Pending: 32021D1011

January 16, 2026
22.6.2021 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 222/21
(1) On 7 December 2015, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2015/2274(1)appointing Mr Ángel LOSADA FERNÁNDEZ as the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Sahel.
(2) On 25 June 2018, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2018/906(2)extending the mandate of Mr LOSADA FERNÁNDEZ as the EUSR for the Sahel. That Decision was last amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/283(3). The EUSR’s mandate is to expire on 30 June 2021.
(3) A new EUSR for the Sahel should be appointed for a period of 14 months.
(4) The EUSR will implement the mandate in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union’s external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty,
(a) actively contribute to the implementation of the Strategy and coordinate and further develop the Union’s integrated approach to the crises in the region, with a view to enhancing the overall coherence and effectiveness of Union activities in the Sahel;
(b) engage, including through shuttle diplomacy, with all relevant stakeholders in the region, governments, regional organisations, in particular the G5 Sahel and its Joint Force, the signatories of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali resulting from the Algiers Process (the ‘Mali Peace Agreement’), international organisations, civil society and diasporas, and the countries of the Maghreb, the Gulf of Guinea and the Lake Chad Basin, with a view to furthering the Union’s objectives and contributing to a better understanding of the role of the Union in the Sahel. With the G5 Sahel attention shall be paid, inter alia, to promoting respect for human rights and to non-military elements of its Joint Force such as the police component;
(c) represent and promote the interests and visibility of the Union in relevant regional and international fora and by participating in the Comité de Suivi of the Mali Peace Agreement, and other national processes relevant for the stability of the region;
(d) facilitate fully coordinated and comprehensive Union action in the region drawing on all relevant instruments, including the European Peace Facility, on development cooperation, Member States’ activities and Union support to crisis management and conflict prevention through the European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian armed Forces (EUTM Mali), the European Union CSDP mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali), the European Union CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger), and on stabilisation efforts within the Coalition for the Sahel, in particular the P3S and the Sahel Alliance and their respective secretariats;
(e) maintain close cooperation with the United Nations (UN), in particular the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel, the Special Coordinator for development in the Sahel, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Head of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the African Union, in particular the African Union High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, the G5 Sahel, in particular the G5 Presidency and its Executive Secretary, the High Representative of the Coalition for the Sahel, the Economic Community of West African States, the Lake Chad Basin Commission; the Liptako-Gourma Authority; and other leading national, regional and international stakeholders, including other special envoys for the Sahel, as well as with the relevant authorities especially in the Maghreb, in the Horn of Africa, in the Gulf of Guinea and in the Middle East area;
(f) closely follow, analyse and report on the impact of root causes of instability and long-term trends in the region, including climate change, biodiversity loss, pastoralism, access to natural resources, notably land and water, as well as promote sustainable management of and cooperation over natural resources that reinforce stability, and support efforts to limit the spread of instability, by paying particular attention to the most vulnerable regions in terms of security, notably the Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad regions;
(g) closely follow other regional and trans-boundary dimensions of the challenges the region is facing, including pandemics, terrorism, radicalisation, organised crime, cyber-threats, arms smuggling, trafficking in human beings and smuggling, drug trafficking, maritime insecurity, refugee and migration flows and related illicit financial flows;
(h) closely follow the humanitarian, political, security and development consequences of large scale refugee and migration flows, including internally displaced persons. Upon request, engage in dialogues on migration with relevant stakeholders and contribute more generally to the Union’s policy on migration and refugees with respect to the region, in line with the Union’s political priorities, in order to continue to promote fruitful cooperation in the areas of migration, based on the constructive partnerships established in recent years;
(i) in close cooperation with the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, contribute to the further implementation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy as well as of the relevant Council Conclusions on preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism. Maintain regular high level political contacts with the countries in the region affected by terrorism and international organised crime and ensure the Union’s key role in the efforts to fight terrorism and international organised crime and their root causes. This includes the Union’s efforts to enhance its support to regional capacity of the security sector through the regionalisation of the common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and active support to regional capacity building in particular of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, its coordination with international players such as MINUSMA, and its relation with the local population, in line with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2359 (2017) and 2391 (2017);
(j) closely follow the political, security and development consequences of humanitarian crises in the region;
(k) contribute, in cooperation with the EUSR for Human Rights, to the implementation of the Union’s human rights policy in the region, in line with the Union Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, the Union Guidelines on human rights, in particular the Union Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict, as well as on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them, and the Union’s policy on Women, Peace and Security in line with the Union Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2019-2024, promote inclusiveness and gender equality in the state building process, in line with UNSCR 1325 (2000) and subsequent resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, including UNSCR 2242 (2015), and support the implementation of UNSCR 2250 (2015) on youth, peace and security;
(l) continue to pay particular attention to the justice sector as a whole, and to accountability mechanisms that can be used to fight impunity and to restore the population’s trust in its justice system. The EUSR’s contribution shall include regular monitoring and reporting on developments, as well as formulating recommendations in this regard and maintaining regular contacts with the relevant authorities in the region, the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and engage with the human rights defenders and observers in the region;
(m) through frequent contacts in the region, including with local actors, increase the Union’s knowledge on local expectations and local contexts. Based on a thorough and continuous analysis of the situation, facilitate reflection and contribute to the early response and the strategic and long-term vision of the Union in the Sahel;
(n) follow up and report on compliance with relevant UNSCRs, in particular UNSCRs 2056 (2012), 2071 (2012), 2085 (2012), 2100 (2013), 2227 (2015), 2295 (2016), 2364 (2017), 2374 (2017), 2359 (2017), 2391 (2017), 2423 (2018), 2432 (2018), 2480 (2019), 2484 (2019), 2531 (2020) and 2541 (2020).
(a) advise and report on the formulation of Union positions in regional and international fora, as appropriate, in order to proactively promote action based on partnership and mutual accountability and strengthen the Union’s integrated approach towards the Sahel;
(b) contribute to maintaining an overview of all Union activities and cooperate closely with relevant Union delegations and Member States.
(a) establishing a specific security plan based on guidance from the EEAS, including specific physical, organisational and procedural security measures, governing management of the secure movement of personnel to, and within, the area of responsibility, as well as management of security incidents, and including a contingency plan and evacuation plan;
(b) ensuring that all personnel deployed outside the Union are covered by high risk insurance as required by the conditions in the area of responsibility;
(c) ensuring that all members of the EUSR’s team to be deployed outside the Union, including locally contracted personnel, have received appropriate security training before or upon arriving in the area of responsibility, based on the risk ratings assigned to that area by the EEAS;
(d) ensuring that all agreed recommendations made following regular security assessments are implemented and providing the HR, the Council and the Commission with written reports on their implementation and on other security issues within the framework of the regular progress reports and a final comprehensive mandate implementation report.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 33 and Article 31(2) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 7 December 2015, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2015/2274(1)appointing Mr Ángel LOSADA FERNÁNDEZ as the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Sahel.
(2) On 25 June 2018, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2018/906(2)extending the mandate of Mr LOSADA FERNÁNDEZ as the EUSR for the Sahel. That Decision was last amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/283(3). The EUSR’s mandate is to expire on 30 June 2021.
(3) A new EUSR for the Sahel should be appointed for a period of 14 months.
(4) The EUSR will implement the mandate in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union’s external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

European Union Special Representative
Article 1
1. Ms Emanuela DEL RE is hereby appointed as the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Sahel from 1 July 2021 to 31 August 2022. The Council may decide that the mandate of the EUSR be extended or terminated earlier, based on an assessment by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR).
2. For the purposes of the EUSR’s mandate, the Sahel is defined as comprising that area which is the main geographic scope of the European Union’s Integrated Strategy in the Sahel (the ‘Strategy’) as adopted by Council conclusions on 16 April 2021, namely Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. The EUSR shall also engage with the countries of the Lake Chad Basin and other countries and regional or international entities beyond the Sahel, including the Maghreb, West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea, as appropriate.

Policy objectives
Article 2
1. Based on the policy objectives of the Strategy, the EUSR’s mandate shall be to contribute actively and giving priority to regional and international efforts to achieve lasting peace, security, stability and sustainable development in the region. The EUSR shall furthermore aim to enhance the quality, impact and visibility of the Union’s multi-faceted engagement in the Sahel.
2. The EUSR shall contribute to developing and implementing the Union’s efforts in the region in an integrated way, including in the political, security and development areas, and to coordinating all relevant instruments and stakeholders for Union actions. The EUSR shall contribute to deepening the Union’s engagement and coordination efforts with national, regional and international mechanisms, notably the Partnership for Security and Stability in the Sahel (P3S), the Sahel Alliance and the Coalition for the Sahel as a framework for political and strategic engagement with the Sahel.
3. The EUSR action shall be pursued in close cooperation and coordination with the European external action service, the Union delegations, the Commission, Member States and other relevant stakeholders. Particular focus shall be given to strengthening and deepening the partnership with the G5 Sahel and contributing to international reflection on permanent and predictable funding in support of the G5 Sahel Joint Force.

Mandate
Article 3
1. In order to achieve the policy objectives in the Sahel, the EUSR’s mandate shall be to:
(a)
actively contribute to the implementation of the Strategy and coordinate and further develop the Union’s integrated approach to the crises in the region, with a view to enhancing the overall coherence and effectiveness of Union activities in the Sahel;
(b)
engage, including through shuttle diplomacy, with all relevant stakeholders in the region, governments, regional organisations, in particular the G5 Sahel and its Joint Force, the signatories of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali resulting from the Algiers Process (the ‘Mali Peace Agreement’), international organisations, civil society and diasporas, and the countries of the Maghreb, the Gulf of Guinea and the Lake Chad Basin, with a view to furthering the Union’s objectives and contributing to a better understanding of the role of the Union in the Sahel. With the G5 Sahel attention shall be paid, inter alia, to promoting respect for human rights and to non-military elements of its Joint Force such as the police component;
(c)
represent and promote the interests and visibility of the Union in relevant regional and international fora and by participating in the Comité de Suivi of the Mali Peace Agreement, and other national processes relevant for the stability of the region;
(d)
facilitate fully coordinated and comprehensive Union action in the region drawing on all relevant instruments, including the European Peace Facility, on development cooperation, Member States’ activities and Union support to crisis management and conflict prevention through the European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian armed Forces (EUTM Mali), the European Union CSDP mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali), the European Union CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger), and on stabilisation efforts within the Coalition for the Sahel, in particular the P3S and the Sahel Alliance and their respective secretariats;
(e)
maintain close cooperation with the United Nations (UN), in particular the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel, the Special Coordinator for development in the Sahel, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Head of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the African Union, in particular the African Union High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, the G5 Sahel, in particular the G5 Presidency and its Executive Secretary, the High Representative of the Coalition for the Sahel, the Economic Community of West African States, the Lake Chad Basin Commission; the Liptako-Gourma Authority; and other leading national, regional and international stakeholders, including other special envoys for the Sahel, as well as with the relevant authorities especially in the Maghreb, in the Horn of Africa, in the Gulf of Guinea and in the Middle East area;
(f)
closely follow, analyse and report on the impact of root causes of instability and long-term trends in the region, including climate change, biodiversity loss, pastoralism, access to natural resources, notably land and water, as well as promote sustainable management of and cooperation over natural resources that reinforce stability, and support efforts to limit the spread of instability, by paying particular attention to the most vulnerable regions in terms of security, notably the Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad regions;
(g)
closely follow other regional and trans-boundary dimensions of the challenges the region is facing, including pandemics, terrorism, radicalisation, organised crime, cyber-threats, arms smuggling, trafficking in human beings and smuggling, drug trafficking, maritime insecurity, refugee and migration flows and related illicit financial flows;
(h)
closely follow the humanitarian, political, security and development consequences of large scale refugee and migration flows, including internally displaced persons. Upon request, engage in dialogues on migration with relevant stakeholders and contribute more generally to the Union’s policy on migration and refugees with respect to the region, in line with the Union’s political priorities, in order to continue to promote fruitful cooperation in the areas of migration, based on the constructive partnerships established in recent years;
(i)
in close cooperation with the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, contribute to the further implementation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy as well as of the relevant Council Conclusions on preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism. Maintain regular high level political contacts with the countries in the region affected by terrorism and international organised crime and ensure the Union’s key role in the efforts to fight terrorism and international organised crime and their root causes. This includes the Union’s efforts to enhance its support to regional capacity of the security sector through the regionalisation of the common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and active support to regional capacity building in particular of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, its coordination with international players such as MINUSMA, and its relation with the local population, in line with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2359 (2017) and 2391 (2017);
(j)
closely follow the political, security and development consequences of humanitarian crises in the region;
(k)
contribute, in cooperation with the EUSR for Human Rights, to the implementation of the Union’s human rights policy in the region, in line with the Union Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, the Union Guidelines on human rights, in particular the Union Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict, as well as on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them, and the Union’s policy on Women, Peace and Security in line with the Union Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2019-2024, promote inclusiveness and gender equality in the state building process, in line with UNSCR 1325 (2000) and subsequent resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, including UNSCR 2242 (2015), and support the implementation of UNSCR 2250 (2015) on youth, peace and security;
(l)
continue to pay particular attention to the justice sector as a whole, and to accountability mechanisms that can be used to fight impunity and to restore the population’s trust in its justice system. The EUSR’s contribution shall include regular monitoring and reporting on developments, as well as formulating recommendations in this regard and maintaining regular contacts with the relevant authorities in the region, the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and engage with the human rights defenders and observers in the region;
(m)
through frequent contacts in the region, including with local actors, increase the Union’s knowledge on local expectations and local contexts. Based on a thorough and continuous analysis of the situation, facilitate reflection and contribute to the early response and the strategic and long-term vision of the Union in the Sahel;
(n)
follow up and report on compliance with relevant UNSCRs, in particular UNSCRs 2056 (2012), 2071 (2012), 2085 (2012), 2100 (2013), 2227 (2015), 2295 (2016), 2364 (2017), 2374 (2017), 2359 (2017), 2391 (2017), 2423 (2018), 2432 (2018), 2480 (2019), 2484 (2019), 2531 (2020) and 2541 (2020).
2. For the purpose of the fulfilment of the EUSR’s mandate, the EUSR shall, inter alia:
(a)
advise and report on the formulation of Union positions in regional and international fora, as appropriate, in order to proactively promote action based on partnership and mutual accountability and strengthen the Union’s integrated approach towards the Sahel;
(b)
contribute to maintaining an overview of all Union activities and cooperate closely with relevant Union delegations and Member States.

Implementation of the mandate
Article 4
1. The EUSR shall be responsible for the implementation of the mandate, acting under the authority of the HR.
2. The PSC shall maintain a privileged link with the EUSR and shall be the EUSR’s primary point of contact with the Council. The PSC shall provide the EUSR with strategic guidance and political direction within the framework of the mandate, without prejudice to the powers of the HR.
3. The EUSR shall cooperate and work in close coordination with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and its relevant departments.

Financing
Article 5
1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the EUSR’s mandate for the period from 1 July 2021 to 31 August 2022 shall be EUR 1 588 000.
2. The expenditure shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.
3. The management of the expenditure shall be subject to a contract between the EUSR and the Commission. The EUSR shall be accountable to the Commission for all expenditure.

Constitution and composition of the team
Article 6
1. Within the limits of the EUSR’s mandate and the corresponding financial means made available, the EUSR shall be responsible for constituting a team. The team shall include the expertise on specific policy issues as required by the mandate. The EUSR shall keep the Council and the Commission promptly informed of the composition of the team.
2. Member States, institutions of the Union and the EEAS may propose the secondment of staff to work with the EUSR. The salary of such seconded personnel shall be covered by the Member State, the institution of the Union concerned or the EEAS, respectively. Experts seconded by Member States to the institutions of the Union or the EEAS may also be posted to work with the EUSR. International contracted staff shall have the nationality of a Member State.
3. All seconded personnel shall remain under the administrative authority of the sending Member State, institution of the Union or the EEAS and shall carry out their duties and act in the interest of the EUSR’s mandate.
4. The EUSR staff shall be co-located with the relevant EEAS departments or Union delegations in order to ensure the coherence and consistency of their respective activities.

Privileges and immunities of the EUSR and the EUSR’s staff
Article 7
The privileges, immunities and further guarantees necessary for the completion and smooth functioning of the EUSR’s mission and the members of the EUSR’s staff shall be agreed with the host countries, as appropriate. Member States and the EEAS shall grant all necessary support to such effect.

Security of EU classified information
Article 8
The EUSR and the members of the EUSR’s team shall respect the security principles and minimum standards established by Council Decision 2013/488/EU(4).

Access to information and logistical support
Article 9
1. Member States, the Commission, the EEAS and the General Secretariat of the Council shall ensure that the EUSR is given access to any relevant information.
2. The Union delegations in the region and/or Member States, as appropriate, shall provide logistical support in the region.

Security
Article 10
In accordance with the Union’s policy on the security of personnel deployed outside the Union in an operational capacity under Title V of the Treaty, the EUSR shall take all reasonably practicable measures, in accordance with the EUSR’s mandate and the security situation in the area of responsibility, for the security of all personnel under the EUSR’s direct authority, in particular by:
(a)
establishing a specific security plan based on guidance from the EEAS, including specific physical, organisational and procedural security measures, governing management of the secure movement of personnel to, and within, the area of responsibility, as well as management of security incidents, and including a contingency plan and evacuation plan;
(b)
ensuring that all personnel deployed outside the Union are covered by high risk insurance as required by the conditions in the area of responsibility;
(c)
ensuring that all members of the EUSR’s team to be deployed outside the Union, including locally contracted personnel, have received appropriate security training before or upon arriving in the area of responsibility, based on the risk ratings assigned to that area by the EEAS;
(d)
ensuring that all agreed recommendations made following regular security assessments are implemented and providing the HR, the Council and the Commission with written reports on their implementation and on other security issues within the framework of the regular progress reports and a final comprehensive mandate implementation report.

Reporting
Article 11
The EUSR shall regularly provide the HR and the PSC with oral and written reports. The EUSR shall also report to Council working parties as necessary. Regular reports shall be circulated through the COREU network. The EUSR may provide the Foreign Affairs Council with reports. In accordance with Article 36 of the Treaty, the EUSR may be involved in briefing the European Parliament.

Coordination
Article 12
1. In the framework of the Strategy, the EUSR shall contribute to the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the Union’s action and shall help ensure that all Union instruments and Member States’ actions are engaged consistently, to attain the Union’s policy objectives. Liaison with Member States shall be sought where appropriate. The activities of the EUSR shall be coordinated with those of the Union delegations and the Commission, as well as those of other EUSRs active in the region. The EUSR shall provide regular briefings to the Union delegations and to Member States’ missions in the region.
2. In the field, close liaison shall be maintained with the relevant Member States’ Heads of missions, the Heads of Union delegations and the Heads of CSDP missions. They shall make every effort to assist the EUSR in the implementation of the mandate. The EUSR, in close coordination with the relevant Union delegations, shall provide the Heads of missions of EUCAP Sahel Niger and of EUCAP Sahel Mali and the Mission Commander of EUTM Mali with local political guidance. The EUSR, the Mission Commander of EUTM Mali and the Civilian Operation Commander shall consult each other as required. The EUSR shall also liaise with other international and regional actors in the field.

Assistance in relation to claims
Article 13
The EUSR and the EUSR’s staff shall assist in providing elements to respond to any claims and obligations arising from the mandates of the previous EUSRs for the Sahel, and shall provide administrative assistance and access to relevant files for such purposes.

Review
Article 14
The implementation of this Decision and its consistency with other contributions from the Union to the region shall be kept under regular review. The EUSR shall present the HR, the Council and the Commission with regular progress reports and a final comprehensive mandate implementation report by 31 May 2022.

Entry into force
Article 15
This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 33 and Article 31(2) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 7 December 2015, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2015/2274(1)appointing Mr Ángel LOSADA FERNÁNDEZ as the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Sahel.
(2) On 25 June 2018, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2018/906(2)extending the mandate of Mr LOSADA FERNÁNDEZ as the EUSR for the Sahel. That Decision was last amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/283(3). The EUSR’s mandate is to expire on 30 June 2021.
(3) A new EUSR for the Sahel should be appointed for a period of 14 months.
(4) The EUSR will implement the mandate in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union’s external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

European Union Special Representative

1. Ms Emanuela DEL RE is hereby appointed as the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Sahel from 1 July 2021 to 31 August 2022. The Council may decide that the mandate of the EUSR be extended or terminated earlier, based on an assessment by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR).
2. For the purposes of the EUSR’s mandate, the Sahel is defined as comprising that area which is the main geographic scope of the European Union’s Integrated Strategy in the Sahel (the ‘Strategy’) as adopted by Council conclusions on 16 April 2021, namely Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. The EUSR shall also engage with the countries of the Lake Chad Basin and other countries and regional or international entities beyond the Sahel, including the Maghreb, West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea, as appropriate.

Policy objectives

1. Based on the policy objectives of the Strategy, the EUSR’s mandate shall be to contribute actively and giving priority to regional and international efforts to achieve lasting peace, security, stability and sustainable development in the region. The EUSR shall furthermore aim to enhance the quality, impact and visibility of the Union’s multi-faceted engagement in the Sahel.
2. The EUSR shall contribute to developing and implementing the Union’s efforts in the region in an integrated way, including in the political, security and development areas, and to coordinating all relevant instruments and stakeholders for Union actions. The EUSR shall contribute to deepening the Union’s engagement and coordination efforts with national, regional and international mechanisms, notably the Partnership for Security and Stability in the Sahel (P3S), the Sahel Alliance and the Coalition for the Sahel as a framework for political and strategic engagement with the Sahel.
3. The EUSR action shall be pursued in close cooperation and coordination with the European external action service, the Union delegations, the Commission, Member States and other relevant stakeholders. Particular focus shall be given to strengthening and deepening the partnership with the G5 Sahel and contributing to international reflection on permanent and predictable funding in support of the G5 Sahel Joint Force.

Mandate

1. In order to achieve the policy objectives in the Sahel, the EUSR’s mandate shall be to:
(a)
actively contribute to the implementation of the Strategy and coordinate and further develop the Union’s integrated approach to the crises in the region, with a view to enhancing the overall coherence and effectiveness of Union activities in the Sahel;
(b)
engage, including through shuttle diplomacy, with all relevant stakeholders in the region, governments, regional organisations, in particular the G5 Sahel and its Joint Force, the signatories of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali resulting from the Algiers Process (the ‘Mali Peace Agreement’), international organisations, civil society and diasporas, and the countries of the Maghreb, the Gulf of Guinea and the Lake Chad Basin, with a view to furthering the Union’s objectives and contributing to a better understanding of the role of the Union in the Sahel. With the G5 Sahel attention shall be paid, inter alia, to promoting respect for human rights and to non-military elements of its Joint Force such as the police component;
(c)
represent and promote the interests and visibility of the Union in relevant regional and international fora and by participating in the Comité de Suivi of the Mali Peace Agreement, and other national processes relevant for the stability of the region;
(d)
facilitate fully coordinated and comprehensive Union action in the region drawing on all relevant instruments, including the European Peace Facility, on development cooperation, Member States’ activities and Union support to crisis management and conflict prevention through the European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian armed Forces (EUTM Mali), the European Union CSDP mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali), the European Union CSDP mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger), and on stabilisation efforts within the Coalition for the Sahel, in particular the P3S and the Sahel Alliance and their respective secretariats;
(e)
maintain close cooperation with the United Nations (UN), in particular the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel, the Special Coordinator for development in the Sahel, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Head of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the African Union, in particular the African Union High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, the G5 Sahel, in particular the G5 Presidency and its Executive Secretary, the High Representative of the Coalition for the Sahel, the Economic Community of West African States, the Lake Chad Basin Commission; the Liptako-Gourma Authority; and other leading national, regional and international stakeholders, including other special envoys for the Sahel, as well as with the relevant authorities especially in the Maghreb, in the Horn of Africa, in the Gulf of Guinea and in the Middle East area;
(f)
closely follow, analyse and report on the impact of root causes of instability and long-term trends in the region, including climate change, biodiversity loss, pastoralism, access to natural resources, notably land and water, as well as promote sustainable management of and cooperation over natural resources that reinforce stability, and support efforts to limit the spread of instability, by paying particular attention to the most vulnerable regions in terms of security, notably the Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad regions;
(g)
closely follow other regional and trans-boundary dimensions of the challenges the region is facing, including pandemics, terrorism, radicalisation, organised crime, cyber-threats, arms smuggling, trafficking in human beings and smuggling, drug trafficking, maritime insecurity, refugee and migration flows and related illicit financial flows;
(h)
closely follow the humanitarian, political, security and development consequences of large scale refugee and migration flows, including internally displaced persons. Upon request, engage in dialogues on migration with relevant stakeholders and contribute more generally to the Union’s policy on migration and refugees with respect to the region, in line with the Union’s political priorities, in order to continue to promote fruitful cooperation in the areas of migration, based on the constructive partnerships established in recent years;
(i)
in close cooperation with the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, contribute to the further implementation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy as well as of the relevant Council Conclusions on preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism. Maintain regular high level political contacts with the countries in the region affected by terrorism and international organised crime and ensure the Union’s key role in the efforts to fight terrorism and international organised crime and their root causes. This includes the Union’s efforts to enhance its support to regional capacity of the security sector through the regionalisation of the common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and active support to regional capacity building in particular of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, its coordination with international players such as MINUSMA, and its relation with the local population, in line with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2359 (2017) and 2391 (2017);
(j)
closely follow the political, security and development consequences of humanitarian crises in the region;
(k)
contribute, in cooperation with the EUSR for Human Rights, to the implementation of the Union’s human rights policy in the region, in line with the Union Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, the Union Guidelines on human rights, in particular the Union Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict, as well as on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them, and the Union’s policy on Women, Peace and Security in line with the Union Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2019-2024, promote inclusiveness and gender equality in the state building process, in line with UNSCR 1325 (2000) and subsequent resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, including UNSCR 2242 (2015), and support the implementation of UNSCR 2250 (2015) on youth, peace and security;
(l)
continue to pay particular attention to the justice sector as a whole, and to accountability mechanisms that can be used to fight impunity and to restore the population’s trust in its justice system. The EUSR’s contribution shall include regular monitoring and reporting on developments, as well as formulating recommendations in this regard and maintaining regular contacts with the relevant authorities in the region, the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and engage with the human rights defenders and observers in the region;
(m)
through frequent contacts in the region, including with local actors, increase the Union’s knowledge on local expectations and local contexts. Based on a thorough and continuous analysis of the situation, facilitate reflection and contribute to the early response and the strategic and long-term vision of the Union in the Sahel;
(n)
follow up and report on compliance with relevant UNSCRs, in particular UNSCRs 2056 (2012), 2071 (2012), 2085 (2012), 2100 (2013), 2227 (2015), 2295 (2016), 2364 (2017), 2374 (2017), 2359 (2017), 2391 (2017), 2423 (2018), 2432 (2018), 2480 (2019), 2484 (2019), 2531 (2020) and 2541 (2020).
2. For the purpose of the fulfilment of the EUSR’s mandate, the EUSR shall, inter alia:
(a)
advise and report on the formulation of Union positions in regional and international fora, as appropriate, in order to proactively promote action based on partnership and mutual accountability and strengthen the Union’s integrated approach towards the Sahel;
(b)
contribute to maintaining an overview of all Union activities and cooperate closely with relevant Union delegations and Member States.

Implementation of the mandate

1. The EUSR shall be responsible for the implementation of the mandate, acting under the authority of the HR.
2. The PSC shall maintain a privileged link with the EUSR and shall be the EUSR’s primary point of contact with the Council. The PSC shall provide the EUSR with strategic guidance and political direction within the framework of the mandate, without prejudice to the powers of the HR.
3. The EUSR shall cooperate and work in close coordination with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and its relevant departments.

Financing

1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the EUSR’s mandate for the period from 1 July 2021 to 31 August 2022 shall be EUR 1 588 000.
2. The expenditure shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.
3. The management of the expenditure shall be subject to a contract between the EUSR and the Commission. The EUSR shall be accountable to the Commission for all expenditure.

Constitution and composition of the team

1. Within the limits of the EUSR’s mandate and the corresponding financial means made available, the EUSR shall be responsible for constituting a team. The team shall include the expertise on specific policy issues as required by the mandate. The EUSR shall keep the Council and the Commission promptly informed of the composition of the team.
2. Member States, institutions of the Union and the EEAS may propose the secondment of staff to work with the EUSR. The salary of such seconded personnel shall be covered by the Member State, the institution of the Union concerned or the EEAS, respectively. Experts seconded by Member States to the institutions of the Union or the EEAS may also be posted to work with the EUSR. International contracted staff shall have the nationality of a Member State.
3. All seconded personnel shall remain under the administrative authority of the sending Member State, institution of the Union or the EEAS and shall carry out their duties and act in the interest of the EUSR’s mandate.
4. The EUSR staff shall be co-located with the relevant EEAS departments or Union delegations in order to ensure the coherence and consistency of their respective activities.

Privileges and immunities of the EUSR and the EUSR’s staff

The privileges, immunities and further guarantees necessary for the completion and smooth functioning of the EUSR’s mission and the members of the EUSR’s staff shall be agreed with the host countries, as appropriate. Member States and the EEAS shall grant all necessary support to such effect.

Security of EU classified information

The EUSR and the members of the EUSR’s team shall respect the security principles and minimum standards established by Council Decision 2013/488/EU(4).

Access to information and logistical support

1. Member States, the Commission, the EEAS and the General Secretariat of the Council shall ensure that the EUSR is given access to any relevant information.
2. The Union delegations in the region and/or Member States, as appropriate, shall provide logistical support in the region.

Security

In accordance with the Union’s policy on the security of personnel deployed outside the Union in an operational capacity under Title V of the Treaty, the EUSR shall take all reasonably practicable measures, in accordance with the EUSR’s mandate and the security situation in the area of responsibility, for the security of all personnel under the EUSR’s direct authority, in particular by:
(a)
establishing a specific security plan based on guidance from the EEAS, including specific physical, organisational and procedural security measures, governing management of the secure movement of personnel to, and within, the area of responsibility, as well as management of security incidents, and including a contingency plan and evacuation plan;
(b)
ensuring that all personnel deployed outside the Union are covered by high risk insurance as required by the conditions in the area of responsibility;
(c)
ensuring that all members of the EUSR’s team to be deployed outside the Union, including locally contracted personnel, have received appropriate security training before or upon arriving in the area of responsibility, based on the risk ratings assigned to that area by the EEAS;
(d)
ensuring that all agreed recommendations made following regular security assessments are implemented and providing the HR, the Council and the Commission with written reports on their implementation and on other security issues within the framework of the regular progress reports and a final comprehensive mandate implementation report.

Reporting

The EUSR shall regularly provide the HR and the PSC with oral and written reports. The EUSR shall also report to Council working parties as necessary. Regular reports shall be circulated through the COREU network. The EUSR may provide the Foreign Affairs Council with reports. In accordance with Article 36 of the Treaty, the EUSR may be involved in briefing the European Parliament.

Coordination

1. In the framework of the Strategy, the EUSR shall contribute to the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the Union’s action and shall help ensure that all Union instruments and Member States’ actions are engaged consistently, to attain the Union’s policy objectives. Liaison with Member States shall be sought where appropriate. The activities of the EUSR shall be coordinated with those of the Union delegations and the Commission, as well as those of other EUSRs active in the region. The EUSR shall provide regular briefings to the Union delegations and to Member States’ missions in the region.
2. In the field, close liaison shall be maintained with the relevant Member States’ Heads of missions, the Heads of Union delegations and the Heads of CSDP missions. They shall make every effort to assist the EUSR in the implementation of the mandate. The EUSR, in close coordination with the relevant Union delegations, shall provide the Heads of missions of EUCAP Sahel Niger and of EUCAP Sahel Mali and the Mission Commander of EUTM Mali with local political guidance. The EUSR, the Mission Commander of EUTM Mali and the Civilian Operation Commander shall consult each other as required. The EUSR shall also liaise with other international and regional actors in the field.

Assistance in relation to claims

The EUSR and the EUSR’s staff shall assist in providing elements to respond to any claims and obligations arising from the mandates of the previous EUSRs for the Sahel, and shall provide administrative assistance and access to relevant files for such purposes.

Review

The implementation of this Decision and its consistency with other contributions from the Union to the region shall be kept under regular review. The EUSR shall present the HR, the Council and the Commission with regular progress reports and a final comprehensive mandate implementation report by 31 May 2022.

Entry into force

This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

Pending: 32021D0788

January 16, 2026
17.5.2021 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 173/6
(1) Since 2020, infections with the SARS-CoV-2 virus in minks have been reported in certain Member States and third countries, and it has been established that human-to-mink and mink-to-human transmission can occur. Furthermore, one Member State has reported human COVID-19 cases infected with the SARS-CoV-2 virus variants related to mink.
(2) On 12 November 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) published, with the contribution of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), a Rapid Risk Assessment on the detection of new SARS-CoV-2 variants related to mink(2)(the ECDC Rapid Risk Assessment).
(3) The ECDC Rapid Risk Assessment concluded that the overall level of risk to human health posed by SARS-CoV-2 mink-related variants can be determined as ranging from low for the general population up to very high for medically vulnerable individuals with occupational exposure. The ECDC Rapid Risk Assessment also indicated that further investigations are needed to assess whether SARS-CoV-2 mink-related variants may have an impact on the risk of reinfection, reduced vaccine efficacy or reduced benefit from treatment.
(4) To decrease the risk posed to public health, the ECDC Rapid Risk Assessment recommends that national authorities should consider implementing measures aimed at mink farms, mink farm workers and communities in contact with mink farms. Those measures should cover human testing, sequencing and characterisation of antigenic properties and virus infectivity as well as animal monitoring and surveillance of mink farms in order to prevent the spread of SARS-CoV-2 variants from animals to humans.
(5) On 20 January 2021, the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) issued a joint tripartite risk assessment on emerging threats at the human-animal-ecosystems interface, which addressed SARS-CoV-2 in animals used for fur farming(3). The risk assessment recommends that the testing of animals for SARS-CoV-2 should be risk-based and should only be considered in the broader response to COVID-19 within a ‘One Health’ approach, incorporating an early warning and surveillance system based on case definitions in farm workers and animals as appropriate. In accordance with the risk assessment, in SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks involving fur farms, sequencing of viruses from human cases and minks, including phylogenetic analysis and comparison of genetic sequences, is recommended to understand the direction of infection (namely, whether animal to animal, animal to human, human to animal or human to human) and to identify and assess any mutations occurring.
(6) On 18 February 2021, EFSA, with the contribution of ECDC, published the scientific report on the monitoring of SARS-CoV-2 infection in mustelids(4)(the EFSA report). The EFSA report indicates that SARS-CoV-2 spreads very efficiently within mink farms once introduced, by direct and indirect contact. Infected humans were likely at the origin of the introduction of SARS-CoV-2 infection into farms. The EFSA report concludes that carrying out surveillance on workers at mink farms is an important step in enabling the early detection of infection. The EFSA report also indicates that raccoon dogs (Nyctereutes procyonoides) are also susceptible to SARS-CoV-2.
(7) The EFSA report recommends that all mink farms that are not yet infected should be considered at risk of infection, as the human disease is widespread and therefore the monitoring objective of choice should be early detection.
(8) In line with the EFSA report, one of the monitoring objectives should be the monitoring of the SARS-CoV-2 virus evolution. Genetic analysis is important to characterise the SARS-CoV-2 virus and to detect possible virus mutations and to identify the origin and the source of the virus. Detecting possible virus mutations is of particular relevance for public health, in order to identify new variant viruses early that may have an impact on diagnostics, transmission, severity or vaccine effectiveness.
(9) Kept and wild raccoon dogs should be considered susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection. The OIE, in its Guidance on working with farmed animals of species susceptible to infection with SARS-CoV-2(5), has called on countries to monitor susceptible animals for SARS-CoV-2 infection, such as mink and raccoon dogs, as well as humans in close contact with them, adopting a ‘One Health’ approach. Monitoring programmes concerning zoonoses should be established by the Commission for laying down detailed rules for the monitoring of this specific zoonotic agent as Directive 2003/99/EC provides for such monitoring in view of collecting coordinated data, make data easier to compile and compare and better identification of the risks, and thus enabling further action where appropriate. The recitals of that Directive mention that zoonoses transmitted through sources other than food, especially from wild animal and pet animal populations, are a matter of concern. In addition, they mention that the collection of data on the occurrence of zoonoses and zoonotic agents in animals, food, feed and humans is necessary to determine the trends and sources of zoonoses. They also mention that priority should be given to those zoonoses posing the greatest risk to human health, but that the monitoring systems should also facilitate the detection of emerging or newly emerging zoonotic diseases and new strains of zoonotic organisms.
(10) In order to enable further risk assessment under the ‘One Health’ approach and to inform and identify possible risk-management options as regards the risks arising from the circulation of SARS-CoV-2 mink-related variants in animals of the familyMustelidaeand in raccoon dogs, an efficient, harmonised monitoring and reporting system allowing for the collection and exchange of all relevant information should be established without delay.
(11) In order to facilitate implementation and to focus resources on higher risk groups, the monitoring system laid down in this act should cover all keptMustelidaeand raccoon dogs, but prioritise establishments with over 500 adult breeders for active monitoring activities and accordingly rules for the sampling and testing for SARS-CoV-2 of animals in those prioritised establishments should be set out in Annex II to this act. In parallel, passive monitoring should be ensured in all kept and wildMustelidaeand raccoon dogs to ensure investigation of specific situations, and accordingly rules for a sampling scheme for the passive monitoring of all such kept or wild animals should be set out in Annex III to this act.
(12) Given the urgency to further assess the risk posed by the epidemiological situation in the Union as regards the occurrence of SARS-CoV-2 in minks and other animals of the familyMustelidaeand in raccoon dogs as well as to assess the viability of the measures, Member States should allocate the required resources for setting up a monitoring system and submit to the Commission regular reports on the occurrence of that infection in kept or wild animals of the familyMustelidaeand in raccoon dogs. Article 3 of Directive 2003/99/EC provides for the publication of data by the Member States. To ensure proper risk communication within the Union, the Commission should publish on its website, for information only, a summary of the information collected as regards SARS-CoV-2, given the importance of risk communication for that virus.
(13) To enable reporting, in a structured manner, of occurrences of SARS-CoV-2 in minks and other animals of the familyMustelidaeand in raccoon dogs, this Decision should establish the model report, the minimum information requirements and the format for data by outbreak and by species susceptible to the SARS-CoV-2 virus. This model report should be used for reporting purposes for that virus.
(14) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/2183(6)lays down rules concerning certain protective measures in relation to reporting infection with SARS-CoV-2 in minks and other animals of the familyMustelidaeand in raccoon dogs and applies until 20 April 2021. Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/2183 is based on Article 9(4) of Council Directive 89/662/EEC(7), and on Article 10(4) of Council Directive 90/425/EEC(8). The measures laid down in that Implementing Decision have been shown to be effective and similar measures should be laid down in this Decision.
(15) It is urgent to collect the required data for further assessing the risks for human health, for enabling early warning of occurrences of SARS-CoV-2 in minks and other animals of the familyMustelidaeand in raccoon dogs, and for monitoring the virus evolution.
(16) For disease monitoring purposes, the general principles for calculating the sample size set by the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code(9)refer to the need to calculate sample size based on factors such as the size of the population, the design of the survey, the expected prevalence and possible clustering, the level of confidence desired and the performance of the tests used. The EFSA report identifies specific design prevalence percentages for SARS-CoV-2, to achieve a given confidence ratio, which are used to set the design prevalence described in Annex II. These design prevalence and confidence levels directly impact, together with other factors, the expected sample size. These principles should be taken into account in the sampling scheme laid down in this Decision.
(17) Considering the current epidemiological situation of SARS-CoV-2 in minks and other animals of the familyMustelidae, this Decision should apply until 31 March 2022. In case there are changes in the epidemiological situation, the duration of period of application of this Decision will be reviewed by the Commission.
(18) Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/2183 should be repealed and replaced by this Decision.
(19) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
(a) the sampling and testing for SARS-CoV-2 of animals kept in establishments, with more than 500 adult breeders at the beginning of the cycle, in accordance with the sampling scheme set out in Annex II.
(b) the sampling and testing for SARS-CoV-2 of kept and wild animals in accordance with the sampling scheme set out in Annex III.
(a) on a weekly basis in the case of further outbreaks of new infections with SARS-CoV-2 in animals after the first confirmation referred to in paragraph 1;
(b) when there are relevant updates on the epidemiology of that disease and its zoonotic implications.
1. Minks (Neovison vison) and all other animals belonging to species of the familyMustelidae;
2. Raccoon dogs (Nyctereutes procyonoides).
(a) Target population: in each establishment keeping animals, samples shall be taken from every dead and sick animal from each epidemiological unit until the number of animals in the expected sample size is reached; in the absence of dead or sick animals, samples shall also be taken from random live animals to reach the expected sample size.
(b) Sampling frequency: samples shall be taken weekly.
(c) Sample matrix: oropharingeal swabs shall be taken from live or dead animals.
(d) Diagnostic tests: tests shall be taken for the detection of SARS-CoV-2 virus genome.
(e) Design prevalence to determine the expected sample size: within each establishment, the sample size shall be based on a 5 % prevalence with 95 % confidence.
(a) Target population: in each establishment keeping animals, samples shall be taken from every dead animal and sick animals as soon as they are identified, from each epidemiological unit until the expected sample size is reached; in the absence of dead or sick animals, samples shall also be taken from random live animals to reach the expected sample size.
(b) Sampling frequency: samples shall be taken every two weeks.
(c) Sample matrix: oropharingeal swabs shall be taken from dead animals; from live animals either oropharingeal or conjunctival or saliva swabs shall be taken or a combination of such swabs shall be taken; in addition, another option may be added to the swabs matrix, by using expiration air directly collected from all animals by using electronic air collector tools.
(d) Diagnostic tests: tests for the detection of SARS-CoV-2 virus genome shall be carried out.
(e) Design prevalence to determine the expected sample size: within each establishment the sample size shall be based on a 20 % prevalence with 95 % confidence.
1. The target populations for the sampling shall be the following:(a)In each establishment keeping animals where there is an increased mortality compared to the baseline mortality rate of that specific production period or animals with clinical signs related to SARS-CoV-2: every dead animal or animals with clinical signs related to SARS-CoV-2, from each epidemiological unit until the expected sample size is reached.(b)In each establishment keeping animals where the competent authority has been informed that cases of SARS-CoV-2 have been detected in the workers of that establishment or their families: every dead animal or animals with clinical signs related to SARS-CoV-2, from each epidemiological unit until the expected sample size is reached. (a) In each establishment keeping animals where there is an increased mortality compared to the baseline mortality rate of that specific production period or animals with clinical signs related to SARS-CoV-2: every dead animal or animals with clinical signs related to SARS-CoV-2, from each epidemiological unit until the expected sample size is reached. (b) In each establishment keeping animals where the competent authority has been informed that cases of SARS-CoV-2 have been detected in the workers of that establishment or their families: every dead animal or animals with clinical signs related to SARS-CoV-2, from each epidemiological unit until the expected sample size is reached.
(a) In each establishment keeping animals where there is an increased mortality compared to the baseline mortality rate of that specific production period or animals with clinical signs related to SARS-CoV-2: every dead animal or animals with clinical signs related to SARS-CoV-2, from each epidemiological unit until the expected sample size is reached.
(b) In each establishment keeping animals where the competent authority has been informed that cases of SARS-CoV-2 have been detected in the workers of that establishment or their families: every dead animal or animals with clinical signs related to SARS-CoV-2, from each epidemiological unit until the expected sample size is reached.
(a) In each establishment keeping animals where there is an increased mortality compared to the baseline mortality rate of that specific production period or animals with clinical signs related to SARS-CoV-2: every dead animal or animals with clinical signs related to SARS-CoV-2, from each epidemiological unit until the expected sample size is reached.
(b) In each establishment keeping animals where the competent authority has been informed that cases of SARS-CoV-2 have been detected in the workers of that establishment or their families: every dead animal or animals with clinical signs related to SARS-CoV-2, from each epidemiological unit until the expected sample size is reached.
2. Sampling frequency: sampling shall be carried out every time an animal suspected of being infected with SARS-CoV-2 is identified as indicated in the target population referred to in point 1.
3. Sample matrix: oropharingeal swabs shall be taken from dead or live animals referred to in point 1.
4. Diagnostic tests: tests for the detection of SARS-CoV-2 virus genome shall be carried out.
5. Design prevalence to determine the expected sample size for the target population referred to in:(i)point (1)(a): within each establishment, the sample size shall be based on a 50 % prevalence with 95 % confidence;(ii)point (1)(b): within each establishment, the sample size shall be based on a 5 % prevalence with 95 % confidence. (i) point (1)(a): within each establishment, the sample size shall be based on a 50 % prevalence with 95 % confidence; (ii) point (1)(b): within each establishment, the sample size shall be based on a 5 % prevalence with 95 % confidence.
(i) point (1)(a): within each establishment, the sample size shall be based on a 50 % prevalence with 95 % confidence;
(ii) point (1)(b): within each establishment, the sample size shall be based on a 5 % prevalence with 95 % confidence.
(i) point (1)(a): within each establishment, the sample size shall be based on a 50 % prevalence with 95 % confidence;
(ii) point (1)(b): within each establishment, the sample size shall be based on a 5 % prevalence with 95 % confidence.
1. The target populations for the sampling shall be for all other kept or wild animals excluding those kept in establishments: animal suspected of being infected with SARS-CoV-2 which have died, or were found dead, or animals with clinical signs related to SARS-CoV-2.
2. Sampling frequency: sampling shall be carried out every time an animal suspected of being infected with SARS-CoV-2 is identified as indicated in the target population referred to in point 1.
3. Sample matrix: oropharingeal swabs shall be taken from dead or live animals referred to in point 1.
4. Diagnostic tests: tests for the detection of SARS-CoV-2 virus genome shall be carried out.
5. Design prevalence to determine the expected sample size: sampling of all reported animals that have died, or were found dead, or animals with clinical signs related to SARS-CoV-2; in case more than 5 animals were found dead in the same place or presumed to belong to the same epidemiological unit, the sample size shall be limited to 5 randomly selected animals.
1. Date of reporting;
2. Member State;
3. Type of report (first confirmation report/weekly-follow-up report);
4. Total number of outbreaks in the Member State included in the report;
5. For each outbreak provide:(a)Serial number of each outbreak in the Member State;(b)Region and approximate geographical location of the establishment or other place where animals were kept or located;(c)Date of suspicion;(d)Date of confirmation;(e)Diagnostic method(s);(f)Date of estimation of introduction of the virus in the establishment or place;(g)Possible source of the virus;(h)Control measures taken (details(1));(i)Number of susceptible animals on establishment or at the place (by susceptible species);(j)Number of animals clinically or subclinically affected on establishment or at the place (by susceptible species; in case an exact figure is not available, an estimate must be provided);(k)Morbidity: number of animals (by susceptible species) clinically affected, with signs resembling COVID-19, on establishment or at the place in relation to the number of susceptible animals with a summary description of the clinical signs (in case an exact figure is not available, an estimate must be provided);(l)Mortality: number of animals (by susceptible species) that have died on establishment or at the place (in case an exact figure is not available, an estimate must be provided); (a) Serial number of each outbreak in the Member State; (b) Region and approximate geographical location of the establishment or other place where animals were kept or located; (c) Date of suspicion; (d) Date of confirmation; (e) Diagnostic method(s); (f) Date of estimation of introduction of the virus in the establishment or place; (g) Possible source of the virus; (h) Control measures taken (details(1)); (i) Number of susceptible animals on establishment or at the place (by susceptible species); (j) Number of animals clinically or subclinically affected on establishment or at the place (by susceptible species; in case an exact figure is not available, an estimate must be provided); (k) Morbidity: number of animals (by susceptible species) clinically affected, with signs resembling COVID-19, on establishment or at the place in relation to the number of susceptible animals with a summary description of the clinical signs (in case an exact figure is not available, an estimate must be provided); (l) Mortality: number of animals (by susceptible species) that have died on establishment or at the place (in case an exact figure is not available, an estimate must be provided);
(a) Serial number of each outbreak in the Member State;
(b) Region and approximate geographical location of the establishment or other place where animals were kept or located;
(c) Date of suspicion;
(d) Date of confirmation;
(e) Diagnostic method(s);
(f) Date of estimation of introduction of the virus in the establishment or place;
(g) Possible source of the virus;
(h) Control measures taken (details(1));
(i) Number of susceptible animals on establishment or at the place (by susceptible species);
(j) Number of animals clinically or subclinically affected on establishment or at the place (by susceptible species; in case an exact figure is not available, an estimate must be provided);
(k) Morbidity: number of animals (by susceptible species) clinically affected, with signs resembling COVID-19, on establishment or at the place in relation to the number of susceptible animals with a summary description of the clinical signs (in case an exact figure is not available, an estimate must be provided);
(l) Mortality: number of animals (by susceptible species) that have died on establishment or at the place (in case an exact figure is not available, an estimate must be provided);
(a) Serial number of each outbreak in the Member State;
(b) Region and approximate geographical location of the establishment or other place where animals were kept or located;
(c) Date of suspicion;
(d) Date of confirmation;
(e) Diagnostic method(s);
(f) Date of estimation of introduction of the virus in the establishment or place;
(g) Possible source of the virus;
(h) Control measures taken (details(1));
(i) Number of susceptible animals on establishment or at the place (by susceptible species);
(j) Number of animals clinically or subclinically affected on establishment or at the place (by susceptible species; in case an exact figure is not available, an estimate must be provided);
(k) Morbidity: number of animals (by susceptible species) clinically affected, with signs resembling COVID-19, on establishment or at the place in relation to the number of susceptible animals with a summary description of the clinical signs (in case an exact figure is not available, an estimate must be provided);
(l) Mortality: number of animals (by susceptible species) that have died on establishment or at the place (in case an exact figure is not available, an estimate must be provided);
6. Data on molecular epidemiology, significant mutations;
7. Where relevant, non-personal epidemiological data on human cases in the Member State directly related to animal outbreaks referred to in Article 4(1) and (2);
8. Other relevant information.
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Directive 2003/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 November 2003 on the monitoring of zoonoses and zoonotic agents, amending Council Decision 90/424/EEC and repealing Council Directive 92/117/EEC(1), and in particular Articles 4(5) and 9(1) and Article 11, third paragraph, thereof,
(1) Since 2020, infections with the SARS-CoV-2 virus in minks have been reported in certain Member States and third countries, and it has been established that human-to-mink and mink-to-human transmission can occur. Furthermore, one Member State has reported human COVID-19 cases infected with the SARS-CoV-2 virus variants related to mink.
(2) On 12 November 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) published, with the contribution of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), a Rapid Risk Assessment on the detection of new SARS-CoV-2 variants related to mink(2)(the ECDC Rapid Risk Assessment).
(3) The ECDC Rapid Risk Assessment concluded that the overall level of risk to human health posed by SARS-CoV-2 mink-related variants can be determined as ranging from low for the general population up to very high for medically vulnerable individuals with occupational exposure. The ECDC Rapid Risk Assessment also indicated that further investigations are needed to assess whether SARS-CoV-2 mink-related variants may have an impact on the risk of reinfection, reduced vaccine efficacy or reduced benefit from treatment.
(4) To decrease the risk posed to public health, the ECDC Rapid Risk Assessment recommends that national authorities should consider implementing measures aimed at mink farms, mink farm workers and communities in contact with mink farms. Those measures should cover human testing, sequencing and characterisation of antigenic properties and virus infectivity as well as animal monitoring and surveillance of mink farms in order to prevent the spread of SARS-CoV-2 variants from animals to humans.
(5) On 20 January 2021, the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) issued a joint tripartite risk assessment on emerging threats at the human-animal-ecosystems interface, which addressed SARS-CoV-2 in animals used for fur farming(3). The risk assessment recommends that the testing of animals for SARS-CoV-2 should be risk-based and should only be considered in the broader response to COVID-19 within a ‘One Health’ approach, incorporating an early warning and surveillance system based on case definitions in farm workers and animals as appropriate. In accordance with the risk assessment, in SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks involving fur farms, sequencing of viruses from human cases and minks, including phylogenetic analysis and comparison of genetic sequences, is recommended to understand the direction of infection (namely, whether animal to animal, animal to human, human to animal or human to human) and to identify and assess any mutations occurring.
(6) On 18 February 2021, EFSA, with the contribution of ECDC, published the scientific report on the monitoring of SARS-CoV-2 infection in mustelids(4)(the EFSA report). The EFSA report indicates that SARS-CoV-2 spreads very efficiently within mink farms once introduced, by direct and indirect contact. Infected humans were likely at the origin of the introduction of SARS-CoV-2 infection into farms. The EFSA report concludes that carrying out surveillance on workers at mink farms is an important step in enabling the early detection of infection. The EFSA report also indicates that raccoon dogs (Nyctereutes procyonoides) are also susceptible to SARS-CoV-2.
(7) The EFSA report recommends that all mink farms that are not yet infected should be considered at risk of infection, as the human disease is widespread and therefore the monitoring objective of choice should be early detection.
(8) In line with the EFSA report, one of the monitoring objectives should be the monitoring of the SARS-CoV-2 virus evolution. Genetic analysis is important to characterise the SARS-CoV-2 virus and to detect possible virus mutations and to identify the origin and the source of the virus. Detecting possible virus mutations is of particular relevance for public health, in order to identify new variant viruses early that may have an impact on diagnostics, transmission, severity or vaccine effectiveness.
(9) Kept and wild raccoon dogs should be considered susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection. The OIE, in its Guidance on working with farmed animals of species susceptible to infection with SARS-CoV-2(5), has called on countries to monitor susceptible animals for SARS-CoV-2 infection, such as mink and raccoon dogs, as well as humans in close contact with them, adopting a ‘One Health’ approach. Monitoring programmes concerning zoonoses should be established by the Commission for laying down detailed rules for the monitoring of this specific zoonotic agent as Directive 2003/99/EC provides for such monitoring in view of collecting coordinated data, make data easier to compile and compare and better identification of the risks, and thus enabling further action where appropriate. The recitals of that Directive mention that zoonoses transmitted through sources other than food, especially from wild animal and pet animal populations, are a matter of concern. In addition, they mention that the collection of data on the occurrence of zoonoses and zoonotic agents in animals, food, feed and humans is necessary to determine the trends and sources of zoonoses. They also mention that priority should be given to those zoonoses posing the greatest risk to human health, but that the monitoring systems should also facilitate the detection of emerging or newly emerging zoonotic diseases and new strains of zoonotic organisms.
(10) In order to enable further risk assessment under the ‘One Health’ approach and to inform and identify possible risk-management options as regards the risks arising from the circulation of SARS-CoV-2 mink-related variants in animals of the familyMustelidaeand in raccoon dogs, an efficient, harmonised monitoring and reporting system allowing for the collection and exchange of all relevant information should be established without delay.
(11) In order to facilitate implementation and to focus resources on higher risk groups, the monitoring system laid down in this act should cover all keptMustelidaeand raccoon dogs, but prioritise establishments with over 500 adult breeders for active monitoring activities and accordingly rules for the sampling and testing for SARS-CoV-2 of animals in those prioritised establishments should be set out in Annex II to this act. In parallel, passive monitoring should be ensured in all kept and wildMustelidaeand raccoon dogs to ensure investigation of specific situations, and accordingly rules for a sampling scheme for the passive monitoring of all such kept or wild animals should be set out in Annex III to this act.
(12) Given the urgency to further assess the risk posed by the epidemiological situation in the Union as regards the occurrence of SARS-CoV-2 in minks and other animals of the familyMustelidaeand in raccoon dogs as well as to assess the viability of the measures, Member States should allocate the required resources for setting up a monitoring system and submit to the Commission regular reports on the occurrence of that infection in kept or wild animals of the familyMustelidaeand in raccoon dogs. Article 3 of Directive 2003/99/EC provides for the publication of data by the Member States. To ensure proper risk communication within the Union, the Commission should publish on its website, for information only, a summary of the information collected as regards SARS-CoV-2, given the importance of risk communication for that virus.
(13) To enable reporting, in a structured manner, of occurrences of SARS-CoV-2 in minks and other animals of the familyMustelidaeand in raccoon dogs, this Decision should establish the model report, the minimum information requirements and the format for data by outbreak and by species susceptible to the SARS-CoV-2 virus. This model report should be used for reporting purposes for that virus.
(14) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/2183(6)lays down rules concerning certain protective measures in relation to reporting infection with SARS-CoV-2 in minks and other animals of the familyMustelidaeand in raccoon dogs and applies until 20 April 2021. Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/2183 is based on Article 9(4) of Council Directive 89/662/EEC(7), and on Article 10(4) of Council Directive 90/425/EEC(8). The measures laid down in that Implementing Decision have been shown to be effective and similar measures should be laid down in this Decision.
(15) It is urgent to collect the required data for further assessing the risks for human health, for enabling early warning of occurrences of SARS-CoV-2 in minks and other animals of the familyMustelidaeand in raccoon dogs, and for monitoring the virus evolution.
(16) For disease monitoring purposes, the general principles for calculating the sample size set by the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code(9)refer to the need to calculate sample size based on factors such as the size of the population, the design of the survey, the expected prevalence and possible clustering, the level of confidence desired and the performance of the tests used. The EFSA report identifies specific design prevalence percentages for SARS-CoV-2, to achieve a given confidence ratio, which are used to set the design prevalence described in Annex II. These design prevalence and confidence levels directly impact, together with other factors, the expected sample size. These principles should be taken into account in the sampling scheme laid down in this Decision.
(17) Considering the current epidemiological situation of SARS-CoV-2 in minks and other animals of the familyMustelidae, this Decision should apply until 31 March 2022. In case there are changes in the epidemiological situation, the duration of period of application of this Decision will be reviewed by the Commission.
(18) Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/2183 should be repealed and replaced by this Decision.
(19) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Subject matter and scope
Article 1
This Decision lays down detailed harmonised rules for the monitoring and reporting by Member States of cases of infection with SARS-CoV-2 in certain animals.
That monitoring and reporting shall cover outbreaks of infection with SARS-CoV-2 in kept and wild animals of the species listed in Annex I (the animals), and shall cover the whole territory of the Member States.

Sampling framework for monitoring
Article 2
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the competent authorities make appropriate arrangements for:
(a)
the sampling and testing for SARS-CoV-2 of animals kept in establishments, with more than 500 adult breeders at the beginning of the cycle, in accordance with the sampling scheme set out in Annex II.
(b)
the sampling and testing for SARS-CoV-2 of kept and wild animals in accordance with the sampling scheme set out in Annex III.

Monitoring virus evolution
Article 3
1. In the case of detection of the SARS-CoV-2 virus in animals, Member States shall ensure that official laboratories carry out phylogenetic analysis in the presumed index case of each outbreak to characterise the virus.
2. Member States shall ensure that viruses sequenced from animals in accordance with paragraph 1 are phylogenetically compared to already known sequences and the results of such studies transmitted to the Commission in accordance with Article 4.

Reporting
Article 4
1. Member States shall submit a report to the Commission within three days from the date of the first confirmation on their territory of the infection of animals with the SARS-CoV-2 virus.
2. Member States shall submit a follow-up report:
(a)
on a weekly basis in the case of further outbreaks of new infections with SARS-CoV-2 in animals after the first confirmation referred to in paragraph 1;
(b)
when there are relevant updates on the epidemiology of that disease and its zoonotic implications.
3. The reports provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall include for each outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 in animals, the information set out in Annex IV.
4. Where relevant, Member States shall submit a report to the Commission on a monthly basis as regards the results of the phylogenetic analysis and the results of the studies referred to in Article 3.
5. The reports provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be communicated in an electronic format to be determined by the Commission in the framework of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed.

Information by the Commission
Article 5
1. The Commission shall inform the Member States in the framework of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed of the reports submitted by the Member States in accordance with Article 4.
2. The Commission shall publish on its website, for information purposes only, an updated summary of the information contained in the reports submitted by the Member States in accordance with Article 4.

Article 6
This Decision shall apply until 31 March 2022.

Article 7
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/2183 is repealed.

Article 8
This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Directive 2003/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 November 2003 on the monitoring of zoonoses and zoonotic agents, amending Council Decision 90/424/EEC and repealing Council Directive 92/117/EEC(1), and in particular Articles 4(5) and 9(1) and Article 11, third paragraph, thereof,
(1) Since 2020, infections with the SARS-CoV-2 virus in minks have been reported in certain Member States and third countries, and it has been established that human-to-mink and mink-to-human transmission can occur. Furthermore, one Member State has reported human COVID-19 cases infected with the SARS-CoV-2 virus variants related to mink.
(2) On 12 November 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) published, with the contribution of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), a Rapid Risk Assessment on the detection of new SARS-CoV-2 variants related to mink(2)(the ECDC Rapid Risk Assessment).
(3) The ECDC Rapid Risk Assessment concluded that the overall level of risk to human health posed by SARS-CoV-2 mink-related variants can be determined as ranging from low for the general population up to very high for medically vulnerable individuals with occupational exposure. The ECDC Rapid Risk Assessment also indicated that further investigations are needed to assess whether SARS-CoV-2 mink-related variants may have an impact on the risk of reinfection, reduced vaccine efficacy or reduced benefit from treatment.
(4) To decrease the risk posed to public health, the ECDC Rapid Risk Assessment recommends that national authorities should consider implementing measures aimed at mink farms, mink farm workers and communities in contact with mink farms. Those measures should cover human testing, sequencing and characterisation of antigenic properties and virus infectivity as well as animal monitoring and surveillance of mink farms in order to prevent the spread of SARS-CoV-2 variants from animals to humans.
(5) On 20 January 2021, the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) issued a joint tripartite risk assessment on emerging threats at the human-animal-ecosystems interface, which addressed SARS-CoV-2 in animals used for fur farming(3). The risk assessment recommends that the testing of animals for SARS-CoV-2 should be risk-based and should only be considered in the broader response to COVID-19 within a ‘One Health’ approach, incorporating an early warning and surveillance system based on case definitions in farm workers and animals as appropriate. In accordance with the risk assessment, in SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks involving fur farms, sequencing of viruses from human cases and minks, including phylogenetic analysis and comparison of genetic sequences, is recommended to understand the direction of infection (namely, whether animal to animal, animal to human, human to animal or human to human) and to identify and assess any mutations occurring.
(6) On 18 February 2021, EFSA, with the contribution of ECDC, published the scientific report on the monitoring of SARS-CoV-2 infection in mustelids(4)(the EFSA report). The EFSA report indicates that SARS-CoV-2 spreads very efficiently within mink farms once introduced, by direct and indirect contact. Infected humans were likely at the origin of the introduction of SARS-CoV-2 infection into farms. The EFSA report concludes that carrying out surveillance on workers at mink farms is an important step in enabling the early detection of infection. The EFSA report also indicates that raccoon dogs (Nyctereutes procyonoides) are also susceptible to SARS-CoV-2.
(7) The EFSA report recommends that all mink farms that are not yet infected should be considered at risk of infection, as the human disease is widespread and therefore the monitoring objective of choice should be early detection.
(8) In line with the EFSA report, one of the monitoring objectives should be the monitoring of the SARS-CoV-2 virus evolution. Genetic analysis is important to characterise the SARS-CoV-2 virus and to detect possible virus mutations and to identify the origin and the source of the virus. Detecting possible virus mutations is of particular relevance for public health, in order to identify new variant viruses early that may have an impact on diagnostics, transmission, severity or vaccine effectiveness.
(9) Kept and wild raccoon dogs should be considered susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection. The OIE, in its Guidance on working with farmed animals of species susceptible to infection with SARS-CoV-2(5), has called on countries to monitor susceptible animals for SARS-CoV-2 infection, such as mink and raccoon dogs, as well as humans in close contact with them, adopting a ‘One Health’ approach. Monitoring programmes concerning zoonoses should be established by the Commission for laying down detailed rules for the monitoring of this specific zoonotic agent as Directive 2003/99/EC provides for such monitoring in view of collecting coordinated data, make data easier to compile and compare and better identification of the risks, and thus enabling further action where appropriate. The recitals of that Directive mention that zoonoses transmitted through sources other than food, especially from wild animal and pet animal populations, are a matter of concern. In addition, they mention that the collection of data on the occurrence of zoonoses and zoonotic agents in animals, food, feed and humans is necessary to determine the trends and sources of zoonoses. They also mention that priority should be given to those zoonoses posing the greatest risk to human health, but that the monitoring systems should also facilitate the detection of emerging or newly emerging zoonotic diseases and new strains of zoonotic organisms.
(10) In order to enable further risk assessment under the ‘One Health’ approach and to inform and identify possible risk-management options as regards the risks arising from the circulation of SARS-CoV-2 mink-related variants in animals of the familyMustelidaeand in raccoon dogs, an efficient, harmonised monitoring and reporting system allowing for the collection and exchange of all relevant information should be established without delay.
(11) In order to facilitate implementation and to focus resources on higher risk groups, the monitoring system laid down in this act should cover all keptMustelidaeand raccoon dogs, but prioritise establishments with over 500 adult breeders for active monitoring activities and accordingly rules for the sampling and testing for SARS-CoV-2 of animals in those prioritised establishments should be set out in Annex II to this act. In parallel, passive monitoring should be ensured in all kept and wildMustelidaeand raccoon dogs to ensure investigation of specific situations, and accordingly rules for a sampling scheme for the passive monitoring of all such kept or wild animals should be set out in Annex III to this act.
(12) Given the urgency to further assess the risk posed by the epidemiological situation in the Union as regards the occurrence of SARS-CoV-2 in minks and other animals of the familyMustelidaeand in raccoon dogs as well as to assess the viability of the measures, Member States should allocate the required resources for setting up a monitoring system and submit to the Commission regular reports on the occurrence of that infection in kept or wild animals of the familyMustelidaeand in raccoon dogs. Article 3 of Directive 2003/99/EC provides for the publication of data by the Member States. To ensure proper risk communication within the Union, the Commission should publish on its website, for information only, a summary of the information collected as regards SARS-CoV-2, given the importance of risk communication for that virus.
(13) To enable reporting, in a structured manner, of occurrences of SARS-CoV-2 in minks and other animals of the familyMustelidaeand in raccoon dogs, this Decision should establish the model report, the minimum information requirements and the format for data by outbreak and by species susceptible to the SARS-CoV-2 virus. This model report should be used for reporting purposes for that virus.
(14) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/2183(6)lays down rules concerning certain protective measures in relation to reporting infection with SARS-CoV-2 in minks and other animals of the familyMustelidaeand in raccoon dogs and applies until 20 April 2021. Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/2183 is based on Article 9(4) of Council Directive 89/662/EEC(7), and on Article 10(4) of Council Directive 90/425/EEC(8). The measures laid down in that Implementing Decision have been shown to be effective and similar measures should be laid down in this Decision.
(15) It is urgent to collect the required data for further assessing the risks for human health, for enabling early warning of occurrences of SARS-CoV-2 in minks and other animals of the familyMustelidaeand in raccoon dogs, and for monitoring the virus evolution.
(16) For disease monitoring purposes, the general principles for calculating the sample size set by the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code(9)refer to the need to calculate sample size based on factors such as the size of the population, the design of the survey, the expected prevalence and possible clustering, the level of confidence desired and the performance of the tests used. The EFSA report identifies specific design prevalence percentages for SARS-CoV-2, to achieve a given confidence ratio, which are used to set the design prevalence described in Annex II. These design prevalence and confidence levels directly impact, together with other factors, the expected sample size. These principles should be taken into account in the sampling scheme laid down in this Decision.
(17) Considering the current epidemiological situation of SARS-CoV-2 in minks and other animals of the familyMustelidae, this Decision should apply until 31 March 2022. In case there are changes in the epidemiological situation, the duration of period of application of this Decision will be reviewed by the Commission.
(18) Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/2183 should be repealed and replaced by this Decision.
(19) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Subject matter and scope

This Decision lays down detailed harmonised rules for the monitoring and reporting by Member States of cases of infection with SARS-CoV-2 in certain animals.
That monitoring and reporting shall cover outbreaks of infection with SARS-CoV-2 in kept and wild animals of the species listed in Annex I (the animals), and shall cover the whole territory of the Member States.

Sampling framework for monitoring

Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the competent authorities make appropriate arrangements for:
(a)
the sampling and testing for SARS-CoV-2 of animals kept in establishments, with more than 500 adult breeders at the beginning of the cycle, in accordance with the sampling scheme set out in Annex II.
(b)
the sampling and testing for SARS-CoV-2 of kept and wild animals in accordance with the sampling scheme set out in Annex III.

Monitoring virus evolution

1. In the case of detection of the SARS-CoV-2 virus in animals, Member States shall ensure that official laboratories carry out phylogenetic analysis in the presumed index case of each outbreak to characterise the virus.
2. Member States shall ensure that viruses sequenced from animals in accordance with paragraph 1 are phylogenetically compared to already known sequences and the results of such studies transmitted to the Commission in accordance with Article 4.

Reporting

1. Member States shall submit a report to the Commission within three days from the date of the first confirmation on their territory of the infection of animals with the SARS-CoV-2 virus.
2. Member States shall submit a follow-up report:
(a)
on a weekly basis in the case of further outbreaks of new infections with SARS-CoV-2 in animals after the first confirmation referred to in paragraph 1;
(b)
when there are relevant updates on the epidemiology of that disease and its zoonotic implications.
3. The reports provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall include for each outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 in animals, the information set out in Annex IV.
4. Where relevant, Member States shall submit a report to the Commission on a monthly basis as regards the results of the phylogenetic analysis and the results of the studies referred to in Article 3.
5. The reports provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be communicated in an electronic format to be determined by the Commission in the framework of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed.

Information by the Commission

1. The Commission shall inform the Member States in the framework of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed of the reports submitted by the Member States in accordance with Article 4.
2. The Commission shall publish on its website, for information purposes only, an updated summary of the information contained in the reports submitted by the Member States in accordance with Article 4.
This Decision shall apply until 31 March 2022.
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/2183 is repealed.
This Decision is addressed to the Member States.
ANNEX IList of animal species subject to monitoring and reporting
1. | Minks (Neovison vison) and all other animals belonging to species of the familyMustelidae;
2. | Raccoon dogs (Nyctereutes procyonoides).

SECTION 1

ANNEX IISampling and testing for SARS-CoV-2 of animals kept in establishments, with more than 500 adult breeders at the beginning of the cycleThe competent authority shall ensure that one of the following sampling schemes is followed:

Default sampling scheme

(a) | Target population: in each establishment keeping animals, samples shall be taken from every dead and sick animal from each epidemiological unit until the number of animals in the expected sample size is reached; in the absence of dead or sick animals, samples shall also be taken from random live animals to reach the expected sample size.
(b) | Sampling frequency: samples shall be taken weekly.
(c) | Sample matrix: oropharingeal swabs shall be taken from live or dead animals.
(d) | Diagnostic tests: tests shall be taken for the detection of SARS-CoV-2 virus genome.
(e) | Design prevalence to determine the expected sample size: within each establishment, the sample size shall be based on a 5 % prevalence with 95 % confidence.SECTION 2
First alternative sampling scheme
Based on a positive outcome of a risk assessment, carried out by the competent authority, which considers the sensitivity of alternative sampling methodologies to be equivalent to oropharingeal swabs as referred to in point (c) of Section 1 and the existence of risk mitigating measures for the occurrence of SARS-CoV-2 in the target population in the establishment, the Member States may decide to use the following alternative sampling scheme instead of the default sampling scheme set out in Section 1:

(a) | Target population: in each establishment keeping animals, samples shall be taken from every dead animal and sick animals as soon as they are identified, from each epidemiological unit until the expected sample size is reached; in the absence of dead or sick animals, samples shall also be taken from random live animals to reach the expected sample size.
(b) | Sampling frequency: samples shall be taken every two weeks.
(c) | Sample matrix: oropharingeal swabs shall be taken from dead animals; from live animals either oropharingeal or conjunctival or saliva swabs shall be taken or a combination of such swabs shall be taken; in addition, another option may be added to the swabs matrix, by using expiration air directly collected from all animals by using electronic air collector tools.
(d) | Diagnostic tests: tests for the detection of SARS-CoV-2 virus genome shall be carried out.
(e) | Design prevalence to determine the expected sample size: within each establishment the sample size shall be based on a 20 % prevalence with 95 % confidence.SECTION 3
Second alternative sampling scheme
Where a risk assessment has been carried out by the competent authority with a positive outcome, and the risk assessment covers the result of SARS-CoV-2 sampling and testing of workers of an establishment and the existence of risk mitigating measures for the occurrence of SARS-CoV-2 in the target population in the establishment, the Member States may decide to rely solely on the sampling scheme for the monitoring of animals provided by Annex III.

SECTION 1

ANNEX IIISampling scheme for the monitoring of kept or wild animalsThe competent authority shall ensure that the following sampling schemes set out in Section 1 and Section 2 are followed.

Monitoring in establishments keeping animals

| 1. | The target populations for the sampling shall be the following:(a)In each establishment keeping animals where there is an increased mortality compared to the baseline mortality rate of that specific production period or animals with clinical signs related to SARS-CoV-2: every dead animal or animals with clinical signs related to SARS-CoV-2, from each epidemiological unit until the expected sample size is reached.(b)In each establishment keeping animals where the competent authority has been informed that cases of SARS-CoV-2 have been detected in the workers of that establishment or their families: every dead animal or animals with clinical signs related to SARS-CoV-2, from each epidemiological unit until the expected sample size is reached. | (a) | In each establishment keeping animals where there is an increased mortality compared to the baseline mortality rate of that specific production period or animals with clinical signs related to SARS-CoV-2: every dead animal or animals with clinical signs related to SARS-CoV-2, from each epidemiological unit until the expected sample size is reached. | (b) | In each establishment keeping animals where the competent authority has been informed that cases of SARS-CoV-2 have been detected in the workers of that establishment or their families: every dead animal or animals with clinical signs related to SARS-CoV-2, from each epidemiological unit until the expected sample size is reached.
(a) | In each establishment keeping animals where there is an increased mortality compared to the baseline mortality rate of that specific production period or animals with clinical signs related to SARS-CoV-2: every dead animal or animals with clinical signs related to SARS-CoV-2, from each epidemiological unit until the expected sample size is reached.
(b) | In each establishment keeping animals where the competent authority has been informed that cases of SARS-CoV-2 have been detected in the workers of that establishment or their families: every dead animal or animals with clinical signs related to SARS-CoV-2, from each epidemiological unit until the expected sample size is reached.
| 2. | Sampling frequency: sampling shall be carried out every time an animal suspected of being infected with SARS-CoV-2 is identified as indicated in the target population referred to in point 1.
| 3. | Sample matrix: oropharingeal swabs shall be taken from dead or live animals referred to in point 1.
| 4. | Diagnostic tests: tests for the detection of SARS-CoV-2 virus genome shall be carried out.
| 5. | Design prevalence to determine the expected sample size for the target population referred to in:(i)point (1)(a): within each establishment, the sample size shall be based on a 50 % prevalence with 95 % confidence;(ii)point (1)(b): within each establishment, the sample size shall be based on a 5 % prevalence with 95 % confidence. | (i) | point (1)(a): within each establishment, the sample size shall be based on a 50 % prevalence with 95 % confidence; | (ii) | point (1)(b): within each establishment, the sample size shall be based on a 5 % prevalence with 95 % confidence.
(i) | point (1)(a): within each establishment, the sample size shall be based on a 50 % prevalence with 95 % confidence;
(ii) | point (1)(b): within each establishment, the sample size shall be based on a 5 % prevalence with 95 % confidence.SECTION 2
Monitoring in all other kept or wild animals

| 1. | The target populations for the sampling shall be for all other kept or wild animals excluding those kept in establishments: animal suspected of being infected with SARS-CoV-2 which have died, or were found dead, or animals with clinical signs related to SARS-CoV-2.
| 2. | Sampling frequency: sampling shall be carried out every time an animal suspected of being infected with SARS-CoV-2 is identified as indicated in the target population referred to in point 1.
| 3. | Sample matrix: oropharingeal swabs shall be taken from dead or live animals referred to in point 1.
| 4. | Diagnostic tests: tests for the detection of SARS-CoV-2 virus genome shall be carried out.
| 5. | Design prevalence to determine the expected sample size: sampling of all reported animals that have died, or were found dead, or animals with clinical signs related to SARS-CoV-2; in case more than 5 animals were found dead in the same place or presumed to belong to the same epidemiological unit, the sample size shall be limited to 5 randomly selected animals.

ANNEX IVInformation to be contained in the reports provided for in Article 4 in relation to outbreaks of infection with SARS-CoV-2 in animals (‘susceptible species’)

1. | Date of reporting;
2. | Member State;
3. | Type of report (first confirmation report/weekly-follow-up report);
4. | Total number of outbreaks in the Member State included in the report;
5. | For each outbreak provide:(a)Serial number of each outbreak in the Member State;(b)Region and approximate geographical location of the establishment or other place where animals were kept or located;(c)Date of suspicion;(d)Date of confirmation;(e)Diagnostic method(s);(f)Date of estimation of introduction of the virus in the establishment or place;(g)Possible source of the virus;(h)Control measures taken (details(1));(i)Number of susceptible animals on establishment or at the place (by susceptible species);(j)Number of animals clinically or subclinically affected on establishment or at the place (by susceptible species; in case an exact figure is not available, an estimate must be provided);(k)Morbidity: number of animals (by susceptible species) clinically affected, with signs resembling COVID-19, on establishment or at the place in relation to the number of susceptible animals with a summary description of the clinical signs (in case an exact figure is not available, an estimate must be provided);(l)Mortality: number of animals (by susceptible species) that have died on establishment or at the place (in case an exact figure is not available, an estimate must be provided); | (a) | Serial number of each outbreak in the Member State; | (b) | Region and approximate geographical location of the establishment or other place where animals were kept or located; | (c) | Date of suspicion; | (d) | Date of confirmation; | (e) | Diagnostic method(s); | (f) | Date of estimation of introduction of the virus in the establishment or place; | (g) | Possible source of the virus; | (h) | Control measures taken (details(1)); | (i) | Number of susceptible animals on establishment or at the place (by susceptible species); | (j) | Number of animals clinically or subclinically affected on establishment or at the place (by susceptible species; in case an exact figure is not available, an estimate must be provided); | (k) | Morbidity: number of animals (by susceptible species) clinically affected, with signs resembling COVID-19, on establishment or at the place in relation to the number of susceptible animals with a summary description of the clinical signs (in case an exact figure is not available, an estimate must be provided); | (l) | Mortality: number of animals (by susceptible species) that have died on establishment or at the place (in case an exact figure is not available, an estimate must be provided);
(a) | Serial number of each outbreak in the Member State;
(b) | Region and approximate geographical location of the establishment or other place where animals were kept or located;
(c) | Date of suspicion;
(d) | Date of confirmation;
(e) | Diagnostic method(s);
(f) | Date of estimation of introduction of the virus in the establishment or place;
(g) | Possible source of the virus;
(h) | Control measures taken (details(1));
(i) | Number of susceptible animals on establishment or at the place (by susceptible species);
(j) | Number of animals clinically or subclinically affected on establishment or at the place (by susceptible species; in case an exact figure is not available, an estimate must be provided);
(k) | Morbidity: number of animals (by susceptible species) clinically affected, with signs resembling COVID-19, on establishment or at the place in relation to the number of susceptible animals with a summary description of the clinical signs (in case an exact figure is not available, an estimate must be provided);
(l) | Mortality: number of animals (by susceptible species) that have died on establishment or at the place (in case an exact figure is not available, an estimate must be provided);
6. | Data on molecular epidemiology, significant mutations;
7. | Where relevant, non-personal epidemiological data on human cases in the Member State directly related to animal outbreaks referred to in Article 4(1) and (2);
8. | Other relevant information.
(1) Movement control inside the Member State; surveillance within containment or protection zone; traceability; quarantine; official disposal of carcasses, by-products and waste; stamping out; control of wildlife reservoirs; zoning; disinfection; vaccination of animals permitted (if a vaccine exists); no treatment of affected animals and other relevant measures.

Pending: 32021D0649

January 16, 2026
20.4.2021 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 133/59
(1) The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on 2 April 2013 through its Resolution A/RES/67/234 B. The ATT was subsequently opened for signature on 3 June 2013 and entered into force on 24 December 2014. All Member States are parties to the ATT.
(2) The ATT aims to establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms and to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion. Key challenges in achieving the aims of the ATT are its effective implementation by States Parties to the ATT (‘States Parties’) and its universalisation, bearing in mind that regulating international arms trade is by definition a global endeavour. To contribute to addressing those challenges, the Council adopted Decision 2013/768/CFSP(1)on 16 December 2013 and Decision (CFSP) 2017/915(2)on 29 May 2017, thereby enlarging the export control-related assistance portfolio of the Union with activities specific to the ATT.
(3) The ATT establishes a Secretariat (the ‘ATT Secretariat’) to assist States Parties in the effective implementation of the ATT. The ATT Secretariat undertakes the following responsibilities: to receive, make available and distribute the reports as mandated by the ATT; to maintain and make available to States Parties the list of national points of contact; to facilitate the matching of offers of and requests for assistance for ATT implementation and promote international cooperation as requested; to facilitate the work of the Conference of States Parties, including making arrangements and providing the necessary services for meetings under the ATT; and to perform other duties as decided by the Conferences of States Parties. The ATT Secretariat also administers the Voluntary Trust Fund established by States Parties under Article 16(3) of the ATT to assist States Parties’ implementation of the ATT. In addition, the Fourth Conference of States Parties entrusted the ATT Secretariat with the administration of the ATT Sponsorship Programme, established to facilitate the participation of State representatives in ATT meetings.
(4) In its 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, the Union commits itself to promoting a rules-based global order. The Union has an interest in promoting agreed rules to provide global public goods and contribute to a peaceful and sustainable world. The Union promotes a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the UN at its core. The Union strongly supports the expanding membership, universalisation, full implementation and enforcement of multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control treaties and regimes, including the ATT. In the context of those overarching policy goals, support for the ATT Secretariat fits well within the specific aim of strengthening the multilateral system underpinning a responsible trade in arms.
(5) The ATT Secretariat is well placed to liaise with all multilateral, regional, national and civil society organisations executing projects in support of ATT universalisation or implementation. The Union is also a longstanding provider of export control assistance in dual-use goods, supporting the development of legal frameworks and institutional capacities for the establishment and enforcement of effective export controls on dual-use and military goods. The ATT Secretariat aims to ensure that its projects are complementary to the Union’s existing dual-use goods and arms export control assistance programmes, such as those under Decision (CFSP) 2017/915,
— to support States Parties to the ATT in strengthening their arms transfer control systems for the effective implementation of the ATT,
— to strengthen the institutional set-up of the ATT Secretariat as the principal body to assist States Parties to the ATT in implementing the ATT.
(a) support for capacity building of ATT national points of contact;
(b) establishing an expert roster to build the capacity of local and regional ATT experts to provide advice and training on ATT implementation at local and regional levels (‘training the trainers’);
(c) support for a database to match needs and resources.
(a) Preparation of a guidance document for National Points of Contact describing the role and possible tasks for that function;
(b) Creation of a web page /portal dedicated specifically to National Points of Contact, with links to information pertinent to them;
(c) Organisation of three half- to one-day briefings in advance of every ATT meeting dedicated to National Points of Contact, in which they would be provided with information and updates on the forthcoming meeting and be given the opportunity to ask questions and clarify information; and
(d) Establishment of a mechanism to regularly and systematically reach out to National Points of Contact on an individual basis to support their ATT engagement.
(a) Increased knowledge of ATT obligations (including reporting) among ATT national points of contact;
(b) Increased awareness of the ATT process;
(c) Wide dissemination of informational materials about the ATT to national points of contact and beyond.
(1) The international travel required for international experts to attend and facilitate training workshops and the daily fees or honoraria demanded by international experts are expensive (relative to the costs associated with engaging a local or regional expert); and
(2) Continued reliance on international experts does not build the capacity and expertise of local and regional consultants, who may be able to provide sustained and tailored training and implementation assistance over the longer-term.
(a) Designing a ‘train the trainers’ workshop that would build the capacity of local and regional consultants to deliver quality training and implementation assistance;
(b) Preparing training materials to facilitate the ‘train the trainers’ workshops;
(c) Undertaking outreach to consultants in targeted regions to participate in the tailored ‘train the trainers’ workshops; and
(d) Holding six ‘train the trainer’ workshops in different regions.
(a) Increased number of local and regional consultants that are ATT ‘experts’, as endorsed by the ATT Secretariat, who can deliver quality training and implementation assistance at the local and regional level;
(b) Development of a public list of consultants that are endorsed by the ATT Secretariat as capable of delivering quality ATT training and implementation assistance (expert roster). Such a list could, for example, be circulated to prospective VTF recipients who are searching for consultants or project implementing partners.
— Local and regional consultants.
— Donors and recipients of the VTF.
(a) Exploring options for establishing a mechanism for matching needs and resources, including through a comparative review of existing mechanisms in other fora, as well as consultations with both recipients and donors;
(b) Designing and establishing a matching needs and resources mechanism, including an electronic database of requests for and offer of assistance as well as the development of an online tool for requesting assistance; and
(c) Launching, publicising and maintaining the matching needs and resources mechanism.
— States Parties and Signatory States seeking assistance for ATT implementation.
— Donor States seeking ATT implementation projects to support.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
(1) The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on 2 April 2013 through its Resolution A/RES/67/234 B. The ATT was subsequently opened for signature on 3 June 2013 and entered into force on 24 December 2014. All Member States are parties to the ATT.
(2) The ATT aims to establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms and to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion. Key challenges in achieving the aims of the ATT are its effective implementation by States Parties to the ATT (‘States Parties’) and its universalisation, bearing in mind that regulating international arms trade is by definition a global endeavour. To contribute to addressing those challenges, the Council adopted Decision 2013/768/CFSP(1)on 16 December 2013 and Decision (CFSP) 2017/915(2)on 29 May 2017, thereby enlarging the export control-related assistance portfolio of the Union with activities specific to the ATT.
(3) The ATT establishes a Secretariat (the ‘ATT Secretariat’) to assist States Parties in the effective implementation of the ATT. The ATT Secretariat undertakes the following responsibilities: to receive, make available and distribute the reports as mandated by the ATT; to maintain and make available to States Parties the list of national points of contact; to facilitate the matching of offers of and requests for assistance for ATT implementation and promote international cooperation as requested; to facilitate the work of the Conference of States Parties, including making arrangements and providing the necessary services for meetings under the ATT; and to perform other duties as decided by the Conferences of States Parties. The ATT Secretariat also administers the Voluntary Trust Fund established by States Parties under Article 16(3) of the ATT to assist States Parties’ implementation of the ATT. In addition, the Fourth Conference of States Parties entrusted the ATT Secretariat with the administration of the ATT Sponsorship Programme, established to facilitate the participation of State representatives in ATT meetings.
(4) In its 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, the Union commits itself to promoting a rules-based global order. The Union has an interest in promoting agreed rules to provide global public goods and contribute to a peaceful and sustainable world. The Union promotes a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the UN at its core. The Union strongly supports the expanding membership, universalisation, full implementation and enforcement of multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control treaties and regimes, including the ATT. In the context of those overarching policy goals, support for the ATT Secretariat fits well within the specific aim of strengthening the multilateral system underpinning a responsible trade in arms.
(5) The ATT Secretariat is well placed to liaise with all multilateral, regional, national and civil society organisations executing projects in support of ATT universalisation or implementation. The Union is also a longstanding provider of export control assistance in dual-use goods, supporting the development of legal frameworks and institutional capacities for the establishment and enforcement of effective export controls on dual-use and military goods. The ATT Secretariat aims to ensure that its projects are complementary to the Union’s existing dual-use goods and arms export control assistance programmes, such as those under Decision (CFSP) 2017/915,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
1. For the purpose of supporting the effective implementation and universalisation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), the Union shall support activities of the ATT Secretariat that have the following objectives:
—
to support States Parties to the ATT in strengthening their arms transfer control systems for the effective implementation of the ATT,
—
to strengthen the institutional set-up of the ATT Secretariat as the principal body to assist States Parties to the ATT in implementing the ATT.
2. In order to achieve the objectives set out in paragraph 1, the Union shall support the following project activities:
(a)
support for capacity building of ATT national points of contact;
(b)
establishing an expert roster to build the capacity of local and regional ATT experts to provide advice and training on ATT implementation at local and regional levels (‘training the trainers’);
(c)
support for a database to match needs and resources.
A detailed description of the project activities referred to in this paragraph is set out in the Annex.

Article 2
1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) shall be responsible for implementing this Decision.
2. The technical implementation of the project activities referred to in Article 1(2) shall be carried out by the ATT Secretariat.
3. The ATT Secretariat shall perform its tasks under the responsibility of the High Representative. For that purpose, the High Representative shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the ATT Secretariat.

Article 3
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the project activities referred to in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 1 370 000.
2. The expenditure financed by the reference amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the Union’s budget.
3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure financed by the reference amount set out in paragraph 1. For that purpose, it shall conclude the necessary agreement with the ATT Secretariat. The agreement shall stipulate that the ATT Secretariat is to ensure the visibility of the Union’s contribution, appropriate to its size.
4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the agreement.

Article 4
1. The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular reports prepared by the ATT Secretariat. The reports shall form the basis for the evaluation carried out by the Council.
2. The Commission shall provide information on the financial aspects of the implementation of the project activities referred to in Article 1(2).

Article 5
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
It shall expire 24 months after the date of conclusion of the agreement referred to in Article 3(3), or six months after the date of its adoption if that agreement has not been concluded within that period.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
(1) The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on 2 April 2013 through its Resolution A/RES/67/234 B. The ATT was subsequently opened for signature on 3 June 2013 and entered into force on 24 December 2014. All Member States are parties to the ATT.
(2) The ATT aims to establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms and to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion. Key challenges in achieving the aims of the ATT are its effective implementation by States Parties to the ATT (‘States Parties’) and its universalisation, bearing in mind that regulating international arms trade is by definition a global endeavour. To contribute to addressing those challenges, the Council adopted Decision 2013/768/CFSP(1)on 16 December 2013 and Decision (CFSP) 2017/915(2)on 29 May 2017, thereby enlarging the export control-related assistance portfolio of the Union with activities specific to the ATT.
(3) The ATT establishes a Secretariat (the ‘ATT Secretariat’) to assist States Parties in the effective implementation of the ATT. The ATT Secretariat undertakes the following responsibilities: to receive, make available and distribute the reports as mandated by the ATT; to maintain and make available to States Parties the list of national points of contact; to facilitate the matching of offers of and requests for assistance for ATT implementation and promote international cooperation as requested; to facilitate the work of the Conference of States Parties, including making arrangements and providing the necessary services for meetings under the ATT; and to perform other duties as decided by the Conferences of States Parties. The ATT Secretariat also administers the Voluntary Trust Fund established by States Parties under Article 16(3) of the ATT to assist States Parties’ implementation of the ATT. In addition, the Fourth Conference of States Parties entrusted the ATT Secretariat with the administration of the ATT Sponsorship Programme, established to facilitate the participation of State representatives in ATT meetings.
(4) In its 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, the Union commits itself to promoting a rules-based global order. The Union has an interest in promoting agreed rules to provide global public goods and contribute to a peaceful and sustainable world. The Union promotes a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the UN at its core. The Union strongly supports the expanding membership, universalisation, full implementation and enforcement of multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control treaties and regimes, including the ATT. In the context of those overarching policy goals, support for the ATT Secretariat fits well within the specific aim of strengthening the multilateral system underpinning a responsible trade in arms.
(5) The ATT Secretariat is well placed to liaise with all multilateral, regional, national and civil society organisations executing projects in support of ATT universalisation or implementation. The Union is also a longstanding provider of export control assistance in dual-use goods, supporting the development of legal frameworks and institutional capacities for the establishment and enforcement of effective export controls on dual-use and military goods. The ATT Secretariat aims to ensure that its projects are complementary to the Union’s existing dual-use goods and arms export control assistance programmes, such as those under Decision (CFSP) 2017/915,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
1. For the purpose of supporting the effective implementation and universalisation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), the Union shall support activities of the ATT Secretariat that have the following objectives:
—
to support States Parties to the ATT in strengthening their arms transfer control systems for the effective implementation of the ATT,
—
to strengthen the institutional set-up of the ATT Secretariat as the principal body to assist States Parties to the ATT in implementing the ATT.
2. In order to achieve the objectives set out in paragraph 1, the Union shall support the following project activities:
(a)
support for capacity building of ATT national points of contact;
(b)
establishing an expert roster to build the capacity of local and regional ATT experts to provide advice and training on ATT implementation at local and regional levels (‘training the trainers’);
(c)
support for a database to match needs and resources.
A detailed description of the project activities referred to in this paragraph is set out in the Annex.
1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) shall be responsible for implementing this Decision.
2. The technical implementation of the project activities referred to in Article 1(2) shall be carried out by the ATT Secretariat.
3. The ATT Secretariat shall perform its tasks under the responsibility of the High Representative. For that purpose, the High Representative shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the ATT Secretariat.
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the project activities referred to in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 1 370 000.
2. The expenditure financed by the reference amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the Union’s budget.
3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure financed by the reference amount set out in paragraph 1. For that purpose, it shall conclude the necessary agreement with the ATT Secretariat. The agreement shall stipulate that the ATT Secretariat is to ensure the visibility of the Union’s contribution, appropriate to its size.
4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the agreement.
1. The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular reports prepared by the ATT Secretariat. The reports shall form the basis for the evaluation carried out by the Council.
2. The Commission shall provide information on the financial aspects of the implementation of the project activities referred to in Article 1(2).
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
It shall expire 24 months after the date of conclusion of the agreement referred to in Article 3(3), or six months after the date of its adoption if that agreement has not been concluded within that period.

1.   Projects

ANNEXPROJECT DOCUMENT1.1. Project 1: Support for capacity building of ATT national points of contact
1.1.1. Overall project objective
To build the capacity of States Parties national points of contact, including increasing their knowledge of ATT obligations and raising their awareness with respect to ATT process developments.
1.1.2. Background
Upon the recommendation of the Working Group on Transparency and Reporting, the 3rd Conference of State Parties mandated the ATT Secretariat to ‘prepare a guidance document for National Points of Contact describing the role and possible tasks for that function, including that of ensuring that mandatory ATT reporting is prepared and submitted in a timely and complete fashion’. Beyond this, the ATT Secretariat has identified a need to ensure national points of contact participate in ATT meetings – including preparatory and Working Group meetings – in a constructive way.
1.1.3. Activities and outputs
This project would involve the following activities/deliverables:

(a) | Preparation of a guidance document for National Points of Contact describing the role and possible tasks for that function;
(b) | Creation of a web page /portal dedicated specifically to National Points of Contact, with links to information pertinent to them;
(c) | Organisation of three half- to one-day briefings in advance of every ATT meeting dedicated to National Points of Contact, in which they would be provided with information and updates on the forthcoming meeting and be given the opportunity to ask questions and clarify information; and
(d) | Establishment of a mechanism to regularly and systematically reach out to National Points of Contact on an individual basis to support their ATT engagement.1.1.4. Expected outcomes of the project

(a) | Increased knowledge of ATT obligations (including reporting) among ATT national points of contact;
(b) | Increased awareness of the ATT process;
(c) | Wide dissemination of informational materials about the ATT to national points of contact and beyond.1.1.5. Beneficiaries
States Parties’ National Points of Contact.
1.2. Project 2: Expert roster (training the trainers)
1.2.1. Overall project objective
To build the capacity of local and regional ATT experts to provide advice and training on ATT implementation at the local and regional levels in order to reduce the reliance on international consultants and organisations, improve the quality of training and implementation assistance and to contribute to better tailoring capacity-building efforts.
1.2.2. Background
While some Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) projects have been implemented with the support of local organisations and national or regional consultants, the majority of VTF projects that have been implemented since the VTF was established by the 2nd Conference of State Parties have involved/engagedinternationalexperts and/or a project implementing partner that is aninternationalorganisation (such as a UN entity) or aninternationalNGO. Continued reliance on international expertise is not efficient or sustainable for the following reasons:

(1) | The international travel required for international experts to attend and facilitate training workshops and the daily fees or honoraria demanded by international experts are expensive (relative to the costs associated with engaging a local or regional expert); and
(2) | Continued reliance on international experts does not build the capacity and expertise of local and regional consultants, who may be able to provide sustained and tailored training and implementation assistance over the longer-term.In addition, it is clear from VTF experience that some consultants and organisations would require development support in order to fully undertake their roles in the ATT implementation projects. The ATT Secretariat would like to address the issues of dependence on international consultants and organisations and the quality of some of the training and assistance provided through a project that seeks to build the capacity of local and regional consultants to provide training and implementation assistance.
1.2.3. Activities and outputs
This project would involve the following activities/deliverables:

(a) | Designing a ‘train the trainers’ workshop that would build the capacity of local and regional consultants to deliver quality training and implementation assistance;
(b) | Preparing training materials to facilitate the ‘train the trainers’ workshops;
(c) | Undertaking outreach to consultants in targeted regions to participate in the tailored ‘train the trainers’ workshops; and
(d) | Holding six ‘train the trainer’ workshops in different regions.1.2.4. Expected outcomes of the project

(a) | Increased number of local and regional consultants that are ATT ‘experts’, as endorsed by the ATT Secretariat, who can deliver quality training and implementation assistance at the local and regional level;
(b) | Development of a public list of consultants that are endorsed by the ATT Secretariat as capable of delivering quality ATT training and implementation assistance (expert roster). Such a list could, for example, be circulated to prospective VTF recipients who are searching for consultants or project implementing partners.1.2.5. Beneficiaries

— | Local and regional consultants.
— | Donors and recipients of the VTF.1.3. Project 3: Support for a matching needs and resources database
1.3.1. Overall project objective
To develop a mechanism for the matching of offers of and requests for assistance for Treaty implementation in order to reduce the duplication and overlap of ATT assistance projects and increase the number of States that receive targeted assistance.
1.3.2. Background
Under Article 18(3)(c) of the ATT, the ATT Secretariat is mandated to ‘Facilitate the matching of offers of and requests for assistance for Treaty implementation’. While States Parties are encouraged to seek assistance, where needed, and provide assistance, upon request, there is no formal mechanism for seeking or offering assistance under the ATT. Furthermore, the current reporting templates do not include a facility to request or offer assistance (as templates in other processes – such as the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons – do). The ATT Secretariat would like to explore the options for developing a database or other mechanism for matching needs and resources for ATT implementation in fulfilment of its obligation under the Treaty and to enhance international cooperation and assistance.
1.3.3. Activities and outputs
This project would involve the following activities/deliverables:

(a) | Exploring options for establishing a mechanism for matching needs and resources, including through a comparative review of existing mechanisms in other fora, as well as consultations with both recipients and donors;
(b) | Designing and establishing a matching needs and resources mechanism, including an electronic database of requests for and offer of assistance as well as the development of an online tool for requesting assistance; and
(c) | Launching, publicising and maintaining the matching needs and resources mechanism.1.3.4. Expected outcome of the project
Enhanced information on States Parties’ assistance needs as well as available resources to address those needs.
The mechanism developed would be closely aligned with the Voluntary Trust Fund (administered by the ATT Secretariat) to ensure complementarity between the assistance mechanisms.
1.3.5. Beneficiaries

— | States Parties and Signatory States seeking assistance for ATT implementation.
— | Donor States seeking ATT implementation projects to support.2. Considerations
2.1. Ensuring complementarity with ongoing ATT outreach
The ATT Secretariat is familiar with other funds engaged in funding ATT implementation-related projects, such as the UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR) and, of course, the EU ATT Outreach Project. The ATT Secretariat has worked closely with the managers/implementers of both actions, including the German Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) and Expertise France, in an effort to avoid duplication of funding. This has involved sharing information on a regular – and confidential – basis on applications received and projects approved by the different funds.
In the context of the EU support to the ATT Secretariat, the ATT Secretariat would build/capitalise on the relationship developed with BAFA and Expertise France to ensure complementarity between the ATT Secretariat’s EU-funded project and the ongoing work of the EU ATT Outreach Project. For example, the ATT Secretariat would engage members of the EU’s pool of experts to participate in an expert workshop to validate the training materials developed for the ‘train the trainers’ element of Project 2 (Expert roster (training the trainers)), and to share their experiences and lessons learned.
In addition, the ATT Secretariat would seek input from the implementing partners of the EU ATT Outreach Projects in the identification of State representatives and other individuals to be selected for participation in the ATT Secretariat’s ‘train the trainers’ programme. The ATT Secretariat could also work with EU ATT Outreach implementing partners and experts to extract assistance needs target States may have that were identified as part of the EU roadmap exercise and other EU outreach. Such information could be used to populate the matching needs and resources database contemplated in Project 3 (Support for a matching needs and resources database).
In summary, the ATT Secretariat sees many opportunities for a continuing dialogue/partnership with the EU ATT Outreach Project to ensure complementarity between the two projects as they strive towards the shared goal of effective ATT implementation.
2.2. Impact and implications of COVID-19
COVID-19 is impacting most countries around the world, albeit to varying degrees. The restrictions on movement, meeting size, and travel that many countries have put in place in response to the outbreak are likely to have an impact on the implementation of ATT projects over the coming months, possibly years.
Given, too, that the duration of the COVID-19 outbreak and its impacts are unclear and cannot be predicted at this stage, it will be difficult to know with any certainty what the implications are for those project activities that involve international travel and/or face-to-face meetings, as well as timelines.
The ATT Secretariat will factor these circumstances into its project planning in the following ways:
First, the ATT Secretariat has prepared a draft project schedule for the implementation of the three projects outlined in the proposal that ensures that as much of the desk-based preparation, planning, outreach, research, and drafting required for each of the projects is undertaken during the first 15 months of the project (April 2021-June 2022). Those activities that require face-to-face engagement – namely the ‘train the trainer’ workshops contemplated in Project 2 (Expert roster (training the trainers)) – would be scheduled to take place in the second year of the project (July – November 2022). Of course, in the event that the COVID pandemic is still impacting the ability to travel and conduct face-to-face workshops in October 2022, an extension of time or other contingency plan may need to be considered.
Second, the ATT Secretariat has contingency plans in place with respect to certain project activities that contemplate face-to-face or in-person engagement. For example, Project 1 (Support for capacity building of ATT national points of contact) contemplates the organisation of a half- to one-day briefing in advance of every ATT meeting (starting in the 8th Conference of State Parties cycle) dedicated to National Points of Contact, in which they would be provided with information and updates on the forthcoming meeting and be given the opportunity to ask questions and clarify information. While it is hoped these briefings can and will take place in person in advance of each ATT meeting (as well as the meeting itself), if this is not possible due to COVID constraints, such briefings could be held virtually, by region (if necessary) to address time-zone and language factors.

Pending: 32020D2251

January 16, 2026

Pending: 32020D1656

January 16, 2026
9.11.2020 EN Official Journal of the European Union LI 372/4
(1) On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the European Union Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (‘the Strategy’), Chapter III of which contains a list of measures that need to be taken both within the Union and in third countries to combat such proliferation.
(2) The Union is actively implementing the Strategy and is giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, in particular through releasing financial resources to support specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
(3) On 17 November 2003, the Council adopted Common Position 2003/805/CFSP(1). That Common Position calls, inter alia, for the promotion of the conclusion of IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols and commits the Union to work towards making the Additional Protocols and comprehensive safeguards agreements the standard for the IAEA verification system.
(4) On 17 May 2004, the Council adopted Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP(2).
(5) On 18 July 2005, the Council adopted Joint Action 2005/574/CFSP(3).
(6) On 12 June 2006, the Council adopted Joint Action 2006/418/CFSP(4).
(7) On 14 April 2008, the Council adopted Joint Action 2008/314/CFSP(5).
(8) On 27 September 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/585/CFSP(6).
(9) On 21 October 2013, the Council adopted Decision 2013/517/CFSP(7).
(10) On 21 December 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/2383(8)and, on 8 June 2020, extended its duration through Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/755(9).
(11) On 8 May 2016, the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) entered into force. All EU Member States, as well as the Euratom Community, are Parties to the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (ACPPNM). The Union continues to promote its universalisation and effective implementation, including through support for the nuclear security activities implemented under the IAEA 2018-2021 Nuclear Security Plan.
(12) Reaffirming that the responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with the State, the Union is committed to continue strengthening nuclear security through the implementation of both national security measures and international cooperation. The Union will continue supporting the work of the IAEA in assisting Member States, upon request, in establishing and improving effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes. The Union support will thus be in line with the Ministerial Declaration and findings of the ‘International Conference on Nuclear Security – Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts’ (the ICONS Conference) which was convened at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna on 10 to 14 February 2020. It will continue contributing to the implementation of the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Plan 2018-21, approved by the IAEA’s Board of Governors on 13 September 2017 and endorsed by the General Conference on 14 September 2017. The Union aims at maintaining the sustainability and effectiveness of the implementation of the previous Council Joint Actions and Decisions in support of the IAEA Nuclear Security Plans,
(a) contribute to global efforts to achieve effective nuclear security, by establishing comprehensive nuclear security guidance and, upon request, promoting the use of such guidance through peer reviews and advisory services and capacity building, including education and training;
(b) assist in adherence to, and implementation of, relevant international legal instruments, and in strengthening the international cooperation and coordination of assistance; and
(c) support the IAEA mandate to play a central role and enhance international cooperation in nuclear security, in response to priorities of Member States expressed through the decisions and resolutions of the IAEA’s Policy Making Organs.
(a) priority and cross-cutting projects in nuclear security such as the Universalisation of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Computer Security and Information Technology Services and Enhancing Nuclear Security Culture;
(b) information management with a focus on assessing nuclear security needs, priorities and threats;
(c) nuclear security of materials and associated facilities with a focus on enhancing physical protection and nuclear material accounting and control for the whole fuel cycle and a concept paper on the application of physical protection measures in the age of COVID-19;
(d) nuclear security of materials out of regulatory control with a focus on institutional response infrastructure for material out of regulatory control;
(e) programme development and international cooperation with a focus on education and training programme development;
(f) gender-focused capacity building and education in nuclear security.
1. Assistance in the drafting of national implementing legislation, including the provision of national, regional and international training courses and seminars, bilateral assistance in drafting national laws and training of individuals.
2. Assistance in establishing, implementing, and maintaining a State’s physical protection regime, including the provision of nuclear security services, such as peer reviews and advisory services, national and regional training courses and workshops aimed at capacity building and the development of the necessary human resources and developing and implementing Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSPs).
1. ACPPNM review at the 2021 Conference of States Parties.
2. International, Regional and National workshops – upon request from Member States – to promote the universalisation of CPPNM and raise awareness.
3. Development of outreach material to encourage further adherence to the ACPPNM.
1. Complete and maintain up-to-date information and computer security guidance publications in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series (New and updated guidance documents) and related technical documents and publications.
2. Hosting of expert meetings specific to the computer security of nuclear facilities to stay abreast of developments in this area.
3. Training courses, exercises and workshops.
4. Technical assistance provided to States in computer security.
1. IAEA contributions to improved information and computer security capabilities at the State, competent authority, and facility levels to support the prevention and detection of, and response to, computer security incidents that have the potential to either directly or indirectly adversely impact nuclear safety and security.
2. Improving international cooperation by bringing together experts and policy-makers to promote the exchange of information and experiences in computer security.
3. Maintain guidance and technical document publications in the area of information and computer security for nuclear security.
1. Organisation of international workshops on nuclear security culture to support Member States’ human resource development.
2. Development and consolidation of nuclear security culture guidance and training material and tools, including self-assessment tools.
1. Development and implementation of INSSPs.
2. Review and re-alignment with INSSP structure of voluntary self-assessment mechanism or tool for States’ use (NUSIMS).
3. Technical Meetings of INSSP Points of Contact.
4. Finalisation of the INSSP User Manual.
1. Production of Nuclear Security Series guidance publications and e-learning tools on countering the insider threat and enhancing material accounting and control for nuclear security purposes at facilities
2. Organisation of awareness and practical training courses.
3. Organisation of awareness and practical training courses on NMAC.
4. Further development of the Shapash virtual reality (VR) training tool.
1. Review Member States’ operating experience of implementing access control and other nuclear security measures during COVID-19.
2. Identify the associated challenges and good practices.
3. Consider the need in modification of the existing technologies or the procedures associated with their use, or development of new technologies to account for the medical requirements associated with COVID-19.
4. Conduct a technical assessment of the proposed modifications of newly-developed access control and other nuclear security technologies to account for pandemic conditions.
1. Good practices and technology recommendations guide to share Member States’ operating experience in nuclear security during COVID-19.
2. Identification of technology areas that need further development to enable effective access control and other nuclear security measures under COVID-19-like conditions.
1. Development of guidance publications for nuclear security infrastructure and related training material and tools.
2. Provision of support to States, upon request, with building human and technological capacity to maintain an effective infrastructure to discharge their responsibilities related to nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.
3. Coordination of support for response working group.
4. Provision of IAEA support on implementation of nuclear security measures for MPEs.
1. Human resources development methodology for nuclear security shared with and used by States.
2. Leadership Academy for Nuclear Security established.
3. Experience and good practices in nuclear security training shared.
4. Support to Member States in application of SAT methodology provided.
5. Support in undertaking continuous, regular training needs analysis (TNA), evaluation of training, and establishment of training committees provided.
6. Support for and coordination of NSSC Network activities, to facilitate sharing of information and resources and to promote cooperation among States with an NSSC or those having an interest in developing a centre.
7. Provision of assistance to States in establishing and operating NSSCs to sustain national nuclear security regimes through programmes in human resource development, technical support and scientific support.
8. Support for regional and sub-regional cooperation among States with planned or operational NSSCs.
9. INSEN.
10. Master’s Programme in Nuclear Security.
11. Schools on Nuclear Security
12. Faculty Development Courses on Nuclear Security Education.
13. Teaching Materials for Nuclear Security Education Programmes.
14. Production of e-learning courses in all official IAEA languages, including translation.
15. Revision of legacy e-learning courses including revision of translation.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty of the European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the European Union Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (‘the Strategy’), Chapter III of which contains a list of measures that need to be taken both within the Union and in third countries to combat such proliferation.
(2) The Union is actively implementing the Strategy and is giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, in particular through releasing financial resources to support specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
(3) On 17 November 2003, the Council adopted Common Position 2003/805/CFSP(1). That Common Position calls, inter alia, for the promotion of the conclusion of IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols and commits the Union to work towards making the Additional Protocols and comprehensive safeguards agreements the standard for the IAEA verification system.
(4) On 17 May 2004, the Council adopted Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP(2).
(5) On 18 July 2005, the Council adopted Joint Action 2005/574/CFSP(3).
(6) On 12 June 2006, the Council adopted Joint Action 2006/418/CFSP(4).
(7) On 14 April 2008, the Council adopted Joint Action 2008/314/CFSP(5).
(8) On 27 September 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/585/CFSP(6).
(9) On 21 October 2013, the Council adopted Decision 2013/517/CFSP(7).
(10) On 21 December 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/2383(8)and, on 8 June 2020, extended its duration through Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/755(9).
(11) On 8 May 2016, the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) entered into force. All EU Member States, as well as the Euratom Community, are Parties to the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (ACPPNM). The Union continues to promote its universalisation and effective implementation, including through support for the nuclear security activities implemented under the IAEA 2018-2021 Nuclear Security Plan.
(12) Reaffirming that the responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with the State, the Union is committed to continue strengthening nuclear security through the implementation of both national security measures and international cooperation. The Union will continue supporting the work of the IAEA in assisting Member States, upon request, in establishing and improving effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes. The Union support will thus be in line with the Ministerial Declaration and findings of the ‘International Conference on Nuclear Security – Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts’ (the ICONS Conference) which was convened at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna on 10 to 14 February 2020. It will continue contributing to the implementation of the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Plan 2018-21, approved by the IAEA’s Board of Governors on 13 September 2017 and endorsed by the General Conference on 14 September 2017. The Union aims at maintaining the sustainability and effectiveness of the implementation of the previous Council Joint Actions and Decisions in support of the IAEA Nuclear Security Plans,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
1. For the purpose of continuing the effective implementation of the Strategy, the Union shall support the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that aim to:
(a)
contribute to global efforts to achieve effective nuclear security, by establishing comprehensive nuclear security guidance and, upon request, promoting the use of such guidance through peer reviews and advisory services and capacity building, including education and training;
(b)
assist in adherence to, and implementation of, relevant international legal instruments, and in strengthening the international cooperation and coordination of assistance; and
(c)
support the IAEA mandate to play a central role and enhance international cooperation in nuclear security, in response to priorities of Member States expressed through the decisions and resolutions of the IAEA’s Policy Making Organs.
2. The projects to be financed by the Union shall support:
(a)
priority and cross-cutting projects in nuclear security such as the Universalisation of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Computer Security and Information Technology Services and Enhancing Nuclear Security Culture;
(b)
information management with a focus on assessing nuclear security needs, priorities and threats;
(c)
nuclear security of materials and associated facilities with a focus on enhancing physical protection and nuclear material accounting and control for the whole fuel cycle and a concept paper on the application of physical protection measures in the age of COVID-19;
(d)
nuclear security of materials out of regulatory control with a focus on institutional response infrastructure for material out of regulatory control;
(e)
programme development and international cooperation with a focus on education and training programme development;
(f)
gender-focused capacity building and education in nuclear security.
3. In the implementation of the projects referred to in paragraph 2, providing support to the activities referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, Union visibility shall be ensured as well as the proper programme management in the execution of this Decision.
4. The projects referred to in paragraph 2 shall be carried out for the benefit of all IAEA Member States and non-IAEA Member States.
5. All project components shall be supported by proactive and innovative public outreach activities, and resources shall be allocated accordingly.
6. A detailed description of the projects referred to in paragraph 2 is set out in the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2
1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.
2. The technical implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be carried out by the IAEA. It shall perform this task under the control of the High Representative. For this purpose, the High Representative shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the IAEA.

Article 3
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 11 582 300.
2. The expenditure financed by the amount stipulated in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the Union budget.
3. The European Commission shall supervise the proper management of the financial reference amount referred to in paragraph 1. For that purpose, it shall conclude a financing agreement with the IAEA. The financing agreement shall stipulate that the IAEA is to ensure visibility of the Union contribution, commensurate with its size.
4. The European Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.

Article 4
1. The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision based on regular reports prepared by the IAEA. Those reports shall form the basis for the evaluation carried out by the Council.
2. The European Commission shall provide information on the financial aspects of the implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2).

Article 5
1. This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
2. This Decision shall expire 36 months after the date of conclusion of the financing agreement referred to in Article 3(3) or 6 months after the date of its adoption if no financing agreement has been concluded within that period.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty of the European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the European Union Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (‘the Strategy’), Chapter III of which contains a list of measures that need to be taken both within the Union and in third countries to combat such proliferation.
(2) The Union is actively implementing the Strategy and is giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, in particular through releasing financial resources to support specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
(3) On 17 November 2003, the Council adopted Common Position 2003/805/CFSP(1). That Common Position calls, inter alia, for the promotion of the conclusion of IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols and commits the Union to work towards making the Additional Protocols and comprehensive safeguards agreements the standard for the IAEA verification system.
(4) On 17 May 2004, the Council adopted Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP(2).
(5) On 18 July 2005, the Council adopted Joint Action 2005/574/CFSP(3).
(6) On 12 June 2006, the Council adopted Joint Action 2006/418/CFSP(4).
(7) On 14 April 2008, the Council adopted Joint Action 2008/314/CFSP(5).
(8) On 27 September 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/585/CFSP(6).
(9) On 21 October 2013, the Council adopted Decision 2013/517/CFSP(7).
(10) On 21 December 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/2383(8)and, on 8 June 2020, extended its duration through Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/755(9).
(11) On 8 May 2016, the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) entered into force. All EU Member States, as well as the Euratom Community, are Parties to the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (ACPPNM). The Union continues to promote its universalisation and effective implementation, including through support for the nuclear security activities implemented under the IAEA 2018-2021 Nuclear Security Plan.
(12) Reaffirming that the responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with the State, the Union is committed to continue strengthening nuclear security through the implementation of both national security measures and international cooperation. The Union will continue supporting the work of the IAEA in assisting Member States, upon request, in establishing and improving effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes. The Union support will thus be in line with the Ministerial Declaration and findings of the ‘International Conference on Nuclear Security – Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts’ (the ICONS Conference) which was convened at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna on 10 to 14 February 2020. It will continue contributing to the implementation of the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Plan 2018-21, approved by the IAEA’s Board of Governors on 13 September 2017 and endorsed by the General Conference on 14 September 2017. The Union aims at maintaining the sustainability and effectiveness of the implementation of the previous Council Joint Actions and Decisions in support of the IAEA Nuclear Security Plans,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
1. For the purpose of continuing the effective implementation of the Strategy, the Union shall support the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that aim to:
(a)
contribute to global efforts to achieve effective nuclear security, by establishing comprehensive nuclear security guidance and, upon request, promoting the use of such guidance through peer reviews and advisory services and capacity building, including education and training;
(b)
assist in adherence to, and implementation of, relevant international legal instruments, and in strengthening the international cooperation and coordination of assistance; and
(c)
support the IAEA mandate to play a central role and enhance international cooperation in nuclear security, in response to priorities of Member States expressed through the decisions and resolutions of the IAEA’s Policy Making Organs.
2. The projects to be financed by the Union shall support:
(a)
priority and cross-cutting projects in nuclear security such as the Universalisation of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Computer Security and Information Technology Services and Enhancing Nuclear Security Culture;
(b)
information management with a focus on assessing nuclear security needs, priorities and threats;
(c)
nuclear security of materials and associated facilities with a focus on enhancing physical protection and nuclear material accounting and control for the whole fuel cycle and a concept paper on the application of physical protection measures in the age of COVID-19;
(d)
nuclear security of materials out of regulatory control with a focus on institutional response infrastructure for material out of regulatory control;
(e)
programme development and international cooperation with a focus on education and training programme development;
(f)
gender-focused capacity building and education in nuclear security.
3. In the implementation of the projects referred to in paragraph 2, providing support to the activities referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, Union visibility shall be ensured as well as the proper programme management in the execution of this Decision.
4. The projects referred to in paragraph 2 shall be carried out for the benefit of all IAEA Member States and non-IAEA Member States.
5. All project components shall be supported by proactive and innovative public outreach activities, and resources shall be allocated accordingly.
6. A detailed description of the projects referred to in paragraph 2 is set out in the Annex to this Decision.
1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.
2. The technical implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be carried out by the IAEA. It shall perform this task under the control of the High Representative. For this purpose, the High Representative shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the IAEA.
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 11 582 300.
2. The expenditure financed by the amount stipulated in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the Union budget.
3. The European Commission shall supervise the proper management of the financial reference amount referred to in paragraph 1. For that purpose, it shall conclude a financing agreement with the IAEA. The financing agreement shall stipulate that the IAEA is to ensure visibility of the Union contribution, commensurate with its size.
4. The European Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.
1. The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision based on regular reports prepared by the IAEA. Those reports shall form the basis for the evaluation carried out by the Council.
2. The European Commission shall provide information on the financial aspects of the implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2).
1. This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
2. This Decision shall expire 36 months after the date of conclusion of the financing agreement referred to in Article 3(3) or 6 months after the date of its adoption if no financing agreement has been concluded within that period.
ANNEX 1.
Heading 1: Priority and Cross-Cutting Projects in Nuclear Security
Project 1: Universalisation of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (ACPPNM)
Background
With the aim of facilitating the adherence to and implementation of the Amendment, the IAEA provides legislative and technical assistance upon request. This includes: 1. Assistance in the drafting of national implementing legislation, including the provision of national, regional and international training courses and seminars, bilateral assistance in drafting national laws and training of individuals. 2. Assistance in establishing, implementing, and maintaining a State’s physical protection regime, including the provision of nuclear security services, such as peer reviews and advisory services, national and regional training courses and workshops aimed at capacity building and the development of the necessary human resources and developing and implementing Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSPs).
Objectives
The objectives will be to assist in the development and promotion of nuclear security globally, including the production and relevant use of guidance in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series, to promote the universalisation of the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Amendment, together referred to as A/CPPNM, and to facilitate information exchange on nuclear security and strengthening the international legal framework.
Deliverables 1. ACPPNM review at the 2021 Conference of States Parties. 2. International, Regional and National workshops – upon request from Member States – to promote the universalisation of CPPNM and raise awareness. 3. Development of outreach material to encourage further adherence to the ACPPNM.
Outcome
IAEA contributions to adherence to the A/CPPNM
Project 2: Computer Security and Information Technology Services
Background
Information and computer security continues to be a critical element for States in improving their nuclear security capabilities.
Nuclear security focuses on the prevention of, detection of, and response to, criminal or intentional unauthorised acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities, or associated activities. The responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with the State, which has to ensure the security of nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities, and associated activities under its jurisdiction. Each State aims to achieve nuclear security by creating its own nuclear security regime appropriate to that State. Computers play an essential role in all aspects of the management of safe and secure operation of nuclear facilities, including computer security and maintaining physical protection. It is vitally important that all such systems are properly secured against malicious intrusions. With the ever changing threat capabilities and attributes, information and computer security is continually evolving and new threat techniques, tactics and processes are continually emerging. The IAEA conducts work aimed at defending against this evolving threat.
Objectives
To improve computer security and information security capabilities in States.
Deliverables 1. Complete and maintain up-to-date information and computer security guidance publications in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series (New and updated guidance documents) and related technical documents and publications. 2. Hosting of expert meetings specific to the computer security of nuclear facilities to stay abreast of developments in this area. 3. Training courses, exercises and workshops. 4. Technical assistance provided to States in computer security.
Outcome 1. IAEA contributions to improved information and computer security capabilities at the State, competent authority, and facility levels to support the prevention and detection of, and response to, computer security incidents that have the potential to either directly or indirectly adversely impact nuclear safety and security. 2. Improving international cooperation by bringing together experts and policy-makers to promote the exchange of information and experiences in computer security. 3. Maintain guidance and technical document publications in the area of information and computer security for nuclear security.
Project 3: Enhancing Nuclear Security Culture
Background
Nuclear security culture is a multidisciplinary approach to prepare the workforce against threats from both outside and inside with their willingness and motivation to follow established procedures, comply with regulations and show vigilance. As most nuclear security systems are human-designed, -managed, and –operated, ultimately, the success of the nuclear security regime depends on the people involved. Nuclear security culture is identified as one of 12 fundamental principles for physical protection of nuclear material and facilities in the ACPPNM as well as one of basic principles in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Materials. The Implementing Guide on Nuclear Security Culture, NSS No 7 defines nuclear security culture as the assembly of characteristics, attitudes and behaviour of individuals, organisations and institutions, which serves as a means to support and enhance nuclear security. NSS No 7 defines the concept, describes the roles and responsibilities of institutions and individuals, and provides characteristics of nuclear security culture that serve to achieve effective nuclear security.
The project focuses on supporting Member States’ human resource development through workshops, training courses and awareness raising seminars, supporting the conduct of nuclear security culture self-assessment and promoting experience and knowledge-sharing on self-assessment tools and methodologies and nuclear security culture good practices.
Objective
To assist States in enhancing their security culture.
Deliverables 1. Organisation of international workshops on nuclear security culture to support Member States’ human resource development. 2. Development and consolidation of nuclear security culture guidance and training material and tools, including self-assessment tools.
Outcome
Promoting international exchanges of experience, knowledge and good practices as regards ways to develop, foster and maintain a robust nuclear security culture compatible with States’ nuclear security regimes.
2.
Heading 2: Information Management
Project 1: Assessing Nuclear Security Needs, Priorities and Threats (INSSP missions)
Background
The IAEA assists individual States that so request to identify and address nuclear security needs through the development and implementation of INSSPs and the development of self-assessment tools. The responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with the State, which has to ensure the security of nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities, and associated activities under its jurisdiction. The IAEA supports States’ efforts to establish effective and sustainable nuclear security regimes, and the INSSP is an effective mechanism in this regard. The INSSP is a non-legally binding document, however its approval or endorsement by the State is considered to be indicative of a commitment to pursue the implementation of agreed nuclear security improvements contained therein. The INSSP is designed to help strategic planning of nuclear security activities in a State and to ensure a State’s ownership of the improvements required to strengthen its nuclear security regime. It provides an assessment of the State’s nuclear security needs and captures activities being undertaken, or planned to be undertaken, by a State and in cooperation, where appropriate, with the IAEA or other international partners.
The INSSP is organised in a general framework of nuclear security areas and objectives that provide a systematic approach for the State to identify its nuclear security needs. The intent is to provide a State with general nuclear security elements of a strategic nature to help in guiding decision makers and strategic planning objectives with a long-term view to establishing self-sustaining nuclear security regimes. The INSSP is structured around six functional areas: (1) Legislative and Regulatory Framework; (2) Threat and Risk Assessment; (3) Physical Protection Regime; (4) Detection of criminal and other unauthorised acts involving material out of regulatory control; (5) Response to nuclear security events; and (6) Sustaining a State’s nuclear security regime. In addition to INSSP missions, the IAEA also organises Technical Meetings of the INSSP Points of Contact.
The INSSP process is supported by Nuclear Security Information Management System (NUSIMS), a voluntary system designed to assist Member States in reviewing the status of their nuclear security infrastructure through Self-Assessment, as well as in tracking their progress towards establishing, maintaining and sustaining an effective nuclear security regime. The information structure of NUSIMS reflects core operational Nuclear Security Areas (NSAs) and is based on the Nuclear Security Fundamentals and Recommendations publications issued within the IAEA Nuclear Security Series.
Objectives
Identify and consolidate the nuclear security needs of individual States into an integrated document that includes the necessary nuclear security improvements, as well as to provide a customised framework for coordinating and implementing nuclear security activities conducted by the State, the IAEA and potential donors.
Maintain a comprehensive information platform providing a good understanding of nuclear security needs of States globally and supporting the implementation of the Nuclear Security Plan.
Deliverables 1. Development and implementation of INSSPs. 2. Review and re-alignment with INSSP structure of voluntary self-assessment mechanism or tool for States’ use (NUSIMS). 3. Technical Meetings of INSSP Points of Contact. 4. Finalisation of the INSSP User Manual.
Outcome
Assessment of requesting States’ nuclear security needs, and provision of support by establishing strategic planning of recommended nuclear security activities to ensure establishment, maintenance and sustainability of an effective nuclear security regime to help States with adherence to A/CPPNM obligations.
3.
Heading 3: Nuclear Security of Materials and Associated Facilities
Project 1: Enhancing Physical Protection and Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for the Whole Fuel Cycle
Background
Activities related to nuclear security of nuclear material in use and storage, nuclear security of the nuclear fuel cycle and associated facilities during their life-time, including accounting and control of nuclear material for nuclear security purposes, and technical implementation of the A/CPPNM. The Agency develops guidance and provides training and assistance to States, upon request, for enhancing nuclear materials security using accounting and control. The project will focus on addressing ‘insider threat’. The IAEA Insider Threat Programme provides guidance on preventive and protective nuclear security measures to mitigate the insider threat. The project will also address nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC). An NMAC system helps to deter and detect unauthorised removal of nuclear material by maintaining an inventory of all nuclear material, including information related to its location. The primary objective of an NMAC system is to maintain and report accurate, timely, complete and reliable information on all activities and operations (including movements) involving nuclear material. The NMAC system at the facility level is established within the context of a national regulatory framework and is controlled by the State’s competent authority. It is not to be confused with a State’s System of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC) established to meet international safeguards obligations.
The IAEA has invested significant resources to develop the hypothetical Shapash Nuclear Research Institute (SNRI). The main purpose for the development of SNRI was to be able to train Member States on Nuclear Security related issues without divulging sensitive information about actual facilities and risk compromising their security. The SNRI 3D model is a useful tool for Nuclear Security training purposes. Further developing SNRI is expected to leverage the power of the 3D model and improve Nuclear Security training outcomes. However, using 3D and VR for training purposes requires specialised knowledge and resources. Training objectives need to be closely matched to the technological solutions used to achieve them. The IAEA intends to further explore the potential strengths of the SNRI 3D model and sustain development of educational material related to SNRI in the future.
Objectives
To provide guidance and tools for preventing and protecting against unauthorised removal of nuclear material and sabotage of nuclear material and facilities by insiders.
To assess which IAEA Member States that process, handle or store nuclear material are using an NMAC system and provide assistance to their competent authorities and operators to ensure a successful NMAC Programme. To assess which IAEA Member States that currently do not have an NMAC system would like to request assistance in establishing an NMAC Programme.
Deliverables 1. Production of Nuclear Security Series guidance publications and e-learning tools on countering the insider threat and enhancing material accounting and control for nuclear security purposes at facilities 2. Organisation of awareness and practical training courses. 3. Organisation of awareness and practical training courses on NMAC. 4. Further development of the Shapash virtual reality (VR) training tool.
Outcome
Continued provision of support to assist States’ efforts to establish effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes that support countering the insider threat and enhancing accounting and control for nuclear security purposes at facilities
Project 2: CRP Concept Paper on the application of physical protection measures in the age of COVID-19
Background
This project will address the application of access control and other nuclear security technologies in the pandemic environment at facilities storing and using nuclear and other radioactive material, including nuclear fuel cycle facilities, research and power reactors, and radioactive material facilities. During a COVID-19-like pandemic, medical measures intended to minimise the transmission of the virus may affect the effectiveness and even the application of the existing nuclear security technologies and procedures such as personnel access control measures. Changes in implementation protocols, modification of the existing technologies, and adaptation of new technologies may be appropriate in some settings to overcome challenges due to COVID-19. The project will review the IAEA Member States’ operating experience of using access control and other nuclear security measures during COVID-19 and identify the associated challenges and good practices. It will then seek to identify nuclear security technologies and procedures (including in the area of access control) in need of improvement and conduct laboratory evaluations of potential modifications and improvements from the standpoint of their implementation under COVID-19 like conditions. IAEA will facilitate exchange of operating experience and technical information among Member States, publish the project-related reports, and support the conduct of research work in selected Member-State laboratories.
Objectives
The project will seek to ensure effective nuclear security measures at nuclear and other radioactive materials facilities during a COVID-19-like situation. Specifically, the project’s objectives include the following: 1. Review Member States’ operating experience of implementing access control and other nuclear security measures during COVID-19. 2. Identify the associated challenges and good practices. 3. Consider the need in modification of the existing technologies or the procedures associated with their use, or development of new technologies to account for the medical requirements associated with COVID-19. 4. Conduct a technical assessment of the proposed modifications of newly-developed access control and other nuclear security technologies to account for pandemic conditions.
Deliverables 1. Good practices and technology recommendations guide to share Member States’ operating experience in nuclear security during COVID-19. 2. Identification of technology areas that need further development to enable effective access control and other nuclear security measures under COVID-19-like conditions.
Outcomes
Enhanced nuclear security measures to prevent theft or sabotage of nuclear and other radioactive material and facilities during pandemic-like situations.
Improved decision making by regulatory bodies and industry concerning implementation of access control and other nuclear security technologies during crisis.
4.
Heading 4: Nuclear Security of Materials Out of Regulatory Control
Project 1: Institutional Response Infrastructure for Material Out of Regulatory Control
Background
The project provides assistance to Member States, upon request, in their efforts to establish the necessary infrastructure to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material. The support for infrastructure under the project is divided into service to identify infrastructure needs and support to States to establish, implement, monitor, assess, and sustain their nuclear security regime related to the response to nuclear security events involving material out of regulatory control. A State’s infrastructure needs are assessed through either the IAEA International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) process, or through the development of a Nuclear Security Response Roadmap. An additional area of responsibility is in the provision of support to States who wish to implement nuclear security systems and measures for Major Public Events (MPEs).
Objective
To assist States in establishing and sustaining an effective institutional infrastructure to strengthen national efforts to protect people, property, the environment and society from the unauthorised use of nuclear and other radioactive material.
Deliverables 1. Development of guidance publications for nuclear security infrastructure and related training material and tools. 2. Provision of support to States, upon request, with building human and technological capacity to maintain an effective infrastructure to discharge their responsibilities related to nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. 3. Coordination of support for response working group. 4. Provision of IAEA support on implementation of nuclear security measures for MPEs.
Outcomes
IAEA contributes to increased awareness of the need for an effective institutional infrastructure in a State to ensure national and international obligations are met.
States have an in-depth understanding of the strengths and areas for development of their MORC (Material Out of Regulatory Control) related nuclear security regime.
States have a clear time-based plan for the development of their MORC response capabilities.
5.
Heading 5: Programme development and international cooperation
Project 1: Education and Training Programme Development
Background
The Agency plays an important role in the provision of coordinated education and training programmes that strengthen capabilities in States to establish and sustain nuclear security regimes. Sufficient numbers of competent and motivated personnel is one of the important prerequisites to establish and sustain States’ nuclear security regimes. Training is an important means to achieve the competence and adequate performance of personnel. The IAEA assists States by providing training based on States’ requests and needs as well as supporting the establishment of nuclear security training programmes and training organisations including Nuclear Security Support Centres (NSSCs).
The Systematic Approach to Training (SAT) is a training approach that provides a logical progression from the identification of the knowledge, skills and attitudes required to perform a job or role in nuclear security to the development and implementation of training to achieve these competencies, and subsequent evaluation of this training. The use of e-learning and other computer training tools, will be a particular focus under this project. This project is not limited to the development of education and training, but also involves coordination of networks such as the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) and the International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres (NSSC Network).
Objectives
The purpose of this project is promote an integrated approach to human resource development in the field of nuclear security, and to assist States in building their capacity to develop and implement effective and sustainable educational and training programmes for human resource development in nuclear security, based on identified needs.
To build stronger cooperation and facilitate increased information exchange among States on the development and implementation of education and training programmes for nuclear security through the INSEN and the International NSSC Network and the Nuclear Security Information Portal (NUSEC).
Deliverables 1. Human resources development methodology for nuclear security shared with and used by States. 2. Leadership Academy for Nuclear Security established. 3. Experience and good practices in nuclear security training shared. 4. Support to Member States in application of SAT methodology provided. 5. Support in undertaking continuous, regular training needs analysis (TNA), evaluation of training, and establishment of training committees provided. 6. Support for and coordination of NSSC Network activities, to facilitate sharing of information and resources and to promote cooperation among States with an NSSC or those having an interest in developing a centre. 7. Provision of assistance to States in establishing and operating NSSCs to sustain national nuclear security regimes through programmes in human resource development, technical support and scientific support. 8. Support for regional and sub-regional cooperation among States with planned or operational NSSCs. 9. INSEN. 10. Master’s Programme in Nuclear Security. 11. Schools on Nuclear Security 12. Faculty Development Courses on Nuclear Security Education. 13. Teaching Materials for Nuclear Security Education Programmes. 14. Production of e-learning courses in all official IAEA languages, including translation. 15. Revision of legacy e-learning courses including revision of translation.
Outcome
States are able to effectively initiate and implement measures to sustain their national nuclear security regimes, in particular, through programmes in human resource development, education, training, technical support, and scientific support.
6.
Heading 6: Gender-Focused Capacity Building and Education in Nuclear Security
Background
Named in recognition of the pioneering physicist and two-time Nobel Prize Laureate Marie Skłodowska-Curie, the fellowship programme was launched by Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi during an IAEA event marking International Women’s Day in March 2020. By supporting their education and work experience, the initiative aims to encourage young women to study and work in nuclear science and technology or non-proliferation. The fellowship programme will provide scholarships for up to 2 years for women pursuing a graduate degree in nuclear science and technology or non-proliferation studies. The fellows will also be offered the chance to intern at the IAEA, in order to supplement the expert knowledge gained during their studies.
Objectives
The Marie Skłodowska-Curie Programme aims to inspire and to encourage young women to pursue a career in nuclear sciences and technology and non-proliferation studies by providing highly motivated and talented female students scholarships for graduate degree programmes along with IAEA internship opportunities. In the long term, the Programme will contribute to a new generation of female science, technology, engineering and mathematics leaders, who will drive scientific and technological developments in their countries.
Deliverable
The programme will fund at least 100 students for the scholarships, at an estimated total cost in the range of EUR 4 to 6 million for a 2-year period.
Outcome
To equip women with scientific education and work experience in order to promote equal representation in the application of nuclear technologies to meet shared global challenges, including nuclear security.

Pending: 32020D1464

January 16, 2026
13.10.2020 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 335/3
(1) The European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003 outlines five key challenges to be addressed by the Union: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. The consequences of the uncontrolled circulation of conventional weapons are central to four of those five challenges. That Strategy underlines the importance of export controls to contain weapons proliferation. The Global Strategy for the Union’s foreign and security policy, titled ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe’, which was presented by the High Representative on 28 June 2016, confirms the Union’s support for the universalisation, full implementation and enforcement of multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control treaties and regimes.
(2) On 5 June 1998 the Union adopted a politically binding Code of Conduct on arms exports, setting common criteria to regulate the legal trade in conventional weapons.
(3) On 19 November 2018 the Council adopted the EU Strategy against illicit firearms, small arms and light weapons and their ammunition (‘Securing arms, protecting citizens’). The full and effective implementation of the 2001 United Nations (UN) Programme of Action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects is the main objective of that Strategy. The Strategy states that the Union will continue to promote responsible and effective arms export control and to support the universalisation and implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty. The Strategy also states that the Union will continue to support the African Union and relevant regional economic communities in their efforts against the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and their ammunition.
(4) The Code of Conduct on arms exports was replaced on 8 December 2008 by Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP(1), which establishes eight criteria against which applications for the export of conventional arms are to be assessed. It also includes a notification and consultation mechanism for arms exports denials, and transparency measures such as the publication of an EU annual report on arms exports. A number of third countries have aligned themselves with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. A 2019 review of that Common Position resulted in the adoption of Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1560(2).
(5) Article 11 of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP states that Member States are to use their best endeavours to encourage other States which export military technology or equipment to apply the criteria set out in that Common Position.
(6) The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was adopted by the UN General Assembly in April 2013 and entered into force on 24 December 2014. The ATT aims to strengthen transparency and responsibility in the arms trade. As with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, the ATT lays down a number of risk-assessment criteria against which arms exports have to be assessed. The Union supports the effective implementation and universalisation of the ATT through its dedicated programmes adopted under Council Decisions 2013/768/CFSP(3)and (CFSP) 2017/915(4). Those programmes assist a number of third countries, upon their request, in strengthening their arms transfer control systems in line with the requirements of the ATT.
(7) It is therefore important to ensure complementarity between the outreach and assistance activities provided for in this Decision and those provided for in Decision (CFSP) 2017/915. To that end, regular exchanges of information should take place between the implementing agencies of the Union outreach activities in the field of arms export control, as well as with the European External Action Service. This coordination mechanism will encourage the participation of experts from other Member States whenever relevant.
(8) Union activities to promote effective and transparent arms export controls have developed since 2008 under Council Joint Action 2008/230/CFSP(5)and Council Decisions 2009/1012/CFSP(6), 2012/711/CFSP(7), (CFSP) 2015/2309(8)and (CFSP) 2018/101(9). The activities carried out have notably supported further regional cooperation and enhanced transparency and greater responsibility, in line with the principles of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and the risk-assessment criteria set out therein. The activities in question have traditionally addressed third countries of the eastern and southern neighbourhoods of the Union.
(9) In recent years, the Union has also provided assistance to improve export controls on dual-use goods in third countries. Effective coordination with those activities relevant to dual-use export controls should be ensured.
(10) The German Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle — BAFA) has been entrusted by the Council with the technical implementation of Decisions 2009/1012/CFSP, 2012/711/CFSP, (CFSP) 2015/2309 and (CFSP) 2018/101. BAFA is also an implementing agency for projects supporting the effective implementation of the ATT under Decision 2013/768/CFSP and Decision (CFSP) 2017/915. Since 2005, BAFA has been engaged in the implementation of a number of Union cooperation projects in the area of dual-use export controls. BAFA is the competent export control authority of Germany, and has developed a large body of knowledge and expertise on outreach activities, in addition to sharing its core competencies with other States.
(11) On 28 May 2018 the UN Secretary-General presented his agenda on disarmament, entitled ‘Securing Our Common Future’. Transparency in military activities, such as reporting on arms imports and exports, promotes democratic accountability and responsible governance. The activities supported through this Decision contribute to the objectives of that agenda, as well as to Sustainable Development Goal 16 of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,
(a) promoting effective controls on arms exports by third countries in accordance with the principles set out in Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and in the ATT, and seeking, where appropriate, complementarity and synergies with Union assistance projects in the field of export controls on dual-use goods; and
(b) supporting third countries’ efforts at national and regional levels to render trade in conventional weapons more responsible and transparent, and to mitigate the risk of the diversion of arms to unauthorised users.
(a) further promoting, among third countries, the criteria and principles set out in Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and in the ATT, on the basis of the achievements made through the implementation of Joint Action 2008/230/CFSP and Decisions 2009/1012/CFSP, 2012/711/CFSP, (CFSP) 2015/2309 and (CFSP) 2018/101;
(b) assisting third countries in the drafting, updating and implementing, as appropriate, of relevant legislative and administrative measures which aim to establish an effective system of conventional arms export controls;
(c) assisting beneficiary countries in the training of licensing and enforcement officers to ensure adequate implementation and enforcement of arms export controls;
(d) assisting beneficiary countries in outreach to their national arms industry to ensure compliance with export control regulations;
(e) promoting transparency and responsibility in the international arms trade, including through support for national and regional measures that promote transparency and appropriate scrutiny with regard to the export of conventional weapons;
(f) encouraging those beneficiary countries that have not taken any steps towards accession to the ATT to join the ATT, and to encourage signatories of the ATT to ratify it; and
(g) promoting further consideration of the risk of the diversion of arms and the mitigation thereof, both from the importing and exporting perspectives.
— their possible membership of, or application for membership of, international export control regimes relating to the transfer of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies;
— their candidatures for membership of the Union and whether the beneficiary countries are official candidates or potential candidates;
— their capacity as a producer, importer or trading hub in relation to trade in conventional military equipment and technologies;
— the level of maturity of the existing national export control system, with particular consideration given to the progress made as a result of support received under previous arms export control cooperation programmes financed by the Union; and
— their position regarding the ATT.
(a) up to two workshops for the countries in South-Eastern Europe;
(b) up to two workshops for the Eastern European and Caucasian countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy;
(c) up to two workshops for the North African Mediterranean countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy; and
(d) up to two workshops for Central Asia.
(a) receive information on the newest developments related to the arms trade (e.g. current procurement channels, the impact of new technologies, and security policy-related issues such as hybrid threats); and
(b) discuss and exchange views on how recent changes and improvements in arms trade controls can be implemented as part of their own national export control system.
(a) South Eastern European candidate or potential candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo(*));
(b) Eastern European and Caucasian countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine);
(c) North African, Mediterranean and Southern Neighbourhood countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Lebanon); and
(d) Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan).
— whether relevant national regulations on arms transfer controls are in place and whether/to what extent they comply with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (including the application of the assessment criteria, the implementation of the EU common military list and reporting);
— where available, information on enforcement cases;
— whether the beneficiary countries are able to report arms exports and/or imports (e.g. UN Register, ATT annual reporting, Wassenaar Arrangement, OSCE and reports to national parliaments);and
— whether the beneficiary country has aligned, or intends to officially align, with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) The European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003 outlines five key challenges to be addressed by the Union: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. The consequences of the uncontrolled circulation of conventional weapons are central to four of those five challenges. That Strategy underlines the importance of export controls to contain weapons proliferation. The Global Strategy for the Union’s foreign and security policy, titled ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe’, which was presented by the High Representative on 28 June 2016, confirms the Union’s support for the universalisation, full implementation and enforcement of multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control treaties and regimes.
(2) On 5 June 1998 the Union adopted a politically binding Code of Conduct on arms exports, setting common criteria to regulate the legal trade in conventional weapons.
(3) On 19 November 2018 the Council adopted the EU Strategy against illicit firearms, small arms and light weapons and their ammunition (‘Securing arms, protecting citizens’). The full and effective implementation of the 2001 United Nations (UN) Programme of Action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects is the main objective of that Strategy. The Strategy states that the Union will continue to promote responsible and effective arms export control and to support the universalisation and implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty. The Strategy also states that the Union will continue to support the African Union and relevant regional economic communities in their efforts against the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and their ammunition.
(4) The Code of Conduct on arms exports was replaced on 8 December 2008 by Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP(1), which establishes eight criteria against which applications for the export of conventional arms are to be assessed. It also includes a notification and consultation mechanism for arms exports denials, and transparency measures such as the publication of an EU annual report on arms exports. A number of third countries have aligned themselves with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. A 2019 review of that Common Position resulted in the adoption of Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1560(2).
(5) Article 11 of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP states that Member States are to use their best endeavours to encourage other States which export military technology or equipment to apply the criteria set out in that Common Position.
(6) The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was adopted by the UN General Assembly in April 2013 and entered into force on 24 December 2014. The ATT aims to strengthen transparency and responsibility in the arms trade. As with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, the ATT lays down a number of risk-assessment criteria against which arms exports have to be assessed. The Union supports the effective implementation and universalisation of the ATT through its dedicated programmes adopted under Council Decisions 2013/768/CFSP(3)and (CFSP) 2017/915(4). Those programmes assist a number of third countries, upon their request, in strengthening their arms transfer control systems in line with the requirements of the ATT.
(7) It is therefore important to ensure complementarity between the outreach and assistance activities provided for in this Decision and those provided for in Decision (CFSP) 2017/915. To that end, regular exchanges of information should take place between the implementing agencies of the Union outreach activities in the field of arms export control, as well as with the European External Action Service. This coordination mechanism will encourage the participation of experts from other Member States whenever relevant.
(8) Union activities to promote effective and transparent arms export controls have developed since 2008 under Council Joint Action 2008/230/CFSP(5)and Council Decisions 2009/1012/CFSP(6), 2012/711/CFSP(7), (CFSP) 2015/2309(8)and (CFSP) 2018/101(9). The activities carried out have notably supported further regional cooperation and enhanced transparency and greater responsibility, in line with the principles of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and the risk-assessment criteria set out therein. The activities in question have traditionally addressed third countries of the eastern and southern neighbourhoods of the Union.
(9) In recent years, the Union has also provided assistance to improve export controls on dual-use goods in third countries. Effective coordination with those activities relevant to dual-use export controls should be ensured.
(10) The German Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle — BAFA) has been entrusted by the Council with the technical implementation of Decisions 2009/1012/CFSP, 2012/711/CFSP, (CFSP) 2015/2309 and (CFSP) 2018/101. BAFA is also an implementing agency for projects supporting the effective implementation of the ATT under Decision 2013/768/CFSP and Decision (CFSP) 2017/915. Since 2005, BAFA has been engaged in the implementation of a number of Union cooperation projects in the area of dual-use export controls. BAFA is the competent export control authority of Germany, and has developed a large body of knowledge and expertise on outreach activities, in addition to sharing its core competencies with other States.
(11) On 28 May 2018 the UN Secretary-General presented his agenda on disarmament, entitled ‘Securing Our Common Future’. Transparency in military activities, such as reporting on arms imports and exports, promotes democratic accountability and responsible governance. The activities supported through this Decision contribute to the objectives of that agenda, as well as to Sustainable Development Goal 16 of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
1. For the purpose of promoting peace and security, and in line with the European Security Strategy and the Global Strategy for the Union’s foreign and security policy, the Union shall pursue the following objectives:
(a)
promoting effective controls on arms exports by third countries in accordance with the principles set out in Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and in the ATT, and seeking, where appropriate, complementarity and synergies with Union assistance projects in the field of export controls on dual-use goods; and
(b)
supporting third countries’ efforts at national and regional levels to render trade in conventional weapons more responsible and transparent, and to mitigate the risk of the diversion of arms to unauthorised users.
2. The Union shall pursue the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 through the following project activities:
(a)
further promoting, among third countries, the criteria and principles set out in Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and in the ATT, on the basis of the achievements made through the implementation of Joint Action 2008/230/CFSP and Decisions 2009/1012/CFSP, 2012/711/CFSP, (CFSP) 2015/2309 and (CFSP) 2018/101;
(b)
assisting third countries in the drafting, updating and implementing, as appropriate, of relevant legislative and administrative measures which aim to establish an effective system of conventional arms export controls;
(c)
assisting beneficiary countries in the training of licensing and enforcement officers to ensure adequate implementation and enforcement of arms export controls;
(d)
assisting beneficiary countries in outreach to their national arms industry to ensure compliance with export control regulations;
(e)
promoting transparency and responsibility in the international arms trade, including through support for national and regional measures that promote transparency and appropriate scrutiny with regard to the export of conventional weapons;
(f)
encouraging those beneficiary countries that have not taken any steps towards accession to the ATT to join the ATT, and to encourage signatories of the ATT to ratify it; and
(g)
promoting further consideration of the risk of the diversion of arms and the mitigation thereof, both from the importing and exporting perspectives.
A detailed description of the project activities referred to in this paragraph is set out in the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2
1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (‘the High Representative’) shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.
2. The implementation of the project activities referred to in Article 1(2) shall be carried out by the German Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle — BAFA). The selection of BAFA is justified by its proven experience, qualifications and necessary expertise across the full range of relevant Union arms export control activities.
3. BAFA shall perform its tasks under the responsibility of the High Representative. For that purpose, the High Representative shall enter into the necessary arrangements with BAFA.

Article 3
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the project activities referred to in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 1 377 542,73.
2. The expenditure financed by the financial reference amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the Union’s budget.
3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the financial reference amount set out in paragraph 1. For that purpose, it shall conclude a financing agreement with BAFA. The financing agreement shall stipulate that BAFA is to ensure the visibility of the Union’s contribution, appropriate to its size.
4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.

Article 4
The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular reports prepared by BAFA. Those reports shall form the basis for the evaluation carried out by the Council. The Commission shall report on the financial aspects of the implementation of the project activities referred to in Article 1(2).

Article 5
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
It shall expire 24 months after the date of conclusion of the financing agreement referred to in Article 3(3), or 6 months after the date of its adoption if no financing agreement has been concluded within that period.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) The European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003 outlines five key challenges to be addressed by the Union: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. The consequences of the uncontrolled circulation of conventional weapons are central to four of those five challenges. That Strategy underlines the importance of export controls to contain weapons proliferation. The Global Strategy for the Union’s foreign and security policy, titled ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe’, which was presented by the High Representative on 28 June 2016, confirms the Union’s support for the universalisation, full implementation and enforcement of multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control treaties and regimes.
(2) On 5 June 1998 the Union adopted a politically binding Code of Conduct on arms exports, setting common criteria to regulate the legal trade in conventional weapons.
(3) On 19 November 2018 the Council adopted the EU Strategy against illicit firearms, small arms and light weapons and their ammunition (‘Securing arms, protecting citizens’). The full and effective implementation of the 2001 United Nations (UN) Programme of Action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects is the main objective of that Strategy. The Strategy states that the Union will continue to promote responsible and effective arms export control and to support the universalisation and implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty. The Strategy also states that the Union will continue to support the African Union and relevant regional economic communities in their efforts against the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and their ammunition.
(4) The Code of Conduct on arms exports was replaced on 8 December 2008 by Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP(1), which establishes eight criteria against which applications for the export of conventional arms are to be assessed. It also includes a notification and consultation mechanism for arms exports denials, and transparency measures such as the publication of an EU annual report on arms exports. A number of third countries have aligned themselves with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. A 2019 review of that Common Position resulted in the adoption of Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1560(2).
(5) Article 11 of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP states that Member States are to use their best endeavours to encourage other States which export military technology or equipment to apply the criteria set out in that Common Position.
(6) The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was adopted by the UN General Assembly in April 2013 and entered into force on 24 December 2014. The ATT aims to strengthen transparency and responsibility in the arms trade. As with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, the ATT lays down a number of risk-assessment criteria against which arms exports have to be assessed. The Union supports the effective implementation and universalisation of the ATT through its dedicated programmes adopted under Council Decisions 2013/768/CFSP(3)and (CFSP) 2017/915(4). Those programmes assist a number of third countries, upon their request, in strengthening their arms transfer control systems in line with the requirements of the ATT.
(7) It is therefore important to ensure complementarity between the outreach and assistance activities provided for in this Decision and those provided for in Decision (CFSP) 2017/915. To that end, regular exchanges of information should take place between the implementing agencies of the Union outreach activities in the field of arms export control, as well as with the European External Action Service. This coordination mechanism will encourage the participation of experts from other Member States whenever relevant.
(8) Union activities to promote effective and transparent arms export controls have developed since 2008 under Council Joint Action 2008/230/CFSP(5)and Council Decisions 2009/1012/CFSP(6), 2012/711/CFSP(7), (CFSP) 2015/2309(8)and (CFSP) 2018/101(9). The activities carried out have notably supported further regional cooperation and enhanced transparency and greater responsibility, in line with the principles of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and the risk-assessment criteria set out therein. The activities in question have traditionally addressed third countries of the eastern and southern neighbourhoods of the Union.
(9) In recent years, the Union has also provided assistance to improve export controls on dual-use goods in third countries. Effective coordination with those activities relevant to dual-use export controls should be ensured.
(10) The German Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle — BAFA) has been entrusted by the Council with the technical implementation of Decisions 2009/1012/CFSP, 2012/711/CFSP, (CFSP) 2015/2309 and (CFSP) 2018/101. BAFA is also an implementing agency for projects supporting the effective implementation of the ATT under Decision 2013/768/CFSP and Decision (CFSP) 2017/915. Since 2005, BAFA has been engaged in the implementation of a number of Union cooperation projects in the area of dual-use export controls. BAFA is the competent export control authority of Germany, and has developed a large body of knowledge and expertise on outreach activities, in addition to sharing its core competencies with other States.
(11) On 28 May 2018 the UN Secretary-General presented his agenda on disarmament, entitled ‘Securing Our Common Future’. Transparency in military activities, such as reporting on arms imports and exports, promotes democratic accountability and responsible governance. The activities supported through this Decision contribute to the objectives of that agenda, as well as to Sustainable Development Goal 16 of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
1. For the purpose of promoting peace and security, and in line with the European Security Strategy and the Global Strategy for the Union’s foreign and security policy, the Union shall pursue the following objectives:
(a)
promoting effective controls on arms exports by third countries in accordance with the principles set out in Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and in the ATT, and seeking, where appropriate, complementarity and synergies with Union assistance projects in the field of export controls on dual-use goods; and
(b)
supporting third countries’ efforts at national and regional levels to render trade in conventional weapons more responsible and transparent, and to mitigate the risk of the diversion of arms to unauthorised users.
2. The Union shall pursue the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 through the following project activities:
(a)
further promoting, among third countries, the criteria and principles set out in Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and in the ATT, on the basis of the achievements made through the implementation of Joint Action 2008/230/CFSP and Decisions 2009/1012/CFSP, 2012/711/CFSP, (CFSP) 2015/2309 and (CFSP) 2018/101;
(b)
assisting third countries in the drafting, updating and implementing, as appropriate, of relevant legislative and administrative measures which aim to establish an effective system of conventional arms export controls;
(c)
assisting beneficiary countries in the training of licensing and enforcement officers to ensure adequate implementation and enforcement of arms export controls;
(d)
assisting beneficiary countries in outreach to their national arms industry to ensure compliance with export control regulations;
(e)
promoting transparency and responsibility in the international arms trade, including through support for national and regional measures that promote transparency and appropriate scrutiny with regard to the export of conventional weapons;
(f)
encouraging those beneficiary countries that have not taken any steps towards accession to the ATT to join the ATT, and to encourage signatories of the ATT to ratify it; and
(g)
promoting further consideration of the risk of the diversion of arms and the mitigation thereof, both from the importing and exporting perspectives.
A detailed description of the project activities referred to in this paragraph is set out in the Annex to this Decision.
1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (‘the High Representative’) shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.
2. The implementation of the project activities referred to in Article 1(2) shall be carried out by the German Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle — BAFA). The selection of BAFA is justified by its proven experience, qualifications and necessary expertise across the full range of relevant Union arms export control activities.
3. BAFA shall perform its tasks under the responsibility of the High Representative. For that purpose, the High Representative shall enter into the necessary arrangements with BAFA.
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the project activities referred to in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 1 377 542,73.
2. The expenditure financed by the financial reference amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the Union’s budget.
3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the financial reference amount set out in paragraph 1. For that purpose, it shall conclude a financing agreement with BAFA. The financing agreement shall stipulate that BAFA is to ensure the visibility of the Union’s contribution, appropriate to its size.
4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.
The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular reports prepared by BAFA. Those reports shall form the basis for the evaluation carried out by the Council. The Commission shall report on the financial aspects of the implementation of the project activities referred to in Article 1(2).
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
It shall expire 24 months after the date of conclusion of the financing agreement referred to in Article 3(3), or 6 months after the date of its adoption if no financing agreement has been concluded within that period.

1.   Objectives

ANNEX
PROJECT FOR THE PROMOTION OF EFFECTIVE ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS
The purpose of this Decision is to promote accountability and responsibility with regard to the legal arms trade in line with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, thereby contributing to peace, security and stability in countries neighbouring the Union. The objectives of this Decision are to promote improved controls on arms transfers by third countries and to support third countries’ efforts, at national and regional levels, to render international trade in conventional weapons more responsible and transparent, and to mitigate the risk of the diversion of arms to unauthorised users. Those objectives should be obtained by promoting the principles and criteria set out in Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and the ATT. The outcomes should aim to increase the effectiveness of national arms export systems in targeted countries: the implementing agency will report on legal, institutional and other relevant changes and their alignment with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and, where appropriate, the ATT. Those outcomes should be pursued in seeking complementarity and synergies with the Union’s ongoing assistance projects in support of the implementation of the ATT, as well as in the field of export controls on dual-use goods. The scope of beneficiaries under this Decision should not overlap with beneficiaries covered under Decision (CFSP) 2017/915.
In order to achieve the abovementioned objectives, the Union should continue to promote the standards of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, building on the achievements reached through the implementation of Joint Action 2008/230/CFSP and Decisions 2009/1012/CFSP, 2012/711/CFSP, (CFSP) 2015/2309 and (CFSP) 2018/101. For that purpose, assistance should be provided to beneficiary third countries for the drafting, updating and implementation, as appropriate, of relevant legislative, administrative and institutional measures that support an effective system of conventional arms transfer controls.
Support should also be given to the training of licensing and enforcement officers responsible for the implementation and enforcement of arms transfer controls, and to national and regional measures promoting transparency and appropriate scrutiny over exports of conventional weapons. Furthermore, contacts with the private sector (including industry, research institutes and academia) should be promoted in order to ensure compliance with arms transfer control legislation and regulations, focusing in particular on internal compliance programmes (ICPs).
2. Selection of the implementing agencyThe implementation of this Decision is entrusted to BAFA. Where appropriate, BAFA will partner with Member States’ export control agencies, relevant regional and international organisations, think tanks, research institutes and NGOs.
BAFA has leading experience in the provision of export control assistance and outreach activities. It has developed such experience in all of the relevant fields of strategic export control, addressing CBRN-related dual-use goods and military goods. Through those programmes and activities, BAFA has gained in-depth knowledge of the export control systems of most of the countries included in this Decision.
With regard to arms export control assistance and outreach, BAFA successfully completed the implementation of Decisions 2009/1012/CFSP, 2012/711/CFSP, (CFSP) 2015/2309 and (CFSP) 2018/101. BAFA is also in charge of the technical implementation of the ATT implementation support programme established by Decisions 2013/768/CFSP and 2017/915/CFSP.
BAFA is therefore uniquely placed to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the export control systems of countries that will be the beneficiaries of the activities provided for in this Decision. It is also most able to facilitate synergies between the various arms export control assistance and outreach programmes and to avoid duplication. This is of particular relevance for beneficiary countries that have received support under previous Union cooperation programmes for strengthening local capacity with regard to applying and updating the national arms trade control system in line with international standards and recent developments.
3. Coordination with other Union assistance projects in the field of export controlsBased on the experience of previous Union outreach activities in the field of export controls covering both dual-use goods and conventional arms, synergy and complementarity should be sought. To that end, the activities referred to in section 5 should be carried out only in countries that are not already targeted through activities under the ATT outreach assistance project. Where appropriate, synergy can be sought in conjunction with other activities financed through the CFSP budget or with other activities relating to dual-use goods export controls financed through Union financial instruments other than the CFSP budget. This should be done in full compliance with the legal and financial limitations set for the use of relevant Union financial instruments.
To that end, regular exchanges of information will take place between the implementing agencies of the Union outreach activities in the field of export control, as well as with the European External Action Service. This coordination mechanism should be formalised, and the participation of experts from other Member States should be encouraged whenever relevant.
4. Coordination with other donors’ assistance projects in the field of export controlsWhere appropriate, synergy and complementarity with other donors’ assistance projects in the field of export control outreach should also be sought. As stated in section 3, coordination with other donors should be carried out, especially for the activities referred to in subsections 5.2.1 to 5.2.3 and 5.2.6.
5. Description of project activities5.1. Project objectivesThe main objective is to provide technical assistance to a number of beneficiary countries which have demonstrated their willingness to develop their standards and practices regarding arms export control. To do so, the activities to be undertaken will take into account the status of the beneficiary countries, in particular regarding:

— | their possible membership of, or application for membership of, international export control regimes relating to the transfer of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies;
— | their candidatures for membership of the Union and whether the beneficiary countries are official candidates or potential candidates;
— | their capacity as a producer, importer or trading hub in relation to trade in conventional military equipment and technologies;
— | the level of maturity of the existing national export control system, with particular consideration given to the progress made as a result of support received under previous arms export control cooperation programmes financed by the Union; and
— | their position regarding the ATT.Where the beneficiary countries addressed are only signatories to the ATT, the activities should — where feasible — seek to ascertain better what the obstacles to ATT ratification are, in particular where those obstacles are of a juridical or regulatory nature and are related to gaps or needs in implementation capacities. Where the countries addressed have taken no steps towards the ATT (neither signature, ratification nor accession), the activities should promote accession thereto, possibly with the support of other beneficiary countries that have ratified the ATT.
5.2. Project description5.2.1. Regional workshopsThe project will take the form of up to eight two-day regional workshops, providing theoretical and practical training as well as an opportunity for dialogue to consolidate regional approaches in relevant areas of conventional arms export controls.
The participants in the workshops (up to 35) will include government officials of the beneficiary countries covered. Representatives from national parliaments, industry and civil society, among others, may also be invited, where appropriate.
Training will be conducted by experts from Member States’ national administrations (including former officials), representatives of countries that have aligned themselves with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, and representatives of the private sector and civil society.
The workshops may take place in a beneficiary country or in another location to be determined by the High Representative, in consultation with the Council Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM).
The regional workshops will be organised as follows:

(a) | up to two workshops for the countries in South-Eastern Europe;
(b) | up to two workshops for the Eastern European and Caucasian countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy;
(c) | up to two workshops for the North African Mediterranean countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy; and
(d) | up to two workshops for Central Asia.In order to foster cross-regional cooperation, partner countries from other regions will be invited to at least one of the workshops for each region.
This regional breakdown of two workshops per region may not be achieved if circumstances are not propitious (for example if the number of participants is unexpectedly too low, if there is no serious offer to host by any beneficiary country of the region, or if there is duplication with other activities of other outreach providers). In the event that one or more of the workshops is not implemented, the number of workshops for the other abovementioned region(s) could be increased accordingly, within the global ceiling of twelve workshops.
5.2.2. Study visitsThe project will take the form of up to seven two- to three-day study visits by government officials to the relevant authorities of either Member States or other beneficiary countries.
Study visits should cover between two and four beneficiary countries. Beneficiary countries of the study visits need not necessarily come from the same region.
5.2.3. Individual and remote assistance to beneficiary countriesThe project will take the form of workshops of no more than 10 days’ duration in total for individual beneficiary countries which request one. State officials from the beneficiary countries, including government, licensing and enforcement officials, will participate in the workshops, which will preferably take place in the respective beneficiary countries. Depending on the exact needs and availability of the beneficiary countries’ and Member States’ experts, the 10 days available overall will be allocated with a minimum two-day format.
The individual assistance workshops will be mainly held at the request of the beneficiary countries. They are intended to address a specific issue related to arms export control raised by a beneficiary country, for example in the margins of a regional workshop or during regular contacts with Union experts and with BAFA. These workshops will be available to cover issues and requests from the beneficiary countries related to arms export control, including targeted national capacity-building measures, outreach to industry and/or academia, and national training strategies in the area of arms export control.
In addition, up to 20 days will be allocated for individual support provided through remote assistance (e.g. legal reviews; consultation on specific cases, including support for technical rating of a particular good; etc.).
Experts from Member States’ national administrations (including former officials), representatives of countries that have aligned themselves with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, and representatives of the private sector will provide their expertise.
5.2.4. Institutional capacity building and advanced-level awareness-raising eventsThe project will take the form of up to three workshops lasting up to four days each aimed at providing support to beneficiary countries with advanced-level arms export control systems for building up their own national capacity. Measures taken will include the application of a ‘train the trainer’ approach focusing on, inter alia, didactics, knowledge transfer and institutional memory in the beneficiary country. National institutional capacity building should cover issues such as internal compliance, risk management, and the intersection between hybrid threat reduction and arms export controls.
5.2.5. Conference for partner countries with advanced export control systemsThe project will take the form of one conference in Brussels lasting up to two days. The conference will provide a forum for advanced-level discussions between Union experts and senior-level representatives (in the areas of policy, licensing and enforcement) of beneficiary countries with advanced export control systems.
This conference will give the participating beneficiary countries the opportunity to:

(a) | receive information on the newest developments related to the arms trade (e.g. current procurement channels, the impact of new technologies, and security policy-related issues such as hybrid threats); and
(b) | discuss and exchange views on how recent changes and improvements in arms trade controls can be implemented as part of their own national export control system.5.2.6. Assessment eventsIn order to evaluate and review the impact of the activities under this Decision, two assessment events (mid-term and final) will be organised in Brussels, ideally back-to-back with a regular COARM meeting.
The mid-term assessment event will take the form of a workshop with the participation of Member States. The workshop may last up to one day.
The final assessment event will take the form of an event in Brussels with the participation of beneficiary countries and Member States. Up to two representatives (appropriate government officials) of each beneficiary country will be invited to the final assessment event.
6. Beneficiaries6.1. Beneficiary countries under this DecisionThe scope of beneficiaries under this Decision should not overlap with the beneficiaries covered under Decision (CFSP) 2017/915. Beneficiary countries under this Decision are:

(a) | South Eastern European candidate or potential candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo(*));
(b) | Eastern European and Caucasian countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine);
(c) | North African, Mediterranean and Southern Neighbourhood countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Lebanon); and
(d) | Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan).6.2. Amendment of the list of beneficiary countriesCOARM may, after consultations with the coordination mechanism referred to in section 3, decide to add countries to the list of beneficiaries, provided that they are not beneficiaries under Decision (CFSP) 2017/915. In exceptional cases, where deemed meaningful, the coordination mechanism may also agree to engage with beneficiaries covered by Decision (CFSP) 2017/915. Modifications should be communicated in a formal manner between BAFA and the Union through the Chair of COARM.
7. Project results and implementation indicatorsIn addition to the final assessment event referred to in subsection 5.2.6, the assessment of the results of the project will take into account the following:
7.1. Individual assessment of beneficiary countriesOn completion of the activities provided for, BAFA will provide the European External Action Service and the Commission with a progress report on each of the beneficiary countries referred to in subsection 6.1. The report will recap the activities that took place in the beneficiary country over the duration of this Decision and assess and describe the beneficiary country’s capacity in the area of arms transfer controls based on information available to BAFA. The basis of assessment will be the beneficiary country’s application of control instruments as stipulated in Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, insofar as these do not apply to Member States only.
7.2. Impact assessment and implementation indicatorsThe impact of activities provided for by this Decision for the beneficiary countries should be assessed after the activities have been carried out. The impact assessment will be carried out by the High Representative, in cooperation with COARM and, as appropriate, with the Union delegations in the beneficiary countries, as well as with other relevant stakeholders.
For that purpose, the following implementation indicators will be used:

— | whether relevant national regulations on arms transfer controls are in place and whether/to what extent they comply with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (including the application of the assessment criteria, the implementation of the EU common military list and reporting);
— | where available, information on enforcement cases;
— | whether the beneficiary countries are able to report arms exports and/or imports (e.g. UN Register, ATT annual reporting, Wassenaar Arrangement, OSCE and reports to national parliaments);and
— | whether the beneficiary country has aligned, or intends to officially align, with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.The individual assessment reports referred to in subsection 7.1 should refer to those implementation indicators as appropriate.
8. Promoting the use of the EU P2P web portal (1) The EU P2P web portal provided for in Decision 2012/711/CFSP has been developed as a Union-owned resource. It operates as a joint platform for all the Union outreach programmes (dual-use and arms). The activities listed in subsections 5.2.1 to 5.2.6 are to raise awareness of the Union outreach web portal and to promote its use. Participants in outreach activities should be informed about the private part of the web portal, which offers permanent access to resources, documents and contacts. Likewise, the use of the web portal should be promoted to other officials who are not able to participate directly in assistance and outreach activities. Furthermore, activities should be promoted through the EU P2P Newsletter.
9. Union visibilityBAFA will take all appropriate measures to publicise the fact that the action is funded by the Union. Such measures will be implemented in accordance with the communication and visibility manual for Union external actions published by the European Commission. BAFA will thus ensure the visibility of the Union contribution with appropriate branding and publicity, highlighting the role of the Union and raising awareness of the reasons for this Decision, as well as Union support for this Decision and the results of that support. Material produced by the project will prominently display the Union flag in accordance with relevant Union guidelines, as well as the logo ‘EU P2P export control programme’. Union delegations should be involved in events in third countries to enhance political follow-up and visibility.
Given that planned activities vary greatly in scope and character, a range of promotional tools will be used, including traditional media, websites, social media, information and promotional materials (including infographics, leaflets, newsletters, press releases and others, as appropriate). Publications and public events procured under the project will be branded accordingly.
10. DurationThe total estimated duration of the project will be 24 months.
11. ReportingThe implementing entity will prepare regular quarterly reports detailing in succinct form the progress of the project, as well as mission reports after the completion of each activity. The reports will be submitted to the High Representative no later than six weeks after the completion of relevant activities.
12. Estimated total cost of the project and Union financial contributionThe total estimated cost of the project is EUR 1 538 292,73, with co-financing from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. The total estimated cost of the Union-financed project is EUR 1 377 542,73.

(*) This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.
(1) https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/research-topic/chemical-biological-radiological-and-nuclear-hazards/eu-p2p-outreach-programmes-export-control and https://circabc.europa.eu/

Pending: 32020D1146

January 16, 2026
3.8.2020 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 250/121
(1) In accordance with Article 12 of Directive 2014/35/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council(2), electrical equipment which is in conformity with harmonised standards or parts thereof, the references of which have been published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union, is to be presumed to be in conformity with the safety objectives referred to in Article 3 of that Directive and set out in Annex I to that Directive, covered by those harmonised standards or parts thereof.
(2) By letter M/511 of 8 November 2012, the Commission made a request to the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN), the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (Cenelec) and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) for providing the first full list of the titles of harmonised standards and for the drafting, revision and the completion of harmonised standards, for electrical equipment designed for use within certain voltage limits in support of Directive 2014/35/EU. The safety objectives referred to in Article 3 of Directive 2014/35/EU and set out in Annex I to that Directive have not changed since the request was made to CEN, Cenelec and ETSI.
(3) On the basis of the request M/511, CEN and Cenelec drafted the following harmonised standards and an amendment thereto: EN 50620:2017 and EN 50620:2017/A1:2019 for charging cables for electric vehicles; EN IEC 60947-9-1:2019 for arc quenching; and EN 61643-31:2019 for low voltage surge protective device.
(4) On the basis of the request M/511, CEN and Cenelec revised the following standards, the references of which are published in the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Unionby Commission Communication (2018/C326/02)(3): EN 60691:2003; EN -11:2010; EN 60934:2001; EN 60974-2:2013; EN 60974-3:2014; EN 60974-5:2013; EN 60974-7:2013; EN 61535:2009; EN 61558-1:2005; EN 61851-1:2011; and EN 62275:2015. This resulted in adoption of, respectively, the following harmonised standards and amendments thereto: EN 60691:2016 and EN 60691:2016/A1:2019, for thermal-links; EN 60728-11:2017 and EN 60728-11:2017/A11:2018, for equipment in cable networks for television signals, sound signals and interactive services; EN IEC 60934:2019 for circuit breakers for equipment (CBE); EN IEC 60947-9-1:2019 for arc quenching; EN IEC 60974-2:2019, EN IEC 60974-3:2019, EN IEC 60974-5:2019 and EN IEC 60974-7:2019, for arc welding; EN IEC 61535:2019 installation couplers intended for permanent connection in fixed installations; EN IEC 61558-1:2019 for transformers, reactors, power supply units and combinations thereof; EN IEC 61851-1:2019 for electric vehicle conductive charging system; and EN IEC 62275:2019 for cable ties in electrical installations.
(5) On the basis of the request M/511, CEN and Cenelec amended the following standards, the references of which are included in Annex I to Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956(4): EN 60335-1:2012; and EN 60335-2-4:2010. This resulted in adoption of, respectively, the following amending harmonised standards: EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019, EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019 and EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019 for household and similar electrical appliances; and EN 60335-2-4:2010/A2:2019 for spin extractors. CEN and Cenelec also amended the following standards, the references of which are published in the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Unionby Communication (2018/C 326/02): EN 60335-2-5:2015; EN 60335-2-7:2010; EN 60335-2-12:2003; EN 60335-2-13:2010; EN 60335-2-17:2013; EN 60335-2-35:2016; EN 60335-2-47:2003; EN 60335-2-48:2003; EN 60335-2-49:2003; EN 60335-2-52:2003; EN 60335-2-61:2003; EN 60335-2-66:2003; EN 60335-2-84:2003; EN 60335-2-87:2002; EN 60335-2-98:2003; EN 60947-5-4:2003; EN 61347-2-7:2012; EN 61347-2-11:2001; EN 61386-1:2008; and EN 62035:2014. This resulted in adoption of, respectively, the following amending harmonised standards: EN 60335-2-5:2015/A11:2019 for dishwashers; EN 60335-2-7:2010/A2:2019 for washing machines; EN 60335-2-12:2003/A2:201 and EN 60335-2-12:2003/A11:2019, for warming plates and similar appliances; EN 60335-2-13:2010/A1:2019 for deep fat fryers, frying pans and similar appliances; EN 60335-2-17:2013/A11:2019 for blankets, pads, clothing and similar flexible heating appliance; EN 60335-2-35:2016/A1:2019 for instantaneous water heaters; EN 60335-2-47:2003/A2:2019 for commercial electric boiling pans; EN 60335-2-48:2003/A2:2019 for commercial electric grillers and toasters; EN 60335-2-49:2003/A2:2019 for commercial electric appliances for keeping food and crockery warm; EN 60335-2-52:2003/A12:2019 for oral hygiene appliances; EN 60335-2-61:2003/A11:2019 for thermal-storage room heaters; EN 60335-2-66:2003/A11:2019 for water-bed heaters; EN 60335-2-84:2003/A2:2019 for toilets; EN 60335-2-87:2002/A2:2019 for electrical animal-stunning equipment; EN 60335-2-98:2003/A11:2019 for humidifiers; EN 60947-5-4:2003/A1:2019 for control circuit devices and switching elements; EN 61347-2-7:2012/A1:2019 for emergency lighting; EN 61347-2-11:2001/A1:2019 for miscellaneous electronic circuits used with luminaires; EN 61386-1:2008/A1:2019 for cable management; and EN 62035:2014/A1:2019 for discharge lamps.
(6) The Commission, together with CEN and Cenelec, has assessed whether those harmonised standards and amendments thereto comply with the request M/511.
(7) Harmonised standards EN 50620:2017 as amended by EN 50620:2017/A1:2019, EN IEC 60947-9-1:2019, EN 61643-31:2019, EN 60691:2003, EN 60728-11:2010, EN 60934:2001, EN 60974-2:2013, EN 60974-3:2014, EN 60974-5:2013, EN 60974-7:2013, EN 61535:2009, EN 61558-1:2005, EN 61851-1:2011, EN 62275:2015, EN 669-1:2018, EN 60335-1:2012 as amended by EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019, EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019 and EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019, EN 60335-2-4:2010 as amended by EN 60335-2-4:2010/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-5:2015 as amended by EN 60335-2-5:2015/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-7:2010 as amended by EN 60335-2-7:2010/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-12:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-12:2003/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-13:2010 as amended by EN 60335-2-13:2010/A1:2019, EN 60335-2-17:2013 as amended by EN 60335-2-17:2013/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-35:2016 as amended by EN 60335-2-35:2016/A1:2019, EN 60335-2-47:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-47:2003/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-48:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-48:2003/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-49:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-49:2003/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-52:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-52:2003/A12:2019, EN 60335-2-61:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-61:2003/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-66:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-66:2003/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-84:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-47:2003/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-87:2002 as amended by EN 60335-2-87:2002/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-98:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-98:2003/A11:2019, EN 60947-5-4:2003 as amended by EN 60947-5-4:2003/A1:2019, EN 61347-2-7:2012 as amended by EN 61347-2-11:2001, EN 61386-1:2008 as amended by EN 61386-1:2008/A1:2019, and EN 62035:2014 as amended by EN 62035:2014/A1:2019, and as amended or corrected by any other standards references of which are published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union,satisfy the safety objectives which they aim to cover and which are set out in Directive 2014/35/EU. It is therefore appropriate to publish the references of those standards in theOfficial Journal of the European Union,together with references of any relevant amending or correcting standards thereto.
(8) Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956 provides in Annex I the references of harmonised standards conferring a presumption of conformity with Directive 2014/35/EU. In order to ensure that the references of harmonised standards drafted in support of Directive 2014/35/EU are listed in one act, the references of those standards should be included in Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956.
(9) CEN and Cenelec also drafted the following corrigenda which introduce technical corrections to the following existing standards the references of which are published in the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Unionby Communication (2018/C 326/02): EN 60669-1:2018/AC:2018-11 correcting harmonised standard EN 60669-1:2018 for switches for household and similar fixed electrical installations; EN 61439-3:2012/AC:2019-04 correcting harmonised standard EN 61439-3:2012 for distribution boards intended to be operated by ordinary persons (DBO); EN 61557-9:2015/AC:2017-02 correcting harmonised standard EN 61557-9:2015 for equipment for insulation fault location in IT systems; and EN 62026-3:2015/AC:2019-12 correcting harmonised standard EN 62026-3:2015 for controller-device interfaces (CDIs) DeviceNets. In order to ensure correct and consistent application of harmonised standards the references of which have been published, it is appropriate to include the references of those harmonised standards together with the references of the corrigenda in Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956 which provides in its Annex I the references of harmonised standards conferring a presumption of conformity with Directive 2014/35/EU.
(10) It is therefore necessary to withdraw the references of the following harmonised standards, from the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Union,given that they have been revised, amended or corrected, together with the references of any amending or correcting standards thereto published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union: EN 60691:2003, EN 60728-11:2010, EN 60934:2001, EN 60974-2:2013, EN 60974-3:2014, EN 60974-5:2013, EN 60974-7:2013, EN 61535:2009, EN 61558-1:2005, EN 61851-1:2011, EN 62275:2015, EN 669-1:2018, EN 61439-3:2012, EN 61557-9:2015, EN 62026-3:2015, EN 60335-1:2012, EN 60335-2-4:2010, EN 60335-2-5:2015, EN 60335-2-7:2010, EN 60335-2-12:2003, EN 60335-2-13:2010, EN 60335-2-17:2013, EN 60335-2-35:2016, EN 60335-2-47:2003, EN 60335-2-48:2003, EN 60335-2-49:2003, EN 60335-2-52:2003, EN 60335-2-61:2003, EN 60335-2-66:2003, EN 60335-2-84:2003, EN 60335-2-87:2002, EN 60335-2-98:2003, EN 60669-1:2018, EN 60947-5-4:2003, EN 61347-2-7:2012, EN 61347-2-11:2001, EN 61386-1:2008 and EN 62035:2014. Annex II to Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956 lists the references of harmonised standards drafted in support of Directive 2014/35/EU that are withdrawn from the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Union. It is therefore appropriate to include those references in that Annex.
(11) It is also necessary to withdraw the references of harmonised standards EN 60335-1:2012 and EN 60335-2-4:2010 together with the references of any amending or correcting standards thereto published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union, from the L series of theOfficial Journal of the European Union, given that they have been amended. It is therefore appropriate to delete those references from Annex I to Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956.
(12) In order to give manufacturers sufficient time to prepare for application of harmonised standards EN 50620:2017, EN 50620:2017/A1:2019, EN IEC 60947-9-1:2019, EN 61643-31:2019, EN 60691:2003, EN 60728-11:2010, EN 60934:2001, EN 60974-2:2013, EN 60974-3:2014, EN 60974-5:2013, EN 60974-7:2013, EN 61535:2009, EN 61558-1:2005, EN 61851-1:2011, EN 62275:2015, EN 669-1:2018, EN 60335-1:2012 as amended by EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019, EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019 and EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019, EN 60335-2-4:2010 as amended by EN 60335-2-4:2010/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-5:2015 as amended by EN 60335-2-5:2015/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-7:2010 as amended by EN 60335-2-7:2010/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-12:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-12:2003/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-13:2010 as amended by EN 60335-2-13:2010/A1:2019, EN 60335-2-17:2013 as amended by EN 60335-2-17:2013/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-35:2016 as amended by EN 60335-2-35:2016/A1:2019, EN 60335-2-47:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-47:2003/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-48:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-48:2003/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-49:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-49:2003/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-52:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-52:2003/A12:2019, EN 60335-2-61:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-61:2003/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-66:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-66:2003/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-84:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-47:2003/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-87:2002 as amended by EN 60335-2-87:2002/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-98:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-98:2003/A11:2019, EN 60947-5-4:2003 as amended by EN 60947-5-4:2003/A1:2019, EN 61347-2-7:2012 as amended by EN 61347-2-11:2001, EN 61386-1:2008 as amended by EN 61386-1:2008/A1:2019, EN 62035:2014 as amended by EN 62035:2014/A1:2019, EN 61439-3:2012 as corrected by EN 61439-3:2012/AC:2019-04, EN 61557-9:2015 as corrected by EN 61557-9:2015/AC:2017-02, EN 62026-3:2015 as corrected by EN 62026-3:2015/AC:2019-12, and EN 60669-1:2018 as corrected by EN 60669-1:2018/AC:2018-11, and as amended or corrected by any other standards references of which are published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union,it is necessary to defer the withdrawal of references of harmonised standards EN 60335-1:2012, EN 60335-2-4:2010, EN 60335-2-5:2015, EN 60335-2-7:2010, EN 60335-2-12:2003, EN 60335-2-13:2010, EN 60335-2-17:2013, EN 60335-2-35:2016, EN 60335-2-47:2003, EN 60335-2-48:2003, EN 60335-2-49:2003, EN 60335-2-52:2003, EN 60335-2-61:2003, EN 60335-2-66:2003, EN 60335-2-84:2003, EN 60335-2-87:2002, EN 60335-2-98:2003, EN 60669-1:2018, EN 60947-5-4:2003, EN 61347-2-7:2012, EN 61347-2-11:2001, EN 61386-1:2008 and EN 62035:2014, together with references of any amending or correcting standards thereto published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.
(13) Harmonised standard EN 50178:1997 was revised by CEN and Cenelec. This resulted in adoption of standard EN 62477-1:2012 and its amendment, EN 62477-1:2012/A11:2014. By Commission Communication (2016/C 249/03)(5), the references of standard EN 62477-1:2012 and of its amendment, EN 62477-1:2012/A11:2014, were published in the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Unionand the reference of standard EN 50178:1997 was included in the column of superseded standards without however indicating a transitional date of cessation of presumption of conformity. In that communication the reference of standard EN 50178:1997 also appeared in the column of published standards. Communication (2018/C 326/02) published both, references of standard EN 62477-1:2012 and of its amendment, EN 62477-1:2012/A11:2014, and of standard EN 50178:1997, without indicating that standard EN 50178:1997 was superseded. Given uncertainty as to the withdrawal of the reference of standard EN 50178:1997 from the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Unionit is necessary to include the reference of EN 50178:1997 in Annex II to Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956 which lists the references of harmonised standards drafted in support of Directive 2014/35/EU that are withdrawn from the C series.
(14) Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956 should therefore be amended accordingly.
(15) Compliance with a harmonised standard confers a presumption of conformity with the corresponding essential requirements, including the safety objectives, set out in Union harmonisation legislation from the date of publication of the reference of such standard in theOfficial Journal of the European Union. This Decision should therefore enter into force on the day of its publication,
(1) rows 2 and 3 are deleted;
(2) the following row 2a is inserted:‘2a.EN 60335-1:2012Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 1: General requirementsEN 60335-1:2012/A11:2014EN 60335-1:2012/A13:2017EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019’ ‘2a. EN 60335-1:2012Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 1: General requirementsEN 60335-1:2012/A11:2014EN 60335-1:2012/A13:2017EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019’
‘2a. EN 60335-1:2012Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 1: General requirementsEN 60335-1:2012/A11:2014EN 60335-1:2012/A13:2017EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019’
‘2a. EN 60335-1:2012Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 1: General requirementsEN 60335-1:2012/A11:2014EN 60335-1:2012/A13:2017EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019’
(3) the following row 3a is inserted:‘3a.EN 60335-2-4:2010Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-4: Particular requirements for spin extractorsEN 60335-2-4:2010/A1:2015EN 60335-2-4:2010/A11:2018EN 60335-2-4:2010/A2:2019’ ‘3a. EN 60335-2-4:2010Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-4: Particular requirements for spin extractorsEN 60335-2-4:2010/A1:2015EN 60335-2-4:2010/A11:2018EN 60335-2-4:2010/A2:2019’
‘3a. EN 60335-2-4:2010Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-4: Particular requirements for spin extractorsEN 60335-2-4:2010/A1:2015EN 60335-2-4:2010/A11:2018EN 60335-2-4:2010/A2:2019’
‘3a. EN 60335-2-4:2010Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-4: Particular requirements for spin extractorsEN 60335-2-4:2010/A1:2015EN 60335-2-4:2010/A11:2018EN 60335-2-4:2010/A2:2019’
(4) the following rows are added:NoReference of the standard‘28.EN 50620:2017Electric cables – Charging cables for electric vehiclesEN 50620:2017/A1:201929.EN 60335-2-5:2015Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-5: Particular requirements for dishwashersEN 60335-2-5:2015/A11:201930.EN 60335-2-7:2010Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-7: Particular requirements for washing machinesEN 60335-2-7:2010/A1:2013EN 60335-2-7:2010/A11:2013EN 60335-2-7:2010/A2:201931.EN 60335-2-12:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-12: Particular requirements for warming plates and similar appliancesEN 60335-2-12:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-12:2003/A2:2019EN 60335-2-12:2003/A11:201932.EN 60335-2-13:2010Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-13: Particular requirements for deep fat fryers, frying pans and similar appliancesEN 60335-2-13:2010/A11:2012EN 60335-2-13:2010/A1:201933.EN 60335-2-17:2013Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-17: Particular requirements for blankets, pads, clothing and similar flexible heating appliancesEN 60335-2-17:2013/A11:201934.EN 60335-2-35:2016Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-35: Particular requirements for instantaneous water heatersEN 60335-2-35:2016/A1:201935.EN 60335-2-47:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-47: Particular requirements for commercial electric boiling pansEN 60335-2-47:2003/AC:2007EN 60335-2-47:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-47:2003/A11:2012EN 60335-2-47:2003/A2:201936.EN 60335-2-48:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-48: Particular requirements for commercial electric grillers and toastersEN 60335-2-48:2003/AC:2007EN 60335-2-48:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-48:2003/A11:2012EN 60335-2-48:2003/A2:201937.EN 60335-2-49:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-49: Particular requirements for commercial electric appliances for keeping food and crockery warmEN 60335-2-49:2003/AC:2007EN 60335-2-49:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-49:2003/A11:2012EN 60335-2-49:2003/A2:201938.EN 60335-2-52:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-52: Particular requirements for oral hygiene appliancesEN 60335-2-52:2003/A11:2010/AC:2012EN 60335-2-52:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-52:2003/A11:2010EN 60335-2-52:2003/A12:201939.EN 60335-2-61:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-61: Particular requirements for thermal-storage room heatersEN 60335-2-61:2003/A1:2005EN 60335-2-61:2003/A2:2008EN 60335-2-61:2003/A11:201940.EN 60335-2-66:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-66: Particular requirements for water-bed heatersEN 60335-2-66:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-66:2003/A2:2012EN 60335-2-66:2003/A11:201941.EN 60335-2-84:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-84: Particular requirements for toiletsEN 60335-2-84:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-84:2003/A2:201942.EN 60335-2-87:2002Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-87: Particular requirements for electrical animal-stunning equipmentEN 60335-2-87:2002/A1:2007EN 60335-2-87:2002/A2:201943.EN 60335-2-98:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-98: Particular requirements for humidifiersEN 60335-2-98:2003/A1:2005EN 60335-2-98:2003/A2:2008EN 60335-2-98:2003/A11:201944.EN 60669-1:2018Switches for household and similar fixed electrical installations – Part 1: General requirementsEN 60669-1:2018/AC:2018-1145.EN 60691:2016Thermal-links – Requirements and application guideEN 60691:2016/A1:201946.EN 60728-11:2017Cable networks for television signals, sound signals and interactive services – Part 11: SafetyEN 60728-11:2017/A11:201847.EN IEC 60934:2019Circuit breakers for equipment (CBE)48.EN 60947-5-4:2003Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – Part 5-4: Control circuit devices and switching elements – Method of assessing the performance of low-energy contacts – Special testsEN 60947-5-4:2003/A1:201949.EN IEC 60947-9-1:2019Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – Part 9-1: Active arc-fault mitigation systems – Arc quenching devices50.EN IEC 60974-2:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 2: Liquid cooling systems51.EN IEC 60974-3:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 3: Arc striking and stabilizing devices52.EN IEC 60974-5:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 5: Wire feeders53.EN IEC 60974-7:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 7: Torches54.EN 61347-2-7:2012Lamp controlgear – Part 2-7: Particular requirements for battery supplied electronic controlgear for emergency lighting (self-contained)EN 61347-2-7:2012/A1:201955.EN 61347-2-11:2001Lamp controlgear – Part 2-11: Particular requirements for miscellaneous electronic circuits used with luminairesEN 61347-2-11:2001/AC:2002EN 61347-2-11:2001/AC:2010EN 61347-2-11:2001/A1:201956.EN 61386-1:2008Conduit systems for cable management – Part 1: General requirementsEN 61386-1:2008/A1:201957.EN 61439-3:2012Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear assemblies – Part 3: Distribution boards intended to be operated by ordinary persons (DBO)EN 61439-3:2012/AC:2019-0458.EN IEC 61535:2019Installation couplers intended for permanent connection in fixed installations59.EN 61557-9:2015Electrical safety in low voltage distribution systems up to 1 000 V a.c. and 1 500 V d.c. – Equipment for testing, measuring or monitoring of protective measures – Part 9: Equipment for insulation fault location in IT systemsEN 61557-9:2015/AC:2017-0260.EN IEC 61558-1:2019Safety of transformers, reactors, power supply units and combinations thereof – Part 1: General requirements and tests61.EN 61643-31:2019Low-voltage surge protective devices – Part 31: Requirements and test methods for SPDs for photovoltaic installations62.EN IEC 61851-1:2019Electric vehicle conductive charging system – Part 1: General requirements63.EN 62026-3:2015Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – Controller-device interfaces (CDIs) – Part 3: DeviceNetEN 62026-3:2015/AC:2019-1264.EN 62035:2014Discharge lamps (excluding fluorescent lamps) – Safety specificationsEN 62035:2014/A1:201965.EN IEC 62275:2019Cable management systems – Cable ties for electrical installations’ No Reference of the standard ‘28. EN 50620:2017Electric cables – Charging cables for electric vehiclesEN 50620:2017/A1:2019 29. EN 60335-2-5:2015Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-5: Particular requirements for dishwashersEN 60335-2-5:2015/A11:2019 30. EN 60335-2-7:2010Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-7: Particular requirements for washing machinesEN 60335-2-7:2010/A1:2013EN 60335-2-7:2010/A11:2013EN 60335-2-7:2010/A2:2019 31. EN 60335-2-12:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-12: Particular requirements for warming plates and similar appliancesEN 60335-2-12:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-12:2003/A2:2019EN 60335-2-12:2003/A11:2019 32. EN 60335-2-13:2010Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-13: Particular requirements for deep fat fryers, frying pans and similar appliancesEN 60335-2-13:2010/A11:2012EN 60335-2-13:2010/A1:2019 33. EN 60335-2-17:2013Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-17: Particular requirements for blankets, pads, clothing and similar flexible heating appliancesEN 60335-2-17:2013/A11:2019 34. EN 60335-2-35:2016Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-35: Particular requirements for instantaneous water heatersEN 60335-2-35:2016/A1:2019 35. EN 60335-2-47:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-47: Particular requirements for commercial electric boiling pansEN 60335-2-47:2003/AC:2007EN 60335-2-47:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-47:2003/A11:2012EN 60335-2-47:2003/A2:2019 36. EN 60335-2-48:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-48: Particular requirements for commercial electric grillers and toastersEN 60335-2-48:2003/AC:2007EN 60335-2-48:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-48:2003/A11:2012EN 60335-2-48:2003/A2:2019 37. EN 60335-2-49:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-49: Particular requirements for commercial electric appliances for keeping food and crockery warmEN 60335-2-49:2003/AC:2007EN 60335-2-49:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-49:2003/A11:2012EN 60335-2-49:2003/A2:2019 38. EN 60335-2-52:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-52: Particular requirements for oral hygiene appliancesEN 60335-2-52:2003/A11:2010/AC:2012EN 60335-2-52:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-52:2003/A11:2010EN 60335-2-52:2003/A12:2019 39. EN 60335-2-61:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-61: Particular requirements for thermal-storage room heatersEN 60335-2-61:2003/A1:2005EN 60335-2-61:2003/A2:2008EN 60335-2-61:2003/A11:2019 40. EN 60335-2-66:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-66: Particular requirements for water-bed heatersEN 60335-2-66:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-66:2003/A2:2012EN 60335-2-66:2003/A11:2019 41. EN 60335-2-84:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-84: Particular requirements for toiletsEN 60335-2-84:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-84:2003/A2:2019 42. EN 60335-2-87:2002Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-87: Particular requirements for electrical animal-stunning equipmentEN 60335-2-87:2002/A1:2007EN 60335-2-87:2002/A2:2019 43. EN 60335-2-98:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-98: Particular requirements for humidifiersEN 60335-2-98:2003/A1:2005EN 60335-2-98:2003/A2:2008EN 60335-2-98:2003/A11:2019 44. EN 60669-1:2018Switches for household and similar fixed electrical installations – Part 1: General requirementsEN 60669-1:2018/AC:2018-11 45. EN 60691:2016Thermal-links – Requirements and application guideEN 60691:2016/A1:2019 46. EN 60728-11:2017Cable networks for television signals, sound signals and interactive services – Part 11: SafetyEN 60728-11:2017/A11:2018 47. EN IEC 60934:2019Circuit breakers for equipment (CBE) 48. EN 60947-5-4:2003Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – Part 5-4: Control circuit devices and switching elements – Method of assessing the performance of low-energy contacts – Special testsEN 60947-5-4:2003/A1:2019 49. EN IEC 60947-9-1:2019Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – Part 9-1: Active arc-fault mitigation systems – Arc quenching devices 50. EN IEC 60974-2:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 2: Liquid cooling systems 51. EN IEC 60974-3:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 3: Arc striking and stabilizing devices 52. EN IEC 60974-5:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 5: Wire feeders 53. EN IEC 60974-7:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 7: Torches 54. EN 61347-2-7:2012Lamp controlgear – Part 2-7: Particular requirements for battery supplied electronic controlgear for emergency lighting (self-contained)EN 61347-2-7:2012/A1:2019 55. EN 61347-2-11:2001Lamp controlgear – Part 2-11: Particular requirements for miscellaneous electronic circuits used with luminairesEN 61347-2-11:2001/AC:2002EN 61347-2-11:2001/AC:2010EN 61347-2-11:2001/A1:2019 56. EN 61386-1:2008Conduit systems for cable management – Part 1: General requirementsEN 61386-1:2008/A1:2019 57. EN 61439-3:2012Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear assemblies – Part 3: Distribution boards intended to be operated by ordinary persons (DBO)EN 61439-3:2012/AC:2019-04 58. EN IEC 61535:2019Installation couplers intended for permanent connection in fixed installations 59. EN 61557-9:2015Electrical safety in low voltage distribution systems up to 1 000 V a.c. and 1 500 V d.c. – Equipment for testing, measuring or monitoring of protective measures – Part 9: Equipment for insulation fault location in IT systemsEN 61557-9:2015/AC:2017-02 60. EN IEC 61558-1:2019Safety of transformers, reactors, power supply units and combinations thereof – Part 1: General requirements and tests 61. EN 61643-31:2019Low-voltage surge protective devices – Part 31: Requirements and test methods for SPDs for photovoltaic installations 62. EN IEC 61851-1:2019Electric vehicle conductive charging system – Part 1: General requirements 63. EN 62026-3:2015Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – Controller-device interfaces (CDIs) – Part 3: DeviceNetEN 62026-3:2015/AC:2019-12 64. EN 62035:2014Discharge lamps (excluding fluorescent lamps) – Safety specificationsEN 62035:2014/A1:2019 65. EN IEC 62275:2019Cable management systems – Cable ties for electrical installations’
No Reference of the standard
‘28. EN 50620:2017Electric cables – Charging cables for electric vehiclesEN 50620:2017/A1:2019
29. EN 60335-2-5:2015Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-5: Particular requirements for dishwashersEN 60335-2-5:2015/A11:2019
30. EN 60335-2-7:2010Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-7: Particular requirements for washing machinesEN 60335-2-7:2010/A1:2013EN 60335-2-7:2010/A11:2013EN 60335-2-7:2010/A2:2019
31. EN 60335-2-12:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-12: Particular requirements for warming plates and similar appliancesEN 60335-2-12:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-12:2003/A2:2019EN 60335-2-12:2003/A11:2019
32. EN 60335-2-13:2010Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-13: Particular requirements for deep fat fryers, frying pans and similar appliancesEN 60335-2-13:2010/A11:2012EN 60335-2-13:2010/A1:2019
33. EN 60335-2-17:2013Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-17: Particular requirements for blankets, pads, clothing and similar flexible heating appliancesEN 60335-2-17:2013/A11:2019
34. EN 60335-2-35:2016Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-35: Particular requirements for instantaneous water heatersEN 60335-2-35:2016/A1:2019
35. EN 60335-2-47:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-47: Particular requirements for commercial electric boiling pansEN 60335-2-47:2003/AC:2007EN 60335-2-47:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-47:2003/A11:2012EN 60335-2-47:2003/A2:2019
36. EN 60335-2-48:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-48: Particular requirements for commercial electric grillers and toastersEN 60335-2-48:2003/AC:2007EN 60335-2-48:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-48:2003/A11:2012EN 60335-2-48:2003/A2:2019
37. EN 60335-2-49:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-49: Particular requirements for commercial electric appliances for keeping food and crockery warmEN 60335-2-49:2003/AC:2007EN 60335-2-49:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-49:2003/A11:2012EN 60335-2-49:2003/A2:2019
38. EN 60335-2-52:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-52: Particular requirements for oral hygiene appliancesEN 60335-2-52:2003/A11:2010/AC:2012EN 60335-2-52:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-52:2003/A11:2010EN 60335-2-52:2003/A12:2019
39. EN 60335-2-61:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-61: Particular requirements for thermal-storage room heatersEN 60335-2-61:2003/A1:2005EN 60335-2-61:2003/A2:2008EN 60335-2-61:2003/A11:2019
40. EN 60335-2-66:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-66: Particular requirements for water-bed heatersEN 60335-2-66:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-66:2003/A2:2012EN 60335-2-66:2003/A11:2019
41. EN 60335-2-84:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-84: Particular requirements for toiletsEN 60335-2-84:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-84:2003/A2:2019
42. EN 60335-2-87:2002Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-87: Particular requirements for electrical animal-stunning equipmentEN 60335-2-87:2002/A1:2007EN 60335-2-87:2002/A2:2019
43. EN 60335-2-98:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-98: Particular requirements for humidifiersEN 60335-2-98:2003/A1:2005EN 60335-2-98:2003/A2:2008EN 60335-2-98:2003/A11:2019
44. EN 60669-1:2018Switches for household and similar fixed electrical installations – Part 1: General requirementsEN 60669-1:2018/AC:2018-11
45. EN 60691:2016Thermal-links – Requirements and application guideEN 60691:2016/A1:2019
46. EN 60728-11:2017Cable networks for television signals, sound signals and interactive services – Part 11: SafetyEN 60728-11:2017/A11:2018
47. EN IEC 60934:2019Circuit breakers for equipment (CBE)
48. EN 60947-5-4:2003Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – Part 5-4: Control circuit devices and switching elements – Method of assessing the performance of low-energy contacts – Special testsEN 60947-5-4:2003/A1:2019
49. EN IEC 60947-9-1:2019Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – Part 9-1: Active arc-fault mitigation systems – Arc quenching devices
50. EN IEC 60974-2:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 2: Liquid cooling systems
51. EN IEC 60974-3:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 3: Arc striking and stabilizing devices
52. EN IEC 60974-5:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 5: Wire feeders
53. EN IEC 60974-7:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 7: Torches
54. EN 61347-2-7:2012Lamp controlgear – Part 2-7: Particular requirements for battery supplied electronic controlgear for emergency lighting (self-contained)EN 61347-2-7:2012/A1:2019
55. EN 61347-2-11:2001Lamp controlgear – Part 2-11: Particular requirements for miscellaneous electronic circuits used with luminairesEN 61347-2-11:2001/AC:2002EN 61347-2-11:2001/AC:2010EN 61347-2-11:2001/A1:2019
56. EN 61386-1:2008Conduit systems for cable management – Part 1: General requirementsEN 61386-1:2008/A1:2019
57. EN 61439-3:2012Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear assemblies – Part 3: Distribution boards intended to be operated by ordinary persons (DBO)EN 61439-3:2012/AC:2019-04
58. EN IEC 61535:2019Installation couplers intended for permanent connection in fixed installations
59. EN 61557-9:2015Electrical safety in low voltage distribution systems up to 1 000 V a.c. and 1 500 V d.c. – Equipment for testing, measuring or monitoring of protective measures – Part 9: Equipment for insulation fault location in IT systemsEN 61557-9:2015/AC:2017-02
60. EN IEC 61558-1:2019Safety of transformers, reactors, power supply units and combinations thereof – Part 1: General requirements and tests
61. EN 61643-31:2019Low-voltage surge protective devices – Part 31: Requirements and test methods for SPDs for photovoltaic installations
62. EN IEC 61851-1:2019Electric vehicle conductive charging system – Part 1: General requirements
63. EN 62026-3:2015Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – Controller-device interfaces (CDIs) – Part 3: DeviceNetEN 62026-3:2015/AC:2019-12
64. EN 62035:2014Discharge lamps (excluding fluorescent lamps) – Safety specificationsEN 62035:2014/A1:2019
65. EN IEC 62275:2019Cable management systems – Cable ties for electrical installations’
No Reference of the standard
‘28. EN 50620:2017Electric cables – Charging cables for electric vehiclesEN 50620:2017/A1:2019
29. EN 60335-2-5:2015Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-5: Particular requirements for dishwashersEN 60335-2-5:2015/A11:2019
30. EN 60335-2-7:2010Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-7: Particular requirements for washing machinesEN 60335-2-7:2010/A1:2013EN 60335-2-7:2010/A11:2013EN 60335-2-7:2010/A2:2019
31. EN 60335-2-12:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-12: Particular requirements for warming plates and similar appliancesEN 60335-2-12:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-12:2003/A2:2019EN 60335-2-12:2003/A11:2019
32. EN 60335-2-13:2010Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-13: Particular requirements for deep fat fryers, frying pans and similar appliancesEN 60335-2-13:2010/A11:2012EN 60335-2-13:2010/A1:2019
33. EN 60335-2-17:2013Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-17: Particular requirements for blankets, pads, clothing and similar flexible heating appliancesEN 60335-2-17:2013/A11:2019
34. EN 60335-2-35:2016Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-35: Particular requirements for instantaneous water heatersEN 60335-2-35:2016/A1:2019
35. EN 60335-2-47:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-47: Particular requirements for commercial electric boiling pansEN 60335-2-47:2003/AC:2007EN 60335-2-47:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-47:2003/A11:2012EN 60335-2-47:2003/A2:2019
36. EN 60335-2-48:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-48: Particular requirements for commercial electric grillers and toastersEN 60335-2-48:2003/AC:2007EN 60335-2-48:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-48:2003/A11:2012EN 60335-2-48:2003/A2:2019
37. EN 60335-2-49:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-49: Particular requirements for commercial electric appliances for keeping food and crockery warmEN 60335-2-49:2003/AC:2007EN 60335-2-49:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-49:2003/A11:2012EN 60335-2-49:2003/A2:2019
38. EN 60335-2-52:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-52: Particular requirements for oral hygiene appliancesEN 60335-2-52:2003/A11:2010/AC:2012EN 60335-2-52:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-52:2003/A11:2010EN 60335-2-52:2003/A12:2019
39. EN 60335-2-61:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-61: Particular requirements for thermal-storage room heatersEN 60335-2-61:2003/A1:2005EN 60335-2-61:2003/A2:2008EN 60335-2-61:2003/A11:2019
40. EN 60335-2-66:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-66: Particular requirements for water-bed heatersEN 60335-2-66:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-66:2003/A2:2012EN 60335-2-66:2003/A11:2019
41. EN 60335-2-84:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-84: Particular requirements for toiletsEN 60335-2-84:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-84:2003/A2:2019
42. EN 60335-2-87:2002Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-87: Particular requirements for electrical animal-stunning equipmentEN 60335-2-87:2002/A1:2007EN 60335-2-87:2002/A2:2019
43. EN 60335-2-98:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-98: Particular requirements for humidifiersEN 60335-2-98:2003/A1:2005EN 60335-2-98:2003/A2:2008EN 60335-2-98:2003/A11:2019
44. EN 60669-1:2018Switches for household and similar fixed electrical installations – Part 1: General requirementsEN 60669-1:2018/AC:2018-11
45. EN 60691:2016Thermal-links – Requirements and application guideEN 60691:2016/A1:2019
46. EN 60728-11:2017Cable networks for television signals, sound signals and interactive services – Part 11: SafetyEN 60728-11:2017/A11:2018
47. EN IEC 60934:2019Circuit breakers for equipment (CBE)
48. EN 60947-5-4:2003Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – Part 5-4: Control circuit devices and switching elements – Method of assessing the performance of low-energy contacts – Special testsEN 60947-5-4:2003/A1:2019
49. EN IEC 60947-9-1:2019Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – Part 9-1: Active arc-fault mitigation systems – Arc quenching devices
50. EN IEC 60974-2:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 2: Liquid cooling systems
51. EN IEC 60974-3:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 3: Arc striking and stabilizing devices
52. EN IEC 60974-5:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 5: Wire feeders
53. EN IEC 60974-7:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 7: Torches
54. EN 61347-2-7:2012Lamp controlgear – Part 2-7: Particular requirements for battery supplied electronic controlgear for emergency lighting (self-contained)EN 61347-2-7:2012/A1:2019
55. EN 61347-2-11:2001Lamp controlgear – Part 2-11: Particular requirements for miscellaneous electronic circuits used with luminairesEN 61347-2-11:2001/AC:2002EN 61347-2-11:2001/AC:2010EN 61347-2-11:2001/A1:2019
56. EN 61386-1:2008Conduit systems for cable management – Part 1: General requirementsEN 61386-1:2008/A1:2019
57. EN 61439-3:2012Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear assemblies – Part 3: Distribution boards intended to be operated by ordinary persons (DBO)EN 61439-3:2012/AC:2019-04
58. EN IEC 61535:2019Installation couplers intended for permanent connection in fixed installations
59. EN 61557-9:2015Electrical safety in low voltage distribution systems up to 1 000 V a.c. and 1 500 V d.c. – Equipment for testing, measuring or monitoring of protective measures – Part 9: Equipment for insulation fault location in IT systemsEN 61557-9:2015/AC:2017-02
60. EN IEC 61558-1:2019Safety of transformers, reactors, power supply units and combinations thereof – Part 1: General requirements and tests
61. EN 61643-31:2019Low-voltage surge protective devices – Part 31: Requirements and test methods for SPDs for photovoltaic installations
62. EN IEC 61851-1:2019Electric vehicle conductive charging system – Part 1: General requirements
63. EN 62026-3:2015Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – Controller-device interfaces (CDIs) – Part 3: DeviceNetEN 62026-3:2015/AC:2019-12
64. EN 62035:2014Discharge lamps (excluding fluorescent lamps) – Safety specificationsEN 62035:2014/A1:2019
65. EN IEC 62275:2019Cable management systems – Cable ties for electrical installations’
No Reference of the standard Date of withdrawal
‘29. EN 60335-2-5:2015Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-5: Particular requirements for dishwashers 3 February 2022
30. EN 60335-2-7:2010Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-7: Particular requirements for washing machinesEN 60335-2-7:2010/A1:2013EN 60335-2-7:2010/A11:2013 3 February 2022
31. EN 60335-2-12:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-12:Particular requirements for warming plates and similar appliancesEN 60335-2-12:2003/A1:2008 3 February 2022
32. EN 60335-2-13:2010Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-13: Particular requirements for deep fat fryers, frying pans and similar appliancesEN 60335-2-13:2010/A11:2012 3 February 2022
33. EN 60335-2-17:2013Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-17: Particular requirements for blankets, pads, clothing and similar flexible heating appliances 3 February 2022
34. EN 60335-2-35:2016Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-35: Particular requirements for instantaneous water heaters 3 February 2022
35. EN 60335-2-47:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-47: Particular requirements for commercial electric boiling pansEN 60335-2-47:2003/AC:2007EN 60335-2-47:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-47:2003/A11:2012 3 February 2022
36. EN 60335-2-48:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-48: Particular requirements for commercial electric grillers and toastersEN 60335-2-48:2003/AC:2007EN 60335-2-48:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-48:2003/A11:2012 3 February 2022
37. EN 60335-2-49:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-49: Particular requirements for commercial electric appliances for keeping food and crockery warmEN 60335-2-49:2003/AC:2007EN 60335-2-49:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-49:2003/A11:2012 3 February 2022
38. EN 60335-2-52:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-52: Particular requirements for oral hygiene appliancesEN 60335-2-52:2003/A11:2010/AC:2012EN 60335-2-52:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-52:2003/A11:2010 3 February 2022
39. EN 60335-2-61:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-61: Particular requirements for thermal-storage room heatersEN 60335-2-61:2003/A1:2005EN 60335-2-61:2003/A2:2008 3 February 2022
40. EN 60335-2-66:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-66: Particular requirements for water-bed heatersEN 60335-2-66:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-66:2003/A2:2012 3 February 2022
41. EN 60335-2-84:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-84: Particular requirements for toiletsEN 60335-2-84:2003/A1:2008 3 February 2022
42. EN 60335-2-87:2002Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-87: Particular requirements for electrical animal-stunning equipmentEN 60335-2-87:2002/A1:2007 3 February 2022
43. EN 60335-2-98:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-98: Particular requirements for humidifiersEN 60335-2-98:2003/A1:2005EN 60335-2-98:2003/A2:2008 3 February 2022
44. EN 60669-1:2018Switches for household and similar fixed electrical installations – Part 1: General requirements 3 February 2021
45. EN 60691:2003Thermal-links – Requirements and application guideEN 60691:2003/A1:2007EN 60691:2003/A2:2010 3 February 2022
46. EN 60728-11:2010Cable networks for television signals, sound signals and interactive services – Part 11: Safety 3 February 2022
47. EN 60934:2001Circuit-breakers for equipment (CBE)EN 60934:2001/A1:2007EN 60934:2001/A2:2013 3 February 2022
48. EN 60947-5-4:2003Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – Part 5-4: Control circuit devices and switching elements – Method of assessing the performance of low-energy contacts – Special tests 3 February 2022
49. EN 60974-2:2013Arc welding equipment – Part 2: Liquid cooling systems 3 February 2022
50. EN 60974-3:2014Arc welding equipment – Part 3: Arc striking and stabilizing devices 3 February 2022
51. EN 60974-5:2013Arc welding equipment – Part 5: Wire feeders 3 February 2022
52. EN 60974-7:2013Arc welding equipment – Part 7:Torches 3 February 2022
53. EN 61347-2-7:2012Lamp controlgear – Part 2-7: Particular requirements for battery supplied electronic controlgear for emergency lighting (self-contained) 3 February 2022
54. EN 61347-2-11:2001Lamp controlgear – Part 2-11: Particular requirements for miscellaneous electronic circuits used with luminairesEN 61347-2-11:2001/AC:2002EN 61347-2-11:2001/AC:2010 3 February 2022
55. EN 61386-1:2008Conduit systems for cable management – Part 1: General requirements 3 February 2022
56. EN 61439-3:2012Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear assemblies – Part 3: Distribution boards intended to be operated by ordinary persons (DBO) 3 February 2021
57. EN 61535:2009Installation couplers intended for permanent connection in fixed installationsEN 61535:2009/A1:2013 3 February 2022
58. EN 61557-9:2015Electrical safety in low voltage distribution systems up to 1 000 V a.c. and 1 500 V d.c. – Equipment for testing, measuring or monitoring of protective measures – Part 9: Equipment for insulation fault location in IT systems 3 February 2021
59. EN 61558-1:2005Safety of power transformers, power supplies, reactors and similar products – Part 1: General requirements and testsEN 61558-1:2005/A1:2009EN 61558-1:2005/AC:2006 3 February 2022
60. EN 61851-1:2011Electric vehicle conductive charging system – Part 1: General requirements 3 February 2022
61. EN 62026-3:2015Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – Controller-device interfaces (CDIs) – Part 3: DeviceNet 3 February 2021
62. EN 62035:2014Discharge lamps (excluding fluorescent lamps) – Safety specifications 3 February 2022
63. EN 62275:2015Cable management systems – Cable ties for electrical installations 3 February 2022
64. EN 50178:1997Electronic equipment for use in power installations’
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on European standardisation, amending Council Directives 89/686/EEC and 93/15/EEC and Directives 94/9/EC, 94/25/EC, 95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 98/34/EC, 2004/22/EC, 2007/23/EC, 2009/23/EC and 2009/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Decision 87/95/EEC and Decision No 1673/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(1), and in particular Article 10(6) thereof,
(1) In accordance with Article 12 of Directive 2014/35/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council(2), electrical equipment which is in conformity with harmonised standards or parts thereof, the references of which have been published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union, is to be presumed to be in conformity with the safety objectives referred to in Article 3 of that Directive and set out in Annex I to that Directive, covered by those harmonised standards or parts thereof.
(2) By letter M/511 of 8 November 2012, the Commission made a request to the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN), the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (Cenelec) and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) for providing the first full list of the titles of harmonised standards and for the drafting, revision and the completion of harmonised standards, for electrical equipment designed for use within certain voltage limits in support of Directive 2014/35/EU. The safety objectives referred to in Article 3 of Directive 2014/35/EU and set out in Annex I to that Directive have not changed since the request was made to CEN, Cenelec and ETSI.
(3) On the basis of the request M/511, CEN and Cenelec drafted the following harmonised standards and an amendment thereto: EN 50620:2017 and EN 50620:2017/A1:2019 for charging cables for electric vehicles; EN IEC 60947-9-1:2019 for arc quenching; and EN 61643-31:2019 for low voltage surge protective device.
(4) On the basis of the request M/511, CEN and Cenelec revised the following standards, the references of which are published in the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Unionby Commission Communication (2018/C326/02)(3): EN 60691:2003; EN -11:2010; EN 60934:2001; EN 60974-2:2013; EN 60974-3:2014; EN 60974-5:2013; EN 60974-7:2013; EN 61535:2009; EN 61558-1:2005; EN 61851-1:2011; and EN 62275:2015. This resulted in adoption of, respectively, the following harmonised standards and amendments thereto: EN 60691:2016 and EN 60691:2016/A1:2019, for thermal-links; EN 60728-11:2017 and EN 60728-11:2017/A11:2018, for equipment in cable networks for television signals, sound signals and interactive services; EN IEC 60934:2019 for circuit breakers for equipment (CBE); EN IEC 60947-9-1:2019 for arc quenching; EN IEC 60974-2:2019, EN IEC 60974-3:2019, EN IEC 60974-5:2019 and EN IEC 60974-7:2019, for arc welding; EN IEC 61535:2019 installation couplers intended for permanent connection in fixed installations; EN IEC 61558-1:2019 for transformers, reactors, power supply units and combinations thereof; EN IEC 61851-1:2019 for electric vehicle conductive charging system; and EN IEC 62275:2019 for cable ties in electrical installations.
(5) On the basis of the request M/511, CEN and Cenelec amended the following standards, the references of which are included in Annex I to Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956(4): EN 60335-1:2012; and EN 60335-2-4:2010. This resulted in adoption of, respectively, the following amending harmonised standards: EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019, EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019 and EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019 for household and similar electrical appliances; and EN 60335-2-4:2010/A2:2019 for spin extractors. CEN and Cenelec also amended the following standards, the references of which are published in the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Unionby Communication (2018/C 326/02): EN 60335-2-5:2015; EN 60335-2-7:2010; EN 60335-2-12:2003; EN 60335-2-13:2010; EN 60335-2-17:2013; EN 60335-2-35:2016; EN 60335-2-47:2003; EN 60335-2-48:2003; EN 60335-2-49:2003; EN 60335-2-52:2003; EN 60335-2-61:2003; EN 60335-2-66:2003; EN 60335-2-84:2003; EN 60335-2-87:2002; EN 60335-2-98:2003; EN 60947-5-4:2003; EN 61347-2-7:2012; EN 61347-2-11:2001; EN 61386-1:2008; and EN 62035:2014. This resulted in adoption of, respectively, the following amending harmonised standards: EN 60335-2-5:2015/A11:2019 for dishwashers; EN 60335-2-7:2010/A2:2019 for washing machines; EN 60335-2-12:2003/A2:201 and EN 60335-2-12:2003/A11:2019, for warming plates and similar appliances; EN 60335-2-13:2010/A1:2019 for deep fat fryers, frying pans and similar appliances; EN 60335-2-17:2013/A11:2019 for blankets, pads, clothing and similar flexible heating appliance; EN 60335-2-35:2016/A1:2019 for instantaneous water heaters; EN 60335-2-47:2003/A2:2019 for commercial electric boiling pans; EN 60335-2-48:2003/A2:2019 for commercial electric grillers and toasters; EN 60335-2-49:2003/A2:2019 for commercial electric appliances for keeping food and crockery warm; EN 60335-2-52:2003/A12:2019 for oral hygiene appliances; EN 60335-2-61:2003/A11:2019 for thermal-storage room heaters; EN 60335-2-66:2003/A11:2019 for water-bed heaters; EN 60335-2-84:2003/A2:2019 for toilets; EN 60335-2-87:2002/A2:2019 for electrical animal-stunning equipment; EN 60335-2-98:2003/A11:2019 for humidifiers; EN 60947-5-4:2003/A1:2019 for control circuit devices and switching elements; EN 61347-2-7:2012/A1:2019 for emergency lighting; EN 61347-2-11:2001/A1:2019 for miscellaneous electronic circuits used with luminaires; EN 61386-1:2008/A1:2019 for cable management; and EN 62035:2014/A1:2019 for discharge lamps.
(6) The Commission, together with CEN and Cenelec, has assessed whether those harmonised standards and amendments thereto comply with the request M/511.
(7) Harmonised standards EN 50620:2017 as amended by EN 50620:2017/A1:2019, EN IEC 60947-9-1:2019, EN 61643-31:2019, EN 60691:2003, EN 60728-11:2010, EN 60934:2001, EN 60974-2:2013, EN 60974-3:2014, EN 60974-5:2013, EN 60974-7:2013, EN 61535:2009, EN 61558-1:2005, EN 61851-1:2011, EN 62275:2015, EN 669-1:2018, EN 60335-1:2012 as amended by EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019, EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019 and EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019, EN 60335-2-4:2010 as amended by EN 60335-2-4:2010/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-5:2015 as amended by EN 60335-2-5:2015/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-7:2010 as amended by EN 60335-2-7:2010/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-12:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-12:2003/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-13:2010 as amended by EN 60335-2-13:2010/A1:2019, EN 60335-2-17:2013 as amended by EN 60335-2-17:2013/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-35:2016 as amended by EN 60335-2-35:2016/A1:2019, EN 60335-2-47:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-47:2003/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-48:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-48:2003/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-49:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-49:2003/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-52:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-52:2003/A12:2019, EN 60335-2-61:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-61:2003/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-66:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-66:2003/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-84:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-47:2003/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-87:2002 as amended by EN 60335-2-87:2002/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-98:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-98:2003/A11:2019, EN 60947-5-4:2003 as amended by EN 60947-5-4:2003/A1:2019, EN 61347-2-7:2012 as amended by EN 61347-2-11:2001, EN 61386-1:2008 as amended by EN 61386-1:2008/A1:2019, and EN 62035:2014 as amended by EN 62035:2014/A1:2019, and as amended or corrected by any other standards references of which are published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union,satisfy the safety objectives which they aim to cover and which are set out in Directive 2014/35/EU. It is therefore appropriate to publish the references of those standards in theOfficial Journal of the European Union,together with references of any relevant amending or correcting standards thereto.
(8) Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956 provides in Annex I the references of harmonised standards conferring a presumption of conformity with Directive 2014/35/EU. In order to ensure that the references of harmonised standards drafted in support of Directive 2014/35/EU are listed in one act, the references of those standards should be included in Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956.
(9) CEN and Cenelec also drafted the following corrigenda which introduce technical corrections to the following existing standards the references of which are published in the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Unionby Communication (2018/C 326/02): EN 60669-1:2018/AC:2018-11 correcting harmonised standard EN 60669-1:2018 for switches for household and similar fixed electrical installations; EN 61439-3:2012/AC:2019-04 correcting harmonised standard EN 61439-3:2012 for distribution boards intended to be operated by ordinary persons (DBO); EN 61557-9:2015/AC:2017-02 correcting harmonised standard EN 61557-9:2015 for equipment for insulation fault location in IT systems; and EN 62026-3:2015/AC:2019-12 correcting harmonised standard EN 62026-3:2015 for controller-device interfaces (CDIs) DeviceNets. In order to ensure correct and consistent application of harmonised standards the references of which have been published, it is appropriate to include the references of those harmonised standards together with the references of the corrigenda in Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956 which provides in its Annex I the references of harmonised standards conferring a presumption of conformity with Directive 2014/35/EU.
(10) It is therefore necessary to withdraw the references of the following harmonised standards, from the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Union,given that they have been revised, amended or corrected, together with the references of any amending or correcting standards thereto published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union: EN 60691:2003, EN 60728-11:2010, EN 60934:2001, EN 60974-2:2013, EN 60974-3:2014, EN 60974-5:2013, EN 60974-7:2013, EN 61535:2009, EN 61558-1:2005, EN 61851-1:2011, EN 62275:2015, EN 669-1:2018, EN 61439-3:2012, EN 61557-9:2015, EN 62026-3:2015, EN 60335-1:2012, EN 60335-2-4:2010, EN 60335-2-5:2015, EN 60335-2-7:2010, EN 60335-2-12:2003, EN 60335-2-13:2010, EN 60335-2-17:2013, EN 60335-2-35:2016, EN 60335-2-47:2003, EN 60335-2-48:2003, EN 60335-2-49:2003, EN 60335-2-52:2003, EN 60335-2-61:2003, EN 60335-2-66:2003, EN 60335-2-84:2003, EN 60335-2-87:2002, EN 60335-2-98:2003, EN 60669-1:2018, EN 60947-5-4:2003, EN 61347-2-7:2012, EN 61347-2-11:2001, EN 61386-1:2008 and EN 62035:2014. Annex II to Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956 lists the references of harmonised standards drafted in support of Directive 2014/35/EU that are withdrawn from the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Union. It is therefore appropriate to include those references in that Annex.
(11) It is also necessary to withdraw the references of harmonised standards EN 60335-1:2012 and EN 60335-2-4:2010 together with the references of any amending or correcting standards thereto published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union, from the L series of theOfficial Journal of the European Union, given that they have been amended. It is therefore appropriate to delete those references from Annex I to Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956.
(12) In order to give manufacturers sufficient time to prepare for application of harmonised standards EN 50620:2017, EN 50620:2017/A1:2019, EN IEC 60947-9-1:2019, EN 61643-31:2019, EN 60691:2003, EN 60728-11:2010, EN 60934:2001, EN 60974-2:2013, EN 60974-3:2014, EN 60974-5:2013, EN 60974-7:2013, EN 61535:2009, EN 61558-1:2005, EN 61851-1:2011, EN 62275:2015, EN 669-1:2018, EN 60335-1:2012 as amended by EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019, EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019 and EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019, EN 60335-2-4:2010 as amended by EN 60335-2-4:2010/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-5:2015 as amended by EN 60335-2-5:2015/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-7:2010 as amended by EN 60335-2-7:2010/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-12:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-12:2003/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-13:2010 as amended by EN 60335-2-13:2010/A1:2019, EN 60335-2-17:2013 as amended by EN 60335-2-17:2013/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-35:2016 as amended by EN 60335-2-35:2016/A1:2019, EN 60335-2-47:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-47:2003/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-48:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-48:2003/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-49:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-49:2003/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-52:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-52:2003/A12:2019, EN 60335-2-61:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-61:2003/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-66:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-66:2003/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-84:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-47:2003/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-87:2002 as amended by EN 60335-2-87:2002/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-98:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-98:2003/A11:2019, EN 60947-5-4:2003 as amended by EN 60947-5-4:2003/A1:2019, EN 61347-2-7:2012 as amended by EN 61347-2-11:2001, EN 61386-1:2008 as amended by EN 61386-1:2008/A1:2019, EN 62035:2014 as amended by EN 62035:2014/A1:2019, EN 61439-3:2012 as corrected by EN 61439-3:2012/AC:2019-04, EN 61557-9:2015 as corrected by EN 61557-9:2015/AC:2017-02, EN 62026-3:2015 as corrected by EN 62026-3:2015/AC:2019-12, and EN 60669-1:2018 as corrected by EN 60669-1:2018/AC:2018-11, and as amended or corrected by any other standards references of which are published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union,it is necessary to defer the withdrawal of references of harmonised standards EN 60335-1:2012, EN 60335-2-4:2010, EN 60335-2-5:2015, EN 60335-2-7:2010, EN 60335-2-12:2003, EN 60335-2-13:2010, EN 60335-2-17:2013, EN 60335-2-35:2016, EN 60335-2-47:2003, EN 60335-2-48:2003, EN 60335-2-49:2003, EN 60335-2-52:2003, EN 60335-2-61:2003, EN 60335-2-66:2003, EN 60335-2-84:2003, EN 60335-2-87:2002, EN 60335-2-98:2003, EN 60669-1:2018, EN 60947-5-4:2003, EN 61347-2-7:2012, EN 61347-2-11:2001, EN 61386-1:2008 and EN 62035:2014, together with references of any amending or correcting standards thereto published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.
(13) Harmonised standard EN 50178:1997 was revised by CEN and Cenelec. This resulted in adoption of standard EN 62477-1:2012 and its amendment, EN 62477-1:2012/A11:2014. By Commission Communication (2016/C 249/03)(5), the references of standard EN 62477-1:2012 and of its amendment, EN 62477-1:2012/A11:2014, were published in the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Unionand the reference of standard EN 50178:1997 was included in the column of superseded standards without however indicating a transitional date of cessation of presumption of conformity. In that communication the reference of standard EN 50178:1997 also appeared in the column of published standards. Communication (2018/C 326/02) published both, references of standard EN 62477-1:2012 and of its amendment, EN 62477-1:2012/A11:2014, and of standard EN 50178:1997, without indicating that standard EN 50178:1997 was superseded. Given uncertainty as to the withdrawal of the reference of standard EN 50178:1997 from the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Unionit is necessary to include the reference of EN 50178:1997 in Annex II to Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956 which lists the references of harmonised standards drafted in support of Directive 2014/35/EU that are withdrawn from the C series.
(14) Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956 should therefore be amended accordingly.
(15) Compliance with a harmonised standard confers a presumption of conformity with the corresponding essential requirements, including the safety objectives, set out in Union harmonisation legislation from the date of publication of the reference of such standard in theOfficial Journal of the European Union. This Decision should therefore enter into force on the day of its publication,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
Annex I to Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/1956 is amended in accordance with Annex I to this Decision.

Article 2
Annex II to Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/1956 is amended in accordance with Annex II to this Decision.

Article 3
This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.
Point (1) of Annex I shall apply from 3 February 2022.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on European standardisation, amending Council Directives 89/686/EEC and 93/15/EEC and Directives 94/9/EC, 94/25/EC, 95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 98/34/EC, 2004/22/EC, 2007/23/EC, 2009/23/EC and 2009/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Decision 87/95/EEC and Decision No 1673/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(1), and in particular Article 10(6) thereof,
(1) In accordance with Article 12 of Directive 2014/35/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council(2), electrical equipment which is in conformity with harmonised standards or parts thereof, the references of which have been published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union, is to be presumed to be in conformity with the safety objectives referred to in Article 3 of that Directive and set out in Annex I to that Directive, covered by those harmonised standards or parts thereof.
(2) By letter M/511 of 8 November 2012, the Commission made a request to the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN), the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (Cenelec) and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) for providing the first full list of the titles of harmonised standards and for the drafting, revision and the completion of harmonised standards, for electrical equipment designed for use within certain voltage limits in support of Directive 2014/35/EU. The safety objectives referred to in Article 3 of Directive 2014/35/EU and set out in Annex I to that Directive have not changed since the request was made to CEN, Cenelec and ETSI.
(3) On the basis of the request M/511, CEN and Cenelec drafted the following harmonised standards and an amendment thereto: EN 50620:2017 and EN 50620:2017/A1:2019 for charging cables for electric vehicles; EN IEC 60947-9-1:2019 for arc quenching; and EN 61643-31:2019 for low voltage surge protective device.
(4) On the basis of the request M/511, CEN and Cenelec revised the following standards, the references of which are published in the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Unionby Commission Communication (2018/C326/02)(3): EN 60691:2003; EN -11:2010; EN 60934:2001; EN 60974-2:2013; EN 60974-3:2014; EN 60974-5:2013; EN 60974-7:2013; EN 61535:2009; EN 61558-1:2005; EN 61851-1:2011; and EN 62275:2015. This resulted in adoption of, respectively, the following harmonised standards and amendments thereto: EN 60691:2016 and EN 60691:2016/A1:2019, for thermal-links; EN 60728-11:2017 and EN 60728-11:2017/A11:2018, for equipment in cable networks for television signals, sound signals and interactive services; EN IEC 60934:2019 for circuit breakers for equipment (CBE); EN IEC 60947-9-1:2019 for arc quenching; EN IEC 60974-2:2019, EN IEC 60974-3:2019, EN IEC 60974-5:2019 and EN IEC 60974-7:2019, for arc welding; EN IEC 61535:2019 installation couplers intended for permanent connection in fixed installations; EN IEC 61558-1:2019 for transformers, reactors, power supply units and combinations thereof; EN IEC 61851-1:2019 for electric vehicle conductive charging system; and EN IEC 62275:2019 for cable ties in electrical installations.
(5) On the basis of the request M/511, CEN and Cenelec amended the following standards, the references of which are included in Annex I to Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956(4): EN 60335-1:2012; and EN 60335-2-4:2010. This resulted in adoption of, respectively, the following amending harmonised standards: EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019, EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019 and EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019 for household and similar electrical appliances; and EN 60335-2-4:2010/A2:2019 for spin extractors. CEN and Cenelec also amended the following standards, the references of which are published in the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Unionby Communication (2018/C 326/02): EN 60335-2-5:2015; EN 60335-2-7:2010; EN 60335-2-12:2003; EN 60335-2-13:2010; EN 60335-2-17:2013; EN 60335-2-35:2016; EN 60335-2-47:2003; EN 60335-2-48:2003; EN 60335-2-49:2003; EN 60335-2-52:2003; EN 60335-2-61:2003; EN 60335-2-66:2003; EN 60335-2-84:2003; EN 60335-2-87:2002; EN 60335-2-98:2003; EN 60947-5-4:2003; EN 61347-2-7:2012; EN 61347-2-11:2001; EN 61386-1:2008; and EN 62035:2014. This resulted in adoption of, respectively, the following amending harmonised standards: EN 60335-2-5:2015/A11:2019 for dishwashers; EN 60335-2-7:2010/A2:2019 for washing machines; EN 60335-2-12:2003/A2:201 and EN 60335-2-12:2003/A11:2019, for warming plates and similar appliances; EN 60335-2-13:2010/A1:2019 for deep fat fryers, frying pans and similar appliances; EN 60335-2-17:2013/A11:2019 for blankets, pads, clothing and similar flexible heating appliance; EN 60335-2-35:2016/A1:2019 for instantaneous water heaters; EN 60335-2-47:2003/A2:2019 for commercial electric boiling pans; EN 60335-2-48:2003/A2:2019 for commercial electric grillers and toasters; EN 60335-2-49:2003/A2:2019 for commercial electric appliances for keeping food and crockery warm; EN 60335-2-52:2003/A12:2019 for oral hygiene appliances; EN 60335-2-61:2003/A11:2019 for thermal-storage room heaters; EN 60335-2-66:2003/A11:2019 for water-bed heaters; EN 60335-2-84:2003/A2:2019 for toilets; EN 60335-2-87:2002/A2:2019 for electrical animal-stunning equipment; EN 60335-2-98:2003/A11:2019 for humidifiers; EN 60947-5-4:2003/A1:2019 for control circuit devices and switching elements; EN 61347-2-7:2012/A1:2019 for emergency lighting; EN 61347-2-11:2001/A1:2019 for miscellaneous electronic circuits used with luminaires; EN 61386-1:2008/A1:2019 for cable management; and EN 62035:2014/A1:2019 for discharge lamps.
(6) The Commission, together with CEN and Cenelec, has assessed whether those harmonised standards and amendments thereto comply with the request M/511.
(7) Harmonised standards EN 50620:2017 as amended by EN 50620:2017/A1:2019, EN IEC 60947-9-1:2019, EN 61643-31:2019, EN 60691:2003, EN 60728-11:2010, EN 60934:2001, EN 60974-2:2013, EN 60974-3:2014, EN 60974-5:2013, EN 60974-7:2013, EN 61535:2009, EN 61558-1:2005, EN 61851-1:2011, EN 62275:2015, EN 669-1:2018, EN 60335-1:2012 as amended by EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019, EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019 and EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019, EN 60335-2-4:2010 as amended by EN 60335-2-4:2010/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-5:2015 as amended by EN 60335-2-5:2015/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-7:2010 as amended by EN 60335-2-7:2010/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-12:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-12:2003/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-13:2010 as amended by EN 60335-2-13:2010/A1:2019, EN 60335-2-17:2013 as amended by EN 60335-2-17:2013/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-35:2016 as amended by EN 60335-2-35:2016/A1:2019, EN 60335-2-47:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-47:2003/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-48:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-48:2003/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-49:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-49:2003/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-52:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-52:2003/A12:2019, EN 60335-2-61:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-61:2003/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-66:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-66:2003/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-84:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-47:2003/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-87:2002 as amended by EN 60335-2-87:2002/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-98:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-98:2003/A11:2019, EN 60947-5-4:2003 as amended by EN 60947-5-4:2003/A1:2019, EN 61347-2-7:2012 as amended by EN 61347-2-11:2001, EN 61386-1:2008 as amended by EN 61386-1:2008/A1:2019, and EN 62035:2014 as amended by EN 62035:2014/A1:2019, and as amended or corrected by any other standards references of which are published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union,satisfy the safety objectives which they aim to cover and which are set out in Directive 2014/35/EU. It is therefore appropriate to publish the references of those standards in theOfficial Journal of the European Union,together with references of any relevant amending or correcting standards thereto.
(8) Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956 provides in Annex I the references of harmonised standards conferring a presumption of conformity with Directive 2014/35/EU. In order to ensure that the references of harmonised standards drafted in support of Directive 2014/35/EU are listed in one act, the references of those standards should be included in Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956.
(9) CEN and Cenelec also drafted the following corrigenda which introduce technical corrections to the following existing standards the references of which are published in the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Unionby Communication (2018/C 326/02): EN 60669-1:2018/AC:2018-11 correcting harmonised standard EN 60669-1:2018 for switches for household and similar fixed electrical installations; EN 61439-3:2012/AC:2019-04 correcting harmonised standard EN 61439-3:2012 for distribution boards intended to be operated by ordinary persons (DBO); EN 61557-9:2015/AC:2017-02 correcting harmonised standard EN 61557-9:2015 for equipment for insulation fault location in IT systems; and EN 62026-3:2015/AC:2019-12 correcting harmonised standard EN 62026-3:2015 for controller-device interfaces (CDIs) DeviceNets. In order to ensure correct and consistent application of harmonised standards the references of which have been published, it is appropriate to include the references of those harmonised standards together with the references of the corrigenda in Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956 which provides in its Annex I the references of harmonised standards conferring a presumption of conformity with Directive 2014/35/EU.
(10) It is therefore necessary to withdraw the references of the following harmonised standards, from the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Union,given that they have been revised, amended or corrected, together with the references of any amending or correcting standards thereto published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union: EN 60691:2003, EN 60728-11:2010, EN 60934:2001, EN 60974-2:2013, EN 60974-3:2014, EN 60974-5:2013, EN 60974-7:2013, EN 61535:2009, EN 61558-1:2005, EN 61851-1:2011, EN 62275:2015, EN 669-1:2018, EN 61439-3:2012, EN 61557-9:2015, EN 62026-3:2015, EN 60335-1:2012, EN 60335-2-4:2010, EN 60335-2-5:2015, EN 60335-2-7:2010, EN 60335-2-12:2003, EN 60335-2-13:2010, EN 60335-2-17:2013, EN 60335-2-35:2016, EN 60335-2-47:2003, EN 60335-2-48:2003, EN 60335-2-49:2003, EN 60335-2-52:2003, EN 60335-2-61:2003, EN 60335-2-66:2003, EN 60335-2-84:2003, EN 60335-2-87:2002, EN 60335-2-98:2003, EN 60669-1:2018, EN 60947-5-4:2003, EN 61347-2-7:2012, EN 61347-2-11:2001, EN 61386-1:2008 and EN 62035:2014. Annex II to Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956 lists the references of harmonised standards drafted in support of Directive 2014/35/EU that are withdrawn from the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Union. It is therefore appropriate to include those references in that Annex.
(11) It is also necessary to withdraw the references of harmonised standards EN 60335-1:2012 and EN 60335-2-4:2010 together with the references of any amending or correcting standards thereto published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union, from the L series of theOfficial Journal of the European Union, given that they have been amended. It is therefore appropriate to delete those references from Annex I to Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956.
(12) In order to give manufacturers sufficient time to prepare for application of harmonised standards EN 50620:2017, EN 50620:2017/A1:2019, EN IEC 60947-9-1:2019, EN 61643-31:2019, EN 60691:2003, EN 60728-11:2010, EN 60934:2001, EN 60974-2:2013, EN 60974-3:2014, EN 60974-5:2013, EN 60974-7:2013, EN 61535:2009, EN 61558-1:2005, EN 61851-1:2011, EN 62275:2015, EN 669-1:2018, EN 60335-1:2012 as amended by EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019, EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019 and EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019, EN 60335-2-4:2010 as amended by EN 60335-2-4:2010/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-5:2015 as amended by EN 60335-2-5:2015/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-7:2010 as amended by EN 60335-2-7:2010/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-12:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-12:2003/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-13:2010 as amended by EN 60335-2-13:2010/A1:2019, EN 60335-2-17:2013 as amended by EN 60335-2-17:2013/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-35:2016 as amended by EN 60335-2-35:2016/A1:2019, EN 60335-2-47:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-47:2003/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-48:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-48:2003/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-49:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-49:2003/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-52:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-52:2003/A12:2019, EN 60335-2-61:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-61:2003/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-66:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-66:2003/A11:2019, EN 60335-2-84:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-47:2003/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-87:2002 as amended by EN 60335-2-87:2002/A2:2019, EN 60335-2-98:2003 as amended by EN 60335-2-98:2003/A11:2019, EN 60947-5-4:2003 as amended by EN 60947-5-4:2003/A1:2019, EN 61347-2-7:2012 as amended by EN 61347-2-11:2001, EN 61386-1:2008 as amended by EN 61386-1:2008/A1:2019, EN 62035:2014 as amended by EN 62035:2014/A1:2019, EN 61439-3:2012 as corrected by EN 61439-3:2012/AC:2019-04, EN 61557-9:2015 as corrected by EN 61557-9:2015/AC:2017-02, EN 62026-3:2015 as corrected by EN 62026-3:2015/AC:2019-12, and EN 60669-1:2018 as corrected by EN 60669-1:2018/AC:2018-11, and as amended or corrected by any other standards references of which are published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union,it is necessary to defer the withdrawal of references of harmonised standards EN 60335-1:2012, EN 60335-2-4:2010, EN 60335-2-5:2015, EN 60335-2-7:2010, EN 60335-2-12:2003, EN 60335-2-13:2010, EN 60335-2-17:2013, EN 60335-2-35:2016, EN 60335-2-47:2003, EN 60335-2-48:2003, EN 60335-2-49:2003, EN 60335-2-52:2003, EN 60335-2-61:2003, EN 60335-2-66:2003, EN 60335-2-84:2003, EN 60335-2-87:2002, EN 60335-2-98:2003, EN 60669-1:2018, EN 60947-5-4:2003, EN 61347-2-7:2012, EN 61347-2-11:2001, EN 61386-1:2008 and EN 62035:2014, together with references of any amending or correcting standards thereto published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.
(13) Harmonised standard EN 50178:1997 was revised by CEN and Cenelec. This resulted in adoption of standard EN 62477-1:2012 and its amendment, EN 62477-1:2012/A11:2014. By Commission Communication (2016/C 249/03)(5), the references of standard EN 62477-1:2012 and of its amendment, EN 62477-1:2012/A11:2014, were published in the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Unionand the reference of standard EN 50178:1997 was included in the column of superseded standards without however indicating a transitional date of cessation of presumption of conformity. In that communication the reference of standard EN 50178:1997 also appeared in the column of published standards. Communication (2018/C 326/02) published both, references of standard EN 62477-1:2012 and of its amendment, EN 62477-1:2012/A11:2014, and of standard EN 50178:1997, without indicating that standard EN 50178:1997 was superseded. Given uncertainty as to the withdrawal of the reference of standard EN 50178:1997 from the C series of theOfficial Journal of the European Unionit is necessary to include the reference of EN 50178:1997 in Annex II to Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956 which lists the references of harmonised standards drafted in support of Directive 2014/35/EU that are withdrawn from the C series.
(14) Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956 should therefore be amended accordingly.
(15) Compliance with a harmonised standard confers a presumption of conformity with the corresponding essential requirements, including the safety objectives, set out in Union harmonisation legislation from the date of publication of the reference of such standard in theOfficial Journal of the European Union. This Decision should therefore enter into force on the day of its publication,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Annex I to Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/1956 is amended in accordance with Annex I to this Decision.
Annex II to Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/1956 is amended in accordance with Annex II to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.
Point (1) of Annex I shall apply from 3 February 2022.
ANNEX IAnnex I to Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956 is amended as follows:

(1) | rows 2 and 3 are deleted;
(2) | the following row 2a is inserted:‘2a.EN 60335-1:2012Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 1: General requirementsEN 60335-1:2012/A11:2014EN 60335-1:2012/A13:2017EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019’ | ‘2a. | EN 60335-1:2012Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 1: General requirementsEN 60335-1:2012/A11:2014EN 60335-1:2012/A13:2017EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019’
‘2a. | EN 60335-1:2012Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 1: General requirementsEN 60335-1:2012/A11:2014EN 60335-1:2012/A13:2017EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019’
(3) | the following row 3a is inserted:‘3a.EN 60335-2-4:2010Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-4: Particular requirements for spin extractorsEN 60335-2-4:2010/A1:2015EN 60335-2-4:2010/A11:2018EN 60335-2-4:2010/A2:2019’ | ‘3a. | EN 60335-2-4:2010Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-4: Particular requirements for spin extractorsEN 60335-2-4:2010/A1:2015EN 60335-2-4:2010/A11:2018EN 60335-2-4:2010/A2:2019’
‘3a. | EN 60335-2-4:2010Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-4: Particular requirements for spin extractorsEN 60335-2-4:2010/A1:2015EN 60335-2-4:2010/A11:2018EN 60335-2-4:2010/A2:2019’
(4) | the following rows are added:NoReference of the standard‘28.EN 50620:2017Electric cables – Charging cables for electric vehiclesEN 50620:2017/A1:201929.EN 60335-2-5:2015Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-5: Particular requirements for dishwashersEN 60335-2-5:2015/A11:201930.EN 60335-2-7:2010Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-7: Particular requirements for washing machinesEN 60335-2-7:2010/A1:2013EN 60335-2-7:2010/A11:2013EN 60335-2-7:2010/A2:201931.EN 60335-2-12:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-12: Particular requirements for warming plates and similar appliancesEN 60335-2-12:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-12:2003/A2:2019EN 60335-2-12:2003/A11:201932.EN 60335-2-13:2010Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-13: Particular requirements for deep fat fryers, frying pans and similar appliancesEN 60335-2-13:2010/A11:2012EN 60335-2-13:2010/A1:201933.EN 60335-2-17:2013Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-17: Particular requirements for blankets, pads, clothing and similar flexible heating appliancesEN 60335-2-17:2013/A11:201934.EN 60335-2-35:2016Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-35: Particular requirements for instantaneous water heatersEN 60335-2-35:2016/A1:201935.EN 60335-2-47:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-47: Particular requirements for commercial electric boiling pansEN 60335-2-47:2003/AC:2007EN 60335-2-47:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-47:2003/A11:2012EN 60335-2-47:2003/A2:201936.EN 60335-2-48:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-48: Particular requirements for commercial electric grillers and toastersEN 60335-2-48:2003/AC:2007EN 60335-2-48:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-48:2003/A11:2012EN 60335-2-48:2003/A2:201937.EN 60335-2-49:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-49: Particular requirements for commercial electric appliances for keeping food and crockery warmEN 60335-2-49:2003/AC:2007EN 60335-2-49:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-49:2003/A11:2012EN 60335-2-49:2003/A2:201938.EN 60335-2-52:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-52: Particular requirements for oral hygiene appliancesEN 60335-2-52:2003/A11:2010/AC:2012EN 60335-2-52:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-52:2003/A11:2010EN 60335-2-52:2003/A12:201939.EN 60335-2-61:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-61: Particular requirements for thermal-storage room heatersEN 60335-2-61:2003/A1:2005EN 60335-2-61:2003/A2:2008EN 60335-2-61:2003/A11:201940.EN 60335-2-66:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-66: Particular requirements for water-bed heatersEN 60335-2-66:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-66:2003/A2:2012EN 60335-2-66:2003/A11:201941.EN 60335-2-84:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-84: Particular requirements for toiletsEN 60335-2-84:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-84:2003/A2:201942.EN 60335-2-87:2002Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-87: Particular requirements for electrical animal-stunning equipmentEN 60335-2-87:2002/A1:2007EN 60335-2-87:2002/A2:201943.EN 60335-2-98:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-98: Particular requirements for humidifiersEN 60335-2-98:2003/A1:2005EN 60335-2-98:2003/A2:2008EN 60335-2-98:2003/A11:201944.EN 60669-1:2018Switches for household and similar fixed electrical installations – Part 1: General requirementsEN 60669-1:2018/AC:2018-1145.EN 60691:2016Thermal-links – Requirements and application guideEN 60691:2016/A1:201946.EN 60728-11:2017Cable networks for television signals, sound signals and interactive services – Part 11: SafetyEN 60728-11:2017/A11:201847.EN IEC 60934:2019Circuit breakers for equipment (CBE)48.EN 60947-5-4:2003Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – Part 5-4: Control circuit devices and switching elements – Method of assessing the performance of low-energy contacts – Special testsEN 60947-5-4:2003/A1:201949.EN IEC 60947-9-1:2019Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – Part 9-1: Active arc-fault mitigation systems – Arc quenching devices50.EN IEC 60974-2:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 2: Liquid cooling systems51.EN IEC 60974-3:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 3: Arc striking and stabilizing devices52.EN IEC 60974-5:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 5: Wire feeders53.EN IEC 60974-7:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 7: Torches54.EN 61347-2-7:2012Lamp controlgear – Part 2-7: Particular requirements for battery supplied electronic controlgear for emergency lighting (self-contained)EN 61347-2-7:2012/A1:201955.EN 61347-2-11:2001Lamp controlgear – Part 2-11: Particular requirements for miscellaneous electronic circuits used with luminairesEN 61347-2-11:2001/AC:2002EN 61347-2-11:2001/AC:2010EN 61347-2-11:2001/A1:201956.EN 61386-1:2008Conduit systems for cable management – Part 1: General requirementsEN 61386-1:2008/A1:201957.EN 61439-3:2012Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear assemblies – Part 3: Distribution boards intended to be operated by ordinary persons (DBO)EN 61439-3:2012/AC:2019-0458.EN IEC 61535:2019Installation couplers intended for permanent connection in fixed installations59.EN 61557-9:2015Electrical safety in low voltage distribution systems up to 1 000 V a.c. and 1 500 V d.c. – Equipment for testing, measuring or monitoring of protective measures – Part 9: Equipment for insulation fault location in IT systemsEN 61557-9:2015/AC:2017-0260.EN IEC 61558-1:2019Safety of transformers, reactors, power supply units and combinations thereof – Part 1: General requirements and tests61.EN 61643-31:2019Low-voltage surge protective devices – Part 31: Requirements and test methods for SPDs for photovoltaic installations62.EN IEC 61851-1:2019Electric vehicle conductive charging system – Part 1: General requirements63.EN 62026-3:2015Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – Controller-device interfaces (CDIs) – Part 3: DeviceNetEN 62026-3:2015/AC:2019-1264.EN 62035:2014Discharge lamps (excluding fluorescent lamps) – Safety specificationsEN 62035:2014/A1:201965.EN IEC 62275:2019Cable management systems – Cable ties for electrical installations’ | No | Reference of the standard | ‘28. | EN 50620:2017Electric cables – Charging cables for electric vehiclesEN 50620:2017/A1:2019 | 29. | EN 60335-2-5:2015Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-5: Particular requirements for dishwashersEN 60335-2-5:2015/A11:2019 | 30. | EN 60335-2-7:2010Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-7: Particular requirements for washing machinesEN 60335-2-7:2010/A1:2013EN 60335-2-7:2010/A11:2013EN 60335-2-7:2010/A2:2019 | 31. | EN 60335-2-12:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-12: Particular requirements for warming plates and similar appliancesEN 60335-2-12:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-12:2003/A2:2019EN 60335-2-12:2003/A11:2019 | 32. | EN 60335-2-13:2010Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-13: Particular requirements for deep fat fryers, frying pans and similar appliancesEN 60335-2-13:2010/A11:2012EN 60335-2-13:2010/A1:2019 | 33. | EN 60335-2-17:2013Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-17: Particular requirements for blankets, pads, clothing and similar flexible heating appliancesEN 60335-2-17:2013/A11:2019 | 34. | EN 60335-2-35:2016Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-35: Particular requirements for instantaneous water heatersEN 60335-2-35:2016/A1:2019 | 35. | EN 60335-2-47:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-47: Particular requirements for commercial electric boiling pansEN 60335-2-47:2003/AC:2007EN 60335-2-47:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-47:2003/A11:2012EN 60335-2-47:2003/A2:2019 | 36. | EN 60335-2-48:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-48: Particular requirements for commercial electric grillers and toastersEN 60335-2-48:2003/AC:2007EN 60335-2-48:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-48:2003/A11:2012EN 60335-2-48:2003/A2:2019 | 37. | EN 60335-2-49:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-49: Particular requirements for commercial electric appliances for keeping food and crockery warmEN 60335-2-49:2003/AC:2007EN 60335-2-49:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-49:2003/A11:2012EN 60335-2-49:2003/A2:2019 | 38. | EN 60335-2-52:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-52: Particular requirements for oral hygiene appliancesEN 60335-2-52:2003/A11:2010/AC:2012EN 60335-2-52:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-52:2003/A11:2010EN 60335-2-52:2003/A12:2019 | 39. | EN 60335-2-61:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-61: Particular requirements for thermal-storage room heatersEN 60335-2-61:2003/A1:2005EN 60335-2-61:2003/A2:2008EN 60335-2-61:2003/A11:2019 | 40. | EN 60335-2-66:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-66: Particular requirements for water-bed heatersEN 60335-2-66:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-66:2003/A2:2012EN 60335-2-66:2003/A11:2019 | 41. | EN 60335-2-84:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-84: Particular requirements for toiletsEN 60335-2-84:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-84:2003/A2:2019 | 42. | EN 60335-2-87:2002Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-87: Particular requirements for electrical animal-stunning equipmentEN 60335-2-87:2002/A1:2007EN 60335-2-87:2002/A2:2019 | 43. | EN 60335-2-98:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-98: Particular requirements for humidifiersEN 60335-2-98:2003/A1:2005EN 60335-2-98:2003/A2:2008EN 60335-2-98:2003/A11:2019 | 44. | EN 60669-1:2018Switches for household and similar fixed electrical installations – Part 1: General requirementsEN 60669-1:2018/AC:2018-11 | 45. | EN 60691:2016Thermal-links – Requirements and application guideEN 60691:2016/A1:2019 | 46. | EN 60728-11:2017Cable networks for television signals, sound signals and interactive services – Part 11: SafetyEN 60728-11:2017/A11:2018 | 47. | EN IEC 60934:2019Circuit breakers for equipment (CBE) | 48. | EN 60947-5-4:2003Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – Part 5-4: Control circuit devices and switching elements – Method of assessing the performance of low-energy contacts – Special testsEN 60947-5-4:2003/A1:2019 | 49. | EN IEC 60947-9-1:2019Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – Part 9-1: Active arc-fault mitigation systems – Arc quenching devices | 50. | EN IEC 60974-2:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 2: Liquid cooling systems | 51. | EN IEC 60974-3:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 3: Arc striking and stabilizing devices | 52. | EN IEC 60974-5:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 5: Wire feeders | 53. | EN IEC 60974-7:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 7: Torches | 54. | EN 61347-2-7:2012Lamp controlgear – Part 2-7: Particular requirements for battery supplied electronic controlgear for emergency lighting (self-contained)EN 61347-2-7:2012/A1:2019 | 55. | EN 61347-2-11:2001Lamp controlgear – Part 2-11: Particular requirements for miscellaneous electronic circuits used with luminairesEN 61347-2-11:2001/AC:2002EN 61347-2-11:2001/AC:2010EN 61347-2-11:2001/A1:2019 | 56. | EN 61386-1:2008Conduit systems for cable management – Part 1: General requirementsEN 61386-1:2008/A1:2019 | 57. | EN 61439-3:2012Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear assemblies – Part 3: Distribution boards intended to be operated by ordinary persons (DBO)EN 61439-3:2012/AC:2019-04 | 58. | EN IEC 61535:2019Installation couplers intended for permanent connection in fixed installations | 59. | EN 61557-9:2015Electrical safety in low voltage distribution systems up to 1 000 V a.c. and 1 500 V d.c. – Equipment for testing, measuring or monitoring of protective measures – Part 9: Equipment for insulation fault location in IT systemsEN 61557-9:2015/AC:2017-02 | 60. | EN IEC 61558-1:2019Safety of transformers, reactors, power supply units and combinations thereof – Part 1: General requirements and tests | 61. | EN 61643-31:2019Low-voltage surge protective devices – Part 31: Requirements and test methods for SPDs for photovoltaic installations | 62. | EN IEC 61851-1:2019Electric vehicle conductive charging system – Part 1: General requirements | 63. | EN 62026-3:2015Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – Controller-device interfaces (CDIs) – Part 3: DeviceNetEN 62026-3:2015/AC:2019-12 | 64. | EN 62035:2014Discharge lamps (excluding fluorescent lamps) – Safety specificationsEN 62035:2014/A1:2019 | 65. | EN IEC 62275:2019Cable management systems – Cable ties for electrical installations’
No | Reference of the standard
‘28. | EN 50620:2017Electric cables – Charging cables for electric vehiclesEN 50620:2017/A1:2019
29. | EN 60335-2-5:2015Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-5: Particular requirements for dishwashersEN 60335-2-5:2015/A11:2019
30. | EN 60335-2-7:2010Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-7: Particular requirements for washing machinesEN 60335-2-7:2010/A1:2013EN 60335-2-7:2010/A11:2013EN 60335-2-7:2010/A2:2019
31. | EN 60335-2-12:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-12: Particular requirements for warming plates and similar appliancesEN 60335-2-12:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-12:2003/A2:2019EN 60335-2-12:2003/A11:2019
32. | EN 60335-2-13:2010Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-13: Particular requirements for deep fat fryers, frying pans and similar appliancesEN 60335-2-13:2010/A11:2012EN 60335-2-13:2010/A1:2019
33. | EN 60335-2-17:2013Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-17: Particular requirements for blankets, pads, clothing and similar flexible heating appliancesEN 60335-2-17:2013/A11:2019
34. | EN 60335-2-35:2016Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-35: Particular requirements for instantaneous water heatersEN 60335-2-35:2016/A1:2019
35. | EN 60335-2-47:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-47: Particular requirements for commercial electric boiling pansEN 60335-2-47:2003/AC:2007EN 60335-2-47:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-47:2003/A11:2012EN 60335-2-47:2003/A2:2019
36. | EN 60335-2-48:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-48: Particular requirements for commercial electric grillers and toastersEN 60335-2-48:2003/AC:2007EN 60335-2-48:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-48:2003/A11:2012EN 60335-2-48:2003/A2:2019
37. | EN 60335-2-49:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-49: Particular requirements for commercial electric appliances for keeping food and crockery warmEN 60335-2-49:2003/AC:2007EN 60335-2-49:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-49:2003/A11:2012EN 60335-2-49:2003/A2:2019
38. | EN 60335-2-52:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-52: Particular requirements for oral hygiene appliancesEN 60335-2-52:2003/A11:2010/AC:2012EN 60335-2-52:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-52:2003/A11:2010EN 60335-2-52:2003/A12:2019
39. | EN 60335-2-61:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-61: Particular requirements for thermal-storage room heatersEN 60335-2-61:2003/A1:2005EN 60335-2-61:2003/A2:2008EN 60335-2-61:2003/A11:2019
40. | EN 60335-2-66:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-66: Particular requirements for water-bed heatersEN 60335-2-66:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-66:2003/A2:2012EN 60335-2-66:2003/A11:2019
41. | EN 60335-2-84:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-84: Particular requirements for toiletsEN 60335-2-84:2003/A1:2008EN 60335-2-84:2003/A2:2019
42. | EN 60335-2-87:2002Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-87: Particular requirements for electrical animal-stunning equipmentEN 60335-2-87:2002/A1:2007EN 60335-2-87:2002/A2:2019
43. | EN 60335-2-98:2003Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-98: Particular requirements for humidifiersEN 60335-2-98:2003/A1:2005EN 60335-2-98:2003/A2:2008EN 60335-2-98:2003/A11:2019
44. | EN 60669-1:2018Switches for household and similar fixed electrical installations – Part 1: General requirementsEN 60669-1:2018/AC:2018-11
45. | EN 60691:2016Thermal-links – Requirements and application guideEN 60691:2016/A1:2019
46. | EN 60728-11:2017Cable networks for television signals, sound signals and interactive services – Part 11: SafetyEN 60728-11:2017/A11:2018
47. | EN IEC 60934:2019Circuit breakers for equipment (CBE)
48. | EN 60947-5-4:2003Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – Part 5-4: Control circuit devices and switching elements – Method of assessing the performance of low-energy contacts – Special testsEN 60947-5-4:2003/A1:2019
49. | EN IEC 60947-9-1:2019Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – Part 9-1: Active arc-fault mitigation systems – Arc quenching devices
50. | EN IEC 60974-2:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 2: Liquid cooling systems
51. | EN IEC 60974-3:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 3: Arc striking and stabilizing devices
52. | EN IEC 60974-5:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 5: Wire feeders
53. | EN IEC 60974-7:2019Arc welding equipment – Part 7: Torches
54. | EN 61347-2-7:2012Lamp controlgear – Part 2-7: Particular requirements for battery supplied electronic controlgear for emergency lighting (self-contained)EN 61347-2-7:2012/A1:2019
55. | EN 61347-2-11:2001Lamp controlgear – Part 2-11: Particular requirements for miscellaneous electronic circuits used with luminairesEN 61347-2-11:2001/AC:2002EN 61347-2-11:2001/AC:2010EN 61347-2-11:2001/A1:2019
56. | EN 61386-1:2008Conduit systems for cable management – Part 1: General requirementsEN 61386-1:2008/A1:2019
57. | EN 61439-3:2012Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear assemblies – Part 3: Distribution boards intended to be operated by ordinary persons (DBO)EN 61439-3:2012/AC:2019-04
58. | EN IEC 61535:2019Installation couplers intended for permanent connection in fixed installations
59. | EN 61557-9:2015Electrical safety in low voltage distribution systems up to 1 000 V a.c. and 1 500 V d.c. – Equipment for testing, measuring or monitoring of protective measures – Part 9: Equipment for insulation fault location in IT systemsEN 61557-9:2015/AC:2017-02
60. | EN IEC 61558-1:2019Safety of transformers, reactors, power supply units and combinations thereof – Part 1: General requirements and tests
61. | EN 61643-31:2019Low-voltage surge protective devices – Part 31: Requirements and test methods for SPDs for photovoltaic installations
62. | EN IEC 61851-1:2019Electric vehicle conductive charging system – Part 1: General requirements
63. | EN 62026-3:2015Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – Controller-device interfaces (CDIs) – Part 3: DeviceNetEN 62026-3:2015/AC:2019-12
64. | EN 62035:2014Discharge lamps (excluding fluorescent lamps) – Safety specificationsEN 62035:2014/A1:2019
65. | EN IEC 62275:2019Cable management systems – Cable ties for electrical installations’

ANNEX IIIn Annex II to Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1956, the following rows are added:

No
Reference of the standard
Date of withdrawal
‘29. EN 60335-2-5:2015
Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-5: Particular requirements for dishwashers
3 February 2022 30. EN 60335-2-7:2010
Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-7: Particular requirements for washing machines
EN 60335-2-7:2010/A1:2013
EN 60335-2-7:2010/A11:2013
3 February 2022 31. EN 60335-2-12:2003
Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-12:
Particular requirements for warming plates and similar appliances
EN 60335-2-12:2003/A1:2008
3 February 2022 32. EN 60335-2-13:2010
Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-13: Particular requirements for deep fat fryers, frying pans and similar appliances
EN 60335-2-13:2010/A11:2012
3 February 2022 33. EN 60335-2-17:2013
Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-17: Particular requirements for blankets, pads, clothing and similar flexible heating appliances
3 February 2022 34. EN 60335-2-35:2016
Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-35: Particular requirements for instantaneous water heaters
3 February 2022 35. EN 60335-2-47:2003
Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-47: Particular requirements for commercial electric boiling pans
EN 60335-2-47:2003/AC:2007
EN 60335-2-47:2003/A1:2008
EN 60335-2-47:2003/A11:2012
3 February 2022 36. EN 60335-2-48:2003
Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-48: Particular requirements for commercial electric grillers and toasters
EN 60335-2-48:2003/AC:2007
EN 60335-2-48:2003/A1:2008
EN 60335-2-48:2003/A11:2012
3 February 2022 37. EN 60335-2-49:2003
Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-49: Particular requirements for commercial electric appliances for keeping food and crockery warm
EN 60335-2-49:2003/AC:2007
EN 60335-2-49:2003/A1:2008
EN 60335-2-49:2003/A11:2012
3 February 2022 38. EN 60335-2-52:2003
Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-52: Particular requirements for oral hygiene appliances
EN 60335-2-52:2003/A11:2010/AC:2012
EN 60335-2-52:2003/A1:2008
EN 60335-2-52:2003/A11:2010
3 February 2022 39. EN 60335-2-61:2003
Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-61: Particular requirements for thermal-storage room heaters
EN 60335-2-61:2003/A1:2005
EN 60335-2-61:2003/A2:2008
3 February 2022 40. EN 60335-2-66:2003
Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-66: Particular requirements for water-bed heaters
EN 60335-2-66:2003/A1:2008
EN 60335-2-66:2003/A2:2012
3 February 2022 41. EN 60335-2-84:2003
Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-84: Particular requirements for toilets
EN 60335-2-84:2003/A1:2008
3 February 2022 42. EN 60335-2-87:2002
Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-87: Particular requirements for electrical animal-stunning equipment
EN 60335-2-87:2002/A1:2007
3 February 2022 43. EN 60335-2-98:2003
Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-98: Particular requirements for humidifiers
EN 60335-2-98:2003/A1:2005
EN 60335-2-98:2003/A2:2008
3 February 2022 44. EN 60669-1:2018
Switches for household and similar fixed electrical installations – Part 1: General requirements
3 February 2021 45. EN 60691:2003
Thermal-links – Requirements and application guide
EN 60691:2003/A1:2007
EN 60691:2003/A2:2010
3 February 2022 46. EN 60728-11:2010
Cable networks for television signals, sound signals and interactive services – Part 11: Safety
3 February 2022 47. EN 60934:2001
Circuit-breakers for equipment (CBE)
EN 60934:2001/A1:2007
EN 60934:2001/A2:2013
3 February 2022 48. EN 60947-5-4:2003
Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – Part 5-4: Control circuit devices and switching elements – Method of assessing the performance of low-energy contacts – Special tests
3 February 2022 49. EN 60974-2:2013
Arc welding equipment – Part 2: Liquid cooling systems
3 February 2022 50. EN 60974-3:2014
Arc welding equipment – Part 3: Arc striking and stabilizing devices
3 February 2022 51. EN 60974-5:2013
Arc welding equipment – Part 5: Wire feeders
3 February 2022 52. EN 60974-7:2013
Arc welding equipment – Part 7:Torches
3 February 2022 53. EN 61347-2-7:2012
Lamp controlgear – Part 2-7: Particular requirements for battery supplied electronic controlgear for emergency lighting (self-contained)
3 February 2022 54. EN 61347-2-11:2001
Lamp controlgear – Part 2-11: Particular requirements for miscellaneous electronic circuits used with luminaires
EN 61347-2-11:2001/AC:2002
EN 61347-2-11:2001/AC:2010
3 February 2022 55. EN 61386-1:2008
Conduit systems for cable management – Part 1: General requirements
3 February 2022 56. EN 61439-3:2012
Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear assemblies – Part 3: Distribution boards intended to be operated by ordinary persons (DBO)
3 February 2021 57. EN 61535:2009
Installation couplers intended for permanent connection in fixed installations
EN 61535:2009/A1:2013
3 February 2022 58. EN 61557-9:2015
Electrical safety in low voltage distribution systems up to 1 000 V a.c. and 1 500 V d.c. – Equipment for testing, measuring or monitoring of protective measures – Part 9: Equipment for insulation fault location in IT systems
3 February 2021 59. EN 61558-1:2005
Safety of power transformers, power supplies, reactors and similar products – Part 1: General requirements and tests
EN 61558-1:2005/A1:2009
EN 61558-1:2005/AC:2006
3 February 2022 60. EN 61851-1:2011
Electric vehicle conductive charging system – Part 1: General requirements
3 February 2022 61. EN 62026-3:2015
Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear – Controller-device interfaces (CDIs) – Part 3: DeviceNet
3 February 2021 62. EN 62035:2014
Discharge lamps (excluding fluorescent lamps) – Safety specifications
3 February 2022 63. EN 62275:2015
Cable management systems – Cable ties for electrical installations
3 February 2022 64. EN 50178:1997
Electronic equipment for use in power installations’

Pending: 32020D0979

January 16, 2026
8.7.2020 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 218/1
(1) On 19 November 2018, the Council adopted the EU Strategy against illicit firearms, small arms & light weapons ('SALW') and their ammunition, entitled 'Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens' (the 'EU SALW Strategy'). The purpose of the EU SALW Strategy is to guide integrated, collective and coordinated European action to prevent and curb the illicit acquisition of SALW and their ammunition by terrorists, criminals and other unauthorised actors, and to promote accountability and responsibility with regard to the legal arms trade.
(2) The EU SALW Strategy observes that poor stockpile security is a key factor that allows arms and ammunition to be diverted from the licit to the illicit markets. The Union and its Member States are committed to helping other countries to improve the management and security of state-held stockpiles by strengthening national legislative and administrative frameworks and strengthening institutions that regulate the legitimate supply and stockpile management of SALW and ammunition for defence and security forces.
(3) The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) has developed standards and good practices for the management of small arms and ammunition: the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) and the Modular Small-Arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC), formerly known as the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS). The EU SALW Strategy commits the Union to promoting and implementing standards and good practices.
(4) On 30 June 2018, the third United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the UN Programme of Action against illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons adopted an outcome document in which States renewed their commitment to prevent and combat the diversion of small arms and light weapons. States reaffirmed that they are to redouble national efforts to provide for the safe, secure and effective management of stockpiles of small arms and light weapons held by government armed forces and by government security forces, in particular in conflict and post-conflict situations. States also acknowledged the application of relevant international standards in strengthening the implementation of the UN Programme of Action.
(5) The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development affirms that combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons is necessary for the achievement of many sustainable development goals, including those relating to peace, justice and strong institutions, poverty reduction, economic growth, health, gender equality and safe cities. Therefore, in Sustainable Development Goal 16.4, all States have committed to significantly reducing illicit financial and arms flows.
(6) In the Agenda for Disarmament 'Securing our Common Future'(1), which was presented on 24 May 2018, the UN Secretary-General called for addressing the excessive accumulation of conventional arms and the illicit trade in conventional arms and called for the support of country-level approaches on small arms. The Union has decided to support the Agenda's Action 22: 'Secure excessive and poorly maintained stockpiles'.
(7) The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) contributes to the development, review and promotion of the International Mine Action Standards, and, through its Ammunition Management Advisory Team (AMAT), to the development, review and dissemination of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG). AMAT is part of GICHD. AMAT was created as a result of a joint initiative between the GICHD and UNODA in response to the urgent need for support to States in the safe, secure and effective management of ammunition, in accordance with the IATG.
(8) On 4 December 2017, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 72/55 on problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus. That resolution supports initiatives at the international, regional and national levels that shed light on improving the sustainable management of ammunition, including through the implementation of the IATG.
(9) The Union and its Member States are top donors for small arms control assistance and capacity development in general, and for physical security and stockpile management in particular. While various international standards and guidelines for stockpile management exist, there is no standardised and internationally recognised methodology for carrying out independent assessments and validation of compliance according to these standards. Consequently, the impact of the Union's assistance for arms stockpile security is difficult to measure.
(10) An internationally recognised methodology for the independent validation of compliance with international arms management standards will make the impact of the Union's assistance to third countries in relation to arms stockpile management measureable; it will also support the risk assessment in the context of arms export control and the provision of military assistance.
(11) The Union should therefore support a project for establishing the feasibility of the development of a voluntary internationally recognised system for the validation of arms and ammunition management on the basis of open international standards,
— During Phase I, in the first year of the implementation, a feasibility study for the development of an internationally recognised Arms and Ammunition Management Validation System ('AAMVS') shall be undertaken to investigate options for appropriate methodologies and tools for the assessment of risk and quality;
— Subject to paragraph 2, during Phase II, based on the outcome of the feasibility study of Phase I, a concept for the creation of an AAMVS shall be developed.
(a) undertake a feasibility study on options to develop an Ammunition Management Validation System, through the development of appropriate risk and quality assessment methodology and tools;
(b) based on the results of objective (a), develop a concept and a way forward to obtaining an internationally recognised Ammunition Management Validation System, with a view to preventing diversion and accidental explosions in arms and ammunition stockpiles.
1. Development of Project Plan (Year 1, Month 1): consultations with the core project team to finalise project planning/timelines, responsibilities, and scope and methodology of the feasibility study.
2. Establishment of the EWG (Year 1, Month 1): identifying relevant experts (maximum of 10 individuals) and inviting them to join the EWG. The EWG will be made up of practitioners (with expertise in arms management, conducting national assessments on weapons and ammunition management, accreditation and certification, arms control, SALW and ammunition manufacture). It will provide ongoing support and expert review of the feasibility study and the subsequent development of the validation methodology. The project team will take the necessary steps to ensure that gender and diversity considerations are taken into account in the makeup of the EWG.
3. Inception Workshop (Year 1, Month 2): organising a one-day workshop in Geneva to bring together 20 key stakeholders (including the core project team, EU/EEAS designates, the EWG, and representatives of partners) to present the scope and methodology of the feasibility study and kick off the project. The workshop will be designed and implemented taking gender and diversity into account.
1. Desk Study (Year 1, Month 2 to 5): collate and review relevant literature, instruments, guidelines, procedures and open standards pertaining to the management of arms and ammunition stockpile and provide an overview of relevant international validation and certification mechanisms.
2. Key Stakeholder Interviews (Year 1, Month 2 to 5): develop a methodology for key stakeholder interviews (KSI) and use this methodology to interview relevant policy practitioners to understand the need for the development of an AAMVS and the appetite for doing so. KSIs will be conducted via telecommunication and in person in Vienna, Brussels, and New York, as well as on the sidelines of relevant meetings/conferences (e.g. MSAG Symposium, UN PoA Meetings of States, UN General Assembly, ATT Conference of State Parties, and various regional meetings). KSIs will be identified taking gender and diversity into account.
3. Preliminary Report (Year 1, Month 4 to 5): based on the desk study and KSIs, draft a report explaining the need for the creation of an AAMVS. The report will provide a clear indication of whether to continue with the feasibility study, and if so, it will outline the scope of the study.
— Is the system technically and operationally feasible?
— Is the system legally feasible?
— Is the system economically/commercially feasible?
— Is the system politically feasible?
— Is the system feasible in terms of military security?
— Is the system feasible in terms of safety and security to the community?
— Is the system feasible within a reasonable period of time?
1. Expert Workshops (Year 1, Month 5 to 11): three workshops will be held, bringing together the up-to ten members of the Expert Working Group (EWG) to discuss and develop the feasibility study. The first two workshops will be held virtually, while the third workshop will be a two-day event in Geneva. The first workshop will be devoted to reviewing the findings of the preliminary report and defining the outline of the feasibility study. The second workshop will be devoted to exploring the technical and operational aspects of setting up an AAMVS. The first day of the third workshop will focus on the legal and economic aspects of such as system, as well as the timeline for the system, while the second day of the third workshop will take stock of the feasibility study as a whole. The workshops will be designed and implemented taking gender and diversity into account.
2. Expert Workshop Reports (Year 1, Month 5 to 11): following each workshop, a workshop report will be drafted and shared with the participants of the EWG and EEAS. The reports will summarise the main discussion, highlighting points of convergence and divergence.
3. Feasibility Report (Year 1, Month 11 to 12): a report outlining the options for developing an AAMVS, through the development of appropriate methodologies and tools for assessing risk and quality.
— Phase II Project Plan (Year 2, Month 1): consultations with the core project team to finalise Phase II planning/timelines, responsibilities, cooperation, the scope of technical assistance (i.e. regional workshops and pilot assessment/validation visits to test methodology).
— Phase II Planning workshop (Year 2, Month 2): the organisation of a one-day workshop in Geneva to bring together 20 key stakeholders (including the core project team, representatives of international standard bodies, representatives of certification bodies, EU/EEAS designates, the EWG, and representatives of partners) to agree upon the scope and content of the AAMVS.
— Expert Methodology Development Workshops (Year 2, Months 3 to 8): three workshops bringing together the Expert Working Group (EWG) and experts in certification and accreditation of international standards to discuss and draft a development plan for the creation of an AAMVS. Two of the workshops will be held virtually, while the third workshop will be a one-day event held in Geneva.
— Validation workshop (Year 2, Month 9): a one-day Validation workshop in Geneva, bringing together 20 participants and providing an opportunity for the project team, the EWG, and experts in certification and accreditation of international standards to present the development plan for an AAMVS. This workshop would not only serve to raise awareness of the benefits and modalities of an AAMVS but also provide an opportunity for identifying concrete steps to be taken to ensure the development and implementation of the AAMVS. The workshop will be designed and implemented with due consideration of gender and diversity.
— Finalisation of the development plan for an AAMVS and identification of next steps (Year 2, Month 10-12): amending the plan based on feedback from validation workshop and publication of the development plan.
— The Council will be regularly briefed about the progress of the implementation of the project.
— Internal Monitoring: based on the results-based management system applied within AMAT and supported by core project staff.
— External Evaluation: in collaboration with the Council, the recruitment of an external evaluation team (i.e. independent consultants not working for the GICHD or the Union at the time of project implementation) which will undertake a mid-term review and final assessment of the project.The mid-term review and final assessment will be held in Brussels, back-to-back with the yearly meetings if possible (see 4.4). The mid-term review will be a two-day workshop, bringing together EEAS, representatives from Union Member States and partners. The final assessment event will be a two-day meeting, attended by EEAS, representatives from Union Member States, as well as representatives from partners.
— The project will include a financial audit in accordance with the Union requirements.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 19 November 2018, the Council adopted the EU Strategy against illicit firearms, small arms & light weapons (‘SALW’) and their ammunition, entitled ‘Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens’ (the ‘EU SALW Strategy’). The purpose of the EU SALW Strategy is to guide integrated, collective and coordinated European action to prevent and curb the illicit acquisition of SALW and their ammunition by terrorists, criminals and other unauthorised actors, and to promote accountability and responsibility with regard to the legal arms trade.
(2) The EU SALW Strategy observes that poor stockpile security is a key factor that allows arms and ammunition to be diverted from the licit to the illicit markets. The Union and its Member States are committed to helping other countries to improve the management and security of state-held stockpiles by strengthening national legislative and administrative frameworks and strengthening institutions that regulate the legitimate supply and stockpile management of SALW and ammunition for defence and security forces.
(3) The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) has developed standards and good practices for the management of small arms and ammunition: the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) and the Modular Small-Arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC), formerly known as the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS). The EU SALW Strategy commits the Union to promoting and implementing standards and good practices.
(4) On 30 June 2018, the third United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the UN Programme of Action against illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons adopted an outcome document in which States renewed their commitment to prevent and combat the diversion of small arms and light weapons. States reaffirmed that they are to redouble national efforts to provide for the safe, secure and effective management of stockpiles of small arms and light weapons held by government armed forces and by government security forces, in particular in conflict and post-conflict situations. States also acknowledged the application of relevant international standards in strengthening the implementation of the UN Programme of Action.
(5) The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development affirms that combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons is necessary for the achievement of many sustainable development goals, including those relating to peace, justice and strong institutions, poverty reduction, economic growth, health, gender equality and safe cities. Therefore, in Sustainable Development Goal 16.4, all States have committed to significantly reducing illicit financial and arms flows.
(6) In the Agenda for Disarmament ‘Securing our Common Future'(1), which was presented on 24 May 2018, the UN Secretary-General called for addressing the excessive accumulation of conventional arms and the illicit trade in conventional arms and called for the support of country-level approaches on small arms. The Union has decided to support the Agenda’s Action 22: ‘Secure excessive and poorly maintained stockpiles’.
(7) The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) contributes to the development, review and promotion of the International Mine Action Standards, and, through its Ammunition Management Advisory Team (AMAT), to the development, review and dissemination of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG). AMAT is part of GICHD. AMAT was created as a result of a joint initiative between the GICHD and UNODA in response to the urgent need for support to States in the safe, secure and effective management of ammunition, in accordance with the IATG.
(8) On 4 December 2017, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 72/55 on problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus. That resolution supports initiatives at the international, regional and national levels that shed light on improving the sustainable management of ammunition, including through the implementation of the IATG.
(9) The Union and its Member States are top donors for small arms control assistance and capacity development in general, and for physical security and stockpile management in particular. While various international standards and guidelines for stockpile management exist, there is no standardised and internationally recognised methodology for carrying out independent assessments and validation of compliance according to these standards. Consequently, the impact of the Union’s assistance for arms stockpile security is difficult to measure.
(10) An internationally recognised methodology for the independent validation of compliance with international arms management standards will make the impact of the Union’s assistance to third countries in relation to arms stockpile management measureable; it will also support the risk assessment in the context of arms export control and the provision of military assistance.
(11) The Union should therefore support a project for establishing the feasibility of the development of a voluntary internationally recognised system for the validation of arms and ammunition management on the basis of open international standards,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
1. With a view to the implementation of the EU Strategy against Illicit Firearms, Small Arms & Light Weapons and their Ammunition entitled ‘Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens’ (‘the EU SALW Strategy’) and the promotion of peace and security, the Union shall support a project to study the feasibility of establishing an internationally recognised validation system for the validation of policies and practices for the safe and secure management of SALW and ammunition.
The project shall consist of two phases, ‘Phase I’ and ‘Phase II’.
—
During Phase I, in the first year of the implementation, a feasibility study for the development of an internationally recognised Arms and Ammunition Management Validation System (‘AAMVS’) shall be undertaken to investigate options for appropriate methodologies and tools for the assessment of risk and quality;
—
Subject to paragraph 2, during Phase II, based on the outcome of the feasibility study of Phase I, a concept for the creation of an AAMVS shall be developed.
A description of the project is set out in the Annex.
2. The Council shall decide on the basis of the outcome of the feasibility study that results from Phase I of the project whether Phase II of the project is to be implemented.

Article 2
1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (‘the High Representative’) shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.
2. The technical implementation of the project referred to in Article 1 shall be carried out by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (‘GICHD’) and its specialised agency, the Ammunition Management Advisory Team (‘AMAT’).
3. The GICHD shall perform its tasks under the responsibility of the High Representative. For that purpose, the High Representative shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the GICHD.

Article 3
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the project financed by the Union referred to in Article 1 shall be EUR 1 642 109.
2. The amount intended to cover Phase I of the project shall be EUR 821 872. The remaining amount of EUR 820 237 shall be used if the Council decides to implement Phase II of the project.
3. The expenditure financed by the reference amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.
4. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure referred to in paragraph 1. For that purpose, it shall conclude the necessary financing agreement with the GICHD. The financing agreement shall stipulate that the GICHD has to ensure the visibility of the Union’s contribution, appropriate to its size.
5. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement referred to in paragraph 4 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.

Article 4
1. The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular half-year narrative reports prepared by the GICHD. Those reports shall form the basis of the evaluation to be carried out by the Council.
2. The Commission shall report to the Council on the financial aspects of the project referred to in Article 1.

Article 5
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
This Decision shall expire 14 months after the date of the conclusion of the financing agreement referred to in Article 3(4), unless the Council decides to extend the Decision in order to allow for the implementation of Phase II of the project, or, if no agreement has been concluded within that period, six months after the date of its entry into force.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 19 November 2018, the Council adopted the EU Strategy against illicit firearms, small arms & light weapons (‘SALW’) and their ammunition, entitled ‘Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens’ (the ‘EU SALW Strategy’). The purpose of the EU SALW Strategy is to guide integrated, collective and coordinated European action to prevent and curb the illicit acquisition of SALW and their ammunition by terrorists, criminals and other unauthorised actors, and to promote accountability and responsibility with regard to the legal arms trade.
(2) The EU SALW Strategy observes that poor stockpile security is a key factor that allows arms and ammunition to be diverted from the licit to the illicit markets. The Union and its Member States are committed to helping other countries to improve the management and security of state-held stockpiles by strengthening national legislative and administrative frameworks and strengthening institutions that regulate the legitimate supply and stockpile management of SALW and ammunition for defence and security forces.
(3) The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) has developed standards and good practices for the management of small arms and ammunition: the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) and the Modular Small-Arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC), formerly known as the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS). The EU SALW Strategy commits the Union to promoting and implementing standards and good practices.
(4) On 30 June 2018, the third United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the UN Programme of Action against illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons adopted an outcome document in which States renewed their commitment to prevent and combat the diversion of small arms and light weapons. States reaffirmed that they are to redouble national efforts to provide for the safe, secure and effective management of stockpiles of small arms and light weapons held by government armed forces and by government security forces, in particular in conflict and post-conflict situations. States also acknowledged the application of relevant international standards in strengthening the implementation of the UN Programme of Action.
(5) The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development affirms that combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons is necessary for the achievement of many sustainable development goals, including those relating to peace, justice and strong institutions, poverty reduction, economic growth, health, gender equality and safe cities. Therefore, in Sustainable Development Goal 16.4, all States have committed to significantly reducing illicit financial and arms flows.
(6) In the Agenda for Disarmament ‘Securing our Common Future'(1), which was presented on 24 May 2018, the UN Secretary-General called for addressing the excessive accumulation of conventional arms and the illicit trade in conventional arms and called for the support of country-level approaches on small arms. The Union has decided to support the Agenda’s Action 22: ‘Secure excessive and poorly maintained stockpiles’.
(7) The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) contributes to the development, review and promotion of the International Mine Action Standards, and, through its Ammunition Management Advisory Team (AMAT), to the development, review and dissemination of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG). AMAT is part of GICHD. AMAT was created as a result of a joint initiative between the GICHD and UNODA in response to the urgent need for support to States in the safe, secure and effective management of ammunition, in accordance with the IATG.
(8) On 4 December 2017, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 72/55 on problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus. That resolution supports initiatives at the international, regional and national levels that shed light on improving the sustainable management of ammunition, including through the implementation of the IATG.
(9) The Union and its Member States are top donors for small arms control assistance and capacity development in general, and for physical security and stockpile management in particular. While various international standards and guidelines for stockpile management exist, there is no standardised and internationally recognised methodology for carrying out independent assessments and validation of compliance according to these standards. Consequently, the impact of the Union’s assistance for arms stockpile security is difficult to measure.
(10) An internationally recognised methodology for the independent validation of compliance with international arms management standards will make the impact of the Union’s assistance to third countries in relation to arms stockpile management measureable; it will also support the risk assessment in the context of arms export control and the provision of military assistance.
(11) The Union should therefore support a project for establishing the feasibility of the development of a voluntary internationally recognised system for the validation of arms and ammunition management on the basis of open international standards,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
1. With a view to the implementation of the EU Strategy against Illicit Firearms, Small Arms & Light Weapons and their Ammunition entitled ‘Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens’ (‘the EU SALW Strategy’) and the promotion of peace and security, the Union shall support a project to study the feasibility of establishing an internationally recognised validation system for the validation of policies and practices for the safe and secure management of SALW and ammunition.
The project shall consist of two phases, ‘Phase I’ and ‘Phase II’.
—
During Phase I, in the first year of the implementation, a feasibility study for the development of an internationally recognised Arms and Ammunition Management Validation System (‘AAMVS’) shall be undertaken to investigate options for appropriate methodologies and tools for the assessment of risk and quality;
—
Subject to paragraph 2, during Phase II, based on the outcome of the feasibility study of Phase I, a concept for the creation of an AAMVS shall be developed.
A description of the project is set out in the Annex.
2. The Council shall decide on the basis of the outcome of the feasibility study that results from Phase I of the project whether Phase II of the project is to be implemented.
1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (‘the High Representative’) shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.
2. The technical implementation of the project referred to in Article 1 shall be carried out by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (‘GICHD’) and its specialised agency, the Ammunition Management Advisory Team (‘AMAT’).
3. The GICHD shall perform its tasks under the responsibility of the High Representative. For that purpose, the High Representative shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the GICHD.
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the project financed by the Union referred to in Article 1 shall be EUR 1 642 109.
2. The amount intended to cover Phase I of the project shall be EUR 821 872. The remaining amount of EUR 820 237 shall be used if the Council decides to implement Phase II of the project.
3. The expenditure financed by the reference amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.
4. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure referred to in paragraph 1. For that purpose, it shall conclude the necessary financing agreement with the GICHD. The financing agreement shall stipulate that the GICHD has to ensure the visibility of the Union’s contribution, appropriate to its size.
5. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement referred to in paragraph 4 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.
1. The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular half-year narrative reports prepared by the GICHD. Those reports shall form the basis of the evaluation to be carried out by the Council.
2. The Commission shall report to the Council on the financial aspects of the project referred to in Article 1.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
This Decision shall expire 14 months after the date of the conclusion of the financing agreement referred to in Article 3(4), unless the Council decides to extend the Decision in order to allow for the implementation of Phase II of the project, or, if no agreement has been concluded within that period, six months after the date of its entry into force.

1.   Rationale for CFSP support

ANNEXPROJECT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED SYSTEM FOR THE VALIDATION OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT ON THE BASIS OF OPEN INTERNATIONAL STANDARDSThis project aims to enhanced security and safety of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition stockpiles through the development of an internationally recognised system that would allow independent validation/certification of compliance by States with open international standards, on a voluntary basis, displaying their ability to address and prevent diversion and accidental explosions.
The diversion and illicit proliferation of SALW and ammunition fuels crime, terrorism, armed violence and instability, undermining sustainable development, good governance, law and order, as well as access to education, healthcare, justice and other civil rights. In addition, illicit SALW can be used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence. The diversion and illicit proliferation of SALW and ammunition has the potential to undermine peace and security, destabilising States and societies and eventually entire regions. In so doing, it undermines progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), especially SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions), but also SDG 5 (gender equality) and 11 (sustainable cities and communities).
The safe, secure and sustainable management of national SALW and ammunition stockpiles is instrumental in curbing illicit proliferation. Ineffective stockpile management is a key factor allowing arms and ammunition to be diverted from licit to illicit markets. Stockpile management is especially precarious in states affected by violent conflict or weak institutions and governance structures. In such contexts, fostering safe, secure and sustainable stockpile management promotes the accountability and responsibility of national authorities for preventing the diversion of SALW and ammunition, which, in turn, contributes to enhancing stability, development and good governance.
The Union and its Member States have been assisting third countries to improve the management and security of national stockpiles by strengthening national legislative and administrative frameworks and institutions that regulate the legitimate supply of SALW and ammunition for defence and security forces and the management of such stockpiles. But the impact of this assistance is difficult to measure. There is currently no international mechanism for allowing third countries to demonstrate their compliance with regulatory requirements and with technical and management standards. This can be problematic for States which have invested in improving their SALW and ammunition management policies and practices but which fail to encourage confidence and trust from international partners because of past track records on diversion and on poor stockpile management and security.
While various international standards, guidelines and best practices for stockpile management and security exist, there is no standardised and internationally recognised methodology for carrying out independent assessments and validation of compliance with these standards. In many sectors – industrial as well as governmental – in order to showcase quality, safety and security of products and services and compliance with international norms, some form of guarantee involving certification or validation is required. The issuance of certificates governed by the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) is a well-known example. The same method can be applied to the safe and secure management of SALW and ammunition stockpiles.
A certification or validation system would allow a State which has invested in stockpile management and security to voluntarily demonstrate that its system for managing SALW and ammunition (i.e. policies and practices) complies with internationally recognised standards. The voluntary certification of national policies and practices would indicate that the risks of accidental explosion and diversion have been addressed and mitigated because implementation of open international standards will have been independently verified. In addition, the guarantee would instil confidence in local communities, as well as among regional and international partners, in the State’s ability to effectively govern and manage its stockpiles, without the State having to disclose information pertaining to the nature and size of its SALW and ammunition stockpile. Certification could also be used to inform diversion risk assessments carried out by arms supplying States within the context of arms export control (such as those outlined under Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) Article 11 and criterion 7 of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP(1)).
Furthermore, regarding cooperation and assistance in the field of SALW and ammunition control, validation and certification can provide guidance in programming decisions and inform impact assessment of past assistance activities.
This project is also relevant in the context of the ongoing work of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) that is examining problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus in response to the adoption of UNGA resolution 72/55 of December 2017.
2. IntroductionThis project will study the feasibility of establishing an internationally recognised validation/certification system for SALW and ammunition management policies and practices. The risk of diversion of SALW and ammunitions to unauthorised actors is present all along the supply chain: from manufacture to transfer (export, transit and import), through stockpiling (storage and utilisation), to disposal (transfer and destruction). Ammunition stockpiles also pose a risk of accidental explosion, particularly in storage but potentially also at other points of the stockpile supply chain. Addressing these challenges is a State responsibility and requires a comprehensive life-cycle approach in line with national and international norms and measures, including, but not limited to, the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG), the Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC), best practices issued by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Allied Ammunition Storage and Transport Publication (NATO-AASTP).
The primary aim of this project is to support the establishment of safe, secure and sustainable policies and practices regarding the management of SALW and ammunition in countries with track records of diversion and accidental explosions. Specifically, the project will generate and analyse options for the internationally recognised validation/certification of policies and practices for the safe and secure management of SALW and ammunition across the supply chain. The project will support the development of a system that would allow States to voluntarily demonstrate through an independent assessment that these issues have been addressed and that their arms management practices and policies are in accordance with open international standards.
This project supports the implementation of the EU Strategy against illicit firearms, small arms & light weapons, and their ammunition (‘EU SALW Strategy’). It aims to strengthen the capacity of beneficiary States in the implementation of the UN PoA, the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), the ATT, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (in particular Goals 16 (target 16.4), 5 and 11), and the UN Secretary General’s Agenda for Disarmament (2018, Action 22: Disarmament that saves lives). Implementing the project will increase transparency and accountability in the governance and management of conventional arms and ammunition in accordance with international good practice, including the IATG, the MOSAIC, OSCE guidelines and the NATO-AASTP. The project will also take into account the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs’ findings and efforts regarding gender sensitive weapons and ammunition management.
3. Project Goal and Main ObjectivesThe overall goal of this project is the globally enhanced security and safety of stockpiles of SALW and ammunition through the development of an internationally recognised system that would allow independent validation/certification of compliance with open international standards on the management of national small arms and ammunition stockpiles.
The desired outcome of the project is intended to serve third countries (non-EU Member States) that have been experiencing challenges with regard to the safe and secure management of arms and ammunition that have led to arms diversion and unintended explosions.
For the sake of the readability this proposal will refer to internationally recognised systems for the validation of arms and ammunition management according to open international standards as Arms and Ammunition Management Validation Systems or AAMVS.
To achieve this goal, the project has the following main objectives:

(a) | undertake a feasibility study on options to develop an Ammunition Management Validation System, through the development of appropriate risk and quality assessment methodology and tools;
(b) | based on the results of objective (a), develop a concept and a way forward to obtaining an internationally recognised Ammunition Management Validation System, with a view to preventing diversion and accidental explosions in arms and ammunition stockpiles.4. Project DescriptionGiven the uncertainties regarding international travel in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and the desire to reduce air travel in light of climate change, where possible and feasible, the implementer will look at meeting-options that do not require travelling (by air).
Phase I: Assessing the feasibility of an internationally recognised Arms and Ammunition Management Validation System (AAMVS)
4.1. Project ConsolidationObjective: the development of the overall project implementation plan in collaboration with the EEAS and partners, the development of the scope of the feasibility study, including methodology and the identification of key stakeholder interviews (KSI), the establishment of the expert working group (EWG) to support and review the feasibility study and to raise awareness of the project.
Activities: specific activities carried out under this output and implemented during the first two months of the project include:

1. | Development of Project Plan (Year 1, Month 1): consultations with the core project team to finalise project planning/timelines, responsibilities, and scope and methodology of the feasibility study.
2. | Establishment of the EWG (Year 1, Month 1): identifying relevant experts (maximum of 10 individuals) and inviting them to join the EWG. The EWG will be made up of practitioners (with expertise in arms management, conducting national assessments on weapons and ammunition management, accreditation and certification, arms control, SALW and ammunition manufacture). It will provide ongoing support and expert review of the feasibility study and the subsequent development of the validation methodology. The project team will take the necessary steps to ensure that gender and diversity considerations are taken into account in the makeup of the EWG.
3. | Inception Workshop (Year 1, Month 2): organising a one-day workshop in Geneva to bring together 20 key stakeholders (including the core project team, EU/EEAS designates, the EWG, and representatives of partners) to present the scope and methodology of the feasibility study and kick off the project. The workshop will be designed and implemented taking gender and diversity into account.Results: the production of a project plan, agreement on project scope, the establishment of the EWG, increased awareness of the project, production of inception workshop summary report.
4.2. Preliminary AnalysisObjective: conduct a preliminary analysis to obtain a more developed understanding of the need for developing an AAMVS. This will be the first milestone of the project. If there is no insurmountable opposition during this assessment, the project will proceed with the full feasibility study.
Activities: specific activities implemented during the first five months of the project include:

1. | Desk Study (Year 1, Month 2 to 5): collate and review relevant literature, instruments, guidelines, procedures and open standards pertaining to the management of arms and ammunition stockpile and provide an overview of relevant international validation and certification mechanisms.
2. | Key Stakeholder Interviews (Year 1, Month 2 to 5): develop a methodology for key stakeholder interviews (KSI) and use this methodology to interview relevant policy practitioners to understand the need for the development of an AAMVS and the appetite for doing so. KSIs will be conducted via telecommunication and in person in Vienna, Brussels, and New York, as well as on the sidelines of relevant meetings/conferences (e.g. MSAG Symposium, UN PoA Meetings of States, UN General Assembly, ATT Conference of State Parties, and various regional meetings). KSIs will be identified taking gender and diversity into account.
3. | Preliminary Report (Year 1, Month 4 to 5): based on the desk study and KSIs, draft a report explaining the need for the creation of an AAMVS. The report will provide a clear indication of whether to continue with the feasibility study, and if so, it will outline the scope of the study.Results: desk study, KSI methodology and analysis, background paper on developing an AAMVS.
4.3. Feasibility StudyObjective: assess the feasibility and options for developing an AAMVS through the development of appropriate methodologies and tools for risk and quality assessment The feasibility study will be guided by the following seven questions that relate to the establishment of an AAMVS:

— | Is the system technically and operationally feasible?
— | Is the system legally feasible?
— | Is the system economically/commercially feasible?
— | Is the system politically feasible?
— | Is the system feasible in terms of military security?
— | Is the system feasible in terms of safety and security to the community?
— | Is the system feasible within a reasonable period of time?Activities: specific activities to be carried out under this output and implemented during the first twelve months of the project include:

1. | Expert Workshops (Year 1, Month 5 to 11): three workshops will be held, bringing together the up-to ten members of the Expert Working Group (EWG) to discuss and develop the feasibility study. The first two workshops will be held virtually, while the third workshop will be a two-day event in Geneva. The first workshop will be devoted to reviewing the findings of the preliminary report and defining the outline of the feasibility study. The second workshop will be devoted to exploring the technical and operational aspects of setting up an AAMVS. The first day of the third workshop will focus on the legal and economic aspects of such as system, as well as the timeline for the system, while the second day of the third workshop will take stock of the feasibility study as a whole. The workshops will be designed and implemented taking gender and diversity into account.
2. | Expert Workshop Reports (Year 1, Month 5 to 11): following each workshop, a workshop report will be drafted and shared with the participants of the EWG and EEAS. The reports will summarise the main discussion, highlighting points of convergence and divergence.
3. | Feasibility Report (Year 1, Month 11 to 12): a report outlining the options for developing an AAMVS, through the development of appropriate methodologies and tools for assessing risk and quality.Results: expert workshops and reports, and feasibility report outlining options for an international validation/certification system for arms and ammunition stockpile management.
4.4. Yearly meetings on arms and ammunition stockpile validation/certificationObjective: raise awareness of the project, present on the progress of the project, and share experiences among the Union States and partners regarding existing international validation/certification methodologies and systems.
Activities: up to two one-day meetings (held at the end of the first and second years of the project, respectively). The meetings will be held in Brussels and will be dedicated to bringing together stakeholders, including Union Member States, representatives of EEAS and the Commission, and relevant partners to raise awareness of the project and present the feasibility study (end of Phase I), and risk and quality assessment methodology and tools (end of Phase II).
The first annual meeting will be the second milestone of the project.
Results: exchanges of information between stakeholders regarding measures for preventing and addressing diversion; meeting report.
The Council will consider the feasibility study resulting from Phase I and will decide whether to continue the project and implement Phase II. The project will expire after 14 months, unless the Council takes a decision to extend it to allow the implementation of Phase II. Setting the expiration at 14 months, instead of 12 months, gives the Council sufficient time to consider the outcome of the feasibility study.
Phase II: Developing a plan for the creation of an Arms and Ammunition Management Validation System (AAMVS)
4.5. Development of validation/certification methodology, tools, and resourcesObjective: most of Phase II will be devoted to development of a concept and development plan for establishing an AAMVS.
Note 1: The implementation of Phase II will depend on a the Council taking a new Decision to extend the project based on the outcome of the feasibility study (Phase I).
Activities: specific activities carried out under this output and implemented during year two of the project include:

— | Phase II Project Plan (Year 2, Month 1): consultations with the core project team to finalise Phase II planning/timelines, responsibilities, cooperation, the scope of technical assistance (i.e. regional workshops and pilot assessment/validation visits to test methodology).
— | Phase II Planning workshop (Year 2, Month 2): the organisation of a one-day workshop in Geneva to bring together 20 key stakeholders (including the core project team, representatives of international standard bodies, representatives of certification bodies, EU/EEAS designates, the EWG, and representatives of partners) to agree upon the scope and content of the AAMVS.
— | Expert Methodology Development Workshops (Year 2, Months 3 to 8): three workshops bringing together the Expert Working Group (EWG) and experts in certification and accreditation of international standards to discuss and draft a development plan for the creation of an AAMVS. Two of the workshops will be held virtually, while the third workshop will be a one-day event held in Geneva.
— | Validation workshop (Year 2, Month 9): a one-day Validation workshop in Geneva, bringing together 20 participants and providing an opportunity for the project team, the EWG, and experts in certification and accreditation of international standards to present the development plan for an AAMVS. This workshop would not only serve to raise awareness of the benefits and modalities of an AAMVS but also provide an opportunity for identifying concrete steps to be taken to ensure the development and implementation of the AAMVS. The workshop will be designed and implemented with due consideration of gender and diversity.
— | Finalisation of the development plan for an AAMVS and identification of next steps (Year 2, Month 10-12): amending the plan based on feedback from validation workshop and publication of the development plan.Results: establishing a plan for the development of an AAMVS.
5. Project Monitoring and EvaluationObjective: provide a mid-term and final assessment of the activities of the project to ensure the project has met its objectives and that project expenditures are in line with the agreed budget.
Activities: the project will include both internal monitoring and external evaluation.

— | The Council will be regularly briefed about the progress of the implementation of the project.
— | Internal Monitoring: based on the results-based management system applied within AMAT and supported by core project staff.
— | External Evaluation: in collaboration with the Council, the recruitment of an external evaluation team (i.e. independent consultants not working for the GICHD or the Union at the time of project implementation) which will undertake a mid-term review and final assessment of the project.The mid-term review and final assessment will be held in Brussels, back-to-back with the yearly meetings if possible (see 4.4). The mid-term review will be a two-day workshop, bringing together EEAS, representatives from Union Member States and partners. The final assessment event will be a two-day meeting, attended by EEAS, representatives from Union Member States, as well as representatives from partners.
— | The project will include a financial audit in accordance with the Union requirements.Results: assessment report of the project impacts; financial audit.
6. Implementing agencies and partnershipsThe GICHD, through AMAT, is the lead implementing agency for the project. Specifically, AMAT will spearhead the feasibility study (Phase I) and work with relevant partners to develop the concept for an assessment methodology and tools (Phase II).
Proposals for additional partners, whose involvement would be of a structural nature for the implementation of the project, will be submitted to CONOP for agreement. That said, potential partners include the Small Arms Survey (SAS), Conflict Armament Research (CAR) and Golden West Humanitarian Foundation (GWHF). Under AMAT’s leadership, SAS and CAR will provide the project with their institutions’ considerable knowledge and expertise on all aspects of diversion, supply chain management, and export controls (the ATT and the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP). GWHF will commit to supporting AMAT’s in-house resources with technical assistance in the development and implementation of the assessment/validation criteria.
To ensure the project outputs are of the highest quality, operational partnerships will be sought with organisations that specialise in assessing risks, capabilities and analyses that relate to ammunition and arms management, including representatives from military organisations, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group (MSAG), and organisations that specialise in the development of certification of management standards and associated accreditation. AMAT will also connect with ongoing Union-funded SALW control projects and Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) projects, such as SEESAC, iTrace and PSSM Sahel, with a view to exchanging experiences and lessons learned.
7. Duration and possible next stepsThe project duration is intended to be 24 months. The initial Council Decision, will expire after 14 months, and thus the project will expire after 14 months unless the Council decides to extend the project. The activities of Phase I of the project should be completed in the first year of the implementation. The Council will be invited to decide on its extension before the expiration of the initial Decision.
8. EU-visibilityThe GICHD/AMAT will be required to take all appropriate measures to publicise that this project has been funded by the Union, in line with the Communications and Visibility Requirements for EU External Actions – 2018 published by the European Commission. The Union’s support will also be acknowledged in invitations and other documents that are shared with the participants of the various events. The GICHD/AMAT will ensure that the Union will be represented in events, where possible, that are supported under this Decision.

(1) Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (OJ L 335, 13.12.2008, p. 99).

Pending: 32020D0732

January 16, 2026
3.6.2020 EN Official Journal of the European Union LI 172/5
(1) On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (the ‘EU Strategy’), Chapter III of which contains a list of measures to combat such proliferation.
(2) The Union is actively implementing the EU Strategy and is giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, in particular those measures related to reinforcement, implementation and universalisation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).
(3) The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General’s Mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons (the ‘SGM’) refers to the authority given to the UN Secretary-General by UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/42/37C. This authority to conduct an investigation in response to reports that may be brought to the attention of the UN Secretary-General by any UN Member State, in order to establish the facts related to an allegation of use of such weapons, was reaffirmed by UN Security Council Resolution 620 (1988).
(4) On 27 February 2006, the Council adopted Joint Action 2006/184/CFSP(1)in support of the BTWC, in the framework of the EU Strategy.
(5) On 20 March 2006, the Council adopted the EU Action Plan on biological and toxin weapons(2), complementary to Joint Action 2006/184/CFSP in support of the BTWC. That Action Plan provides for an efficient use of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and the SGM.
(6) On 10 November 2008, the Council adopted Joint Action 2008/858/CFSP(3)in support of the BTWC, in the framework of the EU Strategy.
(7) On 18 July 2011, the Council adopted Decision 2011/429/CFSP(4)relating to the position of the Union for the Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the BTWC, including support to the SGM.
(8) On 23 July 2012, the Council adopted Decision 2012/421/CFSP(5)in support of the BTWC, in the framework of the EU Strategy.
(9) On 18 January 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/51(6)in support of the BTWC, in the framework of the EU Strategy, including support to the SGM.
(10) In his Agenda for Disarmament ‘Securing our Common Future’, presented on 24 May 2018, the UN Secretary-General noted that the BTWC does not have a single standing body with responsibility to carry out investigations with the aim of determining whether or not biological weapons have been used in violation of the BTWC. Therefore, the Agenda for Disarmament establishes actions that aim to contribute to developing a framework that ensures a coordinated international response to the use of biological weapons and to establish a core standing coordinating capacity to conduct independent investigations of the alleged use of biological weapons.
(11) On 21 January 2019, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2019/97(7)in support of the BTWC in the framework of the EU Strategy.
(12) Through the Joint Actions and Decisions in support of the BTWC, the Union has contributed to the building-up of a multilateral capacity to investigate alleged use of biological weapons. This Decision provides support to the SGM,
(a) making best use of the experience gained through Decisions 2012/421/CFSP and (CFSP) 2016/51;
(b) bearing in mind the lessons learned from the most recent SGM investigation, which took place in 2013 in Syria, with the aim of continuing the implementation of those lessons;
(c) actively encouraging the nomination of experts and laboratories from the Global South to the SGM roster;
(d) actively encouraging the nomination of female experts to the SGM roster;
(e) building strategic partnerships with relevant institutions;
(f) supporting the efforts of interested UN Member States to ensure the full operational readiness of the SGM;
(g) contributing to the implementation of the UN Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament ‘Securing our Common Future’.
(a) support for training of experts on the SGM roster;
(b) capacity-building of laboratories from developing countries;
(c) outreach activities to ensure the nomination to the SGM roster of experts and laboratories from the Global South;
(d) support for a full field exercise (Capstone Exercise);
(e) support for regular coordination activities or workshops or both with relevant organisational partners.
(a) Making best use of the experience gained through Decisions 2012/421/CFSP and (CFSP) 2016/51.
(b) Bearing in mind the lessons learned from the 2013 SGM investigation in Syria.
(c) Actively encouraging the nomination of experts and laboratories from the Global South to the SGM roster, sourced through networks and strategic stakeholders in the Global South.
(d) Building strategic partnerships with relevant institutions.
(e) Seeking a broader range of expertise in the SGM roster and actively encouraging the nomination of female experts to that roster.
(f) Supporting the efforts of interested UN Member States to ensure the full operational readiness of the SGM.
(g) Contributing to the implementation of the UN Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament.
(a) enhancement of the operational readiness of the SGM;
(b) further development of the network of designated laboratories;
(c) enhancement of experts’ skills needed in the context of the SGM missions; and
(d) diversification of expertise in the SGM roster.
(a) harmonisation of national, regional and international biological weapons investigation architecture;
(b) enhanced knowledge and capacity of investigation into alleged use of biological and chemical weapons at a national level; and
(c) awareness-raising with UN Member States and relevant stakeholders.
(a) An additional cadre of new experts is trained, with a view to securing sufficient ‘reach-back’ (reserve/support) capacity.
(b) Experts already engaged in SGM activities continue to receive advanced training.
(c) Training courses are held regularly in the period covered by this Decision.
(a) Enhanced participation of representatives of laboratories from developing countries in events aimed at developing a network of SGM-designated laboratories.
(b) Greater engagement of laboratories from developing countries in SGM training.
(a) Regional outreach workshops held in Africa and in Central and South America.
(b) Enhanced nomination of experts and laboratories from those regions to the SGM roster.
(c) Increased number of experts from those regions participate in SGM skills training courses.
(a) Preparation for the Capstone Exercise is conducted in a timely and comprehensive manner.
(b) Planning missions for the Capstone Exercise are conducted, and all necessary preparations for the exercise completed or discussed with the host country and organisers.
(c) Support is provided for the participation of experts in the Capstone Exercise.
(d) Facilitation and consultation undertaken by the UNODA to ensure that general and specialised equipment necessary for the conduct of the Capstone Exercise is made available by UN Member States and others in advance of the Capstone Exercise.
(a) A series of workshops with relevant international partners are held.
(b) New detailed arrangements for cooperation with such international partners are developed and adopted, such as guidelines, recommended operating procedures, agreements and memoranda of understanding.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (the ‘EU Strategy’), Chapter III of which contains a list of measures to combat such proliferation.
(2) The Union is actively implementing the EU Strategy and is giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, in particular those measures related to reinforcement, implementation and universalisation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).
(3) The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General’s Mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons (the ‘SGM’) refers to the authority given to the UN Secretary-General by UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/42/37C. This authority to conduct an investigation in response to reports that may be brought to the attention of the UN Secretary-General by any UN Member State, in order to establish the facts related to an allegation of use of such weapons, was reaffirmed by UN Security Council Resolution 620 (1988).
(4) On 27 February 2006, the Council adopted Joint Action 2006/184/CFSP(1)in support of the BTWC, in the framework of the EU Strategy.
(5) On 20 March 2006, the Council adopted the EU Action Plan on biological and toxin weapons(2), complementary to Joint Action 2006/184/CFSP in support of the BTWC. That Action Plan provides for an efficient use of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and the SGM.
(6) On 10 November 2008, the Council adopted Joint Action 2008/858/CFSP(3)in support of the BTWC, in the framework of the EU Strategy.
(7) On 18 July 2011, the Council adopted Decision 2011/429/CFSP(4)relating to the position of the Union for the Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the BTWC, including support to the SGM.
(8) On 23 July 2012, the Council adopted Decision 2012/421/CFSP(5)in support of the BTWC, in the framework of the EU Strategy.
(9) On 18 January 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/51(6)in support of the BTWC, in the framework of the EU Strategy, including support to the SGM.
(10) In his Agenda for Disarmament ‘Securing our Common Future’, presented on 24 May 2018, the UN Secretary-General noted that the BTWC does not have a single standing body with responsibility to carry out investigations with the aim of determining whether or not biological weapons have been used in violation of the BTWC. Therefore, the Agenda for Disarmament establishes actions that aim to contribute to developing a framework that ensures a coordinated international response to the use of biological weapons and to establish a core standing coordinating capacity to conduct independent investigations of the alleged use of biological weapons.
(11) On 21 January 2019, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2019/97(7)in support of the BTWC in the framework of the EU Strategy.
(12) Through the Joint Actions and Decisions in support of the BTWC, the Union has contributed to the building-up of a multilateral capacity to investigate alleged use of biological weapons. This Decision provides support to the SGM,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
1. For the purpose of giving immediate and practical application to some elements of the EU Strategy and of building on the successful implementation of Joint Actions 2006/184/CFSP and 2008/858/CFSP and Decision 2012/421/CFSP, this Decision serves as an operational policy tool for providing essential follow-up and momentum to the activities undertaken throughout the period 2016 to 2019 in the framework of Decisions (CFSP) 2016/51 and (CFSP) 2019/97 in support of the BTWC.
2. This Decision is guided by the following principles:
(a)
making best use of the experience gained through Decisions 2012/421/CFSP and (CFSP) 2016/51;
(b)
bearing in mind the lessons learned from the most recent SGM investigation, which took place in 2013 in Syria, with the aim of continuing the implementation of those lessons;
(c)
actively encouraging the nomination of experts and laboratories from the Global South to the SGM roster;
(d)
actively encouraging the nomination of female experts to the SGM roster;
(e)
building strategic partnerships with relevant institutions;
(f)
supporting the efforts of interested UN Member States to ensure the full operational readiness of the SGM;
(g)
contributing to the implementation of the UN Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament ‘Securing our Common Future’.
3. The Union shall support the following projects corresponding to measures of the EU Strategy:
(a)
support for training of experts on the SGM roster;
(b)
capacity-building of laboratories from developing countries;
(c)
outreach activities to ensure the nomination to the SGM roster of experts and laboratories from the Global South;
(d)
support for a full field exercise (Capstone Exercise);
(e)
support for regular coordination activities or workshops or both with relevant organisational partners.
4. A detailed description of those projects is set out in the Annex.

Article 2
1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.
2. The technical implementation of the activities referred to in Article 1 shall be entrusted to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). It shall perform this task under the responsibility of the HR. For that purpose, the HR shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the UNODA.

Article 3
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(3) shall be EUR 1 418 042.
2. The expenditure financed by the amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.
3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure referred to in paragraph 2. For that purpose, it shall conclude a financing agreement with the UNODA. The financing agreement shall stipulate that the UNODA is to ensure visibility of the Union contribution appropriate to its size.
4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.

Article 4
The HR shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of a final financial and narrative report containing, inter alia, lessons learnt, as well as brief reports prepared by the UNODA on each of the projects referred to in Article 1(3). Those reports shall form the basis for the evaluation carried out by the Council. The Council shall also be briefed every six months on information provided by the UNODA regarding progress in implementation of those projects. The Commission shall provide information on the financial aspects of those projects.

Article 5
1. This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
2. This Decision shall expire 36 months after the date of conclusion of the financing agreement referred to in Article 3(3) or six months after the date of adoption of this Decision if no financing agreement has been concluded within that period.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (the ‘EU Strategy’), Chapter III of which contains a list of measures to combat such proliferation.
(2) The Union is actively implementing the EU Strategy and is giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, in particular those measures related to reinforcement, implementation and universalisation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).
(3) The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General’s Mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons (the ‘SGM’) refers to the authority given to the UN Secretary-General by UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/42/37C. This authority to conduct an investigation in response to reports that may be brought to the attention of the UN Secretary-General by any UN Member State, in order to establish the facts related to an allegation of use of such weapons, was reaffirmed by UN Security Council Resolution 620 (1988).
(4) On 27 February 2006, the Council adopted Joint Action 2006/184/CFSP(1)in support of the BTWC, in the framework of the EU Strategy.
(5) On 20 March 2006, the Council adopted the EU Action Plan on biological and toxin weapons(2), complementary to Joint Action 2006/184/CFSP in support of the BTWC. That Action Plan provides for an efficient use of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and the SGM.
(6) On 10 November 2008, the Council adopted Joint Action 2008/858/CFSP(3)in support of the BTWC, in the framework of the EU Strategy.
(7) On 18 July 2011, the Council adopted Decision 2011/429/CFSP(4)relating to the position of the Union for the Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the BTWC, including support to the SGM.
(8) On 23 July 2012, the Council adopted Decision 2012/421/CFSP(5)in support of the BTWC, in the framework of the EU Strategy.
(9) On 18 January 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/51(6)in support of the BTWC, in the framework of the EU Strategy, including support to the SGM.
(10) In his Agenda for Disarmament ‘Securing our Common Future’, presented on 24 May 2018, the UN Secretary-General noted that the BTWC does not have a single standing body with responsibility to carry out investigations with the aim of determining whether or not biological weapons have been used in violation of the BTWC. Therefore, the Agenda for Disarmament establishes actions that aim to contribute to developing a framework that ensures a coordinated international response to the use of biological weapons and to establish a core standing coordinating capacity to conduct independent investigations of the alleged use of biological weapons.
(11) On 21 January 2019, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2019/97(7)in support of the BTWC in the framework of the EU Strategy.
(12) Through the Joint Actions and Decisions in support of the BTWC, the Union has contributed to the building-up of a multilateral capacity to investigate alleged use of biological weapons. This Decision provides support to the SGM,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
1. For the purpose of giving immediate and practical application to some elements of the EU Strategy and of building on the successful implementation of Joint Actions 2006/184/CFSP and 2008/858/CFSP and Decision 2012/421/CFSP, this Decision serves as an operational policy tool for providing essential follow-up and momentum to the activities undertaken throughout the period 2016 to 2019 in the framework of Decisions (CFSP) 2016/51 and (CFSP) 2019/97 in support of the BTWC.
2. This Decision is guided by the following principles:
(a)
making best use of the experience gained through Decisions 2012/421/CFSP and (CFSP) 2016/51;
(b)
bearing in mind the lessons learned from the most recent SGM investigation, which took place in 2013 in Syria, with the aim of continuing the implementation of those lessons;
(c)
actively encouraging the nomination of experts and laboratories from the Global South to the SGM roster;
(d)
actively encouraging the nomination of female experts to the SGM roster;
(e)
building strategic partnerships with relevant institutions;
(f)
supporting the efforts of interested UN Member States to ensure the full operational readiness of the SGM;
(g)
contributing to the implementation of the UN Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament ‘Securing our Common Future’.
3. The Union shall support the following projects corresponding to measures of the EU Strategy:
(a)
support for training of experts on the SGM roster;
(b)
capacity-building of laboratories from developing countries;
(c)
outreach activities to ensure the nomination to the SGM roster of experts and laboratories from the Global South;
(d)
support for a full field exercise (Capstone Exercise);
(e)
support for regular coordination activities or workshops or both with relevant organisational partners.
4. A detailed description of those projects is set out in the Annex.
1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.
2. The technical implementation of the activities referred to in Article 1 shall be entrusted to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). It shall perform this task under the responsibility of the HR. For that purpose, the HR shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the UNODA.
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(3) shall be EUR 1 418 042.
2. The expenditure financed by the amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.
3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure referred to in paragraph 2. For that purpose, it shall conclude a financing agreement with the UNODA. The financing agreement shall stipulate that the UNODA is to ensure visibility of the Union contribution appropriate to its size.
4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.
The HR shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of a final financial and narrative report containing, inter alia, lessons learnt, as well as brief reports prepared by the UNODA on each of the projects referred to in Article 1(3). Those reports shall form the basis for the evaluation carried out by the Council. The Council shall also be briefed every six months on information provided by the UNODA regarding progress in implementation of those projects. The Commission shall provide information on the financial aspects of those projects.
1. This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
2. This Decision shall expire 36 months after the date of conclusion of the financing agreement referred to in Article 3(3) or six months after the date of adoption of this Decision if no financing agreement has been concluded within that period.

1.   BACKGROUND

ANNEXThe United Nations (UN) Secretary-General’s Mechanism for investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons (the ‘SGM’) was established in 1987 by the UN General Assembly by its Resolution A/RES/42/37C. This authority was reaffirmed by the UN Security Council by its Resolution 620 (1988). The technical guidelines and procedures for the timely and efficient investigation into reports of the alleged use of such weapons were developed by experts provided by interested UN Member States, and set out in UN General Assembly Document A/44/561 in 1989. Those guidelines and procedures were endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 1990 by its Resolution A/RES/45/57C.
Without a verification mechanism for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, such as exists for the Chemical Weapons Convention, the SGM stands as the only independent international tool for investigating an allegation of the use of biological weapons, with the endorsement of both the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council.
2. OBJECTIVESThe SGM, by promptly investigating the alleged use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons, and establishing facts related to the allegations, could serve to uphold global norms against the use of such weapons, to help deter the use of such weapons by UN Member States, individuals or organisations, and ultimately to preserve international peace and security.
Activities in support of enhancing the level of preparedness of the SGM for the investigation of the alleged use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons are consistent with the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Decision (CFSP) 2016/51, and in particular its Project 5 ‘Support to the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism’, sought to support the strengthening of the SGM through expanding the number of suitably trained experts on the SGM’s roster of experts and laboratories (the ‘SGM roster’), by convening a meeting of SGM stakeholders and by organising a number of cross-organisational training events. Project 5 of Decision (CFSP) 2016/51 provided basic and specialised skills training for rostered experts through a new systematic training concept, a network of designated analytical laboratories and capacity-building activities for such laboratories, and also outreach activities to promote geographical diversity of experts and laboratories.
There is a need to continue these activities in order to further strengthen international capacity and capability to promptly investigate any violations of the global prohibition on the use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons, with a particular focus on biological weapons. Promoting geographic diversity and gender balance of experts would contribute to enhancing the credibility and legitimacy of the SGM. Further developing the capacity and capability of experts and designated laboratories could also have positive secondary effects on biological research and on public health research and development, especially in developing countries. In addition, implementation of such activities will serve as an example of concrete support to the UN Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament ‘Securing our Common Future’, and in particular Action 10 of that Agenda entitled ‘readiness to investigate alleged use of biological weapons’.
Principles

(a) | Making best use of the experience gained through Decisions 2012/421/CFSP and (CFSP) 2016/51.
(b) | Bearing in mind the lessons learned from the 2013 SGM investigation in Syria.
(c) | Actively encouraging the nomination of experts and laboratories from the Global South to the SGM roster, sourced through networks and strategic stakeholders in the Global South.
(d) | Building strategic partnerships with relevant institutions.
(e) | Seeking a broader range of expertise in the SGM roster and actively encouraging the nomination of female experts to that roster.
(f) | Supporting the efforts of interested UN Member States to ensure the full operational readiness of the SGM.
(g) | Contributing to the implementation of the UN Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament.Expected outcomes
The implementation of this project is expected to produce the following overall outcomes:

(a) | enhancement of the operational readiness of the SGM;
(b) | further development of the network of designated laboratories;
(c) | enhancement of experts’ skills needed in the context of the SGM missions; and
(d) | diversification of expertise in the SGM roster.In addition, the implementation of this project would have the following secondary outcomes:

(a) | harmonisation of national, regional and international biological weapons investigation architecture;
(b) | enhanced knowledge and capacity of investigation into alleged use of biological and chemical weapons at a national level; and
(c) | awareness-raising with UN Member States and relevant stakeholders.3. PROJECTS3.1. Project 1: Support for training of experts on the SGM roster3.1.1. Project purposeTo enhance, update and harmonise the skill-sets of qualified experts, and to provide further training to expert consultants in order to ensure that capability and capacity for field exercises and investigations will be readily available.
3.1.2. Expected results of the project
(a) | An additional cadre of new experts is trained, with a view to securing sufficient ‘reach-back’ (reserve/support) capacity.
(b) | Experts already engaged in SGM activities continue to receive advanced training.
(c) | Training courses are held regularly in the period covered by this Decision.3.1.3. Project descriptionThis project will follow up and expand on the activities and achievements reached under Project 5 of Decision (CFSP) 2016/51 to increase the number of qualified experts and expert consultants on the SGM roster who have been trained in the core skills required for the successful conduct of an SGM investigation, as part of a UN team, and under possibly adverse field conditions.
The project would allow the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) to expand the number of trained qualified experts and expert consultants, in order to ensure sufficient ‘reach-back’ capacity during a field exercise or actual investigation. Core competencies for training include evidence-gathering and handling, report-writing, operational security, field communications, negotiations and media-handling.
Timing and location of these training courses will be heavily dependent on the UN Member States that offer such training courses. The guidelines and procedures for SGM investigations, submitted to and endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 1989, state that ‘any interested Member State may designate to the Secretary-General relevant specialized training or courses available to qualified experts in support of their possible role on his behalf in carrying out investigations of possible use of CBT agents’.
3.1.4. Responsibilities of the implementing agencySubstantive preparation:
In consultation with UN Member States hosting the training event and relevant partners, the UNODA will develop the training programme and select the participating experts.
Logistics and administrative services:
The UNODA will partner with the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) for the logistical arrangements (such as travel arrangements for participants and experts) for the training activities.
3.2. Project 2: Capacity-building of laboratories from developing countries3.2.1. Project purposeTo support participation of representatives from nominated laboratories in training activities aimed at developing a network capable of supporting an SGM investigation into an alleged use of biological weapons.
3.2.2. Expected results of the project
(a) | Enhanced participation of representatives of laboratories from developing countries in events aimed at developing a network of SGM-designated laboratories.
(b) | Greater engagement of laboratories from developing countries in SGM training.3.2.3. Project descriptionIn order to ensure that the SGM is seen as having both integrity and full impartiality, the full participation of nominated laboratories from the Global South, and their engagement in these activities in support of the SGM, is critical. It is therefore essential to facilitate greater engagement and participation of rostered laboratories from these countries in this process, including their participation at dedicated workshops for laboratories organised by UN Member States, as well as their participation as observers in training activities for qualified experts on the SGM roster, in order to ensure that the laboratories and experts are aware of the need to harmonise activities which are transparently in support of a properly-conducted investigation.
3.2.4. Responsibilities of the implementing agencySubstantive preparation:
In consultation with relevant laboratories and UN Member States hosting the event to develop the laboratory network, the UNODA will identify laboratories in developing countries whose participation in that event is to be supported.
Logistics and administrative services:
The UNODA will partner with the UNOPS for the logistical arrangements (such as travel arrangements for participants).
3.3. Project 3: Outreach activities3.3.1. Project purposeTo enhance the nomination of experts and laboratories from the Global South to the SGM roster.
3.3.2. Expected results of the project
(a) | Regional outreach workshops held in Africa and in Central and South America.
(b) | Enhanced nomination of experts and laboratories from those regions to the SGM roster.
(c) | Increased number of experts from those regions participate in SGM skills training courses.3.3.3. Project descriptionWhile the roster of experts and laboratories nominated by UN Member States is diverse, there remains an under-representation of UN Member States from Africa and from Central and South America(1).
The integrity and perceived impartiality of the SGM will be bolstered by ensuring a diverse pool of experts and laboratories from which the UNODA can select for training activities and from which the UN Secretary-General can choose during an actual investigation.
In support of this, regional workshops in each of these two regions will be held, with the aim of engaging directly with the relevant expertise in national capitals in order to explain the SGM, its importance in a coordinated international response to an allegation of the use of biological weapons, and the role and importance of a diverse group of experts in the event an SGM investigation is triggered. Data on nominations from countries in these regions will be compiled following the annual ‘note verbale’ from the UNODA to all UN Member States, in order to ascertain whether there has been any measurable impact on nominations. The exact scope and number of participating UN Member States and of participants in the workshops will be decided mainly through consultations between the UNODA and the countries who offer to host the workshops, taking into account factors such as location of the workshop, budget and relevant capacity in the countries. The Council shall be informed by the UNODA on the process of selecting host countries, and the UNODA will seek guidance and endorsement from the Council in this regard.
3.3.4. Responsibilities of the implementing agencySubstantive preparation:
In consultation with UN Member States hosting the workshops, the UNODA will develop the agenda and programme, and select the participants.
Logistics and administrative services:
The UNODA will partner with the UNOPS for the logistical arrangements for the workshops, such as travel arrangements for participants.
3.4. Project 4: Support for the Capstone Exercise3.4.1. Project purposeTo ensure adequate preparation for, and successful execution of, a full field exercise (known as the ‘Capstone Exercise’) planned to be held in Germany in September 2020.
3.4.2. Expected results of the project
(a) | Preparation for the Capstone Exercise is conducted in a timely and comprehensive manner.
(b) | Planning missions for the Capstone Exercise are conducted, and all necessary preparations for the exercise completed or discussed with the host country and organisers.
(c) | Support is provided for the participation of experts in the Capstone Exercise.
(d) | Facilitation and consultation undertaken by the UNODA to ensure that general and specialised equipment necessary for the conduct of the Capstone Exercise is made available by UN Member States and others in advance of the Capstone Exercise.3.4.3. Project descriptionA Capstone Exercise, or a culminating training activity, is designed to provide the trained experts with a chance to practise the full scope of their scientific expertise and acquired core skills in a realistic field-based event in preparation for an actual deployment. Such an exercise is currently planned for the second half of 2020 by the governments of Germany and Sweden.
In order to ensure the success and value of such an activity, a number of training courses need to be completed prior to the Capstone Exercise, to ensure that experts participating in the Capstone Exercise are fully trained and prepared. These training courses are provided for in Project 1 above. Participation of experts and officials from relevant international organisations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and Interpol, will be supported under this project.
In addition, appropriate equipment, such as personal protective gear, disinfectant, investigative equipment, communication devices, other necessary detection and identification equipment, calibration devices and materials, and photographic and recording devices will need to be acquired and provided by UN Member States and others to the participating experts in advance of the Capstone Exercise.
Lessons learned from the Capstone Exercise will be an important part of informing and improving future SGM training activities, and will identify gaps and challenges in the current SGM operational set-up. In addition to ‘hotwash’ and debriefing for participating experts at the end of the Capstone Exercise, a separate dedicated ‘lessons-learned’ event may take place with funding from other sources.
All of the relevant activities will be carried out in close coordination and cooperation between the UNODA and the governments of Germany and Sweden.
3.4.4. Responsibilities of the implementing agencySubstantive preparation:
The UNODA will consult with the governments of Germany and Sweden and with other relevant UN Member States and partners as regards the substantive preparation for the Capstone Exercise, including the development of its objective, scenario, programme and evaluation mechanism.
Logistics and administrative services:
The UNODA will partner with the UNOPS for the logistical arrangements for the Capstone Exercise, including travel arrangements for participants and experts as well as the acquisition and transport of equipment.
3.5. Project 5: Support for regular coordination activities or workshops with relevant organisational partners3.5.1. Project purposeTo identify and engage organisational partners for cooperation on the SGM.
3.5.2. Expected results of the project
(a) | A series of workshops with relevant international partners are held.
(b) | New detailed arrangements for cooperation with such international partners are developed and adopted, such as guidelines, recommended operating procedures, agreements and memoranda of understanding.3.5.3. Project descriptionIn order to maximise the support of the UN system to the SGM, and in view of the limited resources of the UNODA, it is essential to build strong partnerships with relevant international organisations. Examples of successful arrangements for the provision of expertise and support to both training and potential investigations include the UNODA’s partnerships with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the OIE and the WHO, Interpol, and CBRN Centres of Excellence.
There would be potential to expand this network of partnerships to include other international organisations that may have similar needs in terms of training, expert development and equipment.
Therefore, the UNODA seeks to identify relevant organisational partners, engage with them with due sensitivity to individual mandates, and hold a series of workshops to identify these commonalities and areas for cooperation with a view to securing commitments related to shared training events, equipment and expertise.
3.5.4. Responsibilities of the implementing agencySubstantive preparation:
The UNODA will undertake the substantive preparation for the workshop, including development of the agenda and programme, and the selection of participants.
Logistics and administrative services:
The UNODA will partner with the UNOPS for the logistical arrangements, including travel arrangements for participants and experts.
4. REPORTING AND ASSESSMENTThe UNODA will brief the Council every six months on the progress of the implementation of the project.
At the conclusion of the project, the UNODA will submit to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and to the European Commission (‘Commission’) a final financial and narrative report containing brief reports on each project.
5. DURATIONThe total estimated duration of the implementation of the project is 32 months, from May 2020 to December 2022.
6. BENEFICIARIESThe beneficiaries of Project 1 will be experts on the SGM roster, as well as national health authorities and the institutions to which the relevant experts are affiliated.
The beneficiaries of Project 2 will be designated laboratories participating in the activities, in particular those in developing countries.
The beneficiaries of Project 3 will be countries in the geographic regions that are currently under-represented on the SGM roster. The SGM itself will also be able to enhance its perceived legitimacy by widening its geographical base from which to draw experts and laboratories for training activities and missions.
The beneficiaries of Project 4 will be the UN Member States and partners organising the Capstone Exercise, as well as the experts who participate in the exercise.
The beneficiaries of Project 5 will be the UNODA, relevant departments and agencies in the UN system, and international and regional partners.
7. IMPLEMENTING AGENCY – STAFFING ISSUESThe UNODA will be entrusted with the implementation of this project. The implementation of this project will be in accordance with the financing agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the UNODA. The UNODA will partner with the UNOPS, who will provide logistical and administrative support to this project. The role of the UNOPS would be limited to logistical and administrative support only.
Given the extra-budgetary character of the activities envisaged for the UNODA in the implementation of this project, additional staff will be required. The staff will be responsible for successful implementation of the project, and will organise and deliver activities identified in its projects. In particular, the staff is expected to contribute with substantive experience and expert knowledge to the design and delivery of training activities and to liaise with relevant partners such as international and regional organisations and laboratories. The staff will have to be at a senior level (at P-5 level in the UN system) in view of the complexity of the project and, in relation to the training activities, the high level of experience and knowledge needed in diverse areas, including field deployment, investigations, design and delivery of training activities, and biology and biological weapons.
In addition, the UNOPS will be engaged for the administrative and logistical support in implementing the projects and in particular in the organisation of training courses and workshops, mainly through the booking and issuing of tickets and disbursement of per diem amounts to participants. Utilising the expertise of the UNOPS as an experienced resource for project implementation and administrative support services would be a better option than hiring administrative support staff, as this often generates an expectation of continued employment with the UNODA after the end of the project and the risk that such administrative support staff will be used for non-project related assignments by virtue of being co-located in the office. Using the UNOPS as an implementing agency in this project would also allow the UNODA to further engage the UNOPS in SGM activities, including in the case of actual deployment of the SGM mission in response to a request by UN Member States. The extensive network for procurement, supplies and transportation that the UNOPS possesses could be highly advantageous in cases where the need swiftly to procure and transport equipment would be crucial to the success of a mission.
8. EU VISIBILITYThe UNODA shall take all appropriate measures to publicise the fact that this project has been funded by the Union. The Union’s support will also be acknowledged in invitations and other documents that are shared with the participants of the various events. The UNODA will ensure that, where possible, the Union is represented at events that are supported under this Decision.

(1) Only six African Member States have nominated experts and two States have nominated laboratories. Only five Central/South American States have nominated experts and only one has nominated a laboratory.

Pending: 32020D0489

January 16, 2026
3.4.2020 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 105/3
(1) It is crucial to intensify Union engagement in the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo(*1)and Union engagement in the Western Balkans.
(2) A European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and other Western Balkan regional issues should be appointed for a period of 12 months.
(3) The EUSR will implement the mandate in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union’s external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty,
(a) first and foremost, achieving comprehensive normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, which is key to their respective European paths;
(b) improving good neighbourly relations and also promoting reconciliation;
(c) enhancing Union visibility and effectiveness through public diplomacy;
(d) contributing to the unity, consistency and effectiveness of Union action in the Western Balkans, as appropriate.
(a) as regards the core of the mandate, to facilitate on behalf of the HR the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue in close coordination with the Member States, to work on the comprehensive normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo through the conclusion of a legally binding agreement that addresses all outstanding issues between the parties in accordance with international law and contributes to regional stability, and to monitor and assist as necessary the work of the parties on the implementation of past agreements reached within the framework of the EU-Facilitated Dialogue;
(b) additionally, as appropriate, to work on improving good neighbourly relations and reconciliation between partners in the Western Balkans, helping overcome the legacy of the past;
(c) actively to engage in enhancing the Union’s effectiveness and visibility in the Western Balkans through public diplomacy, as well as to communicate and promote Union values and the broader Union agenda for the region, as appropriate, contributing to a broader understanding of and support for issues related to the Union;
(d) to work in a coordinated and coherent manner with all the Union’s efforts and the overall Union policies regarding the region, as well as with Union delegations, Union offices and in particular with other EUSRs in the Western Balkans, and to maintain close contact with the Member States;
(e) to support the work of the HR and the activities of the Union in the region.
(a) establishing a specific security plan based on guidance from the EEAS, including specific physical, organisational and procedural security measures, governing management of the secure movement of personnel to and within the area of responsibility, as well as management of security incidents and a mission contingency and evacuation plan;
(b) ensuring that all personnel deployed outside the Union are covered by high risk insurance as required by the conditions in the area of responsibility;
(c) ensuring that all members of the EUSR’s staff to be deployed outside the Union, including locally contracted personnel, have received appropriate security training before or upon arriving in the area of responsibility, based on the risk ratings assigned to that area by the EEAS;
(d) ensuring that all agreed recommendations made following regular security assessments are implemented and providing the HR, the Council and the Commission with written reports on their implementation and on other security issues within the framework of the progress reports and the mandate implementation reports.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 31(2) and Article 33 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) It is crucial to intensify Union engagement in the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo(*1)and Union engagement in the Western Balkans.
(2) A European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and other Western Balkan regional issues should be appointed for a period of 12 months.
(3) The EUSR will implement the mandate in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union’s external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

European Union Special Representative
Article 1
Mr Miroslav LAJČÁK is hereby appointed as the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and other Western Balkan regional issues from 2 April 2020 until 31 March 2021. The Council may decide that the mandate of the EUSR be terminated earlier, on the basis of an assessment by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR).

Policy objectives
Article 2
The mandate of the EUSR shall be based on the following policy objectives of the Union in the Western Balkans and shall be in line with established Union policies:
(a)
first and foremost, achieving comprehensive normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, which is key to their respective European paths;
(b)
improving good neighbourly relations and also promoting reconciliation;
(c)
enhancing Union visibility and effectiveness through public diplomacy;
(d)
contributing to the unity, consistency and effectiveness of Union action in the Western Balkans, as appropriate.

Mandate
Article 3
In order to achieve the policy objectives, the mandate of the EUSR shall be:
(a)
as regards the core of the mandate, to facilitate on behalf of the HR the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue in close coordination with the Member States, to work on the comprehensive normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo through the conclusion of a legally binding agreement that addresses all outstanding issues between the parties in accordance with international law and contributes to regional stability, and to monitor and assist as necessary the work of the parties on the implementation of past agreements reached within the framework of the EU-Facilitated Dialogue;
(b)
additionally, as appropriate, to work on improving good neighbourly relations and reconciliation between partners in the Western Balkans, helping overcome the legacy of the past;
(c)
actively to engage in enhancing the Union’s effectiveness and visibility in the Western Balkans through public diplomacy, as well as to communicate and promote Union values and the broader Union agenda for the region, as appropriate, contributing to a broader understanding of and support for issues related to the Union;
(d)
to work in a coordinated and coherent manner with all the Union’s efforts and the overall Union policies regarding the region, as well as with Union delegations, Union offices and in particular with other EUSRs in the Western Balkans, and to maintain close contact with the Member States;
(e)
to support the work of the HR and the activities of the Union in the region.

Implementation of the mandate
Article 4
1. The EUSR shall be responsible for the implementation of the mandate, acting under the authority of the HR.
2. The PSC shall maintain a privileged link with the EUSR and shall be the EUSR’s primary point of contact with the Council. The PSC shall provide the EUSR with strategic guidance and political direction within the framework of the mandate, without prejudice to the powers of the HR.
3. The EUSR shall work in close coordination and cooperation with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the relevant departments thereof.

Financing
Article 5
1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the mandate of the EUSR for the period from 2 April 2020 to 31 March 2021 shall be EUR 1 200 000.
2. The expenditure shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.
3. The management of the expenditure shall be subject to a contract between the EUSR and the Commission. The EUSR shall be accountable to the Commission for all expenditure.

Constitution and composition of the team
Article 6
1. Within the limits of the EUSR’s mandate and the corresponding financial means made available, the EUSR shall be responsible for constituting a team. The team shall include expertise on specific policy issues as required by the mandate. The EUSR shall keep the Council and the Commission promptly informed of the composition of the team.
2. Member States, institutions of the Union and the EEAS may propose the secondment of staff to work with the EUSR. The salary of such seconded personnel shall be covered by the Member State, the institution of the Union concerned or the EEAS, respectively (the ‘sending authority’). Experts seconded by Member States to the institutions of the Union or to the EEAS may also be posted to work with the EUSR. International contracted staff shall have the nationality of a Member State.
3. All seconded personnel shall remain under the administrative authority of the sending authority and shall carry out their duties and act in the interest of the mandate of the EUSR.

Privileges and immunities of the EUSR and the EUSR’s staff
Article 7
Those privileges, immunities and further guarantees relating to the EUSR and EUSR staff members which are necessary for the completion and smooth functioning of the mission shall be agreed with the host parties, as appropriate. Member States and the EEAS shall grant all necessary support to such effect.

Security of EU classified information
Article 8
The EUSR and the members of the EUSR’s team shall respect the security principles and minimum standards established by Council Decision 2013/488/EU(1).

Access to information and logistical support
Article 9
1. Member States, the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council shall ensure that the EUSR is given access to any relevant information.
2. Union delegations and offices, or the Member States, or both, as appropriate, shall provide logistical support in the region.

Security
Article 10
In accordance with the Union’s policy on the security of personnel deployed outside the Union in an operational capacity under Title V of the Treaty, the EUSR shall take all reasonably practicable measures, in conformity with the EUSR’s mandate and on the basis of the security situation in the area of responsibility, for the security of all personnel under the EUSR’s direct authority, in particular by:
(a)
establishing a specific security plan based on guidance from the EEAS, including specific physical, organisational and procedural security measures, governing management of the secure movement of personnel to and within the area of responsibility, as well as management of security incidents and a mission contingency and evacuation plan;
(b)
ensuring that all personnel deployed outside the Union are covered by high risk insurance as required by the conditions in the area of responsibility;
(c)
ensuring that all members of the EUSR’s staff to be deployed outside the Union, including locally contracted personnel, have received appropriate security training before or upon arriving in the area of responsibility, based on the risk ratings assigned to that area by the EEAS;
(d)
ensuring that all agreed recommendations made following regular security assessments are implemented and providing the HR, the Council and the Commission with written reports on their implementation and on other security issues within the framework of the progress reports and the mandate implementation reports.

Reporting
Article 11
The EUSR shall regularly provide the HR and the PSC with reports. The EUSR shall also report to Council working parties as necessary. Regular reports shall be circulated through the COREU network. The EUSR may provide the Foreign Affairs Council with reports. The EUSR may be involved in providing information to the European Parliament.

Coordination and coherence
Article 12
1. The EUSR shall contribute to the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the Union’s action and shall help ensure that all Union instruments and Member States’ actions are engaged consistently to attain the Union’s policy objectives. Liaison with Member States shall be sought where appropriate. The activities of the EUSR shall be coordinated as appropriate with those of the Commission, the EUSR for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EUSR for Kosovo and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Missions in the region, without prejudice to the prerogatives of the Commission, the Head of Delegation of the EUSR and the Head of Office of the EUSR. The EUSR shall provide regular briefings to Member States’ missions and Union delegations and offices.
2. In the field, the EUSR shall liaise closely with the Heads of Union delegations and offices in the region and Heads of Member States’ missions. They shall make every effort to assist the EUSR in the implementation of the mandate. The EUSR shall also liaise with other international and regional actors in the field.

Review
Article 13
The implementation of this Decision and its consistency with other contributions from the Union to the region shall be kept under regular review. The EUSR shall present the HR, the Council and the Commission with a progress report by 30 September 2020 and a comprehensive mandate implementation report by 31 January 2021.

Entry into force
Article 14
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 31(2) and Article 33 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) It is crucial to intensify Union engagement in the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo(*1)and Union engagement in the Western Balkans.
(2) A European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and other Western Balkan regional issues should be appointed for a period of 12 months.
(3) The EUSR will implement the mandate in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union’s external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

European Union Special Representative

Mr Miroslav LAJČÁK is hereby appointed as the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and other Western Balkan regional issues from 2 April 2020 until 31 March 2021. The Council may decide that the mandate of the EUSR be terminated earlier, on the basis of an assessment by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR).

Policy objectives

The mandate of the EUSR shall be based on the following policy objectives of the Union in the Western Balkans and shall be in line with established Union policies:
(a)
first and foremost, achieving comprehensive normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, which is key to their respective European paths;
(b)
improving good neighbourly relations and also promoting reconciliation;
(c)
enhancing Union visibility and effectiveness through public diplomacy;
(d)
contributing to the unity, consistency and effectiveness of Union action in the Western Balkans, as appropriate.

Mandate

In order to achieve the policy objectives, the mandate of the EUSR shall be:
(a)
as regards the core of the mandate, to facilitate on behalf of the HR the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue in close coordination with the Member States, to work on the comprehensive normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo through the conclusion of a legally binding agreement that addresses all outstanding issues between the parties in accordance with international law and contributes to regional stability, and to monitor and assist as necessary the work of the parties on the implementation of past agreements reached within the framework of the EU-Facilitated Dialogue;
(b)
additionally, as appropriate, to work on improving good neighbourly relations and reconciliation between partners in the Western Balkans, helping overcome the legacy of the past;
(c)
actively to engage in enhancing the Union’s effectiveness and visibility in the Western Balkans through public diplomacy, as well as to communicate and promote Union values and the broader Union agenda for the region, as appropriate, contributing to a broader understanding of and support for issues related to the Union;
(d)
to work in a coordinated and coherent manner with all the Union’s efforts and the overall Union policies regarding the region, as well as with Union delegations, Union offices and in particular with other EUSRs in the Western Balkans, and to maintain close contact with the Member States;
(e)
to support the work of the HR and the activities of the Union in the region.

Implementation of the mandate

1. The EUSR shall be responsible for the implementation of the mandate, acting under the authority of the HR.
2. The PSC shall maintain a privileged link with the EUSR and shall be the EUSR’s primary point of contact with the Council. The PSC shall provide the EUSR with strategic guidance and political direction within the framework of the mandate, without prejudice to the powers of the HR.
3. The EUSR shall work in close coordination and cooperation with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the relevant departments thereof.

Financing

1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the mandate of the EUSR for the period from 2 April 2020 to 31 March 2021 shall be EUR 1 200 000.
2. The expenditure shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.
3. The management of the expenditure shall be subject to a contract between the EUSR and the Commission. The EUSR shall be accountable to the Commission for all expenditure.

Constitution and composition of the team

1. Within the limits of the EUSR’s mandate and the corresponding financial means made available, the EUSR shall be responsible for constituting a team. The team shall include expertise on specific policy issues as required by the mandate. The EUSR shall keep the Council and the Commission promptly informed of the composition of the team.
2. Member States, institutions of the Union and the EEAS may propose the secondment of staff to work with the EUSR. The salary of such seconded personnel shall be covered by the Member State, the institution of the Union concerned or the EEAS, respectively (the ‘sending authority’). Experts seconded by Member States to the institutions of the Union or to the EEAS may also be posted to work with the EUSR. International contracted staff shall have the nationality of a Member State.
3. All seconded personnel shall remain under the administrative authority of the sending authority and shall carry out their duties and act in the interest of the mandate of the EUSR.

Privileges and immunities of the EUSR and the EUSR’s staff

Those privileges, immunities and further guarantees relating to the EUSR and EUSR staff members which are necessary for the completion and smooth functioning of the mission shall be agreed with the host parties, as appropriate. Member States and the EEAS shall grant all necessary support to such effect.

Security of EU classified information

The EUSR and the members of the EUSR’s team shall respect the security principles and minimum standards established by Council Decision 2013/488/EU(1).

Access to information and logistical support

1. Member States, the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council shall ensure that the EUSR is given access to any relevant information.
2. Union delegations and offices, or the Member States, or both, as appropriate, shall provide logistical support in the region.

Security

In accordance with the Union’s policy on the security of personnel deployed outside the Union in an operational capacity under Title V of the Treaty, the EUSR shall take all reasonably practicable measures, in conformity with the EUSR’s mandate and on the basis of the security situation in the area of responsibility, for the security of all personnel under the EUSR’s direct authority, in particular by:
(a)
establishing a specific security plan based on guidance from the EEAS, including specific physical, organisational and procedural security measures, governing management of the secure movement of personnel to and within the area of responsibility, as well as management of security incidents and a mission contingency and evacuation plan;
(b)
ensuring that all personnel deployed outside the Union are covered by high risk insurance as required by the conditions in the area of responsibility;
(c)
ensuring that all members of the EUSR’s staff to be deployed outside the Union, including locally contracted personnel, have received appropriate security training before or upon arriving in the area of responsibility, based on the risk ratings assigned to that area by the EEAS;
(d)
ensuring that all agreed recommendations made following regular security assessments are implemented and providing the HR, the Council and the Commission with written reports on their implementation and on other security issues within the framework of the progress reports and the mandate implementation reports.

Reporting

The EUSR shall regularly provide the HR and the PSC with reports. The EUSR shall also report to Council working parties as necessary. Regular reports shall be circulated through the COREU network. The EUSR may provide the Foreign Affairs Council with reports. The EUSR may be involved in providing information to the European Parliament.

Coordination and coherence

1. The EUSR shall contribute to the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the Union’s action and shall help ensure that all Union instruments and Member States’ actions are engaged consistently to attain the Union’s policy objectives. Liaison with Member States shall be sought where appropriate. The activities of the EUSR shall be coordinated as appropriate with those of the Commission, the EUSR for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EUSR for Kosovo and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Missions in the region, without prejudice to the prerogatives of the Commission, the Head of Delegation of the EUSR and the Head of Office of the EUSR. The EUSR shall provide regular briefings to Member States’ missions and Union delegations and offices.
2. In the field, the EUSR shall liaise closely with the Heads of Union delegations and offices in the region and Heads of Member States’ missions. They shall make every effort to assist the EUSR in the implementation of the mandate. The EUSR shall also liaise with other international and regional actors in the field.

Review

The implementation of this Decision and its consistency with other contributions from the Union to the region shall be kept under regular review. The EUSR shall present the HR, the Council and the Commission with a progress report by 30 September 2020 and a comprehensive mandate implementation report by 31 January 2021.

Entry into force

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.