Council Decision (EU) 2024/2133 of 26 July 2024 on the existence of an excessive deficit in Poland

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2133 1.8.2024
(1) Article 126(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits.
(2) The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong, sustainable and inclusive growth underpinned by financial stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union’s objectives for sustainable growth and employment.
(3) The excessive deficit procedure under Article 126 TFEU, as clarified by Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97(1), which is part of the SGP, provides for a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. Protocol No 12 on the excessive deficit procedure, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the TFEU, sets out further provisions relating to the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009(2)lays down detailed rules and definitions for the application of those provisions. The Union’s reformed economic governance framework, which came into force on 30 April 2024, includes Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1264(3), which amended Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. This Decision concerns only the excess of the ratio of the government deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) with respect to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP, in line with existing legal provisions.
(4) Article 126(5) TFEU provides that, if the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur, it is to address an opinion to the Member State concerned and inform the Council accordingly. Having taken into account its report of 19 June 2024 adopted pursuant to Article 126(3) TFEU, and having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee adopted pursuant to Article 126(4) TFEU, the Commission concluded that an excessive deficit exists in Poland. On 8 July 2024, the Commission therefore addressed such an opinion to Poland and informed the Council accordingly.
(5) Article 126(6) TFEU provides that the Council is to consider any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make before deciding after an overall assessment whether an excessive deficit exists. In the case of Poland, the overall assessment leads to the conclusions set out below.
(6) According to the data validated by the Commission (Eurostat) on 22 April 2024, the general government deficit in Poland reached 5,1 % of GDP in 2023, and general government debt stood at 49,6 % of GDP. The Commission, in its report under Article 126(3) TFEU, considered that the excess of the deficit over the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP in 2023 is not exceptional, as it results neither from an unusual event nor from a severe economic downturn in the sense of the SGP. The excess over the TFEU reference value is also not temporary, based on the Commission’s 2024 spring forecast, which projected the general government deficit to remain above 3 % of GDP in 2024 and 2025. In sum, the deficit in 2023 was above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP. The excess is neither considered to be exceptional as defined by the TFEU and the SGP, nor is it considered to be temporary. Hence, the deficit criterion as defined by the TFEU and Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 is prima facie not fulfilled.
(7) Based on data notified to the Commission (Eurostat), the general government deficit in Poland is forecast to reach 5,1 % of GDP in 2024. The Commission’s 2024 spring forecast indicates a deficit of 5,4 % of GDP in 2024, which is above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP. The increase in the deficit, if compared to 2023, reflects increasing expenditure, in particular growing spending on strengthening defence capacity, including investments in military equipment and infrastructure and current military expenditure, new social benefits, including a raise of the family allowances, a 30 % salary increase for teachers and a 20 % salary increase for public administration officials.
(8) In line with the requirements of Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission also analysed all the relevant factors in its report under that Article. As laid down in Article 2(4), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, whenever the ratio of the government debt to GDP does not exceed the reference value, relevant factors are to be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. Overall, the relevant factors examined in the report under Article 126(3) TFEU present a mixed picture. The consideration of those relevant factors does not alter the conclusion that the deficit criterion in the TFEU is not fulfilled.
(9) In view of the deadline of 20 September 2024 for the submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans, which deadline can be extended in accordance with Article 36(1), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council(4), indicatively until 15 October 2024, that being the date for submission of the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States, the Council takes note that the next step in the procedure, namely the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU on the correction of the excessive deficit, will coincide with the Commission’s opinions on the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States under Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5). This approach allows ensuring consistency between the budgetary requirements under the excessive deficit procedure and the adjustment path set out in the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. Enabling such consistency while avoiding a surveillance gap under the excessive deficit procedure, requires the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. This timeline should be considered exceptional and as linked to the transition to the new framework, and therefore as not setting a precedent. The Council also takes note that, failing the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan, the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU will consider the reference trajectory transmitted by the Commission to the Member State determined in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/1263,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 126(6) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Having regard to the observations made by Poland,
Whereas:
(1) Article 126(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits.
(2) The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong, sustainable and inclusive growth underpinned by financial stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union’s objectives for sustainable growth and employment.
(3) The excessive deficit procedure under Article 126 TFEU, as clarified by Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 (1), which is part of the SGP, provides for a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. Protocol No 12 on the excessive deficit procedure, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the TFEU, sets out further provisions relating to the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 (2) lays down detailed rules and definitions for the application of those provisions. The Union’s reformed economic governance framework, which came into force on 30 April 2024, includes Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1264 (3), which amended Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. This Decision concerns only the excess of the ratio of the government deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) with respect to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP, in line with existing legal provisions.
(4) Article 126(5) TFEU provides that, if the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur, it is to address an opinion to the Member State concerned and inform the Council accordingly. Having taken into account its report of 19 June 2024 adopted pursuant to Article 126(3) TFEU, and having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee adopted pursuant to Article 126(4) TFEU, the Commission concluded that an excessive deficit exists in Poland. On 8 July 2024, the Commission therefore addressed such an opinion to Poland and informed the Council accordingly.
(5) Article 126(6) TFEU provides that the Council is to consider any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make before deciding after an overall assessment whether an excessive deficit exists. In the case of Poland, the overall assessment leads to the conclusions set out below.
(6) According to the data validated by the Commission (Eurostat) on 22 April 2024, the general government deficit in Poland reached 5,1 % of GDP in 2023, and general government debt stood at 49,6 % of GDP. The Commission, in its report under Article 126(3) TFEU, considered that the excess of the deficit over the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP in 2023 is not exceptional, as it results neither from an unusual event nor from a severe economic downturn in the sense of the SGP. The excess over the TFEU reference value is also not temporary, based on the Commission’s 2024 spring forecast, which projected the general government deficit to remain above 3 % of GDP in 2024 and 2025. In sum, the deficit in 2023 was above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP. The excess is neither considered to be exceptional as defined by the TFEU and the SGP, nor is it considered to be temporary. Hence, the deficit criterion as defined by the TFEU and Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 is prima facie not fulfilled.
(7) Based on data notified to the Commission (Eurostat), the general government deficit in Poland is forecast to reach 5,1 % of GDP in 2024. The Commission’s 2024 spring forecast indicates a deficit of 5,4 % of GDP in 2024, which is above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP. The increase in the deficit, if compared to 2023, reflects increasing expenditure, in particular growing spending on strengthening defence capacity, including investments in military equipment and infrastructure and current military expenditure, new social benefits, including a raise of the family allowances, a 30 % salary increase for teachers and a 20 % salary increase for public administration officials.
(8) In line with the requirements of Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission also analysed all the relevant factors in its report under that Article. As laid down in Article 2(4), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, whenever the ratio of the government debt to GDP does not exceed the reference value, relevant factors are to be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. Overall, the relevant factors examined in the report under Article 126(3) TFEU present a mixed picture. The consideration of those relevant factors does not alter the conclusion that the deficit criterion in the TFEU is not fulfilled.
(9) In view of the deadline of 20 September 2024 for the submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans, which deadline can be extended in accordance with Article 36(1), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4), indicatively until 15 October 2024, that being the date for submission of the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States, the Council takes note that the next step in the procedure, namely the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU on the correction of the excessive deficit, will coincide with the Commission’s opinions on the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States under Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5). This approach allows ensuring consistency between the budgetary requirements under the excessive deficit procedure and the adjustment path set out in the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. Enabling such consistency while avoiding a surveillance gap under the excessive deficit procedure, requires the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. This timeline should be considered exceptional and as linked to the transition to the new framework, and therefore as not setting a precedent. The Council also takes note that, failing the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan, the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU will consider the reference trajectory transmitted by the Commission to the Member State determined in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/1263,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
From an overall assessment it follows that an excessive deficit exists in Poland due to non-compliance with the deficit criterion.
This Decision shall take effect on the date of its notification.
This Decision is addressed to the Republic of Poland.

Council Decision (EU) 2024/2130 of 26 July 2024 establishing that no effective action has been taken by Romania in response to the Council Recommendation of 18 June 2021

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2130 1.8.2024
(1) Article 126(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits.
(2) The Stability and Growth Pact is a set of rules based on the objective of pursuing sound government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable growth conducive to employment creation. The Stability and Growth Pact includes Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97(1)on the excessive deficit procedure, which was adopted in order to further the prompt correction of excessive general government deficits.
(3) On 3 April 2020, the Council adopted Decision (EU) 2020/509(2)under Article 126(6) TFEU on the existence of an excessive deficit situation in Romania due to a planned non-compliance in 2019 with the deficit criterion of the TFEU, and issued a Recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit in Romania by 2022 at the latest.
(4) On 18 June 2021, in light of the deep contraction in economic activity linked to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Council adopted a revised Recommendation to Romania under Article 126(7) TFEU, thereby recommending that Romania put an end to the excessive deficit situation by 2024 at the latest. Specifically, the Council recommended that Romania reduce its headline deficit to 8,0 % of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2021, 6,2 % of GDP in 2022, 4,4 % of GDP in 2023 and 2,9 % of GDP in 2024. This was consistent with a nominal growth rate of net primary government expenditure of 3,4 % in 2021, 1,3 % in 2022, 0,9 % in 2023 and 0,0 % in 2024. Such reductions would correspond to an annual structural adjustment of 0,7 % of GDP in 2021, 1,8 % of GDP in 2022, 1,7 % of GDP in 2023 and 1,5 % of GDP in 2024. That Recommendation further stated that Romania should fully implement the measures already adopted for 2021, as well as establishing and taking additional measures necessary to achieve the correction of its excessive deficit by 2024. Any windfall gains were to be used to reduce the general government deficit. In its Recommendation, the Council established a deadline of 15 October 2021 for Romania to take effective action and, in accordance with Article 3(4a) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, to report on the consolidation strategy that was envisaged to achieve the targets. Moreover, it recommended that Romania report on progress made in the implementation of the Recommendation at least every six months until the excessive deficit has been corrected.
(5) On 24 November 2021, the Commission concluded that Romania had taken effective action in response to the Council Recommendation of 18 June 2021 under Article 126(7) TFEU, and considered that no additional steps in the excessive deficit procedure were then necessary. Since then, the Commission has found that Romania complied with that Recommendation, due to the fact that the headline deficit targets for 2021 and 2022 were achieved. Based on budgetary outcome data validated by the Commission (Eurostat), Romania’s general government deficit decreased from 7,2 % of GDP in 2021 to 6,3 % of GDP in 2022. The initial estimate for 2022, which was notified and validated in the context of the excessive deficit procedure notification of spring 2023, was 6,2 % of GDP, in line with the headline deficit target recommended by the Council. The excessive deficit procedure therefore remained in abeyance. However, the structural deficit fell by 1,2 percentage points (pps.) of GDP in 2021 and 0,4 pps. of GDP in 2022, which compares with recommended adjustments of 0,7 pps. and 1,8 pps. of GDP, respectively. The cumulative structural adjustment over 2021-2022 was, therefore, below that which had been recommended. Moreover, net primary expenditure growth reached 7,4 % in 2021 and 15,0 % in 2022, well above the targets set out in the Council Recommendation of 18 June 2021.
(6) Since the adoption of the Council Recommendation of 18 June 2021, Romania’s economic performance has been broadly in line with the Commission’s forecasts. In 2021-2023, real GDP growth was broadly consistent with projections included in the analysis by the Commission services of the budgetary situation in Romania following the adoption of the Council Recommendation to Romania of 3 April 2020, laid down in a Commission Staff Working Document of 2 June 2021, despite macroeconomic shocks that occurred in the meantime, in particular Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the ensuing energy-supply shock. The 2023 output gap is estimated to have been less negative than had been projected in June 2021. Moreover, growth in government revenue has been much faster than projected, mostly due to high inflation, but also reflecting the impact of a tax-rich real GDP growth composition. Even if GDP growth would likely have been lower with a considerably tighter fiscal policy, overall, macroeconomic developments cannot justify the significantly worse fiscal outcomes relative to the Council Recommendation of 18 June 2021.
(7) A new assessment of the action taken by Romania to correct the excessive deficit by 2024 in response to the Council Recommendation of 18 June 2021 leads to a number of conclusions listed hereafter.
(8) Based on the budgetary outcome data notified by Romania and validated by the Commission (Eurostat), Romania’s general government deficit increased to 6,6 % of GDP in 2023, much higher than the 4,4 % of GDP recommended by the Council and planned by Romania in its 2023 Convergence Programme. The main reason for this deviation was that government spending continued to grow at a very high rate, mostly driven by social transfers, interest payments, expenditure on goods and services, and capital spending. The 2023 headline deficit was also impacted by the statistical recording of payments of public sector wage increases, amounting to 0,5 % of GDP, following court decisions.
(9) In 2023, the fiscal effort was much lower than recommended by the Council. Romania’s structural balance remained broadly unchanged in 2023, deteriorating by 0,1 % of GDP, well below the target of an improvement by 1,7 % of GDP recommended by the Council. Net primary expenditure growth adjusted for fiscal policy measures on the revenue side was much higher than recommended in 2023, at close to 12 %, versus a target of 0,9 % recommended by the Council.
(10) In 2022 and 2023, strong real and nominal GDP growth fuelled a very strong increase in government revenue, of 20,8 % in 2022 and 14,2 % in 2023, much larger than had been envisioned at the time of the Council Recommendation of 18 June 2021. However, in both years most of the windfall gains on the revenue side were used to finance additional spending, instead of reducing the budget deficit.
(11) The Commission spring 2024 forecast projects the general government deficit to increase to 6,9 % of GDP in 2024. The general government debt-to-GDP ratio is set to increase to 50,9 % by the end of 2024, up from 48,8 % in 2023. As in previous years, the forecast increase of the general government deficit in 2024 reflects high growth in current government expenditure. Following a prudent wage policy in recent years, spending on public wages is projected to increase strongly at a double-digit rate (18,7 %) in 2024, reflecting recent discretionary increases in wages in the education, health and defence sectors. The recalculation of pensions in the context of the pension reform will have a short-term cost in 2024 and 2025 of 1,0 % of GDP over 2024 and 2025.
(12) In 2024, government revenue growth is expected to outpace nominal GDP growth, reflecting efforts to improve tax collection through digitalisation of the tax system and the impact of a package of revenue-increasing measures adopted in autumn 2023, which is expected to boost government revenue by around 1 % of GDP. The package mostly consists of an increase in corporate taxation, in particular for micro-enterprises, an increase in taxation of individuals, coming from a partial removal of preferential tax facilities in the construction and agriculture sectors, the elimination of reduced value-added tax rates for selected goods and services, an increase in excise duties, and a special tax on the turnover of banks and multinational corporations.
(13) Therefore, the response of Romania to the Council Recommendation of 18 June 2021 has been insufficient. Romania did not reach the headline deficit target in 2023, and is not forecast to put an end to its excessive deficit by 2024. The fiscal effort fell significantly short of what was recommended by the Council, and net primary expenditure grew much faster than recommended,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 126(8) thereof,
Having regard to the recommendation from the European Commission,
Whereas:
(1) Article 126(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits.
(2) The Stability and Growth Pact is a set of rules based on the objective of pursuing sound government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable growth conducive to employment creation. The Stability and Growth Pact includes Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 (1) on the excessive deficit procedure, which was adopted in order to further the prompt correction of excessive general government deficits.
(3) On 3 April 2020, the Council adopted Decision (EU) 2020/509 (2) under Article 126(6) TFEU on the existence of an excessive deficit situation in Romania due to a planned non-compliance in 2019 with the deficit criterion of the TFEU, and issued a Recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit in Romania by 2022 at the latest.
(4) On 18 June 2021, in light of the deep contraction in economic activity linked to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Council adopted a revised Recommendation to Romania under Article 126(7) TFEU, thereby recommending that Romania put an end to the excessive deficit situation by 2024 at the latest. Specifically, the Council recommended that Romania reduce its headline deficit to 8,0 % of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2021, 6,2 % of GDP in 2022, 4,4 % of GDP in 2023 and 2,9 % of GDP in 2024. This was consistent with a nominal growth rate of net primary government expenditure of 3,4 % in 2021, 1,3 % in 2022, 0,9 % in 2023 and 0,0 % in 2024. Such reductions would correspond to an annual structural adjustment of 0,7 % of GDP in 2021, 1,8 % of GDP in 2022, 1,7 % of GDP in 2023 and 1,5 % of GDP in 2024. That Recommendation further stated that Romania should fully implement the measures already adopted for 2021, as well as establishing and taking additional measures necessary to achieve the correction of its excessive deficit by 2024. Any windfall gains were to be used to reduce the general government deficit. In its Recommendation, the Council established a deadline of 15 October 2021 for Romania to take effective action and, in accordance with Article 3(4a) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, to report on the consolidation strategy that was envisaged to achieve the targets. Moreover, it recommended that Romania report on progress made in the implementation of the Recommendation at least every six months until the excessive deficit has been corrected.
(5) On 24 November 2021, the Commission concluded that Romania had taken effective action in response to the Council Recommendation of 18 June 2021 under Article 126(7) TFEU, and considered that no additional steps in the excessive deficit procedure were then necessary. Since then, the Commission has found that Romania complied with that Recommendation, due to the fact that the headline deficit targets for 2021 and 2022 were achieved. Based on budgetary outcome data validated by the Commission (Eurostat), Romania’s general government deficit decreased from 7,2 % of GDP in 2021 to 6,3 % of GDP in 2022. The initial estimate for 2022, which was notified and validated in the context of the excessive deficit procedure notification of spring 2023, was 6,2 % of GDP, in line with the headline deficit target recommended by the Council. The excessive deficit procedure therefore remained in abeyance. However, the structural deficit fell by 1,2 percentage points (pps.) of GDP in 2021 and 0,4 pps. of GDP in 2022, which compares with recommended adjustments of 0,7 pps. and 1,8 pps. of GDP, respectively. The cumulative structural adjustment over 2021-2022 was, therefore, below that which had been recommended. Moreover, net primary expenditure growth reached 7,4 % in 2021 and 15,0 % in 2022, well above the targets set out in the Council Recommendation of 18 June 2021.
(6) Since the adoption of the Council Recommendation of 18 June 2021, Romania’s economic performance has been broadly in line with the Commission’s forecasts. In 2021-2023, real GDP growth was broadly consistent with projections included in the analysis by the Commission services of the budgetary situation in Romania following the adoption of the Council Recommendation to Romania of 3 April 2020, laid down in a Commission Staff Working Document of 2 June 2021, despite macroeconomic shocks that occurred in the meantime, in particular Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the ensuing energy-supply shock. The 2023 output gap is estimated to have been less negative than had been projected in June 2021. Moreover, growth in government revenue has been much faster than projected, mostly due to high inflation, but also reflecting the impact of a tax-rich real GDP growth composition. Even if GDP growth would likely have been lower with a considerably tighter fiscal policy, overall, macroeconomic developments cannot justify the significantly worse fiscal outcomes relative to the Council Recommendation of 18 June 2021.
(7) A new assessment of the action taken by Romania to correct the excessive deficit by 2024 in response to the Council Recommendation of 18 June 2021 leads to a number of conclusions listed hereafter.
(8) Based on the budgetary outcome data notified by Romania and validated by the Commission (Eurostat), Romania’s general government deficit increased to 6,6 % of GDP in 2023, much higher than the 4,4 % of GDP recommended by the Council and planned by Romania in its 2023 Convergence Programme. The main reason for this deviation was that government spending continued to grow at a very high rate, mostly driven by social transfers, interest payments, expenditure on goods and services, and capital spending. The 2023 headline deficit was also impacted by the statistical recording of payments of public sector wage increases, amounting to 0,5 % of GDP, following court decisions.
(9) In 2023, the fiscal effort was much lower than recommended by the Council. Romania’s structural balance remained broadly unchanged in 2023, deteriorating by 0,1 % of GDP, well below the target of an improvement by 1,7 % of GDP recommended by the Council. Net primary expenditure growth adjusted for fiscal policy measures on the revenue side was much higher than recommended in 2023, at close to 12 %, versus a target of 0,9 % recommended by the Council.
(10) In 2022 and 2023, strong real and nominal GDP growth fuelled a very strong increase in government revenue, of 20,8 % in 2022 and 14,2 % in 2023, much larger than had been envisioned at the time of the Council Recommendation of 18 June 2021. However, in both years most of the windfall gains on the revenue side were used to finance additional spending, instead of reducing the budget deficit.
(11) The Commission spring 2024 forecast projects the general government deficit to increase to 6,9 % of GDP in 2024. The general government debt-to-GDP ratio is set to increase to 50,9 % by the end of 2024, up from 48,8 % in 2023. As in previous years, the forecast increase of the general government deficit in 2024 reflects high growth in current government expenditure. Following a prudent wage policy in recent years, spending on public wages is projected to increase strongly at a double-digit rate (18,7 %) in 2024, reflecting recent discretionary increases in wages in the education, health and defence sectors. The recalculation of pensions in the context of the pension reform will have a short-term cost in 2024 and 2025 of 1,0 % of GDP over 2024 and 2025.
(12) In 2024, government revenue growth is expected to outpace nominal GDP growth, reflecting efforts to improve tax collection through digitalisation of the tax system and the impact of a package of revenue-increasing measures adopted in autumn 2023, which is expected to boost government revenue by around 1 % of GDP. The package mostly consists of an increase in corporate taxation, in particular for micro-enterprises, an increase in taxation of individuals, coming from a partial removal of preferential tax facilities in the construction and agriculture sectors, the elimination of reduced value-added tax rates for selected goods and services, an increase in excise duties, and a special tax on the turnover of banks and multinational corporations.
(13) Therefore, the response of Romania to the Council Recommendation of 18 June 2021 has been insufficient. Romania did not reach the headline deficit target in 2023, and is not forecast to put an end to its excessive deficit by 2024. The fiscal effort fell significantly short of what was recommended by the Council, and net primary expenditure grew much faster than recommended,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Romania has not taken effective action in response to the Council Recommendation of 18 June 2021.
This Decision is addressed to Romania.

Council Decision (EU) 2024/2129 of 26 July 2024 on the existence of an excessive deficit in Slovakia

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2129 1.8.2024
(1) Article 126(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits.
(2) The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong, sustainable and inclusive growth underpinned by financial stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union’s objectives for sustainable growth and employment.
(3) The excessive deficit procedure under Article 126 TFEU, as clarified by Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97(1), which is part of the SGP, provides for a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. Protocol No 12 on the excessive deficit procedure, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the TFEU, sets out further provisions relating to the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009(2)lays down detailed rules and definitions for the application of those provisions. The Union’s reformed economic governance framework, which came into force on 30 April 2024, includes Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1264(3), which amended Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. This Decision concerns only the excess of the ratio of the government deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) with respect to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP, in line with existing legal provisions.
(4) Article 126(5) TFEU provides that, if the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur, it is to address an opinion to the Member State concerned and inform the Council accordingly. Having taken into account its report of 19 June 2024 adopted pursuant to Article 126(3) TFEU, and having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee adopted pursuant to Article 126(4) TFEU, the Commission concluded that an excessive deficit exists in Slovakia. On 8 July 2024, the Commission therefore addressed such an opinion to Slovakia and informed the Council accordingly.
(5) Article 126(6) TFEU provides that the Council is to consider any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make before deciding after an overall assessment whether an excessive deficit exists. In the case of Slovakia, the overall assessment leads to the conclusions set out below.
(6) According to the data validated by the Commission (Eurostat) on 22 April 2024, the general government deficit in Slovakia reached 4,9 % of GDP in 2023, and general government debt stood at 56,0 % of GDP. The Commission in its report under Article 126(3) TFEU considered that the excess of the deficit over the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP in 2023 is not exceptional, as it results neither from an unusual event nor from a severe economic downturn in the sense of the SGP. The excess over the TFEU reference value is also not temporary, based on the Commission’s 2024 spring forecast, which projected the general government deficit to remain above 3 % of GDP in 2024 and 2025. In sum, the deficit in 2023 was above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP. The excess is neither considered to be exceptional as defined by the TFEU and the SGP, nor is it considered to be temporary. Hence, the deficit criterion as defined by the TFEU and Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 is prima facie not fulfilled.
(7) According to the Slovak 2024 Stability Programme, the general government deficit is forecast to reach 5,9 % of GDP in 2024. This is confirmed by the Commission’s 2024 spring forecast, which also indicates a deficit of 5,9 % of GDP, above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP. The increase in the deficit, if compared to 2023, reflects a continuation of existing energy price support measures and new measures increasing expenditure such as a permanent increase in the 13th pension payment, increase in spending on healthcare, the creation of the Ministry of Tourism and Sports, an amendment to the Education Act introducing a legal right to admission to kindergarten for children older than three years and improving the rights of children with special education needs, and the introduction of performance-based contracts at public universities.
(8) In line with the requirements of Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission also analysed all the relevant factors in its report under that Article. As laid down in Article 2(4), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, whenever the ratio of the government debt to GDP does not exceed the reference value, relevant factors are to be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. Overall, the relevant factors examined in the report under Article 126(3) TFEU are aggravating. The consideration of those relevant factors does not alter the conclusion that the deficit criterion in the TFEU is not fulfilled.
(9) In view of the deadline of 20 September 2024 for the submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans, which deadline can be extended in accordance with Article 36(1), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council(4), indicatively until 15 October 2024, that being the date for submission of the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States, the Council takes note that the next step in the procedure, namely the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU on the correction of the excessive deficit, will coincide with the Commission’s opinions on the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States under Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5). This approach allows ensuring consistency between the budgetary requirements under the excessive deficit procedure and the adjustment path set out in the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. Enabling such consistency while avoiding a surveillance gap under the excessive deficit procedure, requires the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. This timeline should be considered exceptional and as linked to the transition to the new framework, and therefore as not setting a precedent. The Council also takes note that, failing the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan, the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU will consider the reference trajectory transmitted by the Commission to the Member State determined in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/1263,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 126(6) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Having regard to the observations made by Slovakia,
Whereas:
(1) Article 126(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits.
(2) The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong, sustainable and inclusive growth underpinned by financial stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union’s objectives for sustainable growth and employment.
(3) The excessive deficit procedure under Article 126 TFEU, as clarified by Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 (1), which is part of the SGP, provides for a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. Protocol No 12 on the excessive deficit procedure, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the TFEU, sets out further provisions relating to the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 (2) lays down detailed rules and definitions for the application of those provisions. The Union’s reformed economic governance framework, which came into force on 30 April 2024, includes Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1264 (3), which amended Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. This Decision concerns only the excess of the ratio of the government deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) with respect to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP, in line with existing legal provisions.
(4) Article 126(5) TFEU provides that, if the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur, it is to address an opinion to the Member State concerned and inform the Council accordingly. Having taken into account its report of 19 June 2024 adopted pursuant to Article 126(3) TFEU, and having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee adopted pursuant to Article 126(4) TFEU, the Commission concluded that an excessive deficit exists in Slovakia. On 8 July 2024, the Commission therefore addressed such an opinion to Slovakia and informed the Council accordingly.
(5) Article 126(6) TFEU provides that the Council is to consider any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make before deciding after an overall assessment whether an excessive deficit exists. In the case of Slovakia, the overall assessment leads to the conclusions set out below.
(6) According to the data validated by the Commission (Eurostat) on 22 April 2024, the general government deficit in Slovakia reached 4,9 % of GDP in 2023, and general government debt stood at 56,0 % of GDP. The Commission in its report under Article 126(3) TFEU considered that the excess of the deficit over the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP in 2023 is not exceptional, as it results neither from an unusual event nor from a severe economic downturn in the sense of the SGP. The excess over the TFEU reference value is also not temporary, based on the Commission’s 2024 spring forecast, which projected the general government deficit to remain above 3 % of GDP in 2024 and 2025. In sum, the deficit in 2023 was above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP. The excess is neither considered to be exceptional as defined by the TFEU and the SGP, nor is it considered to be temporary. Hence, the deficit criterion as defined by the TFEU and Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 is prima facie not fulfilled.
(7) According to the Slovak 2024 Stability Programme, the general government deficit is forecast to reach 5,9 % of GDP in 2024. This is confirmed by the Commission’s 2024 spring forecast, which also indicates a deficit of 5,9 % of GDP, above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP. The increase in the deficit, if compared to 2023, reflects a continuation of existing energy price support measures and new measures increasing expenditure such as a permanent increase in the 13th pension payment, increase in spending on healthcare, the creation of the Ministry of Tourism and Sports, an amendment to the Education Act introducing a legal right to admission to kindergarten for children older than three years and improving the rights of children with special education needs, and the introduction of performance-based contracts at public universities.
(8) In line with the requirements of Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission also analysed all the relevant factors in its report under that Article. As laid down in Article 2(4), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, whenever the ratio of the government debt to GDP does not exceed the reference value, relevant factors are to be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. Overall, the relevant factors examined in the report under Article 126(3) TFEU are aggravating. The consideration of those relevant factors does not alter the conclusion that the deficit criterion in the TFEU is not fulfilled.
(9) In view of the deadline of 20 September 2024 for the submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans, which deadline can be extended in accordance with Article 36(1), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4), indicatively until 15 October 2024, that being the date for submission of the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States, the Council takes note that the next step in the procedure, namely the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU on the correction of the excessive deficit, will coincide with the Commission’s opinions on the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States under Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5). This approach allows ensuring consistency between the budgetary requirements under the excessive deficit procedure and the adjustment path set out in the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. Enabling such consistency while avoiding a surveillance gap under the excessive deficit procedure, requires the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. This timeline should be considered exceptional and as linked to the transition to the new framework, and therefore as not setting a precedent. The Council also takes note that, failing the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan, the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU will consider the reference trajectory transmitted by the Commission to the Member State determined in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/1263,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
From an overall assessment it follows that an excessive deficit exists in Slovakia due to non-compliance with the deficit criterion.
This Decision shall take effect on the date of its notification.
This Decision is addressed to the Slovak Republic.

Council Decision (EU) 2024/2128 of 26 July 2024 on the existence of an excessive deficit in Malta

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2128 1.8.2024
(1) Article 126(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits.
(2) The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong, sustainable and inclusive growth underpinned by financial stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union’s objectives for sustainable growth and employment.
(3) The excessive deficit procedure under Article 126 TFEU, as clarified by Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97(1), which is part of the SGP, provides for a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. Protocol No 12 on the excessive deficit procedure, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the TFEU, sets out further provisions relating to the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009(2)lays down detailed rules and definitions for the application of those provisions. The Union’s reformed economic governance framework, which came into force on 30 April 2024, includes Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1264(3), which amended Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. This Decision concerns only the excess of the ratio of the government deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) with respect to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP, in line with existing legal provisions.
(4) Article 126(5) TFEU provides that, if the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur, it is to address an opinion to the Member State concerned and inform the Council accordingly. Having taken into account its report of 19 June 2024 adopted pursuant to Article 126(3) TFEU, and having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee adopted pursuant to Article 126(4) TFEU, the Commission concluded that an excessive deficit exists in Malta. On 8 July 2024, the Commission therefore addressed such an opinion to Malta and informed the Council accordingly.
(5) Article 126(6) TFEU provides that the Council is to consider any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make before deciding after an overall assessment whether an excessive deficit exists. In the case of Malta, the overall assessment leads to the conclusions set out below.
(6) According to the data validated by the Commission (Eurostat) on 22 April 2024, the general government deficit in Malta reached 4,9 % of GDP in 2023, and general government debt stood at 50,4 % of GDP. The Commission, in its report under Article 126(3) TFEU, considered that the excess of the deficit over the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP in 2023 is not exceptional, as it results neither from an unusual event nor from a severe economic downturn in the sense of the SGP. The excess over the TFEU reference value is also not temporary, based on the Commission’s 2024 spring forecast, which projected the general government deficit to remain above 3 % of GDP in 2024 and 2025. In sum, the deficit in 2023 was above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP. The excess is neither considered to be exceptional as defined by the TFEU and the SGP, nor is it considered to be temporary. Hence, the deficit criterion as defined by the TFEU and Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 is prima facie not fulfilled.
(7) Based on data notified to the Commission (Eurostat), the general government deficit in Malta is planned to reach 4,5 % of GDP in 2024. The Commission’s 2024 spring forecast indicates a deficit of 4,3 % of GDP in 2024, which is above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP.
(8) In line with the requirements of Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission also analysed all the relevant factors in its report under that Article. As laid down in Article 2(4), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, whenever the ratio of the government debt to GDP does not exceed the reference value, relevant factors are to be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. Overall, the relevant factors examined in the report under Article 126(3) TFEU present a mixed picture. The consideration of those relevant factors does not alter the conclusion that the deficit criterion in the TFEU is not fulfilled.
(9) In view of the deadline of 20 September 2024 for the submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans, which deadline can be extended in accordance with Article 36(1), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council(4), indicatively until 15 October 2024, that being the date for submission of the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States, the Council takes note that the next step in the procedure, namely the Commission recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU on the correction of the excessive deficit, will coincide with the Commission’s opinions on the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States under Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5). This approach allows ensuring consistency between the budgetary requirements under the excessive deficit procedure and the adjustment path set out in the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. Enabling such consistency, while avoiding a surveillance gap under the excessive deficit procedure, requires the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. This timeline should be considered exceptional and as linked to the transition to the new framework, and therefore as not setting a precedent. The Council also takes note that, failing the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan, the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU will consider the reference trajectory transmitted by the Commission to the Member State determined in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/1263,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 126(6) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Having regard to the observations made by Malta,
Whereas:
(1) Article 126(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits.
(2) The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong, sustainable and inclusive growth underpinned by financial stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union’s objectives for sustainable growth and employment.
(3) The excessive deficit procedure under Article 126 TFEU, as clarified by Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 (1), which is part of the SGP, provides for a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. Protocol No 12 on the excessive deficit procedure, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the TFEU, sets out further provisions relating to the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 (2) lays down detailed rules and definitions for the application of those provisions. The Union’s reformed economic governance framework, which came into force on 30 April 2024, includes Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1264 (3), which amended Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. This Decision concerns only the excess of the ratio of the government deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) with respect to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP, in line with existing legal provisions.
(4) Article 126(5) TFEU provides that, if the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur, it is to address an opinion to the Member State concerned and inform the Council accordingly. Having taken into account its report of 19 June 2024 adopted pursuant to Article 126(3) TFEU, and having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee adopted pursuant to Article 126(4) TFEU, the Commission concluded that an excessive deficit exists in Malta. On 8 July 2024, the Commission therefore addressed such an opinion to Malta and informed the Council accordingly.
(5) Article 126(6) TFEU provides that the Council is to consider any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make before deciding after an overall assessment whether an excessive deficit exists. In the case of Malta, the overall assessment leads to the conclusions set out below.
(6) According to the data validated by the Commission (Eurostat) on 22 April 2024, the general government deficit in Malta reached 4,9 % of GDP in 2023, and general government debt stood at 50,4 % of GDP. The Commission, in its report under Article 126(3) TFEU, considered that the excess of the deficit over the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP in 2023 is not exceptional, as it results neither from an unusual event nor from a severe economic downturn in the sense of the SGP. The excess over the TFEU reference value is also not temporary, based on the Commission’s 2024 spring forecast, which projected the general government deficit to remain above 3 % of GDP in 2024 and 2025. In sum, the deficit in 2023 was above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP. The excess is neither considered to be exceptional as defined by the TFEU and the SGP, nor is it considered to be temporary. Hence, the deficit criterion as defined by the TFEU and Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 is prima facie not fulfilled.
(7) Based on data notified to the Commission (Eurostat), the general government deficit in Malta is planned to reach 4,5 % of GDP in 2024. The Commission’s 2024 spring forecast indicates a deficit of 4,3 % of GDP in 2024, which is above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP.
(8) In line with the requirements of Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission also analysed all the relevant factors in its report under that Article. As laid down in Article 2(4), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, whenever the ratio of the government debt to GDP does not exceed the reference value, relevant factors are to be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. Overall, the relevant factors examined in the report under Article 126(3) TFEU present a mixed picture. The consideration of those relevant factors does not alter the conclusion that the deficit criterion in the TFEU is not fulfilled.
(9) In view of the deadline of 20 September 2024 for the submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans, which deadline can be extended in accordance with Article 36(1), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4), indicatively until 15 October 2024, that being the date for submission of the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States, the Council takes note that the next step in the procedure, namely the Commission recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU on the correction of the excessive deficit, will coincide with the Commission’s opinions on the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States under Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5). This approach allows ensuring consistency between the budgetary requirements under the excessive deficit procedure and the adjustment path set out in the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. Enabling such consistency, while avoiding a surveillance gap under the excessive deficit procedure, requires the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. This timeline should be considered exceptional and as linked to the transition to the new framework, and therefore as not setting a precedent. The Council also takes note that, failing the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan, the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU will consider the reference trajectory transmitted by the Commission to the Member State determined in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/1263,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
From an overall assessment it follows that an excessive deficit exists in Malta due to non-compliance with the deficit criterion.
This Decision shall take effect on the date of its notification.
This Decision is addressed to the Republic of Malta.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/2127 of 24 July 2024 on the request for registration, pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/788 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of the European citizens’ initiative entitled Stop Fake Food: Origin on Label (notified under document C(2024) 5001)

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2127 2.8.2024
(1) A request for registration of a European citizens’ initiative entitled ‘Stop Fake Food: Origin on Label’ was submitted to the Commission on 14 June 2024.
(2) The aims of the initiative as expressed by the organisers are to call for: (i) ‘European consumers to have access to transparent information about the food they buy’; (ii) the respect of the expectations of European consumers ‘in terms of high quality and sustainability standards’ of food; (iii) ‘the origin of all products entering the common market to be clearly and explicitly indicated’; and (iv) all products entering the common market to respect the same ‘environmental, health and labour standards applicable in the internal market, in order to protect consumer health and the planet’.
(3) An annex to the initiative provides further details on the subject matter, objectives and background to the initiative. It refers to criteria related to the acquisition of origin and to the place of origin in Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(2)and Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council(3). The organisers consider it necessary to comply ‘with the principle of reciprocity, to prohibit imports of food processed using substances and methods banned in Europe’ and to increase ‘border checks on food entering at European and national borders’. The organisers also state that the indication of origin requirement should be extended to all food products ‘in order to prevent fraud, protect public health and guarantee consumers’ right to information.’
(4) As regards the aims of the initiative, the Commission could submit a proposal for a legal act to ensure that European consumers have access to transparent information about the food that they purchase and which satisfies their expectations in terms of high quality and sustainability standards on the basis of Articles 114 and 169 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
(5) The Commission could also submit, based on Articles 114 and 207 TFEU, a proposal for a legal act to ensure explicit and clear indications of origin for all products entering the internal market, and to require them to respect the same environmental, health and labour standards that apply within the internal market to protect the health of consumers and the planet.
(6) For those reasons, the Commission considers that none of the parts of the initiative manifestly falls outside the framework of the Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties.
(7) That conclusion does not affect the assessment of whether the concrete substantive conditions required for the Commission to act, including compliance with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity and compatibility with fundamental rights, would be met in this case.
(8) The group of organisers has provided appropriate evidence that it fulfils the requirements laid down in Article 5(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/788 and has designated the contact persons in accordance with Article 5(3), first subparagraph, of that Regulation.
(9) The initiative is not manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexatious, nor is it manifestly contrary to the values of the Union as set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union or to the rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
(10) The initiative entitled ‘Stop Fake Food: Origin on Label’ should therefore be registered.
(11) The conclusion that the conditions for registration under Article 6(3) of Regulation (EU) 2019/788 are fulfilled does not imply that the Commission in any way confirms the factual correctness of the content of the initiative, which is the sole responsibility of the group of organisers of the initiative. The content of the initiative only expresses the views of the group of organisers, and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Commission,
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/788 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on the European citizens’ initiative (1), and in particular Article 6(2) and (3) thereof,
Whereas:
(1) A request for registration of a European citizens’ initiative entitled ‘Stop Fake Food: Origin on Label’ was submitted to the Commission on 14 June 2024.
(2) The aims of the initiative as expressed by the organisers are to call for: (i) ‘European consumers to have access to transparent information about the food they buy’; (ii) the respect of the expectations of European consumers ‘in terms of high quality and sustainability standards’ of food; (iii) ‘the origin of all products entering the common market to be clearly and explicitly indicated’; and (iv) all products entering the common market to respect the same ‘environmental, health and labour standards applicable in the internal market, in order to protect consumer health and the planet’.
(3) An annex to the initiative provides further details on the subject matter, objectives and background to the initiative. It refers to criteria related to the acquisition of origin and to the place of origin in Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) and Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3). The organisers consider it necessary to comply ‘with the principle of reciprocity, to prohibit imports of food processed using substances and methods banned in Europe’ and to increase ‘border checks on food entering at European and national borders’. The organisers also state that the indication of origin requirement should be extended to all food products ‘in order to prevent fraud, protect public health and guarantee consumers’ right to information.’
(4) As regards the aims of the initiative, the Commission could submit a proposal for a legal act to ensure that European consumers have access to transparent information about the food that they purchase and which satisfies their expectations in terms of high quality and sustainability standards on the basis of Articles 114 and 169 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
(5) The Commission could also submit, based on Articles 114 and 207 TFEU, a proposal for a legal act to ensure explicit and clear indications of origin for all products entering the internal market, and to require them to respect the same environmental, health and labour standards that apply within the internal market to protect the health of consumers and the planet.
(6) For those reasons, the Commission considers that none of the parts of the initiative manifestly falls outside the framework of the Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties.
(7) That conclusion does not affect the assessment of whether the concrete substantive conditions required for the Commission to act, including compliance with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity and compatibility with fundamental rights, would be met in this case.
(8) The group of organisers has provided appropriate evidence that it fulfils the requirements laid down in Article 5(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/788 and has designated the contact persons in accordance with Article 5(3), first subparagraph, of that Regulation.
(9) The initiative is not manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexatious, nor is it manifestly contrary to the values of the Union as set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union or to the rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
(10) The initiative entitled ‘Stop Fake Food: Origin on Label’ should therefore be registered.
(11) The conclusion that the conditions for registration under Article 6(3) of Regulation (EU) 2019/788 are fulfilled does not imply that the Commission in any way confirms the factual correctness of the content of the initiative, which is the sole responsibility of the group of organisers of the initiative. The content of the initiative only expresses the views of the group of organisers, and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Commission,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The European citizens’ initiative entitled ‘Stop Fake Food: Origin on Label’ shall be registered.
This Decision is addressed to the group of organisers of the citizens’ initiative entitled ‘Stop Fake Food: Origin on Label’, represented by Ettore PRANDINI and Paolo DI STEFANO acting as contact persons.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/2126 of 24 July 2024 on the request for registration, pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/788 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of the European citizens’ initiative entitled Stop Cruelty Stop Slaughter (notified under document C(2024) 5280)

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2126 2.8.2024
(1) A request for registration of a European citizens’ initiative entitled ‘Stop Cruelty Stop Slaughter’ was submitted to the Commission on 5 June 2024.
(2) The aim of the initiative as expressed by the organisers is divided into two objectives calling for: (i) ‘incentives for the production of plant proteins, including plant-based milk and egg substitutes, and for the production of cultivated meat’; and (ii) ‘plans to gradually reduce the number of farm animals at a rate of 50 % of the number of farm animals each year, and to progressively close all animal farms’.
(3) An annex to the initiative provides further details on the subject matter, objectives and background to the initiative. It states that factory farming and slaughterhouses ‘pose a constant threat to public health’ and spread ‘new pandemics and health and hygiene problems’. The organisers consider that ‘[c]losing these places down and using EU funding to incentivise the conversion of existing animal husbandry activities into activities involving plant proteins or cultivated proteins’ would be ‘a valuable tool to prevent new diseases’. The annex also refers to the need ‘for research into increasingly “clean” and “ethical” production of cultivated meat, thereby improving animal welfare and helping to protect the environment and public health’. An additional document providing the same information as the annex has also been submitted by the group of organisers as part of their registration request.
(4) As regards the first objective of the initiative, the Commission could submit a proposal establishing incentives for the production of plant proteins and of cultivated meat on the basis of Article 43(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), as long as such incentives cover products included in Annex I TFEU. The Commission could also submit such a proposal based on Article 114 TFEU, concerning other types of incentives, going beyond agricultural subsidies, insofar as said incentives would aim at improving the functioning of the internal market.
(5) As regards the second objective of the initiative, the Commission could submit a proposal including measures to incentivise a gradual reduction in the number of farm animals, based on Article 43(2) TFEU. The Commission could also submit such a proposal based on Article 168(4) TFEU, provided that the plans would consist in measures in the veterinary and phytosanitary fields that have as their direct objective the protection of public health.
(6) For those reasons, the Commission considers that none of the parts of the initiative manifestly falls outside the framework of the Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties.
(7) That conclusion does not affect the assessment of whether the concrete substantive conditions required for the Commission to act, including compliance with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity and compatibility with fundamental rights, would be met in this case.
(8) The group of organisers has provided appropriate evidence that it fulfils the requirements laid down in Article 5(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/788 and has designated the contact persons in accordance with Article 5(3), first subparagraph, of that Regulation.
(9) The initiative is not manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexatious, nor is it manifestly contrary to the values of the Union as set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union or to the rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
(10) The initiative entitled ‘Stop Cruelty Stop Slaughter’ should therefore be registered.
(11) The conclusion that the conditions for registration under Article 6(3) of Regulation (EU) 2019/788 are fulfilled does not imply that the Commission in any way confirms the factual correctness of the content of the initiative, which is the sole responsibility of the group of organisers of the initiative. The content of the initiative only expresses the views of the group of organisers, and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Commission,
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/788 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on the European citizens’ initiative (1), and in particular Article 6(2) and (3) thereof,
Whereas:
(1) A request for registration of a European citizens’ initiative entitled ‘Stop Cruelty Stop Slaughter’ was submitted to the Commission on 5 June 2024.
(2) The aim of the initiative as expressed by the organisers is divided into two objectives calling for: (i) ‘incentives for the production of plant proteins, including plant-based milk and egg substitutes, and for the production of cultivated meat’; and (ii) ‘plans to gradually reduce the number of farm animals at a rate of 50 % of the number of farm animals each year, and to progressively close all animal farms’.
(3) An annex to the initiative provides further details on the subject matter, objectives and background to the initiative. It states that factory farming and slaughterhouses ‘pose a constant threat to public health’ and spread ‘new pandemics and health and hygiene problems’. The organisers consider that ‘[c]losing these places down and using EU funding to incentivise the conversion of existing animal husbandry activities into activities involving plant proteins or cultivated proteins’ would be ‘a valuable tool to prevent new diseases’. The annex also refers to the need ‘for research into increasingly “clean” and “ethical” production of cultivated meat, thereby improving animal welfare and helping to protect the environment and public health’. An additional document providing the same information as the annex has also been submitted by the group of organisers as part of their registration request.
(4) As regards the first objective of the initiative, the Commission could submit a proposal establishing incentives for the production of plant proteins and of cultivated meat on the basis of Article 43(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), as long as such incentives cover products included in Annex I TFEU. The Commission could also submit such a proposal based on Article 114 TFEU, concerning other types of incentives, going beyond agricultural subsidies, insofar as said incentives would aim at improving the functioning of the internal market.
(5) As regards the second objective of the initiative, the Commission could submit a proposal including measures to incentivise a gradual reduction in the number of farm animals, based on Article 43(2) TFEU. The Commission could also submit such a proposal based on Article 168(4) TFEU, provided that the plans would consist in measures in the veterinary and phytosanitary fields that have as their direct objective the protection of public health.
(6) For those reasons, the Commission considers that none of the parts of the initiative manifestly falls outside the framework of the Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties.
(7) That conclusion does not affect the assessment of whether the concrete substantive conditions required for the Commission to act, including compliance with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity and compatibility with fundamental rights, would be met in this case.
(8) The group of organisers has provided appropriate evidence that it fulfils the requirements laid down in Article 5(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/788 and has designated the contact persons in accordance with Article 5(3), first subparagraph, of that Regulation.
(9) The initiative is not manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexatious, nor is it manifestly contrary to the values of the Union as set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union or to the rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
(10) The initiative entitled ‘Stop Cruelty Stop Slaughter’ should therefore be registered.
(11) The conclusion that the conditions for registration under Article 6(3) of Regulation (EU) 2019/788 are fulfilled does not imply that the Commission in any way confirms the factual correctness of the content of the initiative, which is the sole responsibility of the group of organisers of the initiative. The content of the initiative only expresses the views of the group of organisers, and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Commission,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The European citizens’ initiative entitled ‘Stop Cruelty Stop Slaughter’ shall be registered.
This Decision is addressed to the group of organisers of the citizens’ initiative entitled ‘Stop Cruelty Stop Slaughter’, represented by Gabriele BONCI and Zdenek JOUKL acting as contact persons.

Council Decision (EU) 2024/2125 of 26 July 2024 on the existence of an excessive deficit in Belgium

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2125 1.8.2024
(1) Article 126(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits.
(2) The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong, sustainable and inclusive growth underpinned by financial stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union’s objectives for sustainable growth and employment.
(3) The excessive deficit procedure under Article 126 TFEU, as clarified by Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97(1), which is part of the SGP, provides for a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. Protocol No 12 on the excessive deficit procedure, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the TFEU, sets out further provisions relating to the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009(2)lays down detailed rules and definitions for the application of those provisions. The Union’s reformed economic governance framework, which came into force on 30 April 2024, includes Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1264(3), which amended Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. As the Council has not yet set the net expenditure path for Belgium, the Commission is not able to assess compliance with the debt criterion in accordance with the new rules. This Decision therefore concerns only the excess of the ratio of the government deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) with respect to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP, in line with existing legal provisions.
(4) Article 126(5) TFEU provides that, if the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur, it is to address an opinion to the Member State concerned and inform the Council accordingly. Having taken into account its report of 19 June 2024 adopted pursuant to Article 126(3) TFEU, and having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee adopted pursuant to Article 126(4) TFEU, the Commission concluded that an excessive deficit exists in Belgium. On 8 July 2024, the Commission therefore addressed such an opinion to Belgium and informed the Council accordingly.
(5) Article 126(6) TFEU provides that the Council is to consider any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make before deciding after an overall assessment whether an excessive deficit exists. In the case of Belgium, the overall assessment leads to the conclusions set out below.
(6) According to the data validated by the Commission (Eurostat) on 22 April 2024, the general government deficit in Belgium reached 4,4 % of GDP in 2023, and general government debt stood at 105,2 % of GDP. The Commission, in its report under Article 126(3) TFEU, considered that the excess of the deficit over the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP in 2023 is not exceptional, as it results neither from an unusual event nor from a severe economic downturn in the sense of the SGP. The excess over the TFEU reference value is also not temporary, based on the Commission’s 2024 spring forecast, which projected the general government deficit to remain above 3 % of GDP in 2024 and 2025. In sum, the deficit in 2023 was above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP. The excess is neither considered to be exceptional as defined by the TFEU and the SGP, nor is it considered to be temporary. Hence, the deficit criterion as defined by the TFEU and Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 is prima facie not fulfilled.
(7) According to the Belgian 2024 Stability Programme, the general government deficit is planned to reach 4,6 % of GDP in 2024. The Commission’s 2024 spring forecast indicates a deficit of 4,4 % of GDP in 2024, which is above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP.
(8) In line with the requirements of Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission also analysed all the relevant factors in its report under that Article. As laid down in Article 2(4), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, when assessing compliance on the basis of the deficit criterion, if the ratio of the government debt to GDP exceeds the reference value, those relevant factors are to be taken into account in the steps following the report under Article 126(3) TFEU and leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit only if – before these relevant factors are taken into account – the general government deficit remains close to the reference value and its excess over the reference value is temporary. In the case of Belgium, that double condition is not met. Therefore, relevant factors are not taken into account in the steps leading to this Decision.
(9) In view of the deadline of 20 September 2024 for the submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans, which deadline can be extended in accordance with Article 36(1), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council(4), indicatively until 15 October 2024, that being the date for submission of the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States, the Council takes note that the next step in the procedure, namely the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU on the correction of the excessive deficit, will coincide with the Commission’s opinions on the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States under Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5). This approach allows ensuring consistency between the budgetary requirements under the excessive deficit procedure and the adjustment path set out in the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. Enabling such consistency, while avoiding a surveillance gap under the excessive deficit procedure, requires the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. This timeline should be considered exceptional and as linked to the transition to the new framework, and therefore as not setting a precedent. The Council also takes note that, failing the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan, the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU will consider the reference trajectory transmitted by the Commission to the Member State determined in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/1263,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 126(6) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Having regard to the observations made by Belgium,
Whereas:
(1) Article 126(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits.
(2) The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong, sustainable and inclusive growth underpinned by financial stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union’s objectives for sustainable growth and employment.
(3) The excessive deficit procedure under Article 126 TFEU, as clarified by Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 (1), which is part of the SGP, provides for a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. Protocol No 12 on the excessive deficit procedure, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the TFEU, sets out further provisions relating to the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 (2) lays down detailed rules and definitions for the application of those provisions. The Union’s reformed economic governance framework, which came into force on 30 April 2024, includes Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1264 (3), which amended Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. As the Council has not yet set the net expenditure path for Belgium, the Commission is not able to assess compliance with the debt criterion in accordance with the new rules. This Decision therefore concerns only the excess of the ratio of the government deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) with respect to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP, in line with existing legal provisions.
(4) Article 126(5) TFEU provides that, if the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur, it is to address an opinion to the Member State concerned and inform the Council accordingly. Having taken into account its report of 19 June 2024 adopted pursuant to Article 126(3) TFEU, and having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee adopted pursuant to Article 126(4) TFEU, the Commission concluded that an excessive deficit exists in Belgium. On 8 July 2024, the Commission therefore addressed such an opinion to Belgium and informed the Council accordingly.
(5) Article 126(6) TFEU provides that the Council is to consider any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make before deciding after an overall assessment whether an excessive deficit exists. In the case of Belgium, the overall assessment leads to the conclusions set out below.
(6) According to the data validated by the Commission (Eurostat) on 22 April 2024, the general government deficit in Belgium reached 4,4 % of GDP in 2023, and general government debt stood at 105,2 % of GDP. The Commission, in its report under Article 126(3) TFEU, considered that the excess of the deficit over the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP in 2023 is not exceptional, as it results neither from an unusual event nor from a severe economic downturn in the sense of the SGP. The excess over the TFEU reference value is also not temporary, based on the Commission’s 2024 spring forecast, which projected the general government deficit to remain above 3 % of GDP in 2024 and 2025. In sum, the deficit in 2023 was above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP. The excess is neither considered to be exceptional as defined by the TFEU and the SGP, nor is it considered to be temporary. Hence, the deficit criterion as defined by the TFEU and Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 is prima facie not fulfilled.
(7) According to the Belgian 2024 Stability Programme, the general government deficit is planned to reach 4,6 % of GDP in 2024. The Commission’s 2024 spring forecast indicates a deficit of 4,4 % of GDP in 2024, which is above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP.
(8) In line with the requirements of Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission also analysed all the relevant factors in its report under that Article. As laid down in Article 2(4), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, when assessing compliance on the basis of the deficit criterion, if the ratio of the government debt to GDP exceeds the reference value, those relevant factors are to be taken into account in the steps following the report under Article 126(3) TFEU and leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit only if – before these relevant factors are taken into account – the general government deficit remains close to the reference value and its excess over the reference value is temporary. In the case of Belgium, that double condition is not met. Therefore, relevant factors are not taken into account in the steps leading to this Decision.
(9) In view of the deadline of 20 September 2024 for the submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans, which deadline can be extended in accordance with Article 36(1), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4), indicatively until 15 October 2024, that being the date for submission of the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States, the Council takes note that the next step in the procedure, namely the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU on the correction of the excessive deficit, will coincide with the Commission’s opinions on the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States under Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5). This approach allows ensuring consistency between the budgetary requirements under the excessive deficit procedure and the adjustment path set out in the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. Enabling such consistency, while avoiding a surveillance gap under the excessive deficit procedure, requires the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. This timeline should be considered exceptional and as linked to the transition to the new framework, and therefore as not setting a precedent. The Council also takes note that, failing the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan, the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU will consider the reference trajectory transmitted by the Commission to the Member State determined in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/1263,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
From an overall assessment it follows that an excessive deficit exists in Belgium due to non-compliance with the deficit criterion.
This Decision shall take effect on the date of its notification.
This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Belgium.

Council Decision (EU) 2024/2124 of 26 July 2024 on the existence of an excessive deficit in Italy

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2124 1.8.2024
(1) Article 126(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits.
(2) The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong, sustainable and inclusive growth underpinned by financial stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union’s objectives for sustainable growth and employment.
(3) The excessive deficit procedure under Article 126 TFEU, as clarified by Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97(1), which is part of the SGP, provides for a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. Protocol No 12 on the excessive deficit procedure, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the TFEU, sets out further provisions relating to the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009(2)lays down detailed rules and definitions for the application of those provisions. The Union’s reformed economic governance framework, which came into force on 30 April 2024, includes Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1264(3), which amended Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. As the Council has not yet set the net expenditure path for Italy, the Commission is not able to assess compliance with the debt criterion in accordance with the new rules. This Decision therefore concerns only the excess of the ratio of the government deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) with respect to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP, in line with existing legal provisions.
(4) Article 126(5) TFEU provides that, if the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur, it is to address an opinion to the Member State concerned and inform the Council accordingly. Having taken into account its report of 19 June 2024 adopted pursuant to Article 126(3) TFEU, and having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee adopted pursuant to Article 126(4) TFEU, the Commission concluded that an excessive deficit exists in Italy. On 8 July 2024, the Commission therefore addressed such an opinion to Italy and informed the Council accordingly.
(5) Article 126(6) TFEU provides that the Council is to consider any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make before deciding after an overall assessment whether an excessive deficit exists. In the case of Italy, the overall assessment leads to the conclusions set out below.
(6) According to the data validated by the Commission (Eurostat) on 22 April 2024, the general government deficit in Italy reached 7,4 % of GDP in 2023, and general government debt stood at 137,3 % of GDP. The Commission, in its report under Article 126(3) TFEU, considered that the excess of the deficit over the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP in 2023 is not exceptional, as it results neither from an unusual event nor from a severe economic downturn in the sense of the SGP. The excess over the TFEU reference value is also not temporary, based on the Commission’s 2024 spring forecast, which projected the general government deficit to remain above 3 % of GDP in 2024 and 2025. In sum, the deficit in 2023 was above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP. The excess is neither considered to be exceptional as defined by the TFEU and the SGP, nor is it considered to be temporary. Hence, the deficit criterion as defined by the TFEU and Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 is prima facie not fulfilled.
(7) According to the Italian 2024 Stability Programme, the general government deficit is planned to reach 4,3 % of GDP in 2024. The Commission’s 2024 spring forecast indicates a deficit of 4,4 % of GDP in 2024, which is above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP.
(8) In line with the requirements of Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission also analysed all the relevant factors in its report under that Article. As laid down in Article 2(4), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, when assessing compliance on the basis of the deficit criterion, if the ratio of the government debt to GDP exceeds the reference value, those relevant factors are to be taken into account in the steps following the report under Article 126(3) TFEU and leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit only if – before these relevant factors are taken into account – the general government deficit remains close to the reference value and its excess over the reference value is temporary. In the case of Italy, that double condition is not met. Therefore, relevant factors are not taken into account in the steps leading to this Decision.
(9) In view of the deadline of 20 September 2024 for the submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans, which deadline can be extended in accordance with Article 36(1), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council(4), indicatively until 15 October 2024, that being the date for submission of the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States, the Council takes note that the next step in the procedure, namely the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU on the correction of the excessive deficit, will coincide with the Commission’s opinions on the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States under Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5). This approach allows ensuring consistency between the budgetary requirements under the excessive deficit procedure and the adjustment path set out in the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. Enabling such consistency, while avoiding a surveillance gap under the excessive deficit procedure, requires the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. This timeline should be considered exceptional and as linked to the transition to the new framework, and therefore as not setting a precedent. The Council also takes note that, failing the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan, the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU will consider the reference trajectory transmitted by the Commission to the Member State determined in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/1263,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 126(6) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Having regard to the observations made by Italy,
Whereas:
(1) Article 126(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits.
(2) The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong, sustainable and inclusive growth underpinned by financial stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union’s objectives for sustainable growth and employment.
(3) The excessive deficit procedure under Article 126 TFEU, as clarified by Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 (1), which is part of the SGP, provides for a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. Protocol No 12 on the excessive deficit procedure, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the TFEU, sets out further provisions relating to the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 (2) lays down detailed rules and definitions for the application of those provisions. The Union’s reformed economic governance framework, which came into force on 30 April 2024, includes Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1264 (3), which amended Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. As the Council has not yet set the net expenditure path for Italy, the Commission is not able to assess compliance with the debt criterion in accordance with the new rules. This Decision therefore concerns only the excess of the ratio of the government deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) with respect to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP, in line with existing legal provisions.
(4) Article 126(5) TFEU provides that, if the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur, it is to address an opinion to the Member State concerned and inform the Council accordingly. Having taken into account its report of 19 June 2024 adopted pursuant to Article 126(3) TFEU, and having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee adopted pursuant to Article 126(4) TFEU, the Commission concluded that an excessive deficit exists in Italy. On 8 July 2024, the Commission therefore addressed such an opinion to Italy and informed the Council accordingly.
(5) Article 126(6) TFEU provides that the Council is to consider any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make before deciding after an overall assessment whether an excessive deficit exists. In the case of Italy, the overall assessment leads to the conclusions set out below.
(6) According to the data validated by the Commission (Eurostat) on 22 April 2024, the general government deficit in Italy reached 7,4 % of GDP in 2023, and general government debt stood at 137,3 % of GDP. The Commission, in its report under Article 126(3) TFEU, considered that the excess of the deficit over the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP in 2023 is not exceptional, as it results neither from an unusual event nor from a severe economic downturn in the sense of the SGP. The excess over the TFEU reference value is also not temporary, based on the Commission’s 2024 spring forecast, which projected the general government deficit to remain above 3 % of GDP in 2024 and 2025. In sum, the deficit in 2023 was above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP. The excess is neither considered to be exceptional as defined by the TFEU and the SGP, nor is it considered to be temporary. Hence, the deficit criterion as defined by the TFEU and Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 is prima facie not fulfilled.
(7) According to the Italian 2024 Stability Programme, the general government deficit is planned to reach 4,3 % of GDP in 2024. The Commission’s 2024 spring forecast indicates a deficit of 4,4 % of GDP in 2024, which is above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP.
(8) In line with the requirements of Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission also analysed all the relevant factors in its report under that Article. As laid down in Article 2(4), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, when assessing compliance on the basis of the deficit criterion, if the ratio of the government debt to GDP exceeds the reference value, those relevant factors are to be taken into account in the steps following the report under Article 126(3) TFEU and leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit only if – before these relevant factors are taken into account – the general government deficit remains close to the reference value and its excess over the reference value is temporary. In the case of Italy, that double condition is not met. Therefore, relevant factors are not taken into account in the steps leading to this Decision.
(9) In view of the deadline of 20 September 2024 for the submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans, which deadline can be extended in accordance with Article 36(1), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4), indicatively until 15 October 2024, that being the date for submission of the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States, the Council takes note that the next step in the procedure, namely the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU on the correction of the excessive deficit, will coincide with the Commission’s opinions on the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States under Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5). This approach allows ensuring consistency between the budgetary requirements under the excessive deficit procedure and the adjustment path set out in the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. Enabling such consistency, while avoiding a surveillance gap under the excessive deficit procedure, requires the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. This timeline should be considered exceptional and as linked to the transition to the new framework, and therefore as not setting a precedent. The Council also takes note that, failing the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan, the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU will consider the reference trajectory transmitted by the Commission to the Member State determined in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/1263,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
From an overall assessment it follows that an excessive deficit exists in Italy due to non-compliance with the deficit criterion.
This Decision shall take effect on the date of its notification.
This Decision is addressed to the Italian Republic.

Council Decision (EU) 2024/2123 of 26 July 2024 on the existence of an excessive deficit in Hungary

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2123 1.8.2024
(1) Article 126(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits.
(2) The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong, sustainable and inclusive growth underpinned by financial stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union’s objectives for sustainable growth and employment.
(3) The excessive deficit procedure under Article 126 TFEU, as clarified by Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97(1), which is part of the SGP, provides for a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. Protocol No 12 on the excessive deficit procedure, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the TFEU, sets out further provisions relating to the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009(2)lays down detailed rules and definitions for the application of those provisions. The Union’s reformed economic governance framework, which came into force on 30 April 2024, includes Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1264(3), which amended Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. As the Council has not yet set the net expenditure path for Hungary, the Commission is not able to assess compliance with the debt criterion in accordance with the new rules. This Decision therefore concerns only the excess of the ratio of the government deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) with respect to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP, in line with existing legal provisions.
(4) Article 126(5) TFEU provides that, if the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur, it is to address an opinion to the Member State concerned and inform the Council accordingly. Having taken into account its report of 19 June 2024 adopted pursuant to Article 126(3) TFEU and having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee adopted pursuant to Article 126(4) TFEU, the Commission concluded that an excessive deficit exists in Hungary. On 8 July 2024, the Commission therefore addressed such an opinion to Hungary and informed the Council accordingly.
(5) Article 126(6) TFEU provides that the Council is to consider any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make before deciding after an overall assessment whether an excessive deficit exists. In the case of Hungary, the overall assessment leads to the conclusions set out below.
(6) According to the data validated by the Commission (Eurostat) on 22 April 2024, the general government deficit in Hungary reached 6,7 % of GDP in 2023, and general government debt stood at 73,5 % of GDP. The Commission, in its report under Article 126(3) TFEU, considered that the excess of the deficit over the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP in 2023 is not exceptional, as it results neither from an unusual event nor from a severe economic downturn in the sense of the SGP. The excess over the TFEU reference value is also not temporary, based on the Commission’s 2024 spring forecast, which projected the general government deficit to remain above 3 % of GDP in 2024 and 2025. In sum, the deficit in 2023 was above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP. The excess is neither considered to be exceptional as defined by the TFEU and the SGP, nor is it considered to be temporary. Hence, the deficit criterion as defined by the TFEU and Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 is prima facie not fulfilled.
(7) According to the Hungarian 2024 Convergence Programme, the general government deficit is planned to reach 4,5 % of GDP in 2024. The Commission’s 2024 spring forecast indicates a deficit of 5,4 % of GDP in 2024, which is above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP. The difference between the two sets of projections stems primarily from the higher projected baseline growth in expenditure in the Commission’s forecast, in particular as regards public wages, intermediate consumption and current transfers. The Commission also forecasts slightly lower revenue from social contributions and taxes on production and imports in 2024.
(8) In line with the requirements of Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission also analysed all the relevant factors in its report under that Article. As laid down in Article 2(4), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, when assessing compliance on the basis of the deficit criterion, if the ratio of the government debt to GDP exceeds the reference value, those relevant factors are to be taken into account in the steps following the report under Article 126(3) TFEU and leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit only if – before these relevant factors are taken into account – the general government deficit remains close to the reference value and its excess over the reference value is temporary. In the case of Hungary, that double condition is not met. Therefore, relevant factors are not taken into account in the steps leading to this Decision.
(9) In view of the deadline of 20 September 2024 for the submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans, which deadline can be extended in accordance with Article 36(1), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council(4), indicatively until 15 October 2024, that being the date for submission of the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States, the Council takes note that the next step in the procedure, namely the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU on the correction of the excessive deficit, will coincide with the Commission’s opinions on the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States under Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5). This approach allows ensuring consistency between the budgetary requirements under the excessive deficit procedure and the adjustment path set out in the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. Enabling such consistency, while avoiding a surveillance gap under the excessive deficit procedure, requires the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. This timeline should be considered exceptional and as linked to the transition to the new framework, and therefore as not setting a precedent. The Council also takes note that, failing the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan, the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU will consider the reference trajectory transmitted by the Commission to the Member State determined in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/1263,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 126(6) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Having regard to the observations made by Hungary,
Whereas:
(1) Article 126(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits.
(2) The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong, sustainable and inclusive growth underpinned by financial stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union’s objectives for sustainable growth and employment.
(3) The excessive deficit procedure under Article 126 TFEU, as clarified by Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 (1), which is part of the SGP, provides for a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. Protocol No 12 on the excessive deficit procedure, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the TFEU, sets out further provisions relating to the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 (2) lays down detailed rules and definitions for the application of those provisions. The Union’s reformed economic governance framework, which came into force on 30 April 2024, includes Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1264 (3), which amended Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. As the Council has not yet set the net expenditure path for Hungary, the Commission is not able to assess compliance with the debt criterion in accordance with the new rules. This Decision therefore concerns only the excess of the ratio of the government deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) with respect to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP, in line with existing legal provisions.
(4) Article 126(5) TFEU provides that, if the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur, it is to address an opinion to the Member State concerned and inform the Council accordingly. Having taken into account its report of 19 June 2024 adopted pursuant to Article 126(3) TFEU and having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee adopted pursuant to Article 126(4) TFEU, the Commission concluded that an excessive deficit exists in Hungary. On 8 July 2024, the Commission therefore addressed such an opinion to Hungary and informed the Council accordingly.
(5) Article 126(6) TFEU provides that the Council is to consider any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make before deciding after an overall assessment whether an excessive deficit exists. In the case of Hungary, the overall assessment leads to the conclusions set out below.
(6) According to the data validated by the Commission (Eurostat) on 22 April 2024, the general government deficit in Hungary reached 6,7 % of GDP in 2023, and general government debt stood at 73,5 % of GDP. The Commission, in its report under Article 126(3) TFEU, considered that the excess of the deficit over the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP in 2023 is not exceptional, as it results neither from an unusual event nor from a severe economic downturn in the sense of the SGP. The excess over the TFEU reference value is also not temporary, based on the Commission’s 2024 spring forecast, which projected the general government deficit to remain above 3 % of GDP in 2024 and 2025. In sum, the deficit in 2023 was above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP. The excess is neither considered to be exceptional as defined by the TFEU and the SGP, nor is it considered to be temporary. Hence, the deficit criterion as defined by the TFEU and Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 is prima facie not fulfilled.
(7) According to the Hungarian 2024 Convergence Programme, the general government deficit is planned to reach 4,5 % of GDP in 2024. The Commission’s 2024 spring forecast indicates a deficit of 5,4 % of GDP in 2024, which is above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP. The difference between the two sets of projections stems primarily from the higher projected baseline growth in expenditure in the Commission’s forecast, in particular as regards public wages, intermediate consumption and current transfers. The Commission also forecasts slightly lower revenue from social contributions and taxes on production and imports in 2024.
(8) In line with the requirements of Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission also analysed all the relevant factors in its report under that Article. As laid down in Article 2(4), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, when assessing compliance on the basis of the deficit criterion, if the ratio of the government debt to GDP exceeds the reference value, those relevant factors are to be taken into account in the steps following the report under Article 126(3) TFEU and leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit only if – before these relevant factors are taken into account – the general government deficit remains close to the reference value and its excess over the reference value is temporary. In the case of Hungary, that double condition is not met. Therefore, relevant factors are not taken into account in the steps leading to this Decision.
(9) In view of the deadline of 20 September 2024 for the submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans, which deadline can be extended in accordance with Article 36(1), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4), indicatively until 15 October 2024, that being the date for submission of the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States, the Council takes note that the next step in the procedure, namely the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU on the correction of the excessive deficit, will coincide with the Commission’s opinions on the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States under Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5). This approach allows ensuring consistency between the budgetary requirements under the excessive deficit procedure and the adjustment path set out in the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. Enabling such consistency, while avoiding a surveillance gap under the excessive deficit procedure, requires the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. This timeline should be considered exceptional and as linked to the transition to the new framework, and therefore as not setting a precedent. The Council also takes note that, failing the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan, the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU will consider the reference trajectory transmitted by the Commission to the Member State determined in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/1263,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
From an overall assessment it follows that an excessive deficit exists in Hungary due to non-compliance with the deficit criterion.
This Decision shall take effect on the date of its notification.
This Decision is addressed to Hungary.

Council Decision (EU) 2024/2122 of 26 July 2024 on the existence of an excessive deficit in France

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2122 1.8.2024
(1) Article 126(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits.
(2) The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong, sustainable and inclusive growth underpinned by financial stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union’s objectives for sustainable growth and employment.
(3) The excessive deficit procedure under Article 126 TFEU, as clarified by Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97(1), which is part of the SGP, provides for a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. Protocol No 12 on the excessive deficit procedure, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the TFEU, sets out further provisions relating to the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009(2)lays down detailed rules and definitions for the application of those provisions. The Union’s reformed economic governance framework, which came into force on 30 April 2024, includes Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1264(3), which amended Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. As the Council has not yet set the net expenditure path for France, the Commission is not able to assess compliance with the debt criterion in accordance with the new rules. This Decision therefore concerns only the excess of the ratio of the government deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) with respect to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP, in line with existing legal provisions.
(4) Article 126(5) TFEU provides that, if the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur, it is to address an opinion to the Member State concerned and inform the Council accordingly. Having taken into account its report of 19 June 2024 adopted pursuant to Article 126(3) TFEU, and having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee adopted pursuant to Article 126(4) TFEU, the Commission concluded that an excessive deficit exists in France. On 8 July 2024, the Commission therefore addressed such an opinion to France and informed the Council accordingly.
(5) Article 126(6) TFEU provides that the Council is to consider any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make before deciding after an overall assessment whether an excessive deficit exists. In the case of France, the overall assessment leads to the conclusions set out below.
(6) According to the data validated by the Commission (Eurostat) on 22 April 2024, the general government deficit in France reached 5,5 % of GDP in 2023, and general government debt stood at 110,6 % of GDP. The Commission, in its report under Article 126(3) TFEU, considered that the excess of the deficit over the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP in 2023 is not exceptional, as it results neither from an unusual event nor from a severe economic downturn in the sense of the SGP. The excess over the TFEU reference value is also not temporary, based on the Commission’s 2024 spring forecast, which projected the general government deficit to remain above 3 % of GDP in 2024 and 2025. In sum, the deficit in 2023 was above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP. The excess is neither considered to be exceptional as defined by the TFEU and the SGP, nor is it considered to be temporary. Hence, the deficit criterion as defined by the TFEU and Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 is prima facie not fulfilled.
(7) According to the French Stability Programme, the general government deficit is planned to reach 5,1 % of GDP in 2024. The Commission’s 2024 spring forecast indicates a deficit of 5,3 % of GDP in 2024, which is above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP.
(8) In line with the requirements of Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission also analysed all the relevant factors in its report under that Article. As laid down in Article 2(4), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, when assessing compliance on the basis of the deficit criterion, if the ratio of the government debt to GDP exceeds the reference value, those relevant factors are to be taken into account in the steps following the report under Article 126(3) TFEU and leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit only if – before these relevant factors are taken into account – the general government deficit remains close to the reference value and its excess over the reference value is temporary. In the case of France, that double condition is not met. Therefore, relevant factors are not taken into account in the steps leading to this Decision.
(9) In view of the deadline of 20 September 2024 for the submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans, which deadline can be extended in accordance with Article 36(1), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council(4), indicatively until 15 October 2024, that being the date for submission of the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States, the Council takes note that the next step in the procedure, namely the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU on the correction of the excessive deficit, will coincide with the Commission’s opinions on the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States under Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5). This approach allows ensuring consistency between the budgetary requirements under the excessive deficit procedure and the adjustment path set out in the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. Enabling such consistency, while avoiding a surveillance gap under the excessive deficit procedure, requires the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. This timeline should be considered exceptional and as linked to the transition to the new framework, and therefore as not setting a precedent. The Council also takes note that, failing the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan, the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU will consider the reference trajectory transmitted by the Commission to the Member State determined in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/1263,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 126(6) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Having regard to the observations made by France,
Whereas:
(1) Article 126(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits.
(2) The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong, sustainable and inclusive growth underpinned by financial stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union’s objectives for sustainable growth and employment.
(3) The excessive deficit procedure under Article 126 TFEU, as clarified by Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 (1), which is part of the SGP, provides for a decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. Protocol No 12 on the excessive deficit procedure, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the TFEU, sets out further provisions relating to the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 (2) lays down detailed rules and definitions for the application of those provisions. The Union’s reformed economic governance framework, which came into force on 30 April 2024, includes Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1264 (3), which amended Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. As the Council has not yet set the net expenditure path for France, the Commission is not able to assess compliance with the debt criterion in accordance with the new rules. This Decision therefore concerns only the excess of the ratio of the government deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) with respect to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP, in line with existing legal provisions.
(4) Article 126(5) TFEU provides that, if the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur, it is to address an opinion to the Member State concerned and inform the Council accordingly. Having taken into account its report of 19 June 2024 adopted pursuant to Article 126(3) TFEU, and having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee adopted pursuant to Article 126(4) TFEU, the Commission concluded that an excessive deficit exists in France. On 8 July 2024, the Commission therefore addressed such an opinion to France and informed the Council accordingly.
(5) Article 126(6) TFEU provides that the Council is to consider any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make before deciding after an overall assessment whether an excessive deficit exists. In the case of France, the overall assessment leads to the conclusions set out below.
(6) According to the data validated by the Commission (Eurostat) on 22 April 2024, the general government deficit in France reached 5,5 % of GDP in 2023, and general government debt stood at 110,6 % of GDP. The Commission, in its report under Article 126(3) TFEU, considered that the excess of the deficit over the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP in 2023 is not exceptional, as it results neither from an unusual event nor from a severe economic downturn in the sense of the SGP. The excess over the TFEU reference value is also not temporary, based on the Commission’s 2024 spring forecast, which projected the general government deficit to remain above 3 % of GDP in 2024 and 2025. In sum, the deficit in 2023 was above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP. The excess is neither considered to be exceptional as defined by the TFEU and the SGP, nor is it considered to be temporary. Hence, the deficit criterion as defined by the TFEU and Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 is prima facie not fulfilled.
(7) According to the French Stability Programme, the general government deficit is planned to reach 5,1 % of GDP in 2024. The Commission’s 2024 spring forecast indicates a deficit of 5,3 % of GDP in 2024, which is above and not close to the TFEU reference value of 3 % of GDP.
(8) In line with the requirements of Article 126(3) TFEU, the Commission also analysed all the relevant factors in its report under that Article. As laid down in Article 2(4), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, when assessing compliance on the basis of the deficit criterion, if the ratio of the government debt to GDP exceeds the reference value, those relevant factors are to be taken into account in the steps following the report under Article 126(3) TFEU and leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit only if – before these relevant factors are taken into account – the general government deficit remains close to the reference value and its excess over the reference value is temporary. In the case of France, that double condition is not met. Therefore, relevant factors are not taken into account in the steps leading to this Decision.
(9) In view of the deadline of 20 September 2024 for the submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans, which deadline can be extended in accordance with Article 36(1), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4), indicatively until 15 October 2024, that being the date for submission of the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States, the Council takes note that the next step in the procedure, namely the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU on the correction of the excessive deficit, will coincide with the Commission’s opinions on the draft budgetary plans of euro area Member States under Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5). This approach allows ensuring consistency between the budgetary requirements under the excessive deficit procedure and the adjustment path set out in the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. Enabling such consistency, while avoiding a surveillance gap under the excessive deficit procedure, requires the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans. This timeline should be considered exceptional and as linked to the transition to the new framework, and therefore as not setting a precedent. The Council also takes note that, failing the timely submission of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan, the Commission’s recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU will consider the reference trajectory transmitted by the Commission to the Member State determined in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/1263,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
From an overall assessment it follows that an excessive deficit exists in France due to non-compliance with the deficit criterion.
This Decision shall take effect on the date of its notification.
This Decision is addressed to the French Republic.