Pending: 32018D0904

26.6.2018 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 161/12
(1) On 15 April 2015, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2015/598(1)appointing Mr Peter BURIAN as the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for Central Asia. The EUSR's mandate is to expire on 30 June 2018.
(2) The EUSR's mandate should be extended for a further period of 20 months.
(3) The EUSR will implement the mandate in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union's external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty,
(a) promoting good and close relations between the Union and the countries of Central Asia on the basis of common values and interests as set out in relevant agreements;
(b) contributing to strengthening the stability and cooperation between the countries in the region;
(c) contributing to strengthening democracy, the rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Central Asia;
(d) addressing key threats, especially specific problems with direct implications for the Union;
(e) enhancing the Union's effectiveness and visibility in the region, including through closer coordination with other relevant partners and international organisations, such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN.
(a) promote overall Union political coordination in Central Asia and help to ensure consistency of the external actions of the Union in the region;
(b) monitor, on behalf of the HR, together with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission, the implementation process of the Union Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia, complemented by relevant Council conclusions and subsequent progress reports on the implementation of the Union Strategy for Central Asia, make recommendations and report to relevant Council bodies on a regular basis;
(c) assist the Council in further developing a comprehensive policy towards Central Asia;
(d) follow closely political developments in Central Asia by developing and maintaining close contacts with governments, parliaments, the judiciary, civil society and mass media;
(e) encourage Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to cooperate on regional issues of common interest;
(f) develop appropriate contacts and cooperation with the main interested actors in the region, and all relevant regional and international organisations;
(g) contribute to the implementation of the Union's human rights policy in the region in cooperation with the EUSR for Human Rights, including the Union Guidelines on human rights, in particular the Union Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict as well as on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them, and Union policy regarding UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security, including by monitoring and reporting on developments as well as formulating recommendations in this regard;
(h) contribute, in close cooperation with the UN and the OSCE, to conflict prevention and resolution by developing contacts with the authorities and other local actors such as non-governmental organisations, political parties, minorities, religious groups and their leaders;
(i) provide input to the formulation of energy security, border security, countering serious crime, including narcotics and trafficking in human beings, as well as water resource management, environment and climate change aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy with respect to Central Asia;
(j) promote regional security within Central Asian borders in the context of the reduction of the international presence in Afghanistan.
(a) establishing a specific security plan based on guidance from the EEAS, including specific physical, organisational and procedural security measures, governing the management of the secure movement of personnel to, and within, the area of responsibility, as well as management of security incidents and providing for a contingency and evacuation plan;
(b) ensuring that all personnel deployed outside the Union are covered by high-risk insurance, as required by the conditions in the area of responsibility;
(c) ensuring that all members of the EUSR's team to be deployed outside the Union, including locally contracted personnel, have received appropriate security training before or upon arriving in the area of responsibility, based on the risk ratings assigned to that area by the EEAS;
(d) ensuring that all agreed recommendations made following regular security assessments are implemented and providing the Council, the HR and the Commission with written reports on their implementation and on other security issues within the framework of the progress report and the report on the implementation of the mandate.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 33 and Article 31(2) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 15 April 2015, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2015/598(1)appointing Mr Peter BURIAN as the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for Central Asia. The EUSR’s mandate is to expire on 30 June 2018.
(2) The EUSR’s mandate should be extended for a further period of 20 months.
(3) The EUSR will implement the mandate in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union’s external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

European Union Special Representative
Article 1
The mandate of Mr Peter BURIAN as the EUSR for Central Asia is extended until 29 February 2020. The Council may decide that the mandate of the EUSR be terminated earlier, based on an assessment by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR).

Policy objectives
Article 2
The EUSR’s mandate shall be based on the policy objectives of the Union in Central Asia. Those objectives include:
(a)
promoting good and close relations between the Union and the countries of Central Asia on the basis of common values and interests as set out in relevant agreements;
(b)
contributing to strengthening the stability and cooperation between the countries in the region;
(c)
contributing to strengthening democracy, the rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Central Asia;
(d)
addressing key threats, especially specific problems with direct implications for the Union;
(e)
enhancing the Union’s effectiveness and visibility in the region, including through closer coordination with other relevant partners and international organisations, such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN.

Mandate
Article 3
1. In order to achieve the policy objectives, the EUSR’s mandate shall be to:
(a)
promote overall Union political coordination in Central Asia and help to ensure consistency of the external actions of the Union in the region;
(b)
monitor, on behalf of the HR, together with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission, the implementation process of the Union Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia, complemented by relevant Council conclusions and subsequent progress reports on the implementation of the Union Strategy for Central Asia, make recommendations and report to relevant Council bodies on a regular basis;
(c)
assist the Council in further developing a comprehensive policy towards Central Asia;
(d)
follow closely political developments in Central Asia by developing and maintaining close contacts with governments, parliaments, the judiciary, civil society and mass media;
(e)
encourage Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to cooperate on regional issues of common interest;
(f)
develop appropriate contacts and cooperation with the main interested actors in the region, and all relevant regional and international organisations;
(g)
contribute to the implementation of the Union’s human rights policy in the region in cooperation with the EUSR for Human Rights, including the Union Guidelines on human rights, in particular the Union Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict as well as on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them, and Union policy regarding UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security, including by monitoring and reporting on developments as well as formulating recommendations in this regard;
(h)
contribute, in close cooperation with the UN and the OSCE, to conflict prevention and resolution by developing contacts with the authorities and other local actors such as non-governmental organisations, political parties, minorities, religious groups and their leaders;
(i)
provide input to the formulation of energy security, border security, countering serious crime, including narcotics and trafficking in human beings, as well as water resource management, environment and climate change aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy with respect to Central Asia;
(j)
promote regional security within Central Asian borders in the context of the reduction of the international presence in Afghanistan.
2. The EUSR shall support the work of the HR and maintain an overview of all activities of the Union in the region.

Implementation of the mandate
Article 4
1. The EUSR shall be responsible for the implementation of the mandate, acting under the authority of the HR.
2. The PSC shall maintain a privileged link with the EUSR and shall be the EUSR’s primary point of contact with the Council. The PSC shall provide the EUSR with strategic guidance and political direction within the framework of the mandate, without prejudice to the powers of the HR.
3. The EUSR shall work in close coordination with the EEAS and its relevant departments.

Financing
Article 5
1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the EUSR’s mandate for the period from 1 July 2018 to 29 February 2020 shall be EUR 1 660 000.
2. The expenditure shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.
3. The management of the expenditure shall be subject to a contract between the EUSR and the Commission. The EUSR shall be accountable to the Commission for all expenditure.

Constitution and composition of the team
Article 6
1. Within the limits of the EUSR’s mandate and the corresponding financial means made available, the EUSR shall be responsible for constituting a team. The team shall include the expertise on specific policy issues as required by the mandate. The EUSR shall keep the Council and the Commission promptly informed of the composition of the team.
2. Member States, institutions of the Union and the EEAS may propose the secondment of staff to the EUSR. The salary of such seconded personnel shall be covered by the Member State concerned, the institution of the Union concerned or the EEAS, respectively. Experts seconded by Member States to the institutions of the Union or the EEAS may also be posted to work with the EUSR. International contracted staff shall have the nationality of a Member State.
3. All seconded personnel shall remain under the administrative authority of the sending Member State, the sending institution of the Union or the EEAS, and shall carry out their duties and act in the interest of the EUSR’s mandate.
4. The EUSR staff shall be co-located with the relevant EEAS departments or Union delegations in order to ensure coherence and consistency of their respective activities.

Privileges and immunities of the EUSR and the EUSR’s staff
Article 7
The privileges, immunities and further guarantees necessary for the completion and smooth functioning of the EUSR’s mission and the members of the EUSR’s staff shall be agreed with the host countries, as appropriate. Member States and the EEAS shall grant all necessary support to such effect.

Security of EU classified information
Article 8
The EUSR and the members of the EUSR’s team shall respect the security principles and minimum standards established by Council Decision 2013/488/EU(2).

Access to information and logistical support
Article 9
1. Member States, the Commission, the EEAS and the General Secretariat of the Council shall ensure that the EUSR is given access to any relevant information.
2. The Union delegations in the region and/or the Member States, as appropriate, shall provide logistical support in the region.

Security
Article 10
In accordance with the Union’s policy on the security of personnel deployed outside the Union in an operational capacity under Title V of the Treaty, the EUSR shall take all reasonably practicable measures, in accordance with the EUSR’s mandate and the security situation in the area of responsibility, for the security of all personnel under the EUSR’s direct authority, in particular by:
(a)
establishing a specific security plan based on guidance from the EEAS, including specific physical, organisational and procedural security measures, governing the management of the secure movement of personnel to, and within, the area of responsibility, as well as management of security incidents and providing for a contingency and evacuation plan;
(b)
ensuring that all personnel deployed outside the Union are covered by high-risk insurance, as required by the conditions in the area of responsibility;
(c)
ensuring that all members of the EUSR’s team to be deployed outside the Union, including locally contracted personnel, have received appropriate security training before or upon arriving in the area of responsibility, based on the risk ratings assigned to that area by the EEAS;
(d)
ensuring that all agreed recommendations made following regular security assessments are implemented and providing the Council, the HR and the Commission with written reports on their implementation and on other security issues within the framework of the progress report and the report on the implementation of the mandate.

Reporting
Article 11
The EUSR shall regularly provide the HR and the PSC with oral and written reports. The EUSR shall also report to Council working parties, as necessary. Regular reports shall be circulated through the COREU network. The EUSR may provide the Foreign Affairs Council with reports. In accordance with Article 36 of the Treaty, the EUSR may be involved in briefing the European Parliament.

Coordination
Article 12
1. The EUSR shall contribute to the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the Union’s action and shall help ensure that all Union instruments and Member States’ actions are engaged consistently, to attain the Union’s policy objectives. Liaison with Member States shall be sought where appropriate. The activities of the EUSR shall be coordinated with the relevant geographic department of the EEAS, as well as with the Commission. The EUSR shall provide regular briefings to Member States’ missions and Union delegations.
2. In the field, close liaison shall be maintained with the relevant Heads of Member States’ Missions and Heads of Union delegations. They shall make every effort to assist the EUSR in the implementation of the mandate. The EUSR shall also liaise with other international and regional actors in the field.

Assistance in relation to claims
Article 13
The EUSR and the EUSR’s staff shall assist in providing elements to respond to any claims and obligations arising from the mandates of the previous EUSRs for Central Asia, and shall provide administrative assistance and access to relevant files for such purposes.

Review
Article 14
The implementation of this Decision and its consistency with other contributions from the Union to the region shall be kept under regular review. The EUSR shall present the Council, the HR and the Commission with a progress report by 31 October 2018 and a comprehensive mandate implementation report by 30 November 2019.

Entry into force
Article 15
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 33 and Article 31(2) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 15 April 2015, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2015/598(1)appointing Mr Peter BURIAN as the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for Central Asia. The EUSR’s mandate is to expire on 30 June 2018.
(2) The EUSR’s mandate should be extended for a further period of 20 months.
(3) The EUSR will implement the mandate in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union’s external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

European Union Special Representative

The mandate of Mr Peter BURIAN as the EUSR for Central Asia is extended until 29 February 2020. The Council may decide that the mandate of the EUSR be terminated earlier, based on an assessment by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR).

Policy objectives

The EUSR’s mandate shall be based on the policy objectives of the Union in Central Asia. Those objectives include:
(a)
promoting good and close relations between the Union and the countries of Central Asia on the basis of common values and interests as set out in relevant agreements;
(b)
contributing to strengthening the stability and cooperation between the countries in the region;
(c)
contributing to strengthening democracy, the rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Central Asia;
(d)
addressing key threats, especially specific problems with direct implications for the Union;
(e)
enhancing the Union’s effectiveness and visibility in the region, including through closer coordination with other relevant partners and international organisations, such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN.

Mandate

1. In order to achieve the policy objectives, the EUSR’s mandate shall be to:
(a)
promote overall Union political coordination in Central Asia and help to ensure consistency of the external actions of the Union in the region;
(b)
monitor, on behalf of the HR, together with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission, the implementation process of the Union Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia, complemented by relevant Council conclusions and subsequent progress reports on the implementation of the Union Strategy for Central Asia, make recommendations and report to relevant Council bodies on a regular basis;
(c)
assist the Council in further developing a comprehensive policy towards Central Asia;
(d)
follow closely political developments in Central Asia by developing and maintaining close contacts with governments, parliaments, the judiciary, civil society and mass media;
(e)
encourage Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to cooperate on regional issues of common interest;
(f)
develop appropriate contacts and cooperation with the main interested actors in the region, and all relevant regional and international organisations;
(g)
contribute to the implementation of the Union’s human rights policy in the region in cooperation with the EUSR for Human Rights, including the Union Guidelines on human rights, in particular the Union Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict as well as on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them, and Union policy regarding UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security, including by monitoring and reporting on developments as well as formulating recommendations in this regard;
(h)
contribute, in close cooperation with the UN and the OSCE, to conflict prevention and resolution by developing contacts with the authorities and other local actors such as non-governmental organisations, political parties, minorities, religious groups and their leaders;
(i)
provide input to the formulation of energy security, border security, countering serious crime, including narcotics and trafficking in human beings, as well as water resource management, environment and climate change aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy with respect to Central Asia;
(j)
promote regional security within Central Asian borders in the context of the reduction of the international presence in Afghanistan.
2. The EUSR shall support the work of the HR and maintain an overview of all activities of the Union in the region.

Implementation of the mandate

1. The EUSR shall be responsible for the implementation of the mandate, acting under the authority of the HR.
2. The PSC shall maintain a privileged link with the EUSR and shall be the EUSR’s primary point of contact with the Council. The PSC shall provide the EUSR with strategic guidance and political direction within the framework of the mandate, without prejudice to the powers of the HR.
3. The EUSR shall work in close coordination with the EEAS and its relevant departments.

Financing

1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the EUSR’s mandate for the period from 1 July 2018 to 29 February 2020 shall be EUR 1 660 000.
2. The expenditure shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.
3. The management of the expenditure shall be subject to a contract between the EUSR and the Commission. The EUSR shall be accountable to the Commission for all expenditure.

Constitution and composition of the team

1. Within the limits of the EUSR’s mandate and the corresponding financial means made available, the EUSR shall be responsible for constituting a team. The team shall include the expertise on specific policy issues as required by the mandate. The EUSR shall keep the Council and the Commission promptly informed of the composition of the team.
2. Member States, institutions of the Union and the EEAS may propose the secondment of staff to the EUSR. The salary of such seconded personnel shall be covered by the Member State concerned, the institution of the Union concerned or the EEAS, respectively. Experts seconded by Member States to the institutions of the Union or the EEAS may also be posted to work with the EUSR. International contracted staff shall have the nationality of a Member State.
3. All seconded personnel shall remain under the administrative authority of the sending Member State, the sending institution of the Union or the EEAS, and shall carry out their duties and act in the interest of the EUSR’s mandate.
4. The EUSR staff shall be co-located with the relevant EEAS departments or Union delegations in order to ensure coherence and consistency of their respective activities.

Privileges and immunities of the EUSR and the EUSR's staff

The privileges, immunities and further guarantees necessary for the completion and smooth functioning of the EUSR’s mission and the members of the EUSR’s staff shall be agreed with the host countries, as appropriate. Member States and the EEAS shall grant all necessary support to such effect.

Security of EU classified information

The EUSR and the members of the EUSR’s team shall respect the security principles and minimum standards established by Council Decision 2013/488/EU(2).

Access to information and logistical support

1. Member States, the Commission, the EEAS and the General Secretariat of the Council shall ensure that the EUSR is given access to any relevant information.
2. The Union delegations in the region and/or the Member States, as appropriate, shall provide logistical support in the region.

Security

In accordance with the Union’s policy on the security of personnel deployed outside the Union in an operational capacity under Title V of the Treaty, the EUSR shall take all reasonably practicable measures, in accordance with the EUSR’s mandate and the security situation in the area of responsibility, for the security of all personnel under the EUSR’s direct authority, in particular by:
(a)
establishing a specific security plan based on guidance from the EEAS, including specific physical, organisational and procedural security measures, governing the management of the secure movement of personnel to, and within, the area of responsibility, as well as management of security incidents and providing for a contingency and evacuation plan;
(b)
ensuring that all personnel deployed outside the Union are covered by high-risk insurance, as required by the conditions in the area of responsibility;
(c)
ensuring that all members of the EUSR’s team to be deployed outside the Union, including locally contracted personnel, have received appropriate security training before or upon arriving in the area of responsibility, based on the risk ratings assigned to that area by the EEAS;
(d)
ensuring that all agreed recommendations made following regular security assessments are implemented and providing the Council, the HR and the Commission with written reports on their implementation and on other security issues within the framework of the progress report and the report on the implementation of the mandate.

Reporting

The EUSR shall regularly provide the HR and the PSC with oral and written reports. The EUSR shall also report to Council working parties, as necessary. Regular reports shall be circulated through the COREU network. The EUSR may provide the Foreign Affairs Council with reports. In accordance with Article 36 of the Treaty, the EUSR may be involved in briefing the European Parliament.

Coordination

1. The EUSR shall contribute to the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the Union’s action and shall help ensure that all Union instruments and Member States’ actions are engaged consistently, to attain the Union’s policy objectives. Liaison with Member States shall be sought where appropriate. The activities of the EUSR shall be coordinated with the relevant geographic department of the EEAS, as well as with the Commission. The EUSR shall provide regular briefings to Member States’ missions and Union delegations.
2. In the field, close liaison shall be maintained with the relevant Heads of Member States’ Missions and Heads of Union delegations. They shall make every effort to assist the EUSR in the implementation of the mandate. The EUSR shall also liaise with other international and regional actors in the field.

Assistance in relation to claims

The EUSR and the EUSR’s staff shall assist in providing elements to respond to any claims and obligations arising from the mandates of the previous EUSRs for Central Asia, and shall provide administrative assistance and access to relevant files for such purposes.

Review

The implementation of this Decision and its consistency with other contributions from the Union to the region shall be kept under regular review. The EUSR shall present the Council, the HR and the Commission with a progress report by 31 October 2018 and a comprehensive mandate implementation report by 30 November 2019.

Entry into force

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Pending: 32018D0279

24.2.2018 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 54/14
(1) Under point 13 of Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC, Malta may exempt three categories of taxable persons from value added tax (VAT): those whose annual turnover is no higher than EUR 37 000, if the economic activity consists principally in the supply of goods; EUR 24 300 if the economic activity consists principally in the supply of services with a low value added (high inputs); and EUR 14 600 in other cases, namely supplies of services with a high value added (low inputs).
(2) By letter registered with the Commission on 22 September 2017, Malta requested authorisation to apply a special measure derogating from Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC (‘the special measure’), allowing Malta to increase the level of the lowest threshold from EUR 14 600 to EUR 20 000 for the supplies of services with a high value added (low inputs) as of 1 January 2018.
(3) In accordance with Article 395(2) of Directive 2006/112/EC, the Commission informed the other Member States by letter dated 3 November 2017 of the request made by Malta. The Commission notified Malta by letter dated 7 November 2017 that it had all the information necessary to consider the request.
(4) The requested special measure is in line with the objectives of Commission Communication of 25 June 2008 entitled ‘“Think Small First” — A “Small Business Act” for Europe’.
(5) Given that the special measure should result in reduced VAT obligations and thus a reduction in the administrative burden and costs for small enterprises, Malta should be authorised to apply the measure for a limited period, until 31 December 2020. Taxable persons should still be able to opt for the normal VAT arrangements.
(6) Based on information provided by Malta, the special measure will have a negligible impact on the overall amount of tax revenue collected at the stage of final consumption.
(7) In order to ensure that the objectives pursued by the special measure are achieved, in particular those that reduce disruptive effects and ensure a level playing field, it is appropriate that this Decision apply from 1 January 2018. By providing for a retroactive application of the special measure, legitimate expectations of the persons concerned are respected, as the special measure does not encroach on the rights and obligations of economic operators or individuals.
(8) As Articles 281 to 294 of Directive 2006/112/EC governing the special scheme for small enterprises are currently subject to review, it is possible that a directive amending those provisions of Directive 2006/112/EC will enter into force before the period of validity of the special measure expires on 31 December 2020, in which case this Decision will cease to apply.
(9) The special measure has no impact on the Union's own resources accruing from VAT because Malta will carry out a compensation calculation in accordance with Article 6 of Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 1553/89(2),
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax(1), and in particular Article 395 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
(1) Under point 13 of Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC, Malta may exempt three categories of taxable persons from value added tax (VAT): those whose annual turnover is no higher than EUR 37 000, if the economic activity consists principally in the supply of goods; EUR 24 300 if the economic activity consists principally in the supply of services with a low value added (high inputs); and EUR 14 600 in other cases, namely supplies of services with a high value added (low inputs).
(2) By letter registered with the Commission on 22 September 2017, Malta requested authorisation to apply a special measure derogating from Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC (‘the special measure’), allowing Malta to increase the level of the lowest threshold from EUR 14 600 to EUR 20 000 for the supplies of services with a high value added (low inputs) as of 1 January 2018.
(3) In accordance with Article 395(2) of Directive 2006/112/EC, the Commission informed the other Member States by letter dated 3 November 2017 of the request made by Malta. The Commission notified Malta by letter dated 7 November 2017 that it had all the information necessary to consider the request.
(4) The requested special measure is in line with the objectives of Commission Communication of 25 June 2008 entitled ‘“Think Small First” — A “Small Business Act” for Europe’.
(5) Given that the special measure should result in reduced VAT obligations and thus a reduction in the administrative burden and costs for small enterprises, Malta should be authorised to apply the measure for a limited period, until 31 December 2020. Taxable persons should still be able to opt for the normal VAT arrangements.
(6) Based on information provided by Malta, the special measure will have a negligible impact on the overall amount of tax revenue collected at the stage of final consumption.
(7) In order to ensure that the objectives pursued by the special measure are achieved, in particular those that reduce disruptive effects and ensure a level playing field, it is appropriate that this Decision apply from 1 January 2018. By providing for a retroactive application of the special measure, legitimate expectations of the persons concerned are respected, as the special measure does not encroach on the rights and obligations of economic operators or individuals.
(8) As Articles 281 to 294 of Directive 2006/112/EC governing the special scheme for small enterprises are currently subject to review, it is possible that a directive amending those provisions of Directive 2006/112/EC will enter into force before the period of validity of the special measure expires on 31 December 2020, in which case this Decision will cease to apply.
(9) The special measure has no impact on the Union’s own resources accruing from VAT because Malta will carry out a compensation calculation in accordance with Article 6 of Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 1553/89(2),
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
By way of derogation from point 13 of Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC, Malta is authorised to exempt from VAT taxable persons whose economic activity consists principally in supplies of services with a high value added (low inputs) and whose annual turnover is no higher than EUR 20 000.

Article 2
This Decision shall take effect on the day of its notification.
It shall apply from 1 January 2018 until 31 December 2020, or until the entry into force of a directive amending Articles 281 to 294 of Directive 2006/112/EC, whichever date is earlier.

Article 3
This Decision is addressed to Malta.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax(1), and in particular Article 395 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
(1) Under point 13 of Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC, Malta may exempt three categories of taxable persons from value added tax (VAT): those whose annual turnover is no higher than EUR 37 000, if the economic activity consists principally in the supply of goods; EUR 24 300 if the economic activity consists principally in the supply of services with a low value added (high inputs); and EUR 14 600 in other cases, namely supplies of services with a high value added (low inputs).
(2) By letter registered with the Commission on 22 September 2017, Malta requested authorisation to apply a special measure derogating from Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC (‘the special measure’), allowing Malta to increase the level of the lowest threshold from EUR 14 600 to EUR 20 000 for the supplies of services with a high value added (low inputs) as of 1 January 2018.
(3) In accordance with Article 395(2) of Directive 2006/112/EC, the Commission informed the other Member States by letter dated 3 November 2017 of the request made by Malta. The Commission notified Malta by letter dated 7 November 2017 that it had all the information necessary to consider the request.
(4) The requested special measure is in line with the objectives of Commission Communication of 25 June 2008 entitled ‘“Think Small First” — A “Small Business Act” for Europe’.
(5) Given that the special measure should result in reduced VAT obligations and thus a reduction in the administrative burden and costs for small enterprises, Malta should be authorised to apply the measure for a limited period, until 31 December 2020. Taxable persons should still be able to opt for the normal VAT arrangements.
(6) Based on information provided by Malta, the special measure will have a negligible impact on the overall amount of tax revenue collected at the stage of final consumption.
(7) In order to ensure that the objectives pursued by the special measure are achieved, in particular those that reduce disruptive effects and ensure a level playing field, it is appropriate that this Decision apply from 1 January 2018. By providing for a retroactive application of the special measure, legitimate expectations of the persons concerned are respected, as the special measure does not encroach on the rights and obligations of economic operators or individuals.
(8) As Articles 281 to 294 of Directive 2006/112/EC governing the special scheme for small enterprises are currently subject to review, it is possible that a directive amending those provisions of Directive 2006/112/EC will enter into force before the period of validity of the special measure expires on 31 December 2020, in which case this Decision will cease to apply.
(9) The special measure has no impact on the Union’s own resources accruing from VAT because Malta will carry out a compensation calculation in accordance with Article 6 of Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 1553/89(2),
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
By way of derogation from point 13 of Article 287 of Directive 2006/112/EC, Malta is authorised to exempt from VAT taxable persons whose economic activity consists principally in supplies of services with a high value added (low inputs) and whose annual turnover is no higher than EUR 20 000.
This Decision shall take effect on the day of its notification.
It shall apply from 1 January 2018 until 31 December 2020, or until the entry into force of a directive amending Articles 281 to 294 of Directive 2006/112/EC, whichever date is earlier.
This Decision is addressed to Malta.

Pending: 32017D2370

19.12.2017 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 337/28
(1) On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (‘the Strategy’), Chapter III of which contains a list of measures that need to be taken both within the Union and in third countries to combat such proliferation.
(2) The Union is actively implementing the Strategy and giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, in particular by releasing financial resources to support specific projects aimed at enhancing the multilateral non-proliferation system and multilateral confidence-building measures. The Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation (the ‘Code’) is an integral part of that multilateral non-proliferation system.
(3) On 17 November 2003, the Council adopted Common Position 2003/805/CFSP(1). That Common Position calls on the Union to, inter alia, convince as many countries as possible to subscribe to the Code, especially those with ballistic missile capabilities, as well as for the further development and implementation of the Code, especially its confidence-building measures, and for the promotion of a closer relationship between the Code and the United Nations (UN) multilateral non-proliferation system.
(4) On 8 December 2008, the Council adopted its conclusions and a document entitled ‘New lines for action by the European Union in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems’. The document states, inter alia, that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems continue to constitute one of the greatest security challenges and that non-proliferation policy constitutes an essential part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
(5) On 18 December 2008, the Council adopted Decision 2008/974/CFSP(2)in support of the Code in the framework of the implementation of the Strategy.
(6) On 23 July 2012, the Council adopted Decision 2012/423/CFSP(3). That Decision has allowed the successful promotion of the universality of the Code and compliance with its principles.
(7) On 15 December 2014, the Council adopted Decision 2014/913/CFSP(4). That Decision has helped raise the profile of the Code and thereby facilitated the subscription of new Members to the Code. It is a priority of the Union to continue the dialogue among subscribing and non-subscribing States with the aim of further promoting the universality of the Code as well as its better implementation and enhancement. This Decision should contribute to that process.
(8) More generally, the continued proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering WMD constitutes a cause of growing concern for the international community, in particular ongoing missiles programmes in the Middle-East, North-East Asia and South-East Asia.
(9) The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) emphasised in Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004), and recalled in UNSCR 1977 (2011) and 2325 (2016), that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constituted a threat to international peace and security and obliged States, inter alia, to refrain from supporting by any means non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. The threat caused by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery to international peace and security was reaffirmed in UNSCR 1887 (2009) on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament,
(a) promoting the subscription to the Code by an ever larger number of States and ultimately its universality;
(b) supporting the full implementation of the Code;
(c) promoting dialogue among subscribing and non-subscribing States with the aim of helping to build confidence and transparency, encouraging restraint and creating more stability and security for all;
(d) reinforcing the Code's visibility and raising public awareness about the risks and threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation;
(e) exploring, in particular through academic studies, possibilities of enhancing the Code and of promoting cooperation between the Code and other relevant multilateral instruments, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, UNSCR 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Register of Objects Launched in Outer Space.
(a) for subscribing States:(i)importance of full implementation of the Code, notably through the annual declarations and pre-launch notifications provided for in the Code;(ii)encouragement to fully use the Code as a means to promote transparency and confidence, both regionally and internationally, and to help curbing and preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD); (i) importance of full implementation of the Code, notably through the annual declarations and pre-launch notifications provided for in the Code; (ii) encouragement to fully use the Code as a means to promote transparency and confidence, both regionally and internationally, and to help curbing and preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
(i) importance of full implementation of the Code, notably through the annual declarations and pre-launch notifications provided for in the Code;
(ii) encouragement to fully use the Code as a means to promote transparency and confidence, both regionally and internationally, and to help curbing and preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
(i) importance of full implementation of the Code, notably through the annual declarations and pre-launch notifications provided for in the Code;
(ii) encouragement to fully use the Code as a means to promote transparency and confidence, both regionally and internationally, and to help curbing and preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
(b) for non-subscribing States:(i)encouragement to subscribe to the Code and thereby contribute to the wider multilateral efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery;(ii)taking advantage of the Code's provisions to help reduce regional tensions and to build confidence, thereby promoting more security for all. (i) encouragement to subscribe to the Code and thereby contribute to the wider multilateral efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery; (ii) taking advantage of the Code's provisions to help reduce regional tensions and to build confidence, thereby promoting more security for all.
(i) encouragement to subscribe to the Code and thereby contribute to the wider multilateral efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery;
(ii) taking advantage of the Code's provisions to help reduce regional tensions and to build confidence, thereby promoting more security for all.
(i) encouragement to subscribe to the Code and thereby contribute to the wider multilateral efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery;
(ii) taking advantage of the Code's provisions to help reduce regional tensions and to build confidence, thereby promoting more security for all.
(a) promoting the subscription to the Code by an ever larger number of States and ultimately its universality;
(b) supporting the full implementation of the Code by subscribing States;
(c) promoting dialogue among subscribing and non-subscribing States with the aim of helping to build confidence and transparency, encouraging restraint and creating more stability and security for all;
(d) reinforcing the Code's visibility and raising public awareness about the risks and threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation;
(e) exploring, in particular through academic studies, possibilities of enhancing the Code and of promoting cooperation between the Code and other relevant multilateral instruments, such as the MTCR and UNSCR 1540 (2004).
(a) FRS will organise outreach activities in the form of regional and/or sub-regional seminars and expert missions designed to:(i)increase awareness about the risks and challenges of ballistic missile proliferation;(ii)provide a platform for relevant experts to exchange informally (‘Chatham House rules’) on strategic issues and thereby help building confidence among States; and(iii)promote the Union objectives of universality, full implementation and enhancement of the Code.FRS will organise up to nine regional and/or sub-regional events, including in Latin America and the Caribbean, in the Middle East/Africa and in South-East Asia, as well as up to six country-specific expert missions to non-subscribing States. All such events shall be carried out in close collaboration with the authorities of the respective host governments and, as appropriate, other relevant academia; (i) increase awareness about the risks and challenges of ballistic missile proliferation; (ii) provide a platform for relevant experts to exchange informally (‘Chatham House rules’) on strategic issues and thereby help building confidence among States; and (iii) promote the Union objectives of universality, full implementation and enhancement of the Code.
(i) increase awareness about the risks and challenges of ballistic missile proliferation;
(ii) provide a platform for relevant experts to exchange informally (‘Chatham House rules’) on strategic issues and thereby help building confidence among States; and
(iii) promote the Union objectives of universality, full implementation and enhancement of the Code.
(i) increase awareness about the risks and challenges of ballistic missile proliferation;
(ii) provide a platform for relevant experts to exchange informally (‘Chatham House rules’) on strategic issues and thereby help building confidence among States; and
(iii) promote the Union objectives of universality, full implementation and enhancement of the Code.
(b) FRS will organise up to six side-events dedicated to the Code, in the margins of international conferences, notably the Code Annual Regular Meeting in Vienna and the session of the UN General Assembly's First Committee in New York. Such side-events will be designed to help deepen the relationship between the Code and the UN, in conformity with Resolution 71/33, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 5 December 2016;
(c) FRS will organise, in close collaboration with the relevant authorities, a visit by an international group of experts to a space launching site, in accordance with the third indent of subpoint ii) of point (a) of Article 4 of the Code;
(d) FRS will transfer, from the grant allocated by the Union, three times the amount of EUR 29 240,00 to UNIDIR in order to help finance the UNIDIR annual conferences on space security issues and thereby to assist the overarching goal of support to the Code. FRS and UNIDIR will ensure Union visibility at these conferences, appropriate to the size of the Union's contribution;
(e) FRS will commission and publish at least four research papers on issues related to the Code, including one or more research papers on the relationship between the Code and other relevant multilateral instruments, such as the MTCR and the UNSCR 1540 (2004). To that end, FRS will solicit contributions from all research institutes that are part of or associated with the EU NPD Consortium. The topics of the research papers will be agreed between the FRS and the relevant services of the European External Action Service (EEAS);
(f) FRS will undertake communication and information activities with the double objective of enhancing the visibility of the Code and the Union's contribution to it. FRS will elaborate a detailed communication and information plan, for approval by the EEAS and the Commission.
(a) an increase in the number of subscribing States to the Code;
(b) improved implementation of the Code by subscribing States;
(c) enhanced awareness among policy makers, regulators, experts and the public at large of the importance for States to subscribe to and to implement the Code;
(d) enhanced visibility for the Union's efforts in promoting the universality, full implementation and enhancement of the Code.
(a) states, both subscribing and non-subscribing States to the Code;
(b) government officials, policymakers, regulators, experts;
(c) international, regional and sub-regional organisations;
(d) academia and civil society;
(e) the Code Chair.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 28(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (‘the Strategy’), Chapter III of which contains a list of measures that need to be taken both within the Union and in third countries to combat such proliferation.
(2) The Union is actively implementing the Strategy and giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, in particular by releasing financial resources to support specific projects aimed at enhancing the multilateral non-proliferation system and multilateral confidence-building measures. The Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation (the ‘Code’) is an integral part of that multilateral non-proliferation system.
(3) On 17 November 2003, the Council adopted Common Position 2003/805/CFSP(1). That Common Position calls on the Union to, inter alia, convince as many countries as possible to subscribe to the Code, especially those with ballistic missile capabilities, as well as for the further development and implementation of the Code, especially its confidence-building measures, and for the promotion of a closer relationship between the Code and the United Nations (UN) multilateral non-proliferation system.
(4) On 8 December 2008, the Council adopted its conclusions and a document entitled ‘New lines for action by the European Union in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems’. The document states, inter alia, that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems continue to constitute one of the greatest security challenges and that non-proliferation policy constitutes an essential part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
(5) On 18 December 2008, the Council adopted Decision 2008/974/CFSP(2)in support of the Code in the framework of the implementation of the Strategy.
(6) On 23 July 2012, the Council adopted Decision 2012/423/CFSP(3). That Decision has allowed the successful promotion of the universality of the Code and compliance with its principles.
(7) On 15 December 2014, the Council adopted Decision 2014/913/CFSP(4). That Decision has helped raise the profile of the Code and thereby facilitated the subscription of new Members to the Code. It is a priority of the Union to continue the dialogue among subscribing and non-subscribing States with the aim of further promoting the universality of the Code as well as its better implementation and enhancement. This Decision should contribute to that process.
(8) More generally, the continued proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering WMD constitutes a cause of growing concern for the international community, in particular ongoing missiles programmes in the Middle-East, North-East Asia and South-East Asia.
(9) The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) emphasised in Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004), and recalled in UNSCR 1977 (2011) and 2325 (2016), that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constituted a threat to international peace and security and obliged States, inter alia, to refrain from supporting by any means non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. The threat caused by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery to international peace and security was reaffirmed in UNSCR 1887 (2009) on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
1. In accordance with the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (‘the Strategy’), which sets the objective of upholding, implementing and strengthening the multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements, the Union shall further support the universalisation, full implementation and enhancement of the Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation (the ‘Code’).
2. The activities in support of the Code, corresponding to measures in line with the Strategy, shall consist of regional and sub-regional workshops, conferences, expert visits, research, information and communication as well as side events in the margins of international conferences.
3. The aim of the activities shall be:
(a)
promoting the subscription to the Code by an ever larger number of States and ultimately its universality;
(b)
supporting the full implementation of the Code;
(c)
promoting dialogue among subscribing and non-subscribing States with the aim of helping to build confidence and transparency, encouraging restraint and creating more stability and security for all;
(d)
reinforcing the Code’s visibility and raising public awareness about the risks and threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation;
(e)
exploring, in particular through academic studies, possibilities of enhancing the Code and of promoting cooperation between the Code and other relevant multilateral instruments, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, UNSCR 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Register of Objects Launched in Outer Space.
4. A detailed description of the projects is set out in the Annex.

Article 2
1. The High Representative (HR) shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.
2. The technical implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be carried out by theFondation pour la recherche stratégique(FRS). The FRS shall perform this task under the responsibility of the HR. For that purpose, the HR shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the FRS.

Article 3
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 1 878 120,05.
2. The expenditure financed by the amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.
3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure referred to in paragraph 2. For that purpose, it shall conclude a grant agreement with the FRS for the reference amount upon adoption of this Decision. The rules on grants provided for in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5)shall apply to this grant agreement. The agreement shall stipulate that the FRS is to ensure visibility of the Union’s contribution, appropriate to its size.
4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the grant agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the grant agreement.

Article 4
1. The HR shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular reports prepared by the FRS. Those reports shall form the basis for the evaluation carried out by the Council.
2. The Commission shall provide information on the financial aspects of the projects referred to in Article 1(2).

Article 5
1. This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
2. This Decision shall expire 40 months after the date of the conclusion of the grant agreement referred to in Article 3(3). However, it shall expire six months after its entry into force if no grant agreement has been concluded by that time.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 28(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (‘the Strategy’), Chapter III of which contains a list of measures that need to be taken both within the Union and in third countries to combat such proliferation.
(2) The Union is actively implementing the Strategy and giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, in particular by releasing financial resources to support specific projects aimed at enhancing the multilateral non-proliferation system and multilateral confidence-building measures. The Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation (the ‘Code’) is an integral part of that multilateral non-proliferation system.
(3) On 17 November 2003, the Council adopted Common Position 2003/805/CFSP(1). That Common Position calls on the Union to, inter alia, convince as many countries as possible to subscribe to the Code, especially those with ballistic missile capabilities, as well as for the further development and implementation of the Code, especially its confidence-building measures, and for the promotion of a closer relationship between the Code and the United Nations (UN) multilateral non-proliferation system.
(4) On 8 December 2008, the Council adopted its conclusions and a document entitled ‘New lines for action by the European Union in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems’. The document states, inter alia, that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems continue to constitute one of the greatest security challenges and that non-proliferation policy constitutes an essential part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
(5) On 18 December 2008, the Council adopted Decision 2008/974/CFSP(2)in support of the Code in the framework of the implementation of the Strategy.
(6) On 23 July 2012, the Council adopted Decision 2012/423/CFSP(3). That Decision has allowed the successful promotion of the universality of the Code and compliance with its principles.
(7) On 15 December 2014, the Council adopted Decision 2014/913/CFSP(4). That Decision has helped raise the profile of the Code and thereby facilitated the subscription of new Members to the Code. It is a priority of the Union to continue the dialogue among subscribing and non-subscribing States with the aim of further promoting the universality of the Code as well as its better implementation and enhancement. This Decision should contribute to that process.
(8) More generally, the continued proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering WMD constitutes a cause of growing concern for the international community, in particular ongoing missiles programmes in the Middle-East, North-East Asia and South-East Asia.
(9) The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) emphasised in Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004), and recalled in UNSCR 1977 (2011) and 2325 (2016), that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constituted a threat to international peace and security and obliged States, inter alia, to refrain from supporting by any means non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. The threat caused by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery to international peace and security was reaffirmed in UNSCR 1887 (2009) on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
1. In accordance with the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (‘the Strategy’), which sets the objective of upholding, implementing and strengthening the multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements, the Union shall further support the universalisation, full implementation and enhancement of the Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation (the ‘Code’).
2. The activities in support of the Code, corresponding to measures in line with the Strategy, shall consist of regional and sub-regional workshops, conferences, expert visits, research, information and communication as well as side events in the margins of international conferences.
3. The aim of the activities shall be:
(a)
promoting the subscription to the Code by an ever larger number of States and ultimately its universality;
(b)
supporting the full implementation of the Code;
(c)
promoting dialogue among subscribing and non-subscribing States with the aim of helping to build confidence and transparency, encouraging restraint and creating more stability and security for all;
(d)
reinforcing the Code’s visibility and raising public awareness about the risks and threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation;
(e)
exploring, in particular through academic studies, possibilities of enhancing the Code and of promoting cooperation between the Code and other relevant multilateral instruments, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, UNSCR 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Register of Objects Launched in Outer Space.
4. A detailed description of the projects is set out in the Annex.
1. The High Representative (HR) shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.
2. The technical implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be carried out by theFondation pour la recherche stratégique(FRS). The FRS shall perform this task under the responsibility of the HR. For that purpose, the HR shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the FRS.
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 1 878 120,05.
2. The expenditure financed by the amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.
3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure referred to in paragraph 2. For that purpose, it shall conclude a grant agreement with the FRS for the reference amount upon adoption of this Decision. The rules on grants provided for in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5)shall apply to this grant agreement. The agreement shall stipulate that the FRS is to ensure visibility of the Union’s contribution, appropriate to its size.
4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the grant agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the grant agreement.
1. The HR shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular reports prepared by the FRS. Those reports shall form the basis for the evaluation carried out by the Council.
2. The Commission shall provide information on the financial aspects of the projects referred to in Article 1(2).
1. This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
2. This Decision shall expire 40 months after the date of the conclusion of the grant agreement referred to in Article 3(3). However, it shall expire six months after its entry into force if no grant agreement has been concluded by that time.

1.   OBJECTIVE

ANNEXThe main objective of this Decision is to promote through specific measures the universality, the full implementation and the enhancement of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (the ‘Code’), in line with the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
This Decision will complement the Union’s diplomatic engagement with subscribing States and non-subscribing States to the Code. In this regard, relevant Union messages are:

(a) | for subscribing States:(i)importance of full implementation of the Code, notably through the annual declarations and pre-launch notifications provided for in the Code;(ii)encouragement to fully use the Code as a means to promote transparency and confidence, both regionally and internationally, and to help curbing and preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD); | (i) | importance of full implementation of the Code, notably through the annual declarations and pre-launch notifications provided for in the Code; | (ii) | encouragement to fully use the Code as a means to promote transparency and confidence, both regionally and internationally, and to help curbing and preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
(i) | importance of full implementation of the Code, notably through the annual declarations and pre-launch notifications provided for in the Code;
(ii) | encouragement to fully use the Code as a means to promote transparency and confidence, both regionally and internationally, and to help curbing and preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
(b) | for non-subscribing States:(i)encouragement to subscribe to the Code and thereby contribute to the wider multilateral efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery;(ii)taking advantage of the Code’s provisions to help reduce regional tensions and to build confidence, thereby promoting more security for all. | (i) | encouragement to subscribe to the Code and thereby contribute to the wider multilateral efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery; | (ii) | taking advantage of the Code’s provisions to help reduce regional tensions and to build confidence, thereby promoting more security for all.
(i) | encouragement to subscribe to the Code and thereby contribute to the wider multilateral efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery;
(ii) | taking advantage of the Code’s provisions to help reduce regional tensions and to build confidence, thereby promoting more security for all.In addition, this Decision shall be used to help financing a limited number of research papers on synergies between the Code and other relevant multilateral instruments, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), UNSCR 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Register for Objects Launched in Outer Space.
Finally, this Decision aims at supporting the ongoing policy dialogue of the international community on security and sustainability in outer space, notably through providing a limited financial contribution for the annual space conferences, organised by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva.
2. MEASURES
2.1. Objectives of the measures
(a) | promoting the subscription to the Code by an ever larger number of States and ultimately its universality;
(b) | supporting the full implementation of the Code by subscribing States;
(c) | promoting dialogue among subscribing and non-subscribing States with the aim of helping to build confidence and transparency, encouraging restraint and creating more stability and security for all;
(d) | reinforcing the Code’s visibility and raising public awareness about the risks and threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation;
(e) | exploring, in particular through academic studies, possibilities of enhancing the Code and of promoting cooperation between the Code and other relevant multilateral instruments, such as the MTCR and UNSCR 1540 (2004).2.2. Description of the measures
(a) | FRS will organise outreach activities in the form of regional and/or sub-regional seminars and expert missions designed to:(i)increase awareness about the risks and challenges of ballistic missile proliferation;(ii)provide a platform for relevant experts to exchange informally (‘Chatham House rules’) on strategic issues and thereby help building confidence among States; and(iii)promote the Union objectives of universality, full implementation and enhancement of the Code.FRS will organise up to nine regional and/or sub-regional events, including in Latin America and the Caribbean, in the Middle East/Africa and in South-East Asia, as well as up to six country-specific expert missions to non-subscribing States. All such events shall be carried out in close collaboration with the authorities of the respective host governments and, as appropriate, other relevant academia; | (i) | increase awareness about the risks and challenges of ballistic missile proliferation; | (ii) | provide a platform for relevant experts to exchange informally (‘Chatham House rules’) on strategic issues and thereby help building confidence among States; and | (iii) | promote the Union objectives of universality, full implementation and enhancement of the Code.
(i) | increase awareness about the risks and challenges of ballistic missile proliferation;
(ii) | provide a platform for relevant experts to exchange informally (‘Chatham House rules’) on strategic issues and thereby help building confidence among States; and
(iii) | promote the Union objectives of universality, full implementation and enhancement of the Code.
(b) | FRS will organise up to six side-events dedicated to the Code, in the margins of international conferences, notably the Code Annual Regular Meeting in Vienna and the session of the UN General Assembly’s First Committee in New York. Such side-events will be designed to help deepen the relationship between the Code and the UN, in conformity with Resolution 71/33, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 5 December 2016;
(c) | FRS will organise, in close collaboration with the relevant authorities, a visit by an international group of experts to a space launching site, in accordance with the third indent of subpoint ii) of point (a) of Article 4 of the Code;
(d) | FRS will transfer, from the grant allocated by the Union, three times the amount of EUR 29 240,00 to UNIDIR in order to help finance the UNIDIR annual conferences on space security issues and thereby to assist the overarching goal of support to the Code. FRS and UNIDIR will ensure Union visibility at these conferences, appropriate to the size of the Union’s contribution;
(e) | FRS will commission and publish at least four research papers on issues related to the Code, including one or more research papers on the relationship between the Code and other relevant multilateral instruments, such as the MTCR and the UNSCR 1540 (2004). To that end, FRS will solicit contributions from all research institutes that are part of or associated with the EU NPD Consortium. The topics of the research papers will be agreed between the FRS and the relevant services of the European External Action Service (EEAS);
(f) | FRS will undertake communication and information activities with the double objective of enhancing the visibility of the Code and the Union’s contribution to it. FRS will elaborate a detailed communication and information plan, for approval by the EEAS and the Commission.2.3. Results of the measures
(a) | an increase in the number of subscribing States to the Code;
(b) | improved implementation of the Code by subscribing States;
(c) | enhanced awareness among policy makers, regulators, experts and the public at large of the importance for States to subscribe to and to implement the Code;
(d) | enhanced visibility for the Union’s efforts in promoting the universality, full implementation and enhancement of the Code.3. PARTNERS FOR THE MEASURES
FRS, acting in close liaison with the EEAS, will continue developing effective partnerships with interested regional and sub-regional organisations, State authorities, research institutes and other relevant bodies.
FRS will cooperate closely with UNIDIR regarding the measure set out in point 2.2. (e).
4. INTERACTION WITH UNION EFFORTS
Based on the regular feedback from FRS on its activities, the Union may decide to complement those efforts through targeted diplomatic action aimed at raising awareness of the importance for States to subscribe to and to implement the Code.
5. BENEFICIARIES OF THE MEASURES

(a) | states, both subscribing and non-subscribing States to the Code;
(b) | government officials, policymakers, regulators, experts;
(c) | international, regional and sub-regional organisations;
(d) | academia and civil society;
(e) | the Code Chair.6. VENUE
FRS will select, in consultation with the relevant services of the EEAS, potential venues for the meetings, workshops and other events. The criteria used for choosing the venues will include the willingness and commitment of a relevant State or intergovernmental organisation in a particular region to host the event. Specific locations of country visits or country-specific activities will depend on invitations from interested States or intergovernmental organisations.
7. DURATION
The total estimated duration of the action is 36 months.

Pending: 32017D1426

5.8.2017 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 204/95
(1) On 27 December 2001, the Council adopted Common Position 2001/931/CFSP(1).
(2) On 27 January 2017, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2017/154(2)updating the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (‘the list’).
(3) In accordance with Article 1(6) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, it is necessary to review at regular intervals the names of persons, groups and entities in the list to ensure that there are grounds for keeping them thereon.
(4) This Decision sets out the result of the review that the Council has carried out in respect of persons, groups and entities to which Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply.
(5) The Council has verified that competent authorities as referred to in Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP have taken decisions with regard to all persons, groups and entities on the list to the effect that they have been involved in terrorist acts within the meaning of Article 1(2) and (3) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP. The Council has also concluded that the persons, groups and entities to which Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply should continue to be subject to the specific restrictive measures provided for therein.
(6) The list should be updated accordingly and Decision (CFSP) 2017/154 should be repealed,
1. ABDOLLAHI Hamed (a.k.a Mustafa Abdullahi), born August 11, 1960 in Iran. Passport: D9004878.
2. AL-NASSER, Abdelkarim Hussein Mohamed, born in Al Ihsa (Saudi Arabia), citizen of Saudi Arabia.
3. AL YACOUB, Ibrahim Salih Mohammed, born 16.10.1966 in Tarut (Saudi Arabia), citizen of Saudi Arabia.
4. ARBABSIAR Manssor (a.k.a. Mansour Arbabsiar), born March 6 or 15, 1955 in Iran. Iranian and US national. Passport: C2002515 (Iran); Passport: 477845448 (USA). National ID no.: 07442833, expiry date 15 March 2016 (USA driving licence).
5. BOUYERI, Mohammed (a.k.a. Abu ZUBAIR, a.k.a. SOBIAR, a.k.a. Abu ZOUBAIR), born 8.3.1978 in Amsterdam (The Netherlands).
6. EL HAJJ, Hassan Hassan, born 22.3.1988 in Zaghdraiya, Sidon, Lebanon, Canadian citizen. Passport number: JX446643 (Canada).
7. IZZ-AL-DIN, Hasan (a.k.a GARBAYA, Ahmed, a.k.a. SA-ID, a.k.a. SALWWAN, Samir), born 1963 in Lebanon, citizen of Lebanon.
8. MELIAD, Farah, born 5.11.1980 in Sydney (Australia), Australian citizen. Passport number: M2719127 (Australia).
9. MOHAMMED, Khalid Shaikh (a.k.a. ALI, Salem, a.k.a. BIN KHALID, Fahd Bin Adballah, a.k.a. HENIN, Ashraf Refaat Nabith, a.k.a. WADOOD, Khalid Adbul), born 14.4.1965 or 1.3.1964 in Pakistan, passport No 488555.
10. ȘANLI, Dalokay (a.k.a Sinan), born 13.10.1976 in Pülümür (Turkey).
11. SHAHLAI Abdul Reza (a.k.a Abdol Reza Shala'i, a.k.a. Abd-al Reza Shalai, a.k.a. Abdorreza Shahlai, a.k.a. Abdolreza Shahla'i, a.k.a. Abdul-Reza Shahlaee, a.k.a.Hajj Yusef, a.k.a. Haji Yusif, a.k.a.Hajji Yasir, a.k.a.Hajji Yusif, a.k.a.Yusuf Abu-al-Karkh), born circa 1957 in Iran. Addresses: (1) Kermanshah, Iran, (2) Mehran Military Base, Ilam Province, Iran.
12. SHAKURI Ali Gholam, born circa 1965 in Tehran, Iran.
13. SOLEIMANI Qasem (a.k.a Ghasem Soleymani, a.k.a Qasmi Sulayman, a.k.a Qasem Soleymani, a.k.a Qasem Solaimani, a.k.a Qasem Salimani, a.k.a Qasem Solemani, a.k.a Qasem Sulaimani, a.k.a Qasem Sulemani), born March 11, 1957 in Iran. Iranian national. Passport: 008827 (Iran Diplomatic), issued 1999. Title: Major General.
1. ‘Abu Nidal Organisation’ — ‘ANO’ (a.k.a. ‘Fatah Revolutionary Council’, a.k.a. ‘Arab Revolutionary Brigades’, a.k.a. ‘Black September’, a.k.a. ‘Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims’).
2. ‘Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade’.
3. ‘Al-Aqsa e.V.’.
4. ‘Babbar Khalsa’.
5. ‘Communist Party of the Philippines’, including ‘New People's Army’ — ‘NPA’, Philippines.
6. ‘Gama'a al-Islamiyya’ (a.k.a. ‘Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya’) (‘Islamic Group’ — ‘IG’).
7. ‘İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar Cephesi’ — ‘IBDA-C’ (‘Great Islamic Eastern Warriors Front’).
8. ‘Hamas’, including ‘Hamas-Izz al-Din al-Qassem’.
9. ‘Hizballah Military Wing’ (a.k.a. ‘Hezbollah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizbullah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizbollah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hezballah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hisbollah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizbu'llah Military Wing’ a.k.a. ‘Hizb Allah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Jihad Council’ (and all units reporting to it, including the External Security Organisation)).
10. ‘Hizbul Mujahideen’ — ‘HM’.
11. ‘Khalistan Zindabad Force’ — ‘KZF’.
12. ‘Kurdistan Workers' Party’ — ‘PKK’, (a.k.a. ‘KADEK’, a.k.a. ‘KONGRA-GEL’).
13. ‘Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’ — ‘LTTE’.
14. ‘Ejército de Liberación Nacional’ (‘National Liberation Army’).
15. ‘Palestinian Islamic Jihad’ — ‘PIJ’.
16. ‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’ — ‘PFLP’.
17. ‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine — General Command’ (a.k.a. ‘PFLP — General Command’).
18. ‘Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia’ — ‘FARC’ (‘Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’).
19. ‘Devrimci Halk Kurtuluș Partisi-Cephesi’ — ‘DHKP/C’ (a.k.a. ‘Devrimci Sol’ (‘Revolutionary Left’), a.k.a. ‘Dev Sol’) (‘Revolutionary People's Liberation Army/Front/Party’).
20. ‘Sendero Luminoso’ — ‘SL’ (‘Shining Path’).
21. ‘Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan’ — ‘TAK’ (a.k.a. ‘Kurdistan Freedom Falcons’, a.k.a. ‘Kurdistan Freedom Hawks’).
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 27 December 2001, the Council adopted Common Position 2001/931/CFSP(1).
(2) On 27 January 2017, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2017/154(2)updating the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (‘the list’).
(3) In accordance with Article 1(6) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, it is necessary to review at regular intervals the names of persons, groups and entities in the list to ensure that there are grounds for keeping them thereon.
(4) This Decision sets out the result of the review that the Council has carried out in respect of persons, groups and entities to which Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply.
(5) The Council has verified that competent authorities as referred to in Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP have taken decisions with regard to all persons, groups and entities on the list to the effect that they have been involved in terrorist acts within the meaning of Article 1(2) and (3) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP. The Council has also concluded that the persons, groups and entities to which Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply should continue to be subject to the specific restrictive measures provided for therein.
(6) The list should be updated accordingly and Decision (CFSP) 2017/154 should be repealed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
The list of persons, groups and entities to which Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply is set out in the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2
Decision (CFSP) 2017/154 is repealed.

Article 3
This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 27 December 2001, the Council adopted Common Position 2001/931/CFSP(1).
(2) On 27 January 2017, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2017/154(2)updating the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (‘the list’).
(3) In accordance with Article 1(6) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, it is necessary to review at regular intervals the names of persons, groups and entities in the list to ensure that there are grounds for keeping them thereon.
(4) This Decision sets out the result of the review that the Council has carried out in respect of persons, groups and entities to which Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply.
(5) The Council has verified that competent authorities as referred to in Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP have taken decisions with regard to all persons, groups and entities on the list to the effect that they have been involved in terrorist acts within the meaning of Article 1(2) and (3) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP. The Council has also concluded that the persons, groups and entities to which Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply should continue to be subject to the specific restrictive measures provided for therein.
(6) The list should be updated accordingly and Decision (CFSP) 2017/154 should be repealed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The list of persons, groups and entities to which Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply is set out in the Annex to this Decision.
Decision (CFSP) 2017/154 is repealed.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.

List of persons, groups and entities referred to in Article 1

ANNEXI. PERSONS
1. | ABDOLLAHI Hamed (a.k.a Mustafa Abdullahi), born August 11, 1960 in Iran. Passport: D9004878.
2. | AL-NASSER, Abdelkarim Hussein Mohamed, born in Al Ihsa (Saudi Arabia), citizen of Saudi Arabia.
3. | AL YACOUB, Ibrahim Salih Mohammed, born 16.10.1966 in Tarut (Saudi Arabia), citizen of Saudi Arabia.
4. | ARBABSIAR Manssor (a.k.a. Mansour Arbabsiar), born March 6 or 15, 1955 in Iran. Iranian and US national. Passport: C2002515 (Iran); Passport: 477845448 (USA). National ID no.: 07442833, expiry date 15 March 2016 (USA driving licence).
5. | BOUYERI, Mohammed (a.k.a. Abu ZUBAIR, a.k.a. SOBIAR, a.k.a. Abu ZOUBAIR), born 8.3.1978 in Amsterdam (The Netherlands).
6. | EL HAJJ, Hassan Hassan, born 22.3.1988 in Zaghdraiya, Sidon, Lebanon, Canadian citizen. Passport number: JX446643 (Canada).
7. | IZZ-AL-DIN, Hasan (a.k.a GARBAYA, Ahmed, a.k.a. SA-ID, a.k.a. SALWWAN, Samir), born 1963 in Lebanon, citizen of Lebanon.
8. | MELIAD, Farah, born 5.11.1980 in Sydney (Australia), Australian citizen. Passport number: M2719127 (Australia).
9. | MOHAMMED, Khalid Shaikh (a.k.a. ALI, Salem, a.k.a. BIN KHALID, Fahd Bin Adballah, a.k.a. HENIN, Ashraf Refaat Nabith, a.k.a. WADOOD, Khalid Adbul), born 14.4.1965 or 1.3.1964 in Pakistan, passport No 488555.
10. | ȘANLI, Dalokay (a.k.a Sinan), born 13.10.1976 in Pülümür (Turkey).
11. | SHAHLAI Abdul Reza (a.k.a Abdol Reza Shala’i, a.k.a. Abd-al Reza Shalai, a.k.a. Abdorreza Shahlai, a.k.a. Abdolreza Shahla’i, a.k.a. Abdul-Reza Shahlaee, a.k.a.Hajj Yusef, a.k.a. Haji Yusif, a.k.a.Hajji Yasir, a.k.a.Hajji Yusif, a.k.a.Yusuf Abu-al-Karkh), born circa 1957 in Iran. Addresses: (1) Kermanshah, Iran, (2) Mehran Military Base, Ilam Province, Iran.
12. | SHAKURI Ali Gholam, born circa 1965 in Tehran, Iran.
13. | SOLEIMANI Qasem (a.k.a Ghasem Soleymani, a.k.a Qasmi Sulayman, a.k.a Qasem Soleymani, a.k.a Qasem Solaimani, a.k.a Qasem Salimani, a.k.a Qasem Solemani, a.k.a Qasem Sulaimani, a.k.a Qasem Sulemani), born March 11, 1957 in Iran. Iranian national. Passport: 008827 (Iran Diplomatic), issued 1999. Title: Major General.II. GROUPS AND ENTITIES
1. | ‘Abu Nidal Organisation’ — ‘ANO’ (a.k.a. ‘Fatah Revolutionary Council’, a.k.a. ‘Arab Revolutionary Brigades’, a.k.a. ‘Black September’, a.k.a. ‘Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims’).
2. | ‘Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade’.
3. | ‘Al-Aqsa e.V.’.
4. | ‘Babbar Khalsa’.
5. | ‘Communist Party of the Philippines’, including ‘New People’s Army’ — ‘NPA’, Philippines.
6. | ‘Gama’a al-Islamiyya’ (a.k.a. ‘Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya’) (‘Islamic Group’ — ‘IG’).
7. | ‘İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar Cephesi’ — ‘IBDA-C’ (‘Great Islamic Eastern Warriors Front’).
8. | ‘Hamas’, including ‘Hamas-Izz al-Din al-Qassem’.
9. | ‘Hizballah Military Wing’ (a.k.a. ‘Hezbollah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizbullah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizbollah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hezballah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hisbollah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizbu’llah Military Wing’ a.k.a. ‘Hizb Allah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Jihad Council’ (and all units reporting to it, including the External Security Organisation)).
10. | ‘Hizbul Mujahideen’ — ‘HM’.
11. | ‘Khalistan Zindabad Force’ — ‘KZF’.
12. | ‘Kurdistan Workers’ Party’ — ‘PKK’, (a.k.a. ‘KADEK’, a.k.a. ‘KONGRA-GEL’).
13. | ‘Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’ — ‘LTTE’.
14. | ‘Ejército de Liberación Nacional’ (‘National Liberation Army’).
15. | ‘Palestinian Islamic Jihad’ — ‘PIJ’.
16. | ‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’ — ‘PFLP’.
17. | ‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine — General Command’ (a.k.a. ‘PFLP — General Command’).
18. | ‘Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia’ — ‘FARC’ (‘Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’).
19. | ‘Devrimci Halk Kurtuluș Partisi-Cephesi’ — ‘DHKP/C’ (a.k.a. ‘Devrimci Sol’ (‘Revolutionary Left’), a.k.a. ‘Dev Sol’) (‘Revolutionary People’s Liberation Army/Front/Party’).
20. | ‘Sendero Luminoso’ — ‘SL’ (‘Shining Path’).
21. | ‘Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan’ — ‘TAK’ (a.k.a. ‘Kurdistan Freedom Falcons’, a.k.a. ‘Kurdistan Freedom Hawks’).

Pending: 32017D1207

6.7.2017 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 173/18
(1) On 11 and 18 April 2007, Monsanto Europe SA submitted to the Commission three applications, in accordance with Articles 11 and 23 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, for the renewal of the authorisation of existing foods, food ingredients and feed produced from maize MON 810, of the authorisation of feed containing and consisting of maize MON 810 and of the authorisation of maize MON 810 in products consisting of it or containing it for other uses than food and feed, as any other maize, including cultivation. After the date of the entry into force of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, those products were notified to the Commission pursuant to Article 8(1)(a) and (b) and Article 20(1)(b) of that Regulation and included in the Community Register of genetically modified food and feed.
(2) On 9 March 2016, Monsanto Europe SA sent a letter to the Commission requesting that the part of the application concerning cultivation be considered separately from the rest of the application. Therefore, this Decision does not cover the use of maize MON 810 seeds for cultivation.
(3) The placing on the market of pollen produced from maize MON 810 was authorised by Commission Implementing Decision 2013/649/EU(2)and is therefore not covered by this Decision.
(4) On 30 June 2009, the European Food Safety Authority (‘EFSA’) issued a favourable opinion (updated on 30 July 2009) in accordance with Articles 6 and 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003. It concluded that genetically modified maize MON 810, as described in the application, is as safe as its conventional counterpart with respect to potential adverse effects on human and animal health and is unlikely to have adverse effects on the environment taking into account its intended uses(3).
(5) In its opinion, EFSA considered all the specific questions and concerns raised by the Member States in the context of the consultation of the national competent authorities as provided for by Article 6(4) and Article 18(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(6) Taking into account those considerations, the authorisation should be renewed for food and food ingredients produced from maize MON 810, with the exception of pollen, for feed containing or consisting of, or produced from maize MON 810 and for maize MON 810 in products consisting of it or containing it for other uses than food or feed, with the exception of cultivation.
(7) A unique identifier has been assigned to genetically modified maize MON 810 in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 65/2004(4), in the context of the initial authorisation of maize MON 810. That unique identifier should continue to be used.
(8) On the basis of the EFSA opinion, no specific labelling requirements, other than those provided for in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, appear to be necessary for food and food ingredients produced from maize MON 810 and for feed containing, consisting of, or produced from maize MON 810.
(9) The authorisation holder should submit annual reports on the implementation and the results of the activities set out in in this monitoring plan. Those results should be presented in accordance with Commission Decision 2009/770/EC(5).
(10) The EFSA opinion does not justify the imposition of specific conditions or restrictions for the placing on the market and/or for the use and handling of the food and feed, including post-market monitoring requirements.
(11) All relevant information on the authorisation of the products should be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(12) The Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed has not delivered an opinion within the time limit laid down by its Chairman. An implementing act was deemed to be necessary and the chair submitted the draft implementing act to the appeal committee for further deliberation. The appeal committee did not deliver an opinion,
(a) foods and food ingredients produced from MON-ØØ81Ø-6 maize, with the exception of pollen;
(b) feed containing, consisting of or produced from MON-ØØ81Ø-6 maize;
(c) MON-ØØ81Ø-6 maize in products containing it or consisting of it for any other use than food or feed, with the exception of cultivation.
Name : Monsanto Europe SA
Address : Avenue de Tervuren 270-272, B-1150 Brussels — Belgium
(1) foods and food ingredients produced from MON-ØØ81Ø-6 maize, with the exception of pollen;
(2) feed containing, consisting of, or produced from MON-ØØ81Ø-6 maize;
(3) MON-ØØ81Ø-6 maize in products containing it or consisting of it for any other use than food or feed, with the exception of cultivation.The genetically modified MON-ØØ81Ø-6 maize as described in the applications expresses the Cry1Ab protein, derived fromBacillus thuringiensissubsp.kurstaki, which confers protection against predation by certain lepidopteran insect pests, including the European corn borer (Ostrinia nubilalis) and pink borers (Sesamiaspp.).
(1) Event-specific real-time PCR-based method for the quantification of MON-ØØ81Ø-6 maize;
(2) Validated by the Federal Institute for Risk assessment (BfR) in collaboration with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission and other parties, and verified by the EU Reference Laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 on genomic DNA extracted from maize seeds, published at http://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/statusofdossiers.aspx
(3) Reference Material: ERM-BF413 and ERM-AD413 accessible via the Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (IRMM) of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission at https://crm.jrc.ec.europa.eu/
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed(1), and in particular Articles 11(3) and 23(3) thereof,
(1) On 11 and 18 April 2007, Monsanto Europe SA submitted to the Commission three applications, in accordance with Articles 11 and 23 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, for the renewal of the authorisation of existing foods, food ingredients and feed produced from maize MON 810, of the authorisation of feed containing and consisting of maize MON 810 and of the authorisation of maize MON 810 in products consisting of it or containing it for other uses than food and feed, as any other maize, including cultivation. After the date of the entry into force of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, those products were notified to the Commission pursuant to Article 8(1)(a) and (b) and Article 20(1)(b) of that Regulation and included in the Community Register of genetically modified food and feed.
(2) On 9 March 2016, Monsanto Europe SA sent a letter to the Commission requesting that the part of the application concerning cultivation be considered separately from the rest of the application. Therefore, this Decision does not cover the use of maize MON 810 seeds for cultivation.
(3) The placing on the market of pollen produced from maize MON 810 was authorised by Commission Implementing Decision 2013/649/EU(2)and is therefore not covered by this Decision.
(4) On 30 June 2009, the European Food Safety Authority (‘EFSA’) issued a favourable opinion (updated on 30 July 2009) in accordance with Articles 6 and 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003. It concluded that genetically modified maize MON 810, as described in the application, is as safe as its conventional counterpart with respect to potential adverse effects on human and animal health and is unlikely to have adverse effects on the environment taking into account its intended uses(3).
(5) In its opinion, EFSA considered all the specific questions and concerns raised by the Member States in the context of the consultation of the national competent authorities as provided for by Article 6(4) and Article 18(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(6) Taking into account those considerations, the authorisation should be renewed for food and food ingredients produced from maize MON 810, with the exception of pollen, for feed containing or consisting of, or produced from maize MON 810 and for maize MON 810 in products consisting of it or containing it for other uses than food or feed, with the exception of cultivation.
(7) A unique identifier has been assigned to genetically modified maize MON 810 in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 65/2004(4), in the context of the initial authorisation of maize MON 810. That unique identifier should continue to be used.
(8) On the basis of the EFSA opinion, no specific labelling requirements, other than those provided for in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, appear to be necessary for food and food ingredients produced from maize MON 810 and for feed containing, consisting of, or produced from maize MON 810.
(9) The authorisation holder should submit annual reports on the implementation and the results of the activities set out in in this monitoring plan. Those results should be presented in accordance with Commission Decision 2009/770/EC(5).
(10) The EFSA opinion does not justify the imposition of specific conditions or restrictions for the placing on the market and/or for the use and handling of the food and feed, including post-market monitoring requirements.
(11) All relevant information on the authorisation of the products should be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(12) The Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed has not delivered an opinion within the time limit laid down by its Chairman. An implementing act was deemed to be necessary and the chair submitted the draft implementing act to the appeal committee for further deliberation. The appeal committee did not deliver an opinion,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Genetically modified organism and unique identifier
Article 1
Genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON 810, as specified in point (b) of the Annex to this Decision, is assigned the unique identifier MON-ØØ81Ø-6, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 65/2004.

Renewal of the authorisation
Article 2
The authorisation of the following products is renewed in accordance with the conditions set out in this Decision:
(a)
foods and food ingredients produced from MON-ØØ81Ø-6 maize, with the exception of pollen;
(b)
feed containing, consisting of or produced from MON-ØØ81Ø-6 maize;
(c)
MON-ØØ81Ø-6 maize in products containing it or consisting of it for any other use than food or feed, with the exception of cultivation.

Labelling
Article 3
For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6), the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘maize’.

Monitoring for environmental effects
Article 4
1. The authorisation holder shall ensure that the monitoring plan for environmental effects, as set out in point (h) of the Annex to this Decision, is put in place and implemented.
2. The authorisation holder shall submit to the Commission annual reports on the implementation and the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan in accordance with the format set out in Decision 2009/770/EC.

Community register
Article 5
The information set out in the Annex to this Decision shall be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Article 28 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.

Authorisation holder
Article 6
The authorisation holder shall be Monsanto Europe SA, Belgium, representing Monsanto Company, United States of America.

Validity
Article 7
This Decision shall apply for a period of 10 years from the date of its notification.

Addressee
Article 8
This Decision is addressed to Monsanto Europe SA, Avenue de Tervuren 270-272, B-1150 Brussels, Belgium.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed(1), and in particular Articles 11(3) and 23(3) thereof,
(1) On 11 and 18 April 2007, Monsanto Europe SA submitted to the Commission three applications, in accordance with Articles 11 and 23 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, for the renewal of the authorisation of existing foods, food ingredients and feed produced from maize MON 810, of the authorisation of feed containing and consisting of maize MON 810 and of the authorisation of maize MON 810 in products consisting of it or containing it for other uses than food and feed, as any other maize, including cultivation. After the date of the entry into force of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, those products were notified to the Commission pursuant to Article 8(1)(a) and (b) and Article 20(1)(b) of that Regulation and included in the Community Register of genetically modified food and feed.
(2) On 9 March 2016, Monsanto Europe SA sent a letter to the Commission requesting that the part of the application concerning cultivation be considered separately from the rest of the application. Therefore, this Decision does not cover the use of maize MON 810 seeds for cultivation.
(3) The placing on the market of pollen produced from maize MON 810 was authorised by Commission Implementing Decision 2013/649/EU(2)and is therefore not covered by this Decision.
(4) On 30 June 2009, the European Food Safety Authority (‘EFSA’) issued a favourable opinion (updated on 30 July 2009) in accordance with Articles 6 and 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003. It concluded that genetically modified maize MON 810, as described in the application, is as safe as its conventional counterpart with respect to potential adverse effects on human and animal health and is unlikely to have adverse effects on the environment taking into account its intended uses(3).
(5) In its opinion, EFSA considered all the specific questions and concerns raised by the Member States in the context of the consultation of the national competent authorities as provided for by Article 6(4) and Article 18(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(6) Taking into account those considerations, the authorisation should be renewed for food and food ingredients produced from maize MON 810, with the exception of pollen, for feed containing or consisting of, or produced from maize MON 810 and for maize MON 810 in products consisting of it or containing it for other uses than food or feed, with the exception of cultivation.
(7) A unique identifier has been assigned to genetically modified maize MON 810 in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 65/2004(4), in the context of the initial authorisation of maize MON 810. That unique identifier should continue to be used.
(8) On the basis of the EFSA opinion, no specific labelling requirements, other than those provided for in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, appear to be necessary for food and food ingredients produced from maize MON 810 and for feed containing, consisting of, or produced from maize MON 810.
(9) The authorisation holder should submit annual reports on the implementation and the results of the activities set out in in this monitoring plan. Those results should be presented in accordance with Commission Decision 2009/770/EC(5).
(10) The EFSA opinion does not justify the imposition of specific conditions or restrictions for the placing on the market and/or for the use and handling of the food and feed, including post-market monitoring requirements.
(11) All relevant information on the authorisation of the products should be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(12) The Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed has not delivered an opinion within the time limit laid down by its Chairman. An implementing act was deemed to be necessary and the chair submitted the draft implementing act to the appeal committee for further deliberation. The appeal committee did not deliver an opinion,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Genetically modified organism and unique identifier

Genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON 810, as specified in point (b) of the Annex to this Decision, is assigned the unique identifier MON-ØØ81Ø-6, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 65/2004.

Renewal of the authorisation

The authorisation of the following products is renewed in accordance with the conditions set out in this Decision:
(a)
foods and food ingredients produced from MON-ØØ81Ø-6 maize, with the exception of pollen;
(b)
feed containing, consisting of or produced from MON-ØØ81Ø-6 maize;
(c)
MON-ØØ81Ø-6 maize in products containing it or consisting of it for any other use than food or feed, with the exception of cultivation.

Labelling

For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6), the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘maize’.

Monitoring for environmental effects

1. The authorisation holder shall ensure that the monitoring plan for environmental effects, as set out in point (h) of the Annex to this Decision, is put in place and implemented.
2. The authorisation holder shall submit to the Commission annual reports on the implementation and the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan in accordance with the format set out in Decision 2009/770/EC.

Community register

The information set out in the Annex to this Decision shall be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Article 28 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.

Authorisation holder

The authorisation holder shall be Monsanto Europe SA, Belgium, representing Monsanto Company, United States of America.

Validity

This Decision shall apply for a period of 10 years from the date of its notification.

Addressee

This Decision is addressed to Monsanto Europe SA, Avenue de Tervuren 270-272, B-1150 Brussels, Belgium.

(a)   Applicant and authorisation holder:

ANNEX
Name | : | Monsanto Europe SA
Address | : | Avenue de Tervuren 270-272, B-1150 Brussels — BelgiumOn behalf of Monsanto Company — 800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard — St. Louis, Missouri 63167 — United States of America.
(b) Designation and specification of the products:

(1) | foods and food ingredients produced from MON-ØØ81Ø-6 maize, with the exception of pollen;
(2) | feed containing, consisting of, or produced from MON-ØØ81Ø-6 maize;
(3) | MON-ØØ81Ø-6 maize in products containing it or consisting of it for any other use than food or feed, with the exception of cultivation.The genetically modified MON-ØØ81Ø-6 maize as described in the applications expresses the Cry1Ab protein, derived fromBacillus thuringiensissubsp.kurstaki, which confers protection against predation by certain lepidopteran insect pests, including the European corn borer (Ostrinia nubilalis) and pink borers (Sesamiaspp.).(c) Labelling:
For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Articles 13(1) and 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘maize’;
(d) Method for detection:

(1) | Event-specific real-time PCR-based method for the quantification of MON-ØØ81Ø-6 maize;
(2) | Validated by the Federal Institute for Risk assessment (BfR) in collaboration with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission and other parties, and verified by the EU Reference Laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 on genomic DNA extracted from maize seeds, published at http://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/statusofdossiers.aspx
(3) | Reference Material: ERM-BF413 and ERM-AD413 accessible via the Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (IRMM) of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission at https://crm.jrc.ec.europa.eu/(e) Unique identifier:
MON-ØØ81Ø- 6
(f) Information required under Annex II to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity:
(Biosafety Clearing-House, Record ID number:published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed when notified).
(g) Conditions or restrictions on the placing on the market, use or handling of the products:
Not required.
(h) Monitoring plan for environmental effects:
Monitoring plan for environmental effects conforming with Annex VII to Directive 2001/18/EC.
(Link:plan published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed)
(i) Post-market monitoring requirements for the use of the food for human consumption:
Not required.
Note:links to relevant documents may need to be modified over the time. Those modifications will be made available to the public via the updating of the Community register of genetically modified food and feed.

Pending: 32017D0915

30.5.2017 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 139/38
(1) The Arms Trade Treaty (‘ATT’) was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 2 April 2013. The ATT was subsequently opened for signature on 3 June 2013 and entered into force on 24 December 2014. All Member States are parties to the ATT.
(2) The ATT aims to establish the highest possible common international standards to regulate legal trade in conventional weapons and to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion. Key challenges are its effective implementation by States Parties and its universalisation, bearing in mind that regulating the international arms trade is by definition a global endeavour. To contribute to addressing these challenges, the Council adopted Decision 2013/768/CFSP(1)on 16 December 2013, thereby enlarging the export control-related assistance portfolio of the Union with activities specific to the ATT.
(3) Activities carried out under Decision 2013/768/CFSP have addressed sixteen beneficiary countries and have covered a wide range of areas relevant to the establishment and development of a national arms transfer control system as mandated by the ATT. Cooperation has started promisingly with a number of countries that had never before been addressed under other Union export control-related assistance activities, thereby reflecting the global nature of the ATT. Follow-up is therefore advisable towards this sub-set of countries to ensure that progress is sustained and to encourage regional outreach by these beneficiary countries themselves.
(4) In addition to the continuation of activities with beneficiary countries addressed under Decision 2013/768/CFSP, it is advisable to pursue a demand-driven approach whereby assistance activities could be activated at the request of countries having identified needs with regard to ATT implementation. Such an approach has proven to be fair and successful in providing assistance to countries that have expressed commitment and ownership regarding the ATT through their requests for Union assistance. This Decision therefore retains a specific number of activities that will be available upon request.
(5) Union assistance provided under Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/2309(2)addresses a number of countries in the close eastern and southern neighbourhood of the Union. The Union is also a longstanding provider of export control assistance in dual-use goods under its Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), supporting the development of legal frameworks and institutional capacities for the establishment and enforcement of effective export controls on dual-use goods. Via the IcSP instrument and Council Joint Action 2006/419/CFSP(3), Council Joint Action 2008/368/CFSP(4)and Council Decision 2013/391/CFSP(5), the Union also supports the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) which mandates effective transfer controls over weapons of mass destruction-related goods.Controls developed for the implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004), and under the Union dual-use export control assistance programmes, contribute to the overall capacity to effectively implement the ATT since, in many instances, the laws, administrative procedures and agencies in charge of dual-use export control overlap with those in charge of conventional arms export control. It is thus crucial to ensure close coordination between activities carried out in dual-use goods export controls and activities supporting the implementation of the ATT.
(6) The overall large number of activities provided for in this Decision justifies using two implementing entities so that workload can be efficiently shared. The German Federal Office of Economics and Export Control (BAFA) has been entrusted by the Council and the Commission with the implementation of earlier export-control related projects. BAFA has accordingly developed a large body of knowledge and expertise. Expertise France is in charge of EU P2P dual-use goods related projects funded under the IcSP. Its role in implementing this Decision will help ensure proper coordination with dual-use related projects,
(a) to support a number of States to strengthen their arms transfer control systems for effective implementation of the ATT;
(b) to increase awareness and ownership of the ATT at national and regional levels by the relevant national and regional authorities and civil society stakeholders.
(a) assisting beneficiary countries in drafting, updating, and implementing, as appropriate, relevant legislative and administrative measures aimed at establishing and developing an effective system of arms transfer control in line with the requirements of the ATT;
(b) strengthening the expertise and capacities of the beneficiary countries' licensing and enforcement officers notably through best practices sharing, training and access to relevant information sources in order to ensure adequate implementation and enforcement of arms transfer controls;
(c) promoting transparency in the international arms trade, building on the transparency requirements of the ATT;
(d) promoting sustained adherence to the ATT by the beneficiary countries and their neighbours by involving relevant national and regional stakeholders such as national parliaments, competent regional organisations and civil society representatives who have a long term interest in monitoring the effective implementation of the ATT.
— dedicated assistance programmes whereby beneficiary countries will be assisted in a tailored and far-reaching manner to meet the requirements of the ATT. Assistance will be developed, according to an assistance roadmap, to be agreed with the beneficiary countries, that will specify priorities for action, ensure local ownership and indicate commitment where relevant, towards ratification of the ATT;
— ad hoc assistance activities that will address beneficiary countries with limited and more specified needs. Those ad hoc assistance activities will enable the Union to address requests for assistance in a flexible and reactive manner.
(a) reinforcement of arms transfer control capacities and expertise of beneficiary countries;
(b) further awareness of, and ownership by relevant stakeholders such as competent regional organisations, national parliaments and civil society representatives that are interested in the ATT's long term implementation effectiveness;
(c) outreach to other countries with a view to supporting universalisation and effective implementation of the ATT.
— develop a common understanding among experts of the challenges and responses relating to ATT implementation support;
— develop, as appropriate, common material to be used in the assistance imparted by experts (such as a handbook and guidelines) so that advice provided by experts is consistent;
— assess the ‘train the trainer’ component (see 3.1.2.3. and decide upon amendments as necessary.
— BAFA: Ghana; Georgia; Peru; Jamaica; Colombia; Costa Rica
— Expertise France: Senegal; Burkina Faso; Philippines
— Senegal, Burkina Faso, Ghana: up to 3 workshops for up to three ECOWAS countries, where appropriate in cooperation with the ECOWAS Commission, on a rotational basis unless decided otherwise by the three host countries in question;
— Peru, Costa Rica and Columbia: up to 3 workshops for up to three UNLIREC countries, where appropriate in cooperation with UNLIREC, on a rotational basis unless decided otherwise by the three host countries in question;
— Philippines, Georgia, Jamaica: up to two workshops each for up to three of their respective neighbours. Georgia and Philippines host the regional Secretariat of the CBRN Centres of Excellence, which may facilitate synergies with export control-related projects, as well as the identification of, and contacts with, the countries invited.
(a) request for assistance to implement the ATT. This request should be as substantiated as possible, and should identify which specific areas are to be targeted to receive assistance. Where relevant, the requesting country should also refer to past and ongoing assistance from other assistance providers (see also section 6 below) and provide information on its national ATT implementation strategy;
(b) based on the degree of substantiation of the request and the criteria set out in section four the High Representative, in liaison with COARM and the implementing entity, will decide on the eligibility of the requesting country;
(c) where the request for assistance is positively received, an expert assessment visit will be organised by the implementing entity. It should proceed from close contacts between the implementing entity and the third country seeking assistance, and comprise some of the most relevant experts taken from the pool of experts.The expert assessment visit can, where possible, be prepared for by using questionnaires and by collecting existing information; it will be comprised of an initial assessment of the needs and priorities of the country requesting assistance. In particular, it will enable clarification with the country requesting assistance of what is required to effectively implement the ATT and the comparison of those requirements with the existing resources of the country. This initial expert assessment visit will gather all the relevant domestic agencies and stakeholders and identify motivated and reliable local partners;
(d) based on the results of the expert assessment visit, the implementing entity will draft an assistance roadmap. In drafting such an assistance roadmap, the implementing entity will take into account any ATT-related assistance possibly provided through the Voluntary Trust Fund of the ATT, the UN Trust Facility supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR), or by other organisations (see also section 6 below). Where the country seeking assistance has already developed a national implementation strategy for the ATT, the implementing entity will also ensure that the assistance roadmap is consistent with that national implementation strategy;
(e) the draft assistance roadmap will be shared with the beneficiary country with a view to its endorsement by the appropriate authority. The roadmap will be tailored to the beneficiary country and will identify the priorities for assistance;
(f) the roadmap will be implemented with the involvement of relevant experts taken from the pool of experts, and with the involvement of other stakeholders as appropriate. The implementing entity will have the option to delegate the organisation and/or implementation of the assessment process, and the drafting of the assistance roadmap, to an external expert or experts as appropriate. The implementing entity will oversee this process.The range of assistance instruments will, in particular, cover legal reviews, training seminars, workshops and promote the use of web-based tools and information sources such as the EU P2P outreach web portal and the EU P2P newsletter. Those assistance instruments will be selected by the implementing entity according to the exact needs and priorities identified by the expert assessment visit and in line with the roadmap.
— North, Central and Western Africa: 5 (Expertise France)
— Southern and Eastern Africa: 1 (BAFA)
— South East Asia: 2 (BAFA)
— Middle East & Gulf countries and Central Asia: 1 (Expertise France)
— Latin America: 3 (BAFA) and 1 (Expertise France)
— Africa: 3 (Expertise France)
— Central and South East Asia: 2 (BAFA) and 1 (Expertise France)
— Eastern Europe and Caucasus: 2 (BAFA)
— Gulf countries and Middle East: 2 (Expertise France)
— diplomatic and military/defence personnel from the beneficiary countries, in particular authorities responsible for national policies regarding the ATT;
— technical and law-enforcement personnel from the beneficiary countries, in particular licensing authorities, customs, and law enforcement officials;
— representatives of national, regional and international organisations involved in the provision of assistance, as well as representatives of countries interested in providing or receiving strategic trade control assistance;
— representatives of relevant non-governmental organisations (NGOs), think tanks, national parliaments and industry.
— the degree of political and legal commitment to adhere to the ATT and the status of implementation of international instruments relevant to arms trade and arms transfer control that are applicable to the country;
— the likelihood of a successful outcome of the assistance activities;
— the assessment of any possible assistance already received or planned in the area of dual-use and arms transfer control;
— the country's relevance to the global arms trade;
— the country's relevance to the security interests of the Union;
— Official Development Assistance (ODA) eligibility.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) The Arms Trade Treaty (‘ATT’) was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 2 April 2013. The ATT was subsequently opened for signature on 3 June 2013 and entered into force on 24 December 2014. All Member States are parties to the ATT.
(2) The ATT aims to establish the highest possible common international standards to regulate legal trade in conventional weapons and to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion. Key challenges are its effective implementation by States Parties and its universalisation, bearing in mind that regulating the international arms trade is by definition a global endeavour. To contribute to addressing these challenges, the Council adopted Decision 2013/768/CFSP(1)on 16 December 2013, thereby enlarging the export control-related assistance portfolio of the Union with activities specific to the ATT.
(3) Activities carried out under Decision 2013/768/CFSP have addressed sixteen beneficiary countries and have covered a wide range of areas relevant to the establishment and development of a national arms transfer control system as mandated by the ATT. Cooperation has started promisingly with a number of countries that had never before been addressed under other Union export control-related assistance activities, thereby reflecting the global nature of the ATT. Follow-up is therefore advisable towards this sub-set of countries to ensure that progress is sustained and to encourage regional outreach by these beneficiary countries themselves.
(4) In addition to the continuation of activities with beneficiary countries addressed under Decision 2013/768/CFSP, it is advisable to pursue a demand-driven approach whereby assistance activities could be activated at the request of countries having identified needs with regard to ATT implementation. Such an approach has proven to be fair and successful in providing assistance to countries that have expressed commitment and ownership regarding the ATT through their requests for Union assistance. This Decision therefore retains a specific number of activities that will be available upon request.
(5) Union assistance provided under Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/2309(2)addresses a number of countries in the close eastern and southern neighbourhood of the Union. The Union is also a longstanding provider of export control assistance in dual-use goods under its Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), supporting the development of legal frameworks and institutional capacities for the establishment and enforcement of effective export controls on dual-use goods. Via the IcSP instrument and Council Joint Action 2006/419/CFSP(3), Council Joint Action 2008/368/CFSP(4)and Council Decision 2013/391/CFSP(5), the Union also supports the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) which mandates effective transfer controls over weapons of mass destruction-related goods.Controls developed for the implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004), and under the Union dual-use export control assistance programmes, contribute to the overall capacity to effectively implement the ATT since, in many instances, the laws, administrative procedures and agencies in charge of dual-use export control overlap with those in charge of conventional arms export control. It is thus crucial to ensure close coordination between activities carried out in dual-use goods export controls and activities supporting the implementation of the ATT.
(6) The overall large number of activities provided for in this Decision justifies using two implementing entities so that workload can be efficiently shared. The German Federal Office of Economics and Export Control (BAFA) has been entrusted by the Council and the Commission with the implementation of earlier export-control related projects. BAFA has accordingly developed a large body of knowledge and expertise. Expertise France is in charge of EU P2P dual-use goods related projects funded under the IcSP. Its role in implementing this Decision will help ensure proper coordination with dual-use related projects,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
1. For the purpose of supporting the effective implementation and universalisation of the ATT, the Union shall undertake activities with the following objectives:
(a)
to support a number of States to strengthen their arms transfer control systems for effective implementation of the ATT;
(b)
to increase awareness and ownership of the ATT at national and regional levels by the relevant national and regional authorities and civil society stakeholders.
2. In order to achieve the objectives referred to in paragraph 1, the Union shall undertake the following project activities:
(a)
assisting beneficiary countries in drafting, updating, and implementing, as appropriate, relevant legislative and administrative measures aimed at establishing and developing an effective system of arms transfer control in line with the requirements of the ATT;
(b)
strengthening the expertise and capacities of the beneficiary countries’ licensing and enforcement officers notably through best practices sharing, training and access to relevant information sources in order to ensure adequate implementation and enforcement of arms transfer controls;
(c)
promoting transparency in the international arms trade, building on the transparency requirements of the ATT;
(d)
promoting sustained adherence to the ATT by the beneficiary countries and their neighbours by involving relevant national and regional stakeholders such as national parliaments, competent regional organisations and civil society representatives who have a long term interest in monitoring the effective implementation of the ATT.
A detailed description of the project activities referred to in this paragraph is set out in the Annex.

Article 2
1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) shall be responsible for implementing this Decision.
2. The technical implementation of the project activities referred to in Article 1(2) shall be organised by BAFA and Expertise France.
3. BAFA and Expertise France shall perform their tasks under the responsibility of the High Representative. For that purpose, the High Representative shall enter into the necessary arrangements with BAFA and Expertise France.

Article 3
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the project activities referred to in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 7 178 924,36. The total estimated budget of the overall project shall be EUR 8 368 151,36. The part of that estimated budget not covered by the reference amount shall be provided through co-financing by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and Expertise France.
2. The expenditure financed by the reference amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the Union’s budget.
3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure referred to in paragraph 1. For that purpose, it shall conclude the necessary financing agreements with BAFA and Expertise France. The financing agreements shall stipulate that BAFA and Expertise France are to ensure the visibility of the Union’s contribution, appropriate to its size.
4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreements referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.

Article 4
1. The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular reports prepared by the implementing entities. The reports shall form the basis for the evaluation carried out by the Council.
2. The Commission shall provide information on the financial aspects of the implementation of the project activities referred to in Article 1(2).

Article 5
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
It shall expire 36 months after the date of conclusion of the financing agreements referred to in Article 3(3), or six months after the date of its adoption if those financing agreements have not been concluded within that period.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) The Arms Trade Treaty (‘ATT’) was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 2 April 2013. The ATT was subsequently opened for signature on 3 June 2013 and entered into force on 24 December 2014. All Member States are parties to the ATT.
(2) The ATT aims to establish the highest possible common international standards to regulate legal trade in conventional weapons and to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion. Key challenges are its effective implementation by States Parties and its universalisation, bearing in mind that regulating the international arms trade is by definition a global endeavour. To contribute to addressing these challenges, the Council adopted Decision 2013/768/CFSP(1)on 16 December 2013, thereby enlarging the export control-related assistance portfolio of the Union with activities specific to the ATT.
(3) Activities carried out under Decision 2013/768/CFSP have addressed sixteen beneficiary countries and have covered a wide range of areas relevant to the establishment and development of a national arms transfer control system as mandated by the ATT. Cooperation has started promisingly with a number of countries that had never before been addressed under other Union export control-related assistance activities, thereby reflecting the global nature of the ATT. Follow-up is therefore advisable towards this sub-set of countries to ensure that progress is sustained and to encourage regional outreach by these beneficiary countries themselves.
(4) In addition to the continuation of activities with beneficiary countries addressed under Decision 2013/768/CFSP, it is advisable to pursue a demand-driven approach whereby assistance activities could be activated at the request of countries having identified needs with regard to ATT implementation. Such an approach has proven to be fair and successful in providing assistance to countries that have expressed commitment and ownership regarding the ATT through their requests for Union assistance. This Decision therefore retains a specific number of activities that will be available upon request.
(5) Union assistance provided under Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/2309(2)addresses a number of countries in the close eastern and southern neighbourhood of the Union. The Union is also a longstanding provider of export control assistance in dual-use goods under its Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), supporting the development of legal frameworks and institutional capacities for the establishment and enforcement of effective export controls on dual-use goods. Via the IcSP instrument and Council Joint Action 2006/419/CFSP(3), Council Joint Action 2008/368/CFSP(4)and Council Decision 2013/391/CFSP(5), the Union also supports the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) which mandates effective transfer controls over weapons of mass destruction-related goods.Controls developed for the implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004), and under the Union dual-use export control assistance programmes, contribute to the overall capacity to effectively implement the ATT since, in many instances, the laws, administrative procedures and agencies in charge of dual-use export control overlap with those in charge of conventional arms export control. It is thus crucial to ensure close coordination between activities carried out in dual-use goods export controls and activities supporting the implementation of the ATT.
(6) The overall large number of activities provided for in this Decision justifies using two implementing entities so that workload can be efficiently shared. The German Federal Office of Economics and Export Control (BAFA) has been entrusted by the Council and the Commission with the implementation of earlier export-control related projects. BAFA has accordingly developed a large body of knowledge and expertise. Expertise France is in charge of EU P2P dual-use goods related projects funded under the IcSP. Its role in implementing this Decision will help ensure proper coordination with dual-use related projects,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
1. For the purpose of supporting the effective implementation and universalisation of the ATT, the Union shall undertake activities with the following objectives:
(a)
to support a number of States to strengthen their arms transfer control systems for effective implementation of the ATT;
(b)
to increase awareness and ownership of the ATT at national and regional levels by the relevant national and regional authorities and civil society stakeholders.
2. In order to achieve the objectives referred to in paragraph 1, the Union shall undertake the following project activities:
(a)
assisting beneficiary countries in drafting, updating, and implementing, as appropriate, relevant legislative and administrative measures aimed at establishing and developing an effective system of arms transfer control in line with the requirements of the ATT;
(b)
strengthening the expertise and capacities of the beneficiary countries’ licensing and enforcement officers notably through best practices sharing, training and access to relevant information sources in order to ensure adequate implementation and enforcement of arms transfer controls;
(c)
promoting transparency in the international arms trade, building on the transparency requirements of the ATT;
(d)
promoting sustained adherence to the ATT by the beneficiary countries and their neighbours by involving relevant national and regional stakeholders such as national parliaments, competent regional organisations and civil society representatives who have a long term interest in monitoring the effective implementation of the ATT.
A detailed description of the project activities referred to in this paragraph is set out in the Annex.
1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) shall be responsible for implementing this Decision.
2. The technical implementation of the project activities referred to in Article 1(2) shall be organised by BAFA and Expertise France.
3. BAFA and Expertise France shall perform their tasks under the responsibility of the High Representative. For that purpose, the High Representative shall enter into the necessary arrangements with BAFA and Expertise France.
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the project activities referred to in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 7 178 924,36. The total estimated budget of the overall project shall be EUR 8 368 151,36. The part of that estimated budget not covered by the reference amount shall be provided through co-financing by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and Expertise France.
2. The expenditure financed by the reference amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the Union’s budget.
3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure referred to in paragraph 1. For that purpose, it shall conclude the necessary financing agreements with BAFA and Expertise France. The financing agreements shall stipulate that BAFA and Expertise France are to ensure the visibility of the Union’s contribution, appropriate to its size.
4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreements referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.
1. The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular reports prepared by the implementing entities. The reports shall form the basis for the evaluation carried out by the Council.
2. The Commission shall provide information on the financial aspects of the implementation of the project activities referred to in Article 1(2).
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
It shall expire 36 months after the date of conclusion of the financing agreements referred to in Article 3(3), or six months after the date of its adoption if those financing agreements have not been concluded within that period.

1.   Background and rationale for Union support

ANNEXThis Decision builds on earlier Council Decisions that support the UN process leading to the Arms Trade Treaty (‘ATT’) and the promotion of its effective implementation and universalisation(1). The ATT was adopted on 2 April 2013 by the UN General Assembly and entered into force on 24 December 2014.
The declared objective of the ATT is to ‘establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms and prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion’. Its declared purpose is ‘contributing to international and regional peace, security and stability; reducing human suffering and promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among States Parties’. The ATT’s objective and purpose are therefore compatible with the Union’s overall ambition with regard to foreign and security policy as enshrined in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union.
Further to the adoption of the ATT in 2013, the main challenges now lie in its effective implementation and universalisation.
Export control assistance and outreach is crucial to addressing those challenges and are therefore the central elements of this Decision. With regard to export control assistance, this Decision addresses specific partner countries and leaves open the scope for possible assistance to new countries that request it.
Regarding the nine specific partner countries (Senegal, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Philippines, Georgia, Peru, Jamaica, Colombia, Costa Rica), this Decision provides for the further development of cooperation initiated by the first phase of implementation support activities as funded by Decision 2013/768/CFSP.
Regarding the scope for requesting beneficiary countries, this Decision is based on the same proven activities carried out under Decision 2013/768/CFSP:

— | dedicated assistance programmes whereby beneficiary countries will be assisted in a tailored and far-reaching manner to meet the requirements of the ATT. Assistance will be developed, according to an assistance roadmap, to be agreed with the beneficiary countries, that will specify priorities for action, ensure local ownership and indicate commitment where relevant, towards ratification of the ATT;
— | ad hoc assistance activities that will address beneficiary countries with limited and more specified needs. Those ad hoc assistance activities will enable the Union to address requests for assistance in a flexible and reactive manner.Finally, referring to the challenge of universalisation of the ATT, this Decision includes a regional outreach component that builds upon the nine specific partner countries with the participation of the most relevant regional organisations. Another lever in the support of universalisation is outreach through the annual conference of ATT States Parties.
This Decision therefore provides a comprehensive set of assistance and outreach activities in order to contribute to addressing the challenges of effective implementation and universalisation. It builds upon the results and lessons learnt of the earlier phase funded by Decision 2013/768/CFSP and demonstrates the continued and committed support to the ATT by the Union and its Member States.
2. Overall objectivesThe core objective of this Decision is to support a number of States to strengthen their arms transfer control systems for effective implementation of the ATT and to promote its universalisation. Specifically, the Union action will provide:

(a) | reinforcement of arms transfer control capacities and expertise of beneficiary countries;
(b) | further awareness of, and ownership by relevant stakeholders such as competent regional organisations, national parliaments and civil society representatives that are interested in the ATT’s long term implementation effectiveness;
(c) | outreach to other countries with a view to supporting universalisation and effective implementation of the ATT.3. Description of project activities3.1. Strengthening the pool of experts set up by Decision 2013/768/CFSP3.1.1. Project objectiveThe pool of experts set up by Decision 2013/768/CFSP has provided a well-identified, competent and reliable resource to appropriately support assistance activities. With the experience gained, it is now necessary to enlarge the pool in terms of the number of experts and variety of their expertise, and the type of experts used, for example, the inclusion of non-governmental experts; to encourage their longer term involvement in the beneficiary countries; and to develop a ‘train the trainer’ component within the pool.
3.1.2. Project descriptionThe implementing entities will work to enlarge the pool of experts, ensuring a broad geographical representation and range of expertise, insofar as this is possible. They should notably encourage the participation of experts from countries that have recently been successful in developing national arms transfer control systems, including those developed in connection with international assistance received. The implementing entities shall report regularly to the Council Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM) on the pool, its composition and its capacity to shoulder the workload entailed by the activities foreseen by this Decision. Where necessary, COARM may decide on corrective measures.
The overall expertise of the pool of experts should cover the full scope of a national arms transfer control system in particular, legal issues, licensing, customs/enforcement, awareness, prosecution/sanctions, reporting/transparency.
3.1.2.1. ExpertsImplementing entities will ensure a fair and transparent hiring of experts and, regarding Union experts, will fully use the Union roster of outreach experts which is circulated and updated in COARM.
3.1.2.2. Experts meetingsFour two-day meetings of experts will be convened by the implementing entities (two meetings each) during the period of validity of this Decision. These meetings will notably aim to:

— | develop a common understanding among experts of the challenges and responses relating to ATT implementation support;
— | develop, as appropriate, common material to be used in the assistance imparted by experts (such as a handbook and guidelines) so that advice provided by experts is consistent;
— | assess the ‘train the trainer’ component (see 3.1.2.3. and decide upon amendments as necessary.Two meetings, including the first kick-off one, should take place in Brussels. The other two meetings will take place according to the location of the implementing entity. Up to 40 experts will be invited to each meeting, based on geographical balance and considering the needs of the ‘train the trainer’ component (see 3.1.2.3.).
3.1.2.3. ‘Train the Trainer’ componentThis component intends to support the training of a number of beneficiary countries’ experts in order to enable them to effectively train their own colleagues at a later stage. Where possible, the implementing entities will advertise the ‘train the trainer’ component and identify future trainers when starting assistance activities in beneficiary countries under this Decision. These officials will subsequently be registered in the pool of experts and accordingly invited to the experts meetings referred to in 3.1.2.2.
The ‘train the trainer’ component will take place on an extra third day, directly after the experts meetings. It will gather future trainers and the appropriate number of experts from the pool imparting the training.
In between annual experts meetings and their additional ‘train the trainer’ components, contacts between training experts and future trainers will be encouraged and, as appropriate, extra training sessions could be scheduled in the beneficiary countries back to back with the assistance activities planned (for example half a day of a workshop dedicated, referred to in 3.2.3.1.).
Up to 15 future trainers will be enrolled for each session.
The implementing entity in charge of the experts meeting will be responsible for the related ‘train the trainer’ component.
3.2. Further assistance to long term partner countries3.2.1. Long term partner countriesSenegal, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Philippines, Georgia, Peru, Jamaica, Colombia, Costa Rica.
These long term partner countries will be addressed as follows by the implementing entities:

— | BAFA: Ghana; Georgia; Peru; Jamaica; Colombia; Costa Rica
— | Expertise France: Senegal; Burkina Faso; Philippines3.2.2. Project objectiveDecision 2013/768/CFSP has enabled the Union to initiate cooperation based on an initial roadmap, with the nine partner countries referred to in 3.2.1. The full or partial completion of the roadmap has in turn unveiled additional challenges that need to be addressed to progress towards fuller implementation of the ATT. An overall number of activities available will therefore be provided and be allocated according to the needs, interests and absorption capacities of the beneficiary countries.
3.2.3. Project description3.2.3.1. Workshops in countriesAn overall amount of 45 two-day workshops in the beneficiary countries will be set up for the nine long term partner countries as follow up to the work and achievements already made under Decision 2013/768/CFSP.
3.2.3.2. Study Visits in Member StatesTo complement activities taking place in the beneficiary countries, up to nine three-day study visits will be made available to government, licensing and enforcement officials of the long term partner countries to the relevant authorities of Member States. The organisation of the study visit will be ensured by the implementing entity in charge of the long term partner country benefitting from the study visit (see point 3.2.1.).
Due to their high training potential, the study visits should in principle address future trainers of the beneficiary countries, i.e. beneficiary countries’ officials participating in the ‘train the trainer’ component referred to in point 3.1.2.3.
3.3. Regional outreach3.3.1. Project objectiveThe nine beneficiary countries identified may play a fruitful role in regional outreach by further liaising with their close neighbouring countries on arms transfer issues and on the implementation of the ATT. This could encourage south-south cooperation over the longer term.
This Decision therefore provides them with the possibility, jointly or individually, to host, according to their capacities up to three of their neighbouring countries for sub-regional workshops.
3.3.2. Project descriptionUp to 12 two-day workshops will be planned for regional outreach purposes. Unless agreed otherwise with the host countries, they will take place as follows:

— | Senegal, Burkina Faso, Ghana: up to 3 workshops for up to three ECOWAS countries, where appropriate in cooperation with the ECOWAS Commission, on a rotational basis unless decided otherwise by the three host countries in question;
— | Peru, Costa Rica and Columbia: up to 3 workshops for up to three UNLIREC countries, where appropriate in cooperation with UNLIREC, on a rotational basis unless decided otherwise by the three host countries in question;
— | Philippines, Georgia, Jamaica: up to two workshops each for up to three of their respective neighbours. Georgia and Philippines host the regional Secretariat of the CBRN Centres of Excellence, which may facilitate synergies with export control-related projects, as well as the identification of, and contacts with, the countries invited.Up to ten officials per invited neighbouring country will be invited.
Expertise France will address workshops relating to Senegal, Burkina Faso, Ghana and the Philippines and BAFA will address workshops relating to Peru, Costa Rica, Columbia, Georgia and Jamaica.
3.4. Roadmap-based assistance programmes3.4.1. Project objectiveThe objective of the dedicated assistance programmes and their related roadmaps is to strengthen the capacities of the beneficiary countries to meet the ATT requirements in a global and sustained manner. The roadmap will provide predictability to the new beneficiary country as to what is planned in terms of assistance and will map the improvements that can be expected in its transfer control capacities. Beneficiary countries will be countries requesting assistance after adoption of this Decision.
3.4.2. Project descriptionNational assistance programmes will be established for up to nine beneficiary countries.
The dedicated assistance programmes should be developed according to the following steps:

(a) | request for assistance to implement the ATT. This request should be as substantiated as possible, and should identify which specific areas are to be targeted to receive assistance. Where relevant, the requesting country should also refer to past and ongoing assistance from other assistance providers (see also section 6 below) and provide information on its national ATT implementation strategy;
(b) | based on the degree of substantiation of the request and the criteria set out in section four the High Representative, in liaison with COARM and the implementing entity, will decide on the eligibility of the requesting country;
(c) | where the request for assistance is positively received, an expert assessment visit will be organised by the implementing entity. It should proceed from close contacts between the implementing entity and the third country seeking assistance, and comprise some of the most relevant experts taken from the pool of experts.The expert assessment visit can, where possible, be prepared for by using questionnaires and by collecting existing information; it will be comprised of an initial assessment of the needs and priorities of the country requesting assistance. In particular, it will enable clarification with the country requesting assistance of what is required to effectively implement the ATT and the comparison of those requirements with the existing resources of the country. This initial expert assessment visit will gather all the relevant domestic agencies and stakeholders and identify motivated and reliable local partners;
(d) | based on the results of the expert assessment visit, the implementing entity will draft an assistance roadmap. In drafting such an assistance roadmap, the implementing entity will take into account any ATT-related assistance possibly provided through the Voluntary Trust Fund of the ATT, the UN Trust Facility supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR), or by other organisations (see also section 6 below). Where the country seeking assistance has already developed a national implementation strategy for the ATT, the implementing entity will also ensure that the assistance roadmap is consistent with that national implementation strategy;
(e) | the draft assistance roadmap will be shared with the beneficiary country with a view to its endorsement by the appropriate authority. The roadmap will be tailored to the beneficiary country and will identify the priorities for assistance;
(f) | the roadmap will be implemented with the involvement of relevant experts taken from the pool of experts, and with the involvement of other stakeholders as appropriate. The implementing entity will have the option to delegate the organisation and/or implementation of the assessment process, and the drafting of the assistance roadmap, to an external expert or experts as appropriate. The implementing entity will oversee this process.The range of assistance instruments will, in particular, cover legal reviews, training seminars, workshops and promote the use of web-based tools and information sources such as the EU P2P outreach web portal and the EU P2P newsletter. Those assistance instruments will be selected by the implementing entity according to the exact needs and priorities identified by the expert assessment visit and in line with the roadmap.3.4.3. Geographical breakdown of the roadmapsTaking into account the activities already carried out under Decision 2013/768/CFSP and their desirable follow-up, the nine roadmaps will be implemented as follows (the implementing entity in charge is in brackets):

— | North, Central and Western Africa: 5 (Expertise France)
— | Southern and Eastern Africa: 1 (BAFA)
— | South East Asia: 2 (BAFA)
— | Middle East & Gulf countries and Central Asia: 1 (Expertise France)In accordance with the UN practice, contracts concluded with the implementing entities will further specify which third countries of the above mentioned geographical regions relate to the implementing entities.
3.5. Ad hoc assistance workshops3.5.1. Project objectiveThe objective of the ad hoc assistance workshops is to strengthen the arms transfer control capacities of the beneficiary countries to meet the ATT requirements in a targeted and relevant manner. These ad hoc assistance activities will enable the Union to respond in a flexible and reactive manner to requests for assistance that identify specific needs relevant to the implementation of the ATT. They will be able to address either one beneficiary country individually, or a number of them having similar needs.
3.5.2. Project descriptionUp to 14 two-day workshops will be provided to respond to targeted requests for assistance and expressions of interest to develop one or more specific areas of an arms transfer control system.
These workshops will provide tailored assistance and will address the specific issue(s) raised by the requesting country or countries. They will take place in the beneficiary countries and expertise will be imparted by experts from the pool of experts.
The High Representative, in consultation with COARM, will decide on how to respond to the assistance requests. The High Representative’s assessment will in particular be guided by the criteria set out in section 4, the accuracy of the request and how it identifies the issue(s) at stake, and will consider the geographical balance.
3.5.3. Geographical breakdown of the ad hoc assistance workshopsThe 14 ad hoc assistance workshops will be implemented as follows (the implementing entity in charge is in brackets):

— | Latin America: 3 (BAFA) and 1 (Expertise France)
— | Africa: 3 (Expertise France)
— | Central and South East Asia: 2 (BAFA) and 1 (Expertise France)
— | Eastern Europe and Caucasus: 2 (BAFA)
— | Gulf countries and Middle East: 2 (Expertise France)In accordance with UN practice, contracts concluded with the implementing entities will further specify which third countries of the above mentioned geographical regions relate to the implementing entities.
3.6. Final conference of countries that are beneficiaries of ATT assistance activities3.6.1. Project objectiveThe objective of the conference is to increase the awareness and ownership of relevant stakeholders such as competent regional organisations, national parliaments and civil society representatives that are interested in the ATT’s long term implementation effectiveness.
3.6.2. Project descriptionThe project will take the form of a two-day conference to be organised close to the end of the implementation of this Decision and possibly back to back with a COARM meeting. BAFA will be in charge of its implementation. This conference will gather relevant representatives of the nine long-term beneficiaries (3.2.1.) and of countries beneficiary of activities referred to in 3.4. and 3.5.
The Conference will facilitate exchanges of experience by the beneficiary countries, provide information on their positions vis-à-vis the ATT and the ATT’s ratification and implementation status, and will enable the sharing of relevant information with representatives of national parliaments, regional organisations and civil society.
Participants in the Conference should therefore include:

— | diplomatic and military/defence personnel from the beneficiary countries, in particular authorities responsible for national policies regarding the ATT;
— | technical and law-enforcement personnel from the beneficiary countries, in particular licensing authorities, customs, and law enforcement officials;
— | representatives of national, regional and international organisations involved in the provision of assistance, as well as representatives of countries interested in providing or receiving strategic trade control assistance;
— | representatives of relevant non-governmental organisations (NGOs), think tanks, national parliaments and industry.Up to 80 participants are expected to participate in the Conference. Its location and the final list of countries and organisations invited will be determined by the High Representative in consultation with COARM, on the basis of a proposal made by the implementing entity.
3.7. Side events in the margins of ATT Conferences of States Parties3.7.1. Project objectiveAnnual Conferences of ATT States Parties offer a unique opportunity to reach out to relevant officials and stakeholders in charge of ATT matters. Union-funded side events will notably enable awareness-raising about the Union’s implementation support activities, raise awareness also of countries which may subsequently seek assistance, and promote good practices notably by beneficiary countries.
3.7.2. Project descriptionThree side events will take place over the duration of the programme, i.e. one for every annual Conference of ATT States Parties. Expertise France will be in charge of their implementation. Union funds may notably cover the travel expenses of up to three experts/officials from beneficiary countries.
4. Beneficiaries of project activities referred to in sections 3.4. and 3.5.Beneficiaries of project activities referred to in sections 3.4. and 3.5. may be States that request assistance with a view to implementing the ATT and that will be selected on the basis of, inter alia, the following criteria:

— | the degree of political and legal commitment to adhere to the ATT and the status of implementation of international instruments relevant to arms trade and arms transfer control that are applicable to the country;
— | the likelihood of a successful outcome of the assistance activities;
— | the assessment of any possible assistance already received or planned in the area of dual-use and arms transfer control;
— | the country’s relevance to the global arms trade;
— | the country’s relevance to the security interests of the Union;
— | Official Development Assistance (ODA) eligibility.5. Implementing entitiesThe workload resulting from activities under this Decision makes it advisable to use two competent implementing entities: BAFA and Expertise France. They will, where appropriate, partner with, and/or delegate to, Member States’ export control agencies, relevant regional and international organisations, think tanks, research institutes and NGOs.
BAFA has been entrusted by the Council and the Commission to implement a number of earlier export-control related projects. BAFA has accordingly developed a large body of knowledge and expertise. Expertise France is in charge of EU P2P dual-use goods-related projects funded under the IcSP. Its role in implementing this Decision will help ensure proper coordination with dual use related projects. Taken together, both implementing entities therefore have the proven experience, qualifications and necessary expertise over the full range of relevant Union export control activities, both in the dual-use and arms export control areas.
6. Coordination with other relevant assistance activitiesThe utmost attention should also be paid by the implementing entities to ATT-relevant activities carried out under the UN programme of action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects and its Implementation Support System (PoA-ISS), UNSCR 1540 (2004), the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund and the UNSCAR, as well as bilateral assistance activities. The implementing entities should liaise as appropriate with other assistance providers in order to ensure that there is no duplication of effort and that there is maximum consistency and complementarity.
The project shall also aim to increase among the beneficiary countries the awareness of Union instruments able to support south-south cooperation in export controls. In this regard, the assistance activities should provide information on and promote available instruments such as the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence Initiative and other EU P2P Programmes.
7. Union visibility and availability of assistance materialMaterial produced by the project will ensure the visibility of the Union, based in particular on the logo and graphic chart of the Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Actions including the logo ‘EU P2P export control programme’. Union Delegations should be involved in events in third countries to enhance political follow-up and visibility.
The EU P2P web portal (https://export-control.jrc.ec.europa.eu) will be promoted for the purpose of the ATT-related assistance activities under this Decision. The implementing entities should therefore, in the respective assistance activities they carry out, include information on the web portal and encourage the consultation and use of the portal’s technical resources. They should ensure the visibility of the Union in the promotion of the web portal. Furthermore, activities should be promoted through the EU P2P newsletter.
8. Impact assessmentThe impact of activities provided for by this Decision should be technically assessed upon their completion. Based on information and reports provided by the implementing entities, the impact assessment will be carried out by the High Representative, in cooperation with COARM and, as appropriate, with the Union Delegations in the beneficiary countries, as well as with other relevant stakeholders.
Regarding countries that have benefited from a dedicated assistance programme, the impact assessment should pay special attention to the number of beneficiary countries that have ratified the ATT and to the development of their arms transfer control capacities. Such assessment of the arms transfer control capacities of the beneficiary countries should, in particular, cover the preparation and issuance of national relevant regulations, the fulfilment of ATT reporting obligations, and the empowerment of a relevant body in charge of arms transfer control.
9. ReportingThe implementing entities will prepare regular reports, including after the completion of each of the activities. The reports should be submitted to the High Representative no later than six weeks after the completion of relevant activities.

(1) See Decision 2009/1012/CFSP; Decision 2010/336/CFSP; Decision 2012/711/CFSP; Decision 2013/43/CFSP and Decision 2013/768/CFSP.

Pending: 32017D0154

28.1.2017 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 23/21
(1) On 27 December 2001, the Council adopted Common Position 2001/931/CFSP(1).
(2) On 12 July 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/1136(2)updating the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (‘the list’).
(3) In accordance with Article 1(6) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, it is necessary to review at regular intervals the names of persons, groups and entities on the list to ensure that there are grounds for keeping them thereon.
(4) This Decision sets out the result of the review that the Council has carried out in respect of persons, groups and entities to which Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply.
(5) The Council has verified that competent authorities, as referred to in Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, have taken decisions with regard to all persons, groups and entities on the list to the effect that they have been involved in terrorist acts within the meaning of Article 1(2) and (3) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP. The Council has also concluded that the persons, groups and entities to which Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply should continue to be subject to the specific restrictive measures provided for therein.
(6) The list should be updated accordingly and Decision (CFSP) 2016/1136 should be repealed,
1. ABDOLLAHI, Hamed (a.k.a. Mustafa Abdullahi), born 11 August 1960 in Iran. Passport No: D9004878.
2. AL-NASSER, Abdelkarim Hussein Mohamed, born in Al Ihsa (Saudi Arabia), citizen of Saudi Arabia.
3. AL YACOUB, Ibrahim Salih Mohammed, born 16 October 1966 in Tarut (Saudi Arabia), citizen of Saudi Arabia.
4. ARBABSIAR, Manssor (a.k.a. Mansour Arbabsiar), born 6 or 15 March 1955 in Iran, Iranian and US national. Passport No: C2002515 (Iran); Passport No: 477845448 (USA). National ID No: 07442833, expiry date 15 March 2016 (USA driving licence).
5. BOUYERI, Mohammed (a.k.a. Abu ZUBAIR, a.k.a. SOBIAR, a.k.a. Abu ZOUBAIR), born 8 March 1978 in Amsterdam (the Netherlands) — member of the ‘Hofstadgroep’.
6. EL HAJJ, Hassan Hassan, born 22 March 1988 in Zaghdraiya, Sidon, Lebanon, Canadian citizen. Passport No: JX446643 (Canada).
7. IZZ-AL-DIN, Hasan (a.k.a. GARBAYA, Ahmed, a.k.a. SA-ID, a.k.a. SALWWAN, Samir), born 1963 in Lebanon, citizen of Lebanon.
8. MELIAD, Farah, born 5 November 1980 in Sydney (Australia), Australian citizen. Passport No: M2719127 (Australia).
9. MOHAMMED, Khalid Shaikh (a.k.a. ALI, Salem, a.k.a. BIN KHALID, Fahd Bin Adballah, a.k.a. HENIN, Ashraf Refaat Nabith, a.k.a. WADOOD, Khalid Adbul), born 14 April 1965 or 1 March 1964 in Pakistan, Passport No: 488555.
10. ȘANLI, Dalokay (a.k.a. Sinan), born 13 October 1976 in Pülümür (Turkey).
11. SHAHLAI, Abdul Reza (a.k.a. Abdol Reza Shala'i, a.k.a. Abd-al Reza Shalai, a.k.a. Abdorreza Shahlai, a.k.a. Abdolreza Shahla'i, a.k.a. Abdul-Reza Shahlaee, a.k.a. Hajj Yusef, a.k.a. Haji Yusif, a.k.a. Hajji Yasir, a.k.a. Hajji Yusif, a.k.a.Yusuf Abu-al-Karkh), born circa 1957 in Iran. Addresses: (1) Kermanshah, Iran, (2) Mehran Military Base, Ilam Province, Iran.
12. SHAKURI, Ali Gholam, born circa 1965 in Tehran, Iran.
13. SOLEIMANI, Qasem (a.k.a. Ghasem Soleymani, a.k.a. Qasmi Sulayman, a.k.a. Qasem Soleymani, a.k.a. Qasem Solaimani, a.k.a. Qasem Salimani, a.k.a. Qasem Solemani, a.k.a. Qasem Sulaimani, a.k.a. Qasem Sulemani), born 11 March 1957 in Iran. Iranian national. Passport No: 008827 (Iran Diplomatic), issued 1999. Title: Major General.
1. ‘Abu Nidal Organisation’ — ‘ANO’ (a.k.a. ‘Fatah Revolutionary Council’, a.k.a. ‘Arab Revolutionary Brigades’, a.k.a. ‘Black September’, a.k.a. ‘Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims’).
2. ‘Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade’.
3. ‘Al-Aqsa e.V.’.
4. ‘Babbar Khalsa’.
5. ‘Communist Party of the Philippines’, including ‘New People's Army’ — ‘NPA’, Philippines.
6. ‘Gama'a al-Islamiyya’ (a.k.a. ‘Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya’) (‘Islamic Group’ — ‘IG’).
7. ‘İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar Cephesi’ — ‘IBDA-C’ (‘Great Islamic Eastern Warriors Front’).
8. ‘Hamas’, including ‘Hamas-Izz al-Din al-Qassem’.
9. ‘Hizballah Military Wing’ (a.k.a. ‘Hezbollah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizbullah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizbollah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hezballah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hisbollah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizbu'llah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizb Allah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Jihad Council’ (and all units reporting to it, including the External Security Organisation)).
10. ‘Hizbul Mujahideen’ — ‘HM’.
11. ‘Hofstadgroep’.
12. ‘Khalistan Zindabad Force’ — ‘KZF’.
13. ‘Kurdistan Workers' Party’ — ‘PKK’ (a.k.a. ‘KADEK’, a.k.a. ‘KONGRA-GEL’).
14. ‘Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’ — ‘LTTE’.
15. ‘Ejército de Liberación Nacional’ (‘National Liberation Army’).
16. ‘Palestinian Islamic Jihad’ — ‘PIJ’.
17. ‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’ — ‘PFLP’.
18. ‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine — General Command’ (a.k.a. ‘PFLP — General Command’).
19. ‘Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia’ — ‘FARC’ (‘Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’).
20. ‘Devrimci Halk Kurtuluș Partisi-Cephesi’ — ‘DHKP/C’ (a.k.a. ‘Devrimci Sol’ (‘Revolutionary Left’), a.k.a. ‘Dev Sol’) (‘Revolutionary People's Liberation Army/Front/Party’).
21. ‘Sendero Luminoso’ — ‘SL’ (‘Shining Path’).
22. ‘Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan’ — ‘TAK’ (a.k.a. ‘Kurdistan Freedom Falcons’, a.k.a. ‘Kurdistan Freedom Hawks’).
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 27 December 2001, the Council adopted Common Position 2001/931/CFSP(1).
(2) On 12 July 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/1136(2)updating the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (‘the list’).
(3) In accordance with Article 1(6) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, it is necessary to review at regular intervals the names of persons, groups and entities on the list to ensure that there are grounds for keeping them thereon.
(4) This Decision sets out the result of the review that the Council has carried out in respect of persons, groups and entities to which Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply.
(5) The Council has verified that competent authorities, as referred to in Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, have taken decisions with regard to all persons, groups and entities on the list to the effect that they have been involved in terrorist acts within the meaning of Article 1(2) and (3) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP. The Council has also concluded that the persons, groups and entities to which Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply should continue to be subject to the specific restrictive measures provided for therein.
(6) The list should be updated accordingly and Decision (CFSP) 2016/1136 should be repealed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
The list of persons, groups and entities to which Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply is set out in the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2
Decision (CFSP) 2016/1136 is repealed.

Article 3
This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 27 December 2001, the Council adopted Common Position 2001/931/CFSP(1).
(2) On 12 July 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/1136(2)updating the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (‘the list’).
(3) In accordance with Article 1(6) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, it is necessary to review at regular intervals the names of persons, groups and entities on the list to ensure that there are grounds for keeping them thereon.
(4) This Decision sets out the result of the review that the Council has carried out in respect of persons, groups and entities to which Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply.
(5) The Council has verified that competent authorities, as referred to in Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, have taken decisions with regard to all persons, groups and entities on the list to the effect that they have been involved in terrorist acts within the meaning of Article 1(2) and (3) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP. The Council has also concluded that the persons, groups and entities to which Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply should continue to be subject to the specific restrictive measures provided for therein.
(6) The list should be updated accordingly and Decision (CFSP) 2016/1136 should be repealed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The list of persons, groups and entities to which Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply is set out in the Annex to this Decision.
Decision (CFSP) 2016/1136 is repealed.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.

LIST OF PERSONS, GROUPS AND ENTITIES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 1

ANNEXI. PERSONS
| 1. | ABDOLLAHI, Hamed (a.k.a. Mustafa Abdullahi), born 11 August 1960 in Iran. Passport No: D9004878.
| 2. | AL-NASSER, Abdelkarim Hussein Mohamed, born in Al Ihsa (Saudi Arabia), citizen of Saudi Arabia.
| 3. | AL YACOUB, Ibrahim Salih Mohammed, born 16 October 1966 in Tarut (Saudi Arabia), citizen of Saudi Arabia.
| 4. | ARBABSIAR, Manssor (a.k.a. Mansour Arbabsiar), born 6 or 15 March 1955 in Iran, Iranian and US national. Passport No: C2002515 (Iran); Passport No: 477845448 (USA). National ID No: 07442833, expiry date 15 March 2016 (USA driving licence).
| 5. | BOUYERI, Mohammed (a.k.a. Abu ZUBAIR, a.k.a. SOBIAR, a.k.a. Abu ZOUBAIR), born 8 March 1978 in Amsterdam (the Netherlands) — member of the ‘Hofstadgroep’.
| 6. | EL HAJJ, Hassan Hassan, born 22 March 1988 in Zaghdraiya, Sidon, Lebanon, Canadian citizen. Passport No: JX446643 (Canada).
| 7. | IZZ-AL-DIN, Hasan (a.k.a. GARBAYA, Ahmed, a.k.a. SA-ID, a.k.a. SALWWAN, Samir), born 1963 in Lebanon, citizen of Lebanon.
| 8. | MELIAD, Farah, born 5 November 1980 in Sydney (Australia), Australian citizen. Passport No: M2719127 (Australia).
| 9. | MOHAMMED, Khalid Shaikh (a.k.a. ALI, Salem, a.k.a. BIN KHALID, Fahd Bin Adballah, a.k.a. HENIN, Ashraf Refaat Nabith, a.k.a. WADOOD, Khalid Adbul), born 14 April 1965 or 1 March 1964 in Pakistan, Passport No: 488555.
| 10. | ȘANLI, Dalokay (a.k.a. Sinan), born 13 October 1976 in Pülümür (Turkey).
| 11. | SHAHLAI, Abdul Reza (a.k.a. Abdol Reza Shala’i, a.k.a. Abd-al Reza Shalai, a.k.a. Abdorreza Shahlai, a.k.a. Abdolreza Shahla’i, a.k.a. Abdul-Reza Shahlaee, a.k.a. Hajj Yusef, a.k.a. Haji Yusif, a.k.a. Hajji Yasir, a.k.a. Hajji Yusif, a.k.a.Yusuf Abu-al-Karkh), born circa 1957 in Iran. Addresses: (1) Kermanshah, Iran, (2) Mehran Military Base, Ilam Province, Iran.
| 12. | SHAKURI, Ali Gholam, born circa 1965 in Tehran, Iran.
| 13. | SOLEIMANI, Qasem (a.k.a. Ghasem Soleymani, a.k.a. Qasmi Sulayman, a.k.a. Qasem Soleymani, a.k.a. Qasem Solaimani, a.k.a. Qasem Salimani, a.k.a. Qasem Solemani, a.k.a. Qasem Sulaimani, a.k.a. Qasem Sulemani), born 11 March 1957 in Iran. Iranian national. Passport No: 008827 (Iran Diplomatic), issued 1999. Title: Major General.II. GROUPS AND ENTITIES
| 1. | ‘Abu Nidal Organisation’ — ‘ANO’ (a.k.a. ‘Fatah Revolutionary Council’, a.k.a. ‘Arab Revolutionary Brigades’, a.k.a. ‘Black September’, a.k.a. ‘Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims’).
| 2. | ‘Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade’.
| 3. | ‘Al-Aqsa e.V.’.
| 4. | ‘Babbar Khalsa’.
| 5. | ‘Communist Party of the Philippines’, including ‘New People’s Army’ — ‘NPA’, Philippines.
| 6. | ‘Gama’a al-Islamiyya’ (a.k.a. ‘Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya’) (‘Islamic Group’ — ‘IG’).
| 7. | ‘İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar Cephesi’ — ‘IBDA-C’ (‘Great Islamic Eastern Warriors Front’).
| 8. | ‘Hamas’, including ‘Hamas-Izz al-Din al-Qassem’.
| 9. | ‘Hizballah Military Wing’ (a.k.a. ‘Hezbollah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizbullah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizbollah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hezballah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hisbollah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizbu’llah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizb Allah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Jihad Council’ (and all units reporting to it, including the External Security Organisation)).
| 10. | ‘Hizbul Mujahideen’ — ‘HM’.
| 11. | ‘Hofstadgroep’.
| 12. | ‘Khalistan Zindabad Force’ — ‘KZF’.
| 13. | ‘Kurdistan Workers’ Party’ — ‘PKK’ (a.k.a. ‘KADEK’, a.k.a. ‘KONGRA-GEL’).
| 14. | ‘Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’ — ‘LTTE’.
| 15. | ‘Ejército de Liberación Nacional’ (‘National Liberation Army’).
| 16. | ‘Palestinian Islamic Jihad’ — ‘PIJ’.
| 17. | ‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’ — ‘PFLP’.
| 18. | ‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine — General Command’ (a.k.a. ‘PFLP — General Command’).
| 19. | ‘Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia’ — ‘FARC’ (‘Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’).
| 20. | ‘Devrimci Halk Kurtuluș Partisi-Cephesi’ — ‘DHKP/C’ (a.k.a. ‘Devrimci Sol’ (‘Revolutionary Left’), a.k.a. ‘Dev Sol’) (‘Revolutionary People’s Liberation Army/Front/Party’).
| 21. | ‘Sendero Luminoso’ — ‘SL’ (‘Shining Path’).
| 22. | ‘Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan’ — ‘TAK’ (a.k.a. ‘Kurdistan Freedom Falcons’, a.k.a. ‘Kurdistan Freedom Hawks’).

Pending: 32017D0021

5.7.2017 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 172/32
(1) On 19 June 2014 the European Banking Authority (EBA) adopted its Guidelines on harmonised definitions and templates for funding plans of credit institutions under Recommendation A4 of ESRB/2012/2(3)(hereinafter the ‘EBA Guidelines’). The EBA Guidelines seek to establish consistent, efficient and effective supervisory practices by harmonising templates and definitions to facilitate the reporting of funding plans by credit institutions.
(2) The EBA Guidelines are addressed to competent authorities, as defined in Article 4(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council(4), and to institutions that report funding plans to their competent authorities in accordance with the national implementation framework of Recommendation ESRB/2012/2 of the European Systemic Risk Board(5).
(3) For the exclusive purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred on it by Articles 4(1) and (2) and 5(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) is considered, as appropriate, the competent authority or the designated authority in the participating Member States as established by Union law. Therefore, the ECB is the addressee of the EBA Guidelines regarding credit institutions that are classified as significant in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.
(4) In order to comply with the EBA Guidelines, the ECB should ensure that significant credit institutions report their funding plans in accordance with the harmonised templates and definitions referred to in the funding plan template attached to the EBA Guidelines.
(5) In accordance with Article 6(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, and Article 21 of Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 (ECB/2014/17), without prejudice to the ECB's power to directly receive reported information from credit institutions, or to have direct access to that information on an ongoing basis, the national competent authorities will specifically provide the ECB with all information necessary for the purposes of carrying out the tasks conferred on the ECB by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.
(6) Considering that the information on funding plans is necessary for micro and macroprudential purposes, the ECB has decided to require national competent authorities to provide it with the funding plans of credit institutions.
(7) The manner in which national competent authorities provide the ECB with the funding plans needs to be specified. In particular, the format, frequency and timing of the submission of information, as well as details of the quality checks performed by national competent authorities before submitting information to the ECB should be specified,
(1) ‘significant credit institution’ means a credit institution which has the status of a significant supervised entity in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 (ECB/2014/17); and
(2) ‘less significant credit institution’ means a credit institution which does not have the status of a significant supervised entity in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 (ECB/2014/17).
(a) significant credit institutions at the highest level of consolidation in the participating Member States on a consolidated basis;
(b) significant credit institutions that are not part of a supervised group on an individual basis;
(c) less significant credit institutions in respect of which the relevant national competent authority is obliged to report to the EBA the relevant funding plans in accordance with Decision EBA/DC/2015/130 of the European Banking Authority(6)on a consolidated basis or on an individual basis if those institutions are not part of a supervised group.
(a) national competent authorities shall provide information, if applicable, on the developments implied by the data submitted; and
(b) the information must be complete: existing gaps must be acknowledged, explained to the ECB and, if applicable, filled without undue delay.
THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions(1), and in particular Article 6(2) thereof,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated authorities (SSM Framework Regulation) (ECB/2014/17)(2), and in particular Article 21 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal of the Supervisory Board,
(1) On 19 June 2014 the European Banking Authority (EBA) adopted its Guidelines on harmonised definitions and templates for funding plans of credit institutions under Recommendation A4 of ESRB/2012/2(3)(hereinafter the ‘EBA Guidelines’). The EBA Guidelines seek to establish consistent, efficient and effective supervisory practices by harmonising templates and definitions to facilitate the reporting of funding plans by credit institutions.
(2) The EBA Guidelines are addressed to competent authorities, as defined in Article 4(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council(4), and to institutions that report funding plans to their competent authorities in accordance with the national implementation framework of Recommendation ESRB/2012/2 of the European Systemic Risk Board(5).
(3) For the exclusive purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred on it by Articles 4(1) and (2) and 5(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) is considered, as appropriate, the competent authority or the designated authority in the participating Member States as established by Union law. Therefore, the ECB is the addressee of the EBA Guidelines regarding credit institutions that are classified as significant in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.
(4) In order to comply with the EBA Guidelines, the ECB should ensure that significant credit institutions report their funding plans in accordance with the harmonised templates and definitions referred to in the funding plan template attached to the EBA Guidelines.
(5) In accordance with Article 6(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, and Article 21 of Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 (ECB/2014/17), without prejudice to the ECB’s power to directly receive reported information from credit institutions, or to have direct access to that information on an ongoing basis, the national competent authorities will specifically provide the ECB with all information necessary for the purposes of carrying out the tasks conferred on the ECB by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.
(6) Considering that the information on funding plans is necessary for micro and macroprudential purposes, the ECB has decided to require national competent authorities to provide it with the funding plans of credit institutions.
(7) The manner in which national competent authorities provide the ECB with the funding plans needs to be specified. In particular, the format, frequency and timing of the submission of information, as well as details of the quality checks performed by national competent authorities before submitting information to the ECB should be specified,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Scope
Article 1
This Decision requires national competent authorities to provide the funding plans of certain significant and less significant credit institutions to the ECB, and lays down procedures concerning the submission to the ECB of such funding plans.

Definitions
Article 2
For the purposes of this Decision, the definitions contained in Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 (ECB/2014/17) shall apply, together with the following definitions:
(1)
‘significant credit institution’ means a credit institution which has the status of a significant supervised entity in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 (ECB/2014/17); and
(2)
‘less significant credit institution’ means a credit institution which does not have the status of a significant supervised entity in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 (ECB/2014/17).

Requirements for reporting funding plans
Article 3
1. National competent authorities shall provide the ECB with the funding plans that are in line with the EBA Guidelines of the following credit institutions established in their respective participating Member States:
(a)
significant credit institutions at the highest level of consolidation in the participating Member States on a consolidated basis;
(b)
significant credit institutions that are not part of a supervised group on an individual basis;
(c)
less significant credit institutions in respect of which the relevant national competent authority is obliged to report to the EBA the relevant funding plans in accordance with Decision EBA/DC/2015/130 of the European Banking Authority(6)on a consolidated basis or on an individual basis if those institutions are not part of a supervised group.
2. National competent authorities that collect the funding plans of significant credit institutions that are not referred to in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 shall provide these funding plans to the ECB if they comply with the EBA Guidelines.
3. The funding plans shall be submitted to the ECB in accordance with the harmonised templates and definitions referred to in the funding plan template attached to the EBA Guidelines. The funding plans shall have a reference date of 31 December of the previous year.

Remittance dates
Article 4
1. National competent authorities shall submit the funding plans of the significant credit institutions referred to in Article 3(1)(a) and (b) to the ECB by the 10th working day following the remittance dates referred to in paragraph 8 of the EBA Guidelines.
2. National competent authorities shall submit the funding plans of the credit institutions referred to in Article 3(1)(c) and Article 3(2) to the ECB by 12.00 CET on the dates by which the national competent authorities have to submit funding plans to the EBA under paragraph 8 of the EBA Guidelines.

Data quality checks
Article 5
1. National competent authorities shall monitor and ensure the quality and reliability of the data made available to the ECB. National competent authorities shall apply the validation rules developed and maintained by the EBA and they shall apply the additional data quality checks defined by the ECB in cooperation with the national competent authorities.
2. Further to the compliance with the validation rules and quality checks, the data shall be submitted in accordance with the following additional minimum standards for accuracy:
(a)
national competent authorities shall provide information, if applicable, on the developments implied by the data submitted; and
(b)
the information must be complete: existing gaps must be acknowledged, explained to the ECB and, if applicable, filled without undue delay.

Qualitative information
Article 6
1. National competent authorities shall submit to the ECB without undue delay the corresponding explanations in the event that the data quality for a given table in the taxonomy cannot be warranted.
2. In addition, national competent authorities shall communicate to the ECB the reasons for any significant revisions submitted.

Specification of the transmission format
Article 7
1. National competent authorities shall submit the data specified in this Decision using the applicable eXtensible Business Reporting Language taxonomy in order to provide a uniform technical format for the exchange of data regarding the EBA Guidelines.
2. The supervised entities shall be identified in the corresponding transmission by the use of the Legal Entity Identifier.

First reporting reference dates
Article 8
The first reference date for the reporting pursuant to Article 3 shall be 31 December 2017.

Taking effect
Article 9
This Decision shall take effect on the day of its notification to the addressees.

Addressees
Article 10
This Decision is addressed to the national competent authorities of the participating Member States.

THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions(1), and in particular Article 6(2) thereof,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated authorities (SSM Framework Regulation) (ECB/2014/17)(2), and in particular Article 21 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal of the Supervisory Board,
(1) On 19 June 2014 the European Banking Authority (EBA) adopted its Guidelines on harmonised definitions and templates for funding plans of credit institutions under Recommendation A4 of ESRB/2012/2(3)(hereinafter the ‘EBA Guidelines’). The EBA Guidelines seek to establish consistent, efficient and effective supervisory practices by harmonising templates and definitions to facilitate the reporting of funding plans by credit institutions.
(2) The EBA Guidelines are addressed to competent authorities, as defined in Article 4(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council(4), and to institutions that report funding plans to their competent authorities in accordance with the national implementation framework of Recommendation ESRB/2012/2 of the European Systemic Risk Board(5).
(3) For the exclusive purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred on it by Articles 4(1) and (2) and 5(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, the European Central Bank (ECB) is considered, as appropriate, the competent authority or the designated authority in the participating Member States as established by Union law. Therefore, the ECB is the addressee of the EBA Guidelines regarding credit institutions that are classified as significant in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.
(4) In order to comply with the EBA Guidelines, the ECB should ensure that significant credit institutions report their funding plans in accordance with the harmonised templates and definitions referred to in the funding plan template attached to the EBA Guidelines.
(5) In accordance with Article 6(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, and Article 21 of Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 (ECB/2014/17), without prejudice to the ECB’s power to directly receive reported information from credit institutions, or to have direct access to that information on an ongoing basis, the national competent authorities will specifically provide the ECB with all information necessary for the purposes of carrying out the tasks conferred on the ECB by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.
(6) Considering that the information on funding plans is necessary for micro and macroprudential purposes, the ECB has decided to require national competent authorities to provide it with the funding plans of credit institutions.
(7) The manner in which national competent authorities provide the ECB with the funding plans needs to be specified. In particular, the format, frequency and timing of the submission of information, as well as details of the quality checks performed by national competent authorities before submitting information to the ECB should be specified,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Scope

This Decision requires national competent authorities to provide the funding plans of certain significant and less significant credit institutions to the ECB, and lays down procedures concerning the submission to the ECB of such funding plans.

Definitions

For the purposes of this Decision, the definitions contained in Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 (ECB/2014/17) shall apply, together with the following definitions:
(1)
‘significant credit institution’ means a credit institution which has the status of a significant supervised entity in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 (ECB/2014/17); and
(2)
‘less significant credit institution’ means a credit institution which does not have the status of a significant supervised entity in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 (ECB/2014/17).

Requirements for reporting funding plans

1. National competent authorities shall provide the ECB with the funding plans that are in line with the EBA Guidelines of the following credit institutions established in their respective participating Member States:
(a)
significant credit institutions at the highest level of consolidation in the participating Member States on a consolidated basis;
(b)
significant credit institutions that are not part of a supervised group on an individual basis;
(c)
less significant credit institutions in respect of which the relevant national competent authority is obliged to report to the EBA the relevant funding plans in accordance with Decision EBA/DC/2015/130 of the European Banking Authority(6)on a consolidated basis or on an individual basis if those institutions are not part of a supervised group.
2. National competent authorities that collect the funding plans of significant credit institutions that are not referred to in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 shall provide these funding plans to the ECB if they comply with the EBA Guidelines.
3. The funding plans shall be submitted to the ECB in accordance with the harmonised templates and definitions referred to in the funding plan template attached to the EBA Guidelines. The funding plans shall have a reference date of 31 December of the previous year.

Remittance dates

1. National competent authorities shall submit the funding plans of the significant credit institutions referred to in Article 3(1)(a) and (b) to the ECB by the 10th working day following the remittance dates referred to in paragraph 8 of the EBA Guidelines.
2. National competent authorities shall submit the funding plans of the credit institutions referred to in Article 3(1)(c) and Article 3(2) to the ECB by 12.00 CET on the dates by which the national competent authorities have to submit funding plans to the EBA under paragraph 8 of the EBA Guidelines.

Data quality checks

1. National competent authorities shall monitor and ensure the quality and reliability of the data made available to the ECB. National competent authorities shall apply the validation rules developed and maintained by the EBA and they shall apply the additional data quality checks defined by the ECB in cooperation with the national competent authorities.
2. Further to the compliance with the validation rules and quality checks, the data shall be submitted in accordance with the following additional minimum standards for accuracy:
(a)
national competent authorities shall provide information, if applicable, on the developments implied by the data submitted; and
(b)
the information must be complete: existing gaps must be acknowledged, explained to the ECB and, if applicable, filled without undue delay.

Qualitative information

1. National competent authorities shall submit to the ECB without undue delay the corresponding explanations in the event that the data quality for a given table in the taxonomy cannot be warranted.
2. In addition, national competent authorities shall communicate to the ECB the reasons for any significant revisions submitted.

Specification of the transmission format

1. National competent authorities shall submit the data specified in this Decision using the applicable eXtensible Business Reporting Language taxonomy in order to provide a uniform technical format for the exchange of data regarding the EBA Guidelines.
2. The supervised entities shall be identified in the corresponding transmission by the use of the Legal Entity Identifier.

First reporting reference dates

The first reference date for the reporting pursuant to Article 3 shall be 31 December 2017.

Taking effect

This Decision shall take effect on the day of its notification to the addressees.

Addressees

This Decision is addressed to the national competent authorities of the participating Member States.

Pending: 32016D1136

13.7.2016 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 188/21
(1) On 27 December 2001, the Council adopted Common Position 2001/931/CFSP(1).
(2) On 21 December 2015, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2015/2430(2)updating the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (‘the list’).
(3) In accordance with Article 1(6) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, it is necessary to review at regular intervals the names of persons, groups and entities on the list to ensure that there are grounds for keeping them thereon.
(4) This Decision sets out the result of the review that the Council has carried out in respect of the persons, groups and entities to which Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply.
(5) The Council has verified that competent authorities, as referred to in Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, have taken decisions with regard to all persons, groups and entities on the list to the effect that they have been involved in terrorist acts within the meaning of Article 1(2) and (3) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP. The Council has concluded that the persons, groups and entities to which Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply should continue to be subject to the specific restrictive measures provided for therein.
(6) The list should be updated accordingly and Decision (CFSP) 2015/2430 should be repealed,
1. ABDOLLAHI Hamed (a.k.a Mustafa Abdullahi), born 11 August 1960 in Iran. Passport: D9004878.
2. AL-NASSER, Abdelkarim Hussein Mohamed, born in Al Ihsa (Saudi Arabia), citizen of Saudi Arabia.
3. AL YACOUB, Ibrahim Salih Mohammed, born 16 October 1966 in Tarut (Saudi Arabia), citizen of Saudi Arabia.
4. ARBABSIAR Manssor (a.k.a. Mansour Arbabsiar), born 6 or 15 March 1955 in Iran. Iranian and US national. Passport: C2002515 (Iran); Passport: 477845448 (USA). National ID No: 07442833, expiry date 15 March 2016 (USA driving licence).
5. BOUYERI, Mohammed (a.k.a. Abu ZUBAIR, a.k.a. SOBIAR, a.k.a. Abu ZOUBAIR), born 8 March 1978 in Amsterdam (The Netherlands) — member of the ‘Hofstadgroep’.
6. IZZ-AL-DIN, Hasan (a.k.a GARBAYA, Ahmed, a.k.a. SA-ID, a.k.a. SALWWAN, Samir), Lebanon, born 1963 in Lebanon, citizen of Lebanon.
7. MOHAMMED, Khalid Shaikh (a.k.a. ALI, Salem, a.k.a. BIN KHALID, Fahd Bin Adballah, a.k.a. HENIN, Ashraf Refaat Nabith, a.k.a. WADOOD, Khalid Adbul), born 14 April 1965 or 1 March 1964 in Pakistan, passport No 488555.
8. SHAHLAI Abdul Reza (a.k.a Abdol Reza Shala'i, a.k.a. Abd-al Reza Shalai, a.k.a. Abdorreza Shahlai, a.k.a. Abdolreza Shahla'i, a.k.a. Abdul-Reza Shahlaee, a.k.a.Hajj Yusef, a.k.a. Haji Yusif, a.k.a. Hajji Yasir, a.k.a. Hajji Yusif, a.k.a. Yusuf Abu-al-Karkh), born circa 1957 in Iran. Addresses: (1) Kermanshah, Iran; (2) Mehran Military Base, Ilam Province, Iran.
9. SHAKURI Ali Gholam, born circa 1965 in Tehran, Iran.
10. SOLEIMANI Qasem (a.k.a Ghasem Soleymani, a.k.a Qasmi Sulayman, a.k.a Qasem Soleymani, a.k.a Qasem Solaimani, a.k.a Qasem Salimani, a.k.a Qasem Solemani, a.k.a Qasem Sulaimani, a.k.a Qasem Sulemani), born 11 March 1957 in Iran. Iranian national. Passport: 008827 (Iran Diplomatic), issued 1999. Title: Major General.
1. ‘Abu Nidal Organisation’ — ‘ANO’ (a.k.a. ‘Fatah Revolutionary Council’, a.k.a. ‘Arab Revolutionary Brigades’, a.k.a. ‘Black September’, a.k.a. ‘Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims’).
2. Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade.
3. Al-Aqsa e.V.
4. ‘Babbar Khalsa’.
5. ‘Communist Party of the Philippines’, including ‘New People's Army’ — ‘NPA’, Philippines.
6. ‘Gama'a al-Islamiyya’ (a.k.a. ‘Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya’) (‘Islamic Group’ — ‘IG’).
7. ‘İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar Cephesi’ — ‘IBDA-C’ (‘Great Islamic Eastern Warriors Front’).
8. ‘Hamas’, including ‘Hamas-Izz al-Din al-Qassem’.
9. ‘Hizballah Military Wing’ (a.k.a. ‘Hezbollah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizbullah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizbollah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hezballah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hisbollah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizbu'llah Military Wing’ a.k.a. ‘Hizb Allah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Jihad Council’ (and all units reporting to it, including the External Security Organisation)).
10. ‘Hizbul Mujahideen’ — ‘HM’.
11. Hofstadgroep.
12. ‘Khalistan Zindabad Force’ — ‘KZF’.
13. ‘Kurdistan Workers' Party’ — ‘PKK’ (a.k.a. ‘KADEK’, a.k.a. ‘KONGRA-GEL’).
14. ‘Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’ — ‘LTTE’.
15. ‘Ejército de Liberación Nacional’ (‘National Liberation Army’).
16. ‘Palestinian Islamic Jihad’ — ‘PIJ’.
17. ‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’ — ‘PFLP’.
18. ‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine — General Command’ (a.k.a. ‘PFLP — General Command’).
19. ‘Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia’ — ‘FARC’ (‘Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’).
20. ‘Devrimci Halk Kurtuluș Partisi-Cephesi’ — ‘DHKP/C’ (a.k.a. ‘Devrimci Sol’) (‘Revolutionary Left’), (a.k.a. ‘Dev Sol’) (‘Revolutionary People's Liberation Army/Front/Party’).
21. ‘Sendero Luminoso’ — ‘SL’ (‘Shining Path’).
22. ‘Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan’ — ‘TAK’ (a.k.a. ‘Kurdistan Freedom Falcons’, a.k.a. ‘Kurdistan Freedom Hawks’).
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 27 December 2001, the Council adopted Common Position 2001/931/CFSP(1).
(2) On 21 December 2015, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2015/2430(2)updating the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (‘the list’).
(3) In accordance with Article 1(6) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, it is necessary to review at regular intervals the names of persons, groups and entities on the list to ensure that there are grounds for keeping them thereon.
(4) This Decision sets out the result of the review that the Council has carried out in respect of the persons, groups and entities to which Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply.
(5) The Council has verified that competent authorities, as referred to in Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, have taken decisions with regard to all persons, groups and entities on the list to the effect that they have been involved in terrorist acts within the meaning of Article 1(2) and (3) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP. The Council has concluded that the persons, groups and entities to which Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply should continue to be subject to the specific restrictive measures provided for therein.
(6) The list should be updated accordingly and Decision (CFSP) 2015/2430 should be repealed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
The list of persons, groups and entities to which Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply is set out in the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2
Decision (CFSP) 2015/2430 is hereby repealed.

Article 3
This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 27 December 2001, the Council adopted Common Position 2001/931/CFSP(1).
(2) On 21 December 2015, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2015/2430(2)updating the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (‘the list’).
(3) In accordance with Article 1(6) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, it is necessary to review at regular intervals the names of persons, groups and entities on the list to ensure that there are grounds for keeping them thereon.
(4) This Decision sets out the result of the review that the Council has carried out in respect of the persons, groups and entities to which Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply.
(5) The Council has verified that competent authorities, as referred to in Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, have taken decisions with regard to all persons, groups and entities on the list to the effect that they have been involved in terrorist acts within the meaning of Article 1(2) and (3) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP. The Council has concluded that the persons, groups and entities to which Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply should continue to be subject to the specific restrictive measures provided for therein.
(6) The list should be updated accordingly and Decision (CFSP) 2015/2430 should be repealed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The list of persons, groups and entities to which Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP apply is set out in the Annex to this Decision.
Decision (CFSP) 2015/2430 is hereby repealed.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.

LIST OF PERSONS, GROUPS AND ENTITIES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 1

ANNEXI. PERSONS
| 1. | ABDOLLAHI Hamed (a.k.a Mustafa Abdullahi), born 11 August 1960 in Iran. Passport: D9004878.
| 2. | AL-NASSER, Abdelkarim Hussein Mohamed, born in Al Ihsa (Saudi Arabia), citizen of Saudi Arabia.
| 3. | AL YACOUB, Ibrahim Salih Mohammed, born 16 October 1966 in Tarut (Saudi Arabia), citizen of Saudi Arabia.
| 4. | ARBABSIAR Manssor (a.k.a. Mansour Arbabsiar), born 6 or 15 March 1955 in Iran. Iranian and US national. Passport: C2002515 (Iran); Passport: 477845448 (USA). National ID No: 07442833, expiry date 15 March 2016 (USA driving licence).
| 5. | BOUYERI, Mohammed (a.k.a. Abu ZUBAIR, a.k.a. SOBIAR, a.k.a. Abu ZOUBAIR), born 8 March 1978 in Amsterdam (The Netherlands) — member of the ‘Hofstadgroep’.
| 6. | IZZ-AL-DIN, Hasan (a.k.a GARBAYA, Ahmed, a.k.a. SA-ID, a.k.a. SALWWAN, Samir), Lebanon, born 1963 in Lebanon, citizen of Lebanon.
| 7. | MOHAMMED, Khalid Shaikh (a.k.a. ALI, Salem, a.k.a. BIN KHALID, Fahd Bin Adballah, a.k.a. HENIN, Ashraf Refaat Nabith, a.k.a. WADOOD, Khalid Adbul), born 14 April 1965 or 1 March 1964 in Pakistan, passport No 488555.
| 8. | SHAHLAI Abdul Reza (a.k.a Abdol Reza Shala’i, a.k.a. Abd-al Reza Shalai, a.k.a. Abdorreza Shahlai, a.k.a. Abdolreza Shahla’i, a.k.a. Abdul-Reza Shahlaee, a.k.a.Hajj Yusef, a.k.a. Haji Yusif, a.k.a. Hajji Yasir, a.k.a. Hajji Yusif, a.k.a. Yusuf Abu-al-Karkh), born circa 1957 in Iran. Addresses: (1) Kermanshah, Iran; (2) Mehran Military Base, Ilam Province, Iran.
| 9. | SHAKURI Ali Gholam, born circa 1965 in Tehran, Iran.
| 10. | SOLEIMANI Qasem (a.k.a Ghasem Soleymani, a.k.a Qasmi Sulayman, a.k.a Qasem Soleymani, a.k.a Qasem Solaimani, a.k.a Qasem Salimani, a.k.a Qasem Solemani, a.k.a Qasem Sulaimani, a.k.a Qasem Sulemani), born 11 March 1957 in Iran. Iranian national. Passport: 008827 (Iran Diplomatic), issued 1999. Title: Major General.II. GROUPS AND ENTITIES
| 1. | ‘Abu Nidal Organisation’ — ‘ANO’ (a.k.a. ‘Fatah Revolutionary Council’, a.k.a. ‘Arab Revolutionary Brigades’, a.k.a. ‘Black September’, a.k.a. ‘Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims’).
| 2. | Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade.
| 3. | Al-Aqsa e.V.
| 4. | ‘Babbar Khalsa’.
| 5. | ‘Communist Party of the Philippines’, including ‘New People’s Army’ — ‘NPA’, Philippines.
| 6. | ‘Gama’a al-Islamiyya’ (a.k.a. ‘Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya’) (‘Islamic Group’ — ‘IG’).
| 7. | ‘İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar Cephesi’ — ‘IBDA-C’ (‘Great Islamic Eastern Warriors Front’).
| 8. | ‘Hamas’, including ‘Hamas-Izz al-Din al-Qassem’.
| 9. | ‘Hizballah Military Wing’ (a.k.a. ‘Hezbollah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizbullah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizbollah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hezballah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hisbollah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizbu’llah Military Wing’ a.k.a. ‘Hizb Allah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Jihad Council’ (and all units reporting to it, including the External Security Organisation)).
| 10. | ‘Hizbul Mujahideen’ — ‘HM’.
| 11. | Hofstadgroep.
| 12. | ‘Khalistan Zindabad Force’ — ‘KZF’.
| 13. | ‘Kurdistan Workers’ Party’ — ‘PKK’ (a.k.a. ‘KADEK’, a.k.a. ‘KONGRA-GEL’).
| 14. | ‘Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’ — ‘LTTE’.
| 15. | ‘Ejército de Liberación Nacional’ (‘National Liberation Army’).
| 16. | ‘Palestinian Islamic Jihad’ — ‘PIJ’.
| 17. | ‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’ — ‘PFLP’.
| 18. | ‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine — General Command’ (a.k.a. ‘PFLP — General Command’).
| 19. | ‘Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia’ — ‘FARC’ (‘Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’).
| 20. | ‘Devrimci Halk Kurtuluș Partisi-Cephesi’ — ‘DHKP/C’ (a.k.a. ‘Devrimci Sol’) (‘Revolutionary Left’), (a.k.a. ‘Dev Sol’) (‘Revolutionary People’s Liberation Army/Front/Party’).
| 21. | ‘Sendero Luminoso’ — ‘SL’ (‘Shining Path’).
| 22. | ‘Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan’ — ‘TAK’ (a.k.a. ‘Kurdistan Freedom Falcons’, a.k.a. ‘Kurdistan Freedom Hawks’).

Pending: 32016D0645

23.4.2016 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 108/61
(1) Lumpy skin disease (LSD) is a primarily vector-transmitted viral disease of bovine animals characterised by severe losses in susceptible animals and with the potential for the disease to spread very quickly, notably through movements of and trade in susceptible live animals and products thereof. LSD is not a disease of public health importance, as the virus is not transmissible to humans.
(2) Directive 92/119/EEC lays down general measures for the control of certain animal diseases, including LSD. These include measures to be taken in the event of the suspicion and the confirmation of LSD in a holding. The measures to be taken include the establishment of protection and surveillance zones around outbreaks and other additional measures to control the spread of the disease. Those measures also provide for emergency vaccination in the event of an outbreak of LSD.
(3) Article 14(2) of Directive 92/119/EEC requires that where in a given region, the epizootic in question is exceptionally serious, all the additional measures to be taken by the Member States concerned shall be adopted under the comitology procedure.
(4) On 12 April 2016, Bulgaria informed the Commission of the suspicion of LSD in two bovine holdings situated respectively in the Voden and Chernogorovo villages in the municipality of Dimitrovgrad, in the region of Haskovo in the central-southern part of Bulgaria, about 80 km from the borders with neighbouring countries. On 13 April 2016, Bulgaria notified the confirmation of the two LSD outbreaks and a further suspicion of LSD in the neighbouring municipality of Vodenicharovo in the region of Stara Zagora. On 15 April 2016 Bulgaria confirmed further outbreaks in the village Bialo Pole, in the region of Stara Zagora, and the villages Radievo and Marijno in the region of Haskovo.
(5) Bulgaria has taken measures provided for by Directive 92/119/EEC, and in particular the establishment of protection and surveillance zones around the outbreaks as provided for by Article 10 of that Directive and it has in addition restricted the movement of susceptible animals within the two affected regions and, as a matter of precaution, in neighbouring regions Burgas, Yambol, Sliven, Kardzhali, Plovdiv, Pazardjik, Smolyan, Blagoevgrad, Kjustendil, Pernik, Sofia District and Sofia Town. Surveillance is intensified in the entire country.
(6) Due to the risk of the spread of the LSD virus to other areas of Bulgaria and to other Member States, particularly through trade in live bovine animals and their germinal products, the movement of certain wild ruminants and the placing on the market of certain products derived from bovine animals, should be controlled.
(7) This Decision should use definitions laid down in Article 2 of Directive 92/119/EEC, Article 2 of Council Directive 64/432/EEC(5)and Article 2 of Council Directive 92/65/EEC(6). However, it is also necessary to -lay down some specific definitions in this Decision.
(8) It is necessary to describe the part of the territory of Bulgaria which is considered to be free of LSD and not subject to the restrictions provided for in Directive 92/119/EEC and in this Decision. It is therefore necessary to describe the restricted zone in the Annex to this Decision, taking into account the level of risk for the spread of LSD. The geographical boundaries of that restricted zone should be based on the risk and the outcome of the tracing of possible contacts to the infected holding, the possible role of vectors and the possibility to implement sufficient controls on the movement of animals of susceptible species and products derived from those animals. The restricted zone should include any protection and surveillance zones established in accordance with Directive 92/119/EEC. Based on information provided by Bulgaria, the whole territory of the regions of Haskovo and Stara Zagora in Bulgaria should be the restricted zone described in the Annex to this Decision.
(9) It is also necessary to provide for certain restrictions on the dispatch of animals of susceptible species and their germinal products from the restricted zone to be set out in the Annex to this Decision, as well as restrictions for the placing on the market of certain products of animal origin and animal by-products from that restricted zone.
(10) In terms of the risk of the spread of LSD, different commodities pose different levels of risk. As indicated in the Scientific Opinion of the European Food Safety Authority (the EFSA) on lumpy skin disease(7)the movement of live bovine animals, bovine semen and raw hides and skins from infected bovine animals pose a higher risk in terms of exposure and consequences than other products, such as milk and dairy products, treated hides and skins or fresh meat, meat preparations and meat products originating from bovine animals, where scientific or experimental evidence is lacking on their role of transmission of the disease. Therefore, the measures to be laid down in this Decision should be balanced and proportionate to the risks.
(11) The movements of live bovine animals from the restricted zone in Bulgaria to be set out in the Annex to this Decision should be prohibited in order to prevent the spread of LSD. According to the Scientific Opinion of the EFSA on lumpy skin disease and the Word Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) wild fauna, that is to say, certain exotic wild ruminants may play a potential role in the transmission of LSD, in particular in Africa where that disease is endemic. Therefore some preventive measures should also apply to wild ruminants. In the absence of more precise rules in the Union legislation, the appropriate international standards for such movements provided for in the Terrestrial Animal Health Code of the OIE (OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code)(8)should be used for this purpose.
(12) As Bulgaria has requested for an exemption from the prohibition on the dispatch of bovine animals for direct slaughter from holdings situated in the restricted zone outside protection and surveillance zones and such an exemption is provided for in Article 11.11.5 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code, it is appropriate to allow the dispatch of such consignments under certain conditions.
(13) Similarly, the transmission of LSD through semen and embryos of animals of the bovine species cannot be excluded. Therefore, certain protective measures should be provided for in relation to those commodities. In the absence of Union standards, the Scientific Opinion of the EFSA on LSD and the appropriate OIE Animal Health Terrestrial Code recommendations should be used for this purpose.
(14) According to the Scientific Opinion of the EFSA on lumpy skin disease, the transmission of the LSD virus through semen, natural mating or artificial insemination, has been experimentally demonstrated, and the LSD virus has been isolated from semen of experimentally infected bulls. The collection and use of semen of animals of the bovine species originating in the restricted zone should therefore be prohibited.
(15) In accordance with Article 4.7.14 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code, LSD is assigned in accordance with the Manual of the International Embryo Transfer Society to Category 4 diseases or pathogenic agents, which are those ‘for which studies have been done, or are in progress, that indicate that no conclusions are yet possible with regard to the level of transmission risk or that the risk of transmission via embryo transfer might not be negligible even if the embryos are properly handled in accordance with that Manual between collection and transfer’. The collection and use of embryos of animals of the bovine species originating in the restricted zone should therefore be prohibited.
(16) There is no scientific or experimental evidence suggesting that there is transmission of the LSD virus to animals of susceptible species through fresh meat, meat preparations or meat products. Although the Scientific Opinion of the EFSA on LSD indicates that the LSD virus may survive in meat for a non-indicated period of time, the existing Union ban on the feeding of ruminant proteins to ruminants would exclude the possibility of an unlikely oral transmission of the LSD virus. To avoid any risk of the spread of LSD, the placing on the market of fresh meat, meat preparations and meat products produced from bovine animals originating in the restricted zone to be set out in the Annex to this Decision should only be allowed where the fresh meat was produced from bovine animals kept on disease-free holdings situated in the restricted zone outside established protection and surveillance zones. Such meat should only be placed on the market in the territory of Bulgaria.
(17) In addition, the dispatch of consignments of fresh meat obtained from animals kept and slaughtered outside the restricted zone, as well as meat preparations and meat products, as defined in point 7.1 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council(9)and treated stomachs, bladders and intestines, as defined in point 7.9 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 853/2004, which have undergone one of the treatments laid down in Part 4 of Annex II to Commission Decision 2007/777/EC(10)produced from such fresh meat and processed in establishments situated in the restricted zone, outside protection and surveillance zones, should be permitted under certain conditions.
(18) Colostrum, milk and dairy products used as animal feed may play an important role in the spread of LSD, in particular, where the colostrum, milk and dairy products have not been sufficiently heat-treated or acidified to inactivate the LSD virus.
(19) In its Scientific Opinion on the animal health risks of feeding animals with ready-to-use dairy products without further treatment(11)the EFSA specifies more precisely some methods that can mitigate the risks of the spread of LSD through milk and dairy products. Therefore, the placing on the market and the dispatch of consignments of milk and dairy products for human consumption produced from animals kept in the restricted zone, should be permitted under certain conditions.
(20) Commission Regulation (EU) No 142/2011(12), lays down implementing rules for Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council(13), including requirements for the safe processing of animal by-products and derived products. In order to prevent the spread of LSD, the placing on the market of unprocessed animal by-products should be prohibited. A reference to processed animal by-products in this Decision should be considered as a reference to the animal health standards set out in Regulation (EU) No 142/2011.
(21) In the event of an outbreak of LSD, Article 19 of Directive 92/119/EEC provides for the possibility to carry out vaccination against that disease. Bulgaria has not excluded a recourse to emergency vaccination against LSD. The risk of the spread of that disease from vaccinated animals and their products is different from the risks arising from non-vaccinated and possibly incubating animals. Therefore, it is necessary to lay down conditions for the movement of vaccinated bovine animals and for the placing on the market of products derived from such animals.
(22) Scientific knowledge about LSD is incomplete. Vaccinated bovine animals are protected from clinical signs of that disease but are not necessarily protected from infection and not all vaccinated animals respond with a protective immunity. Therefore, such animals after the period of at least 28 days following the vaccination should be allowed to be sent directly for immediate slaughter to slaughterhouses situated on the territory of Bulgaria.
(23) Consequently, fresh meat and meat preparations thereof, as well as meat products subjected to a non-specific treatment may constitute a non-negligible risk for the spread of LSD. Therefore, it is justified to limit the placing on the market of the fresh meat of bovine animals and susceptible wild ungulates, and meat preparations and meat products thereof to the territory of Bulgaria, provided that such commodities are subjected to special marking which is not oval and cannot be confused with the health mark for fresh meat as set out in Chapter III of Section I of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 854/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council(14)and the identification mark for meat preparations and meat products consisting of or containing meat of bovine animals, as set out in Section I of Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 853/2004.
(24) A specific treatment of meat products in hermetically sealed containers to a Fovalue of three or more and a treatment described in points 1.1 to 1.5 of Part A of Annex IX to Council Directive 2003/85/EC(15)of milk and dairy products sufficiently inactivate LSD virus in such products destined for human consumption and therefore such meat products and such milk and dairy products should be allowed to be placed on the market on the whole of the territory of Bulgaria and in other Member States and to be dispatched to third countries.
(25) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
(a) ‘bovine animal’ means ungulates of the speciesBos taurus, Bos indicus, Bison bisonandBubalus bubalis;
(b) ‘restricted zone’ means the part of the territory of a Member State listed in the Annex to this Decision which includes the area where lumpy skin disease was confirmed and any protection and surveillance zones established in accordance with Article 10 of Directive 92/119/EEC;
(c) ‘captive wild ruminant’ means an animal of the suborder Ruminantia within the order Artiodactyla that has a phenotype not significantly affected by human selection but that lives under direct human supervision or control, including zoo animals;
(d) ‘wild ruminant’ means an animal of the suborder Ruminantia within the order Artiodactyla that has a phenotype unaffected by human selection and lives independent of direct human supervision or control;
(e) ‘meat products’ means meat products, as defined in point 7.1 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 853/2004, and treated stomachs, bladders and intestines, as defined in point 7.9 of that Annex, which have undergone one of the treatments laid down in Part 4 of Annex II to Decision 2007/777/EC.
(a) bovine animals and captive wild ruminants;
(b) semen, ova and embryos of bovine animals.
(a) fresh meat and meat preparations and meat products produced from such fresh meat;
(b) colostrum, milk and dairy products of bovine animals;
(c) fresh hides and skins other than those falling within the definitions in points 28 and 29 of Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 142/2011;
(d) unprocessed animal by-products, unless destined and channelled under official supervision of the competent authority for disposal or processing in an approved plant in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 within the territory of Bulgaria.
(a) the animals have been resident since birth, or for the past 28 days, on a holding where no case of lumpy skin disease was officially reported during that period;
(b) the animals were clinically checked at loading and did not present any clinical signs of lumpy skin disease;
(c) the animals are transported for immediate slaughter directly, without stopping or unloading;
(d) the slaughterhouse is designated for this purpose by the competent authority;
(e) the competent authority of the slaughterhouse must be informed in advance by the dispatching competent authority of the intention to send animals and notifies the dispatching competent authority of their arrival;
(f) on arrival at the slaughterhouse, the animals are kept and slaughtered separately from other animals within a period of less than 36 hours;
(g) the animals intended to be moved:(i)were not vaccinated against lumpy skin disease and have been kept on holdings:—where vaccination was not carried out and which are situated outside protection and surveillance zones, or—where vaccination was carried out and which are situated outside protection and surveillance zones, and a waiting period of at least 7 days after vaccination in the herd has elapsed, or—which are situated in a surveillance zone maintained beyond 30 days because of the occurrence of further cases of the disease, as referred to in Article 13 of Directive 92/119/EEC; or(ii)were vaccinated against lumpy skin disease at least 28 days prior to the date of movement and come from a holding on which all susceptible animals had been vaccinated at least 28 days prior to date of the intended movement. (i) were not vaccinated against lumpy skin disease and have been kept on holdings:—where vaccination was not carried out and which are situated outside protection and surveillance zones, or—where vaccination was carried out and which are situated outside protection and surveillance zones, and a waiting period of at least 7 days after vaccination in the herd has elapsed, or—which are situated in a surveillance zone maintained beyond 30 days because of the occurrence of further cases of the disease, as referred to in Article 13 of Directive 92/119/EEC; or — where vaccination was not carried out and which are situated outside protection and surveillance zones, or — where vaccination was carried out and which are situated outside protection and surveillance zones, and a waiting period of at least 7 days after vaccination in the herd has elapsed, or — which are situated in a surveillance zone maintained beyond 30 days because of the occurrence of further cases of the disease, as referred to in Article 13 of Directive 92/119/EEC; or (ii) were vaccinated against lumpy skin disease at least 28 days prior to the date of movement and come from a holding on which all susceptible animals had been vaccinated at least 28 days prior to date of the intended movement.
(i) were not vaccinated against lumpy skin disease and have been kept on holdings:—where vaccination was not carried out and which are situated outside protection and surveillance zones, or—where vaccination was carried out and which are situated outside protection and surveillance zones, and a waiting period of at least 7 days after vaccination in the herd has elapsed, or—which are situated in a surveillance zone maintained beyond 30 days because of the occurrence of further cases of the disease, as referred to in Article 13 of Directive 92/119/EEC; or — where vaccination was not carried out and which are situated outside protection and surveillance zones, or — where vaccination was carried out and which are situated outside protection and surveillance zones, and a waiting period of at least 7 days after vaccination in the herd has elapsed, or — which are situated in a surveillance zone maintained beyond 30 days because of the occurrence of further cases of the disease, as referred to in Article 13 of Directive 92/119/EEC; or
— where vaccination was not carried out and which are situated outside protection and surveillance zones, or
— where vaccination was carried out and which are situated outside protection and surveillance zones, and a waiting period of at least 7 days after vaccination in the herd has elapsed, or
— which are situated in a surveillance zone maintained beyond 30 days because of the occurrence of further cases of the disease, as referred to in Article 13 of Directive 92/119/EEC; or
(ii) were vaccinated against lumpy skin disease at least 28 days prior to the date of movement and come from a holding on which all susceptible animals had been vaccinated at least 28 days prior to date of the intended movement.
(i) were not vaccinated against lumpy skin disease and have been kept on holdings:—where vaccination was not carried out and which are situated outside protection and surveillance zones, or—where vaccination was carried out and which are situated outside protection and surveillance zones, and a waiting period of at least 7 days after vaccination in the herd has elapsed, or—which are situated in a surveillance zone maintained beyond 30 days because of the occurrence of further cases of the disease, as referred to in Article 13 of Directive 92/119/EEC; or — where vaccination was not carried out and which are situated outside protection and surveillance zones, or — where vaccination was carried out and which are situated outside protection and surveillance zones, and a waiting period of at least 7 days after vaccination in the herd has elapsed, or — which are situated in a surveillance zone maintained beyond 30 days because of the occurrence of further cases of the disease, as referred to in Article 13 of Directive 92/119/EEC; or
— where vaccination was not carried out and which are situated outside protection and surveillance zones, or
— where vaccination was carried out and which are situated outside protection and surveillance zones, and a waiting period of at least 7 days after vaccination in the herd has elapsed, or
— which are situated in a surveillance zone maintained beyond 30 days because of the occurrence of further cases of the disease, as referred to in Article 13 of Directive 92/119/EEC; or
— where vaccination was not carried out and which are situated outside protection and surveillance zones, or
— where vaccination was carried out and which are situated outside protection and surveillance zones, and a waiting period of at least 7 days after vaccination in the herd has elapsed, or
— which are situated in a surveillance zone maintained beyond 30 days because of the occurrence of further cases of the disease, as referred to in Article 13 of Directive 92/119/EEC; or
(ii) were vaccinated against lumpy skin disease at least 28 days prior to the date of movement and come from a holding on which all susceptible animals had been vaccinated at least 28 days prior to date of the intended movement.
(a) the means of transport has been properly cleansed and disinfected before and after the loading of such animals in accordance with Article 9;
(b) before and during the transport, the animals are protected against the attacks of vector insects.
(a) kept on holdings in the restricted zone that were not under restrictions in accordance with Directive 92/119/EEC; or
(b) slaughtered or hunted before 13 April 2016; or
(c) referred to in Article 4(1).
(a) kept on holdings in the restricted zone which are not subject to restrictions in accordance with Directive 92/119/EEC;
(b) slaughtered or hunted before 13 April 2016; or
(c) referred to in Article 4(1); or
(d) kept and slaughtered outside the restricted zone.
(a) the health mark for fresh meat as set out in Chapter III of Section I of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 854/2004;
(b) the identification mark for meat preparations and meat products consisting of, or containing meat of bovine animals, as set out in Section I of Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 853/2004.
— Haskovo Region
— Stara Zagora Region
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Council Directive 89/662/EEC of 11 December 1989 concerning veterinary checks in intra-Community trade with a view to the completion of the internal market(1), and in particular Article 9(4) thereof,
Having regard to Council Directive 90/425/EEC of 26 June 1990 concerning veterinary and zootechnical checks applicable in intra-Community trade in certain live animals and products with a view to the completion of the internal market(2), and in particular Article 10(4) thereof,
Having regard to Council Directive 92/119/EEC of 17 December 1992 introducing general Community measures for the control of certain animal diseases and specific measures relating to swine vesicular disease(3), and in particular Article 14(2) thereof,
Having regard to Council Directive 2002/99/EC of 16 December 2002 laying down the animal health rules governing the production, processing, distribution and introduction of products of animal origin for human consumption(4), and in particular Article 4(3) thereof,
(1) Lumpy skin disease (LSD) is a primarily vector-transmitted viral disease of bovine animals characterised by severe losses in susceptible animals and with the potential for the disease to spread very quickly, notably through movements of and trade in susceptible live animals and products thereof. LSD is not a disease of public health importance, as the virus is not transmissible to humans.
(2) Directive 92/119/EEC lays down general measures for the control of certain animal diseases, including LSD. These include measures to be taken in the event of the suspicion and the confirmation of LSD in a holding. The measures to be taken include the establishment of protection and surveillance zones around outbreaks and other additional measures to control the spread of the disease. Those measures also provide for emergency vaccination in the event of an outbreak of LSD.
(3) Article 14(2) of Directive 92/119/EEC requires that where in a given region, the epizootic in question is exceptionally serious, all the additional measures to be taken by the Member States concerned shall be adopted under the comitology procedure.
(4) On 12 April 2016, Bulgaria informed the Commission of the suspicion of LSD in two bovine holdings situated respectively in the Voden and Chernogorovo villages in the municipality of Dimitrovgrad, in the region of Haskovo in the central-southern part of Bulgaria, about 80 km from the borders with neighbouring countries. On 13 April 2016, Bulgaria notified the confirmation of the two LSD outbreaks and a further suspicion of LSD in the neighbouring municipality of Vodenicharovo in the region of Stara Zagora. On 15 April 2016 Bulgaria confirmed further outbreaks in the village Bialo Pole, in the region of Stara Zagora, and the villages Radievo and Marijno in the region of Haskovo.
(5) Bulgaria has taken measures provided for by Directive 92/119/EEC, and in particular the establishment of protection and surveillance zones around the outbreaks as provided for by Article 10 of that Directive and it has in addition restricted the movement of susceptible animals within the two affected regions and, as a matter of precaution, in neighbouring regions Burgas, Yambol, Sliven, Kardzhali, Plovdiv, Pazardjik, Smolyan, Blagoevgrad, Kjustendil, Pernik, Sofia District and Sofia Town. Surveillance is intensified in the entire country.
(6) Due to the risk of the spread of the LSD virus to other areas of Bulgaria and to other Member States, particularly through trade in live bovine animals and their germinal products, the movement of certain wild ruminants and the placing on the market of certain products derived from bovine animals, should be controlled.
(7) This Decision should use definitions laid down in Article 2 of Directive 92/119/EEC, Article 2 of Council Directive 64/432/EEC(5)and Article 2 of Council Directive 92/65/EEC(6). However, it is also necessary to -lay down some specific definitions in this Decision.
(8) It is necessary to describe the part of the territory of Bulgaria which is considered to be free of LSD and not subject to the restrictions provided for in Directive 92/119/EEC and in this Decision. It is therefore necessary to describe the restricted zone in the Annex to this Decision, taking into account the level of risk for the spread of LSD. The geographical boundaries of that restricted zone should be based on the risk and the outcome of the tracing of possible contacts to the infected holding, the possible role of vectors and the possibility to implement sufficient controls on the movement of animals of susceptible species and products derived from those animals. The restricted zone should include any protection and surveillance zones established in accordance with Directive 92/119/EEC. Based on information provided by Bulgaria, the whole territory of the regions of Haskovo and Stara Zagora in Bulgaria should be the restricted zone described in the Annex to this Decision.
(9) It is also necessary to provide for certain restrictions on the dispatch of animals of susceptible species and their germinal products from the restricted zone to be set out in the Annex to this Decision, as well as restrictions for the placing on the market of certain products of animal origin and animal by-products from that restricted zone.
(10) In terms of the risk of the spread of LSD, different commodities pose different levels of risk. As indicated in the Scientific Opinion of the European Food Safety Authority (the EFSA) on lumpy skin disease(7)the movement of live bovine animals, bovine semen and raw hides and skins from infected bovine animals pose a higher risk in terms of exposure and consequences than other products, such as milk and dairy products, treated hides and skins or fresh meat, meat preparations and meat products originating from bovine animals, where scientific or experimental evidence is lacking on their role of transmission of the disease. Therefore, the measures to be laid down in this Decision should be balanced and proportionate to the risks.
(11) The movements of live bovine animals from the restricted zone in Bulgaria to be set out in the Annex to this Decision should be prohibited in order to prevent the spread of LSD. According to the Scientific Opinion of the EFSA on lumpy skin disease and the Word Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) wild fauna, that is to say, certain exotic wild ruminants may play a potential role in the transmission of LSD, in particular in Africa where that disease is endemic. Therefore some preventive measures should also apply to wild ruminants. In the absence of more precise rules in the Union legislation, the appropriate international standards for such movements provided for in the Terrestrial Animal Health Code of the OIE (OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code)(8)should be used for this purpose.
(12) As Bulgaria has requested for an exemption from the prohibition on the dispatch of bovine animals for direct slaughter from holdings situated in the restricted zone outside protection and surveillance zones and such an exemption is provided for in Article 11.11.5 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code, it is appropriate to allow the dispatch of such consignments under certain conditions.
(13) Similarly, the transmission of LSD through semen and embryos of animals of the bovine species cannot be excluded. Therefore, certain protective measures should be provided for in relation to those commodities. In the absence of Union standards, the Scientific Opinion of the EFSA on LSD and the appropriate OIE Animal Health Terrestrial Code recommendations should be used for this purpose.
(14) According to the Scientific Opinion of the EFSA on lumpy skin disease, the transmission of the LSD virus through semen, natural mating or artificial insemination, has been experimentally demonstrated, and the LSD virus has been isolated from semen of experimentally infected bulls. The collection and use of semen of animals of the bovine species originating in the restricted zone should therefore be prohibited.
(15) In accordance with Article 4.7.14 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code, LSD is assigned in accordance with the Manual of the International Embryo Transfer Society to Category 4 diseases or pathogenic agents, which are those ‘for which studies have been done, or are in progress, that indicate that no conclusions are yet possible with regard to the level of transmission risk or that the risk of transmission via embryo transfer might not be negligible even if the embryos are properly handled in accordance with that Manual between collection and transfer’. The collection and use of embryos of animals of the bovine species originating in the restricted zone should therefore be prohibited.
(16) There is no scientific or experimental evidence suggesting that there is transmission of the LSD virus to animals of susceptible species through fresh meat, meat preparations or meat products. Although the Scientific Opinion of the EFSA on LSD indicates that the LSD virus may survive in meat for a non-indicated period of time, the existing Union ban on the feeding of ruminant proteins to ruminants would exclude the possibility of an unlikely oral transmission of the LSD virus. To avoid any risk of the spread of LSD, the placing on the market of fresh meat, meat preparations and meat products produced from bovine animals originating in the restricted zone to be set out in the Annex to this Decision should only be allowed where the fresh meat was produced from bovine animals kept on disease-free holdings situated in the restricted zone outside established protection and surveillance zones. Such meat should only be placed on the market in the territory of Bulgaria.
(17) In addition, the dispatch of consignments of fresh meat obtained from animals kept and slaughtered outside the restricted zone, as well as meat preparations and meat products, as defined in point 7.1 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council(9)and treated stomachs, bladders and intestines, as defined in point 7.9 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 853/2004, which have undergone one of the treatments laid down in Part 4 of Annex II to Commission Decision 2007/777/EC(10)produced from such fresh meat and processed in establishments situated in the restricted zone, outside protection and surveillance zones, should be permitted under certain conditions.
(18) Colostrum, milk and dairy products used as animal feed may play an important role in the spread of LSD, in particular, where the colostrum, milk and dairy products have not been sufficiently heat-treated or acidified to inactivate the LSD virus.
(19) In its Scientific Opinion on the animal health risks of feeding animals with ready-to-use dairy products without further treatment(11)the EFSA specifies more precisely some methods that can mitigate the risks of the spread of LSD through milk and dairy products. Therefore, the placing on the market and the dispatch of consignments of milk and dairy products for human consumption produced from animals kept in the restricted zone, should be permitted under certain conditions.
(20) Commission Regulation (EU) No 142/2011(12), lays down implementing rules for Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council(13), including requirements for the safe processing of animal by-products and derived products. In order to prevent the spread of LSD, the placing on the market of unprocessed animal by-products should be prohibited. A reference to processed animal by-products in this Decision should be considered as a reference to the animal health standards set out in Regulation (EU) No 142/2011.
(21) In the event of an outbreak of LSD, Article 19 of Directive 92/119/EEC provides for the possibility to carry out vaccination against that disease. Bulgaria has not excluded a recourse to emergency vaccination against LSD. The risk of the spread of that disease from vaccinated animals and their products is different from the risks arising from non-vaccinated and possibly incubating animals. Therefore, it is necessary to lay down conditions for the movement of vaccinated bovine animals and for the placing on the market of products derived from such animals.
(22) Scientific knowledge about LSD is incomplete. Vaccinated bovine animals are protected from clinical signs of that disease but are not necessarily protected from infection and not all vaccinated animals respond with a protective immunity. Therefore, such animals after the period of at least 28 days following the vaccination should be allowed to be sent directly for immediate slaughter to slaughterhouses situated on the territory of Bulgaria.
(23) Consequently, fresh meat and meat preparations thereof, as well as meat products subjected to a non-specific treatment may constitute a non-negligible risk for the spread of LSD. Therefore, it is justified to limit the placing on the market of the fresh meat of bovine animals and susceptible wild ungulates, and meat preparations and meat products thereof to the territory of Bulgaria, provided that such commodities are subjected to special marking which is not oval and cannot be confused with the health mark for fresh meat as set out in Chapter III of Section I of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 854/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council(14)and the identification mark for meat preparations and meat products consisting of or containing meat of bovine animals, as set out in Section I of Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 853/2004.
(24) A specific treatment of meat products in hermetically sealed containers to a Fovalue of three or more and a treatment described in points 1.1 to 1.5 of Part A of Annex IX to Council Directive 2003/85/EC(15)of milk and dairy products sufficiently inactivate LSD virus in such products destined for human consumption and therefore such meat products and such milk and dairy products should be allowed to be placed on the market on the whole of the territory of Bulgaria and in other Member States and to be dispatched to third countries.
(25) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Subject matter and scope
Article 1
This Decision lays down protective measures in relation to the outbreak of lumpy skin disease in Bulgaria and the additional measures to be taken by the Member States concerned in accordance with Directive 92/119/EEC.

Definitions
Article 2
For the purposes of this Directive, the definitions laid down in Article 2 of Directives 64/432/EEC, 92/65/EEC and 92/119/EEC respectively apply.
In addition, the following definitions shall apply:
(a)
‘bovine animal’ means ungulates of the speciesBos taurus, Bos indicus, Bison bisonandBubalus bubalis;
(b)
‘restricted zone’ means the part of the territory of a Member State listed in the Annex to this Decision which includes the area where lumpy skin disease was confirmed and any protection and surveillance zones established in accordance with Article 10 of Directive 92/119/EEC;
(c)
‘captive wild ruminant’ means an animal of the suborder Ruminantia within the order Artiodactyla that has a phenotype not significantly affected by human selection but that lives under direct human supervision or control, including zoo animals;
(d)
‘wild ruminant’ means an animal of the suborder Ruminantia within the order Artiodactyla that has a phenotype unaffected by human selection and lives independent of direct human supervision or control;
(e)
‘meat products’ means meat products, as defined in point 7.1 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 853/2004, and treated stomachs, bladders and intestines, as defined in point 7.9 of that Annex, which have undergone one of the treatments laid down in Part 4 of Annex II to Decision 2007/777/EC.

Prohibition on the movement and dispatch of certain animals and semen and embryos thereof, and placing on the market of certain products of animal origin and animal by-products
Article 3
1. Bulgaria shall prohibit the dispatch of the following commodities from the restricted zone to other parts of Bulgaria, to other Member States and to third countries:
(a)
bovine animals and captive wild ruminants;
(b)
semen, ova and embryos of bovine animals.
2. Bulgaria shall prohibit the placing on the market outside the restricted zone and the dispatch to other Member States and to third countries of the following commodities produced from bovine animals and wild ruminants kept in or hunted in the restricted zone:
(a)
fresh meat and meat preparations and meat products produced from such fresh meat;
(b)
colostrum, milk and dairy products of bovine animals;
(c)
fresh hides and skins other than those falling within the definitions in points 28 and 29 of Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 142/2011;
(d)
unprocessed animal by-products, unless destined and channelled under official supervision of the competent authority for disposal or processing in an approved plant in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 within the territory of Bulgaria.

Derogation from the prohibition on the dispatch of bovine animals and captive wild ruminants for direct slaughter and the dispatch of fresh meat, meat preparations and meat products obtained from such animals
Article 4
1. By way of derogation from the prohibition provided for in Article 3(1)(a), the competent authority may authorise the dispatch of bovine animals and captive wild ruminants from holdings situated in the restricted zone to a slaughterhouse located in other parts of Bulgaria provided that:
(a)
the animals have been resident since birth, or for the past 28 days, on a holding where no case of lumpy skin disease was officially reported during that period;
(b)
the animals were clinically checked at loading and did not present any clinical signs of lumpy skin disease;
(c)
the animals are transported for immediate slaughter directly, without stopping or unloading;
(d)
the slaughterhouse is designated for this purpose by the competent authority;
(e)
the competent authority of the slaughterhouse must be informed in advance by the dispatching competent authority of the intention to send animals and notifies the dispatching competent authority of their arrival;
(f)
on arrival at the slaughterhouse, the animals are kept and slaughtered separately from other animals within a period of less than 36 hours;
(g)
the animals intended to be moved:
(i)
were not vaccinated against lumpy skin disease and have been kept on holdings:
—
where vaccination was not carried out and which are situated outside protection and surveillance zones, or
—
where vaccination was carried out and which are situated outside protection and surveillance zones, and a waiting period of at least 7 days after vaccination in the herd has elapsed, or
—
which are situated in a surveillance zone maintained beyond 30 days because of the occurrence of further cases of the disease, as referred to in Article 13 of Directive 92/119/EEC; or
(ii)
were vaccinated against lumpy skin disease at least 28 days prior to the date of movement and come from a holding on which all susceptible animals had been vaccinated at least 28 days prior to date of the intended movement.
2. Any dispatch of bovine animals and captive wild ruminants in accordance with paragraph 1 shall only take place if the following conditions are fulfilled:
(a)
the means of transport has been properly cleansed and disinfected before and after the loading of such animals in accordance with Article 9;
(b)
before and during the transport, the animals are protected against the attacks of vector insects.
3. The competent authority shall ensure that fresh meat, meat preparations and meat products obtained from the animals referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article are placed on the market in accordance with the requirements provided for in Articles 5 and 6.

Derogation from the prohibition on the placing on the market of fresh meat and meat preparations of bovine animals and wild ruminants
Article 5
1. By way of derogation from the prohibitions provided for in Article 3(2)(a) and (c), the competent authority may authorise the placing on the market in Bulgaria outside the restricted zone of fresh meat, excluding offal other than liver, and meat preparations thereof, as well as fresh hides and skins obtained from bovine animals and wild ruminants:
(a)
kept on holdings in the restricted zone that were not under restrictions in accordance with Directive 92/119/EEC; or
(b)
slaughtered or hunted before 13 April 2016; or
(c)
referred to in Article 4(1).
2. The competent authority shall only authorise the dispatch to other Member States or third countries of consignments of fresh meat obtained from bovine animals kept and slaughtered outside the restricted zone, and meat preparations produced from such fresh meat, provided that such meat and meat preparations were produced, stored and handled without coming into contact with meat and meat preparations not authorised for dispatch to other Member States in accordance with Article 3(2)(a), and the consignments to other Member States are accompanied by an official health certificate in accordance with the model set out in the Annex to Commission Regulation (EC) No 599/2004(16), of which Part II has been completed with the following attestation:
‘Fresh meat or meat preparations complying with Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/645 of 22 April 2016 concerning certain protective measures against lumpy skin disease in Bulgaria.’.

Derogation from the prohibition on the placing on the market of meat products consisting of or containing meat of bovine animals or wild ruminants
Article 6
1. By way of derogation from the prohibition provided for in Article 3(2)(a), the competent authority may authorise the placing on the market of meat products produced in the restricted zone from fresh meat of bovine animals and wild ruminants:
(a)
kept on holdings in the restricted zone which are not subject to restrictions in accordance with Directive 92/119/EEC;
(b)
slaughtered or hunted before 13 April 2016; or
(c)
referred to in Article 4(1); or
(d)
kept and slaughtered outside the restricted zone.
2. The competent authority shall authorise the placing on the market of meat products referred to in paragraph 1, that comply with the conditions of points (a), (b) or (c) of that paragraph, only on the territory of Bulgaria, provided that the meat products have been subjected to a non-specific treatment which ensures that the cut surface of the meat products shows no longer the characteristics of fresh meat.
The competent authority shall ensure that the meat products referred to in the first subparagraph are not dispatched to other Member States or to third countries.
3. The competent authority shall only authorise the dispatch of consignments of meat products produced from fresh meat obtained from the animals referred to in paragraph 1(a), (b) and (c) to other Member States or to third countries, provided that the meat products have been subjected to a specific treatment, as set out in point B of Part 4 of Annex II to Decision 2007/777/EC, in hermetically sealed containers to an Fovalue of three or more, and the consignments to other Member States are accompanied by an official health certificate in accordance with the model set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 599/2004, of which Part II has been completed with the following attestation:
‘Meat products complying with Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/645 of 22 April 2016 concerning certain protective measures against lumpy skin disease in Bulgaria.’.
4. The competent authority shall only authorise the dispatch to other Member States or third countries of consignments of meat products produced from fresh meat obtained from the animals referred to in paragraph 1(d), provided that the meat products have been subjected at least to a non-specific treatment, as set out in point A of Part 4 of Annex II to Decision 2007/777/EC, which ensures that the cut surface of the meat products shows no longer the characteristics of fresh meat and the consignments to other Member States are accompanied by an official health certificate in accordance with the model set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 599/2004, of which Part II has been completed with the following attestation:
‘Meat products complying with Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/645 of 22 April 2016 concerning certain protective measures against lumpy skin disease in Bulgaria.’.

Derogation from the prohibition on the dispatch and placing on the market of milk and dairy products
Article 7
1. By way of derogation from the prohibition provided for in Article 3(2)(b), the competent authority may authorise the placing on the market of milk for human consumption obtained from bovine animals kept on holdings situated in the restricted zone, and dairy products thereof, provided that the milk and dairy products have been subjected to a treatment described in points 1.1 to 1.5 of Part A of Annex IX to Directive 2003/85/EC.
2. The competent authority shall only authorise the dispatch to other Member States or to third countries of consignments of milk obtained from bovine animals kept on holdings situated in the restricted zone, and dairy products thereof, provided that the milk and dairy products are intended for human consumption, have undergone the treatment referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and the consignments to other Member States are accompanied by an official health certificate in accordance with the model set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 599/2004, of which Part II has been completed with the following attestation:
‘Milk or dairy products complying with Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/645 of 22 April 2016 concerning certain protective measures against lumpy skin disease in Bulgaria.’.

Special marking of fresh meat, meat preparations and meat products referred to in Articles 5(1) and 6(2) respectively
Article 8
Bulgaria shall ensure that the fresh meat, meat preparations and meat products referred to in Article 5(1) and Article 6(2) are marked with a special health mark or identification mark that is not oval and cannot be confused with:
(a)
the health mark for fresh meat as set out in Chapter III of Section I of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 854/2004;
(b)
the identification mark for meat preparations and meat products consisting of, or containing meat of bovine animals, as set out in Section I of Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 853/2004.

Requirements concerning transport vehicles, cleansing and disinfection
Article 9
1. The competent authority shall ensure that, for any vehicle which has been in contact with animals of susceptible species in the restricted zone and intends to leave this same zone, the operator or driver of this vehicle provides evidence showing that, since the last contact with those animals, the vehicle has been cleansed and disinfected in a manner to inactivate the lumpy skin disease virus.
2. The competent authority shall specify the information to be submitted by the operator or driver of the livestock vehicle in order to demonstrate the required cleansing and disinfection has taken place.

Information requirements
Article 10
Bulgaria shall inform the Commission and the other Member States, within the framework of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed, of the results of the surveillance for lumpy skin disease carried out in the restricted zone.

Application
Article 11
This Decision shall apply until 31 December 2016.

Article 12
This Decision is addressed to the Republic of Bulgaria.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Council Directive 89/662/EEC of 11 December 1989 concerning veterinary checks in intra-Community trade with a view to the completion of the internal market(1), and in particular Article 9(4) thereof,
Having regard to Council Directive 90/425/EEC of 26 June 1990 concerning veterinary and zootechnical checks applicable in intra-Community trade in certain live animals and products with a view to the completion of the internal market(2), and in particular Article 10(4) thereof,
Having regard to Council Directive 92/119/EEC of 17 December 1992 introducing general Community measures for the control of certain animal diseases and specific measures relating to swine vesicular disease(3), and in particular Article 14(2) thereof,
Having regard to Council Directive 2002/99/EC of 16 December 2002 laying down the animal health rules governing the production, processing, distribution and introduction of products of animal origin for human consumption(4), and in particular Article 4(3) thereof,
(1) Lumpy skin disease (LSD) is a primarily vector-transmitted viral disease of bovine animals characterised by severe losses in susceptible animals and with the potential for the disease to spread very quickly, notably through movements of and trade in susceptible live animals and products thereof. LSD is not a disease of public health importance, as the virus is not transmissible to humans.
(2) Directive 92/119/EEC lays down general measures for the control of certain animal diseases, including LSD. These include measures to be taken in the event of the suspicion and the confirmation of LSD in a holding. The measures to be taken include the establishment of protection and surveillance zones around outbreaks and other additional measures to control the spread of the disease. Those measures also provide for emergency vaccination in the event of an outbreak of LSD.
(3) Article 14(2) of Directive 92/119/EEC requires that where in a given region, the epizootic in question is exceptionally serious, all the additional measures to be taken by the Member States concerned shall be adopted under the comitology procedure.
(4) On 12 April 2016, Bulgaria informed the Commission of the suspicion of LSD in two bovine holdings situated respectively in the Voden and Chernogorovo villages in the municipality of Dimitrovgrad, in the region of Haskovo in the central-southern part of Bulgaria, about 80 km from the borders with neighbouring countries. On 13 April 2016, Bulgaria notified the confirmation of the two LSD outbreaks and a further suspicion of LSD in the neighbouring municipality of Vodenicharovo in the region of Stara Zagora. On 15 April 2016 Bulgaria confirmed further outbreaks in the village Bialo Pole, in the region of Stara Zagora, and the villages Radievo and Marijno in the region of Haskovo.
(5) Bulgaria has taken measures provided for by Directive 92/119/EEC, and in particular the establishment of protection and surveillance zones around the outbreaks as provided for by Article 10 of that Directive and it has in addition restricted the movement of susceptible animals within the two affected regions and, as a matter of precaution, in neighbouring regions Burgas, Yambol, Sliven, Kardzhali, Plovdiv, Pazardjik, Smolyan, Blagoevgrad, Kjustendil, Pernik, Sofia District and Sofia Town. Surveillance is intensified in the entire country.
(6) Due to the risk of the spread of the LSD virus to other areas of Bulgaria and to other Member States, particularly through trade in live bovine animals and their germinal products, the movement of certain wild ruminants and the placing on the market of certain products derived from bovine animals, should be controlled.
(7) This Decision should use definitions laid down in Article 2 of Directive 92/119/EEC, Article 2 of Council Directive 64/432/EEC(5)and Article 2 of Council Directive 92/65/EEC(6). However, it is also necessary to -lay down some specific definitions in this Decision.
(8) It is necessary to describe the part of the territory of Bulgaria which is considered to be free of LSD and not subject to the restrictions provided for in Directive 92/119/EEC and in this Decision. It is therefore necessary to describe the restricted zone in the Annex to this Decision, taking into account the level of risk for the spread of LSD. The geographical boundaries of that restricted zone should be based on the risk and the outcome of the tracing of possible contacts to the infected holding, the possible role of vectors and the possibility to implement sufficient controls on the movement of animals of susceptible species and products derived from those animals. The restricted zone should include any protection and surveillance zones established in accordance with Directive 92/119/EEC. Based on information provided by Bulgaria, the whole territory of the regions of Haskovo and Stara Zagora in Bulgaria should be the restricted zone described in the Annex to this Decision.
(9) It is also necessary to provide for certain restrictions on the dispatch of animals of susceptible species and their germinal products from the restricted zone to be set out in the Annex to this Decision, as well as restrictions for the placing on the market of certain products of animal origin and animal by-products from that restricted zone.
(10) In terms of the risk of the spread of LSD, different commodities pose different levels of risk. As indicated in the Scientific Opinion of the European Food Safety Authority (the EFSA) on lumpy skin disease(7)the movement of live bovine animals, bovine semen and raw hides and skins from infected bovine animals pose a higher risk in terms of exposure and consequences than other products, such as milk and dairy products, treated hides and skins or fresh meat, meat preparations and meat products originating from bovine animals, where scientific or experimental evidence is lacking on their role of transmission of the disease. Therefore, the measures to be laid down in this Decision should be balanced and proportionate to the risks.
(11) The movements of live bovine animals from the restricted zone in Bulgaria to be set out in the Annex to this Decision should be prohibited in order to prevent the spread of LSD. According to the Scientific Opinion of the EFSA on lumpy skin disease and the Word Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) wild fauna, that is to say, certain exotic wild ruminants may play a potential role in the transmission of LSD, in particular in Africa where that disease is endemic. Therefore some preventive measures should also apply to wild ruminants. In the absence of more precise rules in the Union legislation, the appropriate international standards for such movements provided for in the Terrestrial Animal Health Code of the OIE (OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code)(8)should be used for this purpose.
(12) As Bulgaria has requested for an exemption from the prohibition on the dispatch of bovine animals for direct slaughter from holdings situated in the restricted zone outside protection and surveillance zones and such an exemption is provided for in Article 11.11.5 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code, it is appropriate to allow the dispatch of such consignments under certain conditions.
(13) Similarly, the transmission of LSD through semen and embryos of animals of the bovine species cannot be excluded. Therefore, certain protective measures should be provided for in relation to those commodities. In the absence of Union standards, the Scientific Opinion of the EFSA on LSD and the appropriate OIE Animal Health Terrestrial Code recommendations should be used for this purpose.
(14) According to the Scientific Opinion of the EFSA on lumpy skin disease, the transmission of the LSD virus through semen, natural mating or artificial insemination, has been experimentally demonstrated, and the LSD virus has been isolated from semen of experimentally infected bulls. The collection and use of semen of animals of the bovine species originating in the restricted zone should therefore be prohibited.
(15) In accordance with Article 4.7.14 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code, LSD is assigned in accordance with the Manual of the International Embryo Transfer Society to Category 4 diseases or pathogenic agents, which are those ‘for which studies have been done, or are in progress, that indicate that no conclusions are yet possible with regard to the level of transmission risk or that the risk of transmission via embryo transfer might not be negligible even if the embryos are properly handled in accordance with that Manual between collection and transfer’. The collection and use of embryos of animals of the bovine species originating in the restricted zone should therefore be prohibited.
(16) There is no scientific or experimental evidence suggesting that there is transmission of the LSD virus to animals of susceptible species through fresh meat, meat preparations or meat products. Although the Scientific Opinion of the EFSA on LSD indicates that the LSD virus may survive in meat for a non-indicated period of time, the existing Union ban on the feeding of ruminant proteins to ruminants would exclude the possibility of an unlikely oral transmission of the LSD virus. To avoid any risk of the spread of LSD, the placing on the market of fresh meat, meat preparations and meat products produced from bovine animals originating in the restricted zone to be set out in the Annex to this Decision should only be allowed where the fresh meat was produced from bovine animals kept on disease-free holdings situated in the restricted zone outside established protection and surveillance zones. Such meat should only be placed on the market in the territory of Bulgaria.
(17) In addition, the dispatch of consignments of fresh meat obtained from animals kept and slaughtered outside the restricted zone, as well as meat preparations and meat products, as defined in point 7.1 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council(9)and treated stomachs, bladders and intestines, as defined in point 7.9 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 853/2004, which have undergone one of the treatments laid down in Part 4 of Annex II to Commission Decision 2007/777/EC(10)produced from such fresh meat and processed in establishments situated in the restricted zone, outside protection and surveillance zones, should be permitted under certain conditions.
(18) Colostrum, milk and dairy products used as animal feed may play an important role in the spread of LSD, in particular, where the colostrum, milk and dairy products have not been sufficiently heat-treated or acidified to inactivate the LSD virus.
(19) In its Scientific Opinion on the animal health risks of feeding animals with ready-to-use dairy products without further treatment(11)the EFSA specifies more precisely some methods that can mitigate the risks of the spread of LSD through milk and dairy products. Therefore, the placing on the market and the dispatch of consignments of milk and dairy products for human consumption produced from animals kept in the restricted zone, should be permitted under certain conditions.
(20) Commission Regulation (EU) No 142/2011(12), lays down implementing rules for Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council(13), including requirements for the safe processing of animal by-products and derived products. In order to prevent the spread of LSD, the placing on the market of unprocessed animal by-products should be prohibited. A reference to processed animal by-products in this Decision should be considered as a reference to the animal health standards set out in Regulation (EU) No 142/2011.
(21) In the event of an outbreak of LSD, Article 19 of Directive 92/119/EEC provides for the possibility to carry out vaccination against that disease. Bulgaria has not excluded a recourse to emergency vaccination against LSD. The risk of the spread of that disease from vaccinated animals and their products is different from the risks arising from non-vaccinated and possibly incubating animals. Therefore, it is necessary to lay down conditions for the movement of vaccinated bovine animals and for the placing on the market of products derived from such animals.
(22) Scientific knowledge about LSD is incomplete. Vaccinated bovine animals are protected from clinical signs of that disease but are not necessarily protected from infection and not all vaccinated animals respond with a protective immunity. Therefore, such animals after the period of at least 28 days following the vaccination should be allowed to be sent directly for immediate slaughter to slaughterhouses situated on the territory of Bulgaria.
(23) Consequently, fresh meat and meat preparations thereof, as well as meat products subjected to a non-specific treatment may constitute a non-negligible risk for the spread of LSD. Therefore, it is justified to limit the placing on the market of the fresh meat of bovine animals and susceptible wild ungulates, and meat preparations and meat products thereof to the territory of Bulgaria, provided that such commodities are subjected to special marking which is not oval and cannot be confused with the health mark for fresh meat as set out in Chapter III of Section I of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 854/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council(14)and the identification mark for meat preparations and meat products consisting of or containing meat of bovine animals, as set out in Section I of Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 853/2004.
(24) A specific treatment of meat products in hermetically sealed containers to a Fovalue of three or more and a treatment described in points 1.1 to 1.5 of Part A of Annex IX to Council Directive 2003/85/EC(15)of milk and dairy products sufficiently inactivate LSD virus in such products destined for human consumption and therefore such meat products and such milk and dairy products should be allowed to be placed on the market on the whole of the territory of Bulgaria and in other Member States and to be dispatched to third countries.
(25) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Subject matter and scope

This Decision lays down protective measures in relation to the outbreak of lumpy skin disease in Bulgaria and the additional measures to be taken by the Member States concerned in accordance with Directive 92/119/EEC.

Definitions

For the purposes of this Directive, the definitions laid down in Article 2 of Directives 64/432/EEC, 92/65/EEC and 92/119/EEC respectively apply.
In addition, the following definitions shall apply:
(a)
‘bovine animal’ means ungulates of the speciesBos taurus, Bos indicus, Bison bisonandBubalus bubalis;
(b)
‘restricted zone’ means the part of the territory of a Member State listed in the Annex to this Decision which includes the area where lumpy skin disease was confirmed and any protection and surveillance zones established in accordance with Article 10 of Directive 92/119/EEC;
(c)
‘captive wild ruminant’ means an animal of the suborder Ruminantia within the order Artiodactyla that has a phenotype not significantly affected by human selection but that lives under direct human supervision or control, including zoo animals;
(d)
‘wild ruminant’ means an animal of the suborder Ruminantia within the order Artiodactyla that has a phenotype unaffected by human selection and lives independent of direct human supervision or control;
(e)
‘meat products’ means meat products, as defined in point 7.1 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 853/2004, and treated stomachs, bladders and intestines, as defined in point 7.9 of that Annex, which have undergone one of the treatments laid down in Part 4 of Annex II to Decision 2007/777/EC.

Prohibition on the movement and dispatch of certain animals and semen and embryos thereof, and placing on the market of certain products of animal origin and animal by-products

1. Bulgaria shall prohibit the dispatch of the following commodities from the restricted zone to other parts of Bulgaria, to other Member States and to third countries:
(a)
bovine animals and captive wild ruminants;
(b)
semen, ova and embryos of bovine animals.
2. Bulgaria shall prohibit the placing on the market outside the restricted zone and the dispatch to other Member States and to third countries of the following commodities produced from bovine animals and wild ruminants kept in or hunted in the restricted zone:
(a)
fresh meat and meat preparations and meat products produced from such fresh meat;
(b)
colostrum, milk and dairy products of bovine animals;
(c)
fresh hides and skins other than those falling within the definitions in points 28 and 29 of Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 142/2011;
(d)
unprocessed animal by-products, unless destined and channelled under official supervision of the competent authority for disposal or processing in an approved plant in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 within the territory of Bulgaria.

Derogation from the prohibition on the dispatch of bovine animals and captive wild ruminants for direct slaughter and the dispatch of fresh meat, meat preparations and meat products obtained from such animals

1. By way of derogation from the prohibition provided for in Article 3(1)(a), the competent authority may authorise the dispatch of bovine animals and captive wild ruminants from holdings situated in the restricted zone to a slaughterhouse located in other parts of Bulgaria provided that:
(a)
the animals have been resident since birth, or for the past 28 days, on a holding where no case of lumpy skin disease was officially reported during that period;
(b)
the animals were clinically checked at loading and did not present any clinical signs of lumpy skin disease;
(c)
the animals are transported for immediate slaughter directly, without stopping or unloading;
(d)
the slaughterhouse is designated for this purpose by the competent authority;
(e)
the competent authority of the slaughterhouse must be informed in advance by the dispatching competent authority of the intention to send animals and notifies the dispatching competent authority of their arrival;
(f)
on arrival at the slaughterhouse, the animals are kept and slaughtered separately from other animals within a period of less than 36 hours;
(g)
the animals intended to be moved:
(i)
were not vaccinated against lumpy skin disease and have been kept on holdings:
—
where vaccination was not carried out and which are situated outside protection and surveillance zones, or
—
where vaccination was carried out and which are situated outside protection and surveillance zones, and a waiting period of at least 7 days after vaccination in the herd has elapsed, or
—
which are situated in a surveillance zone maintained beyond 30 days because of the occurrence of further cases of the disease, as referred to in Article 13 of Directive 92/119/EEC; or
(ii)
were vaccinated against lumpy skin disease at least 28 days prior to the date of movement and come from a holding on which all susceptible animals had been vaccinated at least 28 days prior to date of the intended movement.
2. Any dispatch of bovine animals and captive wild ruminants in accordance with paragraph 1 shall only take place if the following conditions are fulfilled:
(a)
the means of transport has been properly cleansed and disinfected before and after the loading of such animals in accordance with Article 9;
(b)
before and during the transport, the animals are protected against the attacks of vector insects.
3. The competent authority shall ensure that fresh meat, meat preparations and meat products obtained from the animals referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article are placed on the market in accordance with the requirements provided for in Articles 5 and 6.

Derogation from the prohibition on the placing on the market of fresh meat and meat preparations of bovine animals and wild ruminants

1. By way of derogation from the prohibitions provided for in Article 3(2)(a) and (c), the competent authority may authorise the placing on the market in Bulgaria outside the restricted zone of fresh meat, excluding offal other than liver, and meat preparations thereof, as well as fresh hides and skins obtained from bovine animals and wild ruminants:
(a)
kept on holdings in the restricted zone that were not under restrictions in accordance with Directive 92/119/EEC; or
(b)
slaughtered or hunted before 13 April 2016; or
(c)
referred to in Article 4(1).
2. The competent authority shall only authorise the dispatch to other Member States or third countries of consignments of fresh meat obtained from bovine animals kept and slaughtered outside the restricted zone, and meat preparations produced from such fresh meat, provided that such meat and meat preparations were produced, stored and handled without coming into contact with meat and meat preparations not authorised for dispatch to other Member States in accordance with Article 3(2)(a), and the consignments to other Member States are accompanied by an official health certificate in accordance with the model set out in the Annex to Commission Regulation (EC) No 599/2004(16), of which Part II has been completed with the following attestation:
‘Fresh meat or meat preparations complying with Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/645 of 22 April 2016 concerning certain protective measures against lumpy skin disease in Bulgaria.’.

Derogation from the prohibition on the placing on the market of meat products consisting of or containing meat of bovine animals or wild ruminants

1. By way of derogation from the prohibition provided for in Article 3(2)(a), the competent authority may authorise the placing on the market of meat products produced in the restricted zone from fresh meat of bovine animals and wild ruminants:
(a)
kept on holdings in the restricted zone which are not subject to restrictions in accordance with Directive 92/119/EEC;
(b)
slaughtered or hunted before 13 April 2016; or
(c)
referred to in Article 4(1); or
(d)
kept and slaughtered outside the restricted zone.
2. The competent authority shall authorise the placing on the market of meat products referred to in paragraph 1, that comply with the conditions of points (a), (b) or (c) of that paragraph, only on the territory of Bulgaria, provided that the meat products have been subjected to a non-specific treatment which ensures that the cut surface of the meat products shows no longer the characteristics of fresh meat.
The competent authority shall ensure that the meat products referred to in the first subparagraph are not dispatched to other Member States or to third countries.
3. The competent authority shall only authorise the dispatch of consignments of meat products produced from fresh meat obtained from the animals referred to in paragraph 1(a), (b) and (c) to other Member States or to third countries, provided that the meat products have been subjected to a specific treatment, as set out in point B of Part 4 of Annex II to Decision 2007/777/EC, in hermetically sealed containers to an Fovalue of three or more, and the consignments to other Member States are accompanied by an official health certificate in accordance with the model set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 599/2004, of which Part II has been completed with the following attestation:
‘Meat products complying with Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/645 of 22 April 2016 concerning certain protective measures against lumpy skin disease in Bulgaria.’.
4. The competent authority shall only authorise the dispatch to other Member States or third countries of consignments of meat products produced from fresh meat obtained from the animals referred to in paragraph 1(d), provided that the meat products have been subjected at least to a non-specific treatment, as set out in point A of Part 4 of Annex II to Decision 2007/777/EC, which ensures that the cut surface of the meat products shows no longer the characteristics of fresh meat and the consignments to other Member States are accompanied by an official health certificate in accordance with the model set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 599/2004, of which Part II has been completed with the following attestation:
‘Meat products complying with Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/645 of 22 April 2016 concerning certain protective measures against lumpy skin disease in Bulgaria.’.

Derogation from the prohibition on the dispatch and placing on the market of milk and dairy products

1. By way of derogation from the prohibition provided for in Article 3(2)(b), the competent authority may authorise the placing on the market of milk for human consumption obtained from bovine animals kept on holdings situated in the restricted zone, and dairy products thereof, provided that the milk and dairy products have been subjected to a treatment described in points 1.1 to 1.5 of Part A of Annex IX to Directive 2003/85/EC.
2. The competent authority shall only authorise the dispatch to other Member States or to third countries of consignments of milk obtained from bovine animals kept on holdings situated in the restricted zone, and dairy products thereof, provided that the milk and dairy products are intended for human consumption, have undergone the treatment referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and the consignments to other Member States are accompanied by an official health certificate in accordance with the model set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 599/2004, of which Part II has been completed with the following attestation:
‘Milk or dairy products complying with Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/645 of 22 April 2016 concerning certain protective measures against lumpy skin disease in Bulgaria.’.

Special marking of fresh meat, meat preparations and meat products referred to in Articles 5(1) and 6(2) respectively

Bulgaria shall ensure that the fresh meat, meat preparations and meat products referred to in Article 5(1) and Article 6(2) are marked with a special health mark or identification mark that is not oval and cannot be confused with:
(a)
the health mark for fresh meat as set out in Chapter III of Section I of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 854/2004;
(b)
the identification mark for meat preparations and meat products consisting of, or containing meat of bovine animals, as set out in Section I of Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 853/2004.

Requirements concerning transport vehicles, cleansing and disinfection

1. The competent authority shall ensure that, for any vehicle which has been in contact with animals of susceptible species in the restricted zone and intends to leave this same zone, the operator or driver of this vehicle provides evidence showing that, since the last contact with those animals, the vehicle has been cleansed and disinfected in a manner to inactivate the lumpy skin disease virus.
2. The competent authority shall specify the information to be submitted by the operator or driver of the livestock vehicle in order to demonstrate the required cleansing and disinfection has taken place.

Information requirements

Bulgaria shall inform the Commission and the other Member States, within the framework of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed, of the results of the surveillance for lumpy skin disease carried out in the restricted zone.

Application

This Decision shall apply until 31 December 2016.
This Decision is addressed to the Republic of Bulgaria.

RESTRICTED ZONE REFERRED TO IN POINT (b) OF THE SECOND SUBPARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 2

ANNEXThe following regions in Bulgaria:

— | Haskovo Region
— | Stara Zagora Region