP, as an optional associator that can be configured to be used in lieu of the SeisComP default associator,
— | SeisComP enhanced to enable it to store additional features for hydro-acoustic detections, as well as pixels and pixel families for infrasound detections,
— | SeisComP export modules enhanced, such that detections and their features for hydro-acoustic and infrasound software can be exported to the Open Source Database,
— | current software enhanced to allow complete IMS seismic station configuration and IMS data to be imported into SAEISAN for processing in combination with non-IMS data of interest to NDCs.The project will be executed over the course of 12 months, using agile software development methodologies such as Scrum or Kanban, with releasable software increments and with increased functionality produced every 4 weeks.
It is planned to hold two workshops with NDC representatives with the following objectives

— | The first workshop will introduce the project and will provide NDC representatives the opportunity to present use cases relevant to their own NDC that may benefit from running an automatic associator (NET-VISA) as part of SeisComP, to form SHI events. NDCs are also expected to provide test data from networks of interest to them to the IDC, for testing purposes.
— | The second workshop should serve as the start of a testing period for the software completed during the project. This software will likely include the NET-VISA associator integrated in SeisComP and AS station processing tools for hydro processing integrated into SeisComP.OutcomeThe final deliverable will be an enhanced automatic processing pipeline based on SeisComP to be distributed to NDCs.
The main result is to provide NDCs with additional capabilities to automatically process IDC data, to mix data from IMS and non-IMS stations in NDC-in-a-Box and to reproduce IDC results in NDC-in-a-Box automatic processing.

Project 2: Evolution of the infrasound processing and interactive system
BackgroundSince 2013, the IDC has been working on both the redesign of the infrasound automatic system and on the Extended-NDC-in-a-box projects with release of the software in 2016. The infrasound processing system efforts consisted on the development of an automatic processing array station system and the interactive review software. Those tools have then been integrated in NDC-in-a-box and in the IDC environment.
The initial feedback from NDCs is positive, as NDCs have gained capabilities for infrasound technology. The IDC is currently receiving requests for dedicated infrasound technology training as well as suggestions for enhancements and evolution of the tools, which goes beyond the planned maintenance activities.
The IDC would like to continue efforts to complete the infrasound processing system to support IDC and IMS needs and to support and address NDC request for software.
Objectives:
— | support the evolution of the station processing system to continuously meet IMS and IDC operations sustainment needs,
— | support the NDC requests for software, software update and functionalities for performing NDC activities,
— | continue the implementation of state-of-the-art functionalities to better analyse infrasound signals in order to maintain the scientific credibility of the infrasound technology at the CTBTO,
— | working on the inclusion of infrasound wave propagation models with uncertainty quantification, combined with high-resolution atmospheric specifications during infrasound phase association, event formation and in-depth event analysis to meet mid-term strategy objectives.Outcome
— | to continue building the technical and scientific credibility of the IDC infrasound system and to ensure the sustainment of IDC and IMS operations;
— | to continue building on the efforts for NDC-in-a-Box software started under Decision 2012/699/CFSP and continued under Decision (CFSP) 2015/1837 in allowing NDCs to process the data available from the IMS for both CTBT monitoring purposes and for national purposes. These efforts have created a strong NDC user base and the proposed project results will help gaining NDC trust in the credibility of the verification system;
— | to collaborate with NDCs to build a state-of-the-art infrasound system as part of IDC re-engineering efforts.B. Integrated outreach and capacity building through technical assistance, education and training

Project: Engagement with State Signatories as well as Non-Signatories in Support of the CTBT and its verification regime through integrated outreach and capacity building
BackgroundCapacity building has proven to be fundamental for strengthening the CTBT’s verification regime. Many stations of the CTBT’s IMS are, or will be, located on the territory of developing countries and are managed by developing country institutions. Moreover, many developing countries are in the process of establishing and improving their NDCs to enable them to take full advantage of the data and products generated by the verification system. In this regard, capacity building systems (CBS) have been delivered to over 40 NDCs through Union funding, which need regular maintenance and occasional replacement.
Integrated outreach and capacity building activities provide experts from developing countries with needed background and training to facilitate their participation in the decision-making and policy development processes of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO. Such participation is essential in affirming the democratic and participatory nature of the CTBT, which in turn serves as a confidence building measure to obtain support from Non-Signatory States.
As a key element of the integrated outreach and capacity building, the Secretariat pursues training and education activities aimed at building up and maintaining the necessary capacity in the technical, scientific, legal and policy aspects of the CTBT and its verification regime focusing on States that have not signed or ratified the CTBT. These training and education activities involve cross-divisional efforts and resources and also benefit from the participation of members of the Group of Eminent Persons and support from CTBTO Youth Group members.
ObjectivesThe objectives of the integrated outreach and capacity building activities of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO are to:

(a) | contribute to the universalisation of the CTBT;
(b) | advance prospects for the CTBT’s entry into force; and
(c) | strengthen and maintain support for the CTBT’s verification regime.Activities for Universalisation and Entry into Force:

— | development of online educational materials and tools,
— | training, scientific and diplomatic workshops and conferences,
— | participation in major events on non-proliferation and disarmament issues.Activities for strengthening and maintaining support for the CTBT’s verification regime:

— | software and infrastructure development,
— | technical workshops,
— | systematic training for Extended NDC-in-a-box (eNIAB) software,
— | support for integrating the processing of IMS data with national and regional seismic networks,
— | provision of remedial technical assistance in the form of CBS equipment and its maintenance or replacement.OutcomeEnhanced abilities and awareness of the CTBT and its verification system and strengthened operational capabilities of the verification regime. States that need to sign and/or ratify the CTBT, including those listed in Annex 2 to the CTBT, will become familiar with the benefits of the CTBT and the verification regime.

Pending: 32018D0136

27.1.2018 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 24/3
(1) Directive 92/119/EEC sets out the general Union control measures to be applied in the event of an outbreak of,inter alia, swine vesicular disease. Point 6 of Annex II to Directive 92/119/EEC indicates the European Union reference laboratory for swine vesicular disease which has been designated in order to carry out the functions and duties set out in Annex III thereto.
(2) Directive 2003/85/EC sets out minimum control measures to be applied in the event of an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. Directive 2003/85/EC provides,inter alia, that a European Union reference laboratory for foot-and-mouth disease is to be designated in order to carry out the functions and duties set out in Annex XVI thereto. Subsequently, Commission Implementing Decision 2012/767/EU(3)designated the European Union reference laboratory for foot-and-mouth disease.
(3) As a consequence of the United Kingdom's notification in accordance with Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, the laboratory indicated in Annex II to Directive 92/119/EEC as the European Union reference laboratory for swine vesicular disease and subsequently designated by Implementing Decision 2012/767/EU as the European Union reference laboratory for foot-and-mouth disease will have to discontinue its functions as European Union reference laboratories for those two diseases.
(4) The Commission, in close collaboration with the Member States, has carried out a call for selection and designation of the European Union Reference Laboratory for Foot-and-Mouth Disease, taking into account the criteria of the technical and scientific competence of the laboratory and its staff expertise.
(5) Following completion of the selection procedure, the successful laboratory was the consortium ANSES & CODA-CERVA set up by the Laboratory for Animal Health of the Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety (ANSES), Maisons-Alfort, France, and the Veterinary and Agrochemical Research Centre (CODA-CERVA), Uccle, Belgium.
(6) In order to avoid any disruption of activities of the European Union reference laboratory for foot-and-mouth disease and to allow the newly designated European Union reference laboratory sufficient time to be fully operational, it is appropriate that the measures provided for in this Decision apply as from 1 January 2019.
(7) In its Scientific Opinion on Swine Vesicular Disease and Vesicular Stomatitis(4), the European Food Safety Authority concluded that swine vesicular disease has no longer an epidemic potential and can be rapidly diagnosed by laboratory testing. In addition, the epidemiological situation as regards swine vesicular disease in the European Union has improved significantly and the last cases were only detected through laboratory testing of samples from a small region in a single Member State. Since 2014, swine vesicular disease is no longer listed as notifiable disease by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE)(5).
(8) Although Directives 92/119/EEC and 2003/85/EC will be repealed as of 21 April 2021 in accordance with Article 270 of Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6), foot-and-mouth disease is listed in Article 5(1) of that Regulation, while swine vesicular disease is listed in Annex II thereto. In accordance with Article 275 of that Regulation, the list of diseases in Annex II shall be reviewed at the latest by 20 April 2019. For the above mentioned scientific and technical reasons, swine vesicular disease does not meet the criteria for listing set out in Article 5(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/429.
(9) Furthermore, swine vesicular disease and other vesicular diseases are included in certain functions and duties set out for the European Union reference laboratory for foot-and-mouth disease in Annex XVI to Directive 2003/85/EC, and in particular as regards the capacity of national reference laboratories and the European Union reference laboratory to carry out the differential diagnosis of foot-and-mouth disease. All these elements together allow discontinuing the designation of a European Union reference laboratory for swine vesicular disease.
(10) The reference made to the laboratory indicated in Annex II to Directive 92/119/EEC should be deleted. Annex II to Directive 92/119/EEC should therefore be amended accordingly.
(11) In the interest of clarity, Implementing Decision 2012/767/EU should be repealed with effect of 1 January 2019, the date on which the newly designated European Union reference laboratory for foot-and-mouth disease is to take up its function and duties.
(12) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Council Directive 92/119/EEC of 17 December 1992 introducing general Community measures for the control of certain animal diseases and specific measures relating to swine vesicular disease(1), and in particular Article 24(2) thereof,
Having regard to Council Directive 2003/85/EC of 29 September 2003 on Community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease repealing Directive 85/511/EEC and Decisions 89/531/EEC and 91/665/EEC and amending Directive 92/46/EEC(2), and in particular Article 69(1) thereof,
(1) Directive 92/119/EEC sets out the general Union control measures to be applied in the event of an outbreak of,inter alia, swine vesicular disease. Point 6 of Annex II to Directive 92/119/EEC indicates the European Union reference laboratory for swine vesicular disease which has been designated in order to carry out the functions and duties set out in Annex III thereto.
(2) Directive 2003/85/EC sets out minimum control measures to be applied in the event of an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. Directive 2003/85/EC provides,inter alia, that a European Union reference laboratory for foot-and-mouth disease is to be designated in order to carry out the functions and duties set out in Annex XVI thereto. Subsequently, Commission Implementing Decision 2012/767/EU(3)designated the European Union reference laboratory for foot-and-mouth disease.
(3) As a consequence of the United Kingdom’s notification in accordance with Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, the laboratory indicated in Annex II to Directive 92/119/EEC as the European Union reference laboratory for swine vesicular disease and subsequently designated by Implementing Decision 2012/767/EU as the European Union reference laboratory for foot-and-mouth disease will have to discontinue its functions as European Union reference laboratories for those two diseases.
(4) The Commission, in close collaboration with the Member States, has carried out a call for selection and designation of the European Union Reference Laboratory for Foot-and-Mouth Disease, taking into account the criteria of the technical and scientific competence of the laboratory and its staff expertise.
(5) Following completion of the selection procedure, the successful laboratory was the consortium ANSES & CODA-CERVA set up by the Laboratory for Animal Health of the Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety (ANSES), Maisons-Alfort, France, and the Veterinary and Agrochemical Research Centre (CODA-CERVA), Uccle, Belgium.
(6) In order to avoid any disruption of activities of the European Union reference laboratory for foot-and-mouth disease and to allow the newly designated European Union reference laboratory sufficient time to be fully operational, it is appropriate that the measures provided for in this Decision apply as from 1 January 2019.
(7) In its Scientific Opinion on Swine Vesicular Disease and Vesicular Stomatitis(4), the European Food Safety Authority concluded that swine vesicular disease has no longer an epidemic potential and can be rapidly diagnosed by laboratory testing. In addition, the epidemiological situation as regards swine vesicular disease in the European Union has improved significantly and the last cases were only detected through laboratory testing of samples from a small region in a single Member State. Since 2014, swine vesicular disease is no longer listed as notifiable disease by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE)(5).
(8) Although Directives 92/119/EEC and 2003/85/EC will be repealed as of 21 April 2021 in accordance with Article 270 of Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6), foot-and-mouth disease is listed in Article 5(1) of that Regulation, while swine vesicular disease is listed in Annex II thereto. In accordance with Article 275 of that Regulation, the list of diseases in Annex II shall be reviewed at the latest by 20 April 2019. For the above mentioned scientific and technical reasons, swine vesicular disease does not meet the criteria for listing set out in Article 5(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/429.
(9) Furthermore, swine vesicular disease and other vesicular diseases are included in certain functions and duties set out for the European Union reference laboratory for foot-and-mouth disease in Annex XVI to Directive 2003/85/EC, and in particular as regards the capacity of national reference laboratories and the European Union reference laboratory to carry out the differential diagnosis of foot-and-mouth disease. All these elements together allow discontinuing the designation of a European Union reference laboratory for swine vesicular disease.
(10) The reference made to the laboratory indicated in Annex II to Directive 92/119/EEC should be deleted. Annex II to Directive 92/119/EEC should therefore be amended accordingly.
(11) In the interest of clarity, Implementing Decision 2012/767/EU should be repealed with effect of 1 January 2019, the date on which the newly designated European Union reference laboratory for foot-and-mouth disease is to take up its function and duties.
(12) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
The consortium ANSES & CODA-CERVA set up by the Laboratory for Animal Health of the Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety (ANSES), Maisons-Alfort, France, and the Veterinary and Agrochemical Research Centre (CODA-CERVA), Uccle, Belgium, is hereby designated as the European Union reference laboratory for foot-and-mouth disease for an undetermined period.

Article 2
In Annex II to Directive 92/119/EEC, point 6 is deleted.

Article 3
Implementing Decision 2012/767/EU is repealed with effect from 1 January 2019.
References to the repealed Implementing Decision shall be construed as references to this Decision.

Article 4
This Decision shall apply from 1 January 2019.

Article 5
This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Council Directive 92/119/EEC of 17 December 1992 introducing general Community measures for the control of certain animal diseases and specific measures relating to swine vesicular disease(1), and in particular Article 24(2) thereof,
Having regard to Council Directive 2003/85/EC of 29 September 2003 on Community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease repealing Directive 85/511/EEC and Decisions 89/531/EEC and 91/665/EEC and amending Directive 92/46/EEC(2), and in particular Article 69(1) thereof,
(1) Directive 92/119/EEC sets out the general Union control measures to be applied in the event of an outbreak of,inter alia, swine vesicular disease. Point 6 of Annex II to Directive 92/119/EEC indicates the European Union reference laboratory for swine vesicular disease which has been designated in order to carry out the functions and duties set out in Annex III thereto.
(2) Directive 2003/85/EC sets out minimum control measures to be applied in the event of an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. Directive 2003/85/EC provides,inter alia, that a European Union reference laboratory for foot-and-mouth disease is to be designated in order to carry out the functions and duties set out in Annex XVI thereto. Subsequently, Commission Implementing Decision 2012/767/EU(3)designated the European Union reference laboratory for foot-and-mouth disease.
(3) As a consequence of the United Kingdom’s notification in accordance with Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, the laboratory indicated in Annex II to Directive 92/119/EEC as the European Union reference laboratory for swine vesicular disease and subsequently designated by Implementing Decision 2012/767/EU as the European Union reference laboratory for foot-and-mouth disease will have to discontinue its functions as European Union reference laboratories for those two diseases.
(4) The Commission, in close collaboration with the Member States, has carried out a call for selection and designation of the European Union Reference Laboratory for Foot-and-Mouth Disease, taking into account the criteria of the technical and scientific competence of the laboratory and its staff expertise.
(5) Following completion of the selection procedure, the successful laboratory was the consortium ANSES & CODA-CERVA set up by the Laboratory for Animal Health of the Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety (ANSES), Maisons-Alfort, France, and the Veterinary and Agrochemical Research Centre (CODA-CERVA), Uccle, Belgium.
(6) In order to avoid any disruption of activities of the European Union reference laboratory for foot-and-mouth disease and to allow the newly designated European Union reference laboratory sufficient time to be fully operational, it is appropriate that the measures provided for in this Decision apply as from 1 January 2019.
(7) In its Scientific Opinion on Swine Vesicular Disease and Vesicular Stomatitis(4), the European Food Safety Authority concluded that swine vesicular disease has no longer an epidemic potential and can be rapidly diagnosed by laboratory testing. In addition, the epidemiological situation as regards swine vesicular disease in the European Union has improved significantly and the last cases were only detected through laboratory testing of samples from a small region in a single Member State. Since 2014, swine vesicular disease is no longer listed as notifiable disease by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE)(5).
(8) Although Directives 92/119/EEC and 2003/85/EC will be repealed as of 21 April 2021 in accordance with Article 270 of Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6), foot-and-mouth disease is listed in Article 5(1) of that Regulation, while swine vesicular disease is listed in Annex II thereto. In accordance with Article 275 of that Regulation, the list of diseases in Annex II shall be reviewed at the latest by 20 April 2019. For the above mentioned scientific and technical reasons, swine vesicular disease does not meet the criteria for listing set out in Article 5(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/429.
(9) Furthermore, swine vesicular disease and other vesicular diseases are included in certain functions and duties set out for the European Union reference laboratory for foot-and-mouth disease in Annex XVI to Directive 2003/85/EC, and in particular as regards the capacity of national reference laboratories and the European Union reference laboratory to carry out the differential diagnosis of foot-and-mouth disease. All these elements together allow discontinuing the designation of a European Union reference laboratory for swine vesicular disease.
(10) The reference made to the laboratory indicated in Annex II to Directive 92/119/EEC should be deleted. Annex II to Directive 92/119/EEC should therefore be amended accordingly.
(11) In the interest of clarity, Implementing Decision 2012/767/EU should be repealed with effect of 1 January 2019, the date on which the newly designated European Union reference laboratory for foot-and-mouth disease is to take up its function and duties.
(12) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The consortium ANSES & CODA-CERVA set up by the Laboratory for Animal Health of the Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety (ANSES), Maisons-Alfort, France, and the Veterinary and Agrochemical Research Centre (CODA-CERVA), Uccle, Belgium, is hereby designated as the European Union reference laboratory for foot-and-mouth disease for an undetermined period.
In Annex II to Directive 92/119/EEC, point 6 is deleted.
Implementing Decision 2012/767/EU is repealed with effect from 1 January 2019.
References to the repealed Implementing Decision shall be construed as references to this Decision.
This Decision shall apply from 1 January 2019.
This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Pending: 32018D0101

23.1.2018 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 17/40
(1) The European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003 outlines five key challenges to be addressed by the Union: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organised crime. The consequences of the uncontrolled circulation of conventional weapons are central to four of those five challenges. That Strategy underlines the importance of export controls to contain weapons proliferation. The new Global Strategy for the Union's foreign and security policy, titled ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe’, which was presented by the High Representative on 28 June 2016, confirms the Union's support for the universalisation, full implementation and enforcement of multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control treaties and regimes.
(2) On 5 June 1998, the Union adopted a politically binding Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, which sets common criteria to regulate the legal trade in conventional weapons.
(3) The Union Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition, adopted by the European Council on 15 and 16 December 2005, provides that the Union, at regional and international levels, supports the strengthening of export controls and the promotion of the criteria of the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports by, inter alia, helping third countries to draft relevant national legislation and to promote measures to improve transparency.
(4) The Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was replaced on 8 December 2008 by Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP(1), which establishes eight criteria against which applications for the export of conventional arms are to be assessed. It also includes a notification and consultation mechanism for arms exports denials, and transparency measures such as the yearly publication of an EU annual report on arms exports. A number of third countries have aligned themselves with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.
(5) Article 11 of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP states that Member States are to use their best endeavours to encourage other States which export military technology or equipment to apply the criteria contained in that Common Position.
(6) The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was adopted by the UN General Assembly in April 2013 and entered into force on 24 December 2014. The Treaty aims to strengthen transparency and responsibility in the arms trade. As with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, the ATT lays down a number of risk assessment criteria against which arms exports have to be assessed. The Union concretely supports the effective implementation and universalisation of the ATT through its dedicated programmes adopted under Council Decision 2013/768/CFSP(2)and Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/915(3). Those programmes assist a number of third countries, where they so request, in strengthening their arms transfer control systems in line with the requirements of the Treaty.
(7) It is therefore important to ensure complementarity between the outreach and assistance activities provided for in the present Decision and those provided for in Decision (CFSP) 2017/915.
(8) Union activities to promote effective and transparent arms export controls have developed since 2008 under Joint Action 2008/230/CFSP(4)and Council Decisions 2009/1012/CFSP(5)and 2012/711/CFSP(6)and Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/2309(7). The activities carried out have notably supported further regional cooperation, enhanced transparency and greater responsibility, in line with the principles of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and the risk assessment criteria enshrined therein. The activities in question have traditionally addressed third countries of the eastern and southern neighbourhoods of the Union.
(9) In recent years, the Union has also provided assistance to improve export controls on dual-use goods in third countries, and effective coordination should be ensured between the arms export control activities covered by this Decision and those activities on export controls of dual-use goods.
(10) The German Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (‘BAFA’) has been entrusted by the Council with the technical implementation of Decisions 2009/1012/CFSP and 2012/711/CFSP and Decision (CFSP) 2015/2309. BAFA is also an implementing agency for projects supporting the effective implementation of the ATT under Decision 2013/768/CFSP and Decision (CFSP) 2017/915. BAFA is the competent agency for arms control of an EU Member State, and has developed a large body of knowledge and expertise on outreach activities, in addition to sharing its core competencies with other states,
(a) promoting effective controls on arms exports by third countries, in accordance with the principles set out in Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and in the ATT, and seeking, where appropriate, complementarity and synergies with Union assistance projects in the field of export controls on dual-use goods;
(b) supporting third countries' efforts at national and regional levels to render trade in conventional weapons more responsible and transparent, and to mitigate the risk of the diversion of arms to unauthorised users.
(a) further promoting, among third countries, the criteria and principles set out in Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and in the ATT, based on the achievements reached through the implementation of Decision (CFSP) 2015/2309, Decisions 2012/711/CFSP and 2009/1012/CFSP, and Joint Action 2008/230/CFSP;
(b) assisting third countries in the drafting, updating and implementing, as appropriate, of relevant legislative and administrative measures which aim to establish an effective system of conventional arms export controls;
(c) assisting beneficiary countries in the training of licensing and enforcement officers to ensure the adequate implementation and enforcement of arms export controls;
(d) assisting beneficiary countries in outreach to their national arms industries to ensure compliance with export control regulations;
(e) promoting transparency and responsibility in the international arms trade, including through support for national and regional measures that promote transparency and appropriate scrutiny in the export of conventional weapons;
(f) encouraging those beneficiary countries that have not taken any steps towards accession to the ATT to join the ATT, and to encourage signatories of the ATT to ratify it;
(g) promoting further consideration of the risks of the diversion of arms and the mitigation thereof, both from the importing and exporting perspectives.
— the possible membership of, or application for membership of, international export control regimes relating to the transfer of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies,
— the candidatures for membership of the Union and whether the beneficiary countries are official candidates or potential candidates,
— the position regarding the ATT.
(a) up to two workshops for the countries in South-Eastern Europe; Eastern European and Caucasian countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy and Turkey will be invited to at least one of the workshops;
(b) up to two workshops for the Eastern European and Caucasian countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy; South-Eastern Europe countries and Turkey will be invited to at least one of those workshops;
(c) up to two workshops for the North African Mediterranean countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy; Southern Neighbourhood countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy will be invited to at least one of the workshops;
(d) up to two workshops for Central Asia; Eastern European and Caucasian countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy will be invited to at least one of the workshops.
(i) South Eastern European countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo (under UNSCR/1244/99(1)));
(ii) North African Mediterranean countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia);
(iii) Eastern European and Caucasian countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine);
(iv) Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan);
(v) Southern Neighbourhood countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Jordan and Lebanon);
(vi) Turkey.
— whether relevant national regulations on arms transfer controls are in place and whether/to which extent they meet the provisions of the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (inter alia, application of the assessment criteria, implementation of the EU common military list, reporting),
— where available, information on enforcement cases,
— whether the beneficiary countries are able to report arms exports and/or imports (e.g. UN Register, ATT annual reporting, Wassenaar Arrangement, OSCE, national reports),
— whether the beneficiary country has aligned, or intends to officially align, with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) The European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003 outlines five key challenges to be addressed by the Union: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organised crime. The consequences of the uncontrolled circulation of conventional weapons are central to four of those five challenges. That Strategy underlines the importance of export controls to contain weapons proliferation. The new Global Strategy for the Union’s foreign and security policy, titled ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe’, which was presented by the High Representative on 28 June 2016, confirms the Union’s support for the universalisation, full implementation and enforcement of multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control treaties and regimes.
(2) On 5 June 1998, the Union adopted a politically binding Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, which sets common criteria to regulate the legal trade in conventional weapons.
(3) The Union Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition, adopted by the European Council on 15 and 16 December 2005, provides that the Union, at regional and international levels, supports the strengthening of export controls and the promotion of the criteria of the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports by, inter alia, helping third countries to draft relevant national legislation and to promote measures to improve transparency.
(4) The Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was replaced on 8 December 2008 by Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP(1), which establishes eight criteria against which applications for the export of conventional arms are to be assessed. It also includes a notification and consultation mechanism for arms exports denials, and transparency measures such as the yearly publication of an EU annual report on arms exports. A number of third countries have aligned themselves with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.
(5) Article 11 of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP states that Member States are to use their best endeavours to encourage other States which export military technology or equipment to apply the criteria contained in that Common Position.
(6) The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was adopted by the UN General Assembly in April 2013 and entered into force on 24 December 2014. The Treaty aims to strengthen transparency and responsibility in the arms trade. As with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, the ATT lays down a number of risk assessment criteria against which arms exports have to be assessed. The Union concretely supports the effective implementation and universalisation of the ATT through its dedicated programmes adopted under Council Decision 2013/768/CFSP(2)and Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/915(3). Those programmes assist a number of third countries, where they so request, in strengthening their arms transfer control systems in line with the requirements of the Treaty.
(7) It is therefore important to ensure complementarity between the outreach and assistance activities provided for in the present Decision and those provided for in Decision (CFSP) 2017/915.
(8) Union activities to promote effective and transparent arms export controls have developed since 2008 under Joint Action 2008/230/CFSP(4)and Council Decisions 2009/1012/CFSP(5)and 2012/711/CFSP(6)and Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/2309(7). The activities carried out have notably supported further regional cooperation, enhanced transparency and greater responsibility, in line with the principles of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and the risk assessment criteria enshrined therein. The activities in question have traditionally addressed third countries of the eastern and southern neighbourhoods of the Union.
(9) In recent years, the Union has also provided assistance to improve export controls on dual-use goods in third countries, and effective coordination should be ensured between the arms export control activities covered by this Decision and those activities on export controls of dual-use goods.
(10) The German Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (‘BAFA’) has been entrusted by the Council with the technical implementation of Decisions 2009/1012/CFSP and 2012/711/CFSP and Decision (CFSP) 2015/2309. BAFA is also an implementing agency for projects supporting the effective implementation of the ATT under Decision 2013/768/CFSP and Decision (CFSP) 2017/915. BAFA is the competent agency for arms control of an EU Member State, and has developed a large body of knowledge and expertise on outreach activities, in addition to sharing its core competencies with other states,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
1. For the purpose of promoting peace and security, and in line with the European Security Strategy, the Union shall pursue the following objectives:
(a)
promoting effective controls on arms exports by third countries, in accordance with the principles set out in Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and in the ATT, and seeking, where appropriate, complementarity and synergies with Union assistance projects in the field of export controls on dual-use goods;
(b)
supporting third countries’ efforts at national and regional levels to render trade in conventional weapons more responsible and transparent, and to mitigate the risk of the diversion of arms to unauthorised users.
2. The Union shall pursue the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 through the following project activities:
(a)
further promoting, among third countries, the criteria and principles set out in Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and in the ATT, based on the achievements reached through the implementation of Decision (CFSP) 2015/2309, Decisions 2012/711/CFSP and 2009/1012/CFSP, and Joint Action 2008/230/CFSP;
(b)
assisting third countries in the drafting, updating and implementing, as appropriate, of relevant legislative and administrative measures which aim to establish an effective system of conventional arms export controls;
(c)
assisting beneficiary countries in the training of licensing and enforcement officers to ensure the adequate implementation and enforcement of arms export controls;
(d)
assisting beneficiary countries in outreach to their national arms industries to ensure compliance with export control regulations;
(e)
promoting transparency and responsibility in the international arms trade, including through support for national and regional measures that promote transparency and appropriate scrutiny in the export of conventional weapons;
(f)
encouraging those beneficiary countries that have not taken any steps towards accession to the ATT to join the ATT, and to encourage signatories of the ATT to ratify it;
(g)
promoting further consideration of the risks of the diversion of arms and the mitigation thereof, both from the importing and exporting perspectives.
A detailed description of the project activities referred to in this paragraph is set out in the Annex.

Article 2
1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (‘High Representative’) shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.
2. The implementation of the project activities referred to in Article 1(2) shall be carried out by the German Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (‘BAFA’). The selection of BAFA is justified by its proven experience, qualifications and necessary expertise over the full range of relevant Union arms export control activities
3. BAFA shall perform its tasks under the responsibility of the High Representative. For that purpose, the High Representative shall enter into the necessary arrangements with BAFA.

Article 3
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the project activities referred to in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 1 304 107,28.
2. The expenditure financed by the amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the Union’s budget.
3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the financial reference amount referred to in paragraph 1. For that purpose, it shall conclude a financing agreement with BAFA. The financing agreement shall stipulate that BAFA is to ensure the visibility of the Union’s contribution, appropriate to its size.
4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.

Article 4
The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular reports prepared by BAFA. Those reports shall form the basis for the evaluation carried out by the Council. The Commission shall report on the financial aspects of the implementation of the project activities as referred to in Article 1(2).

Article 5
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
This Decision shall expire 30 months after the date of the conclusion of the financing agreement referred to in Article 3(3), or 6 months after the date of its adoption if no financing agreement has been concluded within that period.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) The European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003 outlines five key challenges to be addressed by the Union: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organised crime. The consequences of the uncontrolled circulation of conventional weapons are central to four of those five challenges. That Strategy underlines the importance of export controls to contain weapons proliferation. The new Global Strategy for the Union’s foreign and security policy, titled ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe’, which was presented by the High Representative on 28 June 2016, confirms the Union’s support for the universalisation, full implementation and enforcement of multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control treaties and regimes.
(2) On 5 June 1998, the Union adopted a politically binding Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, which sets common criteria to regulate the legal trade in conventional weapons.
(3) The Union Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition, adopted by the European Council on 15 and 16 December 2005, provides that the Union, at regional and international levels, supports the strengthening of export controls and the promotion of the criteria of the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports by, inter alia, helping third countries to draft relevant national legislation and to promote measures to improve transparency.
(4) The Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was replaced on 8 December 2008 by Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP(1), which establishes eight criteria against which applications for the export of conventional arms are to be assessed. It also includes a notification and consultation mechanism for arms exports denials, and transparency measures such as the yearly publication of an EU annual report on arms exports. A number of third countries have aligned themselves with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.
(5) Article 11 of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP states that Member States are to use their best endeavours to encourage other States which export military technology or equipment to apply the criteria contained in that Common Position.
(6) The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was adopted by the UN General Assembly in April 2013 and entered into force on 24 December 2014. The Treaty aims to strengthen transparency and responsibility in the arms trade. As with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, the ATT lays down a number of risk assessment criteria against which arms exports have to be assessed. The Union concretely supports the effective implementation and universalisation of the ATT through its dedicated programmes adopted under Council Decision 2013/768/CFSP(2)and Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/915(3). Those programmes assist a number of third countries, where they so request, in strengthening their arms transfer control systems in line with the requirements of the Treaty.
(7) It is therefore important to ensure complementarity between the outreach and assistance activities provided for in the present Decision and those provided for in Decision (CFSP) 2017/915.
(8) Union activities to promote effective and transparent arms export controls have developed since 2008 under Joint Action 2008/230/CFSP(4)and Council Decisions 2009/1012/CFSP(5)and 2012/711/CFSP(6)and Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/2309(7). The activities carried out have notably supported further regional cooperation, enhanced transparency and greater responsibility, in line with the principles of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and the risk assessment criteria enshrined therein. The activities in question have traditionally addressed third countries of the eastern and southern neighbourhoods of the Union.
(9) In recent years, the Union has also provided assistance to improve export controls on dual-use goods in third countries, and effective coordination should be ensured between the arms export control activities covered by this Decision and those activities on export controls of dual-use goods.
(10) The German Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (‘BAFA’) has been entrusted by the Council with the technical implementation of Decisions 2009/1012/CFSP and 2012/711/CFSP and Decision (CFSP) 2015/2309. BAFA is also an implementing agency for projects supporting the effective implementation of the ATT under Decision 2013/768/CFSP and Decision (CFSP) 2017/915. BAFA is the competent agency for arms control of an EU Member State, and has developed a large body of knowledge and expertise on outreach activities, in addition to sharing its core competencies with other states,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
1. For the purpose of promoting peace and security, and in line with the European Security Strategy, the Union shall pursue the following objectives:
(a)
promoting effective controls on arms exports by third countries, in accordance with the principles set out in Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and in the ATT, and seeking, where appropriate, complementarity and synergies with Union assistance projects in the field of export controls on dual-use goods;
(b)
supporting third countries’ efforts at national and regional levels to render trade in conventional weapons more responsible and transparent, and to mitigate the risk of the diversion of arms to unauthorised users.
2. The Union shall pursue the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 through the following project activities:
(a)
further promoting, among third countries, the criteria and principles set out in Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and in the ATT, based on the achievements reached through the implementation of Decision (CFSP) 2015/2309, Decisions 2012/711/CFSP and 2009/1012/CFSP, and Joint Action 2008/230/CFSP;
(b)
assisting third countries in the drafting, updating and implementing, as appropriate, of relevant legislative and administrative measures which aim to establish an effective system of conventional arms export controls;
(c)
assisting beneficiary countries in the training of licensing and enforcement officers to ensure the adequate implementation and enforcement of arms export controls;
(d)
assisting beneficiary countries in outreach to their national arms industries to ensure compliance with export control regulations;
(e)
promoting transparency and responsibility in the international arms trade, including through support for national and regional measures that promote transparency and appropriate scrutiny in the export of conventional weapons;
(f)
encouraging those beneficiary countries that have not taken any steps towards accession to the ATT to join the ATT, and to encourage signatories of the ATT to ratify it;
(g)
promoting further consideration of the risks of the diversion of arms and the mitigation thereof, both from the importing and exporting perspectives.
A detailed description of the project activities referred to in this paragraph is set out in the Annex.
1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (‘High Representative’) shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.
2. The implementation of the project activities referred to in Article 1(2) shall be carried out by the German Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (‘BAFA’). The selection of BAFA is justified by its proven experience, qualifications and necessary expertise over the full range of relevant Union arms export control activities
3. BAFA shall perform its tasks under the responsibility of the High Representative. For that purpose, the High Representative shall enter into the necessary arrangements with BAFA.
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the project activities referred to in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 1 304 107,28.
2. The expenditure financed by the amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the Union’s budget.
3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the financial reference amount referred to in paragraph 1. For that purpose, it shall conclude a financing agreement with BAFA. The financing agreement shall stipulate that BAFA is to ensure the visibility of the Union’s contribution, appropriate to its size.
4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.
The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular reports prepared by BAFA. Those reports shall form the basis for the evaluation carried out by the Council. The Commission shall report on the financial aspects of the implementation of the project activities as referred to in Article 1(2).
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
This Decision shall expire 30 months after the date of the conclusion of the financing agreement referred to in Article 3(3), or 6 months after the date of its adoption if no financing agreement has been concluded within that period.

PROJECT ACTIVITIES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 1(2)

ANNEX1. Objectives
The objectives of this Decision are to promote improved controls on arms transfers by third countries and to support third countries’ efforts, at national and regional levels, to render international trade in conventional weapons more responsible and transparent, and to mitigate the risk of the diversion of arms to unauthorised users. Where relevant, those objectives should include the promotion of the principles and criteria set out in Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and in the ATT. Those objectives should be pursued in seeking, where appropriate, complementarity and synergies with the Union’s assistance projects in the field of export controls on dual-use goods.
In order to achieve the above-mentioned objectives, the Union should continue to promote the standards of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, building on the achievements reached through the implementation of Decision (CFSP) 2015/2309, Decisions 2012/711/CFSP and 2009/1012/CFSP, and Joint Action 2008/230/CFSP. For that purpose, assistance should be provided to beneficiary third countries for the drafting, updating and implementation, as appropriate, of relevant legislative and administrative measures that support an effective system of conventional arms transfer controls. Support should also be provided regarding the assessment and mitigation of the risk of arms diversion.
Support should also be given to the training of licensing and enforcement officers responsible for the implementation and enforcement of arms transfer controls, and to national and regional measures promoting transparency and appropriate scrutiny over exports of conventional weapons. Furthermore, contacts with the private sector and compliance with relevant national legal and administrative provisions that regulate the transfer of arms should be promoted.
2. Selection of the implementing agency
The implementation of this Council Decision is entrusted to BAFA. Where appropriate, BAFA will partner with Member States’ export control agencies, relevant regional and international organisations, think tanks, research institutes and NGOs.
BAFA has leading experience in the provision of export control assistance and outreach activities. It has developed such experience in all the relevant fields of strategic export control, addressing the CBRN-related, dual-use goods and arms areas. Through those programmes and activities, BAFA has gained in-depth knowledge of the export control systems of most of the countries covered by the present Decision.
With regard to arms export control assistance and outreach, BAFA successfully completed the implementation of Decisions 2009/1012/CFSP and 2012/711/CFSP and Decision (CFSP) 2015/2309. BAFA is also in charge of the technical implementation of the ATT implementation support programme established by Decision 2013/768/CFSP and Decision (CFSP) 2017/915.
The overall effect is that BAFA is uniquely placed to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the export control systems of countries that will be the beneficiaries of the activities provided for in this Decision. It is thus most able to facilitate synergies between the various arms export control assistance and outreach programmes and to avoid duplication.
3. Coordination with other Union assistance projects in the field of export controls
Based on the experience of previous Union outreach activities in the field of exports controls covering both dual-use goods and conventional arms, synergy and complementarity should be sought. To that end, the activities referred to in points 5.2.1 to 5.2.3 and 5.2.5 should be carried out, where appropriate, in conjunction with other activities financed through the CFSP budget, in particular those activities provided for under Decision (CFSP) 2017/915, or with other activities relating to dual-use goods export controls financed through Union financial instruments other than the CFSP budget. In particular, back-to-back events should be explored. This should be done in full compliance with the legal and financial limitations set for the use of relevant Union financial instruments.
4. Coordination with other donors’ assistance projects in the field of export controls
Where appropriate, synergy and complementarity with other donors’ assistance projects in the field of export controls should also be sought. As mentioned in point 3, the coordination with other donors should be carried out especially for the activities referred to in points 5.2.1 to 5.2.3 and 5.2.5. The reference in point 3 with regard to back-to-back planning remains valid.
5. Description of project activities
5.1. Project objectives
The main objective is to provide technical assistance to a number of beneficiary countries which have demonstrated their willingness to develop their standards and practices regarding arms export control. To do so, the activities to be undertaken will take into account the status of the beneficiary countries, in particular regarding:

— | the possible membership of, or application for membership of, international export control regimes relating to the transfer of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies,
— | the candidatures for membership of the Union and whether the beneficiary countries are official candidates or potential candidates,
— | the position regarding the ATT.Where the beneficiary countries addressed are only signatories to the ATT, the activities should — where feasible — seek to ascertain better what the obstacles to ATT ratification are, in particular where those obstacles are of a juridical or regulatory nature and are related to gaps or needs in implementation capacities. Where relevant, possible Union support under Decision (CFSP) 2017/915 should be promoted. Where the countries addressed have taken no steps towards the Treaty (neither signature, ratification, nor accession), the activities should promote accession to the ATT, possibly with the support of other beneficiary countries that have ratified the ATT.
Another complementary objective is to sensitise a number of third countries to arms diversion risk-assessment and diversion mitigation, both from the exporting and importing perspectives.
5.2. Project description
5.2.1. Regional workshops
The project will take the form of up to eight 2-day workshops, providing training in relevant areas of conventional arms export controls.
The participants in the workshop (up to 35) would include government officials of the beneficiary countries covered. Representatives from national parliaments and industry and civil society representatives may also be invited, where appropriate.
Training will be conducted by experts from Member States’ national administrations (including former officials), representatives of countries that have aligned themselves with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, and representatives of the private sector and civil society.
The workshops may take place in a beneficiary country or in another location to be determined by the High Representative, in consultation with the Council Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM).
The regional workshops will be organised as follows:

(a) | up to two workshops for the countries in South-Eastern Europe; Eastern European and Caucasian countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy and Turkey will be invited to at least one of the workshops;
(b) | up to two workshops for the Eastern European and Caucasian countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy; South-Eastern Europe countries and Turkey will be invited to at least one of those workshops;
(c) | up to two workshops for the North African Mediterranean countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy; Southern Neighbourhood countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy will be invited to at least one of the workshops;
(d) | up to two workshops for Central Asia; Eastern European and Caucasian countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy will be invited to at least one of the workshops.This regional breakdown of two workshops per region may not be achieved if circumstances are not propitious (for example if the number of participants is unexpectedly too low, if there is no serious offer to host by any beneficiary country of the region, or if there is duplication with other activities of other outreach providers). In the event that one or more workshop is not implemented, the number of workshops for the other abovementioned region(s) could be increased accordingly, within the global ceiling of eight workshops.
5.2.2. Study visits
The project will take the form of up to four 2-day study visits of government officials to the relevant authorities of Member States.
Study visits should cover between two and four beneficiary countries. Beneficiary countries of the study visits need not necessarily come from the same region.
The project will also take the form of up to three 2-day study visits of government, customs and/or licensing officials of beneficiary countries to the relevant authorities of other beneficiary countries.
5.2.3. Individual assistance to beneficiary countries
The project will take the form of workshops of no more than 10 days’ duration in total for individual beneficiary countries which request one, in which state officials from the beneficiary countries, including government, licensing and enforcement officials, will participate. These events will preferably take place in the respective beneficiary countries. Depending on the exact needs and availability of the beneficiary countries’ and EU Member States’ experts, the overall 10 days available will be allocated with a minimum 2-day format.
Experts from Member States’ national administrations (including former officials), representatives of countries that have aligned themselves with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, and representatives of the private sector and civil society will share their expertise.
Those individual assistance workshops will be mainly held at the request of the beneficiary countries. They are intended to address a specific issue or a specific need raised by the beneficiary country, for example, in the margins of a regional workshop or during regular contacts with EU experts and with BAFA.
5.2.4. Experts’ meeting
The project will take the form of a 1-day experts’ meeting in Brussels dedicated to government officials, including government, licensing and enforcement officials from beneficiary countries belonging to the SEE region. The meeting will take place in the margins of the meetings of COARM.
5.2.5. Assessment events
In order to provide a mid-term and a final assessment of the activities under this Decision, two experts meetings will be organised in Brussels, ideally back-to-back with a regular COARM meeting.
The mid-term assessment event will take the form of a workshop with the participation of EU Member States, which may last up to 1 day.
The final assessment event will take the form of a 2-day event in Brussels with the participation of beneficiary countries and EU Member States.
Up to two representatives (appropriate government officials) of each beneficiary country will be invited to the final assessment event.
6. Beneficiaries
6.1. Countries beneficiary of activities under this Council Decision

(i) | South Eastern European countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo (under UNSCR/1244/99(1)));
(ii) | North African Mediterranean countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia);
(iii) | Eastern European and Caucasian countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine);
(iv) | Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan);
(v) | Southern Neighbourhood countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Jordan and Lebanon);
(vi) | Turkey.6.2. Amendment to the scope of beneficiary countries
The COARM Working Party may, upon a proposal from the High Representative, decide to modify the list of beneficiary countries based on an appropriate justification. Modifications should be communicated in a formal manner between BAFA and the EU.
7. Project results and implementation indicators
In addition to the final assessment event referred to in 5.2.5, the assessment of the results of the project will take into account the following:
7.1. Individual assessment of beneficiary countries
On completion of the activities foreseen, BAFA shall provide the EEAS and the Commission with a progress report on each of the beneficiary countries referred to in 6.1. That report will be prepared in liaison with the EU Delegations in the countries concerned and will recap the activities that took place in the beneficiary country over the duration of the Decision. The report will also assess the beneficiary country’s capacity in the area of arms transfer controls. Where the beneficiary country is party to the ATT, the assessment will assess how the capacity in place enables that country to implement the ATT.
7.2. Impact assessment and implementation indicators
The impact of activities provided for by this Decision for the beneficiary countries should be assessed after the activities have been carried out. The impact assessment will be carried out by the High Representative, in cooperation with COARM and, as appropriate, with the EU Delegations in the beneficiary countries, as well as with other relevant stakeholders.
For that purpose, the following indicators will be used:

— | whether relevant national regulations on arms transfer controls are in place and whether/to which extent they meet the provisions of the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (inter alia, application of the assessment criteria, implementation of the EU common military list, reporting),
— | where available, information on enforcement cases,
— | whether the beneficiary countries are able to report arms exports and/or imports (e.g. UN Register, ATT annual reporting, Wassenaar Arrangement, OSCE, national reports),
— | whether the beneficiary country has aligned, or intends to officially align, with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.The individual assessment reports under 7.1 should refer to those implementation indicators as appropriate.
8. Promoting the use of the EU outreach web portal (2) The EU P2P web portal provided for in Decision 2012/711/CFSP has been developed as a Union-owned resource. It operates as a joint platform for all the Union outreach programmes (dual-use, arms). The activities listed under 5.2.1 to 5.2.5 are to raise the awareness of the Union outreach web portal and to promote its use. Participants in outreach activities should be informed about the private part of the web portal that offers permanent access to resources, documents and contacts. Likewise, the use of the web portal should be promoted to other officials who are not able to participate directly in assistance and outreach activities. Furthermore, activities should be promoted through the EU P2P Newsletter.
9. EU visibility
BAFA shall take all appropriate measures to publicise the fact that the action is funded by the European Union. Such measures will be implemented in accordance with the communication and visibility manual for Union external actions published by the European Commission. BAFA will thus ensure the visibility of the Union contribution with appropriate branding and publicity, highlighting the role of the Union and raising awareness of the reasons for the Decision, as well as Union support for the Decision and the results of that support. Material produced by the project will prominently display the Union flag in accordance with Union relevant guidelines, including the logo ‘EU P2P export control programme’. Union Delegations should be involved in events in third countries to enhance political follow-up and visibility.
Given that planned activities vary greatly in scope and character, a range of promotional tools will be used, including traditional media, website, social media, information and promotional materials (including infographics, leaflets, newsletters, press releases and others as appropriate). Publications and public events, procured under the project will be branded accordingly.
10. Duration
The total estimated duration of the project will be 24 months.
11. Reporting
BAFA shall prepare 6-monthly reports, including after the completion of each of the activities. The reports shall be submitted to the High Representative no later than 6 weeks after the completion of relevant activities.
12. Estimated total cost of the project and union financial contribution
The total estimated cost of the project is EUR 1 451 597,28 with co-financing from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. The total estimated cost of the EU-financed project is EUR 1 304 107,28.

(1) This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 (1999) and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.
(2) https://export-control.jrc.ec.europa.eu/

Pending: 32017D2408

21.12.2017 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 342/8
(1) Under point 10 of Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC, Latvia may exempt from value added tax (VAT) taxable persons whose annual turnover is no higher than the equivalent in national currency of EUR 17 200 at the conversion rate on the day of its accession.
(2) By virtue of Council Implementing Decision 2010/584/EU(2), Latvia was authorised, as a derogating measure, to exempt taxable persons whose annual turnover was no higher than EUR 50 000 from VAT, until 31 December 2013. That measure was extended by Council Implementing Decision 2014/796/EU(3)and expires on 31 December 2017.
(3) By letter registered with the Commission of 3 July 2017, Latvia requested authorisation for a special measure in order to continue derogating from Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC and to decrease the exemption threshold to EUR 40 000 (the ‘special measure’).
(4) In accordance with Article 395(2) of Directive 2006/112/EC, the Commission informed the other Member States by letter dated 13 September 2017 of the request made by Latvia. The Commission notified Latvia by letter dated 14 September 2017 that it had all the information necessary to consider the request.
(5) Given that the special measure will result in reduced VAT obligations for small enterprises, Latvia should be authorised to apply it for a limited period of time, until 31 December 2020. Taxable persons should still be able to opt for the normal VAT arrangements.
(6) Based on information provided by Latvia, the special measure will have a negligible impact on the overall amount of tax revenue collected at the final stage of consumption.
(7) As Articles 281 to 294 of Directive 2006/112/EC governing the special scheme for small enterprises are subject to review, it is possible that a directive amending those provisions will enter into force by 31 December 2020.
(8) The special measure has no impact on the Union's own resources accruing from value added tax because Latvia will carry out a compensation calculation in accordance with Article 6 of Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 1553/89(4),
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax(1), and in particular Article 395 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
(1) Under point 10 of Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC, Latvia may exempt from value added tax (VAT) taxable persons whose annual turnover is no higher than the equivalent in national currency of EUR 17 200 at the conversion rate on the day of its accession.
(2) By virtue of Council Implementing Decision 2010/584/EU(2), Latvia was authorised, as a derogating measure, to exempt taxable persons whose annual turnover was no higher than EUR 50 000 from VAT, until 31 December 2013. That measure was extended by Council Implementing Decision 2014/796/EU(3)and expires on 31 December 2017.
(3) By letter registered with the Commission of 3 July 2017, Latvia requested authorisation for a special measure in order to continue derogating from Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC and to decrease the exemption threshold to EUR 40 000 (the ‘special measure’).
(4) In accordance with Article 395(2) of Directive 2006/112/EC, the Commission informed the other Member States by letter dated 13 September 2017 of the request made by Latvia. The Commission notified Latvia by letter dated 14 September 2017 that it had all the information necessary to consider the request.
(5) Given that the special measure will result in reduced VAT obligations for small enterprises, Latvia should be authorised to apply it for a limited period of time, until 31 December 2020. Taxable persons should still be able to opt for the normal VAT arrangements.
(6) Based on information provided by Latvia, the special measure will have a negligible impact on the overall amount of tax revenue collected at the final stage of consumption.
(7) As Articles 281 to 294 of Directive 2006/112/EC governing the special scheme for small enterprises are subject to review, it is possible that a directive amending those provisions will enter into force by 31 December 2020.
(8) The special measure has no impact on the Union’s own resources accruing from value added tax because Latvia will carry out a compensation calculation in accordance with Article 6 of Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 1553/89(4),
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
By way of derogation from point 10 of Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC, the Republic of Latvia is authorised to exempt from VAT taxable persons whose annual turnover is no higher than EUR 40 000.

Article 2
This Decision shall take effect on the day of its notification.
This Decision shall apply from 1 January 2018 until 31 December 2020 or until the entry into force of a directive amending Articles 281 to 294 of Directive 2006/112/EC, whichever date is earlier.

Article 3
This Decision is addressed to the Republic of Latvia.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax(1), and in particular Article 395 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
(1) Under point 10 of Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC, Latvia may exempt from value added tax (VAT) taxable persons whose annual turnover is no higher than the equivalent in national currency of EUR 17 200 at the conversion rate on the day of its accession.
(2) By virtue of Council Implementing Decision 2010/584/EU(2), Latvia was authorised, as a derogating measure, to exempt taxable persons whose annual turnover was no higher than EUR 50 000 from VAT, until 31 December 2013. That measure was extended by Council Implementing Decision 2014/796/EU(3)and expires on 31 December 2017.
(3) By letter registered with the Commission of 3 July 2017, Latvia requested authorisation for a special measure in order to continue derogating from Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC and to decrease the exemption threshold to EUR 40 000 (the ‘special measure’).
(4) In accordance with Article 395(2) of Directive 2006/112/EC, the Commission informed the other Member States by letter dated 13 September 2017 of the request made by Latvia. The Commission notified Latvia by letter dated 14 September 2017 that it had all the information necessary to consider the request.
(5) Given that the special measure will result in reduced VAT obligations for small enterprises, Latvia should be authorised to apply it for a limited period of time, until 31 December 2020. Taxable persons should still be able to opt for the normal VAT arrangements.
(6) Based on information provided by Latvia, the special measure will have a negligible impact on the overall amount of tax revenue collected at the final stage of consumption.
(7) As Articles 281 to 294 of Directive 2006/112/EC governing the special scheme for small enterprises are subject to review, it is possible that a directive amending those provisions will enter into force by 31 December 2020.
(8) The special measure has no impact on the Union’s own resources accruing from value added tax because Latvia will carry out a compensation calculation in accordance with Article 6 of Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 1553/89(4),
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
By way of derogation from point 10 of Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC, the Republic of Latvia is authorised to exempt from VAT taxable persons whose annual turnover is no higher than EUR 40 000.
This Decision shall take effect on the day of its notification.
This Decision shall apply from 1 January 2018 until 31 December 2020 or until the entry into force of a directive amending Articles 281 to 294 of Directive 2006/112/EC, whichever date is earlier.
This Decision is addressed to the Republic of Latvia.

Pending: 32017D1855

14.10.2017 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 265/19
(1) Under point 18 of Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC, Romania may exempt from value added tax (VAT) taxable persons whose annual turnover is no higher than the equivalent in national currency of EUR 35 000 at the conversion rate on the day of its accession.
(2) By virtue of Council Implementing Decision 2012/181/EU(2)Romania is authorised to apply a higher threshold and to exempt from VAT taxable persons with annual turnover not exceeding EUR 65 000. This measure was extended by Council Implementing Decision 2014/931/EU(3)which expires on 31 December 2017.
(3) By letter registered with the Commission on 26 April 2017 Romania requested the authorisation to continue derogating from point 18 of Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC and at the same time to increase the exemption threshold to the equivalent in national currency of EUR 88 500.
(4) A higher threshold for the special scheme for small enterprises is a simplification measure, as it may significantly reduce the VAT obligations of small enterprises.
(5) In accordance with Article 395(2) of Directive 2006/112/EC, the Commission informed the other Member States by letter dated 9 June 2017 of the request made by Romania. The Commission notified Romania by letter dated 12 June 2017 that it had all the information necessary to consider the request.
(6) Romania expects that the measure reduces VAT-related obligations for a number of small enterprises. It should also reduce the burden on the tax authorities by removing the need to monitor the collection of a small volume of revenues from larger number of small enterprises.
(7) Given that this derogating measure is to result in reduced VAT obligations for small enterprises, Romania should be authorised to apply the measure for a limited period. Taxable persons should still be able to opt for the normal VAT arrangements.
(8) As Articles 281 to 294 of Directive 2006/112/EC governing the special scheme for small enterprises are subject to review, it is possible that a directive amending those provisions of Directive 2006/112/EC will enter into force before the period of validity of the derogation expires on 31 December 2020.
(9) Based on information provided by Romania, the increased threshold will have a negligible impact on the overall amount of tax revenue collected at the stage of final consumption.
(10) The derogation has no impact on the Union's own resources accruing from VAT, because Romania will carry out a compensation calculation in accordance with Article 6 of Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 1553/89(4),
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax(1), and in particular Article 395 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
(1) Under point 18 of Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC, Romania may exempt from value added tax (VAT) taxable persons whose annual turnover is no higher than the equivalent in national currency of EUR 35 000 at the conversion rate on the day of its accession.
(2) By virtue of Council Implementing Decision 2012/181/EU(2)Romania is authorised to apply a higher threshold and to exempt from VAT taxable persons with annual turnover not exceeding EUR 65 000. This measure was extended by Council Implementing Decision 2014/931/EU(3)which expires on 31 December 2017.
(3) By letter registered with the Commission on 26 April 2017 Romania requested the authorisation to continue derogating from point 18 of Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC and at the same time to increase the exemption threshold to the equivalent in national currency of EUR 88 500.
(4) A higher threshold for the special scheme for small enterprises is a simplification measure, as it may significantly reduce the VAT obligations of small enterprises.
(5) In accordance with Article 395(2) of Directive 2006/112/EC, the Commission informed the other Member States by letter dated 9 June 2017 of the request made by Romania. The Commission notified Romania by letter dated 12 June 2017 that it had all the information necessary to consider the request.
(6) Romania expects that the measure reduces VAT-related obligations for a number of small enterprises. It should also reduce the burden on the tax authorities by removing the need to monitor the collection of a small volume of revenues from larger number of small enterprises.
(7) Given that this derogating measure is to result in reduced VAT obligations for small enterprises, Romania should be authorised to apply the measure for a limited period. Taxable persons should still be able to opt for the normal VAT arrangements.
(8) As Articles 281 to 294 of Directive 2006/112/EC governing the special scheme for small enterprises are subject to review, it is possible that a directive amending those provisions of Directive 2006/112/EC will enter into force before the period of validity of the derogation expires on 31 December 2020.
(9) Based on information provided by Romania, the increased threshold will have a negligible impact on the overall amount of tax revenue collected at the stage of final consumption.
(10) The derogation has no impact on the Union’s own resources accruing from VAT, because Romania will carry out a compensation calculation in accordance with Article 6 of Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 1553/89(4),
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
By way of derogation from point 18 of Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC, Romania is authorised to exempt from VAT taxable persons whose annual turnover is no higher than the equivalent in national currency of EUR 88 500 at the conversion rate on the day of its accession.

Article 2
This Decision shall take effect on the date of its notification.
This Decision shall apply from 1 January 2018 until 31 December 2020, or until the entry into force of a directive amending the provisions of Articles 281 to 294 of Directive 2006/112/EC, whichever date is the earlier.

Article 3
This Decision is addressed to Romania.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax(1), and in particular Article 395 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
(1) Under point 18 of Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC, Romania may exempt from value added tax (VAT) taxable persons whose annual turnover is no higher than the equivalent in national currency of EUR 35 000 at the conversion rate on the day of its accession.
(2) By virtue of Council Implementing Decision 2012/181/EU(2)Romania is authorised to apply a higher threshold and to exempt from VAT taxable persons with annual turnover not exceeding EUR 65 000. This measure was extended by Council Implementing Decision 2014/931/EU(3)which expires on 31 December 2017.
(3) By letter registered with the Commission on 26 April 2017 Romania requested the authorisation to continue derogating from point 18 of Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC and at the same time to increase the exemption threshold to the equivalent in national currency of EUR 88 500.
(4) A higher threshold for the special scheme for small enterprises is a simplification measure, as it may significantly reduce the VAT obligations of small enterprises.
(5) In accordance with Article 395(2) of Directive 2006/112/EC, the Commission informed the other Member States by letter dated 9 June 2017 of the request made by Romania. The Commission notified Romania by letter dated 12 June 2017 that it had all the information necessary to consider the request.
(6) Romania expects that the measure reduces VAT-related obligations for a number of small enterprises. It should also reduce the burden on the tax authorities by removing the need to monitor the collection of a small volume of revenues from larger number of small enterprises.
(7) Given that this derogating measure is to result in reduced VAT obligations for small enterprises, Romania should be authorised to apply the measure for a limited period. Taxable persons should still be able to opt for the normal VAT arrangements.
(8) As Articles 281 to 294 of Directive 2006/112/EC governing the special scheme for small enterprises are subject to review, it is possible that a directive amending those provisions of Directive 2006/112/EC will enter into force before the period of validity of the derogation expires on 31 December 2020.
(9) Based on information provided by Romania, the increased threshold will have a negligible impact on the overall amount of tax revenue collected at the stage of final consumption.
(10) The derogation has no impact on the Union’s own resources accruing from VAT, because Romania will carry out a compensation calculation in accordance with Article 6 of Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 1553/89(4),
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
By way of derogation from point 18 of Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC, Romania is authorised to exempt from VAT taxable persons whose annual turnover is no higher than the equivalent in national currency of EUR 88 500 at the conversion rate on the day of its accession.
This Decision shall take effect on the date of its notification.
This Decision shall apply from 1 January 2018 until 31 December 2020, or until the entry into force of a directive amending the provisions of Articles 281 to 294 of Directive 2006/112/EC, whichever date is the earlier.
This Decision is addressed to Romania.

Pending: 32017D1768

28.9.2017 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 250/71
(1) Under point (19) of Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC, Croatia may exempt from value added tax (‘VAT’) taxable persons whose annual turnover is no higher than the equivalent in national currency of EUR 35 000 at the conversion rate on the day of its accession.
(2) By letter registered with the Commission on 20 December 2016, Croatia requested authorisation to introduce a special measure derogating from Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC (‘the special measure’), allowing it to exempt, as of 1 January 2018, from VAT taxable persons whose annual turnover is no higher than the equivalent in its national currency of EUR 45 000.
(3) A higher threshold for applying the special scheme for small enterprises is a simplification measure, as it may significantly reduce the VAT obligations of small enterprises.
(4) In accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 395(2) of Directive 2006/112/EC, the Commission informed the other Member States by letter dated 13 March 2017 of the request made by Croatia. By letter dated 14 March 2017, the Commission notified Croatia that it had all the information necessary to consider the request.
(5) From the information provided by Croatia, potentially around 9 000 taxpayers could make use of the special measure in order to reduce their VAT obligations as set out in Chapter 2 of Title XI of Directive 2006/112/EC. It would also reduce the burden on the tax administration and simplify the collection of the tax.
(6) Given that the special measure will result in reduced VAT obligations for small enterprises, Croatia should be authorised to apply it for a limited period. Taxable persons should still be able to opt for the normal VAT arrangements.
(7) As Articles 281 to 294 of Directive 2006/112/EC governing the special scheme for small enterprises are subject to review, it is possible that a directive amending those provisions will enter into force before the period of validity of the derogation expires.
(8) From information provided by Croatia, the increased threshold will have a negligible impact on the overall amount of tax revenue collected at the stage of final consumption.
(9) The derogation will have no impact on the Union's own resources accruing from VAT, because Croatia will carry out a compensation calculation in accordance with Article 6 of Council Regulation (EEC Euratom) No 1553/89(2),
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax(1), and in particular Article 395(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
(1) Under point (19) of Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC, Croatia may exempt from value added tax (‘VAT’) taxable persons whose annual turnover is no higher than the equivalent in national currency of EUR 35 000 at the conversion rate on the day of its accession.
(2) By letter registered with the Commission on 20 December 2016, Croatia requested authorisation to introduce a special measure derogating from Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC (‘the special measure’), allowing it to exempt, as of 1 January 2018, from VAT taxable persons whose annual turnover is no higher than the equivalent in its national currency of EUR 45 000.
(3) A higher threshold for applying the special scheme for small enterprises is a simplification measure, as it may significantly reduce the VAT obligations of small enterprises.
(4) In accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 395(2) of Directive 2006/112/EC, the Commission informed the other Member States by letter dated 13 March 2017 of the request made by Croatia. By letter dated 14 March 2017, the Commission notified Croatia that it had all the information necessary to consider the request.
(5) From the information provided by Croatia, potentially around 9 000 taxpayers could make use of the special measure in order to reduce their VAT obligations as set out in Chapter 2 of Title XI of Directive 2006/112/EC. It would also reduce the burden on the tax administration and simplify the collection of the tax.
(6) Given that the special measure will result in reduced VAT obligations for small enterprises, Croatia should be authorised to apply it for a limited period. Taxable persons should still be able to opt for the normal VAT arrangements.
(7) As Articles 281 to 294 of Directive 2006/112/EC governing the special scheme for small enterprises are subject to review, it is possible that a directive amending those provisions will enter into force before the period of validity of the derogation expires.
(8) From information provided by Croatia, the increased threshold will have a negligible impact on the overall amount of tax revenue collected at the stage of final consumption.
(9) The derogation will have no impact on the Union’s own resources accruing from VAT, because Croatia will carry out a compensation calculation in accordance with Article 6 of Council Regulation (EEC Euratom) No 1553/89(2),
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
By way of derogation from point (19) of Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC, Croatia is authorised to exempt from VAT taxable persons whose annual turnover is no higher than the equivalent in national currency of EUR 45 000 at the conversion rate on the day of its accession.

Article 2
This Decision shall take effect on the day of its notification.
This Decision shall apply from 1 January 2018 until 31 December 2020, or until the entry into force of a directive amending Articles 281 to 294 of Directive 2006/112/EC, whichever date is the earlier.

Article 3
This Decision is addressed to the Republic of Croatia.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax(1), and in particular Article 395(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
(1) Under point (19) of Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC, Croatia may exempt from value added tax (‘VAT’) taxable persons whose annual turnover is no higher than the equivalent in national currency of EUR 35 000 at the conversion rate on the day of its accession.
(2) By letter registered with the Commission on 20 December 2016, Croatia requested authorisation to introduce a special measure derogating from Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC (‘the special measure’), allowing it to exempt, as of 1 January 2018, from VAT taxable persons whose annual turnover is no higher than the equivalent in its national currency of EUR 45 000.
(3) A higher threshold for applying the special scheme for small enterprises is a simplification measure, as it may significantly reduce the VAT obligations of small enterprises.
(4) In accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 395(2) of Directive 2006/112/EC, the Commission informed the other Member States by letter dated 13 March 2017 of the request made by Croatia. By letter dated 14 March 2017, the Commission notified Croatia that it had all the information necessary to consider the request.
(5) From the information provided by Croatia, potentially around 9 000 taxpayers could make use of the special measure in order to reduce their VAT obligations as set out in Chapter 2 of Title XI of Directive 2006/112/EC. It would also reduce the burden on the tax administration and simplify the collection of the tax.
(6) Given that the special measure will result in reduced VAT obligations for small enterprises, Croatia should be authorised to apply it for a limited period. Taxable persons should still be able to opt for the normal VAT arrangements.
(7) As Articles 281 to 294 of Directive 2006/112/EC governing the special scheme for small enterprises are subject to review, it is possible that a directive amending those provisions will enter into force before the period of validity of the derogation expires.
(8) From information provided by Croatia, the increased threshold will have a negligible impact on the overall amount of tax revenue collected at the stage of final consumption.
(9) The derogation will have no impact on the Union’s own resources accruing from VAT, because Croatia will carry out a compensation calculation in accordance with Article 6 of Council Regulation (EEC Euratom) No 1553/89(2),
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
By way of derogation from point (19) of Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC, Croatia is authorised to exempt from VAT taxable persons whose annual turnover is no higher than the equivalent in national currency of EUR 45 000 at the conversion rate on the day of its accession.
This Decision shall take effect on the day of its notification.
This Decision shall apply from 1 January 2018 until 31 December 2020, or until the entry into force of a directive amending Articles 281 to 294 of Directive 2006/112/EC, whichever date is the earlier.
This Decision is addressed to the Republic of Croatia.

Pending: 32017D1428

5.8.2017 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 204/101
(1) The European Union should work towards a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order, inter alia, to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.
(2) On 12 December 2003 the European Council adopted a European Security Strategy identifying global challenges and threats, and calling for a rule-based international order based on effective multilateralism and well-functioning international institutions.
(3) The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (‘the Convention’) entered into force on 1 March 1999. It constitutes the only comprehensive international instrument dealing with all aspects of anti-personnel landmines, including their use, stockpiling, production, trade, clearance and victim assistance. Since 1 June 2013, all Member States are party to the Convention and on 1 September 2016, 162 states have expressed their consent to be bound by it.
(4) On 23 June 2008, the Council adopted Joint Action 2008/487/CFSP(1)in support of the universalisation and implementation of the Convention.
(5) On 3 December 2009, at the second Review Conference of the Convention, the States Parties to the Convention adopted the Cartagena Action Plan 2010-2014 on the universalisation and implementation of all aspects of the Convention. They also adopted the ‘Directive of the States Parties to the Implementation Support Unit’ in which the States Parties agreed that the Convention's Implementation Support Unit (‘ISU’) should provide advice and technical support to States Parties on the implementation and universalisation of the Convention, facilitate communication among the States Parties, and promote communication and information sharing regarding the Convention both to non-party States and to the public. At their 14th meeting in 2015, the States Parties adopted a decision on strengthening financial governance and transparency within the ISU, setting out the conditions for the ISU to undertake activities or projects that do not feature in its yearly budget, including at the invitation of States Parties and non-signatory states.
(6) On 13 November 2012 the Council adopted Decision 2012/700/CFSP(2)in support of the implementation of the Cartagena Action Plan 2010-2014.
(7) At the Third Review Conference of the Convention held in Maputo, Mozambique, in June 2014, the States Parties adopted the Maputo Action Plan aiming to make significant and sustainable progress towards implementation of the Convention in the period before the next Review Conference (2014-2019) and made a joint declaration to aspire to meet the goals of the Convention ‘to the fullest extent possible by 2025’.
(8) In its conclusions of 16 and 17 June 2014 at the Third Review Conference of the Convention, the Council of the European Union recalled the Union's unity in pursuing the objectives of the Convention, with all 28 Member States now States Parties, and that the Union and its Member States have a long history of support for mine clearance and the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines, as well as for assistance to victims of antipersonnel mines. The conclusions reiterated the Union's unwavering support to States Parties in their full and effective implementation of the Convention, and its commitment to promote universalisation of the Convention, to provide resources to fund mine action, and concrete and sustainable assistance to anti-personnel mine victims, their families and communities,
(a) support efforts of States Parties to the Convention to implement the mine clearance aspects of the Maputo Action Plan;
(b) support efforts of States Parties to the Convention to implement the victim assistance aspects of the Maputo Action Plan;
(c) promotion of the universalisation of the Convention;
(d) support efforts of States Parties to the Convention to implement the stockpile destruction aspects of the Maputo Action Plan;
(e) demonstrate the ongoing commitment of the Union and its Member States to the Convention and their resolve to cooperate with and extend assistance to those States that need support in meeting their commitments under the Convention, and enhance the leading role of the Union in pursuing the Convention's vision of a conclusive end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines.
(a) mine clearance: providing support for the implementation of Action III of the Maputo Action Plan, including by means of facilitating and strengthening national planning and reporting in up to five affected States Parties that have upcoming mine clearance deadlines in 2018, 2019, 2020 and beyond;
(b) victim assistance: providing support for the implementation of the Victim Assistance actions of the Maputo Action Plan in up to five affected States Parties. The project will support States Parties to embed the victim assistance aspects of the Maputo Action Plan in an integrated policy linked with national policies on human rights and the rights of persons with disabilities. The project aims to empower mine victims to become active agents in their own development;
(c) in order to promote universalisation of the Convention, the project will support the Presidency of the Convention and a high level task force to engage states that are not parties to the Convention at a high level. The study on border security initiated under the Decision 2012/700/CFSP will be further developed;
(d) stockpile destruction: support for the implementation of the Stockpile Destruction actions of the Maputo Action Plan;
(e) in order to demonstrate the commitment of the Union and ensure its visibility, a launch event will be held to promote this Decision and Union support for mine action in general, and a wrap-up event will be organised to publicise the activities provided for in this Decision and their outcomes, thereby underlining the Union's contribution.
— Support will be provided by the ISU to up to five States Parties in facilitating national stakeholder dialogues. Eligible States Parties have upcoming mine clearance deadlines in 2018, 2019, 2020 and beyond. The Convention's Committee on Article 5 Implementation will be involved in the selection of the recipient States Parties.
— The national stakeholder dialogues will be facilitated by the ISU, in collaboration with stakeholders, such as relevant government officials, representatives from mine-affected populations, mine action donors, including relevant Union entities, mine clearance organisations, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (‘ICBL’), UN agencies and the GICHD. As appropriate, those key actors will be directly involved in the implementation of the project subject to the conditions to be developed in the budgetary impact statement. The dialogues will produce a detailed outcome document highlighting geographically specific information on remaining areas requiring survey and clearance, methodologies to address remaining areas and challenges faced in fulfilling mine clearance obligations and recommendations on overcoming those challenges as well as milestones to address identified challenges. The national stakeholder dialogues will incorporate gender and diversity aspects of mine clearance at the design, management and implementation levels.
— Follow-up actions, in up to five instances, will be undertaken in response to recommendations contained in the outcome documents. Those follow-up actions will provide additional technical support by the ISU (e.g. for drafting/updating of national demining action plans, the development of a project proposal or proposals, etc.).
— The stakeholder dialogues will provide a detailed outcome document setting out the remaining challenges, with objectives, timelines and recommendations for further action.
— The States Parties selected for the national stakeholder dialogues will be able to articulate the status of implementation of the Convention and the Maputo Action Plan as well as to improve their annual reporting to the States Parties on the implementation of their obligations by their deadline.
— The selected States will develop practices in building and fostering partnerships, including with donors and mine clearance organisations, to ensure that they support efforts to fulfil their obligations in as short a time as possible.
— The selected States will be able to better articulate their intentions to fulfil the Maputo Action Plan commitments and their need for support, for example for drafting and updating of national de-mining action plans, the development of a project proposals.
— States Parties to the Convention which are in the process of implementing their mine clearance obligations under the Convention.
— Women, girls, boys and men whose lives are affected by the presence or suspected presence of anti-personnel mines, as well their families and communities.
— National experts working on issues relevant to mine clearance.
— States and organisations supporting mine clearance efforts.
— Support will be provided by the ISU in up to five affected States Parties to convene national stakeholder dialogues in States Parties that either:(a)have engaged little with victim assistance and therefore would benefit from a stimulus to begin doing so; or(b)have engaged in the effort to implement the victim assistance actions of the Maputo Action Plan and would benefit from a national stakeholder dialogue to promote those implementation efforts.The Convention's Committee on Victim Assistance will be involved in the selection of the recipient States Parties. (a) have engaged little with victim assistance and therefore would benefit from a stimulus to begin doing so; or (b) have engaged in the effort to implement the victim assistance actions of the Maputo Action Plan and would benefit from a national stakeholder dialogue to promote those implementation efforts.
(a) have engaged little with victim assistance and therefore would benefit from a stimulus to begin doing so; or
(b) have engaged in the effort to implement the victim assistance actions of the Maputo Action Plan and would benefit from a national stakeholder dialogue to promote those implementation efforts.
(a) have engaged little with victim assistance and therefore would benefit from a stimulus to begin doing so; or
(b) have engaged in the effort to implement the victim assistance actions of the Maputo Action Plan and would benefit from a national stakeholder dialogue to promote those implementation efforts.
— The national stakeholder dialogues will be facilitated by the ISU, in collaboration with key actors, such as relevant government officials, donors, including relevant Union entities, UN agencies, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (‘UNOHCHR’), the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Munition Coalition (‘ICBL-CMC’) and disabled persons' organisations. The national stakeholder dialogues will also result in the drafting of a detailed outcome document, developed in consultation with stakeholders, in which challenges and gaps in the implementation of the Maputo Action Plan's victim assistance commitments will be identified, recommendations made to overcome them and objectives set.
— Follow-up action in up to five instances will be undertaken in response to recommendations contained in the outcome documents. Those follow-up actions may involve the provision of additional technical support by the ISU, for example for the revision of national plans, the development of a project proposal or proposals, etc.
— Decision 2012/700/CFSP supported a global conference that was held in Medellin, Colombia, in April 2014, entitled ‘Bridges between Worlds’ that aimed to advance the international community's understanding regarding the place of victim assistance in broader contexts. As a follow-up, this Decision will enable an international conference for national experts to be organised by the ISU, in collaboration with key actors such as the UNOHCHR, the relevant Union entities, and ICBL-CMC and disabled persons' organisations, to explore challenges and good practices in integrating victim assistance into the broader contexts of disability and development at the national level. In particular, the international conference will aim at strengthening linkages with efforts to implement the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘CRPD’) and planning processes to achieve the UN Sustainable Development Goals. The international conference will build upon the work of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention's Committee on Victim Assistance and representatives of other relevant bodies such as the Victim Assistance Coordinators of the Cluster Munitions Convention (‘CCM’) and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on the Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (‘CCW’).
— National stakeholder dialogues will result in a detailed outcome document identifying challenges and gaps which will provide the selected States with recommendations and concrete steps it can take to address identified challenges in implementing their Maputo Action Plan victim assistance commitments.
— The outcome document will support national policy development and facilitate the dialogue and cooperation with donors and implementing agencies.
— Follow-up actions, in up to five States Parties, to support efforts to overcome the challenges and gaps identified during the national stakeholder dialogues will result in increased capacity of the States Parties to fulfil their Maputo Action Plan commitments for example the revision of national plans, the development of a project proposal or proposals.
— National stakeholder dialogues will create awareness of the global effort and best practices to address the needs and guarantee the rights of survivors through broader frameworks.
— The selected States will be better able to articulate the status of implementation of the Maputo Action Plan as well as to report on plans for its implementation.
— National experts participating in the international conference will have a better understanding of the place of victim assistance in efforts to implement the CRPD and planning processing to achieve the UN Sustainable Development Goals.
— States Parties to the Convention which have reported responsibility for significant numbers of landmine survivors.
— Women, girls, boys and men who have fallen victim to landmines and other explosive remnant of war, as well as their family and communities.
— National experts working on issues relevant to victim assistance.
— A High Level Task Force on the universalisation of the Convention will be supported by the ISU, including support from high-level personalities to engage with the leaders of up to five States not party at the ministerial or higher level regarding accession to the Convention and/or adherence to the Convention and its norms.
— Updated first-hand knowledge on barriers to accession from States which are not parties to the Convention will be sought with a view to that information contributing to substantive documents prepared for the Fourth Review Conference in 2019, including through a comprehensive report regarding what progress has been made on universalising the Convention and its norms as well as the scope for further progress.
— The study on border security initiated under Decision 2012/700/CFSP will be further developed, in collaboration with partners such as the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) or the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), into a tool for universalisation aimed towards States that still consider anti-personnel mines an indispensable tool for border security.
— Up to five non-party States will be engaged at the ministerial or a higher level regarding adherence to the Convention.
— Updated knowledge of the anti-personnel mine policies of non-party States will be obtained. That information will be used in the preparation of a substantive document for the Fourth Review Conference, including through a comprehensive report on progress made towards achieving the aims of universalising the Convention, as well as scope for further progress.
— Advocacy on the part of States Parties to the Convention and non-governmental organisations will be revitalised on the basis of follow-up actions resulting from High Level Task Force visits.
— Increased knowledge will be amassed and compiled in a publication which will address the most frequently raised perceived barriers to accession to the Convention and which can be used to support universalisation efforts.
— Progress will be made towards accession to the Convention and/or an embracing of its norms by non-party States that were engaged through this project.
— States, other than States Parties, which have not yet ratified, approved, accepted, or acceded to, the Convention.
— States Parties to the Convention and non-governmental and international organisations involved in efforts to promote the universalisation of the Convention.
— A launch event will be held to promote this Decision and Union support for Mine Action in general, and a wrap-up event will be organised to publicise the activities provided for in this Decision and their outcomes, thereby underlining the Union's contribution.
— Communication in relation to the activities of the Decision and the Union's commitment to the implementation of the Convention will be highlighted throughout the implementation of this Decision on the Convention's website, through social media platforms as well as through the national and international press.
— Communication material, for example posters, advertising, video footage, publicity material, will be acquired and put at the disposal of involved stakeholders and partners.
— Officials of the Union and its Member States will be aware of this Decision and how it may relate to their work.
— The Union's commitment to the Convention and Mine Action in general will be put in the spotlight for States Parties to the Convention and the global audience interested in human security in general.
— Awareness of the objectives of the Convention and the Maputo Action Plan will be strengthened.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28 and 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) The European Union should work towards a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order, inter alia, to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.
(2) On 12 December 2003 the European Council adopted a European Security Strategy identifying global challenges and threats, and calling for a rule-based international order based on effective multilateralism and well-functioning international institutions.
(3) The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (‘the Convention’) entered into force on 1 March 1999. It constitutes the only comprehensive international instrument dealing with all aspects of anti-personnel landmines, including their use, stockpiling, production, trade, clearance and victim assistance. Since 1 June 2013, all Member States are party to the Convention and on 1 September 2016, 162 states have expressed their consent to be bound by it.
(4) On 23 June 2008, the Council adopted Joint Action 2008/487/CFSP(1)in support of the universalisation and implementation of the Convention.
(5) On 3 December 2009, at the second Review Conference of the Convention, the States Parties to the Convention adopted the Cartagena Action Plan 2010-2014 on the universalisation and implementation of all aspects of the Convention. They also adopted the ‘Directive of the States Parties to the Implementation Support Unit’ in which the States Parties agreed that the Convention’s Implementation Support Unit (‘ISU’) should provide advice and technical support to States Parties on the implementation and universalisation of the Convention, facilitate communication among the States Parties, and promote communication and information sharing regarding the Convention both to non-party States and to the public. At their 14th meeting in 2015, the States Parties adopted a decision on strengthening financial governance and transparency within the ISU, setting out the conditions for the ISU to undertake activities or projects that do not feature in its yearly budget, including at the invitation of States Parties and non-signatory states.
(6) On 13 November 2012 the Council adopted Decision 2012/700/CFSP(2)in support of the implementation of the Cartagena Action Plan 2010-2014.
(7) At the Third Review Conference of the Convention held in Maputo, Mozambique, in June 2014, the States Parties adopted the Maputo Action Plan aiming to make significant and sustainable progress towards implementation of the Convention in the period before the next Review Conference (2014-2019) and made a joint declaration to aspire to meet the goals of the Convention ‘to the fullest extent possible by 2025’.
(8) In its conclusions of 16 and 17 June 2014 at the Third Review Conference of the Convention, the Council of the European Union recalled the Union’s unity in pursuing the objectives of the Convention, with all 28 Member States now States Parties, and that the Union and its Member States have a long history of support for mine clearance and the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines, as well as for assistance to victims of antipersonnel mines. The conclusions reiterated the Union’s unwavering support to States Parties in their full and effective implementation of the Convention, and its commitment to promote universalisation of the Convention, to provide resources to fund mine action, and concrete and sustainable assistance to anti-personnel mine victims, their families and communities,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
1. To contribute to human security by supporting the implementation of the Maputo Action Plan 2014-2019 adopted by the States Parties at the Third Review Conference of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (‘the Convention’), in the framework of the European Security Strategy and in accordance with relevant decisions of the international community, the European Union pursues the following objectives:
(a)
support efforts of States Parties to the Convention to implement the mine clearance aspects of the Maputo Action Plan;
(b)
support efforts of States Parties to the Convention to implement the victim assistance aspects of the Maputo Action Plan;
(c)
promotion of the universalisation of the Convention;
(d)
support efforts of States Parties to the Convention to implement the stockpile destruction aspects of the Maputo Action Plan;
(e)
demonstrate the ongoing commitment of the Union and its Member States to the Convention and their resolve to cooperate with and extend assistance to those States that need support in meeting their commitments under the Convention, and enhance the leading role of the Union in pursuing the Convention’s vision of a conclusive end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines.
2. All the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 shall be pursued in such a way that they reinforce the Convention’s tradition of partnership and collaboration between States, non-governmental and other organisations, including representatives from mine-affected communities. All actions will incorporate gender and diversity aspects at the design, management and implementation levels.
3. In order to achieve the objectives referred to in paragraph 1, the Union shall support the following projects:
(a)
mine clearance: providing support for the implementation of Action III of the Maputo Action Plan, including by means of facilitating and strengthening national planning and reporting in up to five affected States Parties that have upcoming mine clearance deadlines in 2018, 2019, 2020 and beyond;
(b)
victim assistance: providing support for the implementation of the Victim Assistance actions of the Maputo Action Plan in up to five affected States Parties. The project will support States Parties to embed the victim assistance aspects of the Maputo Action Plan in an integrated policy linked with national policies on human rights and the rights of persons with disabilities. The project aims to empower mine victims to become active agents in their own development;
(c)
in order to promote universalisation of the Convention, the project will support the Presidency of the Convention and a high level task force to engage states that are not parties to the Convention at a high level. The study on border security initiated under the Decision 2012/700/CFSP will be further developed;
(d)
stockpile destruction: support for the implementation of the Stockpile Destruction actions of the Maputo Action Plan;
(e)
in order to demonstrate the commitment of the Union and ensure its visibility, a launch event will be held to promote this Decision and Union support for mine action in general, and a wrap-up event will be organised to publicise the activities provided for in this Decision and their outcomes, thereby underlining the Union’s contribution.
4. To meet the objectives referred to in paragraph 1, a detailed description of the measures to be undertaken is set out in the Annex.

Article 2
1. The High Representative for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (‘the High Representative’) shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.
2. The technical implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(3) shall be carried out by the ISU, represented by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (‘GICHD’).
3. The ISU shall perform these tasks under the responsibility of the High Representative. For that purpose, the High Representative will enter into the necessary arrangements with the GICHD.

Article 3
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the measures referred to in Article 1(3) shall be EUR 2 303 274,47.
2. The expenditure financed by the amount stipulated in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.
3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure referred to in paragraph 1. For this purpose, it shall conclude a financing agreement with the GICHD, stipulating that the ISU is to ensure visibility of the Union contribution, appropriate to its size.
4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in the process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.
5. The ISU shall perform the tasks referred to in Article 2 in accordance with the decision on strengthening financial governance and transparency within the ISU, taken at the 14th meeting of States Parties of the Convention in 2015(3).

Article 4
The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular reports to be prepared by the ISU. Those reports shall form the basis for the evaluation by the Council. The Commission shall provide information on the financial aspects of the implementation of this Decision.

Article 5
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
It shall expire 36 months after the date of conclusion of the financing agreement referred to in Article 3(3) or 6 months after the date of its adoption if no financing agreement has been concluded within that period.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28 and 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) The European Union should work towards a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order, inter alia, to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.
(2) On 12 December 2003 the European Council adopted a European Security Strategy identifying global challenges and threats, and calling for a rule-based international order based on effective multilateralism and well-functioning international institutions.
(3) The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (‘the Convention’) entered into force on 1 March 1999. It constitutes the only comprehensive international instrument dealing with all aspects of anti-personnel landmines, including their use, stockpiling, production, trade, clearance and victim assistance. Since 1 June 2013, all Member States are party to the Convention and on 1 September 2016, 162 states have expressed their consent to be bound by it.
(4) On 23 June 2008, the Council adopted Joint Action 2008/487/CFSP(1)in support of the universalisation and implementation of the Convention.
(5) On 3 December 2009, at the second Review Conference of the Convention, the States Parties to the Convention adopted the Cartagena Action Plan 2010-2014 on the universalisation and implementation of all aspects of the Convention. They also adopted the ‘Directive of the States Parties to the Implementation Support Unit’ in which the States Parties agreed that the Convention’s Implementation Support Unit (‘ISU’) should provide advice and technical support to States Parties on the implementation and universalisation of the Convention, facilitate communication among the States Parties, and promote communication and information sharing regarding the Convention both to non-party States and to the public. At their 14th meeting in 2015, the States Parties adopted a decision on strengthening financial governance and transparency within the ISU, setting out the conditions for the ISU to undertake activities or projects that do not feature in its yearly budget, including at the invitation of States Parties and non-signatory states.
(6) On 13 November 2012 the Council adopted Decision 2012/700/CFSP(2)in support of the implementation of the Cartagena Action Plan 2010-2014.
(7) At the Third Review Conference of the Convention held in Maputo, Mozambique, in June 2014, the States Parties adopted the Maputo Action Plan aiming to make significant and sustainable progress towards implementation of the Convention in the period before the next Review Conference (2014-2019) and made a joint declaration to aspire to meet the goals of the Convention ‘to the fullest extent possible by 2025’.
(8) In its conclusions of 16 and 17 June 2014 at the Third Review Conference of the Convention, the Council of the European Union recalled the Union’s unity in pursuing the objectives of the Convention, with all 28 Member States now States Parties, and that the Union and its Member States have a long history of support for mine clearance and the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines, as well as for assistance to victims of antipersonnel mines. The conclusions reiterated the Union’s unwavering support to States Parties in their full and effective implementation of the Convention, and its commitment to promote universalisation of the Convention, to provide resources to fund mine action, and concrete and sustainable assistance to anti-personnel mine victims, their families and communities,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
1. To contribute to human security by supporting the implementation of the Maputo Action Plan 2014-2019 adopted by the States Parties at the Third Review Conference of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (‘the Convention’), in the framework of the European Security Strategy and in accordance with relevant decisions of the international community, the European Union pursues the following objectives:
(a)
support efforts of States Parties to the Convention to implement the mine clearance aspects of the Maputo Action Plan;
(b)
support efforts of States Parties to the Convention to implement the victim assistance aspects of the Maputo Action Plan;
(c)
promotion of the universalisation of the Convention;
(d)
support efforts of States Parties to the Convention to implement the stockpile destruction aspects of the Maputo Action Plan;
(e)
demonstrate the ongoing commitment of the Union and its Member States to the Convention and their resolve to cooperate with and extend assistance to those States that need support in meeting their commitments under the Convention, and enhance the leading role of the Union in pursuing the Convention’s vision of a conclusive end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines.
2. All the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 shall be pursued in such a way that they reinforce the Convention’s tradition of partnership and collaboration between States, non-governmental and other organisations, including representatives from mine-affected communities. All actions will incorporate gender and diversity aspects at the design, management and implementation levels.
3. In order to achieve the objectives referred to in paragraph 1, the Union shall support the following projects:
(a)
mine clearance: providing support for the implementation of Action III of the Maputo Action Plan, including by means of facilitating and strengthening national planning and reporting in up to five affected States Parties that have upcoming mine clearance deadlines in 2018, 2019, 2020 and beyond;
(b)
victim assistance: providing support for the implementation of the Victim Assistance actions of the Maputo Action Plan in up to five affected States Parties. The project will support States Parties to embed the victim assistance aspects of the Maputo Action Plan in an integrated policy linked with national policies on human rights and the rights of persons with disabilities. The project aims to empower mine victims to become active agents in their own development;
(c)
in order to promote universalisation of the Convention, the project will support the Presidency of the Convention and a high level task force to engage states that are not parties to the Convention at a high level. The study on border security initiated under the Decision 2012/700/CFSP will be further developed;
(d)
stockpile destruction: support for the implementation of the Stockpile Destruction actions of the Maputo Action Plan;
(e)
in order to demonstrate the commitment of the Union and ensure its visibility, a launch event will be held to promote this Decision and Union support for mine action in general, and a wrap-up event will be organised to publicise the activities provided for in this Decision and their outcomes, thereby underlining the Union’s contribution.
4. To meet the objectives referred to in paragraph 1, a detailed description of the measures to be undertaken is set out in the Annex.
1. The High Representative for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (‘the High Representative’) shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.
2. The technical implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(3) shall be carried out by the ISU, represented by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (‘GICHD’).
3. The ISU shall perform these tasks under the responsibility of the High Representative. For that purpose, the High Representative will enter into the necessary arrangements with the GICHD.
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the measures referred to in Article 1(3) shall be EUR 2 303 274,47.
2. The expenditure financed by the amount stipulated in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.
3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure referred to in paragraph 1. For this purpose, it shall conclude a financing agreement with the GICHD, stipulating that the ISU is to ensure visibility of the Union contribution, appropriate to its size.
4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in the process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.
5. The ISU shall perform the tasks referred to in Article 2 in accordance with the decision on strengthening financial governance and transparency within the ISU, taken at the 14th meeting of States Parties of the Convention in 2015(3).
The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular reports to be prepared by the ISU. Those reports shall form the basis for the evaluation by the Council. The Commission shall provide information on the financial aspects of the implementation of this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
It shall expire 36 months after the date of conclusion of the financing agreement referred to in Article 3(3) or 6 months after the date of its adoption if no financing agreement has been concluded within that period.

1.   Objective

ANNEXTo contribute to human security by supporting the implementation of the Maputo Action Plan 2014-2019 adopted by the States Parties at the Third Review Conference of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (‘the Convention’), in the framework of the European Security Strategy and in line with relevant decisions of the international community.
2. Description of projects2.1. Mine clearance: support for the implementation of Action III of the Maputo Action Plan including national planning and reporting in up to five affected States Parties
2.1.1. Project objectiveUp to five States Parties to the Convention are supported in the implementation of the mine clearance aspects of the Maputo Action Plan.
2.1.2. Project description
— | Support will be provided by the ISU to up to five States Parties in facilitating national stakeholder dialogues. Eligible States Parties have upcoming mine clearance deadlines in 2018, 2019, 2020 and beyond. The Convention’s Committee on Article 5 Implementation will be involved in the selection of the recipient States Parties.
— | The national stakeholder dialogues will be facilitated by the ISU, in collaboration with stakeholders, such as relevant government officials, representatives from mine-affected populations, mine action donors, including relevant Union entities, mine clearance organisations, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (‘ICBL’), UN agencies and the GICHD. As appropriate, those key actors will be directly involved in the implementation of the project subject to the conditions to be developed in the budgetary impact statement. The dialogues will produce a detailed outcome document highlighting geographically specific information on remaining areas requiring survey and clearance, methodologies to address remaining areas and challenges faced in fulfilling mine clearance obligations and recommendations on overcoming those challenges as well as milestones to address identified challenges. The national stakeholder dialogues will incorporate gender and diversity aspects of mine clearance at the design, management and implementation levels.
— | Follow-up actions, in up to five instances, will be undertaken in response to recommendations contained in the outcome documents. Those follow-up actions will provide additional technical support by the ISU (e.g. for drafting/updating of national demining action plans, the development of a project proposal or proposals, etc.).2.1.3. Project results
— | The stakeholder dialogues will provide a detailed outcome document setting out the remaining challenges, with objectives, timelines and recommendations for further action.
— | The States Parties selected for the national stakeholder dialogues will be able to articulate the status of implementation of the Convention and the Maputo Action Plan as well as to improve their annual reporting to the States Parties on the implementation of their obligations by their deadline.
— | The selected States will develop practices in building and fostering partnerships, including with donors and mine clearance organisations, to ensure that they support efforts to fulfil their obligations in as short a time as possible.
— | The selected States will be able to better articulate their intentions to fulfil the Maputo Action Plan commitments and their need for support, for example for drafting and updating of national de-mining action plans, the development of a project proposals.2.1.4. Beneficiaries
— | States Parties to the Convention which are in the process of implementing their mine clearance obligations under the Convention.
— | Women, girls, boys and men whose lives are affected by the presence or suspected presence of anti-personnel mines, as well their families and communities.
— | National experts working on issues relevant to mine clearance.
— | States and organisations supporting mine clearance efforts.2.2. Victim assistance: support for the implementation of the Victim Assistance actions of the Maputo Action Plan in up to five affected States Parties2.2.1. Project objectiveThe Maputo Action Plan states that victim assistance should be integrated into broader national polices, plans and legal frameworks related to the rights of persons with disabilities, health, education, employment, development and poverty reduction. The project will support up to five States Parties to embed the victim assistance aspects of the Maputo Action Plan in a broader context of national policies on human rights and the rights of persons with disabilities. The project aims at empowering those who are injured by mines or other explosive remnants of war, survivors, indirect victims such as family members of people killed by anti-personnel mines and people living in mine-affected areas, to become active agents in their own development. The national stakeholder dialogues will incorporate gender and diversity aspects of victim assistance at the design, management and implementation levels.
2.2.2. Project description
— | Support will be provided by the ISU in up to five affected States Parties to convene national stakeholder dialogues in States Parties that either:(a)have engaged little with victim assistance and therefore would benefit from a stimulus to begin doing so; or(b)have engaged in the effort to implement the victim assistance actions of the Maputo Action Plan and would benefit from a national stakeholder dialogue to promote those implementation efforts.The Convention’s Committee on Victim Assistance will be involved in the selection of the recipient States Parties. | (a) | have engaged little with victim assistance and therefore would benefit from a stimulus to begin doing so; or | (b) | have engaged in the effort to implement the victim assistance actions of the Maputo Action Plan and would benefit from a national stakeholder dialogue to promote those implementation efforts.
(a) | have engaged little with victim assistance and therefore would benefit from a stimulus to begin doing so; or
(b) | have engaged in the effort to implement the victim assistance actions of the Maputo Action Plan and would benefit from a national stakeholder dialogue to promote those implementation efforts.
— | The national stakeholder dialogues will be facilitated by the ISU, in collaboration with key actors, such as relevant government officials, donors, including relevant Union entities, UN agencies, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (‘UNOHCHR’), the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Munition Coalition (‘ICBL-CMC’) and disabled persons’ organisations. The national stakeholder dialogues will also result in the drafting of a detailed outcome document, developed in consultation with stakeholders, in which challenges and gaps in the implementation of the Maputo Action Plan’s victim assistance commitments will be identified, recommendations made to overcome them and objectives set.
— | Follow-up action in up to five instances will be undertaken in response to recommendations contained in the outcome documents. Those follow-up actions may involve the provision of additional technical support by the ISU, for example for the revision of national plans, the development of a project proposal or proposals, etc.
— | Decision 2012/700/CFSP supported a global conference that was held in Medellin, Colombia, in April 2014, entitled ‘Bridges between Worlds’ that aimed to advance the international community’s understanding regarding the place of victim assistance in broader contexts. As a follow-up, this Decision will enable an international conference for national experts to be organised by the ISU, in collaboration with key actors such as the UNOHCHR, the relevant Union entities, and ICBL-CMC and disabled persons’ organisations, to explore challenges and good practices in integrating victim assistance into the broader contexts of disability and development at the national level. In particular, the international conference will aim at strengthening linkages with efforts to implement the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘CRPD’) and planning processes to achieve the UN Sustainable Development Goals. The international conference will build upon the work of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention’s Committee on Victim Assistance and representatives of other relevant bodies such as the Victim Assistance Coordinators of the Cluster Munitions Convention (‘CCM’) and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on the Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (‘CCW’).2.2.3. Project results
— | National stakeholder dialogues will result in a detailed outcome document identifying challenges and gaps which will provide the selected States with recommendations and concrete steps it can take to address identified challenges in implementing their Maputo Action Plan victim assistance commitments.
— | The outcome document will support national policy development and facilitate the dialogue and cooperation with donors and implementing agencies.
— | Follow-up actions, in up to five States Parties, to support efforts to overcome the challenges and gaps identified during the national stakeholder dialogues will result in increased capacity of the States Parties to fulfil their Maputo Action Plan commitments for example the revision of national plans, the development of a project proposal or proposals.
— | National stakeholder dialogues will create awareness of the global effort and best practices to address the needs and guarantee the rights of survivors through broader frameworks.
— | The selected States will be better able to articulate the status of implementation of the Maputo Action Plan as well as to report on plans for its implementation.
— | National experts participating in the international conference will have a better understanding of the place of victim assistance in efforts to implement the CRPD and planning processing to achieve the UN Sustainable Development Goals.2.2.4. Beneficiaries
— | States Parties to the Convention which have reported responsibility for significant numbers of landmine survivors.
— | Women, girls, boys and men who have fallen victim to landmines and other explosive remnant of war, as well as their family and communities.
— | National experts working on issues relevant to victim assistance.2.3. Universalisation of the Convention2.3.1. Project objectiveIn order to advance towards universalisation of the Convention, the Decision will support the Presidency of the Convention and a High Level Task Force to engage non-party States at a high level. In this effort, barriers to adherence to the Convention are defined and addressed and updated information on ratification and accession status is acquired.
2.3.2. Project description
— | A High Level Task Force on the universalisation of the Convention will be supported by the ISU, including support from high-level personalities to engage with the leaders of up to five States not party at the ministerial or higher level regarding accession to the Convention and/or adherence to the Convention and its norms.
— | Updated first-hand knowledge on barriers to accession from States which are not parties to the Convention will be sought with a view to that information contributing to substantive documents prepared for the Fourth Review Conference in 2019, including through a comprehensive report regarding what progress has been made on universalising the Convention and its norms as well as the scope for further progress.
— | The study on border security initiated under Decision 2012/700/CFSP will be further developed, in collaboration with partners such as the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) or the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), into a tool for universalisation aimed towards States that still consider anti-personnel mines an indispensable tool for border security.2.3.3. Project results
— | Up to five non-party States will be engaged at the ministerial or a higher level regarding adherence to the Convention.
— | Updated knowledge of the anti-personnel mine policies of non-party States will be obtained. That information will be used in the preparation of a substantive document for the Fourth Review Conference, including through a comprehensive report on progress made towards achieving the aims of universalising the Convention, as well as scope for further progress.
— | Advocacy on the part of States Parties to the Convention and non-governmental organisations will be revitalised on the basis of follow-up actions resulting from High Level Task Force visits.
— | Increased knowledge will be amassed and compiled in a publication which will address the most frequently raised perceived barriers to accession to the Convention and which can be used to support universalisation efforts.
— | Progress will be made towards accession to the Convention and/or an embracing of its norms by non-party States that were engaged through this project.2.3.4. Beneficiaries
— | States, other than States Parties, which have not yet ratified, approved, accepted, or acceded to, the Convention.
— | States Parties to the Convention and non-governmental and international organisations involved in efforts to promote the universalisation of the Convention.2.4. Stockpile destruction: support for the implementation of the stockpile destruction actions of the Maputo Action Plan2.4.1. Project objectiveAssist States Parties that have signalled difficulties in meeting the Convention’s stockpile destruction obligations in order to overcome them.
2.4.2. Project descriptionThe ISU will engage with the aim of identifying the key challenges and identifying possible solutions to complete stockpile destruction efforts in States that have upcoming deadlines or have missed their stockpile destruction deadlines.
2.4.3. Project resultsAcquisition of increased knowledge on the status and challenges of completing stockpile destruction efforts.
2.4.4. BeneficiariesStates Parties to the Convention which are in the process of implementing their stockpile destruction obligations under the Convention.
2.5. Demonstrating the commitment of the European Union2.5.1. Project objectiveThe ongoing commitment of the Union and its Member States to the Convention and the implementation of the Maputo Action Plan are demonstrated, as well as their support to States Parties in the process of implementing key obligations under the Convention.
2.5.2. Project description
— | A launch event will be held to promote this Decision and Union support for Mine Action in general, and a wrap-up event will be organised to publicise the activities provided for in this Decision and their outcomes, thereby underlining the Union’s contribution.
— | Communication in relation to the activities of the Decision and the Union’s commitment to the implementation of the Convention will be highlighted throughout the implementation of this Decision on the Convention’s website, through social media platforms as well as through the national and international press.
— | Communication material, for example posters, advertising, video footage, publicity material, will be acquired and put at the disposal of involved stakeholders and partners.2.5.3. Project results
— | Officials of the Union and its Member States will be aware of this Decision and how it may relate to their work.
— | The Union’s commitment to the Convention and Mine Action in general will be put in the spotlight for States Parties to the Convention and the global audience interested in human security in general.
— | Awareness of the objectives of the Convention and the Maputo Action Plan will be strengthened.

Pending: 32017D1425

5.8.2017 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 204/90
(1) On 21 March 2011, the Council welcomed the European Union Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel region (the ‘EU Sahel Strategy’), underlining that the Union has a longstanding interest in reducing insecurity and improving development in the Sahel region.
(2) On 9 February 2015, the Council reiterated its commitment to supporting Mali's path towards development, peace, reconciliation and stability. Integral to this is that progress is made by the Government of Mali in terms of governance, democracy, rule of law, reform of the justice and security sectors and fight against impunity.
(3) In February 2017, the Government of Mali adopted the ‘Plan de Sécurisation Intégrée des Régions du Centre’ (‘PSIRC’) in order to counter the growing insecurity and to re-establish the presence of the civilian administration in the Centre region (Mopti and Segou) of Mali.
(4) On 26 June 2017, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) agreed on the Concept note for a stabilisation action in Mopti and Segou implemented by an EU stabilisation team, under the auspices of the Union Delegation in Mali.
(5) On 10 July 2017, Mali sent a letter to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), inviting the Union to support the re-establishment of the civilian administration in the Centre region of Mali through the deployment of a stabilisation team,
(a) advise the Malian authorities in Mopti and Segou on Malian national plans and policies including on governance-related issues, and support the planning by the Malian authorities of activities which aim at the return of the civil administration in the region, in close coordination with all Union actors and relevant Union programmes in Mali;
(b) advise the Malian authorities in Mopti and Segou on the implementation of the planned activities referred to in point (a), including by supporting an enhanced dialogue between the Malian authorities and the local populations, with special emphasis on the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000);
(c) facilitate the inter-ministerial coordination on governance-related issues concerning Mopti and Segou, as well as coordination between the relevant Malian ministries and the Mopti and Segou governorates.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 28(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 21 March 2011, the Council welcomed the European Union Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel region (the ‘EU Sahel Strategy’), underlining that the Union has a longstanding interest in reducing insecurity and improving development in the Sahel region.
(2) On 9 February 2015, the Council reiterated its commitment to supporting Mali’s path towards development, peace, reconciliation and stability. Integral to this is that progress is made by the Government of Mali in terms of governance, democracy, rule of law, reform of the justice and security sectors and fight against impunity.
(3) In February 2017, the Government of Mali adopted the ‘Plan de Sécurisation Intégrée des Régions du Centre’ (‘PSIRC’) in order to counter the growing insecurity and to re-establish the presence of the civilian administration in the Centre region (Mopti and Segou) of Mali.
(4) On 26 June 2017, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) agreed on the Concept note for a stabilisation action in Mopti and Segou implemented by an EU stabilisation team, under the auspices of the Union Delegation in Mali.
(5) On 10 July 2017, Mali sent a letter to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), inviting the Union to support the re-establishment of the civilian administration in the Centre region of Mali through the deployment of a stabilisation team,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

EU stabilisation action
Article 1
1. The Union shall undertake a stabilisation action in Mopti and Segou. The action shall be implemented by an EU stabilisation team, under the auspices of the Union Delegation in Mali, for an operating phase of 12 months.
2. The EU stabilisation team shall operate in accordance with the objectives set out in Article 2 and shall carry out the tasks set out in Article 3.
3. The HR shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.

Objectives
Article 2
The EU stabilisation team shall support Malian national plans and policies through its advice to the Malian authorities on the re-establishment and expansion of the civilian administration in the Centre region of Mali, in accordance with international standards, with the primary objective to consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and gender equality by strengthening general governance in this region.

Tasks
Article 3
In order to achieve the objectives of the EU stabilisation action, the EU stabilisation team shall:
(a)
advise the Malian authorities in Mopti and Segou on Malian national plans and policies including on governance-related issues, and support the planning by the Malian authorities of activities which aim at the return of the civil administration in the region, in close coordination with all Union actors and relevant Union programmes in Mali;
(b)
advise the Malian authorities in Mopti and Segou on the implementation of the planned activities referred to in point (a), including by supporting an enhanced dialogue between the Malian authorities and the local populations, with special emphasis on the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000);
(c)
facilitate the inter-ministerial coordination on governance-related issues concerning Mopti and Segou, as well as coordination between the relevant Malian ministries and the Mopti and Segou governorates.

Structure of the EU stabilisation team
Article 4
1. The EU stabilisation team shall complement the action of the Union Delegation in Mali and the CSDP missions deployed in Mali. The team shall operate in Bamako, Mopti and Segou.
2. The Head of the Union Delegation in Mali shall be the head of the EU stabilisation team.
3. The head of the EU stabilisation team shall be assisted by a deputy head of team for the day-to-day implementation of the EU stabilisation action.
4. The EEAS shall identify the point of contact for the EU stabilisation team at headquarters.
5. The Union Delegation in Mali shall provide the EU stabilisation team with logistical support in the region.

Head of the EU stabilisation team
Article 5
1. The head of the EU stabilisation team shall ensure the proper and effective implementation of the tasks of the team, including by issuing instructions to the deputy head of team.
2. The head of the EU stabilisation team shall have overall responsibility for ensuring that the Union’s duty of care is properly discharged.
3. The head of the EU stabilisation team shall be responsible for disciplinary control over the team. For seconded staff, disciplinary action shall be exercised by the seconding national authority in accordance with its national rules or by the seconding Union institution concerned or the EEAS.
4. The head of the EU stabilisation team shall have responsibility for ensuring that gender mainstreaming is an integral part of the EU stabilisation action and that this work is coordinated with the office of the EEAS principal advisor on gender.
5. The head of the EU stabilisation team shall facilitate the coordination of the activities of the team with those undertaken by the Member States and the Union CSDP Missions deployed in Mali.

Staff
Article 6
1. The EU stabilisation team, including its deputy head of team, shall primarily consist of staff seconded by Member States, Union institutions or EEAS. Staff may also be recruited by the head of the team, as required, on a contractual basis, in particular if the functions required are not provided by personnel seconded by the seconding authority.
2. Each seconding authority shall bear the costs related to any of the staff seconded by it to the EU stabilisation team, including travel expenses to and from the place of deployment, salaries, medical coverage, and allowances, other than applicable per diems, as well as hardship and risk allowances.
3. Each seconding authority having seconded a member of staff shall be responsible for answering any claims linked to the secondment, by or concerning the member of staff, and shall be responsible for bringing any action against the person seconded.
4. All staff shall carry out their duties and act in the interests of the EU stabilisation action. All staff shall respect the security principles and minimum standards established by Decision of the HR 2013/C 190/01(1).

Privileges and immunities
Article 7
The HR shall ensure that the staff of the EU stabilisation team benefit from the same privileges and immunities as those of the staff of the Union Delegation in Mali.

Political direction and monitoring by PSC
Article 8
The PSC shall provide the EU stabilisation action with political direction and shall monitor its implementation, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the HR.

Reporting
Article 9
1. The head of the EU stabilisation team shall provide written reports to the HR, PSC and other Council preparatory bodies every 4 months after the beginning of the operating phase. He or she shall also report to the PSC and other Council preparatory bodies upon request. The EEAS services shall report to the PSC and other Council preparatory bodies if needed.
2. The head of the EU stabilisation team shall present the Council, the HR and the Commission with a comprehensive mandate implementation report by the end of its mandate.

Financial arrangements
Article 10
1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the EU stabilisation team’s mandate shall be EUR 3 250 000.
2. All expenditure shall be managed in accordance with the rules and procedures applicable to the general budget of the Union. Participation of natural and legal persons in the award of procurement contracts by the head of the EU stabilisation team shall be open without limitations. Moreover, no rule of origin for the goods purchased for the stabilisation team shall apply.
3. The head of the EU stabilisation team shall be responsible for the implementation of the budget. The management of the expenditure shall be subject to a contract between the head of the EU stabilisation team and the Commission.

Security
Article 11
1. The Union Delegation in Mali shall be responsible for the security of the team members and for ensuring compliance with minimum security requirements which are applicable to the staff of the Delegation.
2. The head of the EU stabilisation team shall comply with the guidance provided by the Regional Security Officer in Mali for the planning of security measures as well as their proper and effective implementation by the team.
3. The staff of the EU stabilisation team shall undergo mandatory security training before taking up their duties. They shall also receive regular in-theatre refresher training sessions organised by the Regional Security Officer in Mali.

Release of information
Article 12
1. The EU stabilisation team shall comply with the security principles and minimum standards established by Decision 2013/C 190/01.
2. The HR shall be authorised to release to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (‘MINUSMA’) as appropriate and in accordance with the operational needs of the EU stabilisation action, EU classified information and documents up to the level ‘RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED’ which are generated for the purposes of the action, in accordance with the security rules for protecting EU classified information in Decision 2013/C 190/01. Local arrangements may be drawn up for this purpose.
3. The HR may delegate the authorisations to release information as well as the ability to conclude the arrangements referred to in this Article to the head of the EU stabilisation team.

Coordination
Article 13
1. The HR shall ensure the consistency of the implementation of this Decision with the Union’s external action as a whole, including the Union’s developments programmes, the European Union Special Representative for the Sahel (EUSR Sahel), as well as the European Union CSDP mission in Mali (‘EUCAP Sahel Mali’) and the EU Training Mission in Mali (‘EUTM Mali’).
2. The EU stabilisation team shall provide regular briefings to Member States’ missions in Mali.
3. The EU stabilisation team shall cooperate with all relevant international actors, as appropriate, including MINUSMA.

Review
Article 14
The EEAS shall conduct an after action review, also based on the comprehensive mandate implementation report referred to in Article 9(2), to be presented to the PSC.

Entry into force and duration
Article 15
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption and shall expire on 31 October 2018.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 28(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 21 March 2011, the Council welcomed the European Union Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel region (the ‘EU Sahel Strategy’), underlining that the Union has a longstanding interest in reducing insecurity and improving development in the Sahel region.
(2) On 9 February 2015, the Council reiterated its commitment to supporting Mali’s path towards development, peace, reconciliation and stability. Integral to this is that progress is made by the Government of Mali in terms of governance, democracy, rule of law, reform of the justice and security sectors and fight against impunity.
(3) In February 2017, the Government of Mali adopted the ‘Plan de Sécurisation Intégrée des Régions du Centre’ (‘PSIRC’) in order to counter the growing insecurity and to re-establish the presence of the civilian administration in the Centre region (Mopti and Segou) of Mali.
(4) On 26 June 2017, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) agreed on the Concept note for a stabilisation action in Mopti and Segou implemented by an EU stabilisation team, under the auspices of the Union Delegation in Mali.
(5) On 10 July 2017, Mali sent a letter to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), inviting the Union to support the re-establishment of the civilian administration in the Centre region of Mali through the deployment of a stabilisation team,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

EU stabilisation action

1. The Union shall undertake a stabilisation action in Mopti and Segou. The action shall be implemented by an EU stabilisation team, under the auspices of the Union Delegation in Mali, for an operating phase of 12 months.
2. The EU stabilisation team shall operate in accordance with the objectives set out in Article 2 and shall carry out the tasks set out in Article 3.
3. The HR shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.

Objectives

The EU stabilisation team shall support Malian national plans and policies through its advice to the Malian authorities on the re-establishment and expansion of the civilian administration in the Centre region of Mali, in accordance with international standards, with the primary objective to consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and gender equality by strengthening general governance in this region.

Tasks

In order to achieve the objectives of the EU stabilisation action, the EU stabilisation team shall:
(a)
advise the Malian authorities in Mopti and Segou on Malian national plans and policies including on governance-related issues, and support the planning by the Malian authorities of activities which aim at the return of the civil administration in the region, in close coordination with all Union actors and relevant Union programmes in Mali;
(b)
advise the Malian authorities in Mopti and Segou on the implementation of the planned activities referred to in point (a), including by supporting an enhanced dialogue between the Malian authorities and the local populations, with special emphasis on the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000);
(c)
facilitate the inter-ministerial coordination on governance-related issues concerning Mopti and Segou, as well as coordination between the relevant Malian ministries and the Mopti and Segou governorates.

Structure of the EU stabilisation team

1. The EU stabilisation team shall complement the action of the Union Delegation in Mali and the CSDP missions deployed in Mali. The team shall operate in Bamako, Mopti and Segou.
2. The Head of the Union Delegation in Mali shall be the head of the EU stabilisation team.
3. The head of the EU stabilisation team shall be assisted by a deputy head of team for the day-to-day implementation of the EU stabilisation action.
4. The EEAS shall identify the point of contact for the EU stabilisation team at headquarters.
5. The Union Delegation in Mali shall provide the EU stabilisation team with logistical support in the region.

Head of the EU stabilisation team

1. The head of the EU stabilisation team shall ensure the proper and effective implementation of the tasks of the team, including by issuing instructions to the deputy head of team.
2. The head of the EU stabilisation team shall have overall responsibility for ensuring that the Union’s duty of care is properly discharged.
3. The head of the EU stabilisation team shall be responsible for disciplinary control over the team. For seconded staff, disciplinary action shall be exercised by the seconding national authority in accordance with its national rules or by the seconding Union institution concerned or the EEAS.
4. The head of the EU stabilisation team shall have responsibility for ensuring that gender mainstreaming is an integral part of the EU stabilisation action and that this work is coordinated with the office of the EEAS principal advisor on gender.
5. The head of the EU stabilisation team shall facilitate the coordination of the activities of the team with those undertaken by the Member States and the Union CSDP Missions deployed in Mali.

Staff

1. The EU stabilisation team, including its deputy head of team, shall primarily consist of staff seconded by Member States, Union institutions or EEAS. Staff may also be recruited by the head of the team, as required, on a contractual basis, in particular if the functions required are not provided by personnel seconded by the seconding authority.
2. Each seconding authority shall bear the costs related to any of the staff seconded by it to the EU stabilisation team, including travel expenses to and from the place of deployment, salaries, medical coverage, and allowances, other than applicable per diems, as well as hardship and risk allowances.
3. Each seconding authority having seconded a member of staff shall be responsible for answering any claims linked to the secondment, by or concerning the member of staff, and shall be responsible for bringing any action against the person seconded.
4. All staff shall carry out their duties and act in the interests of the EU stabilisation action. All staff shall respect the security principles and minimum standards established by Decision of the HR 2013/C 190/01(1).

Privileges and immunities

The HR shall ensure that the staff of the EU stabilisation team benefit from the same privileges and immunities as those of the staff of the Union Delegation in Mali.

Political direction and monitoring by PSC

The PSC shall provide the EU stabilisation action with political direction and shall monitor its implementation, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the HR.

Reporting

1. The head of the EU stabilisation team shall provide written reports to the HR, PSC and other Council preparatory bodies every 4 months after the beginning of the operating phase. He or she shall also report to the PSC and other Council preparatory bodies upon request. The EEAS services shall report to the PSC and other Council preparatory bodies if needed.
2. The head of the EU stabilisation team shall present the Council, the HR and the Commission with a comprehensive mandate implementation report by the end of its mandate.

Financial arrangements

1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the EU stabilisation team’s mandate shall be EUR 3 250 000.
2. All expenditure shall be managed in accordance with the rules and procedures applicable to the general budget of the Union. Participation of natural and legal persons in the award of procurement contracts by the head of the EU stabilisation team shall be open without limitations. Moreover, no rule of origin for the goods purchased for the stabilisation team shall apply.
3. The head of the EU stabilisation team shall be responsible for the implementation of the budget. The management of the expenditure shall be subject to a contract between the head of the EU stabilisation team and the Commission.

Security

1. The Union Delegation in Mali shall be responsible for the security of the team members and for ensuring compliance with minimum security requirements which are applicable to the staff of the Delegation.
2. The head of the EU stabilisation team shall comply with the guidance provided by the Regional Security Officer in Mali for the planning of security measures as well as their proper and effective implementation by the team.
3. The staff of the EU stabilisation team shall undergo mandatory security training before taking up their duties. They shall also receive regular in-theatre refresher training sessions organised by the Regional Security Officer in Mali.

Release of information

1. The EU stabilisation team shall comply with the security principles and minimum standards established by Decision 2013/C 190/01.
2. The HR shall be authorised to release to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (‘MINUSMA’) as appropriate and in accordance with the operational needs of the EU stabilisation action, EU classified information and documents up to the level ‘RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED’ which are generated for the purposes of the action, in accordance with the security rules for protecting EU classified information in Decision 2013/C 190/01. Local arrangements may be drawn up for this purpose.
3. The HR may delegate the authorisations to release information as well as the ability to conclude the arrangements referred to in this Article to the head of the EU stabilisation team.

Coordination

1. The HR shall ensure the consistency of the implementation of this Decision with the Union’s external action as a whole, including the Union’s developments programmes, the European Union Special Representative for the Sahel (EUSR Sahel), as well as the European Union CSDP mission in Mali (‘EUCAP Sahel Mali’) and the EU Training Mission in Mali (‘EUTM Mali’).
2. The EU stabilisation team shall provide regular briefings to Member States’ missions in Mali.
3. The EU stabilisation team shall cooperate with all relevant international actors, as appropriate, including MINUSMA.

Review

The EEAS shall conduct an after action review, also based on the comprehensive mandate implementation report referred to in Article 9(2), to be presented to the PSC.

Entry into force and duration

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption and shall expire on 31 October 2018.