Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2015 of 22 July 2024 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to support the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2015 23.7.2024
(1) Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509(1)establishes the European Peace Facility (EPF) for the financing by Member States of Union actions under the common foreign and security policy to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security pursuant to Article 21(2), point (c), of the Treaty. In particular, pursuant to Article 1(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, the EPF is to be used for the financing of assistance measures such as actions to strengthen the capacities of third States and regional and international organisations relating to military and defence matters.
(2) Mauritania is a key partner in regional, European and international initiatives aimed at strengthening peace and development in the Sahel region. The country is strongly committed to the fight against irregular migration on the Western route. The Union has a strong partnership with the government of Mauritania, with the aim of achieving long-term development through a comprehensive and integrated approach.
(3) Mauritania plays a major role in the ‘European Union’s Integrated Strategy in the Sahel’, the ‘Sahel Coalition’ and the ‘Partnership for Security and Stability in the Sahel (P3S)’, as well as the ‘Sahel Alliance’. The international community, including the Union, has made considerable efforts to support Mauritania in its fight against terrorism over the recent years. The Union is committed to a close relationship in support of Mauritania in its fight against the intrusion of non-state armed groups.
(4) On 4 April 2024, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy received a request for the Union to assist the Armed Forces of Mauritania with the procurement of key equipment to enhance their capabilities in the land, air, sea, and medical components.
(5) Assistance measures are to be implemented taking into account the principles and requirements set out in Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, in particular compliance with Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP(2), and in line with the rules for the implementation of revenue and expenditure financed under the EPF.
(6) The Council reaffirms its determination to protect, promote and fulfil human rights, fundamental freedoms and democratic principles and to strengthen the rule of law and good governance, in compliance with the Charter of the United Nations, with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with international law, in particular international human rights law and international humanitarian law,
(a) to enhance the capacities of the Armed Forces of Mauritania in the land, air, sea, and medical components in order to ensure security in the country and in the region;
(b) to support Mauritania’s land and maritime surveillance and deterrence activities, as well as military operations at the country’s eastern and southern borders, and in its maritime zone;
(c) to better protect the civilian population;
(d) to contribute to peace and stability in the region.
(a) individual protective equipment for combatants;
(b) medical equipment;
(c) a range of multi-purpose aeronautical equipment required for ground services of aircraft;
(d) a naval patrol boat.
(a) compliance of the units of the Armed Forces of Mauritania supported under the assistance measure with relevant international law, in particular international human rights law and international humanitarian law;
(b) proper and efficient use of any assets provided under the assistance measure for the purposes for which they were provided;
(c) sufficient maintenance of any assets provided under the assistance measure to ensure their usability and operational availability over their life cycle;
(d) that any assets provided under the assistance measure are not lost, or transferred without the consent of the Facility Committee established by Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 to persons or entities other than those identified in those arrangements, at the end of their life cycle.
(a) delivery verification, whereby EPF delivery certificates are to be signed by the end-user forces upon transfer of ownership;
(b) reporting on the inventory, whereby the beneficiary is to report annually on the inventory of designated items until such reporting is no longer deemed necessary by the Political and Security Committee (PSC);
(c) on-site visits, whereby the beneficiary is to grant the High Representative and the EPF auditors access to conduct on-site checks and EPF audits, upon request.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 28(1) and Article 41(2) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 (1) establishes the European Peace Facility (EPF) for the financing by Member States of Union actions under the common foreign and security policy to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security pursuant to Article 21(2), point (c), of the Treaty. In particular, pursuant to Article 1(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, the EPF is to be used for the financing of assistance measures such as actions to strengthen the capacities of third States and regional and international organisations relating to military and defence matters.
(2) Mauritania is a key partner in regional, European and international initiatives aimed at strengthening peace and development in the Sahel region. The country is strongly committed to the fight against irregular migration on the Western route. The Union has a strong partnership with the government of Mauritania, with the aim of achieving long-term development through a comprehensive and integrated approach.
(3) Mauritania plays a major role in the ‘European Union’s Integrated Strategy in the Sahel’, the ‘Sahel Coalition’ and the ‘Partnership for Security and Stability in the Sahel (P3S)’, as well as the ‘Sahel Alliance’. The international community, including the Union, has made considerable efforts to support Mauritania in its fight against terrorism over the recent years. The Union is committed to a close relationship in support of Mauritania in its fight against the intrusion of non-state armed groups.
(4) On 4 April 2024, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy received a request for the Union to assist the Armed Forces of Mauritania with the procurement of key equipment to enhance their capabilities in the land, air, sea, and medical components.
(5) Assistance measures are to be implemented taking into account the principles and requirements set out in Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, in particular compliance with Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2), and in line with the rules for the implementation of revenue and expenditure financed under the EPF.
(6) The Council reaffirms its determination to protect, promote and fulfil human rights, fundamental freedoms and democratic principles and to strengthen the rule of law and good governance, in compliance with the Charter of the United Nations, with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with international law, in particular international human rights law and international humanitarian law,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Establishment, objectives, scope and duration

1. An assistance measure benefiting Mauritania (the ‘beneficiary’) to be financed under the European Peace Facility (EPF) (the ‘assistance measure’) is hereby established.

2. The objectives of the assistance measure are the following:
(a) to enhance the capacities of the Armed Forces of Mauritania in the land, air, sea, and medical components in order to ensure security in the country and in the region;
(b) to support Mauritania’s land and maritime surveillance and deterrence activities, as well as military operations at the country’s eastern and southern borders, and in its maritime zone;
(c) to better protect the civilian population;
(d) to contribute to peace and stability in the region.

3. To achieve the objectives set out in paragraph 2, the assistance measure shall finance the following types of equipment not designed to deliver lethal force:
(a) individual protective equipment for combatants;
(b) medical equipment;
(c) a range of multi-purpose aeronautical equipment required for ground services of aircraft;
(d) a naval patrol boat.
The assistance measure shall also finance related supplies and services, including technical training, where needed.

4. The duration of the assistance measure shall be 36 months from the date of adoption of this Decision.

Financial arrangements

1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the assistance measure shall be EUR 15 000 000.
2. All expenditure shall be managed in accordance with Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 and in line with the rules for the implementation of revenue and expenditure financed under the EPF.

Arrangements with the beneficiary

1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) shall make the necessary arrangements with the beneficiary to ensure its compliance with the requirements and conditions established by this Decision as a condition for the provision of support under the assistance measure.

2. The arrangements referred to in paragraph 1 shall include provisions obliging the beneficiary to ensure:
(a) compliance of the units of the Armed Forces of Mauritania supported under the assistance measure with relevant international law, in particular international human rights law and international humanitarian law;
(b) proper and efficient use of any assets provided under the assistance measure for the purposes for which they were provided;
(c) sufficient maintenance of any assets provided under the assistance measure to ensure their usability and operational availability over their life cycle;
(d) that any assets provided under the assistance measure are not lost, or transferred without the consent of the Facility Committee established by Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 to persons or entities other than those identified in those arrangements, at the end of their life cycle.

3. The arrangements referred to in paragraph 1 shall include provisions on the suspension and termination of support under the assistance measure in the event of the beneficiary being found in breach of the obligations set out in paragraph 2.

Implementation

1. The High Representative shall be responsible for ensuring the implementation of this Decision in accordance with Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, and in line with the rules for the implementation of revenue and expenditure financed under the EPF and with the Integrated Methodological Framework for assessing and identifying the required measures and controls for assistance measures under the EPF.

2. The implementation of the activities referred to in Article 1(3) of this Decision shall be carried out by the administrator for assistance measures, including through an administrative arrangement with Economat des Armées, in accordance with Article 37 of Decision (CFSP) 2021/509.

Monitoring, control and evaluation

1. The High Representative shall monitor the compliance by the beneficiary with the obligations set out in Article 3. That monitoring shall be used to provide awareness of the context and the risks of breaches of the obligations set out in Article 3, and to contribute to the prevention of such breaches, including violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by the units of the Armed Forces of Mauritania supported under the assistance measure.

2. The post-shipment control of equipment and supplies shall be organised as follows:
(a) delivery verification, whereby EPF delivery certificates are to be signed by the end-user forces upon transfer of ownership;
(b) reporting on the inventory, whereby the beneficiary is to report annually on the inventory of designated items until such reporting is no longer deemed necessary by the Political and Security Committee (PSC);
(c) on-site visits, whereby the beneficiary is to grant the High Representative and the EPF auditors access to conduct on-site checks and EPF audits, upon request.

3. The High Representative shall conduct a final evaluation upon completion of the assistance measure to assess whether the assistance measure has contributed to reaching the objectives set out in Article 1(2).

Reporting

During the period of implementation, the High Representative shall provide the PSC with six-monthly reports on the implementation of the assistance measure, in accordance with Article 63 of Decision (CFSP) 2021/509. The administrator for assistance measures shall regularly inform the Facility Committee established by Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 on the implementation of revenue and expenditure in accordance with Article 38 of that Decision, including by providing information on the suppliers and subcontractors involved.

Suspension and termination

1. The PSC may decide to suspend wholly or partially the implementation of the assistance measure in accordance with Article 64 of Decision (CFSP) 2021/509.
2. The PSC may recommend that the Council terminate the assistance measure.

Entry into force

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2024/2012 of 22 July 2024 implementing Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2012 23.7.2024
(1) On 31 July 2015, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333.
(2) Pursuant to Article 17(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333, the Council has reviewed the lists of designated persons and entities set out in Annexes II and IV to that Decision.
(3) The Council has concluded that the entries for one person, who is deceased, and for two entities should be deleted, and that the restrictive measures against all other persons and entities in the lists set out in Annexes II and IV to Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333 should be maintained.
(4) Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333 should therefore be amended accordingly,
(1) in Annex II (‘List of persons and entities referred to in Article 8(2)’), Part A (‘Persons’), entry 19 (concerning PRIGOZHIN, Yevgeniy Viktorovich) is deleted;
(2) in Annex IV (‘List of persons and entities referred to in Article 9(2)’), Part A (‘Persons’), entry 24 (concerning PRIGOZHIN, Yevgeniy Viktorovich) is deleted;
(3) in Annex IV (‘List of persons and entities referred to in Article 9(2)’), Part B (‘Entities’) is amended as follows:(a)entry 13 (concerning Ashton Global Investments Limited) is deleted;(b)entry 15 (concerning Kinloss Property Limited) is deleted. (a) entry 13 (concerning Ashton Global Investments Limited) is deleted; (b) entry 15 (concerning Kinloss Property Limited) is deleted.
(a) entry 13 (concerning Ashton Global Investments Limited) is deleted;
(b) entry 15 (concerning Kinloss Property Limited) is deleted.
(a) entry 13 (concerning Ashton Global Investments Limited) is deleted;
(b) entry 15 (concerning Kinloss Property Limited) is deleted.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 31(2) thereof,
Having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333 of 31 July 2015 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya, and repealing Decision 2011/137/CFSP (1), and in particular Article 12(2) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 31 July 2015, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333.
(2) Pursuant to Article 17(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333, the Council has reviewed the lists of designated persons and entities set out in Annexes II and IV to that Decision.
(3) The Council has concluded that the entries for one person, who is deceased, and for two entities should be deleted, and that the restrictive measures against all other persons and entities in the lists set out in Annexes II and IV to Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333 should be maintained.
(4) Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333 should therefore be amended accordingly,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Annexes II and IV to Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333 are amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333 is amended as follows:

(1) in Annex II (‘List of persons and entities referred to in Article 8(2)’), Part A (‘Persons’), entry 19 (concerning PRIGOZHIN, Yevgeniy Viktorovich) is deleted;

(2) in Annex IV (‘List of persons and entities referred to in Article 9(2)’), Part A (‘Persons’), entry 24 (concerning PRIGOZHIN, Yevgeniy Viktorovich) is deleted;

(3) in Annex IV (‘List of persons and entities referred to in Article 9(2)’), Part B (‘Entities’) is amended as follows:
(a) entry 13 (concerning Ashton Global Investments Limited) is deleted;
(b) entry 15 (concerning Kinloss Property Limited) is deleted.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2010 of 22 July 2024 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to support the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2010 23.7.2024
(1) Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509(1)establishes the European Peace Facility (EPF) for the financing by Member States of Union actions under the common foreign and security policy to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security pursuant to Article 21(2), point (c), of the Treaty. In particular, pursuant to Article 1(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, the EPF is to be used for the financing of assistance measures such as actions to strengthen the capacities of third States and regional and international organisations relating to military and defence matters.
(2) The 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy sets the objectives of strengthening security and defence, investing in the resilience of States and societies to the east of the Union, developing an integrated approach to conflict and crises, promoting and supporting cooperative regional orders, and reinforcing global governance on the basis of international law, including international human rights law and international humanitarian law.
(3) On 21 March 2022, the Union approved the Strategic Compass with the objective of becoming a stronger and more capable security provider, including through the increased use of the EPF in support of partners’ defence capabilities.
(4) The Union is committed to enhancing the comprehensive political and economic partnership and cooperation with the Republic of Armenia, based on the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part(2)(the ‘Enhanced Partnership Agreement’), and to promoting the development of close political relations. Pursuant to Article 5(1) of the Enhanced Partnership Agreement, the Union and the Republic of Armenia are to intensify their dialogue and cooperation in the area of foreign and security policy, including the common security and defence policy (CSDP), and are to address in particular issues of conflict prevention and crisis management, risk reduction, cybersecurity, security-sector reform, regional stability, disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control and export control.
(5) The Union recognises the Republic of Armenia’s intent to contribute to the Union’s CSDP missions and operations in the future and welcomes the Republic of Armenia’s formal request of November 2023 to launch negotiations for an agreement establishing a framework for its participation in Union crisis management operations.
(6) On 30 January 2024, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy received a request from the Republic of Armenia for the Union to assist the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia with the procurement of key equipment to strengthen the capacities of its logistics units and military medical units.
(7) Assistance measures are to be implemented taking into account the principles and requirements set out in Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, in particular compliance with Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP(3), and in line with the rules for the implementation of revenue and expenditure financed under the EPF.
(8) The Council reaffirms its determination to protect, promote and fulfil human rights, fundamental freedoms and democratic principles and to strengthen the rule of law and good governance, in compliance with the Charter of the United Nations, with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with international law, in particular international human rights law and international humanitarian law,
(a) to contribute to strengthening the capacities of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia in order to enhance national security, stability and resilience in the defence sector, in line with the Union’s overall policy on the Republic of Armenia;
(b) to allow the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia to enhance operational effectiveness, accelerate compliance with Union standards and interoperability, and thereby better protect civilians in crises and emergencies;
(c) to strengthen the capacities of the Republic of Armenia with respect to its future participation in Union military CSDP missions and operations.
(a) compliance of the units of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia supported under the assistance measure with relevant international law, in particular international human rights law and international humanitarian law;
(b) proper and efficient use of any assets provided under the assistance measure for the purposes for which they were provided;
(c) sufficient maintenance of any assets provided under the assistance measure to ensure their usability and operational availability over their life cycle;
(d) that any assets provided under the assistance measure are not lost, or transferred without the consent of the Facility Committee established by Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 to persons or entities other than those identified in those arrangements, at the end of their life cycle.
(a) delivery verification, whereby EPF delivery certificates are to be signed by the end-user forces upon transfer of ownership;
(b) reporting, whereby the beneficiary is to report annually on the activities conducted with the equipment, supplies and services provided under the assistance measure and on the inventory of designated items until such reporting is no longer deemed necessary by the Political and Security Committee (PSC);
(c) on-site visits, whereby the beneficiary is to grant the High Representative and the EPF auditors access to conduct on-site checks and EPF audits, upon request.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 28(1) and Article 41(2) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 (1) establishes the European Peace Facility (EPF) for the financing by Member States of Union actions under the common foreign and security policy to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security pursuant to Article 21(2), point (c), of the Treaty. In particular, pursuant to Article 1(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, the EPF is to be used for the financing of assistance measures such as actions to strengthen the capacities of third States and regional and international organisations relating to military and defence matters.
(2) The 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy sets the objectives of strengthening security and defence, investing in the resilience of States and societies to the east of the Union, developing an integrated approach to conflict and crises, promoting and supporting cooperative regional orders, and reinforcing global governance on the basis of international law, including international human rights law and international humanitarian law.
(3) On 21 March 2022, the Union approved the Strategic Compass with the objective of becoming a stronger and more capable security provider, including through the increased use of the EPF in support of partners’ defence capabilities.
(4) The Union is committed to enhancing the comprehensive political and economic partnership and cooperation with the Republic of Armenia, based on the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part (2) (the ‘Enhanced Partnership Agreement’), and to promoting the development of close political relations. Pursuant to Article 5(1) of the Enhanced Partnership Agreement, the Union and the Republic of Armenia are to intensify their dialogue and cooperation in the area of foreign and security policy, including the common security and defence policy (CSDP), and are to address in particular issues of conflict prevention and crisis management, risk reduction, cybersecurity, security-sector reform, regional stability, disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control and export control.
(5) The Union recognises the Republic of Armenia’s intent to contribute to the Union’s CSDP missions and operations in the future and welcomes the Republic of Armenia’s formal request of November 2023 to launch negotiations for an agreement establishing a framework for its participation in Union crisis management operations.
(6) On 30 January 2024, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy received a request from the Republic of Armenia for the Union to assist the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia with the procurement of key equipment to strengthen the capacities of its logistics units and military medical units.
(7) Assistance measures are to be implemented taking into account the principles and requirements set out in Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, in particular compliance with Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (3), and in line with the rules for the implementation of revenue and expenditure financed under the EPF.
(8) The Council reaffirms its determination to protect, promote and fulfil human rights, fundamental freedoms and democratic principles and to strengthen the rule of law and good governance, in compliance with the Charter of the United Nations, with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with international law, in particular international human rights law and international humanitarian law,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Establishment, objectives, scope and duration

1. An assistance measure benefiting the Republic of Armenia (the ‘beneficiary’) to be financed under the European Peace Facility (EPF) (the ‘assistance measure’) is hereby established.

2. The objectives of the assistance measure are the following:
(a) to contribute to strengthening the capacities of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia in order to enhance national security, stability and resilience in the defence sector, in line with the Union’s overall policy on the Republic of Armenia;
(b) to allow the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia to enhance operational effectiveness, accelerate compliance with Union standards and interoperability, and thereby better protect civilians in crises and emergencies;
(c) to strengthen the capacities of the Republic of Armenia with respect to its future participation in Union military CSDP missions and operations.

3. To achieve the objectives set out in paragraph 2, the assistance measure shall finance logistics equipment not designed to deliver lethal force, namely a mobile field camp capability for a battalion-size unit, including a role-1 medical treatment facility.
The assistance measure shall also finance related supplies and services, including technical training, where needed.

4. The duration of the assistance measure shall be 30 months from the date of adoption of this Decision.

Financial arrangements

1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the assistance measure shall be EUR 10 000 000.
2. All expenditure shall be managed in accordance with Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 and in line with the rules for the implementation of revenue and expenditure financed under the EPF.

Arrangements with the beneficiary

1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) shall make the necessary arrangements with the beneficiary to ensure its compliance with the requirements and conditions established by this Decision as a condition for the provision of support under the assistance measure.

2. The arrangements referred to in paragraph 1 shall include provisions obliging the beneficiary to ensure:
(a) compliance of the units of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia supported under the assistance measure with relevant international law, in particular international human rights law and international humanitarian law;
(b) proper and efficient use of any assets provided under the assistance measure for the purposes for which they were provided;
(c) sufficient maintenance of any assets provided under the assistance measure to ensure their usability and operational availability over their life cycle;
(d) that any assets provided under the assistance measure are not lost, or transferred without the consent of the Facility Committee established by Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 to persons or entities other than those identified in those arrangements, at the end of their life cycle.

3. The arrangements referred to in paragraph 1 shall include provisions on the suspension and termination of support under the assistance measure in the event of the beneficiary being found in breach of the obligations set out in paragraph 2.

Implementation

1. The High Representative shall be responsible for ensuring the implementation of this Decision in accordance with Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, and in line with the rules for the implementation of revenue and expenditure financed under the EPF and with the Integrated Methodological Framework for assessing and identifying the required measures and controls for assistance measures under the EPF.

2. The implementation of the activities referred to in Article 1(3) of this Decision shall be carried out by the administrator for assistance measures, including through administrative arrangements in accordance with Article 37 of Decision (CFSP) 2021/509.

Monitoring, control and evaluation

1. The High Representative shall monitor the compliance by the beneficiary with the obligations set out in Article 3. That monitoring shall be used to provide awareness of the context and the risks of breaches of the obligations set out in Article 3, and to contribute to the prevention of such breaches, including violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by the units of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia supported under the assistance measure.

2. The post-shipment control of equipment and supplies shall be organised as follows:
(a) delivery verification, whereby EPF delivery certificates are to be signed by the end-user forces upon transfer of ownership;
(b) reporting, whereby the beneficiary is to report annually on the activities conducted with the equipment, supplies and services provided under the assistance measure and on the inventory of designated items until such reporting is no longer deemed necessary by the Political and Security Committee (PSC);
(c) on-site visits, whereby the beneficiary is to grant the High Representative and the EPF auditors access to conduct on-site checks and EPF audits, upon request.

3. The High Representative shall conduct a final evaluation upon completion of the assistance measure to assess whether the assistance measure has contributed to reaching the objectives set out in Article 1(2).

Reporting

During the period of implementation, the High Representative shall provide the PSC with six-monthly reports on the implementation of the assistance measure, in accordance with Article 63 of Decision (CFSP) 2021/509. The administrator for assistance measures shall regularly inform the Facility Committee established by Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 on the implementation of revenue and expenditure in accordance with Article 38 of that Decision, including by providing information on the suppliers and subcontractors involved.

Suspension and termination

1. The PSC may decide to suspend wholly or partially the implementation of the assistance measure in accordance with Article 64 of Decision (CFSP) 2021/509.
2. The PSC may recommend that the Council terminate the assistance measure.

Entry into force

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2009 of 22 July 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2009 22.7.2024
(1) On 7 December 2020, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999(1).
(2) On 8 December 2020, in the Declaration by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the European Union regarding the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, the Union and its Member States reaffirmed their strong commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights around the world. The EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime underscores the Union’s determination to enhance its role in addressing serious human rights violations and abuses worldwide. Achieving the effective enjoyment of human rights by everyone is a strategic goal of the Union. Respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights are fundamental values of the Union and its common foreign and security policy.
(3) In its conclusions of 14 November 2022, the Council expressed concern about the disproportionate effect that armed conflicts continue to have on women and girls worldwide, as well as the prevalence of sexual and gender-based violence including conflict-related sexual violence, offline and online. It committed to enhanced efforts to counter such violence in order to ensure full accountability and to combat impunity. Furthermore, in its conclusions of June 2014, the Council had stressed that combating and eliminating all forms of violence against women requires coordinated policies at all relevant levels and a comprehensive approach targeting the key issues of prevention, under-reporting, protection, victim support, and the prosecution of perpetrators as well as other measures. The strategic use of restrictive measures reinforces this approach by increasing pressure to prevent further violations and abuses and, in coordination with other Union instruments in the human rights toolbox, draws attention to these violations and abuses and those responsible.
(4) In that context, four persons and two entities should be included in the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999.
(5) Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 should therefore be amended accordingly,
(1) the following entries are added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies under heading ‘A. Natural persons’:Names (Transliteration into Latin script)NamesIdentifying informationReasons for listingDate of listing‘115.Abdel Karim Mohammad IBRAHIMعبد الكريم محمود إبراهيم(Arabic spelling)Position(s): Chief of staff of the Syrian ArmyPOB: Tartous, SyriaNationality: SyrianGender: maleAbdel Karim Mohammad Ibrahim is the chief of staff of the Syrian Army.The Syrian state, including its military, commits systematic and widespread torture, rape and sexual and gender-based violence against civilians.As the chief of staff of the Syrian Army, Abdel Karim Mohammad Ibrahim is responsible for the actions of the armed forces under his command.Therefore, Abdel Karim Mohammad Ibrahim is responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture and systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence.22.7.2024116.Ali Mahmoud ABBASعلي محمود عباس(Arabic spelling)Position(s): Minister of Defence and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the ArmyDOB: 2.11.1964POB: Rif Dimashq, SyriaNationality: SyrianGender: maleAli Mahmoud Abbas has been the Minister of Defence of Syria and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Army since 2022.The Syrian state, including its military, commits systematic and widespread torture, rape as well as sexual and gender-based violence against civilians.As the Minister of Defense of Syria and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Army, Ali Mahmoud Abbas is responsible for the actions of the armed forces under his command.Therefore, Ali Mahmoud Abbas is responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture and systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence.22.7.2024117.RI Chang DaePosition(s): Minister of State SecurityNationality: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)Gender: maleRi Chang Dae has been the Minister of State Security in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) since 2022.Women and girls showing opposition to the regime or held in detention or prison centres in DPRK are systematically targeted by violence, particularly under the guard of the Ministry of State Security and in centres run by that Ministry.As head of the Ministry of State Security, Ri Chang Dae is responsible for numerous acts of sexual and gender-based violence committed by officials of that Ministry.Ri Chang Dae is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence.22.7.2024118*.Evgeniy Aleksandrovich SOBOLEVa.k.a. Yevhen Oleksandrovich SOBOLEVЕвгений Александрович Соболев(Russian spelling)Position(s): Head of the penitentiary service of the Russian occupation authorities in the Kherson regionDOB: 25.7.1985POB: Nova Kakhovka, Kherson region, UkraineNationality: RussianGender: malePassport No.: 3125216313Evgeniy Sobolev is the head of the penitentiary service of the Russian occupation authorities in the Kherson region.Under his command, a widespread and systematic pattern of human rights violations in detention facilities in areas under the control of the Russian occupation authorities, including the Kherson region, has been documented.This pattern includes torture, and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and sexual and gender-based violence. The practices involved include rape, forced nudity, genital electrocution and threats of genital mutilation.Persons suspected of passing information to the Ukrainian authorities, or of supporting the Ukrainian armed forces, have been specifically targeted.In his capacity as head of the penitentiary service of the Russian occupational authorities in the Kherson region, Evgeniy Sobolev is responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment and other human rights violations, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence.22.7.2024’ Names (Transliteration into Latin script) Names Identifying information Reasons for listing Date of listing ‘115. Abdel Karim Mohammad IBRAHIM عبد الكريم محمود إبراهيم(Arabic spelling) Position(s): Chief of staff of the Syrian ArmyPOB: Tartous, SyriaNationality: SyrianGender: male Abdel Karim Mohammad Ibrahim is the chief of staff of the Syrian Army.The Syrian state, including its military, commits systematic and widespread torture, rape and sexual and gender-based violence against civilians.As the chief of staff of the Syrian Army, Abdel Karim Mohammad Ibrahim is responsible for the actions of the armed forces under his command.Therefore, Abdel Karim Mohammad Ibrahim is responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture and systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 22.7.2024 116. Ali Mahmoud ABBAS علي محمود عباس(Arabic spelling) Position(s): Minister of Defence and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the ArmyDOB: 2.11.1964POB: Rif Dimashq, SyriaNationality: SyrianGender: male Ali Mahmoud Abbas has been the Minister of Defence of Syria and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Army since 2022.The Syrian state, including its military, commits systematic and widespread torture, rape as well as sexual and gender-based violence against civilians.As the Minister of Defense of Syria and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Army, Ali Mahmoud Abbas is responsible for the actions of the armed forces under his command.Therefore, Ali Mahmoud Abbas is responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture and systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 22.7.2024 117. RI Chang Dae Position(s): Minister of State SecurityNationality: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)Gender: male Ri Chang Dae has been the Minister of State Security in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) since 2022.Women and girls showing opposition to the regime or held in detention or prison centres in DPRK are systematically targeted by violence, particularly under the guard of the Ministry of State Security and in centres run by that Ministry.As head of the Ministry of State Security, Ri Chang Dae is responsible for numerous acts of sexual and gender-based violence committed by officials of that Ministry.Ri Chang Dae is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 22.7.2024 118*. Evgeniy Aleksandrovich SOBOLEVa.k.a. Yevhen Oleksandrovich SOBOLEV Евгений Александрович Соболев(Russian spelling) Position(s): Head of the penitentiary service of the Russian occupation authorities in the Kherson regionDOB: 25.7.1985POB: Nova Kakhovka, Kherson region, UkraineNationality: RussianGender: malePassport No.: 3125216313 Evgeniy Sobolev is the head of the penitentiary service of the Russian occupation authorities in the Kherson region.Under his command, a widespread and systematic pattern of human rights violations in detention facilities in areas under the control of the Russian occupation authorities, including the Kherson region, has been documented.This pattern includes torture, and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and sexual and gender-based violence. The practices involved include rape, forced nudity, genital electrocution and threats of genital mutilation.Persons suspected of passing information to the Ukrainian authorities, or of supporting the Ukrainian armed forces, have been specifically targeted.In his capacity as head of the penitentiary service of the Russian occupational authorities in the Kherson region, Evgeniy Sobolev is responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment and other human rights violations, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 22.7.2024’
Names (Transliteration into Latin script) Names Identifying information Reasons for listing Date of listing
‘115. Abdel Karim Mohammad IBRAHIM عبد الكريم محمود إبراهيم(Arabic spelling) Position(s): Chief of staff of the Syrian ArmyPOB: Tartous, SyriaNationality: SyrianGender: male Abdel Karim Mohammad Ibrahim is the chief of staff of the Syrian Army.The Syrian state, including its military, commits systematic and widespread torture, rape and sexual and gender-based violence against civilians.As the chief of staff of the Syrian Army, Abdel Karim Mohammad Ibrahim is responsible for the actions of the armed forces under his command.Therefore, Abdel Karim Mohammad Ibrahim is responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture and systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 22.7.2024
116. Ali Mahmoud ABBAS علي محمود عباس(Arabic spelling) Position(s): Minister of Defence and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the ArmyDOB: 2.11.1964POB: Rif Dimashq, SyriaNationality: SyrianGender: male Ali Mahmoud Abbas has been the Minister of Defence of Syria and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Army since 2022.The Syrian state, including its military, commits systematic and widespread torture, rape as well as sexual and gender-based violence against civilians.As the Minister of Defense of Syria and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Army, Ali Mahmoud Abbas is responsible for the actions of the armed forces under his command.Therefore, Ali Mahmoud Abbas is responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture and systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 22.7.2024
117. RI Chang Dae Position(s): Minister of State SecurityNationality: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)Gender: male Ri Chang Dae has been the Minister of State Security in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) since 2022.Women and girls showing opposition to the regime or held in detention or prison centres in DPRK are systematically targeted by violence, particularly under the guard of the Ministry of State Security and in centres run by that Ministry.As head of the Ministry of State Security, Ri Chang Dae is responsible for numerous acts of sexual and gender-based violence committed by officials of that Ministry.Ri Chang Dae is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 22.7.2024
118*. Evgeniy Aleksandrovich SOBOLEVa.k.a. Yevhen Oleksandrovich SOBOLEV Евгений Александрович Соболев(Russian spelling) Position(s): Head of the penitentiary service of the Russian occupation authorities in the Kherson regionDOB: 25.7.1985POB: Nova Kakhovka, Kherson region, UkraineNationality: RussianGender: malePassport No.: 3125216313 Evgeniy Sobolev is the head of the penitentiary service of the Russian occupation authorities in the Kherson region.Under his command, a widespread and systematic pattern of human rights violations in detention facilities in areas under the control of the Russian occupation authorities, including the Kherson region, has been documented.This pattern includes torture, and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and sexual and gender-based violence. The practices involved include rape, forced nudity, genital electrocution and threats of genital mutilation.Persons suspected of passing information to the Ukrainian authorities, or of supporting the Ukrainian armed forces, have been specifically targeted.In his capacity as head of the penitentiary service of the Russian occupational authorities in the Kherson region, Evgeniy Sobolev is responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment and other human rights violations, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 22.7.2024’
Names (Transliteration into Latin script) Names Identifying information Reasons for listing Date of listing
‘115. Abdel Karim Mohammad IBRAHIM عبد الكريم محمود إبراهيم(Arabic spelling) Position(s): Chief of staff of the Syrian ArmyPOB: Tartous, SyriaNationality: SyrianGender: male Abdel Karim Mohammad Ibrahim is the chief of staff of the Syrian Army.The Syrian state, including its military, commits systematic and widespread torture, rape and sexual and gender-based violence against civilians.As the chief of staff of the Syrian Army, Abdel Karim Mohammad Ibrahim is responsible for the actions of the armed forces under his command.Therefore, Abdel Karim Mohammad Ibrahim is responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture and systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 22.7.2024
116. Ali Mahmoud ABBAS علي محمود عباس(Arabic spelling) Position(s): Minister of Defence and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the ArmyDOB: 2.11.1964POB: Rif Dimashq, SyriaNationality: SyrianGender: male Ali Mahmoud Abbas has been the Minister of Defence of Syria and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Army since 2022.The Syrian state, including its military, commits systematic and widespread torture, rape as well as sexual and gender-based violence against civilians.As the Minister of Defense of Syria and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Army, Ali Mahmoud Abbas is responsible for the actions of the armed forces under his command.Therefore, Ali Mahmoud Abbas is responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture and systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 22.7.2024
117. RI Chang Dae Position(s): Minister of State SecurityNationality: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)Gender: male Ri Chang Dae has been the Minister of State Security in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) since 2022.Women and girls showing opposition to the regime or held in detention or prison centres in DPRK are systematically targeted by violence, particularly under the guard of the Ministry of State Security and in centres run by that Ministry.As head of the Ministry of State Security, Ri Chang Dae is responsible for numerous acts of sexual and gender-based violence committed by officials of that Ministry.Ri Chang Dae is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 22.7.2024
118*. Evgeniy Aleksandrovich SOBOLEVa.k.a. Yevhen Oleksandrovich SOBOLEV Евгений Александрович Соболев(Russian spelling) Position(s): Head of the penitentiary service of the Russian occupation authorities in the Kherson regionDOB: 25.7.1985POB: Nova Kakhovka, Kherson region, UkraineNationality: RussianGender: malePassport No.: 3125216313 Evgeniy Sobolev is the head of the penitentiary service of the Russian occupation authorities in the Kherson region.Under his command, a widespread and systematic pattern of human rights violations in detention facilities in areas under the control of the Russian occupation authorities, including the Kherson region, has been documented.This pattern includes torture, and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and sexual and gender-based violence. The practices involved include rape, forced nudity, genital electrocution and threats of genital mutilation.Persons suspected of passing information to the Ukrainian authorities, or of supporting the Ukrainian armed forces, have been specifically targeted.In his capacity as head of the penitentiary service of the Russian occupational authorities in the Kherson region, Evgeniy Sobolev is responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment and other human rights violations, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 22.7.2024’
(2) the following entries are added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies under heading ‘B. Legal persons, entities and bodies’:Name (Transliteration into Latin script)NameIdentifying informationReasons for listingDate of listing‘32.Kokorat San RasType of entity: Haitian gang operating mostly in the Artibonite and North West regionKokorat San Ras is a gang operating in Haiti that came into existence and gained strength between 2015 and 2017. It operates in specific areas (Artibonite/North-West) and its influence keeps on growing.Kokorat San Ras is well known for its use of violent attacks and physical aggression in order to gain control of more areas. During those attacks, rape and other violence against women are a common weapon.Kokorat San Ras is therefore responsible for serious human rights abuses, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence.22.7.202433.Onsong County MSS Detention CentreType of entity: detention centrePlace of registration: Onsong County, North Hamgyong Province, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)Onsong County MSS Detention Centre is a detention facility in North Hamgyong Province of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).The facility is managed by the DPRK’s general police force, the Ministry of People’s Security (MPS), and is staffed by MPS state officials and correctional officers.In the Onsong County MSS Detention Centre, torture is an established part of the interrogation process, used to extract a full confession of those arbitrarily detained.Examples of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment include the prolonged denial of food, starvation, denial of medical assistance, lack of hygiene, positional torture.Detainees in the Onsong County MSS Detention Centre are also subject to rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, such as enslavement, invasive body searches, forced abortions, and systematic targeting of women’s capacity to reproduce.The Onsong County MSS Detention Centre is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrest or detention, as well as other human rights violations, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence.22.7.2024’ Name (Transliteration into Latin script) Name Identifying information Reasons for listing Date of listing ‘32. Kokorat San Ras Type of entity: Haitian gang operating mostly in the Artibonite and North West region Kokorat San Ras is a gang operating in Haiti that came into existence and gained strength between 2015 and 2017. It operates in specific areas (Artibonite/North-West) and its influence keeps on growing.Kokorat San Ras is well known for its use of violent attacks and physical aggression in order to gain control of more areas. During those attacks, rape and other violence against women are a common weapon.Kokorat San Ras is therefore responsible for serious human rights abuses, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 22.7.2024 33. Onsong County MSS Detention Centre Type of entity: detention centrePlace of registration: Onsong County, North Hamgyong Province, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Onsong County MSS Detention Centre is a detention facility in North Hamgyong Province of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).The facility is managed by the DPRK’s general police force, the Ministry of People’s Security (MPS), and is staffed by MPS state officials and correctional officers.In the Onsong County MSS Detention Centre, torture is an established part of the interrogation process, used to extract a full confession of those arbitrarily detained.Examples of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment include the prolonged denial of food, starvation, denial of medical assistance, lack of hygiene, positional torture.Detainees in the Onsong County MSS Detention Centre are also subject to rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, such as enslavement, invasive body searches, forced abortions, and systematic targeting of women’s capacity to reproduce.The Onsong County MSS Detention Centre is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrest or detention, as well as other human rights violations, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 22.7.2024’
Name (Transliteration into Latin script) Name Identifying information Reasons for listing Date of listing
‘32. Kokorat San Ras Type of entity: Haitian gang operating mostly in the Artibonite and North West region Kokorat San Ras is a gang operating in Haiti that came into existence and gained strength between 2015 and 2017. It operates in specific areas (Artibonite/North-West) and its influence keeps on growing.Kokorat San Ras is well known for its use of violent attacks and physical aggression in order to gain control of more areas. During those attacks, rape and other violence against women are a common weapon.Kokorat San Ras is therefore responsible for serious human rights abuses, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 22.7.2024
33. Onsong County MSS Detention Centre Type of entity: detention centrePlace of registration: Onsong County, North Hamgyong Province, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Onsong County MSS Detention Centre is a detention facility in North Hamgyong Province of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).The facility is managed by the DPRK’s general police force, the Ministry of People’s Security (MPS), and is staffed by MPS state officials and correctional officers.In the Onsong County MSS Detention Centre, torture is an established part of the interrogation process, used to extract a full confession of those arbitrarily detained.Examples of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment include the prolonged denial of food, starvation, denial of medical assistance, lack of hygiene, positional torture.Detainees in the Onsong County MSS Detention Centre are also subject to rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, such as enslavement, invasive body searches, forced abortions, and systematic targeting of women’s capacity to reproduce.The Onsong County MSS Detention Centre is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrest or detention, as well as other human rights violations, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 22.7.2024’
Name (Transliteration into Latin script) Name Identifying information Reasons for listing Date of listing
‘32. Kokorat San Ras Type of entity: Haitian gang operating mostly in the Artibonite and North West region Kokorat San Ras is a gang operating in Haiti that came into existence and gained strength between 2015 and 2017. It operates in specific areas (Artibonite/North-West) and its influence keeps on growing.Kokorat San Ras is well known for its use of violent attacks and physical aggression in order to gain control of more areas. During those attacks, rape and other violence against women are a common weapon.Kokorat San Ras is therefore responsible for serious human rights abuses, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 22.7.2024
33. Onsong County MSS Detention Centre Type of entity: detention centrePlace of registration: Onsong County, North Hamgyong Province, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Onsong County MSS Detention Centre is a detention facility in North Hamgyong Province of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).The facility is managed by the DPRK’s general police force, the Ministry of People’s Security (MPS), and is staffed by MPS state officials and correctional officers.In the Onsong County MSS Detention Centre, torture is an established part of the interrogation process, used to extract a full confession of those arbitrarily detained.Examples of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment include the prolonged denial of food, starvation, denial of medical assistance, lack of hygiene, positional torture.Detainees in the Onsong County MSS Detention Centre are also subject to rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, such as enslavement, invasive body searches, forced abortions, and systematic targeting of women’s capacity to reproduce.The Onsong County MSS Detention Centre is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrest or detention, as well as other human rights violations, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 22.7.2024’
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 7 December 2020, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 (1).
(2) On 8 December 2020, in the Declaration by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the European Union regarding the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, the Union and its Member States reaffirmed their strong commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights around the world. The EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime underscores the Union’s determination to enhance its role in addressing serious human rights violations and abuses worldwide. Achieving the effective enjoyment of human rights by everyone is a strategic goal of the Union. Respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights are fundamental values of the Union and its common foreign and security policy.
(3) In its conclusions of 14 November 2022, the Council expressed concern about the disproportionate effect that armed conflicts continue to have on women and girls worldwide, as well as the prevalence of sexual and gender-based violence including conflict-related sexual violence, offline and online. It committed to enhanced efforts to counter such violence in order to ensure full accountability and to combat impunity. Furthermore, in its conclusions of June 2014, the Council had stressed that combating and eliminating all forms of violence against women requires coordinated policies at all relevant levels and a comprehensive approach targeting the key issues of prevention, under-reporting, protection, victim support, and the prosecution of perpetrators as well as other measures. The strategic use of restrictive measures reinforces this approach by increasing pressure to prevent further violations and abuses and, in coordination with other Union instruments in the human rights toolbox, draws attention to these violations and abuses and those responsible.
(4) In that context, four persons and two entities should be included in the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999.
(5) Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 should therefore be amended accordingly,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

The Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 is amended as follows:

(1) the following entries are added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies under heading ‘A. Natural persons’:

Names (Transliteration into Latin script)
Names
Identifying information
Reasons for listing
Date of listing
‘115. Abdel Karim Mohammad IBRAHIM
عبد الكريم محمود إبراهيم
(Arabic spelling)
Position(s): Chief of staff of the Syrian Army
POB: Tartous, Syria
Nationality: Syrian
Gender: male
Abdel Karim Mohammad Ibrahim is the chief of staff of the Syrian Army.
The Syrian state, including its military, commits systematic and widespread torture, rape and sexual and gender-based violence against civilians.
As the chief of staff of the Syrian Army, Abdel Karim Mohammad Ibrahim is responsible for the actions of the armed forces under his command.
Therefore, Abdel Karim Mohammad Ibrahim is responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture and systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence.
22.7.2024 116. Ali Mahmoud ABBAS
علي محمود عباس
(Arabic spelling)
Position(s): Minister of Defence and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Army
DOB: 2.11.1964
POB: Rif Dimashq, Syria
Nationality: Syrian
Gender: male
Ali Mahmoud Abbas has been the Minister of Defence of Syria and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Army since 2022. The Syrian state, including its military, commits systematic and widespread torture, rape as well as sexual and gender-based violence against civilians.
As the Minister of Defense of Syria and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Army, Ali Mahmoud Abbas is responsible for the actions of the armed forces under his command.
Therefore, Ali Mahmoud Abbas is responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture and systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence.
22.7.2024 117. RI Chang Dae

Position(s): Minister of State Security
Nationality: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)
Gender: male
Ri Chang Dae has been the Minister of State Security in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) since 2022. Women and girls showing opposition to the regime or held in detention or prison centres in DPRK are systematically targeted by violence, particularly under the guard of the Ministry of State Security and in centres run by that Ministry.
As head of the Ministry of State Security, Ri Chang Dae is responsible for numerous acts of sexual and gender-based violence committed by officials of that Ministry.
Ri Chang Dae is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence.
22.7.2024
118*.
Evgeniy Aleksandrovich SOBOLEV
a.k.a. Yevhen Oleksandrovich SOBOLEV
Евгений Александрович Соболев
(Russian spelling)
Position(s): Head of the penitentiary service of the Russian occupation authorities in the Kherson region
DOB: 25.7.1985
POB: Nova Kakhovka, Kherson region, Ukraine
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
Passport No.: 3125216313
Evgeniy Sobolev is the head of the penitentiary service of the Russian occupation authorities in the Kherson region.
Under his command, a widespread and systematic pattern of human rights violations in detention facilities in areas under the control of the Russian occupation authorities, including the Kherson region, has been documented.
This pattern includes torture, and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and sexual and gender-based violence. The practices involved include rape, forced nudity, genital electrocution and threats of genital mutilation.
Persons suspected of passing information to the Ukrainian authorities, or of supporting the Ukrainian armed forces, have been specifically targeted.
In his capacity as head of the penitentiary service of the Russian occupational authorities in the Kherson region, Evgeniy Sobolev is responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment and other human rights violations, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence.
22.7.2024’

(2) the following entries are added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies under heading ‘B. Legal persons, entities and bodies’:

Name (Transliteration into Latin script)
Name
Identifying information
Reasons for listing
Date of listing
‘32. Kokorat San Ras

Type of entity: Haitian gang operating mostly in the Artibonite and North West region
Kokorat San Ras is a gang operating in Haiti that came into existence and gained strength between 2015 and 2017. It operates in specific areas (Artibonite/North-West) and its influence keeps on growing.
Kokorat San Ras is well known for its use of violent attacks and physical aggression in order to gain control of more areas. During those attacks, rape and other violence against women are a common weapon.
Kokorat San Ras is therefore responsible for serious human rights abuses, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence.
22.7.2024 33. Onsong County MSS Detention Centre

Type of entity: detention centre
Place of registration: Onsong County, North Hamgyong Province, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)
Onsong County MSS Detention Centre is a detention facility in North Hamgyong Province of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
The facility is managed by the DPRK’s general police force, the Ministry of People’s Security (MPS), and is staffed by MPS state officials and correctional officers.
In the Onsong County MSS Detention Centre, torture is an established part of the interrogation process, used to extract a full confession of those arbitrarily detained.
Examples of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment include the prolonged denial of food, starvation, denial of medical assistance, lack of hygiene, positional torture.
Detainees in the Onsong County MSS Detention Centre are also subject to rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, such as enslavement, invasive body searches, forced abortions, and systematic targeting of women’s capacity to reproduce.
The Onsong County MSS Detention Centre is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrest or detention, as well as other human rights violations, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence.
22.7.2024’

Council Decision (EU) 2024/2006 of 17 June 2024 on the signing, on behalf of the Union, and provisional application of the Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and Canada, of the other part, on the participation of Canada in Union programmes

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2006 26.7.2024
(1) By letter dated 21 June 2021, Canada expressed its formal interest in becoming associated to Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2021-2027) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council(1)(‘the Horizon Europe Programme’).
(2) On 9 September 2022, the Council adopted Decision (EU) 2022/1526(2), authorising the opening of negotiations with Canada, on behalf of the Union, for an agreement on the general principles for the participation of Canada in Union programmes and on the association of Canada to the Horizon Europe Programme.
(3) The negotiations have been completed, and the Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and Canada, of the other part, on the participation of Canada in Union programmes (‘the Agreement’) was initialled on 17 November 2022. The conclusion of the negotiations was officially announced at the EU-Canada summit held on 23 and 24 November 2023 in St John’s, Canada.
(4) With a view to establishing a lasting framework for cooperation between the Union and Canada, the Agreement sets out the terms and conditions for the participation of Canada in the Union programmes or activities that are opened to the participation of Canada in accordance with the basic acts establishing those Union programmes or activities. Under the Agreement, the Union will carry out cooperation measures with Canada pursuant to Article 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
(5) Pursuant to Article 1 of the Agreement, the specific terms and conditions applicable to the participation of Canada in any Union programme or activity are subject to the adoption of protocols to the Agreement.
(6) Pursuant to Article 3(3) of the Agreement, the specific terms and conditions for participation of Canada in the Horizon Europe Programme are laid down in the Protocol on the association of Canada to Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2021-2027) (‘the Protocol on the association of Canada to Horizon Europe’).
(7) In line with the Council’s mandate, the Protocol on the association of Canada to Horizon Europe was negotiated in parallel to the Agreement and, pursuant to Article 19(14) of the Agreement, forms an integral part thereof. Canada should participate as an associated country in Pillar II (Global Challenges and European Industrial Competitiveness) of the Horizon Europe Programme.
(8) Canada fulfils the criteria set out in Article 16(1), point (d), of Regulation (EU) 2021/695.
(9) The Agreement complies with Article 16(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/695, which requires that the association to the Horizon Europe Programme of the third countries under Article 16(1), point (d), of that Regulation be in accordance with the conditions laid down in an agreement covering the participation of such a country or territory to any Union programme, provided that the agreement: ensures a fair balance as regards the contributions and benefits of the third country participating in the Union programmes; lays down the conditions of participation in the Union programmes, including the calculation of financial contributions to individual programmes, and their administrative costs; does not confer on the third country any decision-making power in respect of the Union programme; and guarantees the rights of the Union to ensure sound financial management and to protect the Union’s financial interests.
(10) The Agreement should be signed.
(11) With a view to ensuring timely cooperation between the Union and Canada in the field of research, technological development and innovation and allowing for the participation of Canadian entities in the Horizon Europe Programme, the Agreement should be applied on a provisional basis, pending the completion of the procedures necessary for its entry into force.
(12) In accordance with the Treaties, the Commission should ensure the signing of the Agreement, subject to its conclusion,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Articles 186 and 212, in conjunction with Article 218(5), thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Whereas:
(1) By letter dated 21 June 2021, Canada expressed its formal interest in becoming associated to Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2021-2027) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) (‘the Horizon Europe Programme’).
(2) On 9 September 2022, the Council adopted Decision (EU) 2022/1526 (2), authorising the opening of negotiations with Canada, on behalf of the Union, for an agreement on the general principles for the participation of Canada in Union programmes and on the association of Canada to the Horizon Europe Programme.
(3) The negotiations have been completed, and the Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and Canada, of the other part, on the participation of Canada in Union programmes (‘the Agreement’) was initialled on 17 November 2022. The conclusion of the negotiations was officially announced at the EU-Canada summit held on 23 and 24 November 2023 in St John’s, Canada.
(4) With a view to establishing a lasting framework for cooperation between the Union and Canada, the Agreement sets out the terms and conditions for the participation of Canada in the Union programmes or activities that are opened to the participation of Canada in accordance with the basic acts establishing those Union programmes or activities. Under the Agreement, the Union will carry out cooperation measures with Canada pursuant to Article 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
(5) Pursuant to Article 1 of the Agreement, the specific terms and conditions applicable to the participation of Canada in any Union programme or activity are subject to the adoption of protocols to the Agreement.
(6) Pursuant to Article 3(3) of the Agreement, the specific terms and conditions for participation of Canada in the Horizon Europe Programme are laid down in the Protocol on the association of Canada to Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2021-2027) (‘the Protocol on the association of Canada to Horizon Europe’).
(7) In line with the Council’s mandate, the Protocol on the association of Canada to Horizon Europe was negotiated in parallel to the Agreement and, pursuant to Article 19(14) of the Agreement, forms an integral part thereof. Canada should participate as an associated country in Pillar II (Global Challenges and European Industrial Competitiveness) of the Horizon Europe Programme.
(8) Canada fulfils the criteria set out in Article 16(1), point (d), of Regulation (EU) 2021/695.
(9) The Agreement complies with Article 16(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/695, which requires that the association to the Horizon Europe Programme of the third countries under Article 16(1), point (d), of that Regulation be in accordance with the conditions laid down in an agreement covering the participation of such a country or territory to any Union programme, provided that the agreement: ensures a fair balance as regards the contributions and benefits of the third country participating in the Union programmes; lays down the conditions of participation in the Union programmes, including the calculation of financial contributions to individual programmes, and their administrative costs; does not confer on the third country any decision-making power in respect of the Union programme; and guarantees the rights of the Union to ensure sound financial management and to protect the Union’s financial interests.
(10) The Agreement should be signed.
(11) With a view to ensuring timely cooperation between the Union and Canada in the field of research, technological development and innovation and allowing for the participation of Canadian entities in the Horizon Europe Programme, the Agreement should be applied on a provisional basis, pending the completion of the procedures necessary for its entry into force.
(12) In accordance with the Treaties, the Commission should ensure the signing of the Agreement, subject to its conclusion,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The signing on behalf of the Union of the Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and Canada, of the other part, on the participation of Canada in Union programmes (‘the Agreement’) is hereby authorised, subject to the conclusion of the said Agreement (3).
The Commission shall ensure the signing of the Agreement, subject to its conclusion.
The Agreement shall be applied on a provisional basis in accordance with Article 19(2) thereof, pending the completion of the procedures necessary for its entry into force.
The Commission shall give the notification provided for in Article 19(2) of the Agreement on behalf of the Union.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2003 of 22 July 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/2110 on the European Union CSDP Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUAM RCA)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2003 23.7.2024
(1) On 9 December 2019, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2019/2110(1), which established the European Union CSDP Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUAM RCA) with an initial mandate until 8 August 2022, 2 years after the launch of EUAM RCA.
(2) On 28 July 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/1333(2), which extended the mandate of EUAM RCA until 9 August 2024.
(3) It is necessary to extend the mandate of EUAM RCA until 31 October 2024 to allow for the completion of the strategic assessment of the EU Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA) and of EUAM RCA.
(4) Decision (CFSP) 2019/2110 should be amended accordingly.
(5) EUAM RCA will be conducted in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union’s external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union,
(1) in Article 13(1), the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:‘The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to EUAM RCA for the period from 9 August 2022 until 31 October 2024 shall be EUR 28 400 000.’.
(2) in Article 17, the last sentence is replaced by the following:‘The mandate of EUAM RCA shall end on 31 October 2024.’.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union and in particular Article 42(4) and Article 43(2) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 9 December 2019, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2019/2110 (1), which established the European Union CSDP Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUAM RCA) with an initial mandate until 8 August 2022, 2 years after the launch of EUAM RCA.
(2) On 28 July 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/1333 (2), which extended the mandate of EUAM RCA until 9 August 2024.
(3) It is necessary to extend the mandate of EUAM RCA until 31 October 2024 to allow for the completion of the strategic assessment of the EU Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA) and of EUAM RCA.
(4) Decision (CFSP) 2019/2110 should be amended accordingly.
(5) EUAM RCA will be conducted in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union’s external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Decision (CFSP) 2019/2110 is amended as follows:

(1) in Article 13(1), the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:
‘The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to EUAM RCA for the period from 9 August 2022 until 31 October 2024 shall be EUR 28 400 000.’.
(2) in Article 17, the last sentence is replaced by the following:
‘The mandate of EUAM RCA shall end on 31 October 2024.’.

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Council Decision (EU) 2024/2001 of 16 July 2024 amending Decision 1999/70/EC concerning the external auditors of the national central banks, as regards the external auditors of the Banque de France

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2001 19.7.2024
(1) The accounts of the European Central Bank (ECB) and of the national central banks of the Member States whose currency is the euro are to be audited by independent external auditors recommended by the Governing Council of the ECB and approved by the Council of the European Union.
(2) The mandate of the current external auditors of the Banque de France, Mazars and KPMG S.A., will end following the audit for the financial year 2023. It is therefore necessary to appoint external auditors from the financial year 2024 onwards.
(3) The Banque de France has selected Mazars S.A. and Deloitte & Associés S.A.S. as its external auditors for the financial years 2024 to 2029.
(4) The Governing Council of the ECB has recommended that Mazars S.A. and Deloitte & Associés S.A.S. be appointed as the external auditors of the Banque de France for the financial years 2024 to 2029.
(5) Following the recommendation of the Governing Council of the ECB, Council Decision 1999/70/EC(2)should be amended accordingly,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to Protocol No 4 on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 27.1 thereof,
Having regard to the Recommendation of the European Central Bank of 4 June 2024 to the Council of the European Union on the external auditors of the Banque de France (ECB/2024/15) (1),
Whereas:
(1) The accounts of the European Central Bank (ECB) and of the national central banks of the Member States whose currency is the euro are to be audited by independent external auditors recommended by the Governing Council of the ECB and approved by the Council of the European Union.
(2) The mandate of the current external auditors of the Banque de France, Mazars and KPMG S.A., will end following the audit for the financial year 2023. It is therefore necessary to appoint external auditors from the financial year 2024 onwards.
(3) The Banque de France has selected Mazars S.A. and Deloitte & Associés S.A.S. as its external auditors for the financial years 2024 to 2029.
(4) The Governing Council of the ECB has recommended that Mazars S.A. and Deloitte & Associés S.A.S. be appointed as the external auditors of the Banque de France for the financial years 2024 to 2029.
(5) Following the recommendation of the Governing Council of the ECB, Council Decision 1999/70/EC (2) should be amended accordingly,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
In Article 1 of Decision 1999/70/EC, paragraph 4 is replaced by the following:

‘4. Mazars S.A. and Deloitte & Associés S.A.S. are hereby approved as the external auditors of the Banque de France for the financial years 2024 to 2029.’.

This Decision shall take effect on the date of its notification.
This Decision is addressed to the European Central Bank.

Commission Decision (EU) 2024/1997 of 22 July 2024 amending Decision (EU) 2021/156 renewing the mandate of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/1997 24.7.2024
(1) Commission Decision (EU) 2021/156(2)renewed the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies’ (‘EGE’) mandate for an indefinite period to ensure that it continues to provide independent advice at horizontal level to the Commission on all Union policies and legislation where ethical, societal and fundamental rights dimensions intersect with the development of science and new technologies, either at the request of the Commission or on its own initiative and in agreement with the Commission.
(2) Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council(3), pursues the objective, among others, to deliver on the Union’s strategic priorities and to contribute to the realisation of Union objectives and policies, which – in line with Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union – aim to promote peace, the Union’s values and the well-being of its peoples. Article 3(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/695 stipulates that the specific objective of the Programme is, inter alia, to generate knowledge supporting and implementing Union policies to address global challenges. Article 12(6) establishes that the budget of Horizon Europe, the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, may also cover expenses for preparation, monitoring, control, audit, evaluation and other activities and expenditures necessary for managing and implementing the Horizon Europe Programme, including all administrative expenditures, as well as evaluating the achievement of its objectives. It may also cover, in so far as they are related to the objectives of the Programme, expenses relating to studies, to meetings of experts, information and communication actions. The EGE provides advice fulfilling the objectives of Horizon Europe.
(3) The EGE’s activities are essential to the development and monitoring of Union policies or legislation by the Commission as they support the integration of fundamental rights and values into Union policies in the areas of the development of science and new technologies. The EGE is established to this specific end and is tasked with providing guidance critical for the development, implementation and monitoring of Union policies or legislation in the form of analyses and recommendations, presented in Opinions and Statements and oriented towards the promotion of ethical Union policymaking. The guidance provided by the EGE is developed in response to requests from the Commission on specific challenges faced, or on the EGE’s own initiative on the basis of its identification of specific challenges that the Commission may address. The advice of the EGE has come to cover a wide range of areas and challenges of increasing complexity. The interaction between policy demand and the EGE’s advice should be further strengthened, and the independent nature, quality, integrity and transparency of its advice to the Commission should continue to be ensured at the highest standards. Therefore, adequate financial support should be provided in the form of a special allowance for the members of the EGE, in parallel to the reimbursement of travel and subsistence expenses.
(4) The EGE should be composed of highly qualified and independent experts, appointed in their personal capacity, acting independently and in the public interest. For their selection the Commission is assisted by an independent Identification Committee. Selection takes place on the basis of objective criteria, following an open call for applications. Adequate financial support should also be provided to the members of the Identification Committee in the form of a special allowance to compensate them for their essential work in maintaining the integrity of the EGE in the context of the selection of the EGE members.
(5) The EGE should designate a chairperson and one or two deputy-chairpersons for a duration of up to their term of office.
(6) The responsible Commission department should be able to convene meetings of the EGE not only in person but also online to take into account the new working arrangements introduced in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and the policy on Greening the Commission.
(7) The EGE Roundtable events should no longer be linked to the development of an Opinion, so that they may be organised when relevant and possible.
(8) Decision (EU) 2021/156 should therefore be amended accordingly,
(1) In Article 5, paragraph 4 is replaced by the following:‘The selection process shall be overseen by an Identification Committee. In particular, the Identification Committee shall assist the Commission in identifying and selecting potential members of the EGE and in assessing their availability and willingness to serve as such. The Identification Committee shall consist of three members, appointed on the basis of their relevant experience by the member of the Commission responsible for the Commission department providing the secretariat of the EGE and supported by a secretariat provided by the responsible Commission department. The Identification Committee shall make an assessment of the eligible candidates from the list submitted by the responsible Commission department on the basis of an initial assessment of all applications against the selection criteria. The Identification Committee shall submit its recommendation to the member of the Commission responsible for the Commission department providing the secretariat of the EGE.’
(2) Article 6 is replaced by the following:‘The EGE shall elect a chairperson and one or two deputy-chairpersons from amongst its members for the duration of up to their term of office by simple majority.’
(3) In Article 7, paragraph 7 is replaced by the following:‘7.   The meetings of the EGE shall be held on Commission premises, via videoconference or in hybrid mode, in accordance with the modalities and the calendar fixed by the responsible Commission department. The EGE shall meet between four to six times during a 12-month period. Further meetings may be organised when necessary, in agreement with the responsible Commission department.’
(4) In Article 7, paragraph 9 is replaced by the following:‘9.   The responsible Commission department shall organise a public round table in order to promote dialogue and improve transparency for the issues on which the EGE is working. The EGE shall establish close links with the Commission departments concerned by issues on which the EGE is working.’
(5) Article 13 is replaced by the following:‘Article 13Special allowances and meeting expenses1.   The members of the EGE shall be paid EUR 450 for each day of full attendance at a plenary meeting, EUR 225 for partial attendance, and EUR 225/450 for each half/full day of additional work in the service of the EGE. They shall not have an employment relationship with the Commission. The special allowances shall be paid to the members of the EGE, of its sub-groups and of the Identification Committee under Article 5(4) of this Decision according to Article 21(2) of the horizontal rules.2.   The members of the EGE may be asked by the Commission to devote up to 40 working days (including meetings and work) per year to these tasks. For the chairperson and deputy-chairpersons the maximum number is 60 working days.3.   Travel and subsistence expenses incurred by participants in the activities of the EGE and its sub-groups and by the members of the Identification Committee under Article 5(4) of this Decision shall be reimbursed by the Commission. Reimbursement shall be made in accordance with the rates provided under Article 13 of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations(4)and within the limits of the available appropriations allocated to the Commission services under the annual procedure for the allocation of resources.’
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Commission Decision of 30 May 2016 establishing horizontal rules on the creation and operation of Commission expert groups (1),
Whereas:
(1) Commission Decision (EU) 2021/156 (2) renewed the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies’ (‘EGE’) mandate for an indefinite period to ensure that it continues to provide independent advice at horizontal level to the Commission on all Union policies and legislation where ethical, societal and fundamental rights dimensions intersect with the development of science and new technologies, either at the request of the Commission or on its own initiative and in agreement with the Commission.
(2) Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3), pursues the objective, among others, to deliver on the Union’s strategic priorities and to contribute to the realisation of Union objectives and policies, which – in line with Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union – aim to promote peace, the Union’s values and the well-being of its peoples. Article 3(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/695 stipulates that the specific objective of the Programme is, inter alia, to generate knowledge supporting and implementing Union policies to address global challenges. Article 12(6) establishes that the budget of Horizon Europe, the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, may also cover expenses for preparation, monitoring, control, audit, evaluation and other activities and expenditures necessary for managing and implementing the Horizon Europe Programme, including all administrative expenditures, as well as evaluating the achievement of its objectives. It may also cover, in so far as they are related to the objectives of the Programme, expenses relating to studies, to meetings of experts, information and communication actions. The EGE provides advice fulfilling the objectives of Horizon Europe.
(3) The EGE’s activities are essential to the development and monitoring of Union policies or legislation by the Commission as they support the integration of fundamental rights and values into Union policies in the areas of the development of science and new technologies. The EGE is established to this specific end and is tasked with providing guidance critical for the development, implementation and monitoring of Union policies or legislation in the form of analyses and recommendations, presented in Opinions and Statements and oriented towards the promotion of ethical Union policymaking. The guidance provided by the EGE is developed in response to requests from the Commission on specific challenges faced, or on the EGE’s own initiative on the basis of its identification of specific challenges that the Commission may address. The advice of the EGE has come to cover a wide range of areas and challenges of increasing complexity. The interaction between policy demand and the EGE’s advice should be further strengthened, and the independent nature, quality, integrity and transparency of its advice to the Commission should continue to be ensured at the highest standards. Therefore, adequate financial support should be provided in the form of a special allowance for the members of the EGE, in parallel to the reimbursement of travel and subsistence expenses.
(4) The EGE should be composed of highly qualified and independent experts, appointed in their personal capacity, acting independently and in the public interest. For their selection the Commission is assisted by an independent Identification Committee. Selection takes place on the basis of objective criteria, following an open call for applications. Adequate financial support should also be provided to the members of the Identification Committee in the form of a special allowance to compensate them for their essential work in maintaining the integrity of the EGE in the context of the selection of the EGE members.
(5) The EGE should designate a chairperson and one or two deputy-chairpersons for a duration of up to their term of office.
(6) The responsible Commission department should be able to convene meetings of the EGE not only in person but also online to take into account the new working arrangements introduced in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and the policy on Greening the Commission.
(7) The EGE Roundtable events should no longer be linked to the development of an Opinion, so that they may be organised when relevant and possible.
(8) Decision (EU) 2021/156 should therefore be amended accordingly,
HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:
Decision (EU) 2021/156 is amended as follows:

(1) In Article 5, paragraph 4 is replaced by the following:
‘The selection process shall be overseen by an Identification Committee. In particular, the Identification Committee shall assist the Commission in identifying and selecting potential members of the EGE and in assessing their availability and willingness to serve as such. The Identification Committee shall consist of three members, appointed on the basis of their relevant experience by the member of the Commission responsible for the Commission department providing the secretariat of the EGE and supported by a secretariat provided by the responsible Commission department. The Identification Committee shall make an assessment of the eligible candidates from the list submitted by the responsible Commission department on the basis of an initial assessment of all applications against the selection criteria. The Identification Committee shall submit its recommendation to the member of the Commission responsible for the Commission department providing the secretariat of the EGE.’

(2) Article 6 is replaced by the following:
‘The EGE shall elect a chairperson and one or two deputy-chairpersons from amongst its members for the duration of up to their term of office by simple majority.’

(3) In Article 7, paragraph 7 is replaced by the following:
‘7. The meetings of the EGE shall be held on Commission premises, via videoconference or in hybrid mode, in accordance with the modalities and the calendar fixed by the responsible Commission department. The EGE shall meet between four to six times during a 12-month period. Further meetings may be organised when necessary, in agreement with the responsible Commission department.’
(4) In Article 7, paragraph 9 is replaced by the following:
‘9. The responsible Commission department shall organise a public round table in order to promote dialogue and improve transparency for the issues on which the EGE is working. The EGE shall establish close links with the Commission departments concerned by issues on which the EGE is working.’
(5) Article 13 is replaced by the following:
‘Article 13
Special allowances and meeting expenses 1. The members of the EGE shall be paid EUR 450 for each day of full attendance at a plenary meeting, EUR 225 for partial attendance, and EUR 225/450 for each half/full day of additional work in the service of the EGE. They shall not have an employment relationship with the Commission. The special allowances shall be paid to the members of the EGE, of its sub-groups and of the Identification Committee under Article 5(4) of this Decision according to Article 21(2) of the horizontal rules. 2. The members of the EGE may be asked by the Commission to devote up to 40 working days (including meetings and work) per year to these tasks. For the chairperson and deputy-chairpersons the maximum number is 60 working days. 3. Travel and subsistence expenses incurred by participants in the activities of the EGE and its sub-groups and by the members of the Identification Committee under Article 5(4) of this Decision shall be reimbursed by the Commission. Reimbursement shall be made in accordance with the rates provided under Article 13 of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations (4) and within the limits of the available appropriations allocated to the Commission services under the annual procedure for the allocation of resources.’

Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1984 of 15 July 2024 in support of the Institutional Transitional Planning for Non-Routine Missions and Investigative Capacities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/1984 16.7.2024
(1) On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (the ‘EU Strategy’).
(2) The EU Strategy underlines the crucial role of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (the ‘Chemical Weapons Convention’, ‘CWC’) and of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (the ‘OPCW’) in creating a world free of chemical weapons. As part of the EU Strategy, the Union committed to working towards universal adherence to key disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements, including the CWC.
(3) Since 2004, the Union has supported the activities of the OPCW through the following Joint Actions and Council Decisions: Council Joint Action 2004/797/CFSP(1); Council Joint Action 2005/913/CFSP(2); Council Joint Action 2007/185/CFSP(3); Council Joint Action 2007/185/CFSP; Council Decision 2009/569/CFSP(4); Council Decision 2012/166/CFSP(5); Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/259(6); Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/538(7); Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1026(8)amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1515(9); Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2073(10)and Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1344(11).
(4) The continued consistent and targeted assistance by the Union to the OPCW is warranted in the context of the active implementation of Chapter III of the EU Strategy. There is a specific need for further support to strengthening the OPCW’s investigative capacities in the framework of its institutional transitional planning for non-routine missions, as well as transferring collected evidentiary information with a view to enabling international accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria.
(5) The Union should therefore adopt this Decision in order to provide the necessary support.
(6) The OPCW technical Secretariat should be entrusted with the technical implementation of the activities to be carried out under this Decision,
— Integration of knowledge and expertise for investigative methodologies, protocols and activities (e.g. deployments etc.);
— Continued compliance with evidentiary information sharing, as mandated in paragraph 12 of OPCW Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 of 26-28 June 2018, entitled ‘Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use’, to preserve and provide information to relevant investigatory entities.
— Integration of knowledge and expertise for investigative methodologies, protocols and activities (e.g., deployments etc.);
— Continued compliance with evidentiary information sharing, as mandated in C-SS-4/DEC.3 (para 12), to preserve and provide information to relevant investigatory entities.
— Output 1: Integration of OPCW’s preparedness and response capacities institutionally for any new chemical weapons use or allegation thereof and to new and/or emergent risks. With the following indicative activities:—Transition of secured information from investigations to an integrated platform under a knowledge information plan, aligned with new/revised OPCW institutional functions and organigramme.—Development and testing of a learning portfolio (trainings, material such as compendium, best practices, etc.) related to chemical weapons use or allegations thereof for OPCW knowledge transfer and sharing (to include topics of relevant expertise that provides detail reflecting OPCW’s specialisation gained from the conduct of investigations in the Syrian Arab Republic such as: conduct of witness/states parties/victim interviews; alleged chemical weapons use scene management; investigative case management and legal preparation; chain of custody management, etc.). — Transition of secured information from investigations to an integrated platform under a knowledge information plan, aligned with new/revised OPCW institutional functions and organigramme. — Development and testing of a learning portfolio (trainings, material such as compendium, best practices, etc.) related to chemical weapons use or allegations thereof for OPCW knowledge transfer and sharing (to include topics of relevant expertise that provides detail reflecting OPCW’s specialisation gained from the conduct of investigations in the Syrian Arab Republic such as: conduct of witness/states parties/victim interviews; alleged chemical weapons use scene management; investigative case management and legal preparation; chain of custody management, etc.).
— Transition of secured information from investigations to an integrated platform under a knowledge information plan, aligned with new/revised OPCW institutional functions and organigramme.
— Development and testing of a learning portfolio (trainings, material such as compendium, best practices, etc.) related to chemical weapons use or allegations thereof for OPCW knowledge transfer and sharing (to include topics of relevant expertise that provides detail reflecting OPCW’s specialisation gained from the conduct of investigations in the Syrian Arab Republic such as: conduct of witness/states parties/victim interviews; alleged chemical weapons use scene management; investigative case management and legal preparation; chain of custody management, etc.).
— Transition of secured information from investigations to an integrated platform under a knowledge information plan, aligned with new/revised OPCW institutional functions and organigramme.
— Development and testing of a learning portfolio (trainings, material such as compendium, best practices, etc.) related to chemical weapons use or allegations thereof for OPCW knowledge transfer and sharing (to include topics of relevant expertise that provides detail reflecting OPCW’s specialisation gained from the conduct of investigations in the Syrian Arab Republic such as: conduct of witness/states parties/victim interviews; alleged chemical weapons use scene management; investigative case management and legal preparation; chain of custody management, etc.).
— Output 2: Enabling and strengthening the transfer of evidentiary information to the International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) in relation to issued reports of the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) on the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, in line with C-SS-4/ DEC.3 para 12, and in support of international accountability for the use of chemical weapons. With the following indicative activities:—Creation of an enabling environment to manage progress across report ‘teams’ with shared services covering provision and preservation of information from IIT reports for transfer to the IIIM—Provision and preservation of information from the First IIT report covering use of chemical weapons use in Ltamenah for transfer based on requests from the IIIM including identification, review, redaction, verification of consent, transfer, and archival processes for the initial submission, follow up responses and archival of all relevant incident files.—Provision and preservation of information from the Second IIT report covering use of chemical weapons use in Saraqib for transfer based on requests from the IIIM including identification, review, redaction, verification of consent, transfer, and archival processes for all incident files.—Provision and preservation of information from the Third IIT report covering use of chemical weapons use in Douma for transfer based on requests from the IIIM including identification, review, redaction, verification of consent, transfer, and archival processes for all incident files.—Provision and preservation of information from the Fourth IIT report covering use of chemical weapons use in Marea for transfer based on requests from the IIIM including identification, review, redaction, verification of consent, transfer, and archival processes for all incident files. — Creation of an enabling environment to manage progress across report ‘teams’ with shared services covering provision and preservation of information from IIT reports for transfer to the IIIM — Provision and preservation of information from the First IIT report covering use of chemical weapons use in Ltamenah for transfer based on requests from the IIIM including identification, review, redaction, verification of consent, transfer, and archival processes for the initial submission, follow up responses and archival of all relevant incident files. — Provision and preservation of information from the Second IIT report covering use of chemical weapons use in Saraqib for transfer based on requests from the IIIM including identification, review, redaction, verification of consent, transfer, and archival processes for all incident files. — Provision and preservation of information from the Third IIT report covering use of chemical weapons use in Douma for transfer based on requests from the IIIM including identification, review, redaction, verification of consent, transfer, and archival processes for all incident files. — Provision and preservation of information from the Fourth IIT report covering use of chemical weapons use in Marea for transfer based on requests from the IIIM including identification, review, redaction, verification of consent, transfer, and archival processes for all incident files.
— Creation of an enabling environment to manage progress across report ‘teams’ with shared services covering provision and preservation of information from IIT reports for transfer to the IIIM
— Provision and preservation of information from the First IIT report covering use of chemical weapons use in Ltamenah for transfer based on requests from the IIIM including identification, review, redaction, verification of consent, transfer, and archival processes for the initial submission, follow up responses and archival of all relevant incident files.
— Provision and preservation of information from the Second IIT report covering use of chemical weapons use in Saraqib for transfer based on requests from the IIIM including identification, review, redaction, verification of consent, transfer, and archival processes for all incident files.
— Provision and preservation of information from the Third IIT report covering use of chemical weapons use in Douma for transfer based on requests from the IIIM including identification, review, redaction, verification of consent, transfer, and archival processes for all incident files.
— Provision and preservation of information from the Fourth IIT report covering use of chemical weapons use in Marea for transfer based on requests from the IIIM including identification, review, redaction, verification of consent, transfer, and archival processes for all incident files.
— Creation of an enabling environment to manage progress across report ‘teams’ with shared services covering provision and preservation of information from IIT reports for transfer to the IIIM
— Provision and preservation of information from the First IIT report covering use of chemical weapons use in Ltamenah for transfer based on requests from the IIIM including identification, review, redaction, verification of consent, transfer, and archival processes for the initial submission, follow up responses and archival of all relevant incident files.
— Provision and preservation of information from the Second IIT report covering use of chemical weapons use in Saraqib for transfer based on requests from the IIIM including identification, review, redaction, verification of consent, transfer, and archival processes for all incident files.
— Provision and preservation of information from the Third IIT report covering use of chemical weapons use in Douma for transfer based on requests from the IIIM including identification, review, redaction, verification of consent, transfer, and archival processes for all incident files.
— Provision and preservation of information from the Fourth IIT report covering use of chemical weapons use in Marea for transfer based on requests from the IIIM including identification, review, redaction, verification of consent, transfer, and archival processes for all incident files.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (the ‘EU Strategy’).
(2) The EU Strategy underlines the crucial role of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (the ‘Chemical Weapons Convention’, ‘CWC’) and of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (the ‘OPCW’) in creating a world free of chemical weapons. As part of the EU Strategy, the Union committed to working towards universal adherence to key disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements, including the CWC.
(3) Since 2004, the Union has supported the activities of the OPCW through the following Joint Actions and Council Decisions: Council Joint Action 2004/797/CFSP (1); Council Joint Action 2005/913/CFSP (2); Council Joint Action 2007/185/CFSP (3); Council Joint Action 2007/185/CFSP; Council Decision 2009/569/CFSP (4); Council Decision 2012/166/CFSP (5); Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/259 (6); Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/538 (7); Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1026 (8) amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1515 (9); Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2073 (10) and Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1344 (11).
(4) The continued consistent and targeted assistance by the Union to the OPCW is warranted in the context of the active implementation of Chapter III of the EU Strategy. There is a specific need for further support to strengthening the OPCW’s investigative capacities in the framework of its institutional transitional planning for non-routine missions, as well as transferring collected evidentiary information with a view to enabling international accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria.
(5) The Union should therefore adopt this Decision in order to provide the necessary support.
(6) The OPCW technical Secretariat should be entrusted with the technical implementation of the activities to be carried out under this Decision,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
1. With a view to the implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Union shall support the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction through an operational action.

2. The objectives of the action referred to in paragraph 1 shall be:
—
Integration of knowledge and expertise for investigative methodologies, protocols and activities (e.g. deployments etc.);
—
Continued compliance with evidentiary information sharing, as mandated in paragraph 12 of OPCW Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 of 26-28 June 2018, entitled ‘Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use’, to preserve and provide information to relevant investigatory entities.

3. A detailed description of the action referred to in paragraph 1 is set out in the Project Document.

1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘HR’) shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.

2. The technical implementation of the action referred to in Article 1 shall be carried out by the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW.

3. The OPCW shall perform the task referred to in paragraph 2 under the responsibility of the HR. For that purpose, the HR shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the OPCW.

1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the actions referred to in Article 1 shall be EUR 1 605 447,56.
2. The expenditure financed by the reference amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the rules and procedures applicable to the general budget of the Union.

3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure financed by the reference amount set out in paragraph 1. For that purpose, it shall conclude a contribution agreement with the OPCW. The contribution agreement shall stipulate that the OPCW is to ensure the visibility of the Union’s contribution, appropriate to its size.

4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of the conclusion of the agreement.

1. The HR shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular reports by the OPCW. The reports shall form the basis of the evaluation carried out by the Council.

2. The Commission shall provide information on the financial aspects of the implementation of the actions referred to in Article 1.

1. This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

2. This Decision shall expire 24 months after the conclusion of the agreement referred to in Article 3(3). However, it shall expire six months after the date of its entry into force if no agreement has been concluded within that period.

1.   Background and Rationale

In December 2003, the European Union (EU) adopted the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (EU Strategy), in which it recognised the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction to international peace and security. The EU Strategy underlines the crucial role of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and of the OPCW in creating a world free of chemical weapons. The objectives of the EU Strategy are complementary to those of the CWC. The EU and the OPCW, since the adoption of the EU Strategy, have pursued cooperation including engagement through a series of Joint Actions and Decisions. (1)
The OPCW has received consistent support from the EU in the implementation of its mandate, reflecting a continued commitment to the full implementation of the CWC, with 43,6M EUR of voluntary contributions through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Joint Actions and Decisions approved since 2004. The OPCW welcomes the EU’s continued commitment to supporting OPCW’s efforts to fulfil the goal of the Convention – a world free of chemical weapons, thus contributing to international peace and security. The OPCW further recognises EU support through financing since 2004 covering varied areas such as: application of the verification regime and destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, promotion of universality, implementation of the CWC by States Parties, international cooperation for chemical activities, preparedness to prevent and respond to attacks involving toxic chemicals, developments in the field of science and technology, cyber security, construction of the OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology, situation awareness and satellite imagery products, and addressing the threats of chemical weapons use. Furthermore, recognising emerging challenges in countering re-emergence of chemical weapons, the OPCW also welcomes the EU’s sustained interest in strengthening its support to the institutionalisation of OPCW’s investigative and verification capacities.
Following the end of the destruction of all declared chemical weapons stockpiles in July 2023, the OPCW has continued its adaptation to the post-destruction phase. Accordingly, the Secretariat of the OPCW has initiated a knowledge mapping for processes related to ensuring retention of the Secretariat capacities related to effective response to use of chemical weapons and allegations thereof.
This proposal is to be considered in conjunction with the Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1344, 26 June 2023, (EU2023), and the activities under Output 3 (‘Effective responses to allegations of chemical weapons use’). Activities in the Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1344, are primarily in relation to the conduct of pending/on-going investigations. This proposal focuses on obligations and activities occurring after the conclusion of investigations and issuance of reports.
The proposal for 2024 CFSP funding is aligned with the OPCW and Technical Secretariat’s priorities associated with knowledge acquisition, expertise integration, with the detailing of information security processes and procedures to date, as well as in response to the risk of developments in science and technology which impact chemical weapons use and the threats thereof. In concrete terms, the proposal seeks to capture the outcomes of the conduct of independent and impartial investigative activities, and, inter alia, the related documentation obligations mandated under the decision of the Conference of the States Parties C-SS-4/DEC.3, para 12, adopted on 27 June 2018, and C-28/Dec.12 adopted on 30 November 2023. In furtherance of efforts made by the Secretariat in implementing modalities under para 21 of C-SS-4/DEC.3, and in line with para 2 of C-28/Dec.12, the Conference of States Parties has requested the Secretariat to continue efforts to sustain and build its capabilities to investigate allegations of use of chemical weapons, including through the further development of tools and methodologies such as those related to forensics, witness interviews, evidence collection, chain of custody, the planning and conduct of regular training and other relevant exercises, the integration and retention of knowledge, skills and expertise accumulated through the conduct of previous missions, and by any other means the Director-General deems necessary and appropriate.
The OPCW 2024-2025 Biennial Programme and Budget was adopted at the 28th Conference of States Parties (27 Nov – 1 Dec 2023). It includes the ongoing transformation of the Inspectorate Division. This adaptation seeks to incorporate and integrate the knowledge and expertise gained through non-routine missions conducted in Syria and beyond, so as to embed this distinctive capacity through trainings within the relevant existing Secretariat structures and respond in the benefit of States Parties upon request. This transition period will require complementary voluntary contributions, of which the EU proposal will partially finance, in addition to resources available through the 2024-2025 Programme and Budget to accelerate the implementation of the below objectives and activities, as well as through the use of the OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology.
2. Overall Objectives of the Proposed Action

The overall objective of the EU Council Decision would be to strengthen the Secretariat’s capacity to respond effectively and credibly to chemical weapons use and allegations thereof. Such support would contribute to the implementation of OPCW’s mandates. It would also enable timely participation in the implementation of OPCW’s obligations under the CWC, in relation to international accountability efforts against the use of chemical weapons.
3. Specific Objectives of the Action

—
Integration of knowledge and expertise for investigative methodologies, protocols and activities (e.g., deployments etc.);

—
Continued compliance with evidentiary information sharing, as mandated in C-SS-4/DEC.3 (para 12), to preserve and provide information to relevant investigatory entities.

4. Expected Outputs of the Action

—
Output 1: Integration of OPCW’s preparedness and response capacities institutionally for any new chemical weapons use or allegation thereof and to new and/or emergent risks. With the following indicative activities:
—
Transition of secured information from investigations to an integrated platform under a knowledge information plan, aligned with new/revised OPCW institutional functions and organigramme.
—
Development and testing of a learning portfolio (trainings, material such as compendium, best practices, etc.) related to chemical weapons use or allegations thereof for OPCW knowledge transfer and sharing (to include topics of relevant expertise that provides detail reflecting OPCW’s specialisation gained from the conduct of investigations in the Syrian Arab Republic such as: conduct of witness/states parties/victim interviews; alleged chemical weapons use scene management; investigative case management and legal preparation; chain of custody management, etc.).

—
Output 2: Enabling and strengthening the transfer of evidentiary information to the International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) in relation to issued reports of the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) on the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, in line with C-SS-4/ DEC.3 para 12, and in support of international accountability for the use of chemical weapons. With the following indicative activities:
—
Creation of an enabling environment to manage progress across report ‘teams’ with shared services covering provision and preservation of information from IIT reports for transfer to the IIIM
—
Provision and preservation of information from the First IIT report covering use of chemical weapons use in Ltamenah for transfer based on requests from the IIIM including identification, review, redaction, verification of consent, transfer, and archival processes for the initial submission, follow up responses and archival of all relevant incident files.
—
Provision and preservation of information from the Second IIT report covering use of chemical weapons use in Saraqib for transfer based on requests from the IIIM including identification, review, redaction, verification of consent, transfer, and archival processes for all incident files.
—
Provision and preservation of information from the Third IIT report covering use of chemical weapons use in Douma for transfer based on requests from the IIIM including identification, review, redaction, verification of consent, transfer, and archival processes for all incident files.
—
Provision and preservation of information from the Fourth IIT report covering use of chemical weapons use in Marea for transfer based on requests from the IIIM including identification, review, redaction, verification of consent, transfer, and archival processes for all incident files.

5. Final Beneficiaries

Beneficiaries include: OPCW Secretariat personnel and teams; and CWC stakeholders including States Parties, National Authorities, Civil Society, International and Intergovernmental Organisations, etc.
6. Duration

Expenditures funded through this project are expected to be incurred and concluded over a 24-month implementation period.

(1) Inclusive of Joint Action 2004/797/CFSP (expired); Joint Action 2005/913/CFSP (expired); Joint Action 2007/185/CFSP (expired); Decision 2009/569/CFSP (expired); Joint Action 2012/166/CFSP (expired); Decision 2013/726/CFSP (expired); Decision 2015/259 (extended with Decision 2018/294 and expired); Decision (CFSP) 2015/2215 (expired); Decision 2017/2302 (extended with Decision 2019/1092, expired); Decision 2017/2303 (extended with Decision 2018/1943 and Decision 2019/2112, expired); Decision 2019/538 (extended with Decision 2022/573, expired); Decision 2021/1026 (extended with Decision 2023/1515, in force through August 2024), and Decision 2021/2073 (in force through Dec 2025); Decision 2023/1344 (in force through June 2026).

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1983 of 18 July 2024 on the harmonisation of the 40,5-43,5 GHz frequency band for terrestrial systems capable of providing wireless broadband electronic communications services in the Union (notified under document C(2024) 1520)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/1983 22.7.2024
(1) Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council(2)(‘European Electronic Communications Code’) refers to the need for further study of the 40,5-43,5 GHz frequency band in the context of ensuring increased coordinated availabilities of radio spectrum to achieve very high speed fixed and wireless networks. That Directive also requires Member States to promote the harmonisation of use of radio spectrum by electronic communications networks and services across the Union,inter alia, by pursuing wireless broadband coverage of their national territory and population at high quality and speed, as well as coverage of major national and European transport paths.
(2) The 40,5-43,5 GHz (‘42 GHz’) frequency band was harmonised globally for International Mobile Telecommunications(3)(IMT) at the 2019 World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC-19) through amending the Radio Regulations of the International Telecommunication Union’s Radiocommunication Sector (ITU-R). The relevant amendment to the Radio Regulations stipulates measures to ensure coexistence between IMT systems, including 5G, and Fixed Satellite Service (FSS) as well as the Radio Astronomy Service (RAS) within the 42 GHz frequency band.
(3) The Commission’s Communication ‘Connectivity for a Competitive Digital Single Market – Towards a European Gigabit Society’(4)sets out ambitious connectivity objectives for the Union, which were updated with the Commission Communication ‘2030 Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade’(5)and further supported by Decision (EU) 2022/2481 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6)establishing the Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030. Those connectivity objectives are to be achieved through the widespread deployment and take-up of very high capacity networks. The Commission’s Communication ‘5G for Europe: An Action Plan’(7)identifies coordinated actions at Union level, including the identification and harmonisation of radio spectrum for 5G on the basis of the opinion of the Radio Spectrum Policy Group (RSPG), in order to ensure uninterrupted 5G coverage in all urban areas and major terrestrial transport paths by 2025.
(4) The RSPG has adopted three opinions on a strategic spectrum roadmap for 5G in Europe(8), in which,inter alia, it highlighted the need for implementation of frequency bands above 24 GHz to meet the high capacity performance targets of 5G, and identified the 42 GHz frequency band as a priority in terms of studies for second stage mm-wave 5G bands for terrestrial wireless networks in the Union. The RSPG considered the 42 GHz frequency band as a viable option for 5G in the longer term, taking into account the need for a general balance between the provision of terrestrial mobile and satellite services within the 40-50 GHz frequency range.
(5) The 42 GHz frequency band provides high capacity allowing for innovative next generation (including 5G) wireless broadband (WBB) electronic communications services (ECS) based on small cells(9)and using large block sizes of at least 200 MHz. The use of that frequency band appears suitable, in this context, for hotspots in urban and suburban areas.
(6) While the 42 GHz frequency band is allocated to the Fixed Service (FS) in the Member States of the Union(10)and used for terrestrial fixed wireless connections (‘fixed links’), flexibility of spectrum use is required to ensure coexistence between WBB ECS, including 5G, and fixed links.
(7) The 42 GHz frequency band is also used for satellite services across the Member States of the Union. That use comprises the 40,5-42,5 GHz frequency range for space-to-Earth communications and the 42,5-43,5 GHz frequency range for Earth-to-space communications, thus supporting receiving and transmitting FSS earth stations, respectively. The adjacent 39,5-40,5 GHz frequency band is allocated to both FSS and Mobile Satellite Service (MSS) for space-to-Earth communications. The latter frequency band is to be used by both coordinated and uncoordinated receiving satellite earth stations (both FSS and MSS). Therefore, those satellite earth stations should be appropriately protected against interference from terrestrial WBB ECS.
(8) The 42,5-43,5 GHz frequency band is further used for systems in the RAS which should be appropriately protected against interference from terrestrial WBB ECS.
(9) Next-generation terrestrial systems providing WBB ECS, including 5G, should be deployed within the 42 GHz frequency band under harmonised technical conditions in the Union. Those conditions should safeguard the continued operation and potential future development of systems in the relevant incumbent FS, RAS and FSS within this band. Those conditions should equally ensure that such existing and future systems do not have a significant negative impact on the deployment and coverage of next-generation (5G) terrestrial wireless systems.
(10) Pursuant to Article 4(2) of Decision 676/2002/EC, on 14 April 2020, the Commission issued a mandate to the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) to develop least restrictive harmonised technical conditions suitable for next-generation (5G) terrestrial wireless systems for priority frequency bands above 24 GHz, including the 42 GHz frequency band.
(11) In response to that mandate, on 18 November 2022 the CEPT issued a report(11)(‘CEPT Report 82’) specifying the least restrictive harmonised technical conditions in the 42 GHz frequency band, based on the concept of a Block Edge Mask (BEM), for the introduction of next-generation (5G) terrestrial wireless systems in that band, in compliance with the principles of technology and service neutrality. Those technical conditions are consistent with 5G standardisation developments in particular regarding the channelling arrangements(12)and the use of active antenna systems (AAS), and are therefore conducive to global harmonisation.
(12) The harmonised technical conditions in the CEPT Report 82 assume synchronised operation of neighbouring terrestrial WBB ECS systems of different operators and knowledge of the location of the WBB ECS base stations. Unsynchronised or semi-synchronised operation of neighbouring terrestrial WBB ECS systems requires further studies in order to develop relevant harmonised technical conditions but remains possible with geographical separation and may be subject to additional appropriate mitigation measures applicable at national level.
(13) The harmonised technical conditions provided in the CEPT Report 82 for the use of the 42 GHz frequency band for terrestrial systems providing WBB ECS are based on the assumption of hotspot deployment and an authorisation regime where the locations of the WBB ECS base stations (transmitters and receivers) are known. Additional measures at national level may be needed for an authorisation regime where the locations of WBB ECS base stations are not known in advance of an installation, in order to ensure appropriate coexistence of those services with other services in this band and in adjacent bands, while still respecting the least restrictive harmonised technical conditions set out in the Annex to this Decision. Such additional measures are provided in Annex 3 to the CEPT Report 82.
(14) The CEPT Report 82 also provides guidance for the use of the 42 GHz frequency band for terrestrial WBB ECS (including 5G) in order to ensure protection of FS, FSS and RAS within this band, as well as of FS, FSS and MSS in adjacent bands.
(15) Coexistence between terrestrial systems providing WBB ECS (including 5G) and FSS earth stations operating in the 42 GHz frequency band, and in the adjacent 39,5-40,5 GHz frequency band, can be ensured by applying, where appropriate, technical constraints to the deployment of WBB ECS base stations in a limited geographical area around a satellite earth station. Coexistence measures should be considered between FSS earth stations and WBB ECS base stations where they are near each other, recognising that WBB ECS base stations are expected to be deployed primarily in densely populated areas.
(16) In line with Directive 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council(13), compliance of WBB ECS base stations and terminal stations with the out-of-band emissions’ limits below 40,5 GHz and above 43,5 GHz should be based on the assumptions referred to in the CEPT Report 82(14).
(17) In addition, the CEPT has developed technical guidelines(15)(16)to support the introduction of terrestrial systems providing WBB ECS in the 42 GHz frequency band, while allowing in a proportionate way the continued use of FSS receiving and transmitting earth stations in the relevant portions of the 42 GHz frequency band, as well as coexistence with FSS receiving earth stations in the adjacent 39,5-40,5 GHz frequency band. Those technical guidelines can facilitate coexistence in fulfilling the obligations under this Decision.
(18) Coexistence between terrestrial systems providing WBB ECS (including 5G) and satellite receivers in the FSS within the 42 GHz frequency band is currently feasible, subject to technical conditions that address the antenna elevation of the WBB ECS base stations, noting also the applicable provisions of the Radio Regulations of the ITU-R.
(19) Coexistence between terrestrial systems providing WBB ECS (including 5G) and fixed links within the 42 GHz frequency band is feasible on a case-by-case basis, subject to coordination at national level between both services, if deployed in the same area and in the same frequency range.
(20) The CEPT Report 82 does not address the usage of the 42 GHz frequency band for the provision of WBB ECS to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as drones.
(21) Specific measures, such as establishing geographical separation distances and exclusion zones, may be required at national level on a case-by-case basis to ensure the protection of stations in the RAS operating in the 42,5-43,5 GHz frequency band.
(22) Cross-border frequency coordination agreements among Member States as well as between Member States and third countries may be necessary to avoid harmful interference and to improve spectrum efficiency and convergence in spectrum use, in compliance with Article 28 of Directive (EU) 2018/1972.
(23) Member States should take up the 42 GHz frequency band for next-generation terrestrial (5G) wireless broadband electronic communications services based on legally binding harmonised technical conditions in accordance with the CEPT Report 82 and in line with the Union’s policy objectives.
(24) The notion of ‘designating and making available’ the 42 GHz frequency band in the context of this Decision refers to the following steps: (i) the adaptation of the national legal framework on frequency allocation to include the intended use of this band under the harmonised technical conditions set in this Decision, (ii) the initiation of all necessary measures in order to ensure coexistence with existing use in this band to the extent necessary, (iii) the initiation of the appropriate measures, supported by the launch of a stakeholder consultation process where appropriate, in order to allow the use of this band in accordance with the applicable legal framework at Union level, including the harmonised technical conditions of this Decision. Subsequent to this, Member States should allow the use of the 42 GHz frequency band pursuant to Directive (EU) 2018/1972, in particular, Article 53 thereof.
(25) Pursuant to Article 4(3) of Decision 676/2002/EC, the Commission should set a deadline to the Member States for the implementation of this Decision. Besides, following the obligation laid down in Article 7 of Decision 676/2002/EC, Member States should provide the Commission with all information necessary for the purpose of verifying the implementation of this Decision. This should apply in particular as regards the gradual introduction and development of terrestrial 5G services in the 42 GHz frequency band and any coexistence issues, to help the timely review and the assessment of its impact at Union level. Such review should also address the suitability of the technical conditions to ensure adequate protection of other services, taking into account the development of terrestrial systems providing WBB ECS, including 5G.
(26) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Radio Spectrum Committee,
(a) systems in the Radio Astronomy Service operating within the 42,5-43,5 GHz frequency band;
(b) satellite systems in the Fixed Satellite Service operating within the 40,5-42,5 GHz frequency band for space-to-Earth communications and within the 42,5-43,5 GHz frequency band for Earth-to-space communications;
(c) satellite systems in the Fixed Satellite Service and Mobile Satellite Service operating within the 39,5-40,5 GHz frequency band for space-to-Earth communications.
(1) ‘active antenna systems (AAS)’means a base station and an antenna system where the amplitude and/or phase between antenna elements is continually adjusted, resulting in an antenna pattern that varies in response to short term changes in the radio environment. This excludes long-term beam shaping such as fixed electrical down tilt. In AAS base stations the antenna system is integrated as part of the base station system or product;
(2) ‘synchronised operation’means operation of two or more different time division duplex (TDD) networks, where simultaneous uplink (UL) and downlink (DL) transmissions do not occur, that is at any given moment in time either all networks transmit in downlink or all networks transmit in uplink. This requires the alignment of all DL and UL transmissions for all TDD networks involved as well as synchronising the beginning of the frame across all networks;
(3) ‘unsynchronised operation’means operation of two or more different TDD networks, where at any given moment in time at least one network transmits in DL while at least one network transmits in UL. This might happen if the TDD networks either do not align all DL and UL transmissions or do not synchronise at the beginning of the frame;
(4) ‘semi-synchronised operation’means operation of two or more different TDD networks, where part of the frame is consistent with synchronised operation, while the remaining portion of the frame is consistent with unsynchronised operation. This requires the adoption of a frame structure for all TDD networks involved, including slots where the UL/DL direction is not specified, as well as synchronising the beginning of the frame across all networks;
(5) ‘equivalent isotropically radiated power (EIRP)’is the product of the power supplied to the antenna and the antenna gain in a given direction relative to an isotropic antenna (absolute or isotropic gain);
(6) ‘total radiated power (TRP)’ is a measure of how much power a composite antenna radiates. It equals the total conducted power input into the antenna array system less any losses in the antenna array system. TRP means the integral of the power transmitted in different directions over the entire radiation sphere as shown in the formula:
(1) The duplex mode of operation in the 40,5-43,5 GHz frequency band shall be TDD.
(2) The assigned block size shall be a multiple of 200 MHz. A smaller block size of 50 MHz or 100 MHz or 150 MHz, adjacent to the assigned block of another spectrum user, is also possible to ensure efficient use of the whole frequency band.
(3) The technical conditions contained in this Annex are essential to address the mutual coexistence of terrestrial systems capable of providing wireless broadband electronic communications services (WBB ECS) and the coexistence of such systems with space station receivers in the Fixed Satellite Service (FSS) within the 42,5-43,5 GHz frequency band.
(4) Base station and terminal station transmission within the 40,5-43,5 GHz frequency band shall be in compliance with the technical conditions set out in this Annex.
(5) The harmonised technical conditions provided below are based on the assumption of hotspot deployment and an authorisation regime where the locations of the WBB ECS base stations (both transmitters and receivers) are known. In order to implement the necessary protection for systems referred to in Article 3, additional measures at national level may be required for an authorisation regime where the locations of WBB ECS base stations are not known in advance of an installation(1), while still respecting the harmonised technical conditions for WBB ECS set out in this Annex.
(6) Additional measures may be required at national level, in order to ensure appropriate protection of receiving satellite earth stations operating within the 40,5-42,5 GHz frequency band and, if needed, within the adjacent 39,5-40,5 GHz frequency band, and of systems in the Radio Astronomy Service (RAS) within the 42,5-43,5 GHz frequency band, as well as to ensure the coexistence of terrestrial systems capable of providing WBB ECS with terrestrial fixed links(2).
(7) For WBB ECS base stations, the protection of adjacent services below 40,5 GHz and above 43,5 GHz is provided through relevant out-of-band limits, which are derived in accordance with ETSI TS 138 104 V17.6.0 (table 9.7.4.3.3-2)(3).
(8) For terminal stations, the protection of adjacent services is provided by the requirements of ETSI TS 138.101-2 V.17.6.0 (table 6.5.2.1-1).
BEM Element Definition
In-block Assigned spectrum block for which the BEM is derived.
Baseline Spectrum within the 40,5-43,5 GHz frequency band used for terrestrial systems capable of providing WBB ECS, not including the operator’s block under consideration and the corresponding transitional regions.
Transitional region Spectrum adjacent to an operator’s block.
Frequency range Maximum TRP Measurement bandwidth
Up to 50 MHz below or above an operator’s block 12 dBm 50 MHz
Frequency range Maximum TRP Measurement bandwidth
Baseline 4 dBm 50 MHz
Requirement on elevation of the main beam of AAS outdoor base stations
When deploying such base stations, it shall be ensured that each antenna is normally transmitting only with the main beam pointing below the horizon and in addition the antenna shall have mechanical pointing below the horizon except when the base station is only receiving.
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Decision No 676/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a regulatory framework for radio spectrum policy in the European Community (Radio Spectrum Decision) (1), and in particular Article 4(3) thereof,
Whereas:
(1) Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) (‘European Electronic Communications Code’) refers to the need for further study of the 40,5-43,5 GHz frequency band in the context of ensuring increased coordinated availabilities of radio spectrum to achieve very high speed fixed and wireless networks. That Directive also requires Member States to promote the harmonisation of use of radio spectrum by electronic communications networks and services across the Union, inter alia, by pursuing wireless broadband coverage of their national territory and population at high quality and speed, as well as coverage of major national and European transport paths.
(2) The 40,5-43,5 GHz (‘42 GHz’) frequency band was harmonised globally for International Mobile Telecommunications (3) (IMT) at the 2019 World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC-19) through amending the Radio Regulations of the International Telecommunication Union’s Radiocommunication Sector (ITU-R). The relevant amendment to the Radio Regulations stipulates measures to ensure coexistence between IMT systems, including 5G, and Fixed Satellite Service (FSS) as well as the Radio Astronomy Service (RAS) within the 42 GHz frequency band.
(3) The Commission’s Communication ‘Connectivity for a Competitive Digital Single Market – Towards a European Gigabit Society’ (4) sets out ambitious connectivity objectives for the Union, which were updated with the Commission Communication ‘2030 Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade’ (5) and further supported by Decision (EU) 2022/2481 of the European Parliament and of the Council (6) establishing the Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030. Those connectivity objectives are to be achieved through the widespread deployment and take-up of very high capacity networks. The Commission’s Communication ‘5G for Europe: An Action Plan’ (7) identifies coordinated actions at Union level, including the identification and harmonisation of radio spectrum for 5G on the basis of the opinion of the Radio Spectrum Policy Group (RSPG), in order to ensure uninterrupted 5G coverage in all urban areas and major terrestrial transport paths by 2025.
(4) The RSPG has adopted three opinions on a strategic spectrum roadmap for 5G in Europe (8), in which, inter alia, it highlighted the need for implementation of frequency bands above 24 GHz to meet the high capacity performance targets of 5G, and identified the 42 GHz frequency band as a priority in terms of studies for second stage mm-wave 5G bands for terrestrial wireless networks in the Union. The RSPG considered the 42 GHz frequency band as a viable option for 5G in the longer term, taking into account the need for a general balance between the provision of terrestrial mobile and satellite services within the 40-50 GHz frequency range.
(5) The 42 GHz frequency band provides high capacity allowing for innovative next generation (including 5G) wireless broadband (WBB) electronic communications services (ECS) based on small cells (9) and using large block sizes of at least 200 MHz. The use of that frequency band appears suitable, in this context, for hotspots in urban and suburban areas.
(6) While the 42 GHz frequency band is allocated to the Fixed Service (FS) in the Member States of the Union (10) and used for terrestrial fixed wireless connections (‘fixed links’), flexibility of spectrum use is required to ensure coexistence between WBB ECS, including 5G, and fixed links.
(7) The 42 GHz frequency band is also used for satellite services across the Member States of the Union. That use comprises the 40,5-42,5 GHz frequency range for space-to-Earth communications and the 42,5-43,5 GHz frequency range for Earth-to-space communications, thus supporting receiving and transmitting FSS earth stations, respectively. The adjacent 39,5-40,5 GHz frequency band is allocated to both FSS and Mobile Satellite Service (MSS) for space-to-Earth communications. The latter frequency band is to be used by both coordinated and uncoordinated receiving satellite earth stations (both FSS and MSS). Therefore, those satellite earth stations should be appropriately protected against interference from terrestrial WBB ECS.
(8) The 42,5-43,5 GHz frequency band is further used for systems in the RAS which should be appropriately protected against interference from terrestrial WBB ECS.
(9) Next-generation terrestrial systems providing WBB ECS, including 5G, should be deployed within the 42 GHz frequency band under harmonised technical conditions in the Union. Those conditions should safeguard the continued operation and potential future development of systems in the relevant incumbent FS, RAS and FSS within this band. Those conditions should equally ensure that such existing and future systems do not have a significant negative impact on the deployment and coverage of next-generation (5G) terrestrial wireless systems.
(10) Pursuant to Article 4(2) of Decision 676/2002/EC, on 14 April 2020, the Commission issued a mandate to the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) to develop least restrictive harmonised technical conditions suitable for next-generation (5G) terrestrial wireless systems for priority frequency bands above 24 GHz, including the 42 GHz frequency band.
(11) In response to that mandate, on 18 November 2022 the CEPT issued a report (11) (‘CEPT Report 82’) specifying the least restrictive harmonised technical conditions in the 42 GHz frequency band, based on the concept of a Block Edge Mask (BEM), for the introduction of next-generation (5G) terrestrial wireless systems in that band, in compliance with the principles of technology and service neutrality. Those technical conditions are consistent with 5G standardisation developments in particular regarding the channelling arrangements (12) and the use of active antenna systems (AAS), and are therefore conducive to global harmonisation.
(12) The harmonised technical conditions in the CEPT Report 82 assume synchronised operation of neighbouring terrestrial WBB ECS systems of different operators and knowledge of the location of the WBB ECS base stations. Unsynchronised or semi-synchronised operation of neighbouring terrestrial WBB ECS systems requires further studies in order to develop relevant harmonised technical conditions but remains possible with geographical separation and may be subject to additional appropriate mitigation measures applicable at national level.
(13) The harmonised technical conditions provided in the CEPT Report 82 for the use of the 42 GHz frequency band for terrestrial systems providing WBB ECS are based on the assumption of hotspot deployment and an authorisation regime where the locations of the WBB ECS base stations (transmitters and receivers) are known. Additional measures at national level may be needed for an authorisation regime where the locations of WBB ECS base stations are not known in advance of an installation, in order to ensure appropriate coexistence of those services with other services in this band and in adjacent bands, while still respecting the least restrictive harmonised technical conditions set out in the Annex to this Decision. Such additional measures are provided in Annex 3 to the CEPT Report 82.
(14) The CEPT Report 82 also provides guidance for the use of the 42 GHz frequency band for terrestrial WBB ECS (including 5G) in order to ensure protection of FS, FSS and RAS within this band, as well as of FS, FSS and MSS in adjacent bands.
(15) Coexistence between terrestrial systems providing WBB ECS (including 5G) and FSS earth stations operating in the 42 GHz frequency band, and in the adjacent 39,5-40,5 GHz frequency band, can be ensured by applying, where appropriate, technical constraints to the deployment of WBB ECS base stations in a limited geographical area around a satellite earth station. Coexistence measures should be considered between FSS earth stations and WBB ECS base stations where they are near each other, recognising that WBB ECS base stations are expected to be deployed primarily in densely populated areas.
(16) In line with Directive 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (13), compliance of WBB ECS base stations and terminal stations with the out-of-band emissions’ limits below 40,5 GHz and above 43,5 GHz should be based on the assumptions referred to in the CEPT Report 82 (14).
(17) In addition, the CEPT has developed technical guidelines (15) (16) to support the introduction of terrestrial systems providing WBB ECS in the 42 GHz frequency band, while allowing in a proportionate way the continued use of FSS receiving and transmitting earth stations in the relevant portions of the 42 GHz frequency band, as well as coexistence with FSS receiving earth stations in the adjacent 39,5-40,5 GHz frequency band. Those technical guidelines can facilitate coexistence in fulfilling the obligations under this Decision.
(18) Coexistence between terrestrial systems providing WBB ECS (including 5G) and satellite receivers in the FSS within the 42 GHz frequency band is currently feasible, subject to technical conditions that address the antenna elevation of the WBB ECS base stations, noting also the applicable provisions of the Radio Regulations of the ITU-R.
(19) Coexistence between terrestrial systems providing WBB ECS (including 5G) and fixed links within the 42 GHz frequency band is feasible on a case-by-case basis, subject to coordination at national level between both services, if deployed in the same area and in the same frequency range.
(20) The CEPT Report 82 does not address the usage of the 42 GHz frequency band for the provision of WBB ECS to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as drones.
(21) Specific measures, such as establishing geographical separation distances and exclusion zones, may be required at national level on a case-by-case basis to ensure the protection of stations in the RAS operating in the 42,5-43,5 GHz frequency band.
(22) Cross-border frequency coordination agreements among Member States as well as between Member States and third countries may be necessary to avoid harmful interference and to improve spectrum efficiency and convergence in spectrum use, in compliance with Article 28 of Directive (EU) 2018/1972.
(23) Member States should take up the 42 GHz frequency band for next-generation terrestrial (5G) wireless broadband electronic communications services based on legally binding harmonised technical conditions in accordance with the CEPT Report 82 and in line with the Union’s policy objectives.
(24) The notion of ‘designating and making available’ the 42 GHz frequency band in the context of this Decision refers to the following steps: (i) the adaptation of the national legal framework on frequency allocation to include the intended use of this band under the harmonised technical conditions set in this Decision, (ii) the initiation of all necessary measures in order to ensure coexistence with existing use in this band to the extent necessary, (iii) the initiation of the appropriate measures, supported by the launch of a stakeholder consultation process where appropriate, in order to allow the use of this band in accordance with the applicable legal framework at Union level, including the harmonised technical conditions of this Decision. Subsequent to this, Member States should allow the use of the 42 GHz frequency band pursuant to Directive (EU) 2018/1972, in particular, Article 53 thereof.
(25) Pursuant to Article 4(3) of Decision 676/2002/EC, the Commission should set a deadline to the Member States for the implementation of this Decision. Besides, following the obligation laid down in Article 7 of Decision 676/2002/EC, Member States should provide the Commission with all information necessary for the purpose of verifying the implementation of this Decision. This should apply in particular as regards the gradual introduction and development of terrestrial 5G services in the 42 GHz frequency band and any coexistence issues, to help the timely review and the assessment of its impact at Union level. Such review should also address the suitability of the technical conditions to ensure adequate protection of other services, taking into account the development of terrestrial systems providing WBB ECS, including 5G.
(26) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Radio Spectrum Committee,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
This Decision establishes the essential harmonised technical conditions for the availability and efficient use of the 40,5-43,5 GHz frequency band in the Union for terrestrial systems capable of providing wireless broadband electronic communications services.
Member States shall designate and make available on a non-exclusive basis the 40,5-43,5 GHz frequency band for terrestrial systems capable of providing wireless broadband electronic communications services, in compliance with the technical conditions set out in the Annex.
Member States shall ensure that, in compliance with the technical conditions set out in the Annex, the terrestrial systems referred to in Article 1 protect the following systems appropriately and do not constrain their future evolution and development:

(a) systems in the Radio Astronomy Service operating within the 42,5-43,5 GHz frequency band;
(b) satellite systems in the Fixed Satellite Service operating within the 40,5-42,5 GHz frequency band for space-to-Earth communications and within the 42,5-43,5 GHz frequency band for Earth-to-space communications;
(c) satellite systems in the Fixed Satellite Service and Mobile Satellite Service operating within the 39,5-40,5 GHz frequency band for space-to-Earth communications.

Member States shall ensure the coexistence of the terrestrial systems referred to in Article 1 with the continued operation of terrestrial fixed links within the 40,5-43,5 GHz frequency band, based on frequency coordination at national level. Member States may also enable the future evolution and development of terrestrial fixed links within the 40,5-43,5 GHz frequency band at national level.
Under the condition that the number and locations of new satellite earth stations are determined so as not to impose disproportionate constraints on the systems referred to in Article 1, and subject to market demand for such stations, Member States shall ensure the continued deployment and operation of satellite earth stations providing Fixed Satellite Service within the 40,5-43,5 GHz frequency band.
Member States shall facilitate cross-border coordination agreements to enable operation of the terrestrial systems referred to in Article 1, taking into account existing regulatory procedures and rights applicable under relevant international agreements.
Member States shall implement this Decision by 31 December 2026.
Member States shall provide the Commission with all necessary information on the implementation of this Decision immediately after the adoption of the relevant national measures.
Member States shall monitor the use of the 40,5-43,5 GHz frequency band, including the progress on coexistence between the terrestrial systems referred to in Article 1 and other systems using that band, and report their findings to the Commission upon request or on their own initiative to allow for a timely review of this Decision.
This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

1.   DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this Decision, the following definitions apply:

(1) ‘active antenna systems (AAS)’
means a base station and an antenna system where the amplitude and/or phase between antenna elements is continually adjusted, resulting in an antenna pattern that varies in response to short term changes in the radio environment. This excludes long-term beam shaping such as fixed electrical down tilt. In AAS base stations the antenna system is integrated as part of the base station system or product;

(2) ‘synchronised operation’
means operation of two or more different time division duplex (TDD) networks, where simultaneous uplink (UL) and downlink (DL) transmissions do not occur, that is at any given moment in time either all networks transmit in downlink or all networks transmit in uplink. This requires the alignment of all DL and UL transmissions for all TDD networks involved as well as synchronising the beginning of the frame across all networks;

(3) ‘unsynchronised operation’
means operation of two or more different TDD networks, where at any given moment in time at least one network transmits in DL while at least one network transmits in UL. This might happen if the TDD networks either do not align all DL and UL transmissions or do not synchronise at the beginning of the frame;

(4) ‘semi-synchronised operation’
means operation of two or more different TDD networks, where part of the frame is consistent with synchronised operation, while the remaining portion of the frame is consistent with unsynchronised operation. This requires the adoption of a frame structure for all TDD networks involved, including slots where the UL/DL direction is not specified, as well as synchronising the beginning of the frame across all networks;

(5) ‘equivalent isotropically radiated power (EIRP)’
is the product of the power supplied to the antenna and the antenna gain in a given direction relative to an isotropic antenna (absolute or isotropic gain);

(6) ‘total radiated power (TRP)’ is a measure of how much power a composite antenna radiates. It equals the total conducted power input into the antenna array system less any losses in the antenna array system. TRP means the integral of the power transmitted in different directions over the entire radiation sphere as shown in the formula:

where P(θ,φ) is the power radiated by an antenna array system in direction (θ,φ) given by the formula:

where PTx denotes the conducted power (measured in Watts), which is input to the array system, and g(θ,φ) denotes the array systems directional gain along the (θ, φ) direction.
2. GENERAL PARAMETERS

(1) The duplex mode of operation in the 40,5-43,5 GHz frequency band shall be TDD.

(2) The assigned block size shall be a multiple of 200 MHz. A smaller block size of 50 MHz or 100 MHz or 150 MHz, adjacent to the assigned block of another spectrum user, is also possible to ensure efficient use of the whole frequency band.

(3) The technical conditions contained in this Annex are essential to address the mutual coexistence of terrestrial systems capable of providing wireless broadband electronic communications services (WBB ECS) and the coexistence of such systems with space station receivers in the Fixed Satellite Service (FSS) within the 42,5-43,5 GHz frequency band.

(4) Base station and terminal station transmission within the 40,5-43,5 GHz frequency band shall be in compliance with the technical conditions set out in this Annex.

(5) The harmonised technical conditions provided below are based on the assumption of hotspot deployment and an authorisation regime where the locations of the WBB ECS base stations (both transmitters and receivers) are known. In order to implement the necessary protection for systems referred to in Article 3, additional measures at national level may be required for an authorisation regime where the locations of WBB ECS base stations are not known in advance of an installation (1), while still respecting the harmonised technical conditions for WBB ECS set out in this Annex.

(6) Additional measures may be required at national level, in order to ensure appropriate protection of receiving satellite earth stations operating within the 40,5-42,5 GHz frequency band and, if needed, within the adjacent 39,5-40,5 GHz frequency band, and of systems in the Radio Astronomy Service (RAS) within the 42,5-43,5 GHz frequency band, as well as to ensure the coexistence of terrestrial systems capable of providing WBB ECS with terrestrial fixed links (2).

(7) For WBB ECS base stations, the protection of adjacent services below 40,5 GHz and above 43,5 GHz is provided through relevant out-of-band limits, which are derived in accordance with ETSI TS 138 104 V17.6.0 (table 9.7.4.3.3-2) (3).

(8) For terminal stations, the protection of adjacent services is provided by the requirements of ETSI TS 138.101-2 V.17.6.0 (table 6.5.2.1-1).

Figure 1 provides an example of a possible channelling arrangement.

Figure 1

Example of a channelling arrangement within the 40,5-43,5 GHz frequency band

3. TECHNICAL CONDITIONS FOR BASE STATIONS – BLOCK EDGE MASK

The following technical parameters for base stations, called Block Edge Mask (BEM), are an essential component of conditions necessary to ensure coexistence between neighbouring networks capable of providing WBB ECS, in the absence of bilateral or multilateral agreements between operators of such neighbouring networks. Network operators of WBB ECS in the 40,5-43,5 GHz frequency band may agree bilaterally or multilaterally, on less stringent technical parameters, provided that they continue to comply with the technical conditions applicable for the protection of other services, applications or networks and with their obligations resulting from cross-border coordination. Member States shall ensure that those less stringent technical parameters can be used by agreement among all concerned parties.
A BEM is an emission mask that defines power levels as a function of frequency relative to the edge of a block of spectrum assigned to an operator. The BEM consists of several elements that are given in Table 1. The in-block power limit is applied to a block assigned to an operator. The baseline power limit ensures the protection of the spectrum of other operators within the 40,5-43,5 GHz frequency band. The transitional region power limit enables filter roll-off from the in-block to the baseline power limit in order to ensure coexistence with other operators in adjacent blocks. Both the baseline power limit and the transitional region power limit represent out-of-block BEM elements.
Figure 2 shows a general BEM applicable to the 40,5-43,5 GHz frequency band.

Figure 2

Illustration of a block edge mask

No harmonised in-block power limit is specified. Tables 2 and 3 assume synchronised operation. Unsynchronised or semi-synchronised operation necessitates the geographical separation of neighbouring networks, while additional appropriate mitigation measures applicable at national level may also be applied. Table 4 provides an additional technical condition for base stations to facilitate coexistence with satellite systems in the Earth-to-space FSS.

Table 1

Definition of BEM elements

BEM Element
Definition
In-block
Assigned spectrum block for which the BEM is derived.
Baseline
Spectrum within the 40,5-43,5 GHz frequency band used for terrestrial systems capable of providing WBB ECS, not including the operator’s block under consideration and the corresponding transitional regions.
Transitional region
Spectrum adjacent to an operator’s block.

Table 2

Base station transitional region power limit for synchronised operation

Frequency range
Maximum TRP
Measurement bandwidth
Up to 50 MHz below or above an operator’s block
12 dBm
50 MHz

Explanatory note

This limit ensures coexistence between wireless broadband electronic communications networks in adjacent block(s) within the 40,5-43,5 GHz frequency band in synchronised operation. Appropriate mitigation measures may be applied at national level in case of unsynchronised or semi-synchronised operations (4).

Table 3

Base station baseline power limit for synchronised operation

Frequency range
Maximum TRP
Measurement bandwidth
Baseline
4 dBm
50 MHz

Explanatory note

This limit ensures coexistence between wireless broadband electronic communications networks in non-adjacent blocks within the 40,5-43,5 GHz frequency band in synchronised operation. Appropriate mitigation measures may be applied at national level in case of unsynchronised or semi-synchronised operations (4).

Table 4

Additional conditions applying to AAS outdoor base stations

Requirement on elevation of the main beam of AAS outdoor base stations
When deploying such base stations, it shall be ensured that each antenna is normally transmitting only with the main beam pointing below the horizon and in addition the antenna shall have mechanical pointing below the horizon except when the base station is only receiving.

Explanatory note

The condition applies to the protection of space station receivers in the FSS (Earth-to-space).

(1) The implementation of sharing conditions implies the need for prior information on the existing or planned location of the interfering and/or the interfered system or on the distance between them.

(2) Guidance on such measures is provided in the ECC Recommendations (22)01 and (22)02.

(3) The values for those limits are: TRP of -5 dBm/MHz (0 ≤ Δf < 20 MHz), -13 dBm/MHz (20 MHz ≤ Δf 400 MHz.

(4) Relevant information is provided in ECC Report 307 ‘Toolbox for the most appropriate synchronisation regulatory framework including coexistence of MFCN in 24,25-27,5 GHz in unsynchronised and semi-synchronised mode’, approved on 6 March 2020.