Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/2078 of 31 July 2024 refusing the renewal of the authorisation of SmokEz Enviro-23 (SF-006) as a smoke flavouring primary product (notified under document C(2024) 3706)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2078 1.8.2024
(1) Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 provides that only smoke flavourings included in the Union list of authorised smoke flavouring primary products (‘the Union list’) may be placed on the market within the Union.
(2) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1321/2013(2)established the Union list. SmokEz Enviro-23 (SF-006) was included in that list with expiry date of the authorisation 1 January 2024.
(3) By letter dated 27 June 2022, Kerry Inc. informed the Commission that it had acquired the assets of Red Arrow Products Company LLC and that it now owns the rights for SmokEz Enviro-23 (SF-006).
(4) On 30 June 2022, the company Kerry Inc submitted an application for the renewal of the authorisation of SmokEz Enviro-23 (SF-006) as a smoke flavouring primary product.
(5) On 28 September 2023, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) adopted its scientific opinion on the safety of SmokEz Enviro-23 (SF-006)(3).
(6) In its scientific opinion, the Authority noted that SmokEz Enviro-23 (SF-006) contains the substances furan-2(5H)-one and benzene–1,2-diol and concluded that a concern for genotoxicity for those substances was identifiedin vivoupon oral administration. In line with the Authority’s statement on the genotoxicity assessment of chemical mixtures(4)and considering that the exposure estimates for those two components are above the threshold of toxicological concern (TTC) of 0,0025 μg/kg bw per day for DNA-reactive mutagens and/or carcinogens, the Authority concluded that SmokEz Enviro-23 (SF-006) raises concern with respect to genotoxicity. Furthermore, the Authority concluded that other four components in SmokEz Enviro-23 (SF-006) and the unidentified part thereof raise a potential concern for genotoxicity.
(7) Pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003, only smoke flavourings that do not present risks to human health may be authorised and placed on the market. It is therefore appropriate to refuse the renewal of the authorisation of SmokEz Enviro-23 (SF-006) as a smoke flavouring primary product.
(8) However, in order to allow food business operators to use SmokEz Enviro-23 (SF-006) as a smoke flavouring primary product for the production of foods to be placed on the market until 1 July 2029, as provided for in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2067(5), SmokEz Enviro-23 (SF-006) should be allowed to be placed on the market until that date.
(9) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 November 2003 on smoke flavourings used or intended for use in or on foods (1) , and in particular Article 12(3) thereof,
Whereas:
(1) Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 provides that only smoke flavourings included in the Union list of authorised smoke flavouring primary products (‘the Union list’) may be placed on the market within the Union.
(2) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1321/2013 (2) established the Union list. SmokEz Enviro-23 (SF-006) was included in that list with expiry date of the authorisation 1 January 2024.
(3) By letter dated 27 June 2022, Kerry Inc. informed the Commission that it had acquired the assets of Red Arrow Products Company LLC and that it now owns the rights for SmokEz Enviro-23 (SF-006).
(4) On 30 June 2022, the company Kerry Inc submitted an application for the renewal of the authorisation of SmokEz Enviro-23 (SF-006) as a smoke flavouring primary product.
(5) On 28 September 2023, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) adopted its scientific opinion on the safety of SmokEz Enviro-23 (SF-006) (3).
(6) In its scientific opinion, the Authority noted that SmokEz Enviro-23 (SF-006) contains the substances furan-2(5H)-one and benzene–1,2-diol and concluded that a concern for genotoxicity for those substances was identified in vivo upon oral administration. In line with the Authority’s statement on the genotoxicity assessment of chemical mixtures (4) and considering that the exposure estimates for those two components are above the threshold of toxicological concern (TTC) of 0,0025 μg/kg bw per day for DNA-reactive mutagens and/or carcinogens, the Authority concluded that SmokEz Enviro-23 (SF-006) raises concern with respect to genotoxicity. Furthermore, the Authority concluded that other four components in SmokEz Enviro-23 (SF-006) and the unidentified part thereof raise a potential concern for genotoxicity.
(7) Pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003, only smoke flavourings that do not present risks to human health may be authorised and placed on the market. It is therefore appropriate to refuse the renewal of the authorisation of SmokEz Enviro-23 (SF-006) as a smoke flavouring primary product.
(8) However, in order to allow food business operators to use SmokEz Enviro-23 (SF-006) as a smoke flavouring primary product for the production of foods to be placed on the market until 1 July 2029, as provided for in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2067 (5), SmokEz Enviro-23 (SF-006) should be allowed to be placed on the market until that date.
(9) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The renewal of the authorisation of SmokEz Enviro-23 (SF-006) as a smoke flavouring primary product is refused.
SmokEz Enviro-23 (SF-006) may continue to be placed on the market until 1 July 2029.
This Decision is addressed to Kerry Inc, Global Technology and Innovation Centre, 3400 Milington Road, Beloit, WI 53511, United States.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/2077 of 31 July 2024 refusing the renewal of the authorisation of Fumokomp (SF-009) as a smoke flavouring primary product (notified under document C(2024) 3708)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2077 1.8.2024
(1) Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 provides that only smoke flavourings included in the Union list of authorised smoke flavouring primary products (‘the Union list’) may be placed on the market within the Union.
(2) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1321/2013(2)established the Union list. Fumokomp (SF-009) was included in that list with expiry date of the authorisation 1 January 2024.
(3) On 27 June 2022, the company Kompozíció Kft submitted an application for the renewal of the authorisation of Fumokomp (SF-009) as a smoke flavouring primary product.
(4) On 28 September 2023, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) adopted its scientific opinion on the safety of Fumokomp (SF-009)(3).
(5) In its scientific opinion, the Authority noted that the absence of the genotoxic substance furan-2(5H)-one from Fumokomp (SF-009) was not convincingly demonstrated and that the whole mixture testing in anin vitromouse lymphoma assay gave positive results which would require an adequatein vivofollow-up study. In addition, the Authority considered that the potential for aneugenicity of Fumokomp (SF-009) had not been adequately investigated. Accordingly, the Authority concluded that the potential safety concern for genotoxicity of Fumokomp (SF-009) cannot be ruled out.
(6) Pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003, only smoke flavourings that do not present risks to human health may be authorised and placed on the market. It is therefore appropriate to refuse the renewal of the authorisation of Fumokomp (SF-009) as a smoke flavouring primary product.
(7) However, in order to allow food business operators to use Fumokomp (SF-009) as a smoke flavouring primary product for the production of foods to be placed on the market until 1 July 2029, as provided for in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2067(4), Fumokomp (SF-009) should be allowed to be placed on the market until that date.
(8) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 November 2003 on smoke flavourings used or intended for use in or on foods (1), and in particular Article 12(3) thereof,
Whereas:
(1) Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 provides that only smoke flavourings included in the Union list of authorised smoke flavouring primary products (‘the Union list’) may be placed on the market within the Union.
(2) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1321/2013 (2) established the Union list. Fumokomp (SF-009) was included in that list with expiry date of the authorisation 1 January 2024.
(3) On 27 June 2022, the company Kompozíció Kft submitted an application for the renewal of the authorisation of Fumokomp (SF-009) as a smoke flavouring primary product.
(4) On 28 September 2023, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) adopted its scientific opinion on the safety of Fumokomp (SF-009) (3).
(5) In its scientific opinion, the Authority noted that the absence of the genotoxic substance furan-2(5H)-one from Fumokomp (SF-009) was not convincingly demonstrated and that the whole mixture testing in an in vitro mouse lymphoma assay gave positive results which would require an adequate in vivo follow-up study. In addition, the Authority considered that the potential for aneugenicity of Fumokomp (SF-009) had not been adequately investigated. Accordingly, the Authority concluded that the potential safety concern for genotoxicity of Fumokomp (SF-009) cannot be ruled out.
(6) Pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003, only smoke flavourings that do not present risks to human health may be authorised and placed on the market. It is therefore appropriate to refuse the renewal of the authorisation of Fumokomp (SF-009) as a smoke flavouring primary product.
(7) However, in order to allow food business operators to use Fumokomp (SF-009) as a smoke flavouring primary product for the production of foods to be placed on the market until 1 July 2029, as provided for in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2067 (4), Fumokomp (SF-009) should be allowed to be placed on the market until that date.
(8) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The renewal of the authorisation of Fumokomp (SF-009) as a smoke flavouring primary product is refused.
Fumokomp (SF-009) may continue to be placed on the market until 1 July 2029.
This Decision is addressed to Kompozíció Kft, 2053 Herceghalom, Hungary.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2075 of 26 July 2024 amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2075 29.7.2024
(1) On 26 July 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/413/CFSP(1).
(2) In accordance with Articles 26(1) and (3) of Decision 2010/413/CFSP, the Council has reviewed the list of designated persons and entities set out in Annexes II and V to that Decision.
(3) The Council has concluded that the entries concerning two persons and four entities designated in Annex II to Decision 2010/413/CFSP should be removed from that Annex. The restrictive measures against all other persons and entities in the list set out in Annex II to Decision 2010/413/CFSP should be maintained, insofar as their names are not mentioned in Annex VI to that Decision, and 56 entries included in Annex II should be updated. Moreover, all entries in Annex V to that Decision should be deleted.
(4) Decision 2010/413/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,
(1) entries 13 (concerning Anis NACCACHE) and 14 (concerning Brigadier-General Mohammad NADERI) in the list headed ‘I. Persons and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities and persons and entities providing support to the Government of Iran.’, under the subheading ‘A. Persons’, are deleted,
(2) under the heading ‘I. Persons and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities and persons and entities providing support to the Government of Iran.’, the following entries replace the corresponding entries in the list set out under the subheading ‘A. Persons’:NameIdentifying informationReasonsDate of listing‘12.Mohammad Reza MOVASAGHNIADeputy Minister for Industry and Chairman of IMIDRO, the Iranian Mines and Mining Industries Development and Renovation Organization, since August 2023. Former head of EU-designated Naval Defense Missile Industry Group, also known as Samen Al A’Emmeh Industries Group (SAIG), and Cruise Missile Industry Group.26.7.201029.Milad JAFARI (Milad JAFERI)DOB: 20.9.1974Iranian national supplying goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated SHIG front companies. Delivered goods to SHIG between January and November 2010. Payments for some of the goods were made at the central branch of EU-designated Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI) in Tehran after November 2010.1.12.201131.Ali KARIMIANIranian national supplying goods, mostly carbon fibre to EU-designated SHIG and SBIG.1.12.201132.Majid KHANSARIManaging Director of EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC).1.12.201150.Mohammad Baqer ZOLQADR(محمد باقر ذو القدر)(a.k.a. Mohammad Baqer ZULQADER;Mohammad Bagher ZOLGHADR)DOB: 1954POB: Faisa, IranFunction: Secretary of the Expediency Discernment CouncilNationality: IranianGender: maleMohammad Baqer Zolqadr is a former IRGC officer who is currently Secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council. The supreme leader, who appoints members of this Council, has delegated the supervision of the government to it. In practice, the Expediency Discernment Council supports the Government of Iran by being an intricate part of the regime. In his role, Zolqadr therefore provides support to the Government of Iran.17.10.2023 (UN: 24.3.2007)’ Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing ‘12. Mohammad Reza MOVASAGHNIA Deputy Minister for Industry and Chairman of IMIDRO, the Iranian Mines and Mining Industries Development and Renovation Organization, since August 2023. Former head of EU-designated Naval Defense Missile Industry Group, also known as Samen Al A’Emmeh Industries Group (SAIG), and Cruise Missile Industry Group. 26.7.2010 29. Milad JAFARI (Milad JAFERI) DOB: 20.9.1974 Iranian national supplying goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated SHIG front companies. Delivered goods to SHIG between January and November 2010. Payments for some of the goods were made at the central branch of EU-designated Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI) in Tehran after November 2010. 1.12.2011 31. Ali KARIMIAN Iranian national supplying goods, mostly carbon fibre to EU-designated SHIG and SBIG. 1.12.2011 32. Majid KHANSARI Managing Director of EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC). 1.12.2011 50. Mohammad Baqer ZOLQADR(محمد باقر ذو القدر)(a.k.a. Mohammad Baqer ZULQADER;Mohammad Bagher ZOLGHADR) DOB: 1954POB: Faisa, IranFunction: Secretary of the Expediency Discernment CouncilNationality: IranianGender: male Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr is a former IRGC officer who is currently Secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council. The supreme leader, who appoints members of this Council, has delegated the supervision of the government to it. In practice, the Expediency Discernment Council supports the Government of Iran by being an intricate part of the regime. In his role, Zolqadr therefore provides support to the Government of Iran. 17.10.2023 (UN: 24.3.2007)’
Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing
‘12. Mohammad Reza MOVASAGHNIA Deputy Minister for Industry and Chairman of IMIDRO, the Iranian Mines and Mining Industries Development and Renovation Organization, since August 2023. Former head of EU-designated Naval Defense Missile Industry Group, also known as Samen Al A’Emmeh Industries Group (SAIG), and Cruise Missile Industry Group. 26.7.2010
29. Milad JAFARI (Milad JAFERI) DOB: 20.9.1974 Iranian national supplying goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated SHIG front companies. Delivered goods to SHIG between January and November 2010. Payments for some of the goods were made at the central branch of EU-designated Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI) in Tehran after November 2010. 1.12.2011
31. Ali KARIMIAN Iranian national supplying goods, mostly carbon fibre to EU-designated SHIG and SBIG. 1.12.2011
32. Majid KHANSARI Managing Director of EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC). 1.12.2011
50. Mohammad Baqer ZOLQADR(محمد باقر ذو القدر)(a.k.a. Mohammad Baqer ZULQADER;Mohammad Bagher ZOLGHADR) DOB: 1954POB: Faisa, IranFunction: Secretary of the Expediency Discernment CouncilNationality: IranianGender: male Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr is a former IRGC officer who is currently Secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council. The supreme leader, who appoints members of this Council, has delegated the supervision of the government to it. In practice, the Expediency Discernment Council supports the Government of Iran by being an intricate part of the regime. In his role, Zolqadr therefore provides support to the Government of Iran. 17.10.2023 (UN: 24.3.2007)’
Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing
‘12. Mohammad Reza MOVASAGHNIA Deputy Minister for Industry and Chairman of IMIDRO, the Iranian Mines and Mining Industries Development and Renovation Organization, since August 2023. Former head of EU-designated Naval Defense Missile Industry Group, also known as Samen Al A’Emmeh Industries Group (SAIG), and Cruise Missile Industry Group. 26.7.2010
29. Milad JAFARI (Milad JAFERI) DOB: 20.9.1974 Iranian national supplying goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated SHIG front companies. Delivered goods to SHIG between January and November 2010. Payments for some of the goods were made at the central branch of EU-designated Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI) in Tehran after November 2010. 1.12.2011
31. Ali KARIMIAN Iranian national supplying goods, mostly carbon fibre to EU-designated SHIG and SBIG. 1.12.2011
32. Majid KHANSARI Managing Director of EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC). 1.12.2011
50. Mohammad Baqer ZOLQADR(محمد باقر ذو القدر)(a.k.a. Mohammad Baqer ZULQADER;Mohammad Bagher ZOLGHADR) DOB: 1954POB: Faisa, IranFunction: Secretary of the Expediency Discernment CouncilNationality: IranianGender: male Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr is a former IRGC officer who is currently Secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council. The supreme leader, who appoints members of this Council, has delegated the supervision of the government to it. In practice, the Expediency Discernment Council supports the Government of Iran by being an intricate part of the regime. In his role, Zolqadr therefore provides support to the Government of Iran. 17.10.2023 (UN: 24.3.2007)’
(3) entries 59 (concerning Marou Sanat (a.k.a. Mohandesi Tarh Va Toseh Maro Sanat Company)), 95 (concerning Samen Industries (a.k.a. Khorasan Metallurgy Industries)), 98 (concerning SURENA (a.k.a. Sakhd Va Rah-An-Da-Zi)), and 179 (concerning Farayand Technique (a.k.a. Technology of Centrifuge of Iran Company)) in the list headed ‘I. Persons and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities and persons and entities providing support to the Government of Iran.’, under the subheading ‘B. Entities’, are deleted,
(4) under the heading ‘I. Persons and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities and persons and entities providing support to the Government of Iran.’, the following entries replace the corresponding entries in the list set out under the subheading ‘B. Entities’:NameIdentifying informationReasonsDate of listing‘1.Aerospace Industries Organisation, AIOAIO, 28 Shian 5, Lavizan, Tehran, IranLangare Street,Nobonyad Square,Tehran, IranAIO oversees Iran’s production of missiles, including EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group and Fajr Industrial Group.23.4.20079.ESNICO (Equipment Supplier for Nuclear Industries Corporation)No. 1, 37th Avenue, Asadabadi Street, Tehran, IranProcures industrial goods, specifically for the nuclear programme activities carried out by AEOI, Novin Energy and EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company. ESNICO’s Director is Haleh Bakhtiar.26.7.201018.Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (a.k.a. TSA; TESA; Farayand Technique; Technology of Centrifuge of Iran Company)Address 1: 156 Golestan Street, Saradr-e Jangal, TehranAddress 2: Khalij-e Fars Boulevard, Kilometre 10 of Atomic Energy Road, Rowshan Shahr, Third Moshtaq Street, Esfahan, IranAddress 3: Yousef Abad District, No. 1, 37th Street, Tehran, IranIran Centrifuge Technology Company manufactures uranium enrichment centrifuge parts, and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.26.7.201020.Iran Electronics Industries and the following subsidiaries:P.O. Box 18575-365, Tehran, IranWholly-owned subsidiary of MODAFL (and therefore a sister-organisation to AIO, AvIO and DIO). Its role is to manufacture electronic components for Iranian weapons systems. It is therefore an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.23.6.2008(a)Isfahan OpticsP.O. Box 81465-313 Kaveh Ave., Isfahan, IranP.O. Box 81465-117, Isfahan, IranOwned, controlled by, or acts on behalf of Iran Electronics Industries, an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. Isfahan Optics is also engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.26.7.201029.Ministry Of Defense And Support For Armed Forces Logistics (a.k.a. Ministry Of Defense For Armed Forces Logistics; a.k.a. MODAFL; a.k.a. MODSAF)Address no. 1: Ferdowsi Avenue, Sarhang Sakhaei Street, Tehran, IranAddress no. 2: PO Box 11365-8439, IranAddress no. 3: Sarhang Sakhaei Street, Ferdowsi Avenue, Tehran, IranAddress no. 4: PO Box 11365-8439, IranAddress no. 5: Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, IranAddress no. 6: PO Box 16315-189, Tehran, IranAddress no. 7: located on the west side of Dabestan Street, Abbas Abad District, Tehran, IranAddress no. 8: PO Box 19315-189, Pasdaran Street, South Noubonyand Square, Tehran, IranThe Ministry Of Defense And Support For Armed Forces Logistics, which includes the MODLEX Export Center (also referred to as the Ministry of Defense Logistics Export (MODLEX)), is responsible for Iran’s defence research, development, manufacturing and export programmes, including support to missile and nuclear programmes.23.6.200831.Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI)صنایع شیمیایی پارچین(a.k.a. Parchin Chemical Factories Chemical Industries Group;PCF Chemical Industries Group;Parchin Chemical Factories;Parchin Chemical Industry Group;PCI Group;Parchin Chemical Ind (PCF);Parchin Chemical Factories;Para Chemical Industries;PCF;PCI;Parchin Military Base)Address no. 1: Khavaran Road Km 30-35, Parchin Special Road, Varamin, ParchinAddress no. 2: Nobonyad Square, Tehran 15765-358Address no. 3: Parchin Forked Rd., 35th km. Khavaran Rd., Pakdasht, Tehran, Iran (Factory)Address no. 4: 2nd Floor, Sanam Bldg., Nobonyad Sq., Tehran, Iran (Head Office)Address no. 5: Pasdaran Square, P.O. Box 16765/358, Tehran, IranAddress no. 6: 2nd Floor, Sanam Bldg., 3rd Floor, Sanam Bldg., P.O. Box 16765/358, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, IranParchin Chemical Industries (PCI) produces ammunition, explosives and solid propellants for rockets and missiles. Parchin facilities were used for the production and testing of nuclear weapons. Parchin Chemical Industries is therefore responsible for providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.Parchin Chemical Industries is part of the Chemical Industries and Development of Material Group (CIDMG), which is a branch of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which falls under Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and is therefore owned by the Iranian Government. Parchin Chemical Industries is therefore an entity that provides support to the Government of Iran, and is controlled by and associated with entities providing support to the Government of Iran.23.6.2008 (UN: 24.3.2007)Telephone no.: + 98 21 2258929; + 98 21 35243153; + 98 21 3130626Website:http://icig.ir/Registration no.: Cooperative Company Registration No 892Associated entities: Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL); Defense Industries Organization (DIO); Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO); Iran Electronics Industries (IEI)35.RakaA department of EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company. Established in late 2006, it was responsible for the construction of the Uranium enrichment plant at Fordow (Qom).26.7.201042.Yasa Part and the following subsidiaries:Company dealing with procurement activities related to the purchase of materials and technologies necessary to nuclear and ballistic programmes.26.7.2010(a)Arfa Paint Company (a.k.a. ARFA; Arfa Company)Address 1: Unit 5, 9th floor, Sarve Tower, Saadat Abad, Tehran, IranAddress 2: 16th km Karaj Special Road, Tehran, IranActing on behalf of Yasa Part.26.7.2010(b)Arfeh CompanyAddress: West Lavasani, Tehran, IranActing on behalf of Yasa Part.26.7.2010(d)Hosseini Nejad Trading Co. (a.k.a. Hosseini Nejad Trading Company)Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.26.7.2010(e)Iran Saffron Company (a.k.a. Iransaffron Co.; Iran Safron; Iran Saffron; Iran Saffron Co.)Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.26.7.201057.Hirbod CoHirbod Co – Flat 2, 3 Second Street, Asad Abadi Avenue, Tehran 14316A company that has procured goods and equipment destined for Iran’s Nuclear and Ballistic Missile programmes for the EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC).23.5.201160.Paya Parto (a.k.a. Paya Partov; National Centre for Laser Science and Technology)Paya Parto (a.k.a. Paya Partov or Iranian National Centre for Laser Science and Technology) is an entity that researches stable isotope separation, a key parameter for centrifuges component production, as part of Iran’s nuclear program.In 2021, against the backdrop of Iran’s National Nuclear Day, Paya Parto, under its alias National Centre for Laser Science and Technology, unveiled a number of “unspecified nuclear projects”.Paya Part is therefore responsible for providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.23.5.201176.Iran Marine Industrial Company (SADRA)Sadra Building No 3, Shafagh St., Poonak Khavari Blvd., Shahrak Ghods, P.O. Box 14669-56491, Tehran, IranEffectively controlled by EU-designated Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA), which is designated for being an IRGC company. Provides support to the Government of Iran through its involvement in the Iranian energy sector including in the South Pars Gas field.23.5.201181.Eyvaz TechnicNo 3, Building 3, Shahid Hamid Sadigh Alley, Shariati Street, Tehran, Iran.Producer of vacuum equipment that has supplied the uranium enrichment sites at Natanz and Qom/Fordow. In 2011, it supplied pressure transducers to EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC).1.12.201183.Ghani Sazi Uranium Company (a.k.a. Iran Uranium Enrichment Company)3, Qarqavol Close, 20th Street, Tehran, IranIt has production contracts with EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) and EU-designated TESA.1.12.201184.Iran Pooya (a.k.a. Iran Pouya)A government owned company that operated the biggest extruder of aluminium in Iran and supplied material for use in the production of casings for the IR-1 and IR-2 centrifuges. A major manufacturer of aluminium cylinders for centrifuges whose customers include the AEOI and EU-designated TESA.1.12.201188.MACPAR Makina San Ve TicIstasyon MH, Sehitler cad, Guldeniz Sit, Number 79/2, Tuzla 34930, Istanbul, TurkeyCompany run by Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies.1.12.201189.MATSA (Mohandesi Toseh Sokht Atomi Company)90, Fathi Shaghaghi Street, Tehran, Iran.Iranian company contracted to EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) to provide design and engineering services across the nuclear fuel cycle. Most recently has been procuring equipment for the Natanz uranium enrichment site.1.12.201191.Multimat lc ve Dis Ticaret Pazarlama Limited SirketiCompany run by Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies.1.12.201197.STEP Standart Teknik Parca San ve TIC A.S.79/2 Tuzla, 34940, Istanbul, TurkeyCompany run by Milad Jafari, who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) through front companies.1.12.2011102.Yarsanat (a.k.a. Yar Sanat, a.k.a. Yarestan Vacuumi)No. 101, West Zardosht Street, 3rd Floor, 14157 Tehran; No. 139 Hoveyzeh Street, 15337, Tehran, IranProcurement company for EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC). Involved in purchasing equipment and materials, which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme. It has attempted the procurement of vacuum products and pressure transducers.1.12.2011148.Iran Composites Institute (a.k.a. Composites Research Laboratory (CRL))Iran Composites Institute, Iranian University of Science and Technology, 16845-188, Tehran, Iran,Telephone: 98 217 3912858Fax: 98 217 7491206Email: mailto:[email protected]:http://www.irancomposites.orgIranian Composites Institute (ICI, a.k.a. Composite Institute of Iran; Composites Research Laboratory (CRL)) has been assisting designated entities in violating the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of 2011, ICI had been contracted to provide EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA) with IR-2M centrifuge rotors.22.12.2012149.Jelvesazan Company22 Bahman St., Bozorgmehr Ave, 84155666, Esfahan, IranTel: 98 0311 2658311 15Fax: 98 0311 2679097Jelvesazan Company has been assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of early 2012, Jelvesazan intended to supply controlled vacuum pumps to EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA).22.12.2012151.Simatec Development CompanySimatec Development Company has been assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of early 2010 Simatec was contracted by EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) to procure Vacon inverters to power uranium enrichment centrifuges. As of mid-2012 Simatec was attempting to procure EU-controlled inverters.22.12.2012152.Aluminat1.Parcham St, 13th Km of Qom Rd 38135 Arak (Factory)2.Unit 38, 5th Fl, Bldg No 60, Golfam St, Jordan, 19395-5716, TehranTel: 98 212 2049216 / 22049928 / 22045237Fax: 98 21 22057127Website: www.aluminat.comAluminat has been assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. In early 2012, Aluminat had a contract to supply 6061-T6 aluminium to EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA).22.12.2012161.Sharif University of TechnologyLast address known: Azadi Ave/Street, PO Box 11365-11155, Tehran, Iran, Tel. + 98 21 66 161 Email: [email protected] University of Technology (SUT) has a number of cooperation agreements with Iranian Government organisations designated by the EU, which operate in military or military-related fields, particularly in the field of ballistic missile production and procurement. This includes: an agreement with the EU-designated Aerospace Industries Organisation for, inter alia, the production of satellites; cooperating with the Iranian Ministry of Defence and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) on smart boat competitions; a broader agreement with the EU-designated IRGC Air Force, which covers developing and strengthening the University’s relations, organisational and strategic cooperation.Taken together, these show a significant record of engagement with the Government of Iran in military or military-related fields that constitutes support to the Government of Iran.8.11.2014175.Defense Technology and Science Research Centre (DTSRC)موسسه آموزشی و تحقیقاتی صنایع دفاعی(a.k.a. Institute for Defense Education and Research;Moassese Amozesh Va Tahghighati)Address: Pasdaran Av., P.O. Box 19585/777, Tehran, IranType of entity: government entityPlace of registration: Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL); Defense Industries Organization (DIO)The Defense Technology and Science Research Centre (DTSRC) is an Iran-based government entity that conducts defence-related research and development as well as procurement. It is majority-owned by and subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and falls under its Defense Industries Organization (DIO). MODAFL provides logistic support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Therefore, DTSRC provides support to the Government of Iran.17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010 EU: 24.4.2007)176.Electro Sanam Company(a.k.a. E.S. Co.; E.X. Co.;Electro Sanam Co.;Electro Sanam;Sanam Industrial Group;Electro Sanam Industries;Sanam Electronics)Address no. 1: No 24, 3rd Floor, Sink St., after Beheshti St., Northern Sohrevardi Ave. 15779 Tehran, IranAddress no. 2: Tehran P.O. Box 19395/5339, Araj Forkway, Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, IranTelephone no.: + 98 21 8757587; + 98 21 7863352; + 98 21 88757587Fax no.: + 98 21 8757588; + 98 21 7867810; + 98 21 88757588; + 98 21 22549738Electro Sanam Company is a front company for the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) that is involved in Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Electro Sanam Company is therefore engaged in, directly associated with, or providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.17.10.2023 (UN: 3.3.2008)Email: [email protected]; [email protected] of registration: IranDate of registration: 1992Registration no.: 339747National ID no.: 10103864724Principal place of business: Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)182.Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG)گروه صنایع مهمات سازی ومتالوژیAddress no. 1: P.O. Box 16765/1835 Pasdaran StreetAddress no. 2: Department 145-42 P.O. Box 16765/128 Moghan Avenue, Pasdaran StreetPlace of registration: Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Shahid Sattari Industries; Parchin Ammunition Industries; 7th of Tir Industries Complex; Yazd Metallurgy Industries; Khorasan Metallurgy Industries; Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries; Defense Industries Organization (DIO)Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) is the largest industrial group of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO). Its products include ammunition, mortar bombs, pyrotechnics, anti-tank and sea mines, hand grenades, detonators, brass materials, cutting tools, industrial valves, perforating charges for the oil industry and other industrial parts. It is comprised of ten subsidiaries, including Shahid Sattari Industries, Parchin Ammunition Industries, 7th of Tir Industries Complex, Yazd Metallurgy Industries, Khorasan Metallurgy Industries, Isfahan Ammunition Industries, Shahid Shiroudi Industries and Shahid Sayyad Shirazi Industries. It has played a key role in manufacturing and developing weaponry and is linked to several companies involved in proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. It is thus engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems by Iran.17.10.2023 (UN: 24.3.2007)184.Defense Industries Organization (DIO)سازمان صنایع دفاع جمهوری اسلامی ایرانAddress: Amin Industrial Estate, Khalage Rd., Seyedi District P.O. Box 91735/549, Mashad, IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Kaveh cutting tool company; 7th of Tir Industries; Khorasan Metallurgy Industries; Iran Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO); Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO); Iran Electronics Industries (IEI); Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)The Defense Industries Organization (DIO) is a conglomerate of over 300 companies and a subsidiary of Iran’s Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) whose function is to provide the Armed Forces with the necessary manufacturing capacity and technical abilities. It has played a central role in Iran’s ballistic missile development programme and in the implementation of Iran’s centrifuge programme. DIO oversees numerous state-owned defence contractors and front companies directly or through its primary subsidiary, the Aerospace Industries Organization.17.10.2023 (UN: 23.12.2006)It plays a significant role in producing diverse military hardware for Iran, including missiles. In recent years, the DIO has attempted to become export-oriented, allowing Iran to become an exporter of weapons: in 2022, DIO has grown by 200 % compared to 2021, has developed 75 new weapons and has multiplied its exports by 2,5 , thus contributing to the growth of Iran’s defence industry. DIO is thus providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.185.Kaveh Cutting Tools Company(a.k.a. Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co.;Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co. Persian;Mojtame-e Abzar Boreshi Kaveh)Address no. 1: Km 4 Khalaj Road, end of Seyyedi Street, Mashad 91638, IranAddress no. 2: P.O. Box 91735/549, Mashad, IranAddress no. 3: 3rd Km of Khalaj Road, Seyyedi Street, Mashad, IranAddress no. 4: Moqan St., Tehran, IranWebsite: www.kavehtools.irPlace of registration: Mashad, IranDate of registration: 1993Principal place of business: Mashad, IranAssociated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO); Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG)Kaveh Cutting Tools Company is an Iranian manufacturing company that has been involved in the production of components for Iran’s IR-1 centrifuges, and in the procurement for Iran’s centrifuge programme. It is controlled by the Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) and subordinate to the Defense Industries Organization (DIO). It is thus engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems by Iran.17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010)186.Khorasan Metallurgy Industriesصنایع مهمات سازی و متالورژی خراسان(a.k.a. Khorasan Metallurgy;Khorasan Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries;Khorasan Metalogy Industries;The Metallurgy Industries of Khorasan;Metalogy Industry of Khorasan;Samen IndustriesPreviously known as: Amin Industrial Complex)Address: 2nd km of Khalaj Road End of Seyyedi St., P.O.Box 91735-549, 91735 Mashad, Iran.Website: www.khwarizmi.irTelephone no.: + 98 511 3853008; + 98 511 3870225Type of entity: public companyPlace of registration: IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG); Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL); Defense Industries Organization (DIO)Khorasan Metallurgy Industries is part of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and a subsidiary of the Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG). It is responsible for the production of ammunition and centrifuge components as well as cutting tools and products such as drills, milling cutters, taps, reamers and compound tools. It is providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.17.10.2023 (UN: 3.3.2008)187.Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries(a.k.a. Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries;Sayyad Shirazi Industries;Sayad Shirazi;Sayad Shirazi industries;Sayad Shirazi industry;Shaheed Sayad Shirazee ammunition industries;Shahid Sayyadi Shirazi Industries;Shahid Sayyed Shirazi Ind.)Address no. 1: Next To Nirou Battery Mfg. Co, Shahid Babaii Expressway, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, IranAddress no. 2: Pasdaran St., P.O. Box 16765, Tehran 1835, IranAddress no. 3: Babaei Highway – Next to Niru M.F.G, Tehran, IranPlace of registration: Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG); Defense Industries Organization (DIO)Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries is a missile producer owned by Shahid Sayyad Shirazi, former deputy chief of staff of Iran’s Armed Forces that is linked to the Iranian military industry. Shahid Sayyad Shirazi Industries has been trying to acquire metals from China used in high-tech weaponry, including long-range nuclear missiles. It is part of the Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG), which has played a key role in manufacturing and developing weaponry and is linked to several companies involved in proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, and a subsidiary of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO) that is directly involved in missile development. It is therefore controlled by an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapons delivery systems.17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010)193.Niru Battery Manufacturing Companyشرکت باطری سازی نیرو(a.k.a. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company;Niru Batteries MFG. Co. Ltd.;Nour Battery Manufacturing Company;Sherkate Battrijazi Niru;Niru Battery Co;Niru Battery Mfg. Co.;Nirou Battery Manufacturing;Saba Battery Company;Niru Co. Ltd.;Sherkat Battery Sazi Niru Sahami Khass;The Niru Battery Company;Address no. 1: Nobonyad Blvd., Pasdaran Avenue, P.O. Box 19575/361, Tehran, IranAddress no. 2: Next to Babee Exp. Way, Nobonyad Sq., Tehran, IranAddress no. 3: Next to Shahid Babaei Exp. way, Nobonyad Sq., 16689, Tehran, IranAddress no. 4: End of Pasdaran Avenue, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, IranTelephone no.: + 98 21 251 0523 / 254 7093; + 98 21 22547094; + 98 21 22567608-9; + 98 21 2545084Website: www.nirubattery.com; www.niruco.comNiru Battery Manufacturing Company is an entity registered in Iran that manufactures power units for the Iranian military, including for missile systems. It is controlled by the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), responsible for Iran’s defence research, development and manufacturing programmes, including support to missile and nuclear programmes. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company is a subsidiary of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), a conglomerate of companies run by the Islamic Republic of Iran whose function is to provide the Armed Forces with the necessary manufacturing capacity and technical abilities. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company is therefore controlled by an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.17.10.2023 (UN: 3.3.2008)Niru Battery Manufacturing (Batrisazi-ye Niru);Niru Battery Mfg.CO (Saba Battery);Sherkate Batri-e Niru;Power Energy Source Development Company (ESDO))Email: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] of registration: Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO); Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)194.Safety Equipment Procurement Company(a.k.a. Safety Equipment Procurement;SEP;SEP Co.;SEPCO;Safety Equipment Procurement Inc.)Address: P.O. Box 16785/195, Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)Safety Equipment Procurement Company is a front company for Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), which is responsible for Iran’s liquid-fuelled ballistic missile programme. AIO is the leading industrial and military subsidiary of Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and oversees Iran’s missile production. AIO has used the Safety Equipment Procurement Company for procurement since at least 2003. It is involved in Iran’s ballistic missile activities and is therefore engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.17.10.2023 (UN: 3.3.2008)195.Sanam Industrial Group(a.k.a. Sanam Industries Group;Sanam Industrial Production Group;Department 140;Sanam Projects Management (SPM);Sanam Industrial Company;Sanam Industries Co.;Sanam Industrial and Trading Company;Sanam Group)Address no. 1: Pasdaran Road 15, Tehran, IranAddress no. 2: 3rd Fl., Sanam Bldg., Nobonyad Sq., Pasdaran Ave., Tehran (19579), IranAddress no. 3: P.O. Box 19575/596, Tehran, IranAddress no. 4: Km. 25th of Khavaran Rd., Tehran, Iran (Factory Address)Address no. 5: Farzam Alley, No 3, Fatemi Square, Palestine StTelephone no.: + 98 21 2546008; + 98 21 2556772; + 98 21 88969501Sanam Industrial Group is controlled by Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) and has purchased equipment for the Iranian missile programme. Sanam Industrial Group is therefore providing support for Iran’s development of nuclear weapon delivery systems and is an entity that provides support to the Government of Iran and entities owned or controlled by it or persons and entities associated with it.17.10.2023 (UN: 24.3.2007)Fax: + 98 21 2556830; + 98 21 88969501Place of registration: TehranRegistration no.: 176855Economic code: 411139673763National ID: 10102191894Date of registration: 1987 and 2001197.Yazd Metallurgy Industries (YMI)شرکت ذوب فلزات یزد(a.k.a.YMI;Yazd Metallurgy Industry;Yazd Ammunition Industries;Yazd Metallurgical Ind’s Co.;Yazd Metallurgical Industries;Yazd Metal Smelting Industrial Group;Yazd Ammunition Manufacturing and Metallurgy Industries;Directorate of Yazd Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries)Address no. 1: Pasdaran Ave., Next to Telecommunication Industry, Tehran 16588, IranAddress no. 2: P.O. Box 89195/878, Yazd, IranAddress no. 3: P.O. Box 89195/678, Yazd, IranAddress no. 4: Km 5 of Taft Road, Yazd, IranTelephone no.: + 98 35 15220322Fax no.: + 98 35 1523096Place of registration: IranDate of registration: 1961Registration number: 860Economic code: 411315443678Associated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO); Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG); Shahid Sayyad Shirazi IndustriesYazd Metallurgy Industries (YMI) is affiliated with Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and is a subsidiary of Ammunition Industries Group in Iran. YMI is involved in IR-1 centrifuge components manufacturing at DIO workshops in Iran’s missile programme. Furthermore, it is involved in the production of goods that can be used for either the production of nuclear weapons or vehicles for the delivery of such weapons.Therefore, it has been providing support for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems by Iran, through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology.17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010)199.Shahid Baheri Industrial Group (SBIG)صنایع شهید باقری(a.k.a. Shahid Baheri Organisation;SBIG;Shahid Baheri Industries Group;Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group;Department 140/14;Shahid Bagheri Industries Group;Mahtab Technical Engineering Company;Composite Propellant Missile Industry;Sanaye Sokhte Morakab;SSM)Address: Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)Shahid Baheri Industrial Group (SBIG) is a subsidiary to Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). Shahid Baheri Industrial Group (SBIG) develops and produces Iran’s solid-propellant ballistic missiles. The development of such missiles is key to the building of nuclear weapon delivery capacities. Therefore, SBIG is engaged in, directly associated with, or providing support for, Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.17.10.2023 (UN: 23.12.2006)200.Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG)گروه صنعتی شهید همت(a.k.a. Sabalan CIE; Sabalan Company; Sabalan Petrochemical Company (SPC); Sabalan Petrochemical Industries Company (SPICO); Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company (SAPICO); Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG);Chahid Hemmat Industrial Group;Address: Damavand Tehran Highway, P.O. Box 16595/159, No 5, Eslami St., Golestane Sevvom St., Pasdaran St., Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) is subordinate to Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). SHIG is responsible for Iran’s liquid-fuelled ballistic missile programme, including the production of missiles. The development of such missiles is key to the building of nuclear weapon delivery capacities. Therefore, SHIG is engaged in, directly associated with, or providing support for, Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.17.10.2023 (UN: 23.12.2006)’Hemmat Missile Industries Factory;Shahid Hemmat Industrial Complex;SHIC;Shahid Hemmat Industrial Factories;SHIF;Shahid Hemmat Industries Group;Shahid Hemmat Complex;Shahid Hemmat Industries;Shahid Hemmat Industrial Complex;Shahid Hemat; Industrial Complex;Shahid Hemmat) Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing ‘1. Aerospace Industries Organisation, AIO AIO, 28 Shian 5, Lavizan, Tehran, IranLangare Street,Nobonyad Square,Tehran, Iran AIO oversees Iran’s production of missiles, including EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group and Fajr Industrial Group. 23.4.2007 9. ESNICO (Equipment Supplier for Nuclear Industries Corporation) No. 1, 37th Avenue, Asadabadi Street, Tehran, Iran Procures industrial goods, specifically for the nuclear programme activities carried out by AEOI, Novin Energy and EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company. ESNICO’s Director is Haleh Bakhtiar. 26.7.2010 18. Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (a.k.a. TSA; TESA; Farayand Technique; Technology of Centrifuge of Iran Company) Address 1: 156 Golestan Street, Saradr-e Jangal, TehranAddress 2: Khalij-e Fars Boulevard, Kilometre 10 of Atomic Energy Road, Rowshan Shahr, Third Moshtaq Street, Esfahan, IranAddress 3: Yousef Abad District, No. 1, 37th Street, Tehran, Iran Iran Centrifuge Technology Company manufactures uranium enrichment centrifuge parts, and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. 26.7.2010 20. Iran Electronics Industries and the following subsidiaries: P.O. Box 18575-365, Tehran, Iran Wholly-owned subsidiary of MODAFL (and therefore a sister-organisation to AIO, AvIO and DIO). Its role is to manufacture electronic components for Iranian weapons systems. It is therefore an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. 23.6.2008 (a)Isfahan Optics (a) Isfahan Optics P.O. Box 81465-313 Kaveh Ave., Isfahan, IranP.O. Box 81465-117, Isfahan, Iran Owned, controlled by, or acts on behalf of Iran Electronics Industries, an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. Isfahan Optics is also engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. 26.7.2010 29. Ministry Of Defense And Support For Armed Forces Logistics (a.k.a. Ministry Of Defense For Armed Forces Logistics; a.k.a. MODAFL; a.k.a. MODSAF) Address no. 1: Ferdowsi Avenue, Sarhang Sakhaei Street, Tehran, IranAddress no. 2: PO Box 11365-8439, IranAddress no. 3: Sarhang Sakhaei Street, Ferdowsi Avenue, Tehran, IranAddress no. 4: PO Box 11365-8439, IranAddress no. 5: Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, IranAddress no. 6: PO Box 16315-189, Tehran, IranAddress no. 7: located on the west side of Dabestan Street, Abbas Abad District, Tehran, IranAddress no. 8: PO Box 19315-189, Pasdaran Street, South Noubonyand Square, Tehran, Iran The Ministry Of Defense And Support For Armed Forces Logistics, which includes the MODLEX Export Center (also referred to as the Ministry of Defense Logistics Export (MODLEX)), is responsible for Iran’s defence research, development, manufacturing and export programmes, including support to missile and nuclear programmes. 23.6.2008 31. Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI)صنایع شیمیایی پارچین(a.k.a. Parchin Chemical Factories Chemical Industries Group;PCF Chemical Industries Group;Parchin Chemical Factories;Parchin Chemical Industry Group;PCI Group;Parchin Chemical Ind (PCF);Parchin Chemical Factories;Para Chemical Industries;PCF;PCI;Parchin Military Base) Address no. 1: Khavaran Road Km 30-35, Parchin Special Road, Varamin, ParchinAddress no. 2: Nobonyad Square, Tehran 15765-358Address no. 3: Parchin Forked Rd., 35th km. Khavaran Rd., Pakdasht, Tehran, Iran (Factory)Address no. 4: 2nd Floor, Sanam Bldg., Nobonyad Sq., Tehran, Iran (Head Office)Address no. 5: Pasdaran Square, P.O. Box 16765/358, Tehran, IranAddress no. 6: 2nd Floor, Sanam Bldg., 3rd Floor, Sanam Bldg., P.O. Box 16765/358, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, Iran Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI) produces ammunition, explosives and solid propellants for rockets and missiles. Parchin facilities were used for the production and testing of nuclear weapons. Parchin Chemical Industries is therefore responsible for providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.Parchin Chemical Industries is part of the Chemical Industries and Development of Material Group (CIDMG), which is a branch of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which falls under Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and is therefore owned by the Iranian Government. Parchin Chemical Industries is therefore an entity that provides support to the Government of Iran, and is controlled by and associated with entities providing support to the Government of Iran. 23.6.2008 (UN: 24.3.2007) Telephone no.: + 98 21 2258929; + 98 21 35243153; + 98 21 3130626Website:http://icig.ir/Registration no.: Cooperative Company Registration No 892Associated entities: Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL); Defense Industries Organization (DIO); Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO); Iran Electronics Industries (IEI) 35. Raka A department of EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company. Established in late 2006, it was responsible for the construction of the Uranium enrichment plant at Fordow (Qom). 26.7.2010 42. Yasa Part and the following subsidiaries: Company dealing with procurement activities related to the purchase of materials and technologies necessary to nuclear and ballistic programmes. 26.7.2010 (a)Arfa Paint Company (a.k.a. ARFA; Arfa Company) (a) Arfa Paint Company (a.k.a. ARFA; Arfa Company) Address 1: Unit 5, 9th floor, Sarve Tower, Saadat Abad, Tehran, IranAddress 2: 16th km Karaj Special Road, Tehran, Iran Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. 26.7.2010 (b)Arfeh Company (b) Arfeh Company Address: West Lavasani, Tehran, Iran Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. 26.7.2010 (d)Hosseini Nejad Trading Co. (a.k.a. Hosseini Nejad Trading Company) (d) Hosseini Nejad Trading Co. (a.k.a. Hosseini Nejad Trading Company) Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. 26.7.2010 (e)Iran Saffron Company (a.k.a. Iransaffron Co.; Iran Safron; Iran Saffron; Iran Saffron Co.) (e) Iran Saffron Company (a.k.a. Iransaffron Co.; Iran Safron; Iran Saffron; Iran Saffron Co.) Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. 26.7.2010 57. Hirbod Co Hirbod Co – Flat 2, 3 Second Street, Asad Abadi Avenue, Tehran 14316 A company that has procured goods and equipment destined for Iran’s Nuclear and Ballistic Missile programmes for the EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC). 23.5.2011 60. Paya Parto (a.k.a. Paya Partov; National Centre for Laser Science and Technology) Paya Parto (a.k.a. Paya Partov or Iranian National Centre for Laser Science and Technology) is an entity that researches stable isotope separation, a key parameter for centrifuges component production, as part of Iran’s nuclear program.In 2021, against the backdrop of Iran’s National Nuclear Day, Paya Parto, under its alias National Centre for Laser Science and Technology, unveiled a number of “unspecified nuclear projects”.Paya Part is therefore responsible for providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. 23.5.2011 76. Iran Marine Industrial Company (SADRA) Sadra Building No 3, Shafagh St., Poonak Khavari Blvd., Shahrak Ghods, P.O. Box 14669-56491, Tehran, Iran Effectively controlled by EU-designated Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA), which is designated for being an IRGC company. Provides support to the Government of Iran through its involvement in the Iranian energy sector including in the South Pars Gas field. 23.5.2011 81. Eyvaz Technic No 3, Building 3, Shahid Hamid Sadigh Alley, Shariati Street, Tehran, Iran. Producer of vacuum equipment that has supplied the uranium enrichment sites at Natanz and Qom/Fordow. In 2011, it supplied pressure transducers to EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC). 1.12.2011 83. Ghani Sazi Uranium Company (a.k.a. Iran Uranium Enrichment Company) 3, Qarqavol Close, 20th Street, Tehran, Iran It has production contracts with EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) and EU-designated TESA. 1.12.2011 84. Iran Pooya (a.k.a. Iran Pouya) A government owned company that operated the biggest extruder of aluminium in Iran and supplied material for use in the production of casings for the IR-1 and IR-2 centrifuges. A major manufacturer of aluminium cylinders for centrifuges whose customers include the AEOI and EU-designated TESA. 1.12.2011 88. MACPAR Makina San Ve Tic Istasyon MH, Sehitler cad, Guldeniz Sit, Number 79/2, Tuzla 34930, Istanbul, Turkey Company run by Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies. 1.12.2011 89. MATSA (Mohandesi Toseh Sokht Atomi Company) 90, Fathi Shaghaghi Street, Tehran, Iran. Iranian company contracted to EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) to provide design and engineering services across the nuclear fuel cycle. Most recently has been procuring equipment for the Natanz uranium enrichment site. 1.12.2011 91. Multimat lc ve Dis Ticaret Pazarlama Limited Sirketi Company run by Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies. 1.12.2011 97. STEP Standart Teknik Parca San ve TIC A.S. 79/2 Tuzla, 34940, Istanbul, Turkey Company run by Milad Jafari, who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) through front companies. 1.12.2011 102. Yarsanat (a.k.a. Yar Sanat, a.k.a. Yarestan Vacuumi) No. 101, West Zardosht Street, 3rd Floor, 14157 Tehran; No. 139 Hoveyzeh Street, 15337, Tehran, Iran Procurement company for EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC). Involved in purchasing equipment and materials, which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme. It has attempted the procurement of vacuum products and pressure transducers. 1.12.2011 148. Iran Composites Institute (a.k.a. Composites Research Laboratory (CRL)) Iran Composites Institute, Iranian University of Science and Technology, 16845-188, Tehran, Iran,Telephone: 98 217 3912858Fax: 98 217 7491206Email: mailto:[email protected]:http://www.irancomposites.org Iranian Composites Institute (ICI, a.k.a. Composite Institute of Iran; Composites Research Laboratory (CRL)) has been assisting designated entities in violating the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of 2011, ICI had been contracted to provide EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA) with IR-2M centrifuge rotors. 22.12.2012 149. Jelvesazan Company 22 Bahman St., Bozorgmehr Ave, 84155666, Esfahan, IranTel: 98 0311 2658311 15Fax: 98 0311 2679097 Jelvesazan Company has been assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of early 2012, Jelvesazan intended to supply controlled vacuum pumps to EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA). 22.12.2012 151. Simatec Development Company Simatec Development Company has been assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of early 2010 Simatec was contracted by EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) to procure Vacon inverters to power uranium enrichment centrifuges. As of mid-2012 Simatec was attempting to procure EU-controlled inverters. 22.12.2012 152. Aluminat 1.Parcham St, 13th Km of Qom Rd 38135 Arak (Factory)2.Unit 38, 5th Fl, Bldg No 60, Golfam St, Jordan, 19395-5716, TehranTel: 98 212 2049216 / 22049928 / 22045237Fax: 98 21 22057127Website: www.aluminat.com 1. Parcham St, 13th Km of Qom Rd 38135 Arak (Factory) 2. Unit 38, 5th Fl, Bldg No 60, Golfam St, Jordan, 19395-5716, Tehran Aluminat has been assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. In early 2012, Aluminat had a contract to supply 6061-T6 aluminium to EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA). 22.12.2012 161. Sharif University of Technology Last address known: Azadi Ave/Street, PO Box 11365-11155, Tehran, Iran, Tel. + 98 21 66 161 Email: [email protected] Sharif University of Technology (SUT) has a number of cooperation agreements with Iranian Government organisations designated by the EU, which operate in military or military-related fields, particularly in the field of ballistic missile production and procurement. This includes: an agreement with the EU-designated Aerospace Industries Organisation for, inter alia, the production of satellites; cooperating with the Iranian Ministry of Defence and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) on smart boat competitions; a broader agreement with the EU-designated IRGC Air Force, which covers developing and strengthening the University’s relations, organisational and strategic cooperation.Taken together, these show a significant record of engagement with the Government of Iran in military or military-related fields that constitutes support to the Government of Iran. 8.11.2014 175. Defense Technology and Science Research Centre (DTSRC)موسسه آموزشی و تحقیقاتی صنایع دفاعی(a.k.a. Institute for Defense Education and Research;Moassese Amozesh Va Tahghighati) Address: Pasdaran Av., P.O. Box 19585/777, Tehran, IranType of entity: government entityPlace of registration: Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL); Defense Industries Organization (DIO) The Defense Technology and Science Research Centre (DTSRC) is an Iran-based government entity that conducts defence-related research and development as well as procurement. It is majority-owned by and subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and falls under its Defense Industries Organization (DIO). MODAFL provides logistic support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Therefore, DTSRC provides support to the Government of Iran. 17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010 EU: 24.4.2007) 176. Electro Sanam Company(a.k.a. E.S. Co.; E.X. Co.;Electro Sanam Co.;Electro Sanam;Sanam Industrial Group;Electro Sanam Industries;Sanam Electronics) Address no. 1: No 24, 3rd Floor, Sink St., after Beheshti St., Northern Sohrevardi Ave. 15779 Tehran, IranAddress no. 2: Tehran P.O. Box 19395/5339, Araj Forkway, Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, IranTelephone no.: + 98 21 8757587; + 98 21 7863352; + 98 21 88757587Fax no.: + 98 21 8757588; + 98 21 7867810; + 98 21 88757588; + 98 21 22549738 Electro Sanam Company is a front company for the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) that is involved in Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Electro Sanam Company is therefore engaged in, directly associated with, or providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. 17.10.2023 (UN: 3.3.2008) Email: [email protected]; [email protected] of registration: IranDate of registration: 1992Registration no.: 339747National ID no.: 10103864724Principal place of business: Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) 182. Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG)گروه صنایع مهمات سازی ومتالوژی Address no. 1: P.O. Box 16765/1835 Pasdaran StreetAddress no. 2: Department 145-42 P.O. Box 16765/128 Moghan Avenue, Pasdaran StreetPlace of registration: Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Shahid Sattari Industries; Parchin Ammunition Industries; 7th of Tir Industries Complex; Yazd Metallurgy Industries; Khorasan Metallurgy Industries; Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries; Defense Industries Organization (DIO) Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) is the largest industrial group of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO). Its products include ammunition, mortar bombs, pyrotechnics, anti-tank and sea mines, hand grenades, detonators, brass materials, cutting tools, industrial valves, perforating charges for the oil industry and other industrial parts. It is comprised of ten subsidiaries, including Shahid Sattari Industries, Parchin Ammunition Industries, 7th of Tir Industries Complex, Yazd Metallurgy Industries, Khorasan Metallurgy Industries, Isfahan Ammunition Industries, Shahid Shiroudi Industries and Shahid Sayyad Shirazi Industries. It has played a key role in manufacturing and developing weaponry and is linked to several companies involved in proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. It is thus engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems by Iran. 17.10.2023 (UN: 24.3.2007) 184. Defense Industries Organization (DIO)سازمان صنایع دفاع جمهوری اسلامی ایران Address: Amin Industrial Estate, Khalage Rd., Seyedi District P.O. Box 91735/549, Mashad, IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Kaveh cutting tool company; 7th of Tir Industries; Khorasan Metallurgy Industries; Iran Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO); Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO); Iran Electronics Industries (IEI); Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) The Defense Industries Organization (DIO) is a conglomerate of over 300 companies and a subsidiary of Iran’s Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) whose function is to provide the Armed Forces with the necessary manufacturing capacity and technical abilities. It has played a central role in Iran’s ballistic missile development programme and in the implementation of Iran’s centrifuge programme. DIO oversees numerous state-owned defence contractors and front companies directly or through its primary subsidiary, the Aerospace Industries Organization. 17.10.2023 (UN: 23.12.2006) It plays a significant role in producing diverse military hardware for Iran, including missiles. In recent years, the DIO has attempted to become export-oriented, allowing Iran to become an exporter of weapons: in 2022, DIO has grown by 200 % compared to 2021, has developed 75 new weapons and has multiplied its exports by 2,5 , thus contributing to the growth of Iran’s defence industry. DIO is thus providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. 185. Kaveh Cutting Tools Company(a.k.a. Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co.;Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co. Persian;Mojtame-e Abzar Boreshi Kaveh) Address no. 1: Km 4 Khalaj Road, end of Seyyedi Street, Mashad 91638, IranAddress no. 2: P.O. Box 91735/549, Mashad, IranAddress no. 3: 3rd Km of Khalaj Road, Seyyedi Street, Mashad, IranAddress no. 4: Moqan St., Tehran, IranWebsite: www.kavehtools.irPlace of registration: Mashad, IranDate of registration: 1993Principal place of business: Mashad, IranAssociated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO); Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) Kaveh Cutting Tools Company is an Iranian manufacturing company that has been involved in the production of components for Iran’s IR-1 centrifuges, and in the procurement for Iran’s centrifuge programme. It is controlled by the Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) and subordinate to the Defense Industries Organization (DIO). It is thus engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems by Iran. 17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010) 186. Khorasan Metallurgy Industriesصنایع مهمات سازی و متالورژی خراسان(a.k.a. Khorasan Metallurgy;Khorasan Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries;Khorasan Metalogy Industries;The Metallurgy Industries of Khorasan;Metalogy Industry of Khorasan;Samen IndustriesPreviously known as: Amin Industrial Complex) Address: 2nd km of Khalaj Road End of Seyyedi St., P.O.Box 91735-549, 91735 Mashad, Iran.Website: www.khwarizmi.irTelephone no.: + 98 511 3853008; + 98 511 3870225Type of entity: public companyPlace of registration: IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG); Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL); Defense Industries Organization (DIO) Khorasan Metallurgy Industries is part of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and a subsidiary of the Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG). It is responsible for the production of ammunition and centrifuge components as well as cutting tools and products such as drills, milling cutters, taps, reamers and compound tools. It is providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. 17.10.2023 (UN: 3.3.2008) 187. Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries(a.k.a. Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries;Sayyad Shirazi Industries;Sayad Shirazi;Sayad Shirazi industries;Sayad Shirazi industry;Shaheed Sayad Shirazee ammunition industries;Shahid Sayyadi Shirazi Industries;Shahid Sayyed Shirazi Ind.) Address no. 1: Next To Nirou Battery Mfg. Co, Shahid Babaii Expressway, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, IranAddress no. 2: Pasdaran St., P.O. Box 16765, Tehran 1835, IranAddress no. 3: Babaei Highway – Next to Niru M.F.G, Tehran, IranPlace of registration: Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG); Defense Industries Organization (DIO) Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries is a missile producer owned by Shahid Sayyad Shirazi, former deputy chief of staff of Iran’s Armed Forces that is linked to the Iranian military industry. Shahid Sayyad Shirazi Industries has been trying to acquire metals from China used in high-tech weaponry, including long-range nuclear missiles. It is part of the Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG), which has played a key role in manufacturing and developing weaponry and is linked to several companies involved in proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, and a subsidiary of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO) that is directly involved in missile development. It is therefore controlled by an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapons delivery systems. 17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010) 193. Niru Battery Manufacturing Companyشرکت باطری سازی نیرو(a.k.a. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company;Niru Batteries MFG. Co. Ltd.;Nour Battery Manufacturing Company;Sherkate Battrijazi Niru;Niru Battery Co;Niru Battery Mfg. Co.;Nirou Battery Manufacturing;Saba Battery Company;Niru Co. Ltd.;Sherkat Battery Sazi Niru Sahami Khass;The Niru Battery Company; Address no. 1: Nobonyad Blvd., Pasdaran Avenue, P.O. Box 19575/361, Tehran, IranAddress no. 2: Next to Babee Exp. Way, Nobonyad Sq., Tehran, IranAddress no. 3: Next to Shahid Babaei Exp. way, Nobonyad Sq., 16689, Tehran, IranAddress no. 4: End of Pasdaran Avenue, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, IranTelephone no.: + 98 21 251 0523 / 254 7093; + 98 21 22547094; + 98 21 22567608-9; + 98 21 2545084Website: www.nirubattery.com; www.niruco.com Niru Battery Manufacturing Company is an entity registered in Iran that manufactures power units for the Iranian military, including for missile systems. It is controlled by the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), responsible for Iran’s defence research, development and manufacturing programmes, including support to missile and nuclear programmes. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company is a subsidiary of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), a conglomerate of companies run by the Islamic Republic of Iran whose function is to provide the Armed Forces with the necessary manufacturing capacity and technical abilities. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company is therefore controlled by an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. 17.10.2023 (UN: 3.3.2008) Niru Battery Manufacturing (Batrisazi-ye Niru);Niru Battery Mfg.CO (Saba Battery);Sherkate Batri-e Niru;Power Energy Source Development Company (ESDO)) Email: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] of registration: Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO); Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) 194. Safety Equipment Procurement Company(a.k.a. Safety Equipment Procurement;SEP;SEP Co.;SEPCO;Safety Equipment Procurement Inc.) Address: P.O. Box 16785/195, Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) Safety Equipment Procurement Company is a front company for Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), which is responsible for Iran’s liquid-fuelled ballistic missile programme. AIO is the leading industrial and military subsidiary of Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and oversees Iran’s missile production. AIO has used the Safety Equipment Procurement Company for procurement since at least 2003. It is involved in Iran’s ballistic missile activities and is therefore engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. 17.10.2023 (UN: 3.3.2008) 195. Sanam Industrial Group(a.k.a. Sanam Industries Group;Sanam Industrial Production Group;Department 140;Sanam Projects Management (SPM);Sanam Industrial Company;Sanam Industries Co.;Sanam Industrial and Trading Company;Sanam Group) Address no. 1: Pasdaran Road 15, Tehran, IranAddress no. 2: 3rd Fl., Sanam Bldg., Nobonyad Sq., Pasdaran Ave., Tehran (19579), IranAddress no. 3: P.O. Box 19575/596, Tehran, IranAddress no. 4: Km. 25th of Khavaran Rd., Tehran, Iran (Factory Address)Address no. 5: Farzam Alley, No 3, Fatemi Square, Palestine StTelephone no.: + 98 21 2546008; + 98 21 2556772; + 98 21 88969501 Sanam Industrial Group is controlled by Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) and has purchased equipment for the Iranian missile programme. Sanam Industrial Group is therefore providing support for Iran’s development of nuclear weapon delivery systems and is an entity that provides support to the Government of Iran and entities owned or controlled by it or persons and entities associated with it. 17.10.2023 (UN: 24.3.2007) Fax: + 98 21 2556830; + 98 21 88969501Place of registration: TehranRegistration no.: 176855Economic code: 411139673763National ID: 10102191894Date of registration: 1987 and 2001 197. Yazd Metallurgy Industries (YMI)شرکت ذوب فلزات یزد(a.k.a.YMI;Yazd Metallurgy Industry;Yazd Ammunition Industries;Yazd Metallurgical Ind’s Co.;Yazd Metallurgical Industries;Yazd Metal Smelting Industrial Group;Yazd Ammunition Manufacturing and Metallurgy Industries;Directorate of Yazd Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries) Address no. 1: Pasdaran Ave., Next to Telecommunication Industry, Tehran 16588, IranAddress no. 2: P.O. Box 89195/878, Yazd, IranAddress no. 3: P.O. Box 89195/678, Yazd, IranAddress no. 4: Km 5 of Taft Road, Yazd, IranTelephone no.: + 98 35 15220322Fax no.: + 98 35 1523096Place of registration: IranDate of registration: 1961Registration number: 860Economic code: 411315443678Associated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO); Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG); Shahid Sayyad Shirazi Industries Yazd Metallurgy Industries (YMI) is affiliated with Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and is a subsidiary of Ammunition Industries Group in Iran. YMI is involved in IR-1 centrifuge components manufacturing at DIO workshops in Iran’s missile programme. Furthermore, it is involved in the production of goods that can be used for either the production of nuclear weapons or vehicles for the delivery of such weapons.Therefore, it has been providing support for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems by Iran, through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology. 17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010) 199. Shahid Baheri Industrial Group (SBIG)صنایع شهید باقری(a.k.a. Shahid Baheri Organisation;SBIG;Shahid Baheri Industries Group;Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group;Department 140/14;Shahid Bagheri Industries Group;Mahtab Technical Engineering Company;Composite Propellant Missile Industry;Sanaye Sokhte Morakab;SSM) Address: Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) Shahid Baheri Industrial Group (SBIG) is a subsidiary to Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). Shahid Baheri Industrial Group (SBIG) develops and produces Iran’s solid-propellant ballistic missiles. The development of such missiles is key to the building of nuclear weapon delivery capacities. Therefore, SBIG is engaged in, directly associated with, or providing support for, Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. 17.10.2023 (UN: 23.12.2006) 200. Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG)گروه صنعتی شهید همت(a.k.a. Sabalan CIE; Sabalan Company; Sabalan Petrochemical Company (SPC); Sabalan Petrochemical Industries Company (SPICO); Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company (SAPICO); Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG);Chahid Hemmat Industrial Group; Address: Damavand Tehran Highway, P.O. Box 16595/159, No 5, Eslami St., Golestane Sevvom St., Pasdaran St., Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) is subordinate to Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). SHIG is responsible for Iran’s liquid-fuelled ballistic missile programme, including the production of missiles. The development of such missiles is key to the building of nuclear weapon delivery capacities. Therefore, SHIG is engaged in, directly associated with, or providing support for, Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. 17.10.2023 (UN: 23.12.2006)’ Hemmat Missile Industries Factory;Shahid Hemmat Industrial Complex;SHIC;Shahid Hemmat Industrial Factories;SHIF;Shahid Hemmat Industries Group;Shahid Hemmat Complex;Shahid Hemmat Industries;Shahid Hemmat Industrial Complex;Shahid Hemat; Industrial Complex;Shahid Hemmat)
Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing
‘1. Aerospace Industries Organisation, AIO AIO, 28 Shian 5, Lavizan, Tehran, IranLangare Street,Nobonyad Square,Tehran, Iran AIO oversees Iran’s production of missiles, including EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group and Fajr Industrial Group. 23.4.2007
9. ESNICO (Equipment Supplier for Nuclear Industries Corporation) No. 1, 37th Avenue, Asadabadi Street, Tehran, Iran Procures industrial goods, specifically for the nuclear programme activities carried out by AEOI, Novin Energy and EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company. ESNICO’s Director is Haleh Bakhtiar. 26.7.2010
18. Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (a.k.a. TSA; TESA; Farayand Technique; Technology of Centrifuge of Iran Company) Address 1: 156 Golestan Street, Saradr-e Jangal, TehranAddress 2: Khalij-e Fars Boulevard, Kilometre 10 of Atomic Energy Road, Rowshan Shahr, Third Moshtaq Street, Esfahan, IranAddress 3: Yousef Abad District, No. 1, 37th Street, Tehran, Iran Iran Centrifuge Technology Company manufactures uranium enrichment centrifuge parts, and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. 26.7.2010
20. Iran Electronics Industries and the following subsidiaries: P.O. Box 18575-365, Tehran, Iran Wholly-owned subsidiary of MODAFL (and therefore a sister-organisation to AIO, AvIO and DIO). Its role is to manufacture electronic components for Iranian weapons systems. It is therefore an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. 23.6.2008
(a)Isfahan Optics (a) Isfahan Optics P.O. Box 81465-313 Kaveh Ave., Isfahan, IranP.O. Box 81465-117, Isfahan, Iran Owned, controlled by, or acts on behalf of Iran Electronics Industries, an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. Isfahan Optics is also engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. 26.7.2010
(a) Isfahan Optics
29. Ministry Of Defense And Support For Armed Forces Logistics (a.k.a. Ministry Of Defense For Armed Forces Logistics; a.k.a. MODAFL; a.k.a. MODSAF) Address no. 1: Ferdowsi Avenue, Sarhang Sakhaei Street, Tehran, IranAddress no. 2: PO Box 11365-8439, IranAddress no. 3: Sarhang Sakhaei Street, Ferdowsi Avenue, Tehran, IranAddress no. 4: PO Box 11365-8439, IranAddress no. 5: Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, IranAddress no. 6: PO Box 16315-189, Tehran, IranAddress no. 7: located on the west side of Dabestan Street, Abbas Abad District, Tehran, IranAddress no. 8: PO Box 19315-189, Pasdaran Street, South Noubonyand Square, Tehran, Iran The Ministry Of Defense And Support For Armed Forces Logistics, which includes the MODLEX Export Center (also referred to as the Ministry of Defense Logistics Export (MODLEX)), is responsible for Iran’s defence research, development, manufacturing and export programmes, including support to missile and nuclear programmes. 23.6.2008
31. Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI)صنایع شیمیایی پارچین(a.k.a. Parchin Chemical Factories Chemical Industries Group;PCF Chemical Industries Group;Parchin Chemical Factories;Parchin Chemical Industry Group;PCI Group;Parchin Chemical Ind (PCF);Parchin Chemical Factories;Para Chemical Industries;PCF;PCI;Parchin Military Base) Address no. 1: Khavaran Road Km 30-35, Parchin Special Road, Varamin, ParchinAddress no. 2: Nobonyad Square, Tehran 15765-358Address no. 3: Parchin Forked Rd., 35th km. Khavaran Rd., Pakdasht, Tehran, Iran (Factory)Address no. 4: 2nd Floor, Sanam Bldg., Nobonyad Sq., Tehran, Iran (Head Office)Address no. 5: Pasdaran Square, P.O. Box 16765/358, Tehran, IranAddress no. 6: 2nd Floor, Sanam Bldg., 3rd Floor, Sanam Bldg., P.O. Box 16765/358, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, Iran Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI) produces ammunition, explosives and solid propellants for rockets and missiles. Parchin facilities were used for the production and testing of nuclear weapons. Parchin Chemical Industries is therefore responsible for providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.Parchin Chemical Industries is part of the Chemical Industries and Development of Material Group (CIDMG), which is a branch of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which falls under Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and is therefore owned by the Iranian Government. Parchin Chemical Industries is therefore an entity that provides support to the Government of Iran, and is controlled by and associated with entities providing support to the Government of Iran. 23.6.2008 (UN: 24.3.2007)
Telephone no.: + 98 21 2258929; + 98 21 35243153; + 98 21 3130626Website:http://icig.ir/Registration no.: Cooperative Company Registration No 892Associated entities: Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL); Defense Industries Organization (DIO); Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO); Iran Electronics Industries (IEI)
35. Raka A department of EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company. Established in late 2006, it was responsible for the construction of the Uranium enrichment plant at Fordow (Qom). 26.7.2010
42. Yasa Part and the following subsidiaries: Company dealing with procurement activities related to the purchase of materials and technologies necessary to nuclear and ballistic programmes. 26.7.2010
(a)Arfa Paint Company (a.k.a. ARFA; Arfa Company) (a) Arfa Paint Company (a.k.a. ARFA; Arfa Company) Address 1: Unit 5, 9th floor, Sarve Tower, Saadat Abad, Tehran, IranAddress 2: 16th km Karaj Special Road, Tehran, Iran Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. 26.7.2010
(a) Arfa Paint Company (a.k.a. ARFA; Arfa Company)
(b)Arfeh Company (b) Arfeh Company Address: West Lavasani, Tehran, Iran Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. 26.7.2010
(b) Arfeh Company
(d)Hosseini Nejad Trading Co. (a.k.a. Hosseini Nejad Trading Company) (d) Hosseini Nejad Trading Co. (a.k.a. Hosseini Nejad Trading Company) Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. 26.7.2010
(d) Hosseini Nejad Trading Co. (a.k.a. Hosseini Nejad Trading Company)
(e)Iran Saffron Company (a.k.a. Iransaffron Co.; Iran Safron; Iran Saffron; Iran Saffron Co.) (e) Iran Saffron Company (a.k.a. Iransaffron Co.; Iran Safron; Iran Saffron; Iran Saffron Co.) Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. 26.7.2010
(e) Iran Saffron Company (a.k.a. Iransaffron Co.; Iran Safron; Iran Saffron; Iran Saffron Co.)
57. Hirbod Co Hirbod Co – Flat 2, 3 Second Street, Asad Abadi Avenue, Tehran 14316 A company that has procured goods and equipment destined for Iran’s Nuclear and Ballistic Missile programmes for the EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC). 23.5.2011
60. Paya Parto (a.k.a. Paya Partov; National Centre for Laser Science and Technology) Paya Parto (a.k.a. Paya Partov or Iranian National Centre for Laser Science and Technology) is an entity that researches stable isotope separation, a key parameter for centrifuges component production, as part of Iran’s nuclear program.In 2021, against the backdrop of Iran’s National Nuclear Day, Paya Parto, under its alias National Centre for Laser Science and Technology, unveiled a number of “unspecified nuclear projects”.Paya Part is therefore responsible for providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. 23.5.2011
76. Iran Marine Industrial Company (SADRA) Sadra Building No 3, Shafagh St., Poonak Khavari Blvd., Shahrak Ghods, P.O. Box 14669-56491, Tehran, Iran Effectively controlled by EU-designated Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA), which is designated for being an IRGC company. Provides support to the Government of Iran through its involvement in the Iranian energy sector including in the South Pars Gas field. 23.5.2011
81. Eyvaz Technic No 3, Building 3, Shahid Hamid Sadigh Alley, Shariati Street, Tehran, Iran. Producer of vacuum equipment that has supplied the uranium enrichment sites at Natanz and Qom/Fordow. In 2011, it supplied pressure transducers to EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC). 1.12.2011
83. Ghani Sazi Uranium Company (a.k.a. Iran Uranium Enrichment Company) 3, Qarqavol Close, 20th Street, Tehran, Iran It has production contracts with EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) and EU-designated TESA. 1.12.2011
84. Iran Pooya (a.k.a. Iran Pouya) A government owned company that operated the biggest extruder of aluminium in Iran and supplied material for use in the production of casings for the IR-1 and IR-2 centrifuges. A major manufacturer of aluminium cylinders for centrifuges whose customers include the AEOI and EU-designated TESA. 1.12.2011
88. MACPAR Makina San Ve Tic Istasyon MH, Sehitler cad, Guldeniz Sit, Number 79/2, Tuzla 34930, Istanbul, Turkey Company run by Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies. 1.12.2011
89. MATSA (Mohandesi Toseh Sokht Atomi Company) 90, Fathi Shaghaghi Street, Tehran, Iran. Iranian company contracted to EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) to provide design and engineering services across the nuclear fuel cycle. Most recently has been procuring equipment for the Natanz uranium enrichment site. 1.12.2011
91. Multimat lc ve Dis Ticaret Pazarlama Limited Sirketi Company run by Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies. 1.12.2011
97. STEP Standart Teknik Parca San ve TIC A.S. 79/2 Tuzla, 34940, Istanbul, Turkey Company run by Milad Jafari, who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) through front companies. 1.12.2011
102. Yarsanat (a.k.a. Yar Sanat, a.k.a. Yarestan Vacuumi) No. 101, West Zardosht Street, 3rd Floor, 14157 Tehran; No. 139 Hoveyzeh Street, 15337, Tehran, Iran Procurement company for EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC). Involved in purchasing equipment and materials, which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme. It has attempted the procurement of vacuum products and pressure transducers. 1.12.2011
148. Iran Composites Institute (a.k.a. Composites Research Laboratory (CRL)) Iran Composites Institute, Iranian University of Science and Technology, 16845-188, Tehran, Iran,Telephone: 98 217 3912858Fax: 98 217 7491206Email: mailto:[email protected]:http://www.irancomposites.org Iranian Composites Institute (ICI, a.k.a. Composite Institute of Iran; Composites Research Laboratory (CRL)) has been assisting designated entities in violating the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of 2011, ICI had been contracted to provide EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA) with IR-2M centrifuge rotors. 22.12.2012
149. Jelvesazan Company 22 Bahman St., Bozorgmehr Ave, 84155666, Esfahan, IranTel: 98 0311 2658311 15Fax: 98 0311 2679097 Jelvesazan Company has been assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of early 2012, Jelvesazan intended to supply controlled vacuum pumps to EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA). 22.12.2012
151. Simatec Development Company Simatec Development Company has been assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of early 2010 Simatec was contracted by EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) to procure Vacon inverters to power uranium enrichment centrifuges. As of mid-2012 Simatec was attempting to procure EU-controlled inverters. 22.12.2012
152. Aluminat 1.Parcham St, 13th Km of Qom Rd 38135 Arak (Factory)2.Unit 38, 5th Fl, Bldg No 60, Golfam St, Jordan, 19395-5716, TehranTel: 98 212 2049216 / 22049928 / 22045237Fax: 98 21 22057127Website: www.aluminat.com 1. Parcham St, 13th Km of Qom Rd 38135 Arak (Factory) 2. Unit 38, 5th Fl, Bldg No 60, Golfam St, Jordan, 19395-5716, Tehran Aluminat has been assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. In early 2012, Aluminat had a contract to supply 6061-T6 aluminium to EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA). 22.12.2012
1. Parcham St, 13th Km of Qom Rd 38135 Arak (Factory)
2. Unit 38, 5th Fl, Bldg No 60, Golfam St, Jordan, 19395-5716, Tehran
161. Sharif University of Technology Last address known: Azadi Ave/Street, PO Box 11365-11155, Tehran, Iran, Tel. + 98 21 66 161 Email: [email protected] Sharif University of Technology (SUT) has a number of cooperation agreements with Iranian Government organisations designated by the EU, which operate in military or military-related fields, particularly in the field of ballistic missile production and procurement. This includes: an agreement with the EU-designated Aerospace Industries Organisation for, inter alia, the production of satellites; cooperating with the Iranian Ministry of Defence and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) on smart boat competitions; a broader agreement with the EU-designated IRGC Air Force, which covers developing and strengthening the University’s relations, organisational and strategic cooperation.Taken together, these show a significant record of engagement with the Government of Iran in military or military-related fields that constitutes support to the Government of Iran. 8.11.2014
175. Defense Technology and Science Research Centre (DTSRC)موسسه آموزشی و تحقیقاتی صنایع دفاعی(a.k.a. Institute for Defense Education and Research;Moassese Amozesh Va Tahghighati) Address: Pasdaran Av., P.O. Box 19585/777, Tehran, IranType of entity: government entityPlace of registration: Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL); Defense Industries Organization (DIO) The Defense Technology and Science Research Centre (DTSRC) is an Iran-based government entity that conducts defence-related research and development as well as procurement. It is majority-owned by and subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and falls under its Defense Industries Organization (DIO). MODAFL provides logistic support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Therefore, DTSRC provides support to the Government of Iran. 17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010 EU: 24.4.2007)
176. Electro Sanam Company(a.k.a. E.S. Co.; E.X. Co.;Electro Sanam Co.;Electro Sanam;Sanam Industrial Group;Electro Sanam Industries;Sanam Electronics) Address no. 1: No 24, 3rd Floor, Sink St., after Beheshti St., Northern Sohrevardi Ave. 15779 Tehran, IranAddress no. 2: Tehran P.O. Box 19395/5339, Araj Forkway, Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, IranTelephone no.: + 98 21 8757587; + 98 21 7863352; + 98 21 88757587Fax no.: + 98 21 8757588; + 98 21 7867810; + 98 21 88757588; + 98 21 22549738 Electro Sanam Company is a front company for the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) that is involved in Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Electro Sanam Company is therefore engaged in, directly associated with, or providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. 17.10.2023 (UN: 3.3.2008)
Email: [email protected]; [email protected] of registration: IranDate of registration: 1992Registration no.: 339747National ID no.: 10103864724Principal place of business: Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)
182. Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG)گروه صنایع مهمات سازی ومتالوژی Address no. 1: P.O. Box 16765/1835 Pasdaran StreetAddress no. 2: Department 145-42 P.O. Box 16765/128 Moghan Avenue, Pasdaran StreetPlace of registration: Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Shahid Sattari Industries; Parchin Ammunition Industries; 7th of Tir Industries Complex; Yazd Metallurgy Industries; Khorasan Metallurgy Industries; Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries; Defense Industries Organization (DIO) Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) is the largest industrial group of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO). Its products include ammunition, mortar bombs, pyrotechnics, anti-tank and sea mines, hand grenades, detonators, brass materials, cutting tools, industrial valves, perforating charges for the oil industry and other industrial parts. It is comprised of ten subsidiaries, including Shahid Sattari Industries, Parchin Ammunition Industries, 7th of Tir Industries Complex, Yazd Metallurgy Industries, Khorasan Metallurgy Industries, Isfahan Ammunition Industries, Shahid Shiroudi Industries and Shahid Sayyad Shirazi Industries. It has played a key role in manufacturing and developing weaponry and is linked to several companies involved in proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. It is thus engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems by Iran. 17.10.2023 (UN: 24.3.2007)
184. Defense Industries Organization (DIO)سازمان صنایع دفاع جمهوری اسلامی ایران Address: Amin Industrial Estate, Khalage Rd., Seyedi District P.O. Box 91735/549, Mashad, IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Kaveh cutting tool company; 7th of Tir Industries; Khorasan Metallurgy Industries; Iran Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO); Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO); Iran Electronics Industries (IEI); Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) The Defense Industries Organization (DIO) is a conglomerate of over 300 companies and a subsidiary of Iran’s Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) whose function is to provide the Armed Forces with the necessary manufacturing capacity and technical abilities. It has played a central role in Iran’s ballistic missile development programme and in the implementation of Iran’s centrifuge programme. DIO oversees numerous state-owned defence contractors and front companies directly or through its primary subsidiary, the Aerospace Industries Organization. 17.10.2023 (UN: 23.12.2006)
It plays a significant role in producing diverse military hardware for Iran, including missiles. In recent years, the DIO has attempted to become export-oriented, allowing Iran to become an exporter of weapons: in 2022, DIO has grown by 200 % compared to 2021, has developed 75 new weapons and has multiplied its exports by 2,5 , thus contributing to the growth of Iran’s defence industry. DIO is thus providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
185. Kaveh Cutting Tools Company(a.k.a. Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co.;Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co. Persian;Mojtame-e Abzar Boreshi Kaveh) Address no. 1: Km 4 Khalaj Road, end of Seyyedi Street, Mashad 91638, IranAddress no. 2: P.O. Box 91735/549, Mashad, IranAddress no. 3: 3rd Km of Khalaj Road, Seyyedi Street, Mashad, IranAddress no. 4: Moqan St., Tehran, IranWebsite: www.kavehtools.irPlace of registration: Mashad, IranDate of registration: 1993Principal place of business: Mashad, IranAssociated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO); Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) Kaveh Cutting Tools Company is an Iranian manufacturing company that has been involved in the production of components for Iran’s IR-1 centrifuges, and in the procurement for Iran’s centrifuge programme. It is controlled by the Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) and subordinate to the Defense Industries Organization (DIO). It is thus engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems by Iran. 17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010)
186. Khorasan Metallurgy Industriesصنایع مهمات سازی و متالورژی خراسان(a.k.a. Khorasan Metallurgy;Khorasan Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries;Khorasan Metalogy Industries;The Metallurgy Industries of Khorasan;Metalogy Industry of Khorasan;Samen IndustriesPreviously known as: Amin Industrial Complex) Address: 2nd km of Khalaj Road End of Seyyedi St., P.O.Box 91735-549, 91735 Mashad, Iran.Website: www.khwarizmi.irTelephone no.: + 98 511 3853008; + 98 511 3870225Type of entity: public companyPlace of registration: IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG); Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL); Defense Industries Organization (DIO) Khorasan Metallurgy Industries is part of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and a subsidiary of the Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG). It is responsible for the production of ammunition and centrifuge components as well as cutting tools and products such as drills, milling cutters, taps, reamers and compound tools. It is providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. 17.10.2023 (UN: 3.3.2008)
187. Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries(a.k.a. Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries;Sayyad Shirazi Industries;Sayad Shirazi;Sayad Shirazi industries;Sayad Shirazi industry;Shaheed Sayad Shirazee ammunition industries;Shahid Sayyadi Shirazi Industries;Shahid Sayyed Shirazi Ind.) Address no. 1: Next To Nirou Battery Mfg. Co, Shahid Babaii Expressway, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, IranAddress no. 2: Pasdaran St., P.O. Box 16765, Tehran 1835, IranAddress no. 3: Babaei Highway – Next to Niru M.F.G, Tehran, IranPlace of registration: Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG); Defense Industries Organization (DIO) Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries is a missile producer owned by Shahid Sayyad Shirazi, former deputy chief of staff of Iran’s Armed Forces that is linked to the Iranian military industry. Shahid Sayyad Shirazi Industries has been trying to acquire metals from China used in high-tech weaponry, including long-range nuclear missiles. It is part of the Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG), which has played a key role in manufacturing and developing weaponry and is linked to several companies involved in proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, and a subsidiary of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO) that is directly involved in missile development. It is therefore controlled by an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapons delivery systems. 17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010)
193. Niru Battery Manufacturing Companyشرکت باطری سازی نیرو(a.k.a. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company;Niru Batteries MFG. Co. Ltd.;Nour Battery Manufacturing Company;Sherkate Battrijazi Niru;Niru Battery Co;Niru Battery Mfg. Co.;Nirou Battery Manufacturing;Saba Battery Company;Niru Co. Ltd.;Sherkat Battery Sazi Niru Sahami Khass;The Niru Battery Company; Address no. 1: Nobonyad Blvd., Pasdaran Avenue, P.O. Box 19575/361, Tehran, IranAddress no. 2: Next to Babee Exp. Way, Nobonyad Sq., Tehran, IranAddress no. 3: Next to Shahid Babaei Exp. way, Nobonyad Sq., 16689, Tehran, IranAddress no. 4: End of Pasdaran Avenue, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, IranTelephone no.: + 98 21 251 0523 / 254 7093; + 98 21 22547094; + 98 21 22567608-9; + 98 21 2545084Website: www.nirubattery.com; www.niruco.com Niru Battery Manufacturing Company is an entity registered in Iran that manufactures power units for the Iranian military, including for missile systems. It is controlled by the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), responsible for Iran’s defence research, development and manufacturing programmes, including support to missile and nuclear programmes. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company is a subsidiary of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), a conglomerate of companies run by the Islamic Republic of Iran whose function is to provide the Armed Forces with the necessary manufacturing capacity and technical abilities. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company is therefore controlled by an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. 17.10.2023 (UN: 3.3.2008)
Niru Battery Manufacturing (Batrisazi-ye Niru);Niru Battery Mfg.CO (Saba Battery);Sherkate Batri-e Niru;Power Energy Source Development Company (ESDO)) Email: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] of registration: Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO); Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)
194. Safety Equipment Procurement Company(a.k.a. Safety Equipment Procurement;SEP;SEP Co.;SEPCO;Safety Equipment Procurement Inc.) Address: P.O. Box 16785/195, Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) Safety Equipment Procurement Company is a front company for Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), which is responsible for Iran’s liquid-fuelled ballistic missile programme. AIO is the leading industrial and military subsidiary of Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and oversees Iran’s missile production. AIO has used the Safety Equipment Procurement Company for procurement since at least 2003. It is involved in Iran’s ballistic missile activities and is therefore engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. 17.10.2023 (UN: 3.3.2008)
195. Sanam Industrial Group(a.k.a. Sanam Industries Group;Sanam Industrial Production Group;Department 140;Sanam Projects Management (SPM);Sanam Industrial Company;Sanam Industries Co.;Sanam Industrial and Trading Company;Sanam Group) Address no. 1: Pasdaran Road 15, Tehran, IranAddress no. 2: 3rd Fl., Sanam Bldg., Nobonyad Sq., Pasdaran Ave., Tehran (19579), IranAddress no. 3: P.O. Box 19575/596, Tehran, IranAddress no. 4: Km. 25th of Khavaran Rd., Tehran, Iran (Factory Address)Address no. 5: Farzam Alley, No 3, Fatemi Square, Palestine StTelephone no.: + 98 21 2546008; + 98 21 2556772; + 98 21 88969501 Sanam Industrial Group is controlled by Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) and has purchased equipment for the Iranian missile programme. Sanam Industrial Group is therefore providing support for Iran’s development of nuclear weapon delivery systems and is an entity that provides support to the Government of Iran and entities owned or controlled by it or persons and entities associated with it. 17.10.2023 (UN: 24.3.2007)
Fax: + 98 21 2556830; + 98 21 88969501Place of registration: TehranRegistration no.: 176855Economic code: 411139673763National ID: 10102191894Date of registration: 1987 and 2001
197. Yazd Metallurgy Industries (YMI)شرکت ذوب فلزات یزد(a.k.a.YMI;Yazd Metallurgy Industry;Yazd Ammunition Industries;Yazd Metallurgical Ind’s Co.;Yazd Metallurgical Industries;Yazd Metal Smelting Industrial Group;Yazd Ammunition Manufacturing and Metallurgy Industries;Directorate of Yazd Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries) Address no. 1: Pasdaran Ave., Next to Telecommunication Industry, Tehran 16588, IranAddress no. 2: P.O. Box 89195/878, Yazd, IranAddress no. 3: P.O. Box 89195/678, Yazd, IranAddress no. 4: Km 5 of Taft Road, Yazd, IranTelephone no.: + 98 35 15220322Fax no.: + 98 35 1523096Place of registration: IranDate of registration: 1961Registration number: 860Economic code: 411315443678Associated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO); Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG); Shahid Sayyad Shirazi Industries Yazd Metallurgy Industries (YMI) is affiliated with Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and is a subsidiary of Ammunition Industries Group in Iran. YMI is involved in IR-1 centrifuge components manufacturing at DIO workshops in Iran’s missile programme. Furthermore, it is involved in the production of goods that can be used for either the production of nuclear weapons or vehicles for the delivery of such weapons.Therefore, it has been providing support for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems by Iran, through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology. 17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010)
199. Shahid Baheri Industrial Group (SBIG)صنایع شهید باقری(a.k.a. Shahid Baheri Organisation;SBIG;Shahid Baheri Industries Group;Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group;Department 140/14;Shahid Bagheri Industries Group;Mahtab Technical Engineering Company;Composite Propellant Missile Industry;Sanaye Sokhte Morakab;SSM) Address: Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) Shahid Baheri Industrial Group (SBIG) is a subsidiary to Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). Shahid Baheri Industrial Group (SBIG) develops and produces Iran’s solid-propellant ballistic missiles. The development of such missiles is key to the building of nuclear weapon delivery capacities. Therefore, SBIG is engaged in, directly associated with, or providing support for, Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. 17.10.2023 (UN: 23.12.2006)
200. Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG)گروه صنعتی شهید همت(a.k.a. Sabalan CIE; Sabalan Company; Sabalan Petrochemical Company (SPC); Sabalan Petrochemical Industries Company (SPICO); Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company (SAPICO); Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG);Chahid Hemmat Industrial Group; Address: Damavand Tehran Highway, P.O. Box 16595/159, No 5, Eslami St., Golestane Sevvom St., Pasdaran St., Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) is subordinate to Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). SHIG is responsible for Iran’s liquid-fuelled ballistic missile programme, including the production of missiles. The development of such missiles is key to the building of nuclear weapon delivery capacities. Therefore, SHIG is engaged in, directly associated with, or providing support for, Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. 17.10.2023 (UN: 23.12.2006)’
Hemmat Missile Industries Factory;Shahid Hemmat Industrial Complex;SHIC;Shahid Hemmat Industrial Factories;SHIF;Shahid Hemmat Industries Group;Shahid Hemmat Complex;Shahid Hemmat Industries;Shahid Hemmat Industrial Complex;Shahid Hemat; Industrial Complex;Shahid Hemmat)
Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing
‘1. Aerospace Industries Organisation, AIO AIO, 28 Shian 5, Lavizan, Tehran, IranLangare Street,Nobonyad Square,Tehran, Iran AIO oversees Iran’s production of missiles, including EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group and Fajr Industrial Group. 23.4.2007
9. ESNICO (Equipment Supplier for Nuclear Industries Corporation) No. 1, 37th Avenue, Asadabadi Street, Tehran, Iran Procures industrial goods, specifically for the nuclear programme activities carried out by AEOI, Novin Energy and EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company. ESNICO’s Director is Haleh Bakhtiar. 26.7.2010
18. Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (a.k.a. TSA; TESA; Farayand Technique; Technology of Centrifuge of Iran Company) Address 1: 156 Golestan Street, Saradr-e Jangal, TehranAddress 2: Khalij-e Fars Boulevard, Kilometre 10 of Atomic Energy Road, Rowshan Shahr, Third Moshtaq Street, Esfahan, IranAddress 3: Yousef Abad District, No. 1, 37th Street, Tehran, Iran Iran Centrifuge Technology Company manufactures uranium enrichment centrifuge parts, and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. 26.7.2010
20. Iran Electronics Industries and the following subsidiaries: P.O. Box 18575-365, Tehran, Iran Wholly-owned subsidiary of MODAFL (and therefore a sister-organisation to AIO, AvIO and DIO). Its role is to manufacture electronic components for Iranian weapons systems. It is therefore an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. 23.6.2008
(a)Isfahan Optics (a) Isfahan Optics P.O. Box 81465-313 Kaveh Ave., Isfahan, IranP.O. Box 81465-117, Isfahan, Iran Owned, controlled by, or acts on behalf of Iran Electronics Industries, an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. Isfahan Optics is also engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. 26.7.2010
(a) Isfahan Optics
29. Ministry Of Defense And Support For Armed Forces Logistics (a.k.a. Ministry Of Defense For Armed Forces Logistics; a.k.a. MODAFL; a.k.a. MODSAF) Address no. 1: Ferdowsi Avenue, Sarhang Sakhaei Street, Tehran, IranAddress no. 2: PO Box 11365-8439, IranAddress no. 3: Sarhang Sakhaei Street, Ferdowsi Avenue, Tehran, IranAddress no. 4: PO Box 11365-8439, IranAddress no. 5: Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, IranAddress no. 6: PO Box 16315-189, Tehran, IranAddress no. 7: located on the west side of Dabestan Street, Abbas Abad District, Tehran, IranAddress no. 8: PO Box 19315-189, Pasdaran Street, South Noubonyand Square, Tehran, Iran The Ministry Of Defense And Support For Armed Forces Logistics, which includes the MODLEX Export Center (also referred to as the Ministry of Defense Logistics Export (MODLEX)), is responsible for Iran’s defence research, development, manufacturing and export programmes, including support to missile and nuclear programmes. 23.6.2008
31. Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI)صنایع شیمیایی پارچین(a.k.a. Parchin Chemical Factories Chemical Industries Group;PCF Chemical Industries Group;Parchin Chemical Factories;Parchin Chemical Industry Group;PCI Group;Parchin Chemical Ind (PCF);Parchin Chemical Factories;Para Chemical Industries;PCF;PCI;Parchin Military Base) Address no. 1: Khavaran Road Km 30-35, Parchin Special Road, Varamin, ParchinAddress no. 2: Nobonyad Square, Tehran 15765-358Address no. 3: Parchin Forked Rd., 35th km. Khavaran Rd., Pakdasht, Tehran, Iran (Factory)Address no. 4: 2nd Floor, Sanam Bldg., Nobonyad Sq., Tehran, Iran (Head Office)Address no. 5: Pasdaran Square, P.O. Box 16765/358, Tehran, IranAddress no. 6: 2nd Floor, Sanam Bldg., 3rd Floor, Sanam Bldg., P.O. Box 16765/358, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, Iran Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI) produces ammunition, explosives and solid propellants for rockets and missiles. Parchin facilities were used for the production and testing of nuclear weapons. Parchin Chemical Industries is therefore responsible for providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.Parchin Chemical Industries is part of the Chemical Industries and Development of Material Group (CIDMG), which is a branch of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which falls under Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and is therefore owned by the Iranian Government. Parchin Chemical Industries is therefore an entity that provides support to the Government of Iran, and is controlled by and associated with entities providing support to the Government of Iran. 23.6.2008 (UN: 24.3.2007)
Telephone no.: + 98 21 2258929; + 98 21 35243153; + 98 21 3130626Website:http://icig.ir/Registration no.: Cooperative Company Registration No 892Associated entities: Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL); Defense Industries Organization (DIO); Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO); Iran Electronics Industries (IEI)
35. Raka A department of EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company. Established in late 2006, it was responsible for the construction of the Uranium enrichment plant at Fordow (Qom). 26.7.2010
42. Yasa Part and the following subsidiaries: Company dealing with procurement activities related to the purchase of materials and technologies necessary to nuclear and ballistic programmes. 26.7.2010
(a)Arfa Paint Company (a.k.a. ARFA; Arfa Company) (a) Arfa Paint Company (a.k.a. ARFA; Arfa Company) Address 1: Unit 5, 9th floor, Sarve Tower, Saadat Abad, Tehran, IranAddress 2: 16th km Karaj Special Road, Tehran, Iran Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. 26.7.2010
(a) Arfa Paint Company (a.k.a. ARFA; Arfa Company)
(b)Arfeh Company (b) Arfeh Company Address: West Lavasani, Tehran, Iran Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. 26.7.2010
(b) Arfeh Company
(d)Hosseini Nejad Trading Co. (a.k.a. Hosseini Nejad Trading Company) (d) Hosseini Nejad Trading Co. (a.k.a. Hosseini Nejad Trading Company) Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. 26.7.2010
(d) Hosseini Nejad Trading Co. (a.k.a. Hosseini Nejad Trading Company)
(e)Iran Saffron Company (a.k.a. Iransaffron Co.; Iran Safron; Iran Saffron; Iran Saffron Co.) (e) Iran Saffron Company (a.k.a. Iransaffron Co.; Iran Safron; Iran Saffron; Iran Saffron Co.) Acting on behalf of Yasa Part. 26.7.2010
(e) Iran Saffron Company (a.k.a. Iransaffron Co.; Iran Safron; Iran Saffron; Iran Saffron Co.)
57. Hirbod Co Hirbod Co – Flat 2, 3 Second Street, Asad Abadi Avenue, Tehran 14316 A company that has procured goods and equipment destined for Iran’s Nuclear and Ballistic Missile programmes for the EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC). 23.5.2011
60. Paya Parto (a.k.a. Paya Partov; National Centre for Laser Science and Technology) Paya Parto (a.k.a. Paya Partov or Iranian National Centre for Laser Science and Technology) is an entity that researches stable isotope separation, a key parameter for centrifuges component production, as part of Iran’s nuclear program.In 2021, against the backdrop of Iran’s National Nuclear Day, Paya Parto, under its alias National Centre for Laser Science and Technology, unveiled a number of “unspecified nuclear projects”.Paya Part is therefore responsible for providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. 23.5.2011
76. Iran Marine Industrial Company (SADRA) Sadra Building No 3, Shafagh St., Poonak Khavari Blvd., Shahrak Ghods, P.O. Box 14669-56491, Tehran, Iran Effectively controlled by EU-designated Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA), which is designated for being an IRGC company. Provides support to the Government of Iran through its involvement in the Iranian energy sector including in the South Pars Gas field. 23.5.2011
81. Eyvaz Technic No 3, Building 3, Shahid Hamid Sadigh Alley, Shariati Street, Tehran, Iran. Producer of vacuum equipment that has supplied the uranium enrichment sites at Natanz and Qom/Fordow. In 2011, it supplied pressure transducers to EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC). 1.12.2011
83. Ghani Sazi Uranium Company (a.k.a. Iran Uranium Enrichment Company) 3, Qarqavol Close, 20th Street, Tehran, Iran It has production contracts with EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) and EU-designated TESA. 1.12.2011
84. Iran Pooya (a.k.a. Iran Pouya) A government owned company that operated the biggest extruder of aluminium in Iran and supplied material for use in the production of casings for the IR-1 and IR-2 centrifuges. A major manufacturer of aluminium cylinders for centrifuges whose customers include the AEOI and EU-designated TESA. 1.12.2011
88. MACPAR Makina San Ve Tic Istasyon MH, Sehitler cad, Guldeniz Sit, Number 79/2, Tuzla 34930, Istanbul, Turkey Company run by Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies. 1.12.2011
89. MATSA (Mohandesi Toseh Sokht Atomi Company) 90, Fathi Shaghaghi Street, Tehran, Iran. Iranian company contracted to EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) to provide design and engineering services across the nuclear fuel cycle. Most recently has been procuring equipment for the Natanz uranium enrichment site. 1.12.2011
91. Multimat lc ve Dis Ticaret Pazarlama Limited Sirketi Company run by Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies. 1.12.2011
97. STEP Standart Teknik Parca San ve TIC A.S. 79/2 Tuzla, 34940, Istanbul, Turkey Company run by Milad Jafari, who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) through front companies. 1.12.2011
102. Yarsanat (a.k.a. Yar Sanat, a.k.a. Yarestan Vacuumi) No. 101, West Zardosht Street, 3rd Floor, 14157 Tehran; No. 139 Hoveyzeh Street, 15337, Tehran, Iran Procurement company for EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC). Involved in purchasing equipment and materials, which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme. It has attempted the procurement of vacuum products and pressure transducers. 1.12.2011
148. Iran Composites Institute (a.k.a. Composites Research Laboratory (CRL)) Iran Composites Institute, Iranian University of Science and Technology, 16845-188, Tehran, Iran,Telephone: 98 217 3912858Fax: 98 217 7491206Email: mailto:[email protected]:http://www.irancomposites.org Iranian Composites Institute (ICI, a.k.a. Composite Institute of Iran; Composites Research Laboratory (CRL)) has been assisting designated entities in violating the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of 2011, ICI had been contracted to provide EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA) with IR-2M centrifuge rotors. 22.12.2012
149. Jelvesazan Company 22 Bahman St., Bozorgmehr Ave, 84155666, Esfahan, IranTel: 98 0311 2658311 15Fax: 98 0311 2679097 Jelvesazan Company has been assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of early 2012, Jelvesazan intended to supply controlled vacuum pumps to EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA). 22.12.2012
151. Simatec Development Company Simatec Development Company has been assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of early 2010 Simatec was contracted by EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) to procure Vacon inverters to power uranium enrichment centrifuges. As of mid-2012 Simatec was attempting to procure EU-controlled inverters. 22.12.2012
152. Aluminat 1.Parcham St, 13th Km of Qom Rd 38135 Arak (Factory)2.Unit 38, 5th Fl, Bldg No 60, Golfam St, Jordan, 19395-5716, TehranTel: 98 212 2049216 / 22049928 / 22045237Fax: 98 21 22057127Website: www.aluminat.com 1. Parcham St, 13th Km of Qom Rd 38135 Arak (Factory) 2. Unit 38, 5th Fl, Bldg No 60, Golfam St, Jordan, 19395-5716, Tehran Aluminat has been assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. In early 2012, Aluminat had a contract to supply 6061-T6 aluminium to EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA). 22.12.2012
1. Parcham St, 13th Km of Qom Rd 38135 Arak (Factory)
2. Unit 38, 5th Fl, Bldg No 60, Golfam St, Jordan, 19395-5716, Tehran
161. Sharif University of Technology Last address known: Azadi Ave/Street, PO Box 11365-11155, Tehran, Iran, Tel. + 98 21 66 161 Email: [email protected] Sharif University of Technology (SUT) has a number of cooperation agreements with Iranian Government organisations designated by the EU, which operate in military or military-related fields, particularly in the field of ballistic missile production and procurement. This includes: an agreement with the EU-designated Aerospace Industries Organisation for, inter alia, the production of satellites; cooperating with the Iranian Ministry of Defence and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) on smart boat competitions; a broader agreement with the EU-designated IRGC Air Force, which covers developing and strengthening the University’s relations, organisational and strategic cooperation.Taken together, these show a significant record of engagement with the Government of Iran in military or military-related fields that constitutes support to the Government of Iran. 8.11.2014
175. Defense Technology and Science Research Centre (DTSRC)موسسه آموزشی و تحقیقاتی صنایع دفاعی(a.k.a. Institute for Defense Education and Research;Moassese Amozesh Va Tahghighati) Address: Pasdaran Av., P.O. Box 19585/777, Tehran, IranType of entity: government entityPlace of registration: Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL); Defense Industries Organization (DIO) The Defense Technology and Science Research Centre (DTSRC) is an Iran-based government entity that conducts defence-related research and development as well as procurement. It is majority-owned by and subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and falls under its Defense Industries Organization (DIO). MODAFL provides logistic support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Therefore, DTSRC provides support to the Government of Iran. 17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010 EU: 24.4.2007)
176. Electro Sanam Company(a.k.a. E.S. Co.; E.X. Co.;Electro Sanam Co.;Electro Sanam;Sanam Industrial Group;Electro Sanam Industries;Sanam Electronics) Address no. 1: No 24, 3rd Floor, Sink St., after Beheshti St., Northern Sohrevardi Ave. 15779 Tehran, IranAddress no. 2: Tehran P.O. Box 19395/5339, Araj Forkway, Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, IranTelephone no.: + 98 21 8757587; + 98 21 7863352; + 98 21 88757587Fax no.: + 98 21 8757588; + 98 21 7867810; + 98 21 88757588; + 98 21 22549738 Electro Sanam Company is a front company for the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) that is involved in Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Electro Sanam Company is therefore engaged in, directly associated with, or providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. 17.10.2023 (UN: 3.3.2008)
Email: [email protected]; [email protected] of registration: IranDate of registration: 1992Registration no.: 339747National ID no.: 10103864724Principal place of business: Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)
182. Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG)گروه صنایع مهمات سازی ومتالوژی Address no. 1: P.O. Box 16765/1835 Pasdaran StreetAddress no. 2: Department 145-42 P.O. Box 16765/128 Moghan Avenue, Pasdaran StreetPlace of registration: Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Shahid Sattari Industries; Parchin Ammunition Industries; 7th of Tir Industries Complex; Yazd Metallurgy Industries; Khorasan Metallurgy Industries; Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries; Defense Industries Organization (DIO) Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) is the largest industrial group of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO). Its products include ammunition, mortar bombs, pyrotechnics, anti-tank and sea mines, hand grenades, detonators, brass materials, cutting tools, industrial valves, perforating charges for the oil industry and other industrial parts. It is comprised of ten subsidiaries, including Shahid Sattari Industries, Parchin Ammunition Industries, 7th of Tir Industries Complex, Yazd Metallurgy Industries, Khorasan Metallurgy Industries, Isfahan Ammunition Industries, Shahid Shiroudi Industries and Shahid Sayyad Shirazi Industries. It has played a key role in manufacturing and developing weaponry and is linked to several companies involved in proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. It is thus engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems by Iran. 17.10.2023 (UN: 24.3.2007)
184. Defense Industries Organization (DIO)سازمان صنایع دفاع جمهوری اسلامی ایران Address: Amin Industrial Estate, Khalage Rd., Seyedi District P.O. Box 91735/549, Mashad, IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Kaveh cutting tool company; 7th of Tir Industries; Khorasan Metallurgy Industries; Iran Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO); Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO); Iran Electronics Industries (IEI); Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) The Defense Industries Organization (DIO) is a conglomerate of over 300 companies and a subsidiary of Iran’s Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) whose function is to provide the Armed Forces with the necessary manufacturing capacity and technical abilities. It has played a central role in Iran’s ballistic missile development programme and in the implementation of Iran’s centrifuge programme. DIO oversees numerous state-owned defence contractors and front companies directly or through its primary subsidiary, the Aerospace Industries Organization. 17.10.2023 (UN: 23.12.2006)
It plays a significant role in producing diverse military hardware for Iran, including missiles. In recent years, the DIO has attempted to become export-oriented, allowing Iran to become an exporter of weapons: in 2022, DIO has grown by 200 % compared to 2021, has developed 75 new weapons and has multiplied its exports by 2,5 , thus contributing to the growth of Iran’s defence industry. DIO is thus providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
185. Kaveh Cutting Tools Company(a.k.a. Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co.;Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co. Persian;Mojtame-e Abzar Boreshi Kaveh) Address no. 1: Km 4 Khalaj Road, end of Seyyedi Street, Mashad 91638, IranAddress no. 2: P.O. Box 91735/549, Mashad, IranAddress no. 3: 3rd Km of Khalaj Road, Seyyedi Street, Mashad, IranAddress no. 4: Moqan St., Tehran, IranWebsite: www.kavehtools.irPlace of registration: Mashad, IranDate of registration: 1993Principal place of business: Mashad, IranAssociated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO); Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) Kaveh Cutting Tools Company is an Iranian manufacturing company that has been involved in the production of components for Iran’s IR-1 centrifuges, and in the procurement for Iran’s centrifuge programme. It is controlled by the Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) and subordinate to the Defense Industries Organization (DIO). It is thus engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems by Iran. 17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010)
186. Khorasan Metallurgy Industriesصنایع مهمات سازی و متالورژی خراسان(a.k.a. Khorasan Metallurgy;Khorasan Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries;Khorasan Metalogy Industries;The Metallurgy Industries of Khorasan;Metalogy Industry of Khorasan;Samen IndustriesPreviously known as: Amin Industrial Complex) Address: 2nd km of Khalaj Road End of Seyyedi St., P.O.Box 91735-549, 91735 Mashad, Iran.Website: www.khwarizmi.irTelephone no.: + 98 511 3853008; + 98 511 3870225Type of entity: public companyPlace of registration: IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG); Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL); Defense Industries Organization (DIO) Khorasan Metallurgy Industries is part of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and a subsidiary of the Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG). It is responsible for the production of ammunition and centrifuge components as well as cutting tools and products such as drills, milling cutters, taps, reamers and compound tools. It is providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. 17.10.2023 (UN: 3.3.2008)
187. Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries(a.k.a. Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries;Sayyad Shirazi Industries;Sayad Shirazi;Sayad Shirazi industries;Sayad Shirazi industry;Shaheed Sayad Shirazee ammunition industries;Shahid Sayyadi Shirazi Industries;Shahid Sayyed Shirazi Ind.) Address no. 1: Next To Nirou Battery Mfg. Co, Shahid Babaii Expressway, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, IranAddress no. 2: Pasdaran St., P.O. Box 16765, Tehran 1835, IranAddress no. 3: Babaei Highway – Next to Niru M.F.G, Tehran, IranPlace of registration: Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG); Defense Industries Organization (DIO) Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries is a missile producer owned by Shahid Sayyad Shirazi, former deputy chief of staff of Iran’s Armed Forces that is linked to the Iranian military industry. Shahid Sayyad Shirazi Industries has been trying to acquire metals from China used in high-tech weaponry, including long-range nuclear missiles. It is part of the Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG), which has played a key role in manufacturing and developing weaponry and is linked to several companies involved in proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, and a subsidiary of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO) that is directly involved in missile development. It is therefore controlled by an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapons delivery systems. 17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010)
193. Niru Battery Manufacturing Companyشرکت باطری سازی نیرو(a.k.a. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company;Niru Batteries MFG. Co. Ltd.;Nour Battery Manufacturing Company;Sherkate Battrijazi Niru;Niru Battery Co;Niru Battery Mfg. Co.;Nirou Battery Manufacturing;Saba Battery Company;Niru Co. Ltd.;Sherkat Battery Sazi Niru Sahami Khass;The Niru Battery Company; Address no. 1: Nobonyad Blvd., Pasdaran Avenue, P.O. Box 19575/361, Tehran, IranAddress no. 2: Next to Babee Exp. Way, Nobonyad Sq., Tehran, IranAddress no. 3: Next to Shahid Babaei Exp. way, Nobonyad Sq., 16689, Tehran, IranAddress no. 4: End of Pasdaran Avenue, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, IranTelephone no.: + 98 21 251 0523 / 254 7093; + 98 21 22547094; + 98 21 22567608-9; + 98 21 2545084Website: www.nirubattery.com; www.niruco.com Niru Battery Manufacturing Company is an entity registered in Iran that manufactures power units for the Iranian military, including for missile systems. It is controlled by the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), responsible for Iran’s defence research, development and manufacturing programmes, including support to missile and nuclear programmes. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company is a subsidiary of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), a conglomerate of companies run by the Islamic Republic of Iran whose function is to provide the Armed Forces with the necessary manufacturing capacity and technical abilities. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company is therefore controlled by an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. 17.10.2023 (UN: 3.3.2008)
Niru Battery Manufacturing (Batrisazi-ye Niru);Niru Battery Mfg.CO (Saba Battery);Sherkate Batri-e Niru;Power Energy Source Development Company (ESDO)) Email: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] of registration: Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO); Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)
194. Safety Equipment Procurement Company(a.k.a. Safety Equipment Procurement;SEP;SEP Co.;SEPCO;Safety Equipment Procurement Inc.) Address: P.O. Box 16785/195, Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) Safety Equipment Procurement Company is a front company for Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), which is responsible for Iran’s liquid-fuelled ballistic missile programme. AIO is the leading industrial and military subsidiary of Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and oversees Iran’s missile production. AIO has used the Safety Equipment Procurement Company for procurement since at least 2003. It is involved in Iran’s ballistic missile activities and is therefore engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. 17.10.2023 (UN: 3.3.2008)
195. Sanam Industrial Group(a.k.a. Sanam Industries Group;Sanam Industrial Production Group;Department 140;Sanam Projects Management (SPM);Sanam Industrial Company;Sanam Industries Co.;Sanam Industrial and Trading Company;Sanam Group) Address no. 1: Pasdaran Road 15, Tehran, IranAddress no. 2: 3rd Fl., Sanam Bldg., Nobonyad Sq., Pasdaran Ave., Tehran (19579), IranAddress no. 3: P.O. Box 19575/596, Tehran, IranAddress no. 4: Km. 25th of Khavaran Rd., Tehran, Iran (Factory Address)Address no. 5: Farzam Alley, No 3, Fatemi Square, Palestine StTelephone no.: + 98 21 2546008; + 98 21 2556772; + 98 21 88969501 Sanam Industrial Group is controlled by Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) and has purchased equipment for the Iranian missile programme. Sanam Industrial Group is therefore providing support for Iran’s development of nuclear weapon delivery systems and is an entity that provides support to the Government of Iran and entities owned or controlled by it or persons and entities associated with it. 17.10.2023 (UN: 24.3.2007)
Fax: + 98 21 2556830; + 98 21 88969501Place of registration: TehranRegistration no.: 176855Economic code: 411139673763National ID: 10102191894Date of registration: 1987 and 2001
197. Yazd Metallurgy Industries (YMI)شرکت ذوب فلزات یزد(a.k.a.YMI;Yazd Metallurgy Industry;Yazd Ammunition Industries;Yazd Metallurgical Ind’s Co.;Yazd Metallurgical Industries;Yazd Metal Smelting Industrial Group;Yazd Ammunition Manufacturing and Metallurgy Industries;Directorate of Yazd Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries) Address no. 1: Pasdaran Ave., Next to Telecommunication Industry, Tehran 16588, IranAddress no. 2: P.O. Box 89195/878, Yazd, IranAddress no. 3: P.O. Box 89195/678, Yazd, IranAddress no. 4: Km 5 of Taft Road, Yazd, IranTelephone no.: + 98 35 15220322Fax no.: + 98 35 1523096Place of registration: IranDate of registration: 1961Registration number: 860Economic code: 411315443678Associated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO); Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG); Shahid Sayyad Shirazi Industries Yazd Metallurgy Industries (YMI) is affiliated with Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and is a subsidiary of Ammunition Industries Group in Iran. YMI is involved in IR-1 centrifuge components manufacturing at DIO workshops in Iran’s missile programme. Furthermore, it is involved in the production of goods that can be used for either the production of nuclear weapons or vehicles for the delivery of such weapons.Therefore, it has been providing support for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems by Iran, through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology. 17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010)
199. Shahid Baheri Industrial Group (SBIG)صنایع شهید باقری(a.k.a. Shahid Baheri Organisation;SBIG;Shahid Baheri Industries Group;Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group;Department 140/14;Shahid Bagheri Industries Group;Mahtab Technical Engineering Company;Composite Propellant Missile Industry;Sanaye Sokhte Morakab;SSM) Address: Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) Shahid Baheri Industrial Group (SBIG) is a subsidiary to Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). Shahid Baheri Industrial Group (SBIG) develops and produces Iran’s solid-propellant ballistic missiles. The development of such missiles is key to the building of nuclear weapon delivery capacities. Therefore, SBIG is engaged in, directly associated with, or providing support for, Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. 17.10.2023 (UN: 23.12.2006)
200. Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG)گروه صنعتی شهید همت(a.k.a. Sabalan CIE; Sabalan Company; Sabalan Petrochemical Company (SPC); Sabalan Petrochemical Industries Company (SPICO); Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company (SAPICO); Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG);Chahid Hemmat Industrial Group; Address: Damavand Tehran Highway, P.O. Box 16595/159, No 5, Eslami St., Golestane Sevvom St., Pasdaran St., Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) is subordinate to Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). SHIG is responsible for Iran’s liquid-fuelled ballistic missile programme, including the production of missiles. The development of such missiles is key to the building of nuclear weapon delivery capacities. Therefore, SHIG is engaged in, directly associated with, or providing support for, Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. 17.10.2023 (UN: 23.12.2006)’
Hemmat Missile Industries Factory;Shahid Hemmat Industrial Complex;SHIC;Shahid Hemmat Industrial Factories;SHIF;Shahid Hemmat Industries Group;Shahid Hemmat Complex;Shahid Hemmat Industries;Shahid Hemmat Industrial Complex;Shahid Hemat; Industrial Complex;Shahid Hemmat)
(a) Isfahan Optics
(a) Arfa Paint Company (a.k.a. ARFA; Arfa Company)
(b) Arfeh Company
(d) Hosseini Nejad Trading Co. (a.k.a. Hosseini Nejad Trading Company)
(e) Iran Saffron Company (a.k.a. Iransaffron Co.; Iran Safron; Iran Saffron; Iran Saffron Co.)
1. Parcham St, 13th Km of Qom Rd 38135 Arak (Factory)
2. Unit 38, 5th Fl, Bldg No 60, Golfam St, Jordan, 19395-5716, Tehran
(5) under the heading ‘II. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)’, the following entry replaces the corresponding entry in the list set out under the subheading ‘A. Persons’:NameIdentifying informationReasonsDate of listing‘4.IRGC Brigadier-General Seyyed Mahdi FARAHIDeputy Minister of Defence and Armed Forces Support since 2021. Previously Deputy Minister of Defence and Industrial Affairs of the Ministry of Defence, head of the Defence Industries and Aerospace Organizations of the Ministry of Defence, as well as commander of the Armed Forces Personnel Training Camp. Former head of Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) and former managing director of the EU-designated Defence Industries Organisation (DIO). Member of the IRGC.23.6.2008’ Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing ‘4. IRGC Brigadier-General Seyyed Mahdi FARAHI Deputy Minister of Defence and Armed Forces Support since 2021. Previously Deputy Minister of Defence and Industrial Affairs of the Ministry of Defence, head of the Defence Industries and Aerospace Organizations of the Ministry of Defence, as well as commander of the Armed Forces Personnel Training Camp. Former head of Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) and former managing director of the EU-designated Defence Industries Organisation (DIO). Member of the IRGC. 23.6.2008’
Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing
‘4. IRGC Brigadier-General Seyyed Mahdi FARAHI Deputy Minister of Defence and Armed Forces Support since 2021. Previously Deputy Minister of Defence and Industrial Affairs of the Ministry of Defence, head of the Defence Industries and Aerospace Organizations of the Ministry of Defence, as well as commander of the Armed Forces Personnel Training Camp. Former head of Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) and former managing director of the EU-designated Defence Industries Organisation (DIO). Member of the IRGC. 23.6.2008’
Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing
‘4. IRGC Brigadier-General Seyyed Mahdi FARAHI Deputy Minister of Defence and Armed Forces Support since 2021. Previously Deputy Minister of Defence and Industrial Affairs of the Ministry of Defence, head of the Defence Industries and Aerospace Organizations of the Ministry of Defence, as well as commander of the Armed Forces Personnel Training Camp. Former head of Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) and former managing director of the EU-designated Defence Industries Organisation (DIO). Member of the IRGC. 23.6.2008’
(6) under the heading ‘II. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)’, the following entries replace the corresponding entries in the list set out under the subheading ‘B. Entities’:NameIdentifying informationReasonsDate of listing‘2.IRGC Air ForceOperates Iran’s inventory of short and medium range ballistic missiles.23.6.20083.IRGC-Air Force Al-Ghadir Missile CommandThe IRGC-Air Force Al-Ghadir Missile Command is a specific element within the IRGC Air Force that has been working with EU-designated SBIG, with the FATEH 110, short range ballistic missile as well as the Ashura medium range ballistic missile. This command appears to be the entity that actually has the operational control of the missiles.26.7.20105.IRGC Qods ForceTehran, IranIran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force is responsible for operations outside Iran and is Tehran’s principal foreign policy tool for special operations and support to terrorists and Islamic militants abroad. Hizballah used Qods Force-supplied rockets, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the 2006 conflict with Israel and benefited from Qods Force training on these systems, according to press reporting. According to a variety of reports, the Qods Force continues to re-supply and train Hizballah on advanced weaponry, anti-aircraft missiles, and long-range rockets. The Qods Force continues to provide limited lethal support, training, and funding to Taliban fighters in southern and western Afghanistan including small arms, ammunition, mortars, and short-range battlefield rockets.26.7.201013.Fater Instituteمؤسسه فاطر(a.k.a.Faater Institute;Fater Engineering Company;Gharargah Ghaem Faater Institute;Fater Engineering)Address no. 1: No 25, Valiasr Jonoobi, Azizi Street, Azadi Sq. NE, Tehran, IranAddress no. 2: No 221, Phase 4, North Falamak-Zarafshan Intersection, Shahrak-E-Ghods, Tehran 14678, IranType of entity: public companyPlace of registration: IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA)Fater Institute is a construction company and subsidiary of the IRGC entity Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) and is therefore controlled by the IRGC.17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010)16.Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquartersقرارگاه سازندگی خاتم الانبیاءAddress: No 221, Phase 4, North Falamak-Zarafshan Intersection, Shahrak-E-Ghods, Tehran 14678, IranType of entity: public companyPlace of registration: IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);Fater InstituteKhatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters is a construction company controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010)22.Behineh Trading Co.Address: Tavakoli Building, Opposite of 15th Alley, Emam-Jomeh Street, Tehran, Iran.Associated individuals: Ali Akbar Tabatabaei (IRGC);Azim Aghajani (IRGC)Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)Behineh Trading Co., which is owned and/or controlled by the Behineh Trading Company, is a front company for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Behineh Trading Company is also related to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran’s development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. It has also been involved in the illegal transport to deliver IRGC equipment. Behineh Trading Co. has been managed and/or overseen by Esmail Ghani, the Head of Iran’s IRGC Quds Force. Therefore, Behineh Trading Co. is owned and/or controlled by the IRGC.17.10.2023 (UN: 18.4.2012)29.Imensazan Consultant Engineers Instituteمؤسسه مهندسین مشاور) ایمنسازان)(a.k.a. ICEI;Imensazen Consultant Engineers;Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute;Imen Sazan Consultant Engineers;Imen Sazen Consultant Engineers Institute;Imen Sazan Consulting Engineers;Imen Sazan Consulting Ins.;Imensazan Co. Eng.;Imensazan Consulting Eng.)Address no. 1: 121 First Golestan Street, Pasdaran Tehran, Tehran Province 65916, IranAddress no. 2: No 5/1, Niroo Alley, Padegan-e-Valiasr Street, Sepah Square, Tehran, IranAddress no. 3: Tehran – Ashrafi Esfahani to the north – above Hakim Bridge – before Chirag Bagh Faiz – East AyatollahAddress no. 4: Sadouq Street – No 5 – Postal code 1461934358 (Mr Engineer Azad – Iran Concrete Association)Telephone no.: 44234261Place of registration: IranDate of registration: 1989 and 1990Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA)Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute is a tunnel construction and passive defence company and a subsidiary of the IRGC entity Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA). Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute is therefore controlled by the IRGC.17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010)30.Yas Airیاس ایر(a.k.a. Pouya Air;Pouya Airlines;Yas Air Kish;YasAir Cargo Airline;Pars Air;Pars Aviation Service Company (PASC);Qeshm Air)Address: Mehrabad International Airport, Next to Terminal No 6, Tehran, IranWebsite: pouyaair.com; yasair.comType of entity: Cargo airlinePlace of registration: IranDate of registration: 2000 (as Qeshm Air) and 2008 renamed Yas AirAssociated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)Yas Air, also known as Pouya Air, is an Iranian cargo airline created and managed as a direct subsidiary of the IRGC. It is therefore controlled by the IRGC.17.10.2023 (UN: 10.12.2012)’ Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing ‘2. IRGC Air Force Operates Iran’s inventory of short and medium range ballistic missiles. 23.6.2008 3. IRGC-Air Force Al-Ghadir Missile Command The IRGC-Air Force Al-Ghadir Missile Command is a specific element within the IRGC Air Force that has been working with EU-designated SBIG, with the FATEH 110, short range ballistic missile as well as the Ashura medium range ballistic missile. This command appears to be the entity that actually has the operational control of the missiles. 26.7.2010 5. IRGC Qods Force Tehran, Iran Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force is responsible for operations outside Iran and is Tehran’s principal foreign policy tool for special operations and support to terrorists and Islamic militants abroad. Hizballah used Qods Force-supplied rockets, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the 2006 conflict with Israel and benefited from Qods Force training on these systems, according to press reporting. According to a variety of reports, the Qods Force continues to re-supply and train Hizballah on advanced weaponry, anti-aircraft missiles, and long-range rockets. The Qods Force continues to provide limited lethal support, training, and funding to Taliban fighters in southern and western Afghanistan including small arms, ammunition, mortars, and short-range battlefield rockets. 26.7.2010 13. Fater Instituteمؤسسه فاطر(a.k.a.Faater Institute;Fater Engineering Company;Gharargah Ghaem Faater Institute;Fater Engineering) Address no. 1: No 25, Valiasr Jonoobi, Azizi Street, Azadi Sq. NE, Tehran, IranAddress no. 2: No 221, Phase 4, North Falamak-Zarafshan Intersection, Shahrak-E-Ghods, Tehran 14678, IranType of entity: public companyPlace of registration: IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) Fater Institute is a construction company and subsidiary of the IRGC entity Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) and is therefore controlled by the IRGC. 17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010) 16. Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquartersقرارگاه سازندگی خاتم الانبیاء Address: No 221, Phase 4, North Falamak-Zarafshan Intersection, Shahrak-E-Ghods, Tehran 14678, IranType of entity: public companyPlace of registration: IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);Fater Institute Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters is a construction company controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). 17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010) 22. Behineh Trading Co. Address: Tavakoli Building, Opposite of 15th Alley, Emam-Jomeh Street, Tehran, Iran.Associated individuals: Ali Akbar Tabatabaei (IRGC);Azim Aghajani (IRGC)Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Behineh Trading Co., which is owned and/or controlled by the Behineh Trading Company, is a front company for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Behineh Trading Company is also related to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran’s development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. It has also been involved in the illegal transport to deliver IRGC equipment. Behineh Trading Co. has been managed and/or overseen by Esmail Ghani, the Head of Iran’s IRGC Quds Force. Therefore, Behineh Trading Co. is owned and/or controlled by the IRGC. 17.10.2023 (UN: 18.4.2012) 29. Imensazan Consultant Engineers Instituteمؤسسه مهندسین مشاور) ایمنسازان)(a.k.a. ICEI;Imensazen Consultant Engineers;Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute;Imen Sazan Consultant Engineers;Imen Sazen Consultant Engineers Institute;Imen Sazan Consulting Engineers;Imen Sazan Consulting Ins.;Imensazan Co. Eng.;Imensazan Consulting Eng.) Address no. 1: 121 First Golestan Street, Pasdaran Tehran, Tehran Province 65916, IranAddress no. 2: No 5/1, Niroo Alley, Padegan-e-Valiasr Street, Sepah Square, Tehran, IranAddress no. 3: Tehran – Ashrafi Esfahani to the north – above Hakim Bridge – before Chirag Bagh Faiz – East AyatollahAddress no. 4: Sadouq Street – No 5 – Postal code 1461934358 (Mr Engineer Azad – Iran Concrete Association)Telephone no.: 44234261Place of registration: IranDate of registration: 1989 and 1990Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute is a tunnel construction and passive defence company and a subsidiary of the IRGC entity Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA). Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute is therefore controlled by the IRGC. 17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010) 30. Yas Airیاس ایر(a.k.a. Pouya Air;Pouya Airlines;Yas Air Kish;YasAir Cargo Airline;Pars Air;Pars Aviation Service Company (PASC);Qeshm Air) Address: Mehrabad International Airport, Next to Terminal No 6, Tehran, IranWebsite: pouyaair.com; yasair.comType of entity: Cargo airlinePlace of registration: IranDate of registration: 2000 (as Qeshm Air) and 2008 renamed Yas AirAssociated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Yas Air, also known as Pouya Air, is an Iranian cargo airline created and managed as a direct subsidiary of the IRGC. It is therefore controlled by the IRGC. 17.10.2023 (UN: 10.12.2012)’
Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing
‘2. IRGC Air Force Operates Iran’s inventory of short and medium range ballistic missiles. 23.6.2008
3. IRGC-Air Force Al-Ghadir Missile Command The IRGC-Air Force Al-Ghadir Missile Command is a specific element within the IRGC Air Force that has been working with EU-designated SBIG, with the FATEH 110, short range ballistic missile as well as the Ashura medium range ballistic missile. This command appears to be the entity that actually has the operational control of the missiles. 26.7.2010
5. IRGC Qods Force Tehran, Iran Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force is responsible for operations outside Iran and is Tehran’s principal foreign policy tool for special operations and support to terrorists and Islamic militants abroad. Hizballah used Qods Force-supplied rockets, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the 2006 conflict with Israel and benefited from Qods Force training on these systems, according to press reporting. According to a variety of reports, the Qods Force continues to re-supply and train Hizballah on advanced weaponry, anti-aircraft missiles, and long-range rockets. The Qods Force continues to provide limited lethal support, training, and funding to Taliban fighters in southern and western Afghanistan including small arms, ammunition, mortars, and short-range battlefield rockets. 26.7.2010
13. Fater Instituteمؤسسه فاطر(a.k.a.Faater Institute;Fater Engineering Company;Gharargah Ghaem Faater Institute;Fater Engineering) Address no. 1: No 25, Valiasr Jonoobi, Azizi Street, Azadi Sq. NE, Tehran, IranAddress no. 2: No 221, Phase 4, North Falamak-Zarafshan Intersection, Shahrak-E-Ghods, Tehran 14678, IranType of entity: public companyPlace of registration: IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) Fater Institute is a construction company and subsidiary of the IRGC entity Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) and is therefore controlled by the IRGC. 17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010)
16. Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquartersقرارگاه سازندگی خاتم الانبیاء Address: No 221, Phase 4, North Falamak-Zarafshan Intersection, Shahrak-E-Ghods, Tehran 14678, IranType of entity: public companyPlace of registration: IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);Fater Institute Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters is a construction company controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). 17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010)
22. Behineh Trading Co. Address: Tavakoli Building, Opposite of 15th Alley, Emam-Jomeh Street, Tehran, Iran.Associated individuals: Ali Akbar Tabatabaei (IRGC);Azim Aghajani (IRGC)Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Behineh Trading Co., which is owned and/or controlled by the Behineh Trading Company, is a front company for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Behineh Trading Company is also related to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran’s development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. It has also been involved in the illegal transport to deliver IRGC equipment. Behineh Trading Co. has been managed and/or overseen by Esmail Ghani, the Head of Iran’s IRGC Quds Force. Therefore, Behineh Trading Co. is owned and/or controlled by the IRGC. 17.10.2023 (UN: 18.4.2012)
29. Imensazan Consultant Engineers Instituteمؤسسه مهندسین مشاور) ایمنسازان)(a.k.a. ICEI;Imensazen Consultant Engineers;Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute;Imen Sazan Consultant Engineers;Imen Sazen Consultant Engineers Institute;Imen Sazan Consulting Engineers;Imen Sazan Consulting Ins.;Imensazan Co. Eng.;Imensazan Consulting Eng.) Address no. 1: 121 First Golestan Street, Pasdaran Tehran, Tehran Province 65916, IranAddress no. 2: No 5/1, Niroo Alley, Padegan-e-Valiasr Street, Sepah Square, Tehran, IranAddress no. 3: Tehran – Ashrafi Esfahani to the north – above Hakim Bridge – before Chirag Bagh Faiz – East AyatollahAddress no. 4: Sadouq Street – No 5 – Postal code 1461934358 (Mr Engineer Azad – Iran Concrete Association)Telephone no.: 44234261Place of registration: IranDate of registration: 1989 and 1990Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute is a tunnel construction and passive defence company and a subsidiary of the IRGC entity Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA). Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute is therefore controlled by the IRGC. 17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010)
30. Yas Airیاس ایر(a.k.a. Pouya Air;Pouya Airlines;Yas Air Kish;YasAir Cargo Airline;Pars Air;Pars Aviation Service Company (PASC);Qeshm Air) Address: Mehrabad International Airport, Next to Terminal No 6, Tehran, IranWebsite: pouyaair.com; yasair.comType of entity: Cargo airlinePlace of registration: IranDate of registration: 2000 (as Qeshm Air) and 2008 renamed Yas AirAssociated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Yas Air, also known as Pouya Air, is an Iranian cargo airline created and managed as a direct subsidiary of the IRGC. It is therefore controlled by the IRGC. 17.10.2023 (UN: 10.12.2012)’
Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing
‘2. IRGC Air Force Operates Iran’s inventory of short and medium range ballistic missiles. 23.6.2008
3. IRGC-Air Force Al-Ghadir Missile Command The IRGC-Air Force Al-Ghadir Missile Command is a specific element within the IRGC Air Force that has been working with EU-designated SBIG, with the FATEH 110, short range ballistic missile as well as the Ashura medium range ballistic missile. This command appears to be the entity that actually has the operational control of the missiles. 26.7.2010
5. IRGC Qods Force Tehran, Iran Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force is responsible for operations outside Iran and is Tehran’s principal foreign policy tool for special operations and support to terrorists and Islamic militants abroad. Hizballah used Qods Force-supplied rockets, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the 2006 conflict with Israel and benefited from Qods Force training on these systems, according to press reporting. According to a variety of reports, the Qods Force continues to re-supply and train Hizballah on advanced weaponry, anti-aircraft missiles, and long-range rockets. The Qods Force continues to provide limited lethal support, training, and funding to Taliban fighters in southern and western Afghanistan including small arms, ammunition, mortars, and short-range battlefield rockets. 26.7.2010
13. Fater Instituteمؤسسه فاطر(a.k.a.Faater Institute;Fater Engineering Company;Gharargah Ghaem Faater Institute;Fater Engineering) Address no. 1: No 25, Valiasr Jonoobi, Azizi Street, Azadi Sq. NE, Tehran, IranAddress no. 2: No 221, Phase 4, North Falamak-Zarafshan Intersection, Shahrak-E-Ghods, Tehran 14678, IranType of entity: public companyPlace of registration: IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) Fater Institute is a construction company and subsidiary of the IRGC entity Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) and is therefore controlled by the IRGC. 17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010)
16. Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquartersقرارگاه سازندگی خاتم الانبیاء Address: No 221, Phase 4, North Falamak-Zarafshan Intersection, Shahrak-E-Ghods, Tehran 14678, IranType of entity: public companyPlace of registration: IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);Fater Institute Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters is a construction company controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). 17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010)
22. Behineh Trading Co. Address: Tavakoli Building, Opposite of 15th Alley, Emam-Jomeh Street, Tehran, Iran.Associated individuals: Ali Akbar Tabatabaei (IRGC);Azim Aghajani (IRGC)Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Behineh Trading Co., which is owned and/or controlled by the Behineh Trading Company, is a front company for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Behineh Trading Company is also related to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran’s development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. It has also been involved in the illegal transport to deliver IRGC equipment. Behineh Trading Co. has been managed and/or overseen by Esmail Ghani, the Head of Iran’s IRGC Quds Force. Therefore, Behineh Trading Co. is owned and/or controlled by the IRGC. 17.10.2023 (UN: 18.4.2012)
29. Imensazan Consultant Engineers Instituteمؤسسه مهندسین مشاور) ایمنسازان)(a.k.a. ICEI;Imensazen Consultant Engineers;Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute;Imen Sazan Consultant Engineers;Imen Sazen Consultant Engineers Institute;Imen Sazan Consulting Engineers;Imen Sazan Consulting Ins.;Imensazan Co. Eng.;Imensazan Consulting Eng.) Address no. 1: 121 First Golestan Street, Pasdaran Tehran, Tehran Province 65916, IranAddress no. 2: No 5/1, Niroo Alley, Padegan-e-Valiasr Street, Sepah Square, Tehran, IranAddress no. 3: Tehran – Ashrafi Esfahani to the north – above Hakim Bridge – before Chirag Bagh Faiz – East AyatollahAddress no. 4: Sadouq Street – No 5 – Postal code 1461934358 (Mr Engineer Azad – Iran Concrete Association)Telephone no.: 44234261Place of registration: IranDate of registration: 1989 and 1990Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute is a tunnel construction and passive defence company and a subsidiary of the IRGC entity Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA). Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute is therefore controlled by the IRGC. 17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010)
30. Yas Airیاس ایر(a.k.a. Pouya Air;Pouya Airlines;Yas Air Kish;YasAir Cargo Airline;Pars Air;Pars Aviation Service Company (PASC);Qeshm Air) Address: Mehrabad International Airport, Next to Terminal No 6, Tehran, IranWebsite: pouyaair.com; yasair.comType of entity: Cargo airlinePlace of registration: IranDate of registration: 2000 (as Qeshm Air) and 2008 renamed Yas AirAssociated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Yas Air, also known as Pouya Air, is an Iranian cargo airline created and managed as a direct subsidiary of the IRGC. It is therefore controlled by the IRGC. 17.10.2023 (UN: 10.12.2012)’
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 26 July 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/413/CFSP (1).
(2) In accordance with Articles 26(1) and (3) of Decision 2010/413/CFSP, the Council has reviewed the list of designated persons and entities set out in Annexes II and V to that Decision.
(3) The Council has concluded that the entries concerning two persons and four entities designated in Annex II to Decision 2010/413/CFSP should be removed from that Annex. The restrictive measures against all other persons and entities in the list set out in Annex II to Decision 2010/413/CFSP should be maintained, insofar as their names are not mentioned in Annex VI to that Decision, and 56 entries included in Annex II should be updated. Moreover, all entries in Annex V to that Decision should be deleted.
(4) Decision 2010/413/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Annexes II and V to Decision 2010/413/CFSP are amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

I.
Annex II to Decision 2010/413/CFSP is amended as follows:
(1) entries 13 (concerning Anis NACCACHE) and 14 (concerning Brigadier-General Mohammad NADERI) in the list headed ‘I. Persons and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities and persons and entities providing support to the Government of Iran.’, under the subheading ‘A. Persons’, are deleted,
(2) under the heading ‘I. Persons and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities and persons and entities providing support to the Government of Iran.’, the following entries replace the corresponding entries in the list set out under the subheading ‘A. Persons’:

Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing
‘12. Mohammad Reza MOVASAGHNIA

Deputy Minister for Industry and Chairman of IMIDRO, the Iranian Mines and Mining Industries Development and Renovation Organization, since August 2023. Former head of EU-designated Naval Defense Missile Industry Group, also known as Samen Al A’Emmeh Industries Group (SAIG), and Cruise Missile Industry Group.
26.7.2010 29. Milad JAFARI (Milad JAFERI)
DOB: 20.9.1974
Iranian national supplying goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated SHIG front companies. Delivered goods to SHIG between January and November 2010. Payments for some of the goods were made at the central branch of EU-designated Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI) in Tehran after November 2010. 1.12.2011 31. Ali KARIMIAN

Iranian national supplying goods, mostly carbon fibre to EU-designated SHIG and SBIG.
1.12.2011 32. Majid KHANSARI

Managing Director of EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC).
1.12.2011 50. Mohammad Baqer ZOLQADR
(محمد باقر ذو القدر)
(a.k.a. Mohammad Baqer ZULQADER;
Mohammad Bagher ZOLGHADR)
DOB: 1954
POB: Faisa, Iran
Function: Secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr is a former IRGC officer who is currently Secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council. The supreme leader, who appoints members of this Council, has delegated the supervision of the government to it. In practice, the Expediency Discernment Council supports the Government of Iran by being an intricate part of the regime. In his role, Zolqadr therefore provides support to the Government of Iran.
17.10.2023 (UN: 24.3.2007)’
(3) entries 59 (concerning Marou Sanat (a.k.a. Mohandesi Tarh Va Toseh Maro Sanat Company)), 95 (concerning Samen Industries (a.k.a. Khorasan Metallurgy Industries)), 98 (concerning SURENA (a.k.a. Sakhd Va Rah-An-Da-Zi)), and 179 (concerning Farayand Technique (a.k.a. Technology of Centrifuge of Iran Company)) in the list headed ‘I. Persons and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities and persons and entities providing support to the Government of Iran.’, under the subheading ‘B. Entities’, are deleted,
(4) under the heading ‘I. Persons and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities and persons and entities providing support to the Government of Iran.’, the following entries replace the corresponding entries in the list set out under the subheading ‘B. Entities’:

Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing
‘1. Aerospace Industries Organisation, AIO
AIO, 28 Shian 5, Lavizan, Tehran, Iran
Langare Street,Nobonyad Square,Tehran, Iran
AIO oversees Iran’s production of missiles, including EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group and Fajr Industrial Group.
23.4.2007 9. ESNICO (Equipment Supplier for Nuclear Industries Corporation)
No. 1, 37th Avenue, Asadabadi Street, Tehran, Iran
Procures industrial goods, specifically for the nuclear programme activities carried out by AEOI, Novin Energy and EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company. ESNICO’s Director is Haleh Bakhtiar.
26.7.2010 18. Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (a.k.a. TSA; TESA; Farayand Technique; Technology of Centrifuge of Iran Company)
Address 1: 156 Golestan Street, Saradr-e Jangal, Tehran
Address 2: Khalij-e Fars Boulevard, Kilometre 10 of Atomic Energy Road, Rowshan Shahr, Third Moshtaq Street, Esfahan, Iran
Address 3: Yousef Abad District, No. 1, 37th Street, Tehran, Iran
Iran Centrifuge Technology Company manufactures uranium enrichment centrifuge parts, and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
26.7.2010 20. Iran Electronics Industries and the following subsidiaries:
P.O. Box 18575-365, Tehran, Iran
Wholly-owned subsidiary of MODAFL (and therefore a sister-organisation to AIO, AvIO and DIO). Its role is to manufacture electronic components for Iranian weapons systems. It is therefore an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
23.6.2008

(a) Isfahan Optics
P.O. Box 81465-313 Kaveh Ave., Isfahan, Iran
P.O. Box 81465-117, Isfahan, Iran
Owned, controlled by, or acts on behalf of Iran Electronics Industries, an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. Isfahan Optics is also engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
26.7.2010 29. Ministry Of Defense And Support For Armed Forces Logistics (a.k.a. Ministry Of Defense For Armed Forces Logistics; a.k.a. MODAFL; a.k.a. MODSAF)
Address no. 1: Ferdowsi Avenue, Sarhang Sakhaei Street, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 2: PO Box 11365-8439, Iran
Address no. 3: Sarhang Sakhaei Street, Ferdowsi Avenue, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 4: PO Box 11365-8439, Iran
Address no. 5: Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, Iran
Address no. 6: PO Box 16315-189, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 7: located on the west side of Dabestan Street, Abbas Abad District, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 8: PO Box 19315-189, Pasdaran Street, South Noubonyand Square, Tehran, Iran
The Ministry Of Defense And Support For Armed Forces Logistics, which includes the MODLEX Export Center (also referred to as the Ministry of Defense Logistics Export (MODLEX)), is responsible for Iran’s defence research, development, manufacturing and export programmes, including support to missile and nuclear programmes.
23.6.2008 31. Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI)
صنایع شیمیایی پارچین
(a.k.a. Parchin Chemical Factories Chemical Industries Group;
PCF Chemical Industries Group;
Parchin Chemical Factories;
Parchin Chemical Industry Group;
PCI Group;
Parchin Chemical Ind (PCF);
Parchin Chemical Factories;
Para Chemical Industries;
PCF;
PCI;
Parchin Military Base)
Address no. 1: Khavaran Road Km 30-35, Parchin Special Road, Varamin, Parchin
Address no. 2: Nobonyad Square, Tehran 15765-358
Address no. 3: Parchin Forked Rd., 35th km. Khavaran Rd., Pakdasht, Tehran, Iran (Factory)
Address no. 4: 2nd Floor, Sanam Bldg., Nobonyad Sq., Tehran, Iran (Head Office)
Address no. 5: Pasdaran Square, P.O. Box 16765/358, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 6: 2nd Floor, Sanam Bldg., 3rd Floor, Sanam Bldg., P.O. Box 16765/358, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, Iran
Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI) produces ammunition, explosives and solid propellants for rockets and missiles. Parchin facilities were used for the production and testing of nuclear weapons. Parchin Chemical Industries is therefore responsible for providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
Parchin Chemical Industries is part of the Chemical Industries and Development of Material Group (CIDMG), which is a branch of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which falls under Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and is therefore owned by the Iranian Government. Parchin Chemical Industries is therefore an entity that provides support to the Government of Iran, and is controlled by and associated with entities providing support to the Government of Iran.
23.6.2008 (UN: 24.3.2007)

Telephone no.: + 98 21 2258929; + 98 21 35243153; + 98 21 3130626
Website: http://icig.ir/
Registration no.: Cooperative Company Registration No 892
Associated entities: Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL); Defense Industries Organization (DIO); Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO); Iran Electronics Industries (IEI)

35. Raka

A department of EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company. Established in late 2006, it was responsible for the construction of the Uranium enrichment plant at Fordow (Qom).
26.7.2010 42. Yasa Part and the following subsidiaries:

Company dealing with procurement activities related to the purchase of materials and technologies necessary to nuclear and ballistic programmes.
26.7.2010

(a) Arfa Paint Company (a.k.a. ARFA; Arfa Company)
Address 1: Unit 5, 9th floor, Sarve Tower, Saadat Abad, Tehran, Iran
Address 2: 16th km Karaj Special Road, Tehran, Iran
Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.
26.7.2010

(b) Arfeh Company
Address: West Lavasani, Tehran, Iran
Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.
26.7.2010

(d) Hosseini Nejad Trading Co. (a.k.a. Hosseini Nejad Trading Company)

Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.
26.7.2010

(e) Iran Saffron Company (a.k.a. Iransaffron Co.; Iran Safron; Iran Saffron; Iran Saffron Co.)

Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.
26.7.2010 57. Hirbod Co
Hirbod Co – Flat 2, 3 Second Street, Asad Abadi Avenue, Tehran 14316
A company that has procured goods and equipment destined for Iran’s Nuclear and Ballistic Missile programmes for the EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC).
23.5.2011 60. Paya Parto (a.k.a. Paya Partov; National Centre for Laser Science and Technology)

Paya Parto (a.k.a. Paya Partov or Iranian National Centre for Laser Science and Technology) is an entity that researches stable isotope separation, a key parameter for centrifuges component production, as part of Iran’s nuclear program.
In 2021, against the backdrop of Iran’s National Nuclear Day, Paya Parto, under its alias National Centre for Laser Science and Technology, unveiled a number of “unspecified nuclear projects”.
Paya Part is therefore responsible for providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
23.5.2011 76. Iran Marine Industrial Company (SADRA)
Sadra Building No 3, Shafagh St., Poonak Khavari Blvd., Shahrak Ghods, P.O. Box 14669-56491, Tehran, Iran
Effectively controlled by EU-designated Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA), which is designated for being an IRGC company. Provides support to the Government of Iran through its involvement in the Iranian energy sector including in the South Pars Gas field.
23.5.2011 81. Eyvaz Technic
No 3, Building 3, Shahid Hamid Sadigh Alley, Shariati Street, Tehran, Iran.
Producer of vacuum equipment that has supplied the uranium enrichment sites at Natanz and Qom/Fordow. In 2011, it supplied pressure transducers to EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC).
1.12.2011 83. Ghani Sazi Uranium Company (a.k.a. Iran Uranium Enrichment Company)
3, Qarqavol Close, 20th Street, Tehran, Iran
It has production contracts with EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) and EU-designated TESA.
1.12.2011 84. Iran Pooya (a.k.a. Iran Pouya)

A government owned company that operated the biggest extruder of aluminium in Iran and supplied material for use in the production of casings for the IR-1 and IR-2 centrifuges. A major manufacturer of aluminium cylinders for centrifuges whose customers include the AEOI and EU-designated TESA.
1.12.2011 88. MACPAR Makina San Ve Tic
Istasyon MH, Sehitler cad, Guldeniz Sit, Number 79/2, Tuzla 34930, Istanbul, Turkey
Company run by Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies.
1.12.2011 89. MATSA (Mohandesi Toseh Sokht Atomi Company)
90, Fathi Shaghaghi Street, Tehran, Iran.
Iranian company contracted to EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) to provide design and engineering services across the nuclear fuel cycle. Most recently has been procuring equipment for the Natanz uranium enrichment site.
1.12.2011 91. Multimat lc ve Dis Ticaret Pazarlama Limited Sirketi

Company run by Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies.
1.12.2011 97. STEP Standart Teknik Parca San ve TIC A.S.
79/2 Tuzla, 34940, Istanbul, Turkey
Company run by Milad Jafari, who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) through front companies.
1.12.2011 102. Yarsanat (a.k.a. Yar Sanat, a.k.a. Yarestan Vacuumi)
No. 101, West Zardosht Street, 3rd Floor, 14157 Tehran; No. 139 Hoveyzeh Street, 15337, Tehran, Iran
Procurement company for EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC). Involved in purchasing equipment and materials, which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme. It has attempted the procurement of vacuum products and pressure transducers.
1.12.2011 148. Iran Composites Institute (a.k.a. Composites Research Laboratory (CRL))
Iran Composites Institute, Iranian University of Science and Technology, 16845-188, Tehran, Iran,
Telephone: 98 217 3912858
Fax: 98 217 7491206
Email: mailto:[email protected]
Website: http://www.irancomposites.org
Iranian Composites Institute (ICI, a.k.a. Composite Institute of Iran; Composites Research Laboratory (CRL)) has been assisting designated entities in violating the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of 2011, ICI had been contracted to provide EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA) with IR-2M centrifuge rotors.
22.12.2012 149. Jelvesazan Company
22 Bahman St., Bozorgmehr Ave, 84155666, Esfahan, Iran
Tel: 98 0311 2658311 15
Fax: 98 0311 2679097
Jelvesazan Company has been assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of early 2012, Jelvesazan intended to supply controlled vacuum pumps to EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA).
22.12.2012 151. Simatec Development Company

Simatec Development Company has been assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. As of early 2010 Simatec was contracted by EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) to procure Vacon inverters to power uranium enrichment centrifuges. As of mid-2012 Simatec was attempting to procure EU-controlled inverters.
22.12.2012 152. Aluminat 1. Parcham St, 13th Km of Qom Rd 38135 Arak (Factory) 2. Unit 38, 5th Fl, Bldg No 60, Golfam St, Jordan, 19395-5716, Tehran
Tel: 98 212 2049216 / 22049928 / 22045237
Fax: 98 21 22057127
Website: www.aluminat.com
Aluminat has been assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. In early 2012, Aluminat had a contract to supply 6061-T6 aluminium to EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA).
22.12.2012 161. Sharif University of Technology
Last address known: Azadi Ave/Street, PO Box 11365-11155, Tehran, Iran, Tel. + 98 21 66 161 Email: [email protected]
Sharif University of Technology (SUT) has a number of cooperation agreements with Iranian Government organisations designated by the EU, which operate in military or military-related fields, particularly in the field of ballistic missile production and procurement. This includes: an agreement with the EU-designated Aerospace Industries Organisation for, inter alia, the production of satellites; cooperating with the Iranian Ministry of Defence and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) on smart boat competitions; a broader agreement with the EU-designated IRGC Air Force, which covers developing and strengthening the University’s relations, organisational and strategic cooperation.
Taken together, these show a significant record of engagement with the Government of Iran in military or military-related fields that constitutes support to the Government of Iran.
8.11.2014 175. Defense Technology and Science Research Centre (DTSRC)
موسسه آموزشی و تحقیقاتی صنایع دفاعی
(a.k.a. Institute for Defense Education and Research;
Moassese Amozesh Va Tahghighati)
Address: Pasdaran Av., P.O. Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran
Type of entity: government entity
Place of registration: Tehran, Iran
Principal place of business: Tehran, Iran
Associated entities: Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL); Defense Industries Organization (DIO)
The Defense Technology and Science Research Centre (DTSRC) is an Iran-based government entity that conducts defence-related research and development as well as procurement. It is majority-owned by and subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and falls under its Defense Industries Organization (DIO). MODAFL provides logistic support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Therefore, DTSRC provides support to the Government of Iran.
17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010 EU: 24.4.2007) 176. Electro Sanam Company
(a.k.a. E.S. Co.; E.X. Co.;
Electro Sanam Co.;
Electro Sanam;
Sanam Industrial Group;
Electro Sanam Industries;
Sanam Electronics)
Address no. 1: No 24, 3rd Floor, Sink St., after Beheshti St., Northern Sohrevardi Ave. 15779 Tehran, Iran
Address no. 2: Tehran P.O. Box 19395/5339, Araj Forkway, Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, Iran
Telephone no.: + 98 21 8757587; + 98 21 7863352; + 98 21 88757587
Fax no.: + 98 21 8757588; + 98 21 7867810; + 98 21 88757588; + 98 21 22549738
Electro Sanam Company is a front company for the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) that is involved in Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Electro Sanam Company is therefore engaged in, directly associated with, or providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
17.10.2023 (UN: 3.3.2008)

Email: [email protected]; [email protected]
Place of registration: Iran
Date of registration: 1992
Registration no.: 339747
National ID no.: 10103864724
Principal place of business: Tehran, Iran
Associated entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)

182. Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG)
گروه صنایع مهمات سازی ومتالوژی
Address no. 1: P.O. Box 16765/1835 Pasdaran Street
Address no. 2: Department 145-42 P.O. Box 16765/128 Moghan Avenue, Pasdaran Street
Place of registration: Tehran, Iran
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated entities: Shahid Sattari Industries; Parchin Ammunition Industries; 7th of Tir Industries Complex; Yazd Metallurgy Industries; Khorasan Metallurgy Industries; Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries; Defense Industries Organization (DIO)
Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) is the largest industrial group of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO). Its products include ammunition, mortar bombs, pyrotechnics, anti-tank and sea mines, hand grenades, detonators, brass materials, cutting tools, industrial valves, perforating charges for the oil industry and other industrial parts. It is comprised of ten subsidiaries, including Shahid Sattari Industries, Parchin Ammunition Industries, 7th of Tir Industries Complex, Yazd Metallurgy Industries, Khorasan Metallurgy Industries, Isfahan Ammunition Industries, Shahid Shiroudi Industries and Shahid Sayyad Shirazi Industries. It has played a key role in manufacturing and developing weaponry and is linked to several companies involved in proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. It is thus engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems by Iran.
17.10.2023 (UN: 24.3.2007) 184. Defense Industries Organization (DIO)
سازمان صنایع دفاع جمهوری اسلامی ایران
Address: Amin Industrial Estate, Khalage Rd., Seyedi District P.O. Box 91735/549, Mashad, Iran
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated entities: Kaveh cutting tool company; 7th of Tir Industries; Khorasan Metallurgy Industries; Iran Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO); Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO); Iran Electronics Industries (IEI); Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)
The Defense Industries Organization (DIO) is a conglomerate of over 300 companies and a subsidiary of Iran’s Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) whose function is to provide the Armed Forces with the necessary manufacturing capacity and technical abilities. It has played a central role in Iran’s ballistic missile development programme and in the implementation of Iran’s centrifuge programme. DIO oversees numerous state-owned defence contractors and front companies directly or through its primary subsidiary, the Aerospace Industries Organization.
17.10.2023 (UN: 23.12.2006)

It plays a significant role in producing diverse military hardware for Iran, including missiles. In recent years, the DIO has attempted to become export-oriented, allowing Iran to become an exporter of weapons: in 2022, DIO has grown by 200 % compared to 2021, has developed 75 new weapons and has multiplied its exports by 2,5 , thus contributing to the growth of Iran’s defence industry. DIO is thus providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
185. Kaveh Cutting Tools Company
(a.k.a. Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co.;
Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co. Persian;
Mojtame-e Abzar Boreshi Kaveh)
Address no. 1: Km 4 Khalaj Road, end of Seyyedi Street, Mashad 91638, Iran
Address no. 2: P.O. Box 91735/549, Mashad, Iran
Address no. 3: 3rd Km of Khalaj Road, Seyyedi Street, Mashad, Iran
Address no. 4: Moqan St., Tehran, Iran
Website: www.kavehtools.ir
Place of registration: Mashad, Iran
Date of registration: 1993
Principal place of business: Mashad, Iran
Associated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO); Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG)
Kaveh Cutting Tools Company is an Iranian manufacturing company that has been involved in the production of components for Iran’s IR-1 centrifuges, and in the procurement for Iran’s centrifuge programme. It is controlled by the Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) and subordinate to the Defense Industries Organization (DIO). It is thus engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems by Iran.
17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010) 186. Khorasan Metallurgy Industries
صنایع مهمات سازی و متالورژی خراسان
(a.k.a. Khorasan Metallurgy;
Khorasan Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries;
Khorasan Metalogy Industries;
The Metallurgy Industries of Khorasan;
Metalogy Industry of Khorasan;
Samen Industries
Previously known as: Amin Industrial Complex)
Address: 2nd km of Khalaj Road End of Seyyedi St., P.O.Box 91735-549, 91735 Mashad, Iran.
Website: www.khwarizmi.ir
Telephone no.: + 98 511 3853008; + 98 511 3870225
Type of entity: public company
Place of registration: Iran
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated entities: Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG); Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL); Defense Industries Organization (DIO)
Khorasan Metallurgy Industries is part of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and a subsidiary of the Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG). It is responsible for the production of ammunition and centrifuge components as well as cutting tools and products such as drills, milling cutters, taps, reamers and compound tools. It is providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
17.10.2023 (UN: 3.3.2008) 187. Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries
(a.k.a. Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries;
Sayyad Shirazi Industries;
Sayad Shirazi;
Sayad Shirazi industries;
Sayad Shirazi industry;
Shaheed Sayad Shirazee ammunition industries;
Shahid Sayyadi Shirazi Industries;
Shahid Sayyed Shirazi Ind.)
Address no. 1: Next To Nirou Battery Mfg. Co, Shahid Babaii Expressway, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 2: Pasdaran St., P.O. Box 16765, Tehran 1835, Iran
Address no. 3: Babaei Highway – Next to Niru M.F.G, Tehran, Iran
Place of registration: Tehran, Iran
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated entities: Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG); Defense Industries Organization (DIO)
Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries is a missile producer owned by Shahid Sayyad Shirazi, former deputy chief of staff of Iran’s Armed Forces that is linked to the Iranian military industry. Shahid Sayyad Shirazi Industries has been trying to acquire metals from China used in high-tech weaponry, including long-range nuclear missiles. It is part of the Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG), which has played a key role in manufacturing and developing weaponry and is linked to several companies involved in proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, and a subsidiary of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO) that is directly involved in missile development. It is therefore controlled by an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapons delivery systems.
17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010) 193. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company
شرکت باطری سازی نیرو
(a.k.a. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company;
Niru Batteries MFG. Co. Ltd.;
Nour Battery Manufacturing Company;
Sherkate Battrijazi Niru;
Niru Battery Co;
Niru Battery Mfg. Co.;
Nirou Battery Manufacturing;
Saba Battery Company;
Niru Co. Ltd.;
Sherkat Battery Sazi Niru Sahami Khass;
The Niru Battery Company;
Address no. 1: Nobonyad Blvd., Pasdaran Avenue, P.O. Box 19575/361, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 2: Next to Babee Exp. Way, Nobonyad Sq., Tehran, Iran
Address no. 3: Next to Shahid Babaei Exp. way, Nobonyad Sq., 16689, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 4: End of Pasdaran Avenue, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, Iran
Telephone no.: + 98 21 251 0523 / 254 7093; + 98 21 22547094; + 98 21 22567608-9; + 98 21 2545084
Website: www.nirubattery.com; www.niruco.com
Niru Battery Manufacturing Company is an entity registered in Iran that manufactures power units for the Iranian military, including for missile systems. It is controlled by the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), responsible for Iran’s defence research, development and manufacturing programmes, including support to missile and nuclear programmes. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company is a subsidiary of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), a conglomerate of companies run by the Islamic Republic of Iran whose function is to provide the Armed Forces with the necessary manufacturing capacity and technical abilities. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company is therefore controlled by an entity engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
17.10.2023 (UN: 3.3.2008)

Niru Battery Manufacturing (Batrisazi-ye Niru);
Niru Battery Mfg.CO (Saba Battery);
Sherkate Batri-e Niru;
Power Energy Source Development Company (ESDO))
Email: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]
Place of registration: Tehran, Iran
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO); Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)

194. Safety Equipment Procurement Company
(a.k.a. Safety Equipment Procurement;
SEP;
SEP Co.;
SEPCO;
Safety Equipment Procurement Inc.)
Address: P.O. Box 16785/195, Tehran, Iran
Associated entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)
Safety Equipment Procurement Company is a front company for Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), which is responsible for Iran’s liquid-fuelled ballistic missile programme. AIO is the leading industrial and military subsidiary of Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and oversees Iran’s missile production. AIO has used the Safety Equipment Procurement Company for procurement since at least 2003. It is involved in Iran’s ballistic missile activities and is therefore engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
17.10.2023 (UN: 3.3.2008) 195. Sanam Industrial Group
(a.k.a. Sanam Industries Group;
Sanam Industrial Production Group;
Department 140;
Sanam Projects Management (SPM);
Sanam Industrial Company;
Sanam Industries Co.;
Sanam Industrial and Trading Company;
Sanam Group)
Address no. 1: Pasdaran Road 15, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 2: 3rd Fl., Sanam Bldg., Nobonyad Sq., Pasdaran Ave., Tehran (19579), Iran
Address no. 3: P.O. Box 19575/596, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 4: Km. 25th of Khavaran Rd., Tehran, Iran (Factory Address)
Address no. 5: Farzam Alley, No 3, Fatemi Square, Palestine St
Telephone no.: + 98 21 2546008; + 98 21 2556772; + 98 21 88969501
Sanam Industrial Group is controlled by Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) and has purchased equipment for the Iranian missile programme. Sanam Industrial Group is therefore providing support for Iran’s development of nuclear weapon delivery systems and is an entity that provides support to the Government of Iran and entities owned or controlled by it or persons and entities associated with it.
17.10.2023 (UN: 24.3.2007)

Fax: + 98 21 2556830; + 98 21 88969501
Place of registration: Tehran
Registration no.: 176855
Economic code: 411139673763
National ID: 10102191894
Date of registration: 1987 and 2001

197. Yazd Metallurgy Industries (YMI)
شرکت ذوب فلزات یزد
(a.k.a.YMI;
Yazd Metallurgy Industry;
Yazd Ammunition Industries;
Yazd Metallurgical Ind’s Co.;
Yazd Metallurgical Industries;
Yazd Metal Smelting Industrial Group;
Yazd Ammunition Manufacturing and Metallurgy Industries;
Directorate of Yazd Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries)
Address no. 1: Pasdaran Ave., Next to Telecommunication Industry, Tehran 16588, Iran
Address no. 2: P.O. Box 89195/878, Yazd, Iran
Address no. 3: P.O. Box 89195/678, Yazd, Iran
Address no. 4: Km 5 of Taft Road, Yazd, Iran
Telephone no.: + 98 35 15220322
Fax no.: + 98 35 1523096
Place of registration: Iran
Date of registration: 1961
Registration number: 860
Economic code: 411315443678
Associated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO); Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG); Shahid Sayyad Shirazi Industries
Yazd Metallurgy Industries (YMI) is affiliated with Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and is a subsidiary of Ammunition Industries Group in Iran. YMI is involved in IR-1 centrifuge components manufacturing at DIO workshops in Iran’s missile programme. Furthermore, it is involved in the production of goods that can be used for either the production of nuclear weapons or vehicles for the delivery of such weapons.
Therefore, it has been providing support for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems by Iran, through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology.
17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010) 199. Shahid Baheri Industrial Group (SBIG)
صنایع شهید باقری
(a.k.a. Shahid Baheri Organisation;
SBIG;
Shahid Baheri Industries Group;
Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group;
Department 140/14;
Shahid Bagheri Industries Group;
Mahtab Technical Engineering Company;
Composite Propellant Missile Industry;
Sanaye Sokhte Morakab;
SSM)
Address: Pasdaran Ave., Tehran, Iran
Associated entities: Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)
Shahid Baheri Industrial Group (SBIG) is a subsidiary to Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). Shahid Baheri Industrial Group (SBIG) develops and produces Iran’s solid-propellant ballistic missiles. The development of such missiles is key to the building of nuclear weapon delivery capacities. Therefore, SBIG is engaged in, directly associated with, or providing support for, Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
17.10.2023 (UN: 23.12.2006) 200. Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG)
گروه صنعتی شهید همت
(a.k.a. Sabalan CIE; Sabalan Company; Sabalan Petrochemical Company (SPC); Sabalan Petrochemical Industries Company (SPICO); Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company (SAPICO); Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG);
Chahid Hemmat Industrial Group;
Address: Damavand Tehran Highway, P.O. Box 16595/159, No 5, Eslami St., Golestane Sevvom St., Pasdaran St., Tehran, Iran
Associated entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)
Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) is subordinate to Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). SHIG is responsible for Iran’s liquid-fuelled ballistic missile programme, including the production of missiles. The development of such missiles is key to the building of nuclear weapon delivery capacities. Therefore, SHIG is engaged in, directly associated with, or providing support for, Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
17.10.2023 (UN: 23.12.2006)’
Hemmat Missile Industries Factory;
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Complex;
SHIC;
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Factories;
SHIF;
Shahid Hemmat Industries Group;
Shahid Hemmat Complex;
Shahid Hemmat Industries;
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Complex;
Shahid Hemat; Industrial Complex;
Shahid Hemmat)
(5) under the heading ‘II. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)’, the following entry replaces the corresponding entry in the list set out under the subheading ‘A. Persons’:

Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing
‘4. IRGC Brigadier-General Seyyed Mahdi FARAHI

Deputy Minister of Defence and Armed Forces Support since 2021. Previously Deputy Minister of Defence and Industrial Affairs of the Ministry of Defence, head of the Defence Industries and Aerospace Organizations of the Ministry of Defence, as well as commander of the Armed Forces Personnel Training Camp. Former head of Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) and former managing director of the EU-designated Defence Industries Organisation (DIO). Member of the IRGC.
23.6.2008’
(6) under the heading ‘II. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)’, the following entries replace the corresponding entries in the list set out under the subheading ‘B. Entities’:

Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing
‘2. IRGC Air Force

Operates Iran’s inventory of short and medium range ballistic missiles.
23.6.2008 3. IRGC-Air Force Al-Ghadir Missile Command

The IRGC-Air Force Al-Ghadir Missile Command is a specific element within the IRGC Air Force that has been working with EU-designated SBIG, with the FATEH 110, short range ballistic missile as well as the Ashura medium range ballistic missile. This command appears to be the entity that actually has the operational control of the missiles.
26.7.2010 5. IRGC Qods Force
Tehran, Iran
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force is responsible for operations outside Iran and is Tehran’s principal foreign policy tool for special operations and support to terrorists and Islamic militants abroad. Hizballah used Qods Force-supplied rockets, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the 2006 conflict with Israel and benefited from Qods Force training on these systems, according to press reporting. According to a variety of reports, the Qods Force continues to re-supply and train Hizballah on advanced weaponry, anti-aircraft missiles, and long-range rockets. The Qods Force continues to provide limited lethal support, training, and funding to Taliban fighters in southern and western Afghanistan including small arms, ammunition, mortars, and short-range battlefield rockets.
26.7.2010 13. Fater Institute
مؤسسه فاطر
(a.k.a.Faater Institute;
Fater Engineering Company;
Gharargah Ghaem Faater Institute;
Fater Engineering)
Address no. 1: No 25, Valiasr Jonoobi, Azizi Street, Azadi Sq. NE, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 2: No 221, Phase 4, North Falamak-Zarafshan Intersection, Shahrak-E-Ghods, Tehran 14678, Iran
Type of entity: public company
Place of registration: Iran
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);
Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA)
Fater Institute is a construction company and subsidiary of the IRGC entity Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) and is therefore controlled by the IRGC.
17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010) 16. Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters
قرارگاه سازندگی خاتم الانبیاء
Address: No 221, Phase 4, North Falamak-Zarafshan Intersection, Shahrak-E-Ghods, Tehran 14678, Iran
Type of entity: public company
Place of registration: Iran
Principal place of business: Iran
Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);
Fater Institute
Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters is a construction company controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010) 22. Behineh Trading Co.
Address: Tavakoli Building, Opposite of 15th Alley, Emam-Jomeh Street, Tehran, Iran.
Associated individuals: Ali Akbar Tabatabaei (IRGC);
Azim Aghajani (IRGC)
Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Behineh Trading Co., which is owned and/or controlled by the Behineh Trading Company, is a front company for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Behineh Trading Company is also related to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran’s development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. It has also been involved in the illegal transport to deliver IRGC equipment. Behineh Trading Co. has been managed and/or overseen by Esmail Ghani, the Head of Iran’s IRGC Quds Force. Therefore, Behineh Trading Co. is owned and/or controlled by the IRGC.
17.10.2023 (UN: 18.4.2012) 29. Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute
مؤسسه مهندسین مشاور) ایمنسازان)
(a.k.a. ICEI;
Imensazen Consultant Engineers;
Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute;
Imen Sazan Consultant Engineers;
Imen Sazen Consultant Engineers Institute;
Imen Sazan Consulting Engineers;
Imen Sazan Consulting Ins.;
Imensazan Co. Eng.;
Imensazan Consulting Eng.)
Address no. 1: 121 First Golestan Street, Pasdaran Tehran, Tehran Province 65916, Iran
Address no. 2: No 5/1, Niroo Alley, Padegan-e-Valiasr Street, Sepah Square, Tehran, Iran
Address no. 3: Tehran – Ashrafi Esfahani to the north – above Hakim Bridge – before Chirag Bagh Faiz – East Ayatollah
Address no. 4: Sadouq Street – No 5 – Postal code 1461934358 (Mr Engineer Azad – Iran Concrete Association)
Telephone no.: 44234261
Place of registration: Iran
Date of registration: 1989 and 1990
Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);
Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA)
Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute is a tunnel construction and passive defence company and a subsidiary of the IRGC entity Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA). Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute is therefore controlled by the IRGC.
17.10.2023 (UN: 9.6.2010) 30. Yas Air
یاس ایر
(a.k.a. Pouya Air;
Pouya Airlines;
Yas Air Kish;
YasAir Cargo Airline;
Pars Air;
Pars Aviation Service Company (PASC);
Qeshm Air)
Address: Mehrabad International Airport, Next to Terminal No 6, Tehran, Iran
Website: pouyaair.com; yasair.com
Type of entity: Cargo airline
Place of registration: Iran
Date of registration: 2000 (as Qeshm Air) and 2008 renamed Yas Air
Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Yas Air, also known as Pouya Air, is an Iranian cargo airline created and managed as a direct subsidiary of the IRGC. It is therefore controlled by the IRGC.
17.10.2023 (UN: 10.12.2012)’

II.
In Annex V to Decision 2010/413/CFSP, all entries are deleted.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/2073 of 31 July 2024 refusing the renewal of the authorisation of Smoke Concentrate 809045 (SF-003) as a smoke flavouring primary product (notified under document C(2024) 3703)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2073 1.8.2024
(1) Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 provides that only smoke flavourings included in the Union list of authorised smoke flavouring primary products (‘the Union list’) may be placed on the market within the Union.
(2) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1321/2013(2)established the Union list. Smoke Concentrate 809045 (SF-003) was included in that list with expiry date of the authorisation 1 January 2024.
(3) On 30 June 2022, the company ‘Symrise AG’ (‘the applicant’) submitted an application for the renewal of the authorisation of Smoke Concentrate 809045 (SF-003) as a smoke flavouring primary product.
(4) On 28 September 2023, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) adopted its scientific opinion on the safety of Smoke Concentrate 809045 (SF-003)(3).
(5) In its scientific opinion, the Authority noted that Smoke Concentrate 809045 (SF-003) contains the substances furan-2(5H)-one and benzene–1,2-diol and concluded that a concern for genotoxicity for those substances was identifiedin vivoupon oral administration. In line with the Authority’s statement on the genotoxicity assessment of chemical mixtures(4)and considering that the exposure estimates for those two components are above the threshold of toxicological concern (TTC) of 0,0025 μg/kg bw per day for DNA-reactive mutagens and/or carcinogens, the Authority concluded that Smoke Concentrate 809045 (SF-003) raises concern with respect to genotoxicity. Furthermore, the Authority concluded that other 11 components in Smoke Concentrate 809045 (SF-003) and the unidentified part thereof raise a potential concern for genotoxicity.
(6) Pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003, only smoke flavourings that do not present risks to human health may be authorised and placed on the market. It is therefore appropriate to refuse the renewal of the authorisation of Smoke Concentrate 809045 (SF-003) as a smoke flavouring.
(7) However, in order to allow food business operators to use Smoke Concentrate 809045 (SF-003) as a smoke flavouring primary product for the production of foods to be placed on the market until 1 July 2029, as provided for in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2067(5), Smoke Concentrate 809045 (SF-003) should be allowed to be placed on the market until that date.
(8) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 November 2003 on smoke flavourings used or intended for use in or on foods (1), and in particular Article 12(3) thereof,
Whereas:
(1) Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 provides that only smoke flavourings included in the Union list of authorised smoke flavouring primary products (‘the Union list’) may be placed on the market within the Union.
(2) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1321/2013 (2) established the Union list. Smoke Concentrate 809045 (SF-003) was included in that list with expiry date of the authorisation 1 January 2024.
(3) On 30 June 2022, the company ‘Symrise AG’ (‘the applicant’) submitted an application for the renewal of the authorisation of Smoke Concentrate 809045 (SF-003) as a smoke flavouring primary product.
(4) On 28 September 2023, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) adopted its scientific opinion on the safety of Smoke Concentrate 809045 (SF-003) (3).
(5) In its scientific opinion, the Authority noted that Smoke Concentrate 809045 (SF-003) contains the substances furan-2(5H)-one and benzene–1,2-diol and concluded that a concern for genotoxicity for those substances was identified in vivo upon oral administration. In line with the Authority’s statement on the genotoxicity assessment of chemical mixtures (4) and considering that the exposure estimates for those two components are above the threshold of toxicological concern (TTC) of 0,0025 μg/kg bw per day for DNA-reactive mutagens and/or carcinogens, the Authority concluded that Smoke Concentrate 809045 (SF-003) raises concern with respect to genotoxicity. Furthermore, the Authority concluded that other 11 components in Smoke Concentrate 809045 (SF-003) and the unidentified part thereof raise a potential concern for genotoxicity.
(6) Pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003, only smoke flavourings that do not present risks to human health may be authorised and placed on the market. It is therefore appropriate to refuse the renewal of the authorisation of Smoke Concentrate 809045 (SF-003) as a smoke flavouring.
(7) However, in order to allow food business operators to use Smoke Concentrate 809045 (SF-003) as a smoke flavouring primary product for the production of foods to be placed on the market until 1 July 2029, as provided for in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2067 (5), Smoke Concentrate 809045 (SF-003) should be allowed to be placed on the market until that date.
(8) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The renewal of the authorisation of Smoke Concentrate 809045 (SF-003) as a smoke flavouring primary product is refused.
Smoke Concentrate 809045 (SF-003) may continue to be placed on the market until 1 July 2029.
This Decision is addressed to Symrise AG, Muehlenfeldstrasse 1, 37603 Holzminden, Germany.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/2072 of 31 July 2024 refusing the renewal of the authorisation of Scansmoke SEF 7525 (SF-004) as a smoke flavouring primary product (notified under document C(2024) 3704)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2072 1.8.2024
(1) Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 provides that only smoke flavourings included in the Union list of authorised smoke flavouring primary products (‘the Union list’) may be placed on the market within the Union.
(2) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1321/2013(2)established the Union list. Scansmoke SEF 7525 (SF-004) was included in that list with expiry date of the authorisation 1 January 2024.
(3) On 30 June 2022, the company Azelis Denmark A/S submitted an application for the renewal of the authorisation of Scansmoke SEF 7525 (SF-004) as a smoke flavouring primary product.
(4) On 28 September 2023, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) adopted its scientific opinion on the safety of Scansmoke SEF 7525 (SF-004)(3).
(5) In its scientific opinion, the Authority noted that Scansmoke SEF 7525 (SF-004) contains styrene and benzofuran that raise a potential concern for genotoxicity. In line with the Authority’s statement on the genotoxicity assessment of chemical mixtures(4)and considering that the exposure estimates for styrene and benzofuran are above the threshold of toxicological concern (TTC) value of 0.0025 μg/kg bw per day for DNA-reactive mutagens and/or carcinogens and that further data are needed to clarify their potential genotoxicity, the Authority concluded that the potential safety concern for genotoxicity of Scansmoke SEF 7525 (SF-004) cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the Authority concluded that also the unidentified part of Scansmoke SEF 7525 (SF-004) raises a potential concern for genotoxicity.
(6) Pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003, only smoke flavourings that do not present risks to human health may be authorised and placed on the market. It is therefore appropriate to refuse the renewal of the authorisation of Scansmoke SEF 7525 (SF-004) as a smoke flavouring primary product.
(7) However, in order to allow food business operators to use Scansmoke SEF 7525 (SF-004) as a smoke flavouring primary product for the production of foods to be placed on the market until 1 July 2029, as provided for in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2067(5), Scansmoke SEF 7525 (SF-004) should be allowed to be placed on the market until that date.
(8) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 November 2003 on smoke flavourings used or intended for use in or on foods (1), and in particular Article 12(3) thereof,
Whereas:
(1) Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 provides that only smoke flavourings included in the Union list of authorised smoke flavouring primary products (‘the Union list’) may be placed on the market within the Union.
(2) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1321/2013 (2) established the Union list. Scansmoke SEF 7525 (SF-004) was included in that list with expiry date of the authorisation 1 January 2024.
(3) On 30 June 2022, the company Azelis Denmark A/S submitted an application for the renewal of the authorisation of Scansmoke SEF 7525 (SF-004) as a smoke flavouring primary product.
(4) On 28 September 2023, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) adopted its scientific opinion on the safety of Scansmoke SEF 7525 (SF-004) (3).
(5) In its scientific opinion, the Authority noted that Scansmoke SEF 7525 (SF-004) contains styrene and benzofuran that raise a potential concern for genotoxicity. In line with the Authority’s statement on the genotoxicity assessment of chemical mixtures (4) and considering that the exposure estimates for styrene and benzofuran are above the threshold of toxicological concern (TTC) value of 0.0025 μg/kg bw per day for DNA-reactive mutagens and/or carcinogens and that further data are needed to clarify their potential genotoxicity, the Authority concluded that the potential safety concern for genotoxicity of Scansmoke SEF 7525 (SF-004) cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the Authority concluded that also the unidentified part of Scansmoke SEF 7525 (SF-004) raises a potential concern for genotoxicity.
(6) Pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003, only smoke flavourings that do not present risks to human health may be authorised and placed on the market. It is therefore appropriate to refuse the renewal of the authorisation of Scansmoke SEF 7525 (SF-004) as a smoke flavouring primary product.
(7) However, in order to allow food business operators to use Scansmoke SEF 7525 (SF-004) as a smoke flavouring primary product for the production of foods to be placed on the market until 1 July 2029, as provided for in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2067 (5), Scansmoke SEF 7525 (SF-004) should be allowed to be placed on the market until that date.
(8) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The renewal of the authorisation of Scansmoke SEF 7525 (SF-004) as a smoke flavouring primary product is refused.
Scansmoke SEF 7525 (SF-004) may continue to be placed on the market until 1 July 2029.
This Decision is addressed to Azelis Denmark A/S, Liskaer 5, 2730 Herley, Denmark.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/2071 of 31 July 2024 refusing the renewal of the authorisation of Scansmoke PB 1110 (SF-001) as a smoke flavouring primary product (notified under document C(2024) 3700)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2071 1.8.2024
(1) Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 provides that only smoke flavourings included in the Union list of authorised smoke flavouring primary products (‘the Union list’) may be placed on the market within the Union.
(2) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1321/2013(2)established the Union list. Scansmoke PB 1110 (SF-001) was included in that list with expiry date of the authorisation 1 January 2024
(3) On 30 June 2022, the company proFagus GmbH submitted an application for the renewal of the authorisation of Scansmoke PB 1110 (SF-001) as a smoke flavouring primary product and requested to rename the product ‘proFagus Smoke R714’.
(4) On 28 September 2023, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) adopted its scientific opinion on the safety of Scansmoke PB 1110 (SF-001)(3).
(5) In its scientific opinion, the Authority noted that Scansmoke PB 1110 (SF-001) contains the substance furan-2(5H)-one and concluded that a concern for genotoxicity for this substance was identifiedin vivoupon oral administration. In line with the Authority’s statement on the genotoxicity assessment of chemical mixtures(4)and considering that the exposure estimates for this component are above the threshold of toxicological concern (TTC) of 0,0025 μg/kg bw per day for DNA-reactive mutagens and/or carcinogens, the Authority concluded that Scansmoke PB 1110 (SF-001) raises concern with respect to genotoxicity. Furthermore, the Authority concluded that other three components in Scansmoke PB 1110 (SF-001) and the unidentified part thereof raise a potential concern for genotoxicity.
(6) Pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003, only smoke flavourings that do not present risks to human health may be authorised and placed on the market. It is therefore appropriate to refuse the renewal of the authorisation of Scansmoke PB 1110 (SF-001) as a smoke flavouring primary product.
(7) However, in order to allow food business operators to use Scansmoke PB 1110 (SF-001) as a smoke flavouring primary product for the production of foods to be placed on the market until 1 July 2029, as provided for in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2067(5), Scansmoke PB 1110 (SF-001) should be allowed to be placed on the market until that date.
(8) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 November 2003 on smoke flavourings used or intended for use in or on foods (1), and in particular Article 12(3) thereof,
Whereas:
(1) Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 provides that only smoke flavourings included in the Union list of authorised smoke flavouring primary products (‘the Union list’) may be placed on the market within the Union.
(2) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1321/2013 (2) established the Union list. Scansmoke PB 1110 (SF-001) was included in that list with expiry date of the authorisation 1 January 2024
(3) On 30 June 2022, the company proFagus GmbH submitted an application for the renewal of the authorisation of Scansmoke PB 1110 (SF-001) as a smoke flavouring primary product and requested to rename the product ‘proFagus Smoke R714’.
(4) On 28 September 2023, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) adopted its scientific opinion on the safety of Scansmoke PB 1110 (SF-001) (3).
(5) In its scientific opinion, the Authority noted that Scansmoke PB 1110 (SF-001) contains the substance furan-2(5H)-one and concluded that a concern for genotoxicity for this substance was identified in vivo upon oral administration. In line with the Authority’s statement on the genotoxicity assessment of chemical mixtures (4) and considering that the exposure estimates for this component are above the threshold of toxicological concern (TTC) of 0,0025 μg/kg bw per day for DNA-reactive mutagens and/or carcinogens, the Authority concluded that Scansmoke PB 1110 (SF-001) raises concern with respect to genotoxicity. Furthermore, the Authority concluded that other three components in Scansmoke PB 1110 (SF-001) and the unidentified part thereof raise a potential concern for genotoxicity.
(6) Pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003, only smoke flavourings that do not present risks to human health may be authorised and placed on the market. It is therefore appropriate to refuse the renewal of the authorisation of Scansmoke PB 1110 (SF-001) as a smoke flavouring primary product.
(7) However, in order to allow food business operators to use Scansmoke PB 1110 (SF-001) as a smoke flavouring primary product for the production of foods to be placed on the market until 1 July 2029, as provided for in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2067 (5), Scansmoke PB 1110 (SF-001) should be allowed to be placed on the market until that date.
(8) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The renewal of the authorisation of Scansmoke PB 1110 (SF-001) as a smoke flavouring primary product is refused.
Scansmoke PB 1110 (SF-001) may continue to be placed on the market until 1 July 2029.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/2069 of 31 July 2024 refusing the renewal of the authorisation of ProFagus-Smoke R709 (SF-008) as a smoke flavouring primary product (notified under document C(2024) 3707)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2069 1.8.2024
(1) Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 provides that only smoke flavourings included in the Union list of authorised smoke flavouring primary products (‘the Union list’) may be placed on the market within the Union.
(2) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1321/2013(2)established the Union list. ProFagus-Smoke R709 (SF-008) was included in that list with expiry date of the authorisation 1 January 2024.
(3) On 30 June 2022, the company ProFagus GmbH submitted an application for the renewal of the authorisation of ProFagus-Smoke R709 (SF-008) as a smoke flavouring primary product.
(4) On 28 September 2023, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) adopted its scientific opinion on the safety of ProFagus-Smoke R709 (SF-008)(3).
(5) In its scientific opinion, the Authority noted that ProFagus-Smoke R709 (SF-008) contains the substance furan-2(5H)-one and concluded that a concern for genotoxicity for this substance was identifiedin vivoupon oral administration. In line with the Authority’s statement on the genotoxicity assessment of chemical mixtures(4)and considering that the exposure estimates for this component are above the threshold of toxicological concern (TTC) of 0,0025 μg/kg bw per day for DNA-reactive mutagens and/or carcinogens, the Authority concluded that ProFagus-Smoke R709 (SF-008) raises concern with respect to genotoxicity. Furthermore, the Authority concluded that other three components in ProFagus-Smoke R709 (SF-008) and the unidentified part thereof raise a potential concern for genotoxicity.
(6) Pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003, only smoke flavourings that do not present risks to human health may be authorised and placed on the market. It is therefore appropriate to refuse the renewal of the authorisation of ProFagus-Smoke R709 (SF-008) as a smoke flavouring primary product.
(7) However, in order to allow food business operators to use ProFagus-Smoke R709 (SF-008) as a smoke flavouring primary product for the production of foods to be placed on the market until 1 July 2029, as provided for in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2067(5), ProFagus-Smoke R709 (SF-008) should be allowed to be placed on the market until that date.
(8) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 November 2003 on smoke flavourings used or intended for use in or on foods (1) , and in particular Article 12(3) thereof,
Whereas:
(1) Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 provides that only smoke flavourings included in the Union list of authorised smoke flavouring primary products (‘the Union list’) may be placed on the market within the Union.
(2) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1321/2013 (2) established the Union list. ProFagus-Smoke R709 (SF-008) was included in that list with expiry date of the authorisation 1 January 2024.
(3) On 30 June 2022, the company ProFagus GmbH submitted an application for the renewal of the authorisation of ProFagus-Smoke R709 (SF-008) as a smoke flavouring primary product.
(4) On 28 September 2023, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) adopted its scientific opinion on the safety of ProFagus-Smoke R709 (SF-008) (3).
(5) In its scientific opinion, the Authority noted that ProFagus-Smoke R709 (SF-008) contains the substance furan-2(5H)-one and concluded that a concern for genotoxicity for this substance was identified in vivo upon oral administration. In line with the Authority’s statement on the genotoxicity assessment of chemical mixtures (4) and considering that the exposure estimates for this component are above the threshold of toxicological concern (TTC) of 0,0025 μg/kg bw per day for DNA-reactive mutagens and/or carcinogens, the Authority concluded that ProFagus-Smoke R709 (SF-008) raises concern with respect to genotoxicity. Furthermore, the Authority concluded that other three components in ProFagus-Smoke R709 (SF-008) and the unidentified part thereof raise a potential concern for genotoxicity.
(6) Pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003, only smoke flavourings that do not present risks to human health may be authorised and placed on the market. It is therefore appropriate to refuse the renewal of the authorisation of ProFagus-Smoke R709 (SF-008) as a smoke flavouring primary product.
(7) However, in order to allow food business operators to use ProFagus-Smoke R709 (SF-008) as a smoke flavouring primary product for the production of foods to be placed on the market until 1 July 2029, as provided for in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2067 (5), ProFagus-Smoke R709 (SF-008) should be allowed to be placed on the market until that date.
(8) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The renewal of the authorisation of ProFagus-Smoke R709 (SF-008) as a smoke flavouring primary product is refused.
ProFagus-Smoke R709 (SF-008) may continue to be placed on the market until 1 July 2029.
This Decision is addressed to ProFagus GmbH, Strategic Projects, Uslarer Straße 30, 37194 Bodenfelde, Germany.

Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2024/2068 of 26 July 2024 implementing Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2068 29.7.2024
(1) On 27 May 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/849.
(2) On 7 March and 15 April 2024, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Committee established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1718 (2006) updated the information relating to two entities subject to restrictive measures.
(3) Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 should therefore be amended accordingly,
Name Alias Location Date of UN designation Other information
‘29. National Aerospace Technology Administration (NATA) f.k.a.: National Aerospace Development Administration;f.k.a.: NADA DPRK 2.3.2016 NATA is involved in the DPRK’s development of space science and technology, including satellite launches and carrier rockets.
54. Ministry of National Defence Ministry of National Defense;Ministry of Defence;Ministry of Defense;f.k.a.: Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces (MPAF) Pyongyang, DPRK 22.12.2017 The Ministry of National Defence manages the general administrative and logistical needs of the Korean People’s Army.’
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 31(2) thereof,
Having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 of 27 May 2016 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and repealing Decision 2013/183/CFSP (1), and in particular Article 33(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 27 May 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/849.
(2) On 7 March and 15 April 2024, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Committee established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1718 (2006) updated the information relating to two entities subject to restrictive measures.
(3) Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 should therefore be amended accordingly,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Annex I to Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

In Annex I to Decision (CFSP) 2016/849, under the heading ‘B. Entities’, entries 29 and 54 are replaced by the following:

Name
Alias
Location
Date of UN designation
Other information
‘29. National Aerospace Technology Administration (NATA)
f.k.a.: National Aerospace Development Administration;
f.k.a.: NADA
DPRK
2.3.2016
NATA is involved in the DPRK’s development of space science and technology, including satellite launches and carrier rockets. 54. Ministry of National Defence
Ministry of National Defense;
Ministry of Defence;
Ministry of Defense;
f.k.a.: Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces (MPAF)
Pyongyang, DPRK
22.12.2017
The Ministry of National Defence manages the general administrative and logistical needs of the Korean People’s Army.’

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/2066 of 31 July 2024 refusing the renewal of the authorisation of Zesti Smoke Code 10 (SF-002) as a smoke flavouring primary product (notified under document C(2024) 3702)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2066 1.8.2024
(1) Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 provides that only smoke flavourings included in the Union list of authorised smoke flavouring primary products (‘the Union list’) may be placed on the market within the Union.
(2) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1321/2013(2)established the Union list. Zesti Smoke Code 10 (SF-002) was included in that list with expiry date of the authorisation 1 January 2024.
(3) By letter dated 10 June 2022, Kerry Ingredients (UK) Limited, which used to operate under the trade name Mastertaste, informed the Commission that Kerry Inc. would represent it in relation with the application for renewal of Zesti Smoke Code 10 (SF-002) and of its intention to have the authorisation registered in the name of Kerry Inc.
(4) On 30 June 2022, the company Kerry Inc submitted an application for the renewal of the authorisation of Zesti Smoke Code 10 (SF-002) as a smoke flavouring primary product.
(5) On 28 September 2023, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) adopted its scientific opinion on the safety of Zesti Smoke Code 10 (SF-002)(3).
(6) In its scientific opinion, the Authority noted that Zesti Smoke Code 10 (SF-002) contains the substances furan-2(5H)-one and benzene–1,2-diol and concluded that a concern for genotoxicity for those substances was identifiedin vivoupon oral administration. In line with the Authority’s statement on the genotoxicity assessment of chemical mixtures(4)and considering that the exposure estimates for those two components are above the threshold of toxicological concern (TTC) of 0,0025 μg/kg bw per day for DNA-reactive mutagens and/or carcinogens, the Authority concluded that Zesti Smoke Code 10 (SF-002) raises concern with respect to genotoxicity. Furthermore, the Authority concluded that other four components in Zesti Smoke Code 10 (SF-002) and the unidentified part thereof raise a potential concern for genotoxicity.
(7) Pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003, only smoke flavourings that do not present risks to human health may be authorised and placed on the market. It is therefore appropriate to refuse the renewal of the authorisation of Zesti Smoke Code 10 (SF-002) as a smoke flavouring primary product.
(8) However, in order to allow food business operators to use Zesti Smoke Code 10 (SF-002) as a smoke flavouring primary product for the production of foods to be placed on the market until 1 July 2029, as provided for in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2067(5), Zesti Smoke Code 10 (SF-002) should be allowed to be placed on the market until that date.
(9) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 November 2003 on smoke flavourings used or intended for use in or on foods (1), and in particular Article 12(3) thereof,
Whereas:
(1) Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 provides that only smoke flavourings included in the Union list of authorised smoke flavouring primary products (‘the Union list’) may be placed on the market within the Union.
(2) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1321/2013 (2) established the Union list. Zesti Smoke Code 10 (SF-002) was included in that list with expiry date of the authorisation 1 January 2024.
(3) By letter dated 10 June 2022, Kerry Ingredients (UK) Limited, which used to operate under the trade name Mastertaste, informed the Commission that Kerry Inc. would represent it in relation with the application for renewal of Zesti Smoke Code 10 (SF-002) and of its intention to have the authorisation registered in the name of Kerry Inc.
(4) On 30 June 2022, the company Kerry Inc submitted an application for the renewal of the authorisation of Zesti Smoke Code 10 (SF-002) as a smoke flavouring primary product.
(5) On 28 September 2023, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) adopted its scientific opinion on the safety of Zesti Smoke Code 10 (SF-002) (3).
(6) In its scientific opinion, the Authority noted that Zesti Smoke Code 10 (SF-002) contains the substances furan-2(5H)-one and benzene–1,2-diol and concluded that a concern for genotoxicity for those substances was identified in vivo upon oral administration. In line with the Authority’s statement on the genotoxicity assessment of chemical mixtures (4) and considering that the exposure estimates for those two components are above the threshold of toxicological concern (TTC) of 0,0025 μg/kg bw per day for DNA-reactive mutagens and/or carcinogens, the Authority concluded that Zesti Smoke Code 10 (SF-002) raises concern with respect to genotoxicity. Furthermore, the Authority concluded that other four components in Zesti Smoke Code 10 (SF-002) and the unidentified part thereof raise a potential concern for genotoxicity.
(7) Pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003, only smoke flavourings that do not present risks to human health may be authorised and placed on the market. It is therefore appropriate to refuse the renewal of the authorisation of Zesti Smoke Code 10 (SF-002) as a smoke flavouring primary product.
(8) However, in order to allow food business operators to use Zesti Smoke Code 10 (SF-002) as a smoke flavouring primary product for the production of foods to be placed on the market until 1 July 2029, as provided for in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2067 (5), Zesti Smoke Code 10 (SF-002) should be allowed to be placed on the market until that date.
(9) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The renewal of the authorisation of Zesti Smoke Code 10 (SF-002) as a smoke flavouring primary product is refused.
Zesti Smoke Code 10 (SF-002) may continue to be placed on the market until 1 July 2029.

Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2024/2064 of 26 July 2024 implementing Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2064 26.7.2024
(1) On 20 December 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/788/CFSP.
(2) On 12 December 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/2231(2)in response to the obstruction of the electoral process and the related human rights violations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Decision (CFSP) 2016/2231 amended Decision 2010/788/CFSP and introduced additional restrictive measures.
(3) Further to an evaluation of the relevant circumstances and in view of the gravity of the situation in DRC, the Council considers that nine persons and one entity should be added to the list of natural or legal persons, entities and bodies set out in Annex II to Decision 2010/788/CFSP.
(4) Decision 2010/788/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,
(1) the following persons are added to Section A (‘Persons’):NameIdentifying informationReasonsDate of listing‘27.Benjamin MBONIMPAFunction/rank: Executive Secretary of the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/ARC), Supervisor of the permanent secretariat of the Alliance Fleuve CongoGender: maleBenjamin Mbonimpa holds a leading position as Executive Secretary of the M23/ARC, a non-governmental armed group operating in Eastern DRC.The M23/ARC sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular through inciting violence. In addition, it is responsible for serious human rights abuses, including killings, attacks and sexual violence against civilians.Owing to his leading position in the M23/ARC, Benjamin Mbonimpa is therefore involved in planning, directing or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC.26.7.202428.Justin Gacheri MUSANGAa.k.a. Gaceri MUSANGA, CS BRAVO SIERRA, BRAVO THREEFunction/rank: Brigadier-General of the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/ARC)POB: Masisi, DRCGender: maleFather: Erasto NTIBATURANA (Hutu customary leader in BUSUMBA)Justin Gacheri Musanga holds a leading position as Brigadier-General of the M23/ARC, a non-governmental armed group operating in Eastern DRC.The M23/ARC sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular through inciting violence. In addition, it is responsible for serious human rights abuses, including killings, attacks and sexual violence against civilians, as well as child recruitment.Owing to his leading position in the M23/ARC, Justin Gacheri Musanga is therefore involved in planning, directing or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC.26.7.202429.Pierre Celestin RURAKABIJEa.k.a. Guillaume NGABO, Bagdad, Simba Guillaume, Samba Guillaume, Ngabo Simba, Lieutenant-ColonelFunction/rank: Deputy Commander of the “Commando de recherche et d’action en profondeur” (CRAP) of the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda / Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR/FOCA)Nationality: RwandaGender: malePierre Celestin Rurakabije holds a leading position as Deputy Commander within the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda – Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR-FOCA), a non-governmental armed group operating in Eastern DRC. In particular, he is the Deputy Commander of the “Commando de recherche et d’action en profondeur” (CRAP) of the FDLR-FOCA – considered as the commando and intelligence unit of the armed group.FDLR-FOCA is a largely Hutu armed group, some of whose leaders took part in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The FDLR-FOCA, including the CRAP unit, contributes to the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular through violence and serious human rights abuses, including attacks on civilians, killings, violence against children, rape and other acts of sexual violence.Owing to his leading position within the FDLR, Pierre Celestin Rurakabije is therefore involved in planning, directing or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC.26.7.202430.Gustave KUBWAYOa.k.a. Sirkoof, Surkoof, Sirkoff, Surcouf, Surcoff, Surcof, Surkouf, Syrkoff, Modeste, Slycove, ColonelFunction/rank: Commander of the “Commando de recherche et d’action en profondeur” (CRAP) of the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda / Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR/FOCA)POB: Karago municipality, Gisenyi prefecture, Rwanda; or Nyabihu District, Western province, RwandaNationality: RwandaGender: maleGustave Kubwayo holds a leading position as Commander in the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda – Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR-FOCA), an armed group operating in Eastern DRC. He leads the special unit “Commando de recherche et d’action en profondeur” (CRAP) of FDLR-FOCA – considered as the commando and intelligence unit of the armed group.FDLR-FOCA is a largely Hutu armed group, some of whose leaders took part in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. FDLR-FOCA fighters, including the CRAP unit, have committed rape and other acts of sexual violence and killed civilians. FDLR-FOCA is systemically engaged in kidnappings for ransom, arbitrary detentions and executions of civilians and the recruitment of child combatants. The armed group is also involved in illegal logging, exploitation of natural resources such as charcoal, and illegally collected taxes at checkpoints.In his position as Commander of the CRAP unit, Gustave Kubwayo is involved in committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict in the DRC.26.7.202431.Jean Claude HABYARIMANA MBITSEa.k.a. Jules MULUMBA, Habyarimana MbitshemundaFunction/rank: Spokesperson of the “Collectif des mouvements pour le changement / Forces de défense du peuple” (CMC-FDP), VDP Spokesperson and Liaison OfficerPOB: Rugari Groupement, Rutshuru Territory, North Kivu province, DRCAddress: Bujumbura, BurundiNationality: CongoleseGender: maleJean Claude Habyarimana Mbitse holds a leading position as spokesperson of the “Collectif des mouvements pour le changement / Forces de défense du peuple” (CMC-FDP), a non-governmental armed group operating in Eastern DRC. In addition, Jean Claude Habyarimana Mbitse holds a leading position as spokesperson and liaison officer of the so-called “Wazalendo” or “Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie” (VDP), a coalition of non-governmental armed groups operating in Eastern DRC which fights against the coalition of M23/RDF/AFC.The CMC-FDP and VDP sustain the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular through inciting violence. In particular, CMC-FDP and VDP combatants committed serious human rights violations and abuses against civilians. For instance, VDP combatants are systemically engaged in kidnappings for ransom, torture, rape, arbitrary detentions and executions of civilians, and the recruitment of child combatants.Owing to his leading position in the CMC-FDP and VDP, Jean Claude Habyarimana Mbitse is therefore involved in planning, directing or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC.26.7.202432.Dominique KAMANZI NDARURUTSEa.k.a. Domi, Dominique NDARURUTSE, Général, Dominique NDARUHUTSEFunction/rank: Commander of the Collectif des Mouvements pour le Changement-Forces de Défense du Peuple (CMC-FDP)DOB: 1982POB: Kashavu, Bukombo Groupement, Rutshuru Territory, North Kivu province, DRCNationality: CongoleseGender: maleDominique Kamanzi Ndarurutse is a Commander of the “Collectif des Mouvements pour le Changement-Forces de Défense du Peuple” (CMC-FDP), an armed group active in Eastern DRC and part of the so-called “Wazalendo” or “Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie” (VDP) coalition consisting of the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) and several other armed groups. This coalition fights against the coalition of the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/RDF) and the “Alliance Fleuve Congo” (AFC) in Eastern DRC and has been involved in human rights violations.The CMC-FDP and VDP sustain the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular through inciting violence. In particular, CMC-FDP and VDP combatants committed serious human rights violations and abuses against civilians. For instance, VDP combatants are systemically engaged in kidnappings for ransom, torture, rape, arbitrary detentions and executions of civilians, and the recruitment of child combatants.As a Commander of CMC-FDP, Dominique Kamanzi Ndarurutse operates its military command and is therefore involved in committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations and abuses in the DRC. As a leader of CMC-FDP, he is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC.26.7.202433.Amigo KIBIRIGEa.k.a. Kibirige Muhammand, Mzee Amigo, Simba Amigo, MarineFunction/rank: Allied Democratic Forces CommanderDOB: 1975 to 1979POB: Masaka, UgandaNationality: UgandanGender: maleAmigo Kibirige is an Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) Commander. ADF is a non-governmental armed group operating in Uganda and Eastern DRC. Amigo Kibirige has been identified as one of the main ADF commanders operating in Mwalika.The ADF sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC (particularly in the Ituri and North Kivu provinces), for example with attacks on civilians. In addition, it is responsible for serious human rights abuses, including attacks against civilians, killings and abductions.Owing to his senior leading position as ADF Commander, Amigo Kibirige is involved in planning, directing or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC.26.7.202434.Augustin MIGABOFunction/rank: Colonel, Deputy Commander of the Special Force Command of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF)DOB: March 1968Place of birth: BurundiNationality: RwandanMilitary service number: 1574Gender: maleColonel Augustin Migabo holds a leading position as Deputy Commander of the Special Force Command of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), deployed in DRC as from May 2022, more specifically in the North Kivu region.The objective of the RDF presence in DRC is to reinforce the operations of the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/ARC), a non-governmental armed group operating in Eastern Congo, by providing troops and equipment.The RDF presence in the DRC constitutes a violation of the territorial integrity of the DRC. It also sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the region as well as the serious human rights abuses and violations committed by members of M23/ARC.Owing to his leading position within the RDF troops present in DRC, Augustin Migabo is responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. He is also responsible for providing support to the armed group M23/ARC, which sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular by providing it with troops and equipment.26.7.202435.Corneille NANGAA YOBELUOFunction/rank: Founder, leader and political coordinator of the “Alliance Fleuve Congo” (AFC)DOB: 9.7.1970POB: Bagboya, Wamba Territory, Haut-Uele Province, DRCNationality: CongolesePassport number: DP0000149, DP0003850Gender: maleCorneille Nangaa Yobeluo holds a leading position as founder, leader and political coordinator of the “Alliance Fleuve Congo” (AFC), a politico-military movement operating in Eastern DRC and openly associated with several non-governmental armed groups, including the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/ARC).Several non-governmental armed groups, including the M23/ARC, have fuelled armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, with the support of the AFC. By publicly and repeatedly calling for the military and violent overthrow of the Congolese government, the AFC also incites violence.Owing to his leading position as founder, leader and political coordinator of the AFC, Corneille Nangaa Yobeluo is therefore responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. He is also responsible for providing support to the armed group M23/ARC, which sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular by forming an alliance and working closely with M23/ARC.26.7.2024’; Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing ‘27. Benjamin MBONIMPA Function/rank: Executive Secretary of the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/ARC), Supervisor of the permanent secretariat of the Alliance Fleuve CongoGender: male Benjamin Mbonimpa holds a leading position as Executive Secretary of the M23/ARC, a non-governmental armed group operating in Eastern DRC.The M23/ARC sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular through inciting violence. In addition, it is responsible for serious human rights abuses, including killings, attacks and sexual violence against civilians.Owing to his leading position in the M23/ARC, Benjamin Mbonimpa is therefore involved in planning, directing or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. 26.7.2024 28. Justin Gacheri MUSANGA a.k.a. Gaceri MUSANGA, CS BRAVO SIERRA, BRAVO THREEFunction/rank: Brigadier-General of the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/ARC)POB: Masisi, DRCGender: maleFather: Erasto NTIBATURANA (Hutu customary leader in BUSUMBA) Justin Gacheri Musanga holds a leading position as Brigadier-General of the M23/ARC, a non-governmental armed group operating in Eastern DRC.The M23/ARC sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular through inciting violence. In addition, it is responsible for serious human rights abuses, including killings, attacks and sexual violence against civilians, as well as child recruitment.Owing to his leading position in the M23/ARC, Justin Gacheri Musanga is therefore involved in planning, directing or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. 26.7.2024 29. Pierre Celestin RURAKABIJE a.k.a. Guillaume NGABO, Bagdad, Simba Guillaume, Samba Guillaume, Ngabo Simba, Lieutenant-ColonelFunction/rank: Deputy Commander of the “Commando de recherche et d’action en profondeur” (CRAP) of the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda / Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR/FOCA)Nationality: RwandaGender: male Pierre Celestin Rurakabije holds a leading position as Deputy Commander within the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda – Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR-FOCA), a non-governmental armed group operating in Eastern DRC. In particular, he is the Deputy Commander of the “Commando de recherche et d’action en profondeur” (CRAP) of the FDLR-FOCA – considered as the commando and intelligence unit of the armed group.FDLR-FOCA is a largely Hutu armed group, some of whose leaders took part in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The FDLR-FOCA, including the CRAP unit, contributes to the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular through violence and serious human rights abuses, including attacks on civilians, killings, violence against children, rape and other acts of sexual violence.Owing to his leading position within the FDLR, Pierre Celestin Rurakabije is therefore involved in planning, directing or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. 26.7.2024 30. Gustave KUBWAYO a.k.a. Sirkoof, Surkoof, Sirkoff, Surcouf, Surcoff, Surcof, Surkouf, Syrkoff, Modeste, Slycove, ColonelFunction/rank: Commander of the “Commando de recherche et d’action en profondeur” (CRAP) of the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda / Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR/FOCA)POB: Karago municipality, Gisenyi prefecture, Rwanda; or Nyabihu District, Western province, RwandaNationality: RwandaGender: male Gustave Kubwayo holds a leading position as Commander in the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda – Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR-FOCA), an armed group operating in Eastern DRC. He leads the special unit “Commando de recherche et d’action en profondeur” (CRAP) of FDLR-FOCA – considered as the commando and intelligence unit of the armed group.FDLR-FOCA is a largely Hutu armed group, some of whose leaders took part in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. FDLR-FOCA fighters, including the CRAP unit, have committed rape and other acts of sexual violence and killed civilians. FDLR-FOCA is systemically engaged in kidnappings for ransom, arbitrary detentions and executions of civilians and the recruitment of child combatants. The armed group is also involved in illegal logging, exploitation of natural resources such as charcoal, and illegally collected taxes at checkpoints.In his position as Commander of the CRAP unit, Gustave Kubwayo is involved in committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict in the DRC. 26.7.2024 31. Jean Claude HABYARIMANA MBITSE a.k.a. Jules MULUMBA, Habyarimana MbitshemundaFunction/rank: Spokesperson of the “Collectif des mouvements pour le changement / Forces de défense du peuple” (CMC-FDP), VDP Spokesperson and Liaison OfficerPOB: Rugari Groupement, Rutshuru Territory, North Kivu province, DRCAddress: Bujumbura, BurundiNationality: CongoleseGender: male Jean Claude Habyarimana Mbitse holds a leading position as spokesperson of the “Collectif des mouvements pour le changement / Forces de défense du peuple” (CMC-FDP), a non-governmental armed group operating in Eastern DRC. In addition, Jean Claude Habyarimana Mbitse holds a leading position as spokesperson and liaison officer of the so-called “Wazalendo” or “Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie” (VDP), a coalition of non-governmental armed groups operating in Eastern DRC which fights against the coalition of M23/RDF/AFC.The CMC-FDP and VDP sustain the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular through inciting violence. In particular, CMC-FDP and VDP combatants committed serious human rights violations and abuses against civilians. For instance, VDP combatants are systemically engaged in kidnappings for ransom, torture, rape, arbitrary detentions and executions of civilians, and the recruitment of child combatants.Owing to his leading position in the CMC-FDP and VDP, Jean Claude Habyarimana Mbitse is therefore involved in planning, directing or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. 26.7.2024 32. Dominique KAMANZI NDARURUTSE a.k.a. Domi, Dominique NDARURUTSE, Général, Dominique NDARUHUTSEFunction/rank: Commander of the Collectif des Mouvements pour le Changement-Forces de Défense du Peuple (CMC-FDP)DOB: 1982POB: Kashavu, Bukombo Groupement, Rutshuru Territory, North Kivu province, DRCNationality: CongoleseGender: male Dominique Kamanzi Ndarurutse is a Commander of the “Collectif des Mouvements pour le Changement-Forces de Défense du Peuple” (CMC-FDP), an armed group active in Eastern DRC and part of the so-called “Wazalendo” or “Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie” (VDP) coalition consisting of the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) and several other armed groups. This coalition fights against the coalition of the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/RDF) and the “Alliance Fleuve Congo” (AFC) in Eastern DRC and has been involved in human rights violations.The CMC-FDP and VDP sustain the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular through inciting violence. In particular, CMC-FDP and VDP combatants committed serious human rights violations and abuses against civilians. For instance, VDP combatants are systemically engaged in kidnappings for ransom, torture, rape, arbitrary detentions and executions of civilians, and the recruitment of child combatants.As a Commander of CMC-FDP, Dominique Kamanzi Ndarurutse operates its military command and is therefore involved in committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations and abuses in the DRC. As a leader of CMC-FDP, he is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. 26.7.2024 33. Amigo KIBIRIGE a.k.a. Kibirige Muhammand, Mzee Amigo, Simba Amigo, MarineFunction/rank: Allied Democratic Forces CommanderDOB: 1975 to 1979POB: Masaka, UgandaNationality: UgandanGender: male Amigo Kibirige is an Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) Commander. ADF is a non-governmental armed group operating in Uganda and Eastern DRC. Amigo Kibirige has been identified as one of the main ADF commanders operating in Mwalika.The ADF sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC (particularly in the Ituri and North Kivu provinces), for example with attacks on civilians. In addition, it is responsible for serious human rights abuses, including attacks against civilians, killings and abductions.Owing to his senior leading position as ADF Commander, Amigo Kibirige is involved in planning, directing or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. 26.7.2024 34. Augustin MIGABO Function/rank: Colonel, Deputy Commander of the Special Force Command of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF)DOB: March 1968Place of birth: BurundiNationality: RwandanMilitary service number: 1574Gender: male Colonel Augustin Migabo holds a leading position as Deputy Commander of the Special Force Command of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), deployed in DRC as from May 2022, more specifically in the North Kivu region.The objective of the RDF presence in DRC is to reinforce the operations of the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/ARC), a non-governmental armed group operating in Eastern Congo, by providing troops and equipment.The RDF presence in the DRC constitutes a violation of the territorial integrity of the DRC. It also sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the region as well as the serious human rights abuses and violations committed by members of M23/ARC.Owing to his leading position within the RDF troops present in DRC, Augustin Migabo is responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. He is also responsible for providing support to the armed group M23/ARC, which sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular by providing it with troops and equipment. 26.7.2024 35. Corneille NANGAA YOBELUO Function/rank: Founder, leader and political coordinator of the “Alliance Fleuve Congo” (AFC)DOB: 9.7.1970POB: Bagboya, Wamba Territory, Haut-Uele Province, DRCNationality: CongolesePassport number: DP0000149, DP0003850Gender: male Corneille Nangaa Yobeluo holds a leading position as founder, leader and political coordinator of the “Alliance Fleuve Congo” (AFC), a politico-military movement operating in Eastern DRC and openly associated with several non-governmental armed groups, including the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/ARC).Several non-governmental armed groups, including the M23/ARC, have fuelled armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, with the support of the AFC. By publicly and repeatedly calling for the military and violent overthrow of the Congolese government, the AFC also incites violence.Owing to his leading position as founder, leader and political coordinator of the AFC, Corneille Nangaa Yobeluo is therefore responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. He is also responsible for providing support to the armed group M23/ARC, which sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular by forming an alliance and working closely with M23/ARC. 26.7.2024’;
Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing
‘27. Benjamin MBONIMPA Function/rank: Executive Secretary of the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/ARC), Supervisor of the permanent secretariat of the Alliance Fleuve CongoGender: male Benjamin Mbonimpa holds a leading position as Executive Secretary of the M23/ARC, a non-governmental armed group operating in Eastern DRC.The M23/ARC sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular through inciting violence. In addition, it is responsible for serious human rights abuses, including killings, attacks and sexual violence against civilians.Owing to his leading position in the M23/ARC, Benjamin Mbonimpa is therefore involved in planning, directing or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. 26.7.2024
28. Justin Gacheri MUSANGA a.k.a. Gaceri MUSANGA, CS BRAVO SIERRA, BRAVO THREEFunction/rank: Brigadier-General of the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/ARC)POB: Masisi, DRCGender: maleFather: Erasto NTIBATURANA (Hutu customary leader in BUSUMBA) Justin Gacheri Musanga holds a leading position as Brigadier-General of the M23/ARC, a non-governmental armed group operating in Eastern DRC.The M23/ARC sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular through inciting violence. In addition, it is responsible for serious human rights abuses, including killings, attacks and sexual violence against civilians, as well as child recruitment.Owing to his leading position in the M23/ARC, Justin Gacheri Musanga is therefore involved in planning, directing or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. 26.7.2024
29. Pierre Celestin RURAKABIJE a.k.a. Guillaume NGABO, Bagdad, Simba Guillaume, Samba Guillaume, Ngabo Simba, Lieutenant-ColonelFunction/rank: Deputy Commander of the “Commando de recherche et d’action en profondeur” (CRAP) of the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda / Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR/FOCA)Nationality: RwandaGender: male Pierre Celestin Rurakabije holds a leading position as Deputy Commander within the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda – Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR-FOCA), a non-governmental armed group operating in Eastern DRC. In particular, he is the Deputy Commander of the “Commando de recherche et d’action en profondeur” (CRAP) of the FDLR-FOCA – considered as the commando and intelligence unit of the armed group.FDLR-FOCA is a largely Hutu armed group, some of whose leaders took part in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The FDLR-FOCA, including the CRAP unit, contributes to the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular through violence and serious human rights abuses, including attacks on civilians, killings, violence against children, rape and other acts of sexual violence.Owing to his leading position within the FDLR, Pierre Celestin Rurakabije is therefore involved in planning, directing or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. 26.7.2024
30. Gustave KUBWAYO a.k.a. Sirkoof, Surkoof, Sirkoff, Surcouf, Surcoff, Surcof, Surkouf, Syrkoff, Modeste, Slycove, ColonelFunction/rank: Commander of the “Commando de recherche et d’action en profondeur” (CRAP) of the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda / Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR/FOCA)POB: Karago municipality, Gisenyi prefecture, Rwanda; or Nyabihu District, Western province, RwandaNationality: RwandaGender: male Gustave Kubwayo holds a leading position as Commander in the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda – Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR-FOCA), an armed group operating in Eastern DRC. He leads the special unit “Commando de recherche et d’action en profondeur” (CRAP) of FDLR-FOCA – considered as the commando and intelligence unit of the armed group.FDLR-FOCA is a largely Hutu armed group, some of whose leaders took part in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. FDLR-FOCA fighters, including the CRAP unit, have committed rape and other acts of sexual violence and killed civilians. FDLR-FOCA is systemically engaged in kidnappings for ransom, arbitrary detentions and executions of civilians and the recruitment of child combatants. The armed group is also involved in illegal logging, exploitation of natural resources such as charcoal, and illegally collected taxes at checkpoints.In his position as Commander of the CRAP unit, Gustave Kubwayo is involved in committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict in the DRC. 26.7.2024
31. Jean Claude HABYARIMANA MBITSE a.k.a. Jules MULUMBA, Habyarimana MbitshemundaFunction/rank: Spokesperson of the “Collectif des mouvements pour le changement / Forces de défense du peuple” (CMC-FDP), VDP Spokesperson and Liaison OfficerPOB: Rugari Groupement, Rutshuru Territory, North Kivu province, DRCAddress: Bujumbura, BurundiNationality: CongoleseGender: male Jean Claude Habyarimana Mbitse holds a leading position as spokesperson of the “Collectif des mouvements pour le changement / Forces de défense du peuple” (CMC-FDP), a non-governmental armed group operating in Eastern DRC. In addition, Jean Claude Habyarimana Mbitse holds a leading position as spokesperson and liaison officer of the so-called “Wazalendo” or “Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie” (VDP), a coalition of non-governmental armed groups operating in Eastern DRC which fights against the coalition of M23/RDF/AFC.The CMC-FDP and VDP sustain the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular through inciting violence. In particular, CMC-FDP and VDP combatants committed serious human rights violations and abuses against civilians. For instance, VDP combatants are systemically engaged in kidnappings for ransom, torture, rape, arbitrary detentions and executions of civilians, and the recruitment of child combatants.Owing to his leading position in the CMC-FDP and VDP, Jean Claude Habyarimana Mbitse is therefore involved in planning, directing or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. 26.7.2024
32. Dominique KAMANZI NDARURUTSE a.k.a. Domi, Dominique NDARURUTSE, Général, Dominique NDARUHUTSEFunction/rank: Commander of the Collectif des Mouvements pour le Changement-Forces de Défense du Peuple (CMC-FDP)DOB: 1982POB: Kashavu, Bukombo Groupement, Rutshuru Territory, North Kivu province, DRCNationality: CongoleseGender: male Dominique Kamanzi Ndarurutse is a Commander of the “Collectif des Mouvements pour le Changement-Forces de Défense du Peuple” (CMC-FDP), an armed group active in Eastern DRC and part of the so-called “Wazalendo” or “Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie” (VDP) coalition consisting of the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) and several other armed groups. This coalition fights against the coalition of the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/RDF) and the “Alliance Fleuve Congo” (AFC) in Eastern DRC and has been involved in human rights violations.The CMC-FDP and VDP sustain the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular through inciting violence. In particular, CMC-FDP and VDP combatants committed serious human rights violations and abuses against civilians. For instance, VDP combatants are systemically engaged in kidnappings for ransom, torture, rape, arbitrary detentions and executions of civilians, and the recruitment of child combatants.As a Commander of CMC-FDP, Dominique Kamanzi Ndarurutse operates its military command and is therefore involved in committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations and abuses in the DRC. As a leader of CMC-FDP, he is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. 26.7.2024
33. Amigo KIBIRIGE a.k.a. Kibirige Muhammand, Mzee Amigo, Simba Amigo, MarineFunction/rank: Allied Democratic Forces CommanderDOB: 1975 to 1979POB: Masaka, UgandaNationality: UgandanGender: male Amigo Kibirige is an Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) Commander. ADF is a non-governmental armed group operating in Uganda and Eastern DRC. Amigo Kibirige has been identified as one of the main ADF commanders operating in Mwalika.The ADF sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC (particularly in the Ituri and North Kivu provinces), for example with attacks on civilians. In addition, it is responsible for serious human rights abuses, including attacks against civilians, killings and abductions.Owing to his senior leading position as ADF Commander, Amigo Kibirige is involved in planning, directing or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. 26.7.2024
34. Augustin MIGABO Function/rank: Colonel, Deputy Commander of the Special Force Command of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF)DOB: March 1968Place of birth: BurundiNationality: RwandanMilitary service number: 1574Gender: male Colonel Augustin Migabo holds a leading position as Deputy Commander of the Special Force Command of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), deployed in DRC as from May 2022, more specifically in the North Kivu region.The objective of the RDF presence in DRC is to reinforce the operations of the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/ARC), a non-governmental armed group operating in Eastern Congo, by providing troops and equipment.The RDF presence in the DRC constitutes a violation of the territorial integrity of the DRC. It also sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the region as well as the serious human rights abuses and violations committed by members of M23/ARC.Owing to his leading position within the RDF troops present in DRC, Augustin Migabo is responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. He is also responsible for providing support to the armed group M23/ARC, which sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular by providing it with troops and equipment. 26.7.2024
35. Corneille NANGAA YOBELUO Function/rank: Founder, leader and political coordinator of the “Alliance Fleuve Congo” (AFC)DOB: 9.7.1970POB: Bagboya, Wamba Territory, Haut-Uele Province, DRCNationality: CongolesePassport number: DP0000149, DP0003850Gender: male Corneille Nangaa Yobeluo holds a leading position as founder, leader and political coordinator of the “Alliance Fleuve Congo” (AFC), a politico-military movement operating in Eastern DRC and openly associated with several non-governmental armed groups, including the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/ARC).Several non-governmental armed groups, including the M23/ARC, have fuelled armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, with the support of the AFC. By publicly and repeatedly calling for the military and violent overthrow of the Congolese government, the AFC also incites violence.Owing to his leading position as founder, leader and political coordinator of the AFC, Corneille Nangaa Yobeluo is therefore responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. He is also responsible for providing support to the armed group M23/ARC, which sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular by forming an alliance and working closely with M23/ARC. 26.7.2024’;
Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing
‘27. Benjamin MBONIMPA Function/rank: Executive Secretary of the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/ARC), Supervisor of the permanent secretariat of the Alliance Fleuve CongoGender: male Benjamin Mbonimpa holds a leading position as Executive Secretary of the M23/ARC, a non-governmental armed group operating in Eastern DRC.The M23/ARC sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular through inciting violence. In addition, it is responsible for serious human rights abuses, including killings, attacks and sexual violence against civilians.Owing to his leading position in the M23/ARC, Benjamin Mbonimpa is therefore involved in planning, directing or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. 26.7.2024
28. Justin Gacheri MUSANGA a.k.a. Gaceri MUSANGA, CS BRAVO SIERRA, BRAVO THREEFunction/rank: Brigadier-General of the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/ARC)POB: Masisi, DRCGender: maleFather: Erasto NTIBATURANA (Hutu customary leader in BUSUMBA) Justin Gacheri Musanga holds a leading position as Brigadier-General of the M23/ARC, a non-governmental armed group operating in Eastern DRC.The M23/ARC sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular through inciting violence. In addition, it is responsible for serious human rights abuses, including killings, attacks and sexual violence against civilians, as well as child recruitment.Owing to his leading position in the M23/ARC, Justin Gacheri Musanga is therefore involved in planning, directing or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. 26.7.2024
29. Pierre Celestin RURAKABIJE a.k.a. Guillaume NGABO, Bagdad, Simba Guillaume, Samba Guillaume, Ngabo Simba, Lieutenant-ColonelFunction/rank: Deputy Commander of the “Commando de recherche et d’action en profondeur” (CRAP) of the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda / Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR/FOCA)Nationality: RwandaGender: male Pierre Celestin Rurakabije holds a leading position as Deputy Commander within the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda – Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR-FOCA), a non-governmental armed group operating in Eastern DRC. In particular, he is the Deputy Commander of the “Commando de recherche et d’action en profondeur” (CRAP) of the FDLR-FOCA – considered as the commando and intelligence unit of the armed group.FDLR-FOCA is a largely Hutu armed group, some of whose leaders took part in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The FDLR-FOCA, including the CRAP unit, contributes to the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular through violence and serious human rights abuses, including attacks on civilians, killings, violence against children, rape and other acts of sexual violence.Owing to his leading position within the FDLR, Pierre Celestin Rurakabije is therefore involved in planning, directing or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. 26.7.2024
30. Gustave KUBWAYO a.k.a. Sirkoof, Surkoof, Sirkoff, Surcouf, Surcoff, Surcof, Surkouf, Syrkoff, Modeste, Slycove, ColonelFunction/rank: Commander of the “Commando de recherche et d’action en profondeur” (CRAP) of the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda / Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR/FOCA)POB: Karago municipality, Gisenyi prefecture, Rwanda; or Nyabihu District, Western province, RwandaNationality: RwandaGender: male Gustave Kubwayo holds a leading position as Commander in the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda – Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR-FOCA), an armed group operating in Eastern DRC. He leads the special unit “Commando de recherche et d’action en profondeur” (CRAP) of FDLR-FOCA – considered as the commando and intelligence unit of the armed group.FDLR-FOCA is a largely Hutu armed group, some of whose leaders took part in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. FDLR-FOCA fighters, including the CRAP unit, have committed rape and other acts of sexual violence and killed civilians. FDLR-FOCA is systemically engaged in kidnappings for ransom, arbitrary detentions and executions of civilians and the recruitment of child combatants. The armed group is also involved in illegal logging, exploitation of natural resources such as charcoal, and illegally collected taxes at checkpoints.In his position as Commander of the CRAP unit, Gustave Kubwayo is involved in committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict in the DRC. 26.7.2024
31. Jean Claude HABYARIMANA MBITSE a.k.a. Jules MULUMBA, Habyarimana MbitshemundaFunction/rank: Spokesperson of the “Collectif des mouvements pour le changement / Forces de défense du peuple” (CMC-FDP), VDP Spokesperson and Liaison OfficerPOB: Rugari Groupement, Rutshuru Territory, North Kivu province, DRCAddress: Bujumbura, BurundiNationality: CongoleseGender: male Jean Claude Habyarimana Mbitse holds a leading position as spokesperson of the “Collectif des mouvements pour le changement / Forces de défense du peuple” (CMC-FDP), a non-governmental armed group operating in Eastern DRC. In addition, Jean Claude Habyarimana Mbitse holds a leading position as spokesperson and liaison officer of the so-called “Wazalendo” or “Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie” (VDP), a coalition of non-governmental armed groups operating in Eastern DRC which fights against the coalition of M23/RDF/AFC.The CMC-FDP and VDP sustain the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular through inciting violence. In particular, CMC-FDP and VDP combatants committed serious human rights violations and abuses against civilians. For instance, VDP combatants are systemically engaged in kidnappings for ransom, torture, rape, arbitrary detentions and executions of civilians, and the recruitment of child combatants.Owing to his leading position in the CMC-FDP and VDP, Jean Claude Habyarimana Mbitse is therefore involved in planning, directing or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. 26.7.2024
32. Dominique KAMANZI NDARURUTSE a.k.a. Domi, Dominique NDARURUTSE, Général, Dominique NDARUHUTSEFunction/rank: Commander of the Collectif des Mouvements pour le Changement-Forces de Défense du Peuple (CMC-FDP)DOB: 1982POB: Kashavu, Bukombo Groupement, Rutshuru Territory, North Kivu province, DRCNationality: CongoleseGender: male Dominique Kamanzi Ndarurutse is a Commander of the “Collectif des Mouvements pour le Changement-Forces de Défense du Peuple” (CMC-FDP), an armed group active in Eastern DRC and part of the so-called “Wazalendo” or “Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie” (VDP) coalition consisting of the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) and several other armed groups. This coalition fights against the coalition of the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/RDF) and the “Alliance Fleuve Congo” (AFC) in Eastern DRC and has been involved in human rights violations.The CMC-FDP and VDP sustain the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular through inciting violence. In particular, CMC-FDP and VDP combatants committed serious human rights violations and abuses against civilians. For instance, VDP combatants are systemically engaged in kidnappings for ransom, torture, rape, arbitrary detentions and executions of civilians, and the recruitment of child combatants.As a Commander of CMC-FDP, Dominique Kamanzi Ndarurutse operates its military command and is therefore involved in committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations and abuses in the DRC. As a leader of CMC-FDP, he is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. 26.7.2024
33. Amigo KIBIRIGE a.k.a. Kibirige Muhammand, Mzee Amigo, Simba Amigo, MarineFunction/rank: Allied Democratic Forces CommanderDOB: 1975 to 1979POB: Masaka, UgandaNationality: UgandanGender: male Amigo Kibirige is an Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) Commander. ADF is a non-governmental armed group operating in Uganda and Eastern DRC. Amigo Kibirige has been identified as one of the main ADF commanders operating in Mwalika.The ADF sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC (particularly in the Ituri and North Kivu provinces), for example with attacks on civilians. In addition, it is responsible for serious human rights abuses, including attacks against civilians, killings and abductions.Owing to his senior leading position as ADF Commander, Amigo Kibirige is involved in planning, directing or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. 26.7.2024
34. Augustin MIGABO Function/rank: Colonel, Deputy Commander of the Special Force Command of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF)DOB: March 1968Place of birth: BurundiNationality: RwandanMilitary service number: 1574Gender: male Colonel Augustin Migabo holds a leading position as Deputy Commander of the Special Force Command of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), deployed in DRC as from May 2022, more specifically in the North Kivu region.The objective of the RDF presence in DRC is to reinforce the operations of the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/ARC), a non-governmental armed group operating in Eastern Congo, by providing troops and equipment.The RDF presence in the DRC constitutes a violation of the territorial integrity of the DRC. It also sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the region as well as the serious human rights abuses and violations committed by members of M23/ARC.Owing to his leading position within the RDF troops present in DRC, Augustin Migabo is responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. He is also responsible for providing support to the armed group M23/ARC, which sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular by providing it with troops and equipment. 26.7.2024
35. Corneille NANGAA YOBELUO Function/rank: Founder, leader and political coordinator of the “Alliance Fleuve Congo” (AFC)DOB: 9.7.1970POB: Bagboya, Wamba Territory, Haut-Uele Province, DRCNationality: CongolesePassport number: DP0000149, DP0003850Gender: male Corneille Nangaa Yobeluo holds a leading position as founder, leader and political coordinator of the “Alliance Fleuve Congo” (AFC), a politico-military movement operating in Eastern DRC and openly associated with several non-governmental armed groups, including the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/ARC).Several non-governmental armed groups, including the M23/ARC, have fuelled armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, with the support of the AFC. By publicly and repeatedly calling for the military and violent overthrow of the Congolese government, the AFC also incites violence.Owing to his leading position as founder, leader and political coordinator of the AFC, Corneille Nangaa Yobeluo is therefore responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. He is also responsible for providing support to the armed group M23/ARC, which sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular by forming an alliance and working closely with M23/ARC. 26.7.2024’;
(2) the following entity is added to Section B (‘Entities’):NameIdentifying informationReasonsDate of listing‘1.Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)Date of creation: 15.12.2023Place of creation: KenyaThe “Alliance Fleuve Congo” (AFC) is a politico-military movement operating in Eastern DRC and is openly associated with several non-governmental armed groups, including the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/ARC).Several non-governmental armed groups, including the M23/ARC, have fuelled the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, with the support of the AFC. By publicly and repeatedly calling for the military and violent overthrow of the Congolese government, the AFC also incites violence.The AFC is therefore responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. AFC is also responsible for providing support to the armed group M23/ARC, which sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular by forming an alliance and worked closely with M23/ARC.26.7.2024’. Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing ‘1. Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) Date of creation: 15.12.2023Place of creation: Kenya The “Alliance Fleuve Congo” (AFC) is a politico-military movement operating in Eastern DRC and is openly associated with several non-governmental armed groups, including the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/ARC).Several non-governmental armed groups, including the M23/ARC, have fuelled the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, with the support of the AFC. By publicly and repeatedly calling for the military and violent overthrow of the Congolese government, the AFC also incites violence.The AFC is therefore responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. AFC is also responsible for providing support to the armed group M23/ARC, which sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular by forming an alliance and worked closely with M23/ARC. 26.7.2024’.
Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing
‘1. Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) Date of creation: 15.12.2023Place of creation: Kenya The “Alliance Fleuve Congo” (AFC) is a politico-military movement operating in Eastern DRC and is openly associated with several non-governmental armed groups, including the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/ARC).Several non-governmental armed groups, including the M23/ARC, have fuelled the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, with the support of the AFC. By publicly and repeatedly calling for the military and violent overthrow of the Congolese government, the AFC also incites violence.The AFC is therefore responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. AFC is also responsible for providing support to the armed group M23/ARC, which sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular by forming an alliance and worked closely with M23/ARC. 26.7.2024’.
Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing
‘1. Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) Date of creation: 15.12.2023Place of creation: Kenya The “Alliance Fleuve Congo” (AFC) is a politico-military movement operating in Eastern DRC and is openly associated with several non-governmental armed groups, including the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/ARC).Several non-governmental armed groups, including the M23/ARC, have fuelled the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, with the support of the AFC. By publicly and repeatedly calling for the military and violent overthrow of the Congolese government, the AFC also incites violence.The AFC is therefore responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. AFC is also responsible for providing support to the armed group M23/ARC, which sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular by forming an alliance and worked closely with M23/ARC. 26.7.2024’.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 31(2) thereof,
Having regard to Council Decision 2010/788/CFSP of 20 December 2010 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1), and in particular Article 6(2) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 20 December 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/788/CFSP.
(2) On 12 December 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/2231 (2) in response to the obstruction of the electoral process and the related human rights violations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Decision (CFSP) 2016/2231 amended Decision 2010/788/CFSP and introduced additional restrictive measures.
(3) Further to an evaluation of the relevant circumstances and in view of the gravity of the situation in DRC, the Council considers that nine persons and one entity should be added to the list of natural or legal persons, entities and bodies set out in Annex II to Decision 2010/788/CFSP.
(4) Decision 2010/788/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Annex II to Decision 2010/788/CFSP is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Annex II to Decision 2010/788/CFSP is amended as follows:

(1) the following persons are added to Section A (‘Persons’):

Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing
‘27. Benjamin MBONIMPA
Function/rank: Executive Secretary of the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/ARC), Supervisor of the permanent secretariat of the Alliance Fleuve Congo
Gender: male
Benjamin Mbonimpa holds a leading position as Executive Secretary of the M23/ARC, a non-governmental armed group operating in Eastern DRC.
The M23/ARC sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular through inciting violence. In addition, it is responsible for serious human rights abuses, including killings, attacks and sexual violence against civilians.
Owing to his leading position in the M23/ARC, Benjamin Mbonimpa is therefore involved in planning, directing or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC.
26.7.2024 28. Justin Gacheri MUSANGA
a.k.a. Gaceri MUSANGA, CS BRAVO SIERRA, BRAVO THREE
Function/rank: Brigadier-General of the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/ARC)
POB: Masisi, DRC
Gender: male
Father: Erasto NTIBATURANA (Hutu customary leader in BUSUMBA)
Justin Gacheri Musanga holds a leading position as Brigadier-General of the M23/ARC, a non-governmental armed group operating in Eastern DRC.
The M23/ARC sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular through inciting violence. In addition, it is responsible for serious human rights abuses, including killings, attacks and sexual violence against civilians, as well as child recruitment.
Owing to his leading position in the M23/ARC, Justin Gacheri Musanga is therefore involved in planning, directing or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC.
26.7.2024 29. Pierre Celestin RURAKABIJE
a.k.a. Guillaume NGABO, Bagdad, Simba Guillaume, Samba Guillaume, Ngabo Simba, Lieutenant-Colonel
Function/rank: Deputy Commander of the “Commando de recherche et d’action en profondeur” (CRAP) of the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda / Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR/FOCA)
Nationality: Rwanda
Gender: male
Pierre Celestin Rurakabije holds a leading position as Deputy Commander within the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda – Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR-FOCA), a non-governmental armed group operating in Eastern DRC. In particular, he is the Deputy Commander of the “Commando de recherche et d’action en profondeur” (CRAP) of the FDLR-FOCA – considered as the commando and intelligence unit of the armed group.
FDLR-FOCA is a largely Hutu armed group, some of whose leaders took part in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The FDLR-FOCA, including the CRAP unit, contributes to the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular through violence and serious human rights abuses, including attacks on civilians, killings, violence against children, rape and other acts of sexual violence.
Owing to his leading position within the FDLR, Pierre Celestin Rurakabije is therefore involved in planning, directing or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC.
26.7.2024 30. Gustave KUBWAYO
a.k.a. Sirkoof, Surkoof, Sirkoff, Surcouf, Surcoff, Surcof, Surkouf, Syrkoff, Modeste, Slycove, Colonel
Function/rank: Commander of the “Commando de recherche et d’action en profondeur” (CRAP) of the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda / Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR/FOCA)
POB: Karago municipality, Gisenyi prefecture, Rwanda; or Nyabihu District, Western province, Rwanda
Nationality: Rwanda
Gender: male
Gustave Kubwayo holds a leading position as Commander in the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda – Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR-FOCA), an armed group operating in Eastern DRC. He leads the special unit “Commando de recherche et d’action en profondeur” (CRAP) of FDLR-FOCA – considered as the commando and intelligence unit of the armed group.
FDLR-FOCA is a largely Hutu armed group, some of whose leaders took part in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. FDLR-FOCA fighters, including the CRAP unit, have committed rape and other acts of sexual violence and killed civilians. FDLR-FOCA is systemically engaged in kidnappings for ransom, arbitrary detentions and executions of civilians and the recruitment of child combatants. The armed group is also involved in illegal logging, exploitation of natural resources such as charcoal, and illegally collected taxes at checkpoints.
In his position as Commander of the CRAP unit, Gustave Kubwayo is involved in committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict in the DRC.
26.7.2024 31. Jean Claude HABYARIMANA MBITSE
a.k.a. Jules MULUMBA, Habyarimana Mbitshemunda
Function/rank: Spokesperson of the “Collectif des mouvements pour le changement / Forces de défense du peuple” (CMC-FDP), VDP Spokesperson and Liaison Officer
POB: Rugari Groupement, Rutshuru Territory, North Kivu province, DRC
Address: Bujumbura, Burundi
Nationality: Congolese
Gender: male
Jean Claude Habyarimana Mbitse holds a leading position as spokesperson of the “Collectif des mouvements pour le changement / Forces de défense du peuple” (CMC-FDP), a non-governmental armed group operating in Eastern DRC. In addition, Jean Claude Habyarimana Mbitse holds a leading position as spokesperson and liaison officer of the so-called “Wazalendo” or “Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie” (VDP), a coalition of non-governmental armed groups operating in Eastern DRC which fights against the coalition of M23/RDF/AFC.
The CMC-FDP and VDP sustain the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular through inciting violence. In particular, CMC-FDP and VDP combatants committed serious human rights violations and abuses against civilians. For instance, VDP combatants are systemically engaged in kidnappings for ransom, torture, rape, arbitrary detentions and executions of civilians, and the recruitment of child combatants.
Owing to his leading position in the CMC-FDP and VDP, Jean Claude Habyarimana Mbitse is therefore involved in planning, directing or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC.
26.7.2024 32. Dominique KAMANZI NDARURUTSE
a.k.a. Domi, Dominique NDARURUTSE, Général, Dominique NDARUHUTSE
Function/rank: Commander of the Collectif des Mouvements pour le Changement-Forces de Défense du Peuple (CMC-FDP)
DOB: 1982
POB: Kashavu, Bukombo Groupement, Rutshuru Territory, North Kivu province, DRC
Nationality: Congolese
Gender: male
Dominique Kamanzi Ndarurutse is a Commander of the “Collectif des Mouvements pour le Changement-Forces de Défense du Peuple” (CMC-FDP), an armed group active in Eastern DRC and part of the so-called “Wazalendo” or “Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie” (VDP) coalition consisting of the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) and several other armed groups. This coalition fights against the coalition of the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/RDF) and the “Alliance Fleuve Congo” (AFC) in Eastern DRC and has been involved in human rights violations.
The CMC-FDP and VDP sustain the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular through inciting violence. In particular, CMC-FDP and VDP combatants committed serious human rights violations and abuses against civilians. For instance, VDP combatants are systemically engaged in kidnappings for ransom, torture, rape, arbitrary detentions and executions of civilians, and the recruitment of child combatants.
As a Commander of CMC-FDP, Dominique Kamanzi Ndarurutse operates its military command and is therefore involved in committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations and abuses in the DRC. As a leader of CMC-FDP, he is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC.
26.7.2024 33. Amigo KIBIRIGE
a.k.a. Kibirige Muhammand, Mzee Amigo, Simba Amigo, Marine
Function/rank: Allied Democratic Forces Commander
DOB: 1975 to 1979
POB: Masaka, Uganda
Nationality: Ugandan
Gender: male
Amigo Kibirige is an Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) Commander. ADF is a non-governmental armed group operating in Uganda and Eastern DRC. Amigo Kibirige has been identified as one of the main ADF commanders operating in Mwalika.
The ADF sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC (particularly in the Ituri and North Kivu provinces), for example with attacks on civilians. In addition, it is responsible for serious human rights abuses, including attacks against civilians, killings and abductions.
Owing to his senior leading position as ADF Commander, Amigo Kibirige is involved in planning, directing or committing acts that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses in the DRC. He is also responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC.
26.7.2024 34. Augustin MIGABO
Function/rank: Colonel, Deputy Commander of the Special Force Command of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF)
DOB: March 1968
Place of birth: Burundi
Nationality: Rwandan
Military service number: 1574
Gender: male
Colonel Augustin Migabo holds a leading position as Deputy Commander of the Special Force Command of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), deployed in DRC as from May 2022, more specifically in the North Kivu region.
The objective of the RDF presence in DRC is to reinforce the operations of the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/ARC), a non-governmental armed group operating in Eastern Congo, by providing troops and equipment.
The RDF presence in the DRC constitutes a violation of the territorial integrity of the DRC. It also sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the region as well as the serious human rights abuses and violations committed by members of M23/ARC.
Owing to his leading position within the RDF troops present in DRC, Augustin Migabo is responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. He is also responsible for providing support to the armed group M23/ARC, which sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular by providing it with troops and equipment.
26.7.2024 35. Corneille NANGAA YOBELUO
Function/rank: Founder, leader and political coordinator of the “Alliance Fleuve Congo” (AFC)
DOB: 9.7.1970
POB: Bagboya, Wamba Territory, Haut-Uele Province, DRC
Nationality: Congolese
Passport number: DP0000149, DP0003850
Gender: male
Corneille Nangaa Yobeluo holds a leading position as founder, leader and political coordinator of the “Alliance Fleuve Congo” (AFC), a politico-military movement operating in Eastern DRC and openly associated with several non-governmental armed groups, including the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/ARC).
Several non-governmental armed groups, including the M23/ARC, have fuelled armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, with the support of the AFC. By publicly and repeatedly calling for the military and violent overthrow of the Congolese government, the AFC also incites violence.
Owing to his leading position as founder, leader and political coordinator of the AFC, Corneille Nangaa Yobeluo is therefore responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. He is also responsible for providing support to the armed group M23/ARC, which sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular by forming an alliance and working closely with M23/ARC.
26.7.2024’;

(2) the following entity is added to Section B (‘Entities’):

Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing
‘1. Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)
Date of creation: 15.12.2023
Place of creation: Kenya
The “Alliance Fleuve Congo” (AFC) is a politico-military movement operating in Eastern DRC and is openly associated with several non-governmental armed groups, including the March 23 Movement / Congolese Revolutionary Army (M23/ARC).
Several non-governmental armed groups, including the M23/ARC, have fuelled the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, with the support of the AFC. By publicly and repeatedly calling for the military and violent overthrow of the Congolese government, the AFC also incites violence.
The AFC is therefore responsible for sustaining the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC. AFC is also responsible for providing support to the armed group M23/ARC, which sustains the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, in particular by forming an alliance and worked closely with M23/ARC.
26.7.2024’.