Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/3004 of 2 December 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/3004 3.12.2024
(1) On 7 December 2020, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999(1).
(2) On the basis of a review of the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999, the measures set out in Articles 2 and 3 of that Decision as regards the natural or legal persons, entities, and bodies listed in that Annex should, except in the case of one deceased person, be extended until 8 December 2025. The entries concerning 31 natural persons and nine entities listed in that Annex should be updated.
(3) Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 should therefore be amended accordingly,
(1) in Article 10, paragraph (1) is replaced by the following:‘1.   This Decision shall apply until 8 December 2026 and shall be kept under constant review. The measures set out in Articles 2 and 3 shall apply as regards the natural or legal persons, entities, and bodies listed in the Annex until 8 December 2025.’;
(2) the Annex is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
(1) in section ‘A. Natural persons’, entry 16 is deleted;
(2) in section ‘A Natural persons’, the entries for the following 31 natural persons are replaced by the following:Names (Transliteration into Latin script)NamesIdentifying informationReasons for listingDate of listing‘1.Alexander (Alexandr) Petrovich KALASHNIKOVAлександр Петрович КАЛАШНИКОВ(Russian spelling)Position(s): Former director of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN)DOB: 27.1.1964POB: Tatarsk, Novosibirsk Region/Oblast, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: maleID Number: 771670606787Alexander Kalashnikov was the director of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) from 8 October 2019 until 25 November 2021. In that position, he oversaw all activities of the FSIN. In his capacity as director of the FSIN, he was responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests and detentions.While Alexei Navalny was recovering in Germany (September 2020 – January 2021) after having been poisoned with a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group, on 28 December 2020 FSIN demanded that he immediately present himself to a probation officer or face a prison sentence for violating a suspended sentence for fraud conviction. That fraud conviction was found to be arbitrary and unfair by the European Court of Human Rights in 2018. On 17 January 2021, acting on the orders of Alexander Kalashnikov, FSIN officers detained Alexei Navalny upon his arrival at Moscow airport.Alexei Navalny’s arrest is based on a decision by the Khimki city court, which in turn was issued at the request of FSIN. In late December 2020, FSIN had already requested that a court replace Alexei Nalvany’s suspended sentence with a prison term. On 17 February 2021, the European Court of Human Rights ordered the Government of Russia to release Alexei Navalny.2.3.20212.Alexander (Alexandr) Ivanovich BASTRYKINАлексaндр Ивaнович БАСТРЫКИНPosition(s): Chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian FederationDOB: 27.8.1953POB: Pskov, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: maleID Number: 782618375392Alexander Bastrykin has served as chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (the “Committee”) since January 2011 (and as acting chairman from October to December 2010). In that position, he oversees all activities of the Committee. Officially, the Committee is presided over by the Russian President. In Alexander Bastrykin’s capacity as chairman of the Committee, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests and detentions.Alexander Bastrykin is responsible for the Committee’s widespread and systematic repressive campaigns against the Russian opposition, targeting and investigating its members. On 29 December 2020, the Committee launched an investigation into the opposition leader Alexei Navalny, charging him with large-scale fraud. Alexei Navalny and others published articles on Alexander Bastrykin’s ownership of Czech real estate firm LAW Bohemia in the 2000s.In 2022, the Investigative Committee, which Alexander Bastrykin is still chairing, charged 92 Ukrainian soldiers with crimes against humanity during Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.2.3.20214.Viktor Vasilievich (Vasilyevich) ZOLOTOVВиктор Васильевич ЗОЛОТОВPosition(s): Director of the Federal Service of National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation (Rosgvardia)DOB: 27.1.1954POB: Sasovo, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: maleID Number: 770600283509Viktor Zolotov has been the Director of the Federal Service of National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation (Rosgvardia) since 5 April 2016 and, therefore, Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation, as well as Commander of OMON – the Special Purpose Mobile Unit integrated in Rosgvardia. In that position, he oversees all activities of Rosgvardia and OMON troops. In his capacity as Director of Rosgvardia, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests and detentions and systematic and widespread violations of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, in particular by violently repressing protests and demonstrations.Rosgvardia was employed to quell the pro-Navalny protests of 23 January and 21 April 2021, and many OMON and National Guard officers were reported to have used brutality and violence against protesters. Dozens of journalists were targeted with aggression by the security forces, including Meduza’s correspondent Kristina Safronova, who was hit by an OMON officer, and Novaya Gazeta’s journalist Yelizaveta Kirpanova, who was hit on the head with a truncheon leaving her bleeding. During the 23 January 2021 protests, security forces arbitrarily detained more than 300 minors.2.3.20216.WANG Junzheng(Chinese spelling)Position(s): Member of the 20th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee (December 2022 – December 2026); Deputy of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC, February 2023 – February 2027); Party Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR); Director of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) (since May 2024); former Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), and Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; Political commissar of the XPCC and CEO of the China Xinjian GroupDOB: May 1963POB: Linyi, Shandong (China)Nationality: ChineseGender: maleParty Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) since October 2021. Member of the 20th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee (December 2022 – December 2026). Deputy of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC, February 2023 – February 2027).Former Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) and Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) from April 2020 to October 2021, as well as Political commissar of the XPCC from May 2020 to October 2021. Former Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR, from February 2019 to September 2020. Wang Junzheng also held other senior posts in the XPCC.The XPCC is a state-owned economic and paramilitary organisation in the XUAR, which exercises administrative authority and controls economic activities in Xinjiang.As Party Secretary and Political commissar of the XPCC, Wang Junzheng was involved in overseeing all policies implemented by the XPCC. In that position, he was responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief, linked, inter alia, to the XPCC’s implementation of a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities.He was also responsible for the XPCC’s systematic use of Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities as a forced workforce, in particular in cotton fields.As Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of the XUAR, Wang Junzheng was involved in overseeing all the security policies implemented in Xinjiang, including the aforementioned programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities. As Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR from February 2019 to September 2020, Wang Junzheng was responsible for maintaining internal security and law enforcement in the XUAR. As such, he held a key political position in charge of overseeing and implementing the aforementioned programme.22.3.20217.WANG Mingshan(Chinese spelling)Position(s): Deputy of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC, February 2023 – February 2027); Deputy Director of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)DOB: January 1964POB: Wuwei, Gansu (China)Nationality: ChineseGender: maleDeputy Director (since February 2024) and former member of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Deputy of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC, February 2023 – February 2027).Former Director and Deputy Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (XPSB) between 2017 and January 2021.As Deputy Director and former Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR (September 2020 – February 2024), Wang Mingshan is responsible for maintaining internal security and law enforcement in the XUAR. As such, he holds a key political position in charge of overseeing a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities.As Former Director and Deputy Party Secretary of the XPSB (2017 to January 2021), he held a key position in Xinjiang’s security apparatus and was directly responsible for implementing the aforementioned programme. In particular, the XPSB has deployed the “Integrated Joint Operations Platform” (IJOP), a big data programme used to track millions of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region and flag those deemed “potentially threatening” to be sent to detention camps.In his current position and due to his former functions, Wang Mingshan is responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief.22.3.20218.CHEN Mingguo(Chinese spelling)Position(s): Secretary of Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR); Member of the CCP Standing Committee of the XUAR.DOB: October 1966POB: Yilong, Sichuan (China)Nationality: ChineseGender: maleSecretary of Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and Member of the CCP Standing Committee of the XUAR since February 2024.Former Director of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (XPSB) since January 2021 and Vice-Chairman of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) People’s Government.As Secretary of Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR), Member of the CCP Standing Committee of the XUAR and former Director of the XPSB, Chen Mingguo holds a key position in Xinjiang’s security apparatus and is directly involved in implementing a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities. In particular, the XPSB has deployed the “Integrated Joint Operations Platform” (IJOP), a big data programme used to track millions of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region and flag those deemed “potentially threatening” to be sent to detention camps. Chen Mingguo is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief.22.3.202113.Aiub Vakhaevich KATAEV (a.k.a. Ayubkhan Vakhaevich KATAEV)Аюб Вахаевич КАТАЕВ (a.k.a. Аюбхан Вахаевич КАТАЕВ) (Russian spelling)Position(s): Former Head of Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in the city of Argun in the Chechen RepublicDOB: 1.12.1983POB: Ilyinsky, ChechnyaNationality: RussianID Number: 200505588830, 014112081090Gender: maleHead of Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in the city of Argun in the Chechen Republic until 2018.In his capacity as Head of Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in Argun, Aiub Kataev oversaw the activities of local state security and police agencies. In this position, he personally oversaw widespread and systematic persecutions in Chechnya, which began in 2017. The repressions are directed against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons, those presumed to belong to LGBTI groups, and other individuals suspected of being opponents of the Head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov. Aiub Kataev and forces formerly under his command are responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, as well as arbitrary arrests and detentions and extrajudicial or arbitrary executions and killings.According to numerous witnesses, Aiub Kataev personally supervised and took part in torturing detainees.22.3.202120.Aleksandr Grigorievitch MALOLETKOАлександр Григорьевич МАЛОЛЕТКО(Russian spelling)Aleksandr Maloletko was a close collaborator of Yevgeny Prigozhin. His action as a “defender of the Motherland” and as the Head of the “Veteran’s Interests Defenders League” was publicly hailed by Yevgeny Prigozhin. He has been working as an instructor for the Wagner Group in the Central African Republic (CAR). He is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses in several countries, including in CAR, and is responsible for supporting the acts of the Wagner Group.25.2.202322.Dimitri SYTIIa.k.a.Dimitri SYTYIДмитрий СЫТИЙ(Russian spelling)Position(s): Director of the Russian House of BanguiDOB: 23.3.1989POB: Minsk (Belarus)Nationality: RussianPassport number: 550246878Gender: maleAddress: NA-SYTAIA/A1-TANKISTAZ KHRUSTITSKOGO 62 APT25/ZP-198217/CI St Petersburg, Russian FederationDimitri Sytii has a leading role within the Wagner Group in the Central African Republic (CAR), and he had close links to Yevgeny Prigozhin. He is in charge of conducting the Wagner Group’s operations and influence policy in CAR. He is the head of the local branch of the Russian House, the cultural arm of the Russian foreign ministry.The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including CAR.Given his influential position in CAR and his leading role in the Wagner Group, he is responsible for serious human rights abuses committed by the Wagner Group in CAR.25.2.202323.Mikhail Sergeyevich POTEPKINМихаил Сергеевич ПОТЕПКИН(Russian spelling)Position(s): Director Meroe GoldDOB: 19.9.1981 or 29.9.1981Nationality: RussianGender: malePassport number: 651697952 (Russian passport)Address: SudanAssociated companies: Megaline; Concord; IT-DebuggerMikhail Potepkin is director of Meroe Gold, a cover entity for the Wagner Group’s operations in Sudan, as well as being involved in M-Invest, Meroe’s parent company. He has a leading role within the Wagner Group in Sudan, and he had close links to Yevgeny Prigozhin. By being affiliated with the Sudanese military, the Wagner Group secured the exploiting and exporting of Sudanese gold to Russia. Potepkin is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Sudan. Through his activities, he also provides support for such abuses committed in Sudan.25.2.202325.Vitalii Viktorovitch PERFILEVВиталий Викторович ПЕРФИЛЬЕВ(Russian spelling)DOB: 11.9.1983POB: Novossibirsk USSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianAddress: Bangui (Central African Republic)Gender: malePassport number: NR 75 2987491Date of delivery: 30.3.2016Expiration date: 30.3.2026Vitalii Perfilev was the security advisor to the President of the Central African Republic (CAR) until November 2023, and a key figure within the Wagner Group in CAR.The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including CAR.Given his former influential position during the period when the human rights abuses were committed in CAR and his leading role in the Wagner Group, Vitalii Perfilev is responsible for serious human rights abuses committed by the Wagner Group in CAR.25.2.202326.Andrei Sergeevich MANDELАндрей Сергеевич МАНДЕЛЬ(Russian spelling)DOB: 2.3.1990POB: GermanyGender: malePassport number: 753615660Andrei Mandel is head of M-Invest, a cover entity for the Wagner Group’s operations in Sudan, as well as being involved in its subsidiary Meroe Gold. He has a leading role within the Wagner Group in Sudan, and had close links with Yevgeny Prigozhin. By being closely affiliated with the Sudanese military, the Wagner Group secured the exploiting and exporting of Sudanese gold to Russia. Andrei Mandel is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Sudan. Through his activities, Andrei Mandel also provides support for such abuses committed in Sudan.25.2.202327.Neda Mohammad NADEEM(Pashto spelling)Position(s): Acting Taliban Minister for Higher EducationNationality: AfghanDOB: 1977POB: Kandahar, AfghanistanGender: maleNeda Mohammed Nadeem has been the acting Taliban Minister for Higher Education since 22 October 2022.Since he took up his position, the Taliban have published decrees banning women from higher education throughout the country. These decrees deprive women of their right to education as well as their equal access to education, violating the principle of equal treatment between men and women.In his capacity as acting Taliban Minister for Higher Education, Neda Mohammed Nadeem is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Afghanistan, in particular the widespread violation of women’s right to education and the right to equal treatment between men and women in the field of education.7.3.202329.Alexander Georgievich FEDORINOVАлександр Георгиевич ФЕДОРИНОВ(Russian spelling)Position(s): commanding officer of Moscow Police StationRank: Lieutenant ColonelDOB: 31.5.1980POB: Michurinsk, Tambov, Russian FederationNationality: RussianGender: maleLieutenant Colonel Alexander Fedorinov is a commanding officer of Moscow Police Station.In his capacity as acting head of the police station in March 2022, he authorised the arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as the subsequent torture, of female anti-war protestors.Alexander Fedorinov is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrests or detentions as well as systematic sexual and gender-based violence.7.3.202333.Gatluak Nyang HOTHNationality: South SudaneseGender: maleGatluak Nyang Hoth was the county commissioner for Mayiandit county (Unity State, South Sudan) from February 2021 until June 2024.In this position, he commanded government-aligned militias to carry out attacks in southern Unity State, between February and May 2022. During this period, troops under his command made widespread and systematic use of sexual violence as a war tactic and instrumentalised it as a reward and entitlement for men participating in the conflict.In his capacity as county commissioner, Gatluak Nyang Hoth is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in South Sudan, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence.7.3.202335.Toe UIa.k.a. Toe YIPosition(s): Deputy Minister of Home AffairsRank: Major-GeneralDOB: 1966Nationality: Myanmar/BurmaGender: maleMajor-General Toe Ui was appointed Deputy Minister of Home Affairs on 3 February 2023. He is the former second in command of the Office of the Chief of Military Security Affairs (OCMSA). The OCMSA is responsible for the management of detention and interrogation centres in Myanmar/Burma and is also tasked with intelligence gathering.OCMSA staff under Ui’s authority use forced nudity, rape, electric shock, burning of genitalia and excessive violence during the arbitrary detention and interrogation of men, women and members of the LGBTIQ community.In his capacity as second in command of the OCMSA, Major-General Toe Ui is responsible for serious human rights violations in Myanmar/Burma, including arbitrary detentions and torture, as well as for systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence.7.3.202337.Andrei Andreevich ZADACHINАндрей Андреевич ЗАДАЧИН(Russian spelling)Position(s): Investigator of the Major Investigative Unit at the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation; MajorDOB: 22.8.1990POB: Moscow, Russian FederationNationality: RussianGender: maleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 771577190559Fiscal Registration Number: YBLWST14JJ39In his position as Investigator of the Major Investigative Unit at the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, Andrei Zadachin issued a politically motivated criminal accusation against Vladimir Kara-Murza. Andrei Zadachin also asked the court that Vladimir Kara-Murza be detained and provided supporting testimony in court.Vladimir Kara-Murza is a prominent opposition activist in Russia. Politically motivated court proceedings based on false allegations started against him in 2022 after he accused the Kremlin of committing war crimes in Ukraine and publicly condemned Russian aggression. In April 2023, he was sentenced to 25 years in a high-security prison/labour camp. The court proceedings against him targeted his activism and served as a show trial in Russia to suppress voices critical of the ruling regime in voicing opposition to the war of aggression against Ukraine. The Russian regime is using the judiciary of the country as a widespread tool in numerous serious human rights violations. The justice system is not independent and is used to systematically and severely violate the human rights of individuals opposed to the ruling regime, by violating their freedom of opinion and expression.Therefore, Andrei Zadachin is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including violations of freedom of opinion and expression.5.6.202340.Diana Igorevna MISHCHENKO(Maiden name: GARIPOVA)Диана Игоревнa МИЩЕНКО(Russian spelling)Position(s): Judge of the Khamovniki District Court of MoscowDOB: 12.5.1977POB: Moscow, Russian FederationNationality: RussianPassport no.: 4508731961Gender: femaleFiscal registration no.: K7VGTQKBDX68Individual Taxpayer Number: 771805281790In her position as Judge of the Khamovniki District Court of Moscow, Diana Mishchenko is involved in the politically motivated court case against Vladimir Kara-Murza. She issued a sentence to approve the administrative arrest of Vladimir Kara-Murza for 15 days.Vladimir Kara-Murza is a prominent opposition activist in Russia. Politically motivated court proceedings based on false allegations started against him in 2022 after he accused the Kremlin of committing war crimes in Ukraine and publicly condemned Russian aggression. In April 2023, he was sentenced to 25 years in a high-security prison/labour camp. The court proceedings against him targeted his activism and served as a show trial in Russia to suppress voices critical of the ruling regime in voicing opposition to the war of aggression against Ukraine. The Russian regime is using the judiciary of the country as a widespread tool in numerous serious human rights violations. The justice system is not independent and is used to systematically and severely violate the human rights of individuals opposed to the ruling regime, by violating their freedom of opinion and expression.Therefore, Diana Mishchenko is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including violations of freedom of opinion and expression.5.6.202343.Sergei Gennadievich PODOPRIGOROVСергей Геннадьевич ПОДОПРИГОРОВ(Russian spelling)Function: Judge of the Moscow City CourtDOB: 8.1.1974POB: Moscow, Russian FederationNationality: RussianGender: maleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 772606428578AddressShmitovskiy Proyezd, 16c2, Moscow, Russia, 123100. Apartment 52.(Шмитовский пр-д, 16с2, Москва, Россия, 123100. Квартира 52)In his position as Judge of the Moscow City Court, Sergei Podoprigorov is involved in the politically motivated court case against Vladimir Kara-Murza. He chaired the collegium of Judges at the Moscow City Court who on 17 April 2023 sentenced opposition activist Vladimir Kara-Murza to 25 years in high-security prison/labour camp.Vladimir Kara-Murza is a prominent opposition activist in Russia. Politically motivated court proceedings based on false allegations started against him in 2022 after he accused the Kremlin of committing war crimes in Ukraine and publicly condemned Russian aggression. In April 2023, he was sentenced to 25 years in a high-security prison/labour camp. The court proceedings against him targeted his activism and served as a show trial in Russia to suppress voices critical of the ruling regime in voicing opposition to the war of aggression against Ukraine. The Russian regime is using the judiciary of the country as a widespread tool in numerous serious human rights violations. The justice system is not independent and is used to systematically and severely violate the human rights of individuals opposed to the ruling regime, by violating their freedom of opinion and expression.Previously, Sergei Podoprigorov, as a Judge at Moscow’s Tverskoi district court, made two rulings in relation to Sergei Magnitsky, who exposed corruption and misconduct by Russian government officials, and was later persecuted and died in Russian prison.Therefore, Sergei Podoprigorov is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including violations of freedom of opinion and expression.5.6.202375.Wadim Konstantinowitsch KALININВадим Kонстантинович КАЛИНИНPosition(s): Head of the IK-3 penal colonyDOB: 7.3.1973POB: Russian FederationNationality: RussianGender: maleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 663401241613Wadim Kalinin is the Head of the IK-3 penal colony.Within the chain of command in the IK-3 penal colony, being officially part of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) “senior command staff” and assuming a managerial role, he is directly tasked with executive decisions and therefore responsible for the overall conditions of imprisonment in the IK-3 penal colony. The IK-3 penal colony, commonly known as the “Polar Wolf”, is the location where detained opposition politician Alexei Navalny died under unknown circumstances. The conditions of Alexei Navalny’s imprisonment in the IK-3 penal colony included physical violence such as torture and withholding warm water and adequate clothing in winter, medical assistance and food and water.Therefore, Wadim Kalinin is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression.22.3.202486.Aleksandr Aleksandrovich MUKHANOVАлександр Александрович МУХАНОВPosition(s): Director of IK-1DOB: 7.12.1984POB: Russian FederationNationality: RussianGender: maleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 332806323008Aleksandr Mukhanov is the Director of correctional colony No1 (IK-1) and he was the Director of correctional colony No2 (IK-2) during the period when Alexei Navalny was held there from March 2021 to June 2022.IK-2 is known for poor conditions of detention. Alexei Navalny, who had recently been poisoned, was refused access to civilian doctors in that colony, despite the threat to his health.As Director of IK-1, Aleksandr Mukhanov is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as well as the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression.22.3.202487.Roman Alexandrovitch VIDYUKOVРоман Александрович ВИДЮКОВ(Russian spelling)Position(s): Deputy Head of the Main Investigation Department at the State Investigative Committee of the Russian FederationDOB: 30.7.1980POB: Russia FederationNationality: RussianGender: maleRoman Vidyukov is Deputy Head of the Main Investigation Department and former investigator at the State Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation.During the period when he held the position of investigator at the State Investigative Committee, Roman Vidyukov led the investigation in one of the cases in which Alexei Navalny was sentenced to nine years in prison in 2022. Roman Vidyukov also was a member of the preliminary investigation team for the “money laundering” case against Alexei Navalny’s anti-corruption foundation. Roman Vidyukov further led the investigation against Lilia Chanysheva, former Head of Alexei Navalny’s headquarters in Ufa, who was convicted of “creation of an extremist community”. Lilia Chanysheva was sentenced to seven and a half years in prison in 2023.During those court cases, Roman Vidyukov allegedly threatened a witness in order to force him to give testimony that would be favourable to the investigation during Alexei Navalny’s fraud case.Roman Vidyukov is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests or detentions and the violation of freedom of opinion and expression which is of serious concern as regards the objectives of the common foreign and security policy set out in Article 21 TEU.22.3.202488.Evgenia Sergeevna NIKOLAEVAЕвгения Сергеевна НИКОЛАЕВА(Russian spelling)Position(s): Judge at the Basmanny District Court in MoscowDOB: 9.7.1981POB: Russian FederationNationality: RussianGender: femaleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 771873894393Evgenia Nikolaeva has been a judge at the Basmanny District Court in Moscow since 2016.She has issued a number of rulings against political opponents (including Alexei Navalny, Ilia Yashin and Vladimir Kara-Murza), thereby contributing to political repression in Russia. In October 2023, she sent Alexei Navalny’s lawyers Alexey Liptser and Igor Sergunin to pre-trial detention for 2 months. Previously, she had repeatedly made life difficult for political prisoners, including by extending the terms of detention in pre-trial detention centre for the former head of Alexei Navalny’s headquarters in Ufa, Lilia Chanysheva. Evgenia Nikolaeva also refused to address complaints about the inaction of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation on the allegation of Alexei Navalny’s poisoning.In her position, Evgenia Nikolaeva is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests or detentions and the violation of freedom of opinion and expression which is of serious concern as regards the objectives of the common foreign and security policy set out in Article 21 TEU.22.3.202496.Sergey Anatolevich MOROZСергей Анатольевич МОРОЗ(Russian spelling)Position(s): Head of the Federal Penitentiary Service of the Russian Federation for MoscowDOB: 15.9.1968POB: Berdyansk, Zaporozhye, Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine)Nationality: RussianGender: maleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 644918369538Sergey Moroz is a Russian official. He is Head of the Federal Penitentiary Service in Moscow.In that position, he placed the opposition politician Alexei Navalny on the federal wanted list. Sergey Moroz is accused of having exerted extreme humiliation and violence on detainees upon their arrival in detention.Therefore, Sergey Moroz is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression.22.3.202497.Elena Evgenievna MOROZOVAЕлена Евгеньевна МОРОЗОВА(Russian spelling)Position(s): Judge of the Khimki City CourtDOB: 2.12.1977Nationality: RussianGender: femaleElena Morozova is a Russian judge working in the Khimki City Court.In her position, she decided to place the opposition politician Alexei Navalny in custody for 30 days after he arrived in Moscow after his treatment for Novichok poisoning. The trial she chaired violated fair trial standards, including the right to review the contents of the indictment and trial documents, the opportunity to consult with a lawyer, and public access to the trial.Therefore, Elena Morozova is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression.22.3.202499.Mikhail Yurievich PTITSYNМихаил Юрьевич ПТИЦЫН(Russian spelling)Position(s): Chairman of the Moscow City CourtDOB: 21.8.1963Nationality: RussianGender: maleMikhail Ptitsyn is Chairman of the Moscow City Court.In that position, he positively considered the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service’s proposal to replace opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s probation sentence with a fully fledged sentence. Consequently, Alexei Navalny was deprived of the possibility to act in public life in Russia by being imprisoned in a penal colony.Therefore, Mikhail Ptitsyn is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression.22.3.2024100.Sergey Alekseevich RYABTSEVСергей Алексеевич РЯБЦЕВ(Russian spelling)Position(s): Judge of the Lefortovo District Court of MoscowDOB: 4.9.1989Nationality: RussianGender: maleSergey Ryabtsev is a Russian judge working in the Lefortovo District Court of Moscow.In that position, he was involved in sabotaging the investigation regarding the poisoning of Alexei Navalny by refusing to address the complaint about the inaction of the Investigative Directorate of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB). Moreover, he continuously delivers sentences against freedom of speech in Russia.Therefore, Sergey Ryabtsev is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression.22.3.2024101.Petr Pavlovich SERKOVПётр Павлович СЕРКОВ(Russian spelling)Position(s): First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian FederationDOB: 7.6.1955POB: Poldamasovo, Ulyanovsk region, former USSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: maleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 732502615730Petr Serkov is the First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.In that position, he upheld the verdict against the opposition politician Alexei Navalny in 2018. Consequently, Alexei Navalny was convicted and imprisoned in a high-security penal colony in order to prevent him from engaging in political activity. Placing Alexei Navalny in a penal colony resulted in his death.Therefore, Petr Serkov is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression.22.3.2024103.Nikolay Viktorovich TIMOSHINНиколай Викторович ТИМОШИН(Russian spelling)Position(s): Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian FederationDOB: 14.8.1959POB: Zhidkoe village, Znamensky district, Oryol region, former USSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: maleNikolay Timoshin is Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. Previously, he held the position of Member of the Court’s Presidium.As Member of the Presidium, Nikolay Timoshin upheld the verdict against the opposition politician Alexei Navalny in 2018. Consequently, Alexei Navalny was convicted and imprisoned in a high-security penal colony in order to prevent him from engaging in political activity.Therefore, Nikolay Timoshin is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression.22.3.2024104.Vladimir Yurievich ZAITSEVВладимир Юрьевич ЗАЙЦЕВ(Russian spelling)Position(s): Chairman of the Appellate Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Russian FederationDOB: 31.3.1957POB: Valamaz, Krasnogorsk, Udmurtia SSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: maleVladimir Zaitsev is Chairman of the Appellate Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.In that position, he excluded Alexei Navalny from running in the presidential election in Russia in 2018 in a politically motivated trial.Therefore, Vladimir Zaitsev is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including systematic violations of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and freedom of expression and opinion.22.3.2024115.Abdel Karim Mahmoud (Mahmood, Mohammad)IBRAHIM(Arabic spelling)Position(s): Chief of staff of the Syrian ArmyPOB: Tartous, SyriaNationality: SyrianGender: maleAbdel Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim is the chief of staff of the Syrian Army.The Syrian state, including its military, commits systematic and widespread torture, rape and sexual and gender-based violence against civilians.As the chief of staff of the Syrian Army, Abdel Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim is responsible for the actions of the armed forces under his command.Therefore, Abdel Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim is responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture and systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence.22.7.2024’; Names (Transliteration into Latin script) Names Identifying information Reasons for listing Date of listing ‘1. Alexander (Alexandr) Petrovich KALASHNIKOV Aлександр Петрович КАЛАШНИКОВ(Russian spelling) Position(s): Former director of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN)DOB: 27.1.1964POB: Tatarsk, Novosibirsk Region/Oblast, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: maleID Number: 771670606787 Alexander Kalashnikov was the director of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) from 8 October 2019 until 25 November 2021. In that position, he oversaw all activities of the FSIN. In his capacity as director of the FSIN, he was responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests and detentions.While Alexei Navalny was recovering in Germany (September 2020 – January 2021) after having been poisoned with a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group, on 28 December 2020 FSIN demanded that he immediately present himself to a probation officer or face a prison sentence for violating a suspended sentence for fraud conviction. That fraud conviction was found to be arbitrary and unfair by the European Court of Human Rights in 2018. On 17 January 2021, acting on the orders of Alexander Kalashnikov, FSIN officers detained Alexei Navalny upon his arrival at Moscow airport.Alexei Navalny’s arrest is based on a decision by the Khimki city court, which in turn was issued at the request of FSIN. In late December 2020, FSIN had already requested that a court replace Alexei Nalvany’s suspended sentence with a prison term. On 17 February 2021, the European Court of Human Rights ordered the Government of Russia to release Alexei Navalny. 2.3.2021 2. Alexander (Alexandr) Ivanovich BASTRYKIN Алексaндр Ивaнович БАСТРЫКИН Position(s): Chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian FederationDOB: 27.8.1953POB: Pskov, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: maleID Number: 782618375392 Alexander Bastrykin has served as chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (the “Committee”) since January 2011 (and as acting chairman from October to December 2010). In that position, he oversees all activities of the Committee. Officially, the Committee is presided over by the Russian President. In Alexander Bastrykin’s capacity as chairman of the Committee, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests and detentions.Alexander Bastrykin is responsible for the Committee’s widespread and systematic repressive campaigns against the Russian opposition, targeting and investigating its members. On 29 December 2020, the Committee launched an investigation into the opposition leader Alexei Navalny, charging him with large-scale fraud. Alexei Navalny and others published articles on Alexander Bastrykin’s ownership of Czech real estate firm LAW Bohemia in the 2000s.In 2022, the Investigative Committee, which Alexander Bastrykin is still chairing, charged 92 Ukrainian soldiers with crimes against humanity during Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. 2.3.2021 4. Viktor Vasilievich (Vasilyevich) ZOLOTOV Виктор Васильевич ЗОЛОТОВ Position(s): Director of the Federal Service of National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation (Rosgvardia)DOB: 27.1.1954POB: Sasovo, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: maleID Number: 770600283509 Viktor Zolotov has been the Director of the Federal Service of National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation (Rosgvardia) since 5 April 2016 and, therefore, Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation, as well as Commander of OMON – the Special Purpose Mobile Unit integrated in Rosgvardia. In that position, he oversees all activities of Rosgvardia and OMON troops. In his capacity as Director of Rosgvardia, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests and detentions and systematic and widespread violations of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, in particular by violently repressing protests and demonstrations.Rosgvardia was employed to quell the pro-Navalny protests of 23 January and 21 April 2021, and many OMON and National Guard officers were reported to have used brutality and violence against protesters. Dozens of journalists were targeted with aggression by the security forces, including Meduza’s correspondent Kristina Safronova, who was hit by an OMON officer, and Novaya Gazeta’s journalist Yelizaveta Kirpanova, who was hit on the head with a truncheon leaving her bleeding. During the 23 January 2021 protests, security forces arbitrarily detained more than 300 minors. 2.3.2021 6. WANG Junzheng (Chinese spelling) Position(s): Member of the 20th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee (December 2022 – December 2026); Deputy of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC, February 2023 – February 2027); Party Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR); Director of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) (since May 2024); former Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), and Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; Political commissar of the XPCC and CEO of the China Xinjian GroupDOB: May 1963POB: Linyi, Shandong (China)Nationality: ChineseGender: male Party Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) since October 2021. Member of the 20th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee (December 2022 – December 2026). Deputy of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC, February 2023 – February 2027).Former Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) and Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) from April 2020 to October 2021, as well as Political commissar of the XPCC from May 2020 to October 2021. Former Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR, from February 2019 to September 2020. Wang Junzheng also held other senior posts in the XPCC.The XPCC is a state-owned economic and paramilitary organisation in the XUAR, which exercises administrative authority and controls economic activities in Xinjiang.As Party Secretary and Political commissar of the XPCC, Wang Junzheng was involved in overseeing all policies implemented by the XPCC. In that position, he was responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief, linked, inter alia, to the XPCC’s implementation of a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities.He was also responsible for the XPCC’s systematic use of Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities as a forced workforce, in particular in cotton fields.As Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of the XUAR, Wang Junzheng was involved in overseeing all the security policies implemented in Xinjiang, including the aforementioned programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities. As Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR from February 2019 to September 2020, Wang Junzheng was responsible for maintaining internal security and law enforcement in the XUAR. As such, he held a key political position in charge of overseeing and implementing the aforementioned programme. 22.3.2021 7. WANG Mingshan (Chinese spelling) Position(s): Deputy of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC, February 2023 – February 2027); Deputy Director of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)DOB: January 1964POB: Wuwei, Gansu (China)Nationality: ChineseGender: male Deputy Director (since February 2024) and former member of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Deputy of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC, February 2023 – February 2027).Former Director and Deputy Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (XPSB) between 2017 and January 2021.As Deputy Director and former Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR (September 2020 – February 2024), Wang Mingshan is responsible for maintaining internal security and law enforcement in the XUAR. As such, he holds a key political position in charge of overseeing a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities.As Former Director and Deputy Party Secretary of the XPSB (2017 to January 2021), he held a key position in Xinjiang’s security apparatus and was directly responsible for implementing the aforementioned programme. In particular, the XPSB has deployed the “Integrated Joint Operations Platform” (IJOP), a big data programme used to track millions of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region and flag those deemed “potentially threatening” to be sent to detention camps.In his current position and due to his former functions, Wang Mingshan is responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief. 22.3.2021 8. CHEN Mingguo (Chinese spelling) Position(s): Secretary of Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR); Member of the CCP Standing Committee of the XUAR.DOB: October 1966POB: Yilong, Sichuan (China)Nationality: ChineseGender: male Secretary of Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and Member of the CCP Standing Committee of the XUAR since February 2024.Former Director of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (XPSB) since January 2021 and Vice-Chairman of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) People’s Government.As Secretary of Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR), Member of the CCP Standing Committee of the XUAR and former Director of the XPSB, Chen Mingguo holds a key position in Xinjiang’s security apparatus and is directly involved in implementing a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities. In particular, the XPSB has deployed the “Integrated Joint Operations Platform” (IJOP), a big data programme used to track millions of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region and flag those deemed “potentially threatening” to be sent to detention camps. Chen Mingguo is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief. 22.3.2021 13. Aiub Vakhaevich KATAEV (a.k.a. Ayubkhan Vakhaevich KATAEV) Аюб Вахаевич КАТАЕВ (a.k.a. Аюбхан Вахаевич КАТАЕВ) (Russian spelling) Position(s): Former Head of Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in the city of Argun in the Chechen RepublicDOB: 1.12.1983POB: Ilyinsky, ChechnyaNationality: RussianID Number: 200505588830, 014112081090Gender: male Head of Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in the city of Argun in the Chechen Republic until 2018.In his capacity as Head of Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in Argun, Aiub Kataev oversaw the activities of local state security and police agencies. In this position, he personally oversaw widespread and systematic persecutions in Chechnya, which began in 2017. The repressions are directed against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons, those presumed to belong to LGBTI groups, and other individuals suspected of being opponents of the Head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov. Aiub Kataev and forces formerly under his command are responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, as well as arbitrary arrests and detentions and extrajudicial or arbitrary executions and killings.According to numerous witnesses, Aiub Kataev personally supervised and took part in torturing detainees. 22.3.2021 20. Aleksandr Grigorievitch MALOLETKO Александр Григорьевич МАЛОЛЕТКО(Russian spelling) Aleksandr Maloletko was a close collaborator of Yevgeny Prigozhin. His action as a “defender of the Motherland” and as the Head of the “Veteran’s Interests Defenders League” was publicly hailed by Yevgeny Prigozhin. He has been working as an instructor for the Wagner Group in the Central African Republic (CAR). He is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses in several countries, including in CAR, and is responsible for supporting the acts of the Wagner Group. 25.2.2023 22. Dimitri SYTIIa.k.a.Dimitri SYTYI Дмитрий СЫТИЙ(Russian spelling) Position(s): Director of the Russian House of BanguiDOB: 23.3.1989POB: Minsk (Belarus)Nationality: RussianPassport number: 550246878Gender: maleAddress: NA-SYTAIA/A1-TANKISTAZ KHRUSTITSKOGO 62 APT25/ZP-198217/CI St Petersburg, Russian Federation Dimitri Sytii has a leading role within the Wagner Group in the Central African Republic (CAR), and he had close links to Yevgeny Prigozhin. He is in charge of conducting the Wagner Group’s operations and influence policy in CAR. He is the head of the local branch of the Russian House, the cultural arm of the Russian foreign ministry.The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including CAR.Given his influential position in CAR and his leading role in the Wagner Group, he is responsible for serious human rights abuses committed by the Wagner Group in CAR. 25.2.2023 23. Mikhail Sergeyevich POTEPKIN Михаил Сергеевич ПОТЕПКИН(Russian spelling) Position(s): Director Meroe GoldDOB: 19.9.1981 or 29.9.1981Nationality: RussianGender: malePassport number: 651697952 (Russian passport)Address: SudanAssociated companies: Megaline; Concord; IT-Debugger Mikhail Potepkin is director of Meroe Gold, a cover entity for the Wagner Group’s operations in Sudan, as well as being involved in M-Invest, Meroe’s parent company. He has a leading role within the Wagner Group in Sudan, and he had close links to Yevgeny Prigozhin. By being affiliated with the Sudanese military, the Wagner Group secured the exploiting and exporting of Sudanese gold to Russia. Potepkin is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Sudan. Through his activities, he also provides support for such abuses committed in Sudan. 25.2.2023 25. Vitalii Viktorovitch PERFILEV Виталий Викторович ПЕРФИЛЬЕВ(Russian spelling) DOB: 11.9.1983POB: Novossibirsk USSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianAddress: Bangui (Central African Republic)Gender: malePassport number: NR 75 2987491Date of delivery: 30.3.2016Expiration date: 30.3.2026 Vitalii Perfilev was the security advisor to the President of the Central African Republic (CAR) until November 2023, and a key figure within the Wagner Group in CAR.The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including CAR.Given his former influential position during the period when the human rights abuses were committed in CAR and his leading role in the Wagner Group, Vitalii Perfilev is responsible for serious human rights abuses committed by the Wagner Group in CAR. 25.2.2023 26. Andrei Sergeevich MANDEL Андрей Сергеевич МАНДЕЛЬ(Russian spelling) DOB: 2.3.1990POB: GermanyGender: malePassport number: 753615660 Andrei Mandel is head of M-Invest, a cover entity for the Wagner Group’s operations in Sudan, as well as being involved in its subsidiary Meroe Gold. He has a leading role within the Wagner Group in Sudan, and had close links with Yevgeny Prigozhin. By being closely affiliated with the Sudanese military, the Wagner Group secured the exploiting and exporting of Sudanese gold to Russia. Andrei Mandel is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Sudan. Through his activities, Andrei Mandel also provides support for such abuses committed in Sudan. 25.2.2023 27. Neda Mohammad NADEEM (Pashto spelling) Position(s): Acting Taliban Minister for Higher EducationNationality: AfghanDOB: 1977POB: Kandahar, AfghanistanGender: male Neda Mohammed Nadeem has been the acting Taliban Minister for Higher Education since 22 October 2022.Since he took up his position, the Taliban have published decrees banning women from higher education throughout the country. These decrees deprive women of their right to education as well as their equal access to education, violating the principle of equal treatment between men and women.In his capacity as acting Taliban Minister for Higher Education, Neda Mohammed Nadeem is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Afghanistan, in particular the widespread violation of women’s right to education and the right to equal treatment between men and women in the field of education. 7.3.2023 29. Alexander Georgievich FEDORINOV Александр Георгиевич ФЕДОРИНОВ(Russian spelling) Position(s): commanding officer of Moscow Police StationRank: Lieutenant ColonelDOB: 31.5.1980POB: Michurinsk, Tambov, Russian FederationNationality: RussianGender: male Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Fedorinov is a commanding officer of Moscow Police Station.In his capacity as acting head of the police station in March 2022, he authorised the arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as the subsequent torture, of female anti-war protestors.Alexander Fedorinov is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrests or detentions as well as systematic sexual and gender-based violence. 7.3.2023 33. Gatluak Nyang HOTH Nationality: South SudaneseGender: male Gatluak Nyang Hoth was the county commissioner for Mayiandit county (Unity State, South Sudan) from February 2021 until June 2024.In this position, he commanded government-aligned militias to carry out attacks in southern Unity State, between February and May 2022. During this period, troops under his command made widespread and systematic use of sexual violence as a war tactic and instrumentalised it as a reward and entitlement for men participating in the conflict.In his capacity as county commissioner, Gatluak Nyang Hoth is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in South Sudan, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 7.3.2023 35. Toe UIa.k.a. Toe YI Position(s): Deputy Minister of Home AffairsRank: Major-GeneralDOB: 1966Nationality: Myanmar/BurmaGender: male Major-General Toe Ui was appointed Deputy Minister of Home Affairs on 3 February 2023. He is the former second in command of the Office of the Chief of Military Security Affairs (OCMSA). The OCMSA is responsible for the management of detention and interrogation centres in Myanmar/Burma and is also tasked with intelligence gathering.OCMSA staff under Ui’s authority use forced nudity, rape, electric shock, burning of genitalia and excessive violence during the arbitrary detention and interrogation of men, women and members of the LGBTIQ community.In his capacity as second in command of the OCMSA, Major-General Toe Ui is responsible for serious human rights violations in Myanmar/Burma, including arbitrary detentions and torture, as well as for systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 7.3.2023 37. Andrei Andreevich ZADACHIN Андрей Андреевич ЗАДАЧИН(Russian spelling) Position(s): Investigator of the Major Investigative Unit at the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation; MajorDOB: 22.8.1990POB: Moscow, Russian FederationNationality: RussianGender: maleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 771577190559Fiscal Registration Number: YBLWST14JJ39 In his position as Investigator of the Major Investigative Unit at the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, Andrei Zadachin issued a politically motivated criminal accusation against Vladimir Kara-Murza. Andrei Zadachin also asked the court that Vladimir Kara-Murza be detained and provided supporting testimony in court.Vladimir Kara-Murza is a prominent opposition activist in Russia. Politically motivated court proceedings based on false allegations started against him in 2022 after he accused the Kremlin of committing war crimes in Ukraine and publicly condemned Russian aggression. In April 2023, he was sentenced to 25 years in a high-security prison/labour camp. The court proceedings against him targeted his activism and served as a show trial in Russia to suppress voices critical of the ruling regime in voicing opposition to the war of aggression against Ukraine. The Russian regime is using the judiciary of the country as a widespread tool in numerous serious human rights violations. The justice system is not independent and is used to systematically and severely violate the human rights of individuals opposed to the ruling regime, by violating their freedom of opinion and expression.Therefore, Andrei Zadachin is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including violations of freedom of opinion and expression. 5.6.2023 40. Diana Igorevna MISHCHENKO(Maiden name: GARIPOVA) Диана Игоревнa МИЩЕНКО(Russian spelling) Position(s): Judge of the Khamovniki District Court of MoscowDOB: 12.5.1977POB: Moscow, Russian FederationNationality: RussianPassport no.: 4508731961Gender: femaleFiscal registration no.: K7VGTQKBDX68Individual Taxpayer Number: 771805281790 In her position as Judge of the Khamovniki District Court of Moscow, Diana Mishchenko is involved in the politically motivated court case against Vladimir Kara-Murza. She issued a sentence to approve the administrative arrest of Vladimir Kara-Murza for 15 days.Vladimir Kara-Murza is a prominent opposition activist in Russia. Politically motivated court proceedings based on false allegations started against him in 2022 after he accused the Kremlin of committing war crimes in Ukraine and publicly condemned Russian aggression. In April 2023, he was sentenced to 25 years in a high-security prison/labour camp. The court proceedings against him targeted his activism and served as a show trial in Russia to suppress voices critical of the ruling regime in voicing opposition to the war of aggression against Ukraine. The Russian regime is using the judiciary of the country as a widespread tool in numerous serious human rights violations. The justice system is not independent and is used to systematically and severely violate the human rights of individuals opposed to the ruling regime, by violating their freedom of opinion and expression.Therefore, Diana Mishchenko is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including violations of freedom of opinion and expression. 5.6.2023 43. Sergei Gennadievich PODOPRIGOROV Сергей Геннадьевич ПОДОПРИГОРОВ(Russian spelling) Function: Judge of the Moscow City CourtDOB: 8.1.1974POB: Moscow, Russian FederationNationality: RussianGender: maleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 772606428578AddressShmitovskiy Proyezd, 16c2, Moscow, Russia, 123100. Apartment 52.(Шмитовский пр-д, 16с2, Москва, Россия, 123100. Квартира 52) In his position as Judge of the Moscow City Court, Sergei Podoprigorov is involved in the politically motivated court case against Vladimir Kara-Murza. He chaired the collegium of Judges at the Moscow City Court who on 17 April 2023 sentenced opposition activist Vladimir Kara-Murza to 25 years in high-security prison/labour camp.Vladimir Kara-Murza is a prominent opposition activist in Russia. Politically motivated court proceedings based on false allegations started against him in 2022 after he accused the Kremlin of committing war crimes in Ukraine and publicly condemned Russian aggression. In April 2023, he was sentenced to 25 years in a high-security prison/labour camp. The court proceedings against him targeted his activism and served as a show trial in Russia to suppress voices critical of the ruling regime in voicing opposition to the war of aggression against Ukraine. The Russian regime is using the judiciary of the country as a widespread tool in numerous serious human rights violations. The justice system is not independent and is used to systematically and severely violate the human rights of individuals opposed to the ruling regime, by violating their freedom of opinion and expression.Previously, Sergei Podoprigorov, as a Judge at Moscow’s Tverskoi district court, made two rulings in relation to Sergei Magnitsky, who exposed corruption and misconduct by Russian government officials, and was later persecuted and died in Russian prison.Therefore, Sergei Podoprigorov is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including violations of freedom of opinion and expression. 5.6.2023 75. Wadim Konstantinowitsch KALININ Вадим Kонстантинович КАЛИНИН Position(s): Head of the IK-3 penal colonyDOB: 7.3.1973POB: Russian FederationNationality: RussianGender: maleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 663401241613 Wadim Kalinin is the Head of the IK-3 penal colony.Within the chain of command in the IK-3 penal colony, being officially part of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) “senior command staff” and assuming a managerial role, he is directly tasked with executive decisions and therefore responsible for the overall conditions of imprisonment in the IK-3 penal colony. The IK-3 penal colony, commonly known as the “Polar Wolf”, is the location where detained opposition politician Alexei Navalny died under unknown circumstances. The conditions of Alexei Navalny’s imprisonment in the IK-3 penal colony included physical violence such as torture and withholding warm water and adequate clothing in winter, medical assistance and food and water.Therefore, Wadim Kalinin is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression. 22.3.2024 86. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich MUKHANOV Александр Александрович МУХАНОВ Position(s): Director of IK-1DOB: 7.12.1984POB: Russian FederationNationality: RussianGender: maleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 332806323008 Aleksandr Mukhanov is the Director of correctional colony No1 (IK-1) and he was the Director of correctional colony No2 (IK-2) during the period when Alexei Navalny was held there from March 2021 to June 2022.IK-2 is known for poor conditions of detention. Alexei Navalny, who had recently been poisoned, was refused access to civilian doctors in that colony, despite the threat to his health.As Director of IK-1, Aleksandr Mukhanov is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as well as the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression. 22.3.2024 87. Roman Alexandrovitch VIDYUKOV Роман Александрович ВИДЮКОВ(Russian spelling) Position(s): Deputy Head of the Main Investigation Department at the State Investigative Committee of the Russian FederationDOB: 30.7.1980POB: Russia FederationNationality: RussianGender: male Roman Vidyukov is Deputy Head of the Main Investigation Department and former investigator at the State Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation.During the period when he held the position of investigator at the State Investigative Committee, Roman Vidyukov led the investigation in one of the cases in which Alexei Navalny was sentenced to nine years in prison in 2022. Roman Vidyukov also was a member of the preliminary investigation team for the “money laundering” case against Alexei Navalny’s anti-corruption foundation. Roman Vidyukov further led the investigation against Lilia Chanysheva, former Head of Alexei Navalny’s headquarters in Ufa, who was convicted of “creation of an extremist community”. Lilia Chanysheva was sentenced to seven and a half years in prison in 2023.During those court cases, Roman Vidyukov allegedly threatened a witness in order to force him to give testimony that would be favourable to the investigation during Alexei Navalny’s fraud case.Roman Vidyukov is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests or detentions and the violation of freedom of opinion and expression which is of serious concern as regards the objectives of the common foreign and security policy set out in Article 21 TEU. 22.3.2024 88. Evgenia Sergeevna NIKOLAEVA Евгения Сергеевна НИКОЛАЕВА(Russian spelling) Position(s): Judge at the Basmanny District Court in MoscowDOB: 9.7.1981POB: Russian FederationNationality: RussianGender: femaleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 771873894393 Evgenia Nikolaeva has been a judge at the Basmanny District Court in Moscow since 2016.She has issued a number of rulings against political opponents (including Alexei Navalny, Ilia Yashin and Vladimir Kara-Murza), thereby contributing to political repression in Russia. In October 2023, she sent Alexei Navalny’s lawyers Alexey Liptser and Igor Sergunin to pre-trial detention for 2 months. Previously, she had repeatedly made life difficult for political prisoners, including by extending the terms of detention in pre-trial detention centre for the former head of Alexei Navalny’s headquarters in Ufa, Lilia Chanysheva. Evgenia Nikolaeva also refused to address complaints about the inaction of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation on the allegation of Alexei Navalny’s poisoning.In her position, Evgenia Nikolaeva is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests or detentions and the violation of freedom of opinion and expression which is of serious concern as regards the objectives of the common foreign and security policy set out in Article 21 TEU. 22.3.2024 96. Sergey Anatolevich MOROZ Сергей Анатольевич МОРОЗ(Russian spelling) Position(s): Head of the Federal Penitentiary Service of the Russian Federation for MoscowDOB: 15.9.1968POB: Berdyansk, Zaporozhye, Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine)Nationality: RussianGender: maleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 644918369538 Sergey Moroz is a Russian official. He is Head of the Federal Penitentiary Service in Moscow.In that position, he placed the opposition politician Alexei Navalny on the federal wanted list. Sergey Moroz is accused of having exerted extreme humiliation and violence on detainees upon their arrival in detention.Therefore, Sergey Moroz is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression. 22.3.2024 97. Elena Evgenievna MOROZOVA Елена Евгеньевна МОРОЗОВА(Russian spelling) Position(s): Judge of the Khimki City CourtDOB: 2.12.1977Nationality: RussianGender: female Elena Morozova is a Russian judge working in the Khimki City Court.In her position, she decided to place the opposition politician Alexei Navalny in custody for 30 days after he arrived in Moscow after his treatment for Novichok poisoning. The trial she chaired violated fair trial standards, including the right to review the contents of the indictment and trial documents, the opportunity to consult with a lawyer, and public access to the trial.Therefore, Elena Morozova is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression. 22.3.2024 99. Mikhail Yurievich PTITSYN Михаил Юрьевич ПТИЦЫН(Russian spelling) Position(s): Chairman of the Moscow City CourtDOB: 21.8.1963Nationality: RussianGender: male Mikhail Ptitsyn is Chairman of the Moscow City Court.In that position, he positively considered the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service’s proposal to replace opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s probation sentence with a fully fledged sentence. Consequently, Alexei Navalny was deprived of the possibility to act in public life in Russia by being imprisoned in a penal colony.Therefore, Mikhail Ptitsyn is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression. 22.3.2024 100. Sergey Alekseevich RYABTSEV Сергей Алексеевич РЯБЦЕВ(Russian spelling) Position(s): Judge of the Lefortovo District Court of MoscowDOB: 4.9.1989Nationality: RussianGender: male Sergey Ryabtsev is a Russian judge working in the Lefortovo District Court of Moscow.In that position, he was involved in sabotaging the investigation regarding the poisoning of Alexei Navalny by refusing to address the complaint about the inaction of the Investigative Directorate of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB). Moreover, he continuously delivers sentences against freedom of speech in Russia.Therefore, Sergey Ryabtsev is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression. 22.3.2024 101. Petr Pavlovich SERKOV Пётр Павлович СЕРКОВ(Russian spelling) Position(s): First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian FederationDOB: 7.6.1955POB: Poldamasovo, Ulyanovsk region, former USSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: maleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 732502615730 Petr Serkov is the First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.In that position, he upheld the verdict against the opposition politician Alexei Navalny in 2018. Consequently, Alexei Navalny was convicted and imprisoned in a high-security penal colony in order to prevent him from engaging in political activity. Placing Alexei Navalny in a penal colony resulted in his death.Therefore, Petr Serkov is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression. 22.3.2024 103. Nikolay Viktorovich TIMOSHIN Николай Викторович ТИМОШИН(Russian spelling) Position(s): Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian FederationDOB: 14.8.1959POB: Zhidkoe village, Znamensky district, Oryol region, former USSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: male Nikolay Timoshin is Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. Previously, he held the position of Member of the Court’s Presidium.As Member of the Presidium, Nikolay Timoshin upheld the verdict against the opposition politician Alexei Navalny in 2018. Consequently, Alexei Navalny was convicted and imprisoned in a high-security penal colony in order to prevent him from engaging in political activity.Therefore, Nikolay Timoshin is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression. 22.3.2024 104. Vladimir Yurievich ZAITSEV Владимир Юрьевич ЗАЙЦЕВ(Russian spelling) Position(s): Chairman of the Appellate Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Russian FederationDOB: 31.3.1957POB: Valamaz, Krasnogorsk, Udmurtia SSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: male Vladimir Zaitsev is Chairman of the Appellate Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.In that position, he excluded Alexei Navalny from running in the presidential election in Russia in 2018 in a politically motivated trial.Therefore, Vladimir Zaitsev is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including systematic violations of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and freedom of expression and opinion. 22.3.2024 115. Abdel Karim Mahmoud (Mahmood, Mohammad)IBRAHIM (Arabic spelling) Position(s): Chief of staff of the Syrian ArmyPOB: Tartous, SyriaNationality: SyrianGender: male Abdel Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim is the chief of staff of the Syrian Army.The Syrian state, including its military, commits systematic and widespread torture, rape and sexual and gender-based violence against civilians.As the chief of staff of the Syrian Army, Abdel Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim is responsible for the actions of the armed forces under his command.Therefore, Abdel Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim is responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture and systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 22.7.2024’;
Names (Transliteration into Latin script) Names Identifying information Reasons for listing Date of listing
‘1. Alexander (Alexandr) Petrovich KALASHNIKOV Aлександр Петрович КАЛАШНИКОВ(Russian spelling) Position(s): Former director of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN)DOB: 27.1.1964POB: Tatarsk, Novosibirsk Region/Oblast, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: maleID Number: 771670606787 Alexander Kalashnikov was the director of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) from 8 October 2019 until 25 November 2021. In that position, he oversaw all activities of the FSIN. In his capacity as director of the FSIN, he was responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests and detentions.While Alexei Navalny was recovering in Germany (September 2020 – January 2021) after having been poisoned with a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group, on 28 December 2020 FSIN demanded that he immediately present himself to a probation officer or face a prison sentence for violating a suspended sentence for fraud conviction. That fraud conviction was found to be arbitrary and unfair by the European Court of Human Rights in 2018. On 17 January 2021, acting on the orders of Alexander Kalashnikov, FSIN officers detained Alexei Navalny upon his arrival at Moscow airport.Alexei Navalny’s arrest is based on a decision by the Khimki city court, which in turn was issued at the request of FSIN. In late December 2020, FSIN had already requested that a court replace Alexei Nalvany’s suspended sentence with a prison term. On 17 February 2021, the European Court of Human Rights ordered the Government of Russia to release Alexei Navalny. 2.3.2021
2. Alexander (Alexandr) Ivanovich BASTRYKIN Алексaндр Ивaнович БАСТРЫКИН Position(s): Chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian FederationDOB: 27.8.1953POB: Pskov, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: maleID Number: 782618375392 Alexander Bastrykin has served as chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (the “Committee”) since January 2011 (and as acting chairman from October to December 2010). In that position, he oversees all activities of the Committee. Officially, the Committee is presided over by the Russian President. In Alexander Bastrykin’s capacity as chairman of the Committee, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests and detentions.Alexander Bastrykin is responsible for the Committee’s widespread and systematic repressive campaigns against the Russian opposition, targeting and investigating its members. On 29 December 2020, the Committee launched an investigation into the opposition leader Alexei Navalny, charging him with large-scale fraud. Alexei Navalny and others published articles on Alexander Bastrykin’s ownership of Czech real estate firm LAW Bohemia in the 2000s.In 2022, the Investigative Committee, which Alexander Bastrykin is still chairing, charged 92 Ukrainian soldiers with crimes against humanity during Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. 2.3.2021
4. Viktor Vasilievich (Vasilyevich) ZOLOTOV Виктор Васильевич ЗОЛОТОВ Position(s): Director of the Federal Service of National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation (Rosgvardia)DOB: 27.1.1954POB: Sasovo, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: maleID Number: 770600283509 Viktor Zolotov has been the Director of the Federal Service of National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation (Rosgvardia) since 5 April 2016 and, therefore, Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation, as well as Commander of OMON – the Special Purpose Mobile Unit integrated in Rosgvardia. In that position, he oversees all activities of Rosgvardia and OMON troops. In his capacity as Director of Rosgvardia, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests and detentions and systematic and widespread violations of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, in particular by violently repressing protests and demonstrations.Rosgvardia was employed to quell the pro-Navalny protests of 23 January and 21 April 2021, and many OMON and National Guard officers were reported to have used brutality and violence against protesters. Dozens of journalists were targeted with aggression by the security forces, including Meduza’s correspondent Kristina Safronova, who was hit by an OMON officer, and Novaya Gazeta’s journalist Yelizaveta Kirpanova, who was hit on the head with a truncheon leaving her bleeding. During the 23 January 2021 protests, security forces arbitrarily detained more than 300 minors. 2.3.2021
6. WANG Junzheng (Chinese spelling) Position(s): Member of the 20th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee (December 2022 – December 2026); Deputy of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC, February 2023 – February 2027); Party Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR); Director of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) (since May 2024); former Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), and Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; Political commissar of the XPCC and CEO of the China Xinjian GroupDOB: May 1963POB: Linyi, Shandong (China)Nationality: ChineseGender: male Party Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) since October 2021. Member of the 20th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee (December 2022 – December 2026). Deputy of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC, February 2023 – February 2027).Former Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) and Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) from April 2020 to October 2021, as well as Political commissar of the XPCC from May 2020 to October 2021. Former Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR, from February 2019 to September 2020. Wang Junzheng also held other senior posts in the XPCC.The XPCC is a state-owned economic and paramilitary organisation in the XUAR, which exercises administrative authority and controls economic activities in Xinjiang.As Party Secretary and Political commissar of the XPCC, Wang Junzheng was involved in overseeing all policies implemented by the XPCC. In that position, he was responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief, linked, inter alia, to the XPCC’s implementation of a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities.He was also responsible for the XPCC’s systematic use of Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities as a forced workforce, in particular in cotton fields.As Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of the XUAR, Wang Junzheng was involved in overseeing all the security policies implemented in Xinjiang, including the aforementioned programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities. As Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR from February 2019 to September 2020, Wang Junzheng was responsible for maintaining internal security and law enforcement in the XUAR. As such, he held a key political position in charge of overseeing and implementing the aforementioned programme. 22.3.2021
7. WANG Mingshan (Chinese spelling) Position(s): Deputy of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC, February 2023 – February 2027); Deputy Director of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)DOB: January 1964POB: Wuwei, Gansu (China)Nationality: ChineseGender: male Deputy Director (since February 2024) and former member of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Deputy of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC, February 2023 – February 2027).Former Director and Deputy Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (XPSB) between 2017 and January 2021.As Deputy Director and former Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR (September 2020 – February 2024), Wang Mingshan is responsible for maintaining internal security and law enforcement in the XUAR. As such, he holds a key political position in charge of overseeing a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities.As Former Director and Deputy Party Secretary of the XPSB (2017 to January 2021), he held a key position in Xinjiang’s security apparatus and was directly responsible for implementing the aforementioned programme. In particular, the XPSB has deployed the “Integrated Joint Operations Platform” (IJOP), a big data programme used to track millions of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region and flag those deemed “potentially threatening” to be sent to detention camps.In his current position and due to his former functions, Wang Mingshan is responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief. 22.3.2021
8. CHEN Mingguo (Chinese spelling) Position(s): Secretary of Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR); Member of the CCP Standing Committee of the XUAR.DOB: October 1966POB: Yilong, Sichuan (China)Nationality: ChineseGender: male Secretary of Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and Member of the CCP Standing Committee of the XUAR since February 2024.Former Director of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (XPSB) since January 2021 and Vice-Chairman of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) People’s Government.As Secretary of Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR), Member of the CCP Standing Committee of the XUAR and former Director of the XPSB, Chen Mingguo holds a key position in Xinjiang’s security apparatus and is directly involved in implementing a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities. In particular, the XPSB has deployed the “Integrated Joint Operations Platform” (IJOP), a big data programme used to track millions of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region and flag those deemed “potentially threatening” to be sent to detention camps. Chen Mingguo is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief. 22.3.2021
13. Aiub Vakhaevich KATAEV (a.k.a. Ayubkhan Vakhaevich KATAEV) Аюб Вахаевич КАТАЕВ (a.k.a. Аюбхан Вахаевич КАТАЕВ) (Russian spelling) Position(s): Former Head of Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in the city of Argun in the Chechen RepublicDOB: 1.12.1983POB: Ilyinsky, ChechnyaNationality: RussianID Number: 200505588830, 014112081090Gender: male Head of Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in the city of Argun in the Chechen Republic until 2018.In his capacity as Head of Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in Argun, Aiub Kataev oversaw the activities of local state security and police agencies. In this position, he personally oversaw widespread and systematic persecutions in Chechnya, which began in 2017. The repressions are directed against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons, those presumed to belong to LGBTI groups, and other individuals suspected of being opponents of the Head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov. Aiub Kataev and forces formerly under his command are responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, as well as arbitrary arrests and detentions and extrajudicial or arbitrary executions and killings.According to numerous witnesses, Aiub Kataev personally supervised and took part in torturing detainees. 22.3.2021
20. Aleksandr Grigorievitch MALOLETKO Александр Григорьевич МАЛОЛЕТКО(Russian spelling) Aleksandr Maloletko was a close collaborator of Yevgeny Prigozhin. His action as a “defender of the Motherland” and as the Head of the “Veteran’s Interests Defenders League” was publicly hailed by Yevgeny Prigozhin. He has been working as an instructor for the Wagner Group in the Central African Republic (CAR). He is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses in several countries, including in CAR, and is responsible for supporting the acts of the Wagner Group. 25.2.2023
22. Dimitri SYTIIa.k.a.Dimitri SYTYI Дмитрий СЫТИЙ(Russian spelling) Position(s): Director of the Russian House of BanguiDOB: 23.3.1989POB: Minsk (Belarus)Nationality: RussianPassport number: 550246878Gender: maleAddress: NA-SYTAIA/A1-TANKISTAZ KHRUSTITSKOGO 62 APT25/ZP-198217/CI St Petersburg, Russian Federation Dimitri Sytii has a leading role within the Wagner Group in the Central African Republic (CAR), and he had close links to Yevgeny Prigozhin. He is in charge of conducting the Wagner Group’s operations and influence policy in CAR. He is the head of the local branch of the Russian House, the cultural arm of the Russian foreign ministry.The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including CAR.Given his influential position in CAR and his leading role in the Wagner Group, he is responsible for serious human rights abuses committed by the Wagner Group in CAR. 25.2.2023
23. Mikhail Sergeyevich POTEPKIN Михаил Сергеевич ПОТЕПКИН(Russian spelling) Position(s): Director Meroe GoldDOB: 19.9.1981 or 29.9.1981Nationality: RussianGender: malePassport number: 651697952 (Russian passport)Address: SudanAssociated companies: Megaline; Concord; IT-Debugger Mikhail Potepkin is director of Meroe Gold, a cover entity for the Wagner Group’s operations in Sudan, as well as being involved in M-Invest, Meroe’s parent company. He has a leading role within the Wagner Group in Sudan, and he had close links to Yevgeny Prigozhin. By being affiliated with the Sudanese military, the Wagner Group secured the exploiting and exporting of Sudanese gold to Russia. Potepkin is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Sudan. Through his activities, he also provides support for such abuses committed in Sudan. 25.2.2023
25. Vitalii Viktorovitch PERFILEV Виталий Викторович ПЕРФИЛЬЕВ(Russian spelling) DOB: 11.9.1983POB: Novossibirsk USSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianAddress: Bangui (Central African Republic)Gender: malePassport number: NR 75 2987491Date of delivery: 30.3.2016Expiration date: 30.3.2026 Vitalii Perfilev was the security advisor to the President of the Central African Republic (CAR) until November 2023, and a key figure within the Wagner Group in CAR.The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including CAR.Given his former influential position during the period when the human rights abuses were committed in CAR and his leading role in the Wagner Group, Vitalii Perfilev is responsible for serious human rights abuses committed by the Wagner Group in CAR. 25.2.2023
26. Andrei Sergeevich MANDEL Андрей Сергеевич МАНДЕЛЬ(Russian spelling) DOB: 2.3.1990POB: GermanyGender: malePassport number: 753615660 Andrei Mandel is head of M-Invest, a cover entity for the Wagner Group’s operations in Sudan, as well as being involved in its subsidiary Meroe Gold. He has a leading role within the Wagner Group in Sudan, and had close links with Yevgeny Prigozhin. By being closely affiliated with the Sudanese military, the Wagner Group secured the exploiting and exporting of Sudanese gold to Russia. Andrei Mandel is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Sudan. Through his activities, Andrei Mandel also provides support for such abuses committed in Sudan. 25.2.2023
27. Neda Mohammad NADEEM (Pashto spelling) Position(s): Acting Taliban Minister for Higher EducationNationality: AfghanDOB: 1977POB: Kandahar, AfghanistanGender: male Neda Mohammed Nadeem has been the acting Taliban Minister for Higher Education since 22 October 2022.Since he took up his position, the Taliban have published decrees banning women from higher education throughout the country. These decrees deprive women of their right to education as well as their equal access to education, violating the principle of equal treatment between men and women.In his capacity as acting Taliban Minister for Higher Education, Neda Mohammed Nadeem is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Afghanistan, in particular the widespread violation of women’s right to education and the right to equal treatment between men and women in the field of education. 7.3.2023
29. Alexander Georgievich FEDORINOV Александр Георгиевич ФЕДОРИНОВ(Russian spelling) Position(s): commanding officer of Moscow Police StationRank: Lieutenant ColonelDOB: 31.5.1980POB: Michurinsk, Tambov, Russian FederationNationality: RussianGender: male Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Fedorinov is a commanding officer of Moscow Police Station.In his capacity as acting head of the police station in March 2022, he authorised the arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as the subsequent torture, of female anti-war protestors.Alexander Fedorinov is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrests or detentions as well as systematic sexual and gender-based violence. 7.3.2023
33. Gatluak Nyang HOTH Nationality: South SudaneseGender: male Gatluak Nyang Hoth was the county commissioner for Mayiandit county (Unity State, South Sudan) from February 2021 until June 2024.In this position, he commanded government-aligned militias to carry out attacks in southern Unity State, between February and May 2022. During this period, troops under his command made widespread and systematic use of sexual violence as a war tactic and instrumentalised it as a reward and entitlement for men participating in the conflict.In his capacity as county commissioner, Gatluak Nyang Hoth is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in South Sudan, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 7.3.2023
35. Toe UIa.k.a. Toe YI Position(s): Deputy Minister of Home AffairsRank: Major-GeneralDOB: 1966Nationality: Myanmar/BurmaGender: male Major-General Toe Ui was appointed Deputy Minister of Home Affairs on 3 February 2023. He is the former second in command of the Office of the Chief of Military Security Affairs (OCMSA). The OCMSA is responsible for the management of detention and interrogation centres in Myanmar/Burma and is also tasked with intelligence gathering.OCMSA staff under Ui’s authority use forced nudity, rape, electric shock, burning of genitalia and excessive violence during the arbitrary detention and interrogation of men, women and members of the LGBTIQ community.In his capacity as second in command of the OCMSA, Major-General Toe Ui is responsible for serious human rights violations in Myanmar/Burma, including arbitrary detentions and torture, as well as for systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 7.3.2023
37. Andrei Andreevich ZADACHIN Андрей Андреевич ЗАДАЧИН(Russian spelling) Position(s): Investigator of the Major Investigative Unit at the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation; MajorDOB: 22.8.1990POB: Moscow, Russian FederationNationality: RussianGender: maleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 771577190559Fiscal Registration Number: YBLWST14JJ39 In his position as Investigator of the Major Investigative Unit at the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, Andrei Zadachin issued a politically motivated criminal accusation against Vladimir Kara-Murza. Andrei Zadachin also asked the court that Vladimir Kara-Murza be detained and provided supporting testimony in court.Vladimir Kara-Murza is a prominent opposition activist in Russia. Politically motivated court proceedings based on false allegations started against him in 2022 after he accused the Kremlin of committing war crimes in Ukraine and publicly condemned Russian aggression. In April 2023, he was sentenced to 25 years in a high-security prison/labour camp. The court proceedings against him targeted his activism and served as a show trial in Russia to suppress voices critical of the ruling regime in voicing opposition to the war of aggression against Ukraine. The Russian regime is using the judiciary of the country as a widespread tool in numerous serious human rights violations. The justice system is not independent and is used to systematically and severely violate the human rights of individuals opposed to the ruling regime, by violating their freedom of opinion and expression.Therefore, Andrei Zadachin is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including violations of freedom of opinion and expression. 5.6.2023
40. Diana Igorevna MISHCHENKO(Maiden name: GARIPOVA) Диана Игоревнa МИЩЕНКО(Russian spelling) Position(s): Judge of the Khamovniki District Court of MoscowDOB: 12.5.1977POB: Moscow, Russian FederationNationality: RussianPassport no.: 4508731961Gender: femaleFiscal registration no.: K7VGTQKBDX68Individual Taxpayer Number: 771805281790 In her position as Judge of the Khamovniki District Court of Moscow, Diana Mishchenko is involved in the politically motivated court case against Vladimir Kara-Murza. She issued a sentence to approve the administrative arrest of Vladimir Kara-Murza for 15 days.Vladimir Kara-Murza is a prominent opposition activist in Russia. Politically motivated court proceedings based on false allegations started against him in 2022 after he accused the Kremlin of committing war crimes in Ukraine and publicly condemned Russian aggression. In April 2023, he was sentenced to 25 years in a high-security prison/labour camp. The court proceedings against him targeted his activism and served as a show trial in Russia to suppress voices critical of the ruling regime in voicing opposition to the war of aggression against Ukraine. The Russian regime is using the judiciary of the country as a widespread tool in numerous serious human rights violations. The justice system is not independent and is used to systematically and severely violate the human rights of individuals opposed to the ruling regime, by violating their freedom of opinion and expression.Therefore, Diana Mishchenko is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including violations of freedom of opinion and expression. 5.6.2023
43. Sergei Gennadievich PODOPRIGOROV Сергей Геннадьевич ПОДОПРИГОРОВ(Russian spelling) Function: Judge of the Moscow City CourtDOB: 8.1.1974POB: Moscow, Russian FederationNationality: RussianGender: maleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 772606428578AddressShmitovskiy Proyezd, 16c2, Moscow, Russia, 123100. Apartment 52.(Шмитовский пр-д, 16с2, Москва, Россия, 123100. Квартира 52) In his position as Judge of the Moscow City Court, Sergei Podoprigorov is involved in the politically motivated court case against Vladimir Kara-Murza. He chaired the collegium of Judges at the Moscow City Court who on 17 April 2023 sentenced opposition activist Vladimir Kara-Murza to 25 years in high-security prison/labour camp.Vladimir Kara-Murza is a prominent opposition activist in Russia. Politically motivated court proceedings based on false allegations started against him in 2022 after he accused the Kremlin of committing war crimes in Ukraine and publicly condemned Russian aggression. In April 2023, he was sentenced to 25 years in a high-security prison/labour camp. The court proceedings against him targeted his activism and served as a show trial in Russia to suppress voices critical of the ruling regime in voicing opposition to the war of aggression against Ukraine. The Russian regime is using the judiciary of the country as a widespread tool in numerous serious human rights violations. The justice system is not independent and is used to systematically and severely violate the human rights of individuals opposed to the ruling regime, by violating their freedom of opinion and expression.Previously, Sergei Podoprigorov, as a Judge at Moscow’s Tverskoi district court, made two rulings in relation to Sergei Magnitsky, who exposed corruption and misconduct by Russian government officials, and was later persecuted and died in Russian prison.Therefore, Sergei Podoprigorov is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including violations of freedom of opinion and expression. 5.6.2023
75. Wadim Konstantinowitsch KALININ Вадим Kонстантинович КАЛИНИН Position(s): Head of the IK-3 penal colonyDOB: 7.3.1973POB: Russian FederationNationality: RussianGender: maleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 663401241613 Wadim Kalinin is the Head of the IK-3 penal colony.Within the chain of command in the IK-3 penal colony, being officially part of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) “senior command staff” and assuming a managerial role, he is directly tasked with executive decisions and therefore responsible for the overall conditions of imprisonment in the IK-3 penal colony. The IK-3 penal colony, commonly known as the “Polar Wolf”, is the location where detained opposition politician Alexei Navalny died under unknown circumstances. The conditions of Alexei Navalny’s imprisonment in the IK-3 penal colony included physical violence such as torture and withholding warm water and adequate clothing in winter, medical assistance and food and water.Therefore, Wadim Kalinin is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression. 22.3.2024
86. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich MUKHANOV Александр Александрович МУХАНОВ Position(s): Director of IK-1DOB: 7.12.1984POB: Russian FederationNationality: RussianGender: maleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 332806323008 Aleksandr Mukhanov is the Director of correctional colony No1 (IK-1) and he was the Director of correctional colony No2 (IK-2) during the period when Alexei Navalny was held there from March 2021 to June 2022.IK-2 is known for poor conditions of detention. Alexei Navalny, who had recently been poisoned, was refused access to civilian doctors in that colony, despite the threat to his health.As Director of IK-1, Aleksandr Mukhanov is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as well as the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression. 22.3.2024
87. Roman Alexandrovitch VIDYUKOV Роман Александрович ВИДЮКОВ(Russian spelling) Position(s): Deputy Head of the Main Investigation Department at the State Investigative Committee of the Russian FederationDOB: 30.7.1980POB: Russia FederationNationality: RussianGender: male Roman Vidyukov is Deputy Head of the Main Investigation Department and former investigator at the State Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation.During the period when he held the position of investigator at the State Investigative Committee, Roman Vidyukov led the investigation in one of the cases in which Alexei Navalny was sentenced to nine years in prison in 2022. Roman Vidyukov also was a member of the preliminary investigation team for the “money laundering” case against Alexei Navalny’s anti-corruption foundation. Roman Vidyukov further led the investigation against Lilia Chanysheva, former Head of Alexei Navalny’s headquarters in Ufa, who was convicted of “creation of an extremist community”. Lilia Chanysheva was sentenced to seven and a half years in prison in 2023.During those court cases, Roman Vidyukov allegedly threatened a witness in order to force him to give testimony that would be favourable to the investigation during Alexei Navalny’s fraud case.Roman Vidyukov is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests or detentions and the violation of freedom of opinion and expression which is of serious concern as regards the objectives of the common foreign and security policy set out in Article 21 TEU. 22.3.2024
88. Evgenia Sergeevna NIKOLAEVA Евгения Сергеевна НИКОЛАЕВА(Russian spelling) Position(s): Judge at the Basmanny District Court in MoscowDOB: 9.7.1981POB: Russian FederationNationality: RussianGender: femaleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 771873894393 Evgenia Nikolaeva has been a judge at the Basmanny District Court in Moscow since 2016.She has issued a number of rulings against political opponents (including Alexei Navalny, Ilia Yashin and Vladimir Kara-Murza), thereby contributing to political repression in Russia. In October 2023, she sent Alexei Navalny’s lawyers Alexey Liptser and Igor Sergunin to pre-trial detention for 2 months. Previously, she had repeatedly made life difficult for political prisoners, including by extending the terms of detention in pre-trial detention centre for the former head of Alexei Navalny’s headquarters in Ufa, Lilia Chanysheva. Evgenia Nikolaeva also refused to address complaints about the inaction of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation on the allegation of Alexei Navalny’s poisoning.In her position, Evgenia Nikolaeva is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests or detentions and the violation of freedom of opinion and expression which is of serious concern as regards the objectives of the common foreign and security policy set out in Article 21 TEU. 22.3.2024
96. Sergey Anatolevich MOROZ Сергей Анатольевич МОРОЗ(Russian spelling) Position(s): Head of the Federal Penitentiary Service of the Russian Federation for MoscowDOB: 15.9.1968POB: Berdyansk, Zaporozhye, Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine)Nationality: RussianGender: maleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 644918369538 Sergey Moroz is a Russian official. He is Head of the Federal Penitentiary Service in Moscow.In that position, he placed the opposition politician Alexei Navalny on the federal wanted list. Sergey Moroz is accused of having exerted extreme humiliation and violence on detainees upon their arrival in detention.Therefore, Sergey Moroz is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression. 22.3.2024
97. Elena Evgenievna MOROZOVA Елена Евгеньевна МОРОЗОВА(Russian spelling) Position(s): Judge of the Khimki City CourtDOB: 2.12.1977Nationality: RussianGender: female Elena Morozova is a Russian judge working in the Khimki City Court.In her position, she decided to place the opposition politician Alexei Navalny in custody for 30 days after he arrived in Moscow after his treatment for Novichok poisoning. The trial she chaired violated fair trial standards, including the right to review the contents of the indictment and trial documents, the opportunity to consult with a lawyer, and public access to the trial.Therefore, Elena Morozova is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression. 22.3.2024
99. Mikhail Yurievich PTITSYN Михаил Юрьевич ПТИЦЫН(Russian spelling) Position(s): Chairman of the Moscow City CourtDOB: 21.8.1963Nationality: RussianGender: male Mikhail Ptitsyn is Chairman of the Moscow City Court.In that position, he positively considered the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service’s proposal to replace opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s probation sentence with a fully fledged sentence. Consequently, Alexei Navalny was deprived of the possibility to act in public life in Russia by being imprisoned in a penal colony.Therefore, Mikhail Ptitsyn is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression. 22.3.2024
100. Sergey Alekseevich RYABTSEV Сергей Алексеевич РЯБЦЕВ(Russian spelling) Position(s): Judge of the Lefortovo District Court of MoscowDOB: 4.9.1989Nationality: RussianGender: male Sergey Ryabtsev is a Russian judge working in the Lefortovo District Court of Moscow.In that position, he was involved in sabotaging the investigation regarding the poisoning of Alexei Navalny by refusing to address the complaint about the inaction of the Investigative Directorate of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB). Moreover, he continuously delivers sentences against freedom of speech in Russia.Therefore, Sergey Ryabtsev is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression. 22.3.2024
101. Petr Pavlovich SERKOV Пётр Павлович СЕРКОВ(Russian spelling) Position(s): First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian FederationDOB: 7.6.1955POB: Poldamasovo, Ulyanovsk region, former USSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: maleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 732502615730 Petr Serkov is the First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.In that position, he upheld the verdict against the opposition politician Alexei Navalny in 2018. Consequently, Alexei Navalny was convicted and imprisoned in a high-security penal colony in order to prevent him from engaging in political activity. Placing Alexei Navalny in a penal colony resulted in his death.Therefore, Petr Serkov is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression. 22.3.2024
103. Nikolay Viktorovich TIMOSHIN Николай Викторович ТИМОШИН(Russian spelling) Position(s): Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian FederationDOB: 14.8.1959POB: Zhidkoe village, Znamensky district, Oryol region, former USSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: male Nikolay Timoshin is Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. Previously, he held the position of Member of the Court’s Presidium.As Member of the Presidium, Nikolay Timoshin upheld the verdict against the opposition politician Alexei Navalny in 2018. Consequently, Alexei Navalny was convicted and imprisoned in a high-security penal colony in order to prevent him from engaging in political activity.Therefore, Nikolay Timoshin is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression. 22.3.2024
104. Vladimir Yurievich ZAITSEV Владимир Юрьевич ЗАЙЦЕВ(Russian spelling) Position(s): Chairman of the Appellate Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Russian FederationDOB: 31.3.1957POB: Valamaz, Krasnogorsk, Udmurtia SSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: male Vladimir Zaitsev is Chairman of the Appellate Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.In that position, he excluded Alexei Navalny from running in the presidential election in Russia in 2018 in a politically motivated trial.Therefore, Vladimir Zaitsev is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including systematic violations of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and freedom of expression and opinion. 22.3.2024
115. Abdel Karim Mahmoud (Mahmood, Mohammad)IBRAHIM (Arabic spelling) Position(s): Chief of staff of the Syrian ArmyPOB: Tartous, SyriaNationality: SyrianGender: male Abdel Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim is the chief of staff of the Syrian Army.The Syrian state, including its military, commits systematic and widespread torture, rape and sexual and gender-based violence against civilians.As the chief of staff of the Syrian Army, Abdel Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim is responsible for the actions of the armed forces under his command.Therefore, Abdel Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim is responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture and systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 22.7.2024’;
Names (Transliteration into Latin script) Names Identifying information Reasons for listing Date of listing
‘1. Alexander (Alexandr) Petrovich KALASHNIKOV Aлександр Петрович КАЛАШНИКОВ(Russian spelling) Position(s): Former director of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN)DOB: 27.1.1964POB: Tatarsk, Novosibirsk Region/Oblast, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: maleID Number: 771670606787 Alexander Kalashnikov was the director of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) from 8 October 2019 until 25 November 2021. In that position, he oversaw all activities of the FSIN. In his capacity as director of the FSIN, he was responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests and detentions.While Alexei Navalny was recovering in Germany (September 2020 – January 2021) after having been poisoned with a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group, on 28 December 2020 FSIN demanded that he immediately present himself to a probation officer or face a prison sentence for violating a suspended sentence for fraud conviction. That fraud conviction was found to be arbitrary and unfair by the European Court of Human Rights in 2018. On 17 January 2021, acting on the orders of Alexander Kalashnikov, FSIN officers detained Alexei Navalny upon his arrival at Moscow airport.Alexei Navalny’s arrest is based on a decision by the Khimki city court, which in turn was issued at the request of FSIN. In late December 2020, FSIN had already requested that a court replace Alexei Nalvany’s suspended sentence with a prison term. On 17 February 2021, the European Court of Human Rights ordered the Government of Russia to release Alexei Navalny. 2.3.2021
2. Alexander (Alexandr) Ivanovich BASTRYKIN Алексaндр Ивaнович БАСТРЫКИН Position(s): Chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian FederationDOB: 27.8.1953POB: Pskov, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: maleID Number: 782618375392 Alexander Bastrykin has served as chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (the “Committee”) since January 2011 (and as acting chairman from October to December 2010). In that position, he oversees all activities of the Committee. Officially, the Committee is presided over by the Russian President. In Alexander Bastrykin’s capacity as chairman of the Committee, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests and detentions.Alexander Bastrykin is responsible for the Committee’s widespread and systematic repressive campaigns against the Russian opposition, targeting and investigating its members. On 29 December 2020, the Committee launched an investigation into the opposition leader Alexei Navalny, charging him with large-scale fraud. Alexei Navalny and others published articles on Alexander Bastrykin’s ownership of Czech real estate firm LAW Bohemia in the 2000s.In 2022, the Investigative Committee, which Alexander Bastrykin is still chairing, charged 92 Ukrainian soldiers with crimes against humanity during Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. 2.3.2021
4. Viktor Vasilievich (Vasilyevich) ZOLOTOV Виктор Васильевич ЗОЛОТОВ Position(s): Director of the Federal Service of National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation (Rosgvardia)DOB: 27.1.1954POB: Sasovo, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: maleID Number: 770600283509 Viktor Zolotov has been the Director of the Federal Service of National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation (Rosgvardia) since 5 April 2016 and, therefore, Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation, as well as Commander of OMON – the Special Purpose Mobile Unit integrated in Rosgvardia. In that position, he oversees all activities of Rosgvardia and OMON troops. In his capacity as Director of Rosgvardia, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests and detentions and systematic and widespread violations of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, in particular by violently repressing protests and demonstrations.Rosgvardia was employed to quell the pro-Navalny protests of 23 January and 21 April 2021, and many OMON and National Guard officers were reported to have used brutality and violence against protesters. Dozens of journalists were targeted with aggression by the security forces, including Meduza’s correspondent Kristina Safronova, who was hit by an OMON officer, and Novaya Gazeta’s journalist Yelizaveta Kirpanova, who was hit on the head with a truncheon leaving her bleeding. During the 23 January 2021 protests, security forces arbitrarily detained more than 300 minors. 2.3.2021
6. WANG Junzheng (Chinese spelling) Position(s): Member of the 20th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee (December 2022 – December 2026); Deputy of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC, February 2023 – February 2027); Party Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR); Director of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) (since May 2024); former Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), and Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; Political commissar of the XPCC and CEO of the China Xinjian GroupDOB: May 1963POB: Linyi, Shandong (China)Nationality: ChineseGender: male Party Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) since October 2021. Member of the 20th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee (December 2022 – December 2026). Deputy of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC, February 2023 – February 2027).Former Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) and Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) from April 2020 to October 2021, as well as Political commissar of the XPCC from May 2020 to October 2021. Former Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR, from February 2019 to September 2020. Wang Junzheng also held other senior posts in the XPCC.The XPCC is a state-owned economic and paramilitary organisation in the XUAR, which exercises administrative authority and controls economic activities in Xinjiang.As Party Secretary and Political commissar of the XPCC, Wang Junzheng was involved in overseeing all policies implemented by the XPCC. In that position, he was responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief, linked, inter alia, to the XPCC’s implementation of a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities.He was also responsible for the XPCC’s systematic use of Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities as a forced workforce, in particular in cotton fields.As Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of the XUAR, Wang Junzheng was involved in overseeing all the security policies implemented in Xinjiang, including the aforementioned programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities. As Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR from February 2019 to September 2020, Wang Junzheng was responsible for maintaining internal security and law enforcement in the XUAR. As such, he held a key political position in charge of overseeing and implementing the aforementioned programme. 22.3.2021
7. WANG Mingshan (Chinese spelling) Position(s): Deputy of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC, February 2023 – February 2027); Deputy Director of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)DOB: January 1964POB: Wuwei, Gansu (China)Nationality: ChineseGender: male Deputy Director (since February 2024) and former member of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Deputy of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC, February 2023 – February 2027).Former Director and Deputy Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (XPSB) between 2017 and January 2021.As Deputy Director and former Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR (September 2020 – February 2024), Wang Mingshan is responsible for maintaining internal security and law enforcement in the XUAR. As such, he holds a key political position in charge of overseeing a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities.As Former Director and Deputy Party Secretary of the XPSB (2017 to January 2021), he held a key position in Xinjiang’s security apparatus and was directly responsible for implementing the aforementioned programme. In particular, the XPSB has deployed the “Integrated Joint Operations Platform” (IJOP), a big data programme used to track millions of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region and flag those deemed “potentially threatening” to be sent to detention camps.In his current position and due to his former functions, Wang Mingshan is responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief. 22.3.2021
8. CHEN Mingguo (Chinese spelling) Position(s): Secretary of Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR); Member of the CCP Standing Committee of the XUAR.DOB: October 1966POB: Yilong, Sichuan (China)Nationality: ChineseGender: male Secretary of Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and Member of the CCP Standing Committee of the XUAR since February 2024.Former Director of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (XPSB) since January 2021 and Vice-Chairman of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) People’s Government.As Secretary of Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR), Member of the CCP Standing Committee of the XUAR and former Director of the XPSB, Chen Mingguo holds a key position in Xinjiang’s security apparatus and is directly involved in implementing a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities. In particular, the XPSB has deployed the “Integrated Joint Operations Platform” (IJOP), a big data programme used to track millions of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region and flag those deemed “potentially threatening” to be sent to detention camps. Chen Mingguo is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief. 22.3.2021
13. Aiub Vakhaevich KATAEV (a.k.a. Ayubkhan Vakhaevich KATAEV) Аюб Вахаевич КАТАЕВ (a.k.a. Аюбхан Вахаевич КАТАЕВ) (Russian spelling) Position(s): Former Head of Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in the city of Argun in the Chechen RepublicDOB: 1.12.1983POB: Ilyinsky, ChechnyaNationality: RussianID Number: 200505588830, 014112081090Gender: male Head of Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in the city of Argun in the Chechen Republic until 2018.In his capacity as Head of Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in Argun, Aiub Kataev oversaw the activities of local state security and police agencies. In this position, he personally oversaw widespread and systematic persecutions in Chechnya, which began in 2017. The repressions are directed against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons, those presumed to belong to LGBTI groups, and other individuals suspected of being opponents of the Head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov. Aiub Kataev and forces formerly under his command are responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, as well as arbitrary arrests and detentions and extrajudicial or arbitrary executions and killings.According to numerous witnesses, Aiub Kataev personally supervised and took part in torturing detainees. 22.3.2021
20. Aleksandr Grigorievitch MALOLETKO Александр Григорьевич МАЛОЛЕТКО(Russian spelling) Aleksandr Maloletko was a close collaborator of Yevgeny Prigozhin. His action as a “defender of the Motherland” and as the Head of the “Veteran’s Interests Defenders League” was publicly hailed by Yevgeny Prigozhin. He has been working as an instructor for the Wagner Group in the Central African Republic (CAR). He is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses in several countries, including in CAR, and is responsible for supporting the acts of the Wagner Group. 25.2.2023
22. Dimitri SYTIIa.k.a.Dimitri SYTYI Дмитрий СЫТИЙ(Russian spelling) Position(s): Director of the Russian House of BanguiDOB: 23.3.1989POB: Minsk (Belarus)Nationality: RussianPassport number: 550246878Gender: maleAddress: NA-SYTAIA/A1-TANKISTAZ KHRUSTITSKOGO 62 APT25/ZP-198217/CI St Petersburg, Russian Federation Dimitri Sytii has a leading role within the Wagner Group in the Central African Republic (CAR), and he had close links to Yevgeny Prigozhin. He is in charge of conducting the Wagner Group’s operations and influence policy in CAR. He is the head of the local branch of the Russian House, the cultural arm of the Russian foreign ministry.The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including CAR.Given his influential position in CAR and his leading role in the Wagner Group, he is responsible for serious human rights abuses committed by the Wagner Group in CAR. 25.2.2023
23. Mikhail Sergeyevich POTEPKIN Михаил Сергеевич ПОТЕПКИН(Russian spelling) Position(s): Director Meroe GoldDOB: 19.9.1981 or 29.9.1981Nationality: RussianGender: malePassport number: 651697952 (Russian passport)Address: SudanAssociated companies: Megaline; Concord; IT-Debugger Mikhail Potepkin is director of Meroe Gold, a cover entity for the Wagner Group’s operations in Sudan, as well as being involved in M-Invest, Meroe’s parent company. He has a leading role within the Wagner Group in Sudan, and he had close links to Yevgeny Prigozhin. By being affiliated with the Sudanese military, the Wagner Group secured the exploiting and exporting of Sudanese gold to Russia. Potepkin is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Sudan. Through his activities, he also provides support for such abuses committed in Sudan. 25.2.2023
25. Vitalii Viktorovitch PERFILEV Виталий Викторович ПЕРФИЛЬЕВ(Russian spelling) DOB: 11.9.1983POB: Novossibirsk USSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianAddress: Bangui (Central African Republic)Gender: malePassport number: NR 75 2987491Date of delivery: 30.3.2016Expiration date: 30.3.2026 Vitalii Perfilev was the security advisor to the President of the Central African Republic (CAR) until November 2023, and a key figure within the Wagner Group in CAR.The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including CAR.Given his former influential position during the period when the human rights abuses were committed in CAR and his leading role in the Wagner Group, Vitalii Perfilev is responsible for serious human rights abuses committed by the Wagner Group in CAR. 25.2.2023
26. Andrei Sergeevich MANDEL Андрей Сергеевич МАНДЕЛЬ(Russian spelling) DOB: 2.3.1990POB: GermanyGender: malePassport number: 753615660 Andrei Mandel is head of M-Invest, a cover entity for the Wagner Group’s operations in Sudan, as well as being involved in its subsidiary Meroe Gold. He has a leading role within the Wagner Group in Sudan, and had close links with Yevgeny Prigozhin. By being closely affiliated with the Sudanese military, the Wagner Group secured the exploiting and exporting of Sudanese gold to Russia. Andrei Mandel is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Sudan. Through his activities, Andrei Mandel also provides support for such abuses committed in Sudan. 25.2.2023
27. Neda Mohammad NADEEM (Pashto spelling) Position(s): Acting Taliban Minister for Higher EducationNationality: AfghanDOB: 1977POB: Kandahar, AfghanistanGender: male Neda Mohammed Nadeem has been the acting Taliban Minister for Higher Education since 22 October 2022.Since he took up his position, the Taliban have published decrees banning women from higher education throughout the country. These decrees deprive women of their right to education as well as their equal access to education, violating the principle of equal treatment between men and women.In his capacity as acting Taliban Minister for Higher Education, Neda Mohammed Nadeem is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Afghanistan, in particular the widespread violation of women’s right to education and the right to equal treatment between men and women in the field of education. 7.3.2023
29. Alexander Georgievich FEDORINOV Александр Георгиевич ФЕДОРИНОВ(Russian spelling) Position(s): commanding officer of Moscow Police StationRank: Lieutenant ColonelDOB: 31.5.1980POB: Michurinsk, Tambov, Russian FederationNationality: RussianGender: male Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Fedorinov is a commanding officer of Moscow Police Station.In his capacity as acting head of the police station in March 2022, he authorised the arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as the subsequent torture, of female anti-war protestors.Alexander Fedorinov is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrests or detentions as well as systematic sexual and gender-based violence. 7.3.2023
33. Gatluak Nyang HOTH Nationality: South SudaneseGender: male Gatluak Nyang Hoth was the county commissioner for Mayiandit county (Unity State, South Sudan) from February 2021 until June 2024.In this position, he commanded government-aligned militias to carry out attacks in southern Unity State, between February and May 2022. During this period, troops under his command made widespread and systematic use of sexual violence as a war tactic and instrumentalised it as a reward and entitlement for men participating in the conflict.In his capacity as county commissioner, Gatluak Nyang Hoth is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in South Sudan, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 7.3.2023
35. Toe UIa.k.a. Toe YI Position(s): Deputy Minister of Home AffairsRank: Major-GeneralDOB: 1966Nationality: Myanmar/BurmaGender: male Major-General Toe Ui was appointed Deputy Minister of Home Affairs on 3 February 2023. He is the former second in command of the Office of the Chief of Military Security Affairs (OCMSA). The OCMSA is responsible for the management of detention and interrogation centres in Myanmar/Burma and is also tasked with intelligence gathering.OCMSA staff under Ui’s authority use forced nudity, rape, electric shock, burning of genitalia and excessive violence during the arbitrary detention and interrogation of men, women and members of the LGBTIQ community.In his capacity as second in command of the OCMSA, Major-General Toe Ui is responsible for serious human rights violations in Myanmar/Burma, including arbitrary detentions and torture, as well as for systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 7.3.2023
37. Andrei Andreevich ZADACHIN Андрей Андреевич ЗАДАЧИН(Russian spelling) Position(s): Investigator of the Major Investigative Unit at the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation; MajorDOB: 22.8.1990POB: Moscow, Russian FederationNationality: RussianGender: maleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 771577190559Fiscal Registration Number: YBLWST14JJ39 In his position as Investigator of the Major Investigative Unit at the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, Andrei Zadachin issued a politically motivated criminal accusation against Vladimir Kara-Murza. Andrei Zadachin also asked the court that Vladimir Kara-Murza be detained and provided supporting testimony in court.Vladimir Kara-Murza is a prominent opposition activist in Russia. Politically motivated court proceedings based on false allegations started against him in 2022 after he accused the Kremlin of committing war crimes in Ukraine and publicly condemned Russian aggression. In April 2023, he was sentenced to 25 years in a high-security prison/labour camp. The court proceedings against him targeted his activism and served as a show trial in Russia to suppress voices critical of the ruling regime in voicing opposition to the war of aggression against Ukraine. The Russian regime is using the judiciary of the country as a widespread tool in numerous serious human rights violations. The justice system is not independent and is used to systematically and severely violate the human rights of individuals opposed to the ruling regime, by violating their freedom of opinion and expression.Therefore, Andrei Zadachin is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including violations of freedom of opinion and expression. 5.6.2023
40. Diana Igorevna MISHCHENKO(Maiden name: GARIPOVA) Диана Игоревнa МИЩЕНКО(Russian spelling) Position(s): Judge of the Khamovniki District Court of MoscowDOB: 12.5.1977POB: Moscow, Russian FederationNationality: RussianPassport no.: 4508731961Gender: femaleFiscal registration no.: K7VGTQKBDX68Individual Taxpayer Number: 771805281790 In her position as Judge of the Khamovniki District Court of Moscow, Diana Mishchenko is involved in the politically motivated court case against Vladimir Kara-Murza. She issued a sentence to approve the administrative arrest of Vladimir Kara-Murza for 15 days.Vladimir Kara-Murza is a prominent opposition activist in Russia. Politically motivated court proceedings based on false allegations started against him in 2022 after he accused the Kremlin of committing war crimes in Ukraine and publicly condemned Russian aggression. In April 2023, he was sentenced to 25 years in a high-security prison/labour camp. The court proceedings against him targeted his activism and served as a show trial in Russia to suppress voices critical of the ruling regime in voicing opposition to the war of aggression against Ukraine. The Russian regime is using the judiciary of the country as a widespread tool in numerous serious human rights violations. The justice system is not independent and is used to systematically and severely violate the human rights of individuals opposed to the ruling regime, by violating their freedom of opinion and expression.Therefore, Diana Mishchenko is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including violations of freedom of opinion and expression. 5.6.2023
43. Sergei Gennadievich PODOPRIGOROV Сергей Геннадьевич ПОДОПРИГОРОВ(Russian spelling) Function: Judge of the Moscow City CourtDOB: 8.1.1974POB: Moscow, Russian FederationNationality: RussianGender: maleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 772606428578AddressShmitovskiy Proyezd, 16c2, Moscow, Russia, 123100. Apartment 52.(Шмитовский пр-д, 16с2, Москва, Россия, 123100. Квартира 52) In his position as Judge of the Moscow City Court, Sergei Podoprigorov is involved in the politically motivated court case against Vladimir Kara-Murza. He chaired the collegium of Judges at the Moscow City Court who on 17 April 2023 sentenced opposition activist Vladimir Kara-Murza to 25 years in high-security prison/labour camp.Vladimir Kara-Murza is a prominent opposition activist in Russia. Politically motivated court proceedings based on false allegations started against him in 2022 after he accused the Kremlin of committing war crimes in Ukraine and publicly condemned Russian aggression. In April 2023, he was sentenced to 25 years in a high-security prison/labour camp. The court proceedings against him targeted his activism and served as a show trial in Russia to suppress voices critical of the ruling regime in voicing opposition to the war of aggression against Ukraine. The Russian regime is using the judiciary of the country as a widespread tool in numerous serious human rights violations. The justice system is not independent and is used to systematically and severely violate the human rights of individuals opposed to the ruling regime, by violating their freedom of opinion and expression.Previously, Sergei Podoprigorov, as a Judge at Moscow’s Tverskoi district court, made two rulings in relation to Sergei Magnitsky, who exposed corruption and misconduct by Russian government officials, and was later persecuted and died in Russian prison.Therefore, Sergei Podoprigorov is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including violations of freedom of opinion and expression. 5.6.2023
75. Wadim Konstantinowitsch KALININ Вадим Kонстантинович КАЛИНИН Position(s): Head of the IK-3 penal colonyDOB: 7.3.1973POB: Russian FederationNationality: RussianGender: maleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 663401241613 Wadim Kalinin is the Head of the IK-3 penal colony.Within the chain of command in the IK-3 penal colony, being officially part of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) “senior command staff” and assuming a managerial role, he is directly tasked with executive decisions and therefore responsible for the overall conditions of imprisonment in the IK-3 penal colony. The IK-3 penal colony, commonly known as the “Polar Wolf”, is the location where detained opposition politician Alexei Navalny died under unknown circumstances. The conditions of Alexei Navalny’s imprisonment in the IK-3 penal colony included physical violence such as torture and withholding warm water and adequate clothing in winter, medical assistance and food and water.Therefore, Wadim Kalinin is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression. 22.3.2024
86. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich MUKHANOV Александр Александрович МУХАНОВ Position(s): Director of IK-1DOB: 7.12.1984POB: Russian FederationNationality: RussianGender: maleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 332806323008 Aleksandr Mukhanov is the Director of correctional colony No1 (IK-1) and he was the Director of correctional colony No2 (IK-2) during the period when Alexei Navalny was held there from March 2021 to June 2022.IK-2 is known for poor conditions of detention. Alexei Navalny, who had recently been poisoned, was refused access to civilian doctors in that colony, despite the threat to his health.As Director of IK-1, Aleksandr Mukhanov is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as well as the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression. 22.3.2024
87. Roman Alexandrovitch VIDYUKOV Роман Александрович ВИДЮКОВ(Russian spelling) Position(s): Deputy Head of the Main Investigation Department at the State Investigative Committee of the Russian FederationDOB: 30.7.1980POB: Russia FederationNationality: RussianGender: male Roman Vidyukov is Deputy Head of the Main Investigation Department and former investigator at the State Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation.During the period when he held the position of investigator at the State Investigative Committee, Roman Vidyukov led the investigation in one of the cases in which Alexei Navalny was sentenced to nine years in prison in 2022. Roman Vidyukov also was a member of the preliminary investigation team for the “money laundering” case against Alexei Navalny’s anti-corruption foundation. Roman Vidyukov further led the investigation against Lilia Chanysheva, former Head of Alexei Navalny’s headquarters in Ufa, who was convicted of “creation of an extremist community”. Lilia Chanysheva was sentenced to seven and a half years in prison in 2023.During those court cases, Roman Vidyukov allegedly threatened a witness in order to force him to give testimony that would be favourable to the investigation during Alexei Navalny’s fraud case.Roman Vidyukov is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests or detentions and the violation of freedom of opinion and expression which is of serious concern as regards the objectives of the common foreign and security policy set out in Article 21 TEU. 22.3.2024
88. Evgenia Sergeevna NIKOLAEVA Евгения Сергеевна НИКОЛАЕВА(Russian spelling) Position(s): Judge at the Basmanny District Court in MoscowDOB: 9.7.1981POB: Russian FederationNationality: RussianGender: femaleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 771873894393 Evgenia Nikolaeva has been a judge at the Basmanny District Court in Moscow since 2016.She has issued a number of rulings against political opponents (including Alexei Navalny, Ilia Yashin and Vladimir Kara-Murza), thereby contributing to political repression in Russia. In October 2023, she sent Alexei Navalny’s lawyers Alexey Liptser and Igor Sergunin to pre-trial detention for 2 months. Previously, she had repeatedly made life difficult for political prisoners, including by extending the terms of detention in pre-trial detention centre for the former head of Alexei Navalny’s headquarters in Ufa, Lilia Chanysheva. Evgenia Nikolaeva also refused to address complaints about the inaction of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation on the allegation of Alexei Navalny’s poisoning.In her position, Evgenia Nikolaeva is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests or detentions and the violation of freedom of opinion and expression which is of serious concern as regards the objectives of the common foreign and security policy set out in Article 21 TEU. 22.3.2024
96. Sergey Anatolevich MOROZ Сергей Анатольевич МОРОЗ(Russian spelling) Position(s): Head of the Federal Penitentiary Service of the Russian Federation for MoscowDOB: 15.9.1968POB: Berdyansk, Zaporozhye, Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine)Nationality: RussianGender: maleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 644918369538 Sergey Moroz is a Russian official. He is Head of the Federal Penitentiary Service in Moscow.In that position, he placed the opposition politician Alexei Navalny on the federal wanted list. Sergey Moroz is accused of having exerted extreme humiliation and violence on detainees upon their arrival in detention.Therefore, Sergey Moroz is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression. 22.3.2024
97. Elena Evgenievna MOROZOVA Елена Евгеньевна МОРОЗОВА(Russian spelling) Position(s): Judge of the Khimki City CourtDOB: 2.12.1977Nationality: RussianGender: female Elena Morozova is a Russian judge working in the Khimki City Court.In her position, she decided to place the opposition politician Alexei Navalny in custody for 30 days after he arrived in Moscow after his treatment for Novichok poisoning. The trial she chaired violated fair trial standards, including the right to review the contents of the indictment and trial documents, the opportunity to consult with a lawyer, and public access to the trial.Therefore, Elena Morozova is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression. 22.3.2024
99. Mikhail Yurievich PTITSYN Михаил Юрьевич ПТИЦЫН(Russian spelling) Position(s): Chairman of the Moscow City CourtDOB: 21.8.1963Nationality: RussianGender: male Mikhail Ptitsyn is Chairman of the Moscow City Court.In that position, he positively considered the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service’s proposal to replace opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s probation sentence with a fully fledged sentence. Consequently, Alexei Navalny was deprived of the possibility to act in public life in Russia by being imprisoned in a penal colony.Therefore, Mikhail Ptitsyn is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression. 22.3.2024
100. Sergey Alekseevich RYABTSEV Сергей Алексеевич РЯБЦЕВ(Russian spelling) Position(s): Judge of the Lefortovo District Court of MoscowDOB: 4.9.1989Nationality: RussianGender: male Sergey Ryabtsev is a Russian judge working in the Lefortovo District Court of Moscow.In that position, he was involved in sabotaging the investigation regarding the poisoning of Alexei Navalny by refusing to address the complaint about the inaction of the Investigative Directorate of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB). Moreover, he continuously delivers sentences against freedom of speech in Russia.Therefore, Sergey Ryabtsev is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression. 22.3.2024
101. Petr Pavlovich SERKOV Пётр Павлович СЕРКОВ(Russian spelling) Position(s): First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian FederationDOB: 7.6.1955POB: Poldamasovo, Ulyanovsk region, former USSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: maleIndividual Taxpayer Number: 732502615730 Petr Serkov is the First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.In that position, he upheld the verdict against the opposition politician Alexei Navalny in 2018. Consequently, Alexei Navalny was convicted and imprisoned in a high-security penal colony in order to prevent him from engaging in political activity. Placing Alexei Navalny in a penal colony resulted in his death.Therefore, Petr Serkov is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression. 22.3.2024
103. Nikolay Viktorovich TIMOSHIN Николай Викторович ТИМОШИН(Russian spelling) Position(s): Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian FederationDOB: 14.8.1959POB: Zhidkoe village, Znamensky district, Oryol region, former USSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: male Nikolay Timoshin is Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. Previously, he held the position of Member of the Court’s Presidium.As Member of the Presidium, Nikolay Timoshin upheld the verdict against the opposition politician Alexei Navalny in 2018. Consequently, Alexei Navalny was convicted and imprisoned in a high-security penal colony in order to prevent him from engaging in political activity.Therefore, Nikolay Timoshin is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression. 22.3.2024
104. Vladimir Yurievich ZAITSEV Владимир Юрьевич ЗАЙЦЕВ(Russian spelling) Position(s): Chairman of the Appellate Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Russian FederationDOB: 31.3.1957POB: Valamaz, Krasnogorsk, Udmurtia SSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: male Vladimir Zaitsev is Chairman of the Appellate Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.In that position, he excluded Alexei Navalny from running in the presidential election in Russia in 2018 in a politically motivated trial.Therefore, Vladimir Zaitsev is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including systematic violations of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and freedom of expression and opinion. 22.3.2024
115. Abdel Karim Mahmoud (Mahmood, Mohammad)IBRAHIM (Arabic spelling) Position(s): Chief of staff of the Syrian ArmyPOB: Tartous, SyriaNationality: SyrianGender: male Abdel Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim is the chief of staff of the Syrian Army.The Syrian state, including its military, commits systematic and widespread torture, rape and sexual and gender-based violence against civilians.As the chief of staff of the Syrian Army, Abdel Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim is responsible for the actions of the armed forces under his command.Therefore, Abdel Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim is responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture and systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. 22.7.2024’;
(3) in section ‘B. Legal persons, entities and bodies’, the entries for the following nine entities are replaced by the following:Name (Transliteration into Latin script)NameIdentifying informationReasons for listingDate of listing‘5.Wagner Group (a.k.a. Expeditionary and Volunteer Corps, Expeditionary Corps, Volunteer Corps, Africa Corps, Vagner Group, PMC Wagner, Liga, League)Группа Вагнера(Russian spelling)The Wagner Group is a Russia-based unincorporated private military entity, which was established in 2014 as a successor organisation of the Slavonic Corps. Through the setting up of local entities, and with the support of local governments, the Wagner Group finances and conducts its operations.The Wagner Group is responsible for serious human rights abuses in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, Mali and Mozambique, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings.13.12.20216.Lobaye Invest SARLUPlace of registration: Bangui (Central African Republic)Date of registration: 24.10.2017Registration number: M 354838 D 0001 (“NIF” number, Tax identification number)Principal place of business: Central African RepublicOther information: Branch of M-FinansLobaye Invest SARLU is a private company registered in the Central African Republic (CAR), subsidiary of the Russian company M-Finans, originally controlled by Yevgeny Prigozhin. It is managed by Dimitri Sytii, a senior Wagner Group executive and by Yevgeny Khodotov, who was associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin. Lobaye Invest operates gold and diamond mines in CAR. It has been linked to the Wagner Group’s operations in CAR. It also finances several media outlets, such as the radio station Lengo Sengo, a Central African radio station conducting disinformation campaigns and promoting the Wagner Group’s presence in CAR.Lobaye Invest is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including the CAR. Through its activities, Lobaye Invest also provides support for such abuses committed in CAR.25.2.20237.DIAMVILLEDate of registration: 28.3.2019Registration number: CA/BG2019B519Principal place of business: Central African RepublicOther information: associated individuals and entities: Wagner Group, Dimitri Sytii, Valery Zakharov, Perfilev, Svetlana Troitskaya, Lobaye InvestDiamville is a screen company used by the Wagner Group present in the Central African Republic (CAR) to illegally trade diamonds. It is closely linked to all major actors of the Wagner Group in CAR, such as Dimitri Sytii. Diamville is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including the CAR. Through its activities, it provides support for such abuses committed in CAR.25.2.20238.Foundation for the Defence of National Values (FDNV)Fund for the Defence of National Values (FDNV)Foundation/organization for the Protection of National Values (FPNV)/(FZNC)Foundation for National Values ProtectionOrganization for the Protection of National ValuesPlace of registration: Moscow (64 Zemlyanoy Val str., building 2, office 201, Moscow, Russian Federation)Website:https://en.fznc.ru/Registration number: 1197700003137Individual Taxpayer Number: 7709448606The Foundation for the Defence of National Values (FDNV) is associated with the Wagner Group. The FDNV operates as the public relations arm of the Wagner Group. It steers pro-Wagner Group propaganda and disinformation campaigns, including to enhance the reputation of the Wagner Group and support its deployment, and engages in covert interference on behalf of the Wagner Group in the various countries that it is active in.The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, including torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Libya, Mali and the Central African Republic.FDNV is associated with the Wagner Group and is responsible for supporting and encouraging the acts of the Wagner Group through pro-Wagner Group propaganda, political interference and disinformation.25.2.20239.Radio Centrafricaine Lengo SengoPlace of registration: Bangui, Central African RepublicDate of registration: November 2018Principal place of business: GalabadjaBangui, Commune de BanguiGalabadja, 8eme Arr.[GPS]-> 4.4070, 18.5465Radio Lengo Sengo is a Central African radio station engaged in online influence operations on behalf of the Wagner Group. Its ultimate objective is to manipulate public opinion. The company conducts disinformation campaigns and promotes the Wagner Group’s presence in the Central African Republic (CAR). Radio Lengo Sengo is financed by Lobaye Invest, a private company connected to the Wagner Group that serves as a cover for its activities in CAR.The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings in several countries including CAR.Radio Lengo Sengo is responsible for supporting and encouraging the acts of the Wagner Group in CAR.25.2.202310.Meroe Gold Co. Ltd(a.k.a.: Meroe For Agricultural & Animal Production; Al-Solag; Al-Sarraj Mining Company Ltd; Al-Sawlaj Mining Company Ltd; Al-Solaj Mining Company; Al-Soladzh Mining Company; Al-Solag Mining Company; Sullaj Mining Company; Al-Sullaj; Al-Solage; Solange; Sullag)Place of registration: Al-jref Gharb Plot 134 Blok 1h, Khartoum, SudanOther information: Mining of other non-ferrous metal oresAssociated with:Al Sawlaj for Mining LtdAswar Multi Activities Co., LtdMeroe Gold is a cover entity for, and closely linked to, the Wagner Group’s operations in Sudan. By being affiliated with the Sudanese military, the Wagner Group secured the exploiting and exporting of Sudanese gold to Russia.Meroe Gold is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, including torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Sudan. Through its activities, Meroe Gold also provides support for such abuses committed in Sudan.25.2.202311.M-InvestPlace of registration: d. 76 korp. 4 litera A ofis N620, prospekt Obukhovskoi Oborony St. Petersburg, Russian FederationRegistration number: 1177847044066Principal place of business: Khartoum, SudanOther information: Tax ID number: 7811636632; Government gazette number: 06513574M-Invest is a cover entity for the Wagner Group’s operations in Sudan. It was closely linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin. By being affiliated with the Sudanese military, the Wagner Group secured the exploiting and exporting of Sudanese gold to Russia. M-Invest is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Sudan. Through its activities, M-Invest also provides support for such abuses committed in Sudan.25.2.202312.Sewa Security ServicesPlace of registration: Bangui (Central African Republic)Principal place of business: Central African RepublicOther information: subsidiary of Lobaye InvestSewa Security Services is a Central African Republic (CAR)-based private company that provides protection for senior CAR government officials. It serves as a cover for the Wagner Group’s activities in CAR. It is a subsidiary of Lobaye Invest, managed by Dimitri Sytii, a senior Wagner Group executive and by Yevgeny Khodotov, who was associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin. Sewa Security has been involved alongside the Wagner Group in a series of violent attacks that have occurred in CAR since the presidential elections of December 2020. Sewa Security is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including CAR. Through its activities, Sewa Security Services also provides support for such abuses committed in CAR.25.2.202317.Department of Information Technologies of the City of MoscowДепартамент Информационных Технологий города Москвы(Russian spelling)Address: (Legal) Russia, 123100 Moscow, 1-Y Krasnogvardeyskiy Proyezd, 21, bld 1; (Actual) Russia, 105064 Moscow Yakovoapostol’skiy Pereulok, 12с1Telephone: + 7 (495) 957-01-31Fax: + 7 (495) 957-75-42Email: [email protected]:https://www.mos.ru/dit/Telegram: t.me/dit_moscowThe Department of Information Technologies of the City of Moscow develops and uses the facial recognition system in Moscow. It transmits data from the facial recognition system to the law enforcement units of the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of the City of Moscow.The Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of the City of Moscow employed the facial recognition system in Moscow as a tool of repression. It used it to monitor and arbitrarily detain independent journalists and opposition activists who participated in peaceful protests in support of Alexei Navalny, against corruption of the government of Russia and in opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The facial recognition system was also used by the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of the City of Moscow to track down and detain draftees seeking to evade mobilisation for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.Therefore, the Department of Information Technologies of the City of Moscow is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests or detentions, and violations or abuses of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association.20.7.2023’ Name (Transliteration into Latin script) Name Identifying information Reasons for listing Date of listing ‘5. Wagner Group (a.k.a. Expeditionary and Volunteer Corps, Expeditionary Corps, Volunteer Corps, Africa Corps, Vagner Group, PMC Wagner, Liga, League) Группа Вагнера(Russian spelling) The Wagner Group is a Russia-based unincorporated private military entity, which was established in 2014 as a successor organisation of the Slavonic Corps. Through the setting up of local entities, and with the support of local governments, the Wagner Group finances and conducts its operations.The Wagner Group is responsible for serious human rights abuses in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, Mali and Mozambique, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings. 13.12.2021 6. Lobaye Invest SARLU Place of registration: Bangui (Central African Republic)Date of registration: 24.10.2017Registration number: M 354838 D 0001 (“NIF” number, Tax identification number)Principal place of business: Central African RepublicOther information: Branch of M-Finans Lobaye Invest SARLU is a private company registered in the Central African Republic (CAR), subsidiary of the Russian company M-Finans, originally controlled by Yevgeny Prigozhin. It is managed by Dimitri Sytii, a senior Wagner Group executive and by Yevgeny Khodotov, who was associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin. Lobaye Invest operates gold and diamond mines in CAR. It has been linked to the Wagner Group’s operations in CAR. It also finances several media outlets, such as the radio station Lengo Sengo, a Central African radio station conducting disinformation campaigns and promoting the Wagner Group’s presence in CAR.Lobaye Invest is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including the CAR. Through its activities, Lobaye Invest also provides support for such abuses committed in CAR. 25.2.2023 7. DIAMVILLE Date of registration: 28.3.2019Registration number: CA/BG2019B519Principal place of business: Central African RepublicOther information: associated individuals and entities: Wagner Group, Dimitri Sytii, Valery Zakharov, Perfilev, Svetlana Troitskaya, Lobaye Invest Diamville is a screen company used by the Wagner Group present in the Central African Republic (CAR) to illegally trade diamonds. It is closely linked to all major actors of the Wagner Group in CAR, such as Dimitri Sytii. Diamville is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including the CAR. Through its activities, it provides support for such abuses committed in CAR. 25.2.2023 8. Foundation for the Defence of National Values (FDNV)Fund for the Defence of National Values (FDNV)Foundation/organization for the Protection of National Values (FPNV)/(FZNC)Foundation for National Values ProtectionOrganization for the Protection of National Values Place of registration: Moscow (64 Zemlyanoy Val str., building 2, office 201, Moscow, Russian Federation)Website:https://en.fznc.ru/Registration number: 1197700003137Individual Taxpayer Number: 7709448606 The Foundation for the Defence of National Values (FDNV) is associated with the Wagner Group. The FDNV operates as the public relations arm of the Wagner Group. It steers pro-Wagner Group propaganda and disinformation campaigns, including to enhance the reputation of the Wagner Group and support its deployment, and engages in covert interference on behalf of the Wagner Group in the various countries that it is active in.The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, including torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Libya, Mali and the Central African Republic.FDNV is associated with the Wagner Group and is responsible for supporting and encouraging the acts of the Wagner Group through pro-Wagner Group propaganda, political interference and disinformation. 25.2.2023 9. Radio Centrafricaine Lengo Sengo Place of registration: Bangui, Central African RepublicDate of registration: November 2018Principal place of business: GalabadjaBangui, Commune de BanguiGalabadja, 8eme Arr.[GPS]-> 4.4070, 18.5465 Radio Lengo Sengo is a Central African radio station engaged in online influence operations on behalf of the Wagner Group. Its ultimate objective is to manipulate public opinion. The company conducts disinformation campaigns and promotes the Wagner Group’s presence in the Central African Republic (CAR). Radio Lengo Sengo is financed by Lobaye Invest, a private company connected to the Wagner Group that serves as a cover for its activities in CAR.The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings in several countries including CAR.Radio Lengo Sengo is responsible for supporting and encouraging the acts of the Wagner Group in CAR. 25.2.2023 10. Meroe Gold Co. Ltd(a.k.a.: Meroe For Agricultural & Animal Production; Al-Solag; Al-Sarraj Mining Company Ltd; Al-Sawlaj Mining Company Ltd; Al-Solaj Mining Company; Al-Soladzh Mining Company; Al-Solag Mining Company; Sullaj Mining Company; Al-Sullaj; Al-Solage; Solange; Sullag) Place of registration: Al-jref Gharb Plot 134 Blok 1h, Khartoum, SudanOther information: Mining of other non-ferrous metal oresAssociated with:Al Sawlaj for Mining LtdAswar Multi Activities Co., Ltd Meroe Gold is a cover entity for, and closely linked to, the Wagner Group’s operations in Sudan. By being affiliated with the Sudanese military, the Wagner Group secured the exploiting and exporting of Sudanese gold to Russia.Meroe Gold is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, including torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Sudan. Through its activities, Meroe Gold also provides support for such abuses committed in Sudan. 25.2.2023 11. M-Invest Place of registration: d. 76 korp. 4 litera A ofis N620, prospekt Obukhovskoi Oborony St. Petersburg, Russian FederationRegistration number: 1177847044066Principal place of business: Khartoum, SudanOther information: Tax ID number: 7811636632; Government gazette number: 06513574 M-Invest is a cover entity for the Wagner Group’s operations in Sudan. It was closely linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin. By being affiliated with the Sudanese military, the Wagner Group secured the exploiting and exporting of Sudanese gold to Russia. M-Invest is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Sudan. Through its activities, M-Invest also provides support for such abuses committed in Sudan. 25.2.2023 12. Sewa Security Services Place of registration: Bangui (Central African Republic)Principal place of business: Central African RepublicOther information: subsidiary of Lobaye Invest Sewa Security Services is a Central African Republic (CAR)-based private company that provides protection for senior CAR government officials. It serves as a cover for the Wagner Group’s activities in CAR. It is a subsidiary of Lobaye Invest, managed by Dimitri Sytii, a senior Wagner Group executive and by Yevgeny Khodotov, who was associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin. Sewa Security has been involved alongside the Wagner Group in a series of violent attacks that have occurred in CAR since the presidential elections of December 2020. Sewa Security is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including CAR. Through its activities, Sewa Security Services also provides support for such abuses committed in CAR. 25.2.2023 17. Department of Information Technologies of the City of Moscow Департамент Информационных Технологий города Москвы(Russian spelling) Address: (Legal) Russia, 123100 Moscow, 1-Y Krasnogvardeyskiy Proyezd, 21, bld 1; (Actual) Russia, 105064 Moscow Yakovoapostol’skiy Pereulok, 12с1Telephone: + 7 (495) 957-01-31Fax: + 7 (495) 957-75-42Email: [email protected]:https://www.mos.ru/dit/Telegram: t.me/dit_moscow The Department of Information Technologies of the City of Moscow develops and uses the facial recognition system in Moscow. It transmits data from the facial recognition system to the law enforcement units of the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of the City of Moscow.The Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of the City of Moscow employed the facial recognition system in Moscow as a tool of repression. It used it to monitor and arbitrarily detain independent journalists and opposition activists who participated in peaceful protests in support of Alexei Navalny, against corruption of the government of Russia and in opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The facial recognition system was also used by the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of the City of Moscow to track down and detain draftees seeking to evade mobilisation for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.Therefore, the Department of Information Technologies of the City of Moscow is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests or detentions, and violations or abuses of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association. 20.7.2023’
Name (Transliteration into Latin script) Name Identifying information Reasons for listing Date of listing
‘5. Wagner Group (a.k.a. Expeditionary and Volunteer Corps, Expeditionary Corps, Volunteer Corps, Africa Corps, Vagner Group, PMC Wagner, Liga, League) Группа Вагнера(Russian spelling) The Wagner Group is a Russia-based unincorporated private military entity, which was established in 2014 as a successor organisation of the Slavonic Corps. Through the setting up of local entities, and with the support of local governments, the Wagner Group finances and conducts its operations.The Wagner Group is responsible for serious human rights abuses in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, Mali and Mozambique, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings. 13.12.2021
6. Lobaye Invest SARLU Place of registration: Bangui (Central African Republic)Date of registration: 24.10.2017Registration number: M 354838 D 0001 (“NIF” number, Tax identification number)Principal place of business: Central African RepublicOther information: Branch of M-Finans Lobaye Invest SARLU is a private company registered in the Central African Republic (CAR), subsidiary of the Russian company M-Finans, originally controlled by Yevgeny Prigozhin. It is managed by Dimitri Sytii, a senior Wagner Group executive and by Yevgeny Khodotov, who was associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin. Lobaye Invest operates gold and diamond mines in CAR. It has been linked to the Wagner Group’s operations in CAR. It also finances several media outlets, such as the radio station Lengo Sengo, a Central African radio station conducting disinformation campaigns and promoting the Wagner Group’s presence in CAR.Lobaye Invest is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including the CAR. Through its activities, Lobaye Invest also provides support for such abuses committed in CAR. 25.2.2023
7. DIAMVILLE Date of registration: 28.3.2019Registration number: CA/BG2019B519Principal place of business: Central African RepublicOther information: associated individuals and entities: Wagner Group, Dimitri Sytii, Valery Zakharov, Perfilev, Svetlana Troitskaya, Lobaye Invest Diamville is a screen company used by the Wagner Group present in the Central African Republic (CAR) to illegally trade diamonds. It is closely linked to all major actors of the Wagner Group in CAR, such as Dimitri Sytii. Diamville is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including the CAR. Through its activities, it provides support for such abuses committed in CAR. 25.2.2023
8. Foundation for the Defence of National Values (FDNV)Fund for the Defence of National Values (FDNV)Foundation/organization for the Protection of National Values (FPNV)/(FZNC)Foundation for National Values ProtectionOrganization for the Protection of National Values Place of registration: Moscow (64 Zemlyanoy Val str., building 2, office 201, Moscow, Russian Federation)Website:https://en.fznc.ru/Registration number: 1197700003137Individual Taxpayer Number: 7709448606 The Foundation for the Defence of National Values (FDNV) is associated with the Wagner Group. The FDNV operates as the public relations arm of the Wagner Group. It steers pro-Wagner Group propaganda and disinformation campaigns, including to enhance the reputation of the Wagner Group and support its deployment, and engages in covert interference on behalf of the Wagner Group in the various countries that it is active in.The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, including torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Libya, Mali and the Central African Republic.FDNV is associated with the Wagner Group and is responsible for supporting and encouraging the acts of the Wagner Group through pro-Wagner Group propaganda, political interference and disinformation. 25.2.2023
9. Radio Centrafricaine Lengo Sengo Place of registration: Bangui, Central African RepublicDate of registration: November 2018Principal place of business: GalabadjaBangui, Commune de BanguiGalabadja, 8eme Arr.[GPS]-> 4.4070, 18.5465 Radio Lengo Sengo is a Central African radio station engaged in online influence operations on behalf of the Wagner Group. Its ultimate objective is to manipulate public opinion. The company conducts disinformation campaigns and promotes the Wagner Group’s presence in the Central African Republic (CAR). Radio Lengo Sengo is financed by Lobaye Invest, a private company connected to the Wagner Group that serves as a cover for its activities in CAR.The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings in several countries including CAR.Radio Lengo Sengo is responsible for supporting and encouraging the acts of the Wagner Group in CAR. 25.2.2023
10. Meroe Gold Co. Ltd(a.k.a.: Meroe For Agricultural & Animal Production; Al-Solag; Al-Sarraj Mining Company Ltd; Al-Sawlaj Mining Company Ltd; Al-Solaj Mining Company; Al-Soladzh Mining Company; Al-Solag Mining Company; Sullaj Mining Company; Al-Sullaj; Al-Solage; Solange; Sullag) Place of registration: Al-jref Gharb Plot 134 Blok 1h, Khartoum, SudanOther information: Mining of other non-ferrous metal oresAssociated with:Al Sawlaj for Mining LtdAswar Multi Activities Co., Ltd Meroe Gold is a cover entity for, and closely linked to, the Wagner Group’s operations in Sudan. By being affiliated with the Sudanese military, the Wagner Group secured the exploiting and exporting of Sudanese gold to Russia.Meroe Gold is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, including torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Sudan. Through its activities, Meroe Gold also provides support for such abuses committed in Sudan. 25.2.2023
11. M-Invest Place of registration: d. 76 korp. 4 litera A ofis N620, prospekt Obukhovskoi Oborony St. Petersburg, Russian FederationRegistration number: 1177847044066Principal place of business: Khartoum, SudanOther information: Tax ID number: 7811636632; Government gazette number: 06513574 M-Invest is a cover entity for the Wagner Group’s operations in Sudan. It was closely linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin. By being affiliated with the Sudanese military, the Wagner Group secured the exploiting and exporting of Sudanese gold to Russia. M-Invest is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Sudan. Through its activities, M-Invest also provides support for such abuses committed in Sudan. 25.2.2023
12. Sewa Security Services Place of registration: Bangui (Central African Republic)Principal place of business: Central African RepublicOther information: subsidiary of Lobaye Invest Sewa Security Services is a Central African Republic (CAR)-based private company that provides protection for senior CAR government officials. It serves as a cover for the Wagner Group’s activities in CAR. It is a subsidiary of Lobaye Invest, managed by Dimitri Sytii, a senior Wagner Group executive and by Yevgeny Khodotov, who was associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin. Sewa Security has been involved alongside the Wagner Group in a series of violent attacks that have occurred in CAR since the presidential elections of December 2020. Sewa Security is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including CAR. Through its activities, Sewa Security Services also provides support for such abuses committed in CAR. 25.2.2023
17. Department of Information Technologies of the City of Moscow Департамент Информационных Технологий города Москвы(Russian spelling) Address: (Legal) Russia, 123100 Moscow, 1-Y Krasnogvardeyskiy Proyezd, 21, bld 1; (Actual) Russia, 105064 Moscow Yakovoapostol’skiy Pereulok, 12с1Telephone: + 7 (495) 957-01-31Fax: + 7 (495) 957-75-42Email: [email protected]:https://www.mos.ru/dit/Telegram: t.me/dit_moscow The Department of Information Technologies of the City of Moscow develops and uses the facial recognition system in Moscow. It transmits data from the facial recognition system to the law enforcement units of the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of the City of Moscow.The Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of the City of Moscow employed the facial recognition system in Moscow as a tool of repression. It used it to monitor and arbitrarily detain independent journalists and opposition activists who participated in peaceful protests in support of Alexei Navalny, against corruption of the government of Russia and in opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The facial recognition system was also used by the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of the City of Moscow to track down and detain draftees seeking to evade mobilisation for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.Therefore, the Department of Information Technologies of the City of Moscow is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests or detentions, and violations or abuses of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association. 20.7.2023’
Name (Transliteration into Latin script) Name Identifying information Reasons for listing Date of listing
‘5. Wagner Group (a.k.a. Expeditionary and Volunteer Corps, Expeditionary Corps, Volunteer Corps, Africa Corps, Vagner Group, PMC Wagner, Liga, League) Группа Вагнера(Russian spelling) The Wagner Group is a Russia-based unincorporated private military entity, which was established in 2014 as a successor organisation of the Slavonic Corps. Through the setting up of local entities, and with the support of local governments, the Wagner Group finances and conducts its operations.The Wagner Group is responsible for serious human rights abuses in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, Mali and Mozambique, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings. 13.12.2021
6. Lobaye Invest SARLU Place of registration: Bangui (Central African Republic)Date of registration: 24.10.2017Registration number: M 354838 D 0001 (“NIF” number, Tax identification number)Principal place of business: Central African RepublicOther information: Branch of M-Finans Lobaye Invest SARLU is a private company registered in the Central African Republic (CAR), subsidiary of the Russian company M-Finans, originally controlled by Yevgeny Prigozhin. It is managed by Dimitri Sytii, a senior Wagner Group executive and by Yevgeny Khodotov, who was associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin. Lobaye Invest operates gold and diamond mines in CAR. It has been linked to the Wagner Group’s operations in CAR. It also finances several media outlets, such as the radio station Lengo Sengo, a Central African radio station conducting disinformation campaigns and promoting the Wagner Group’s presence in CAR.Lobaye Invest is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including the CAR. Through its activities, Lobaye Invest also provides support for such abuses committed in CAR. 25.2.2023
7. DIAMVILLE Date of registration: 28.3.2019Registration number: CA/BG2019B519Principal place of business: Central African RepublicOther information: associated individuals and entities: Wagner Group, Dimitri Sytii, Valery Zakharov, Perfilev, Svetlana Troitskaya, Lobaye Invest Diamville is a screen company used by the Wagner Group present in the Central African Republic (CAR) to illegally trade diamonds. It is closely linked to all major actors of the Wagner Group in CAR, such as Dimitri Sytii. Diamville is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including the CAR. Through its activities, it provides support for such abuses committed in CAR. 25.2.2023
8. Foundation for the Defence of National Values (FDNV)Fund for the Defence of National Values (FDNV)Foundation/organization for the Protection of National Values (FPNV)/(FZNC)Foundation for National Values ProtectionOrganization for the Protection of National Values Place of registration: Moscow (64 Zemlyanoy Val str., building 2, office 201, Moscow, Russian Federation)Website:https://en.fznc.ru/Registration number: 1197700003137Individual Taxpayer Number: 7709448606 The Foundation for the Defence of National Values (FDNV) is associated with the Wagner Group. The FDNV operates as the public relations arm of the Wagner Group. It steers pro-Wagner Group propaganda and disinformation campaigns, including to enhance the reputation of the Wagner Group and support its deployment, and engages in covert interference on behalf of the Wagner Group in the various countries that it is active in.The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, including torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Libya, Mali and the Central African Republic.FDNV is associated with the Wagner Group and is responsible for supporting and encouraging the acts of the Wagner Group through pro-Wagner Group propaganda, political interference and disinformation. 25.2.2023
9. Radio Centrafricaine Lengo Sengo Place of registration: Bangui, Central African RepublicDate of registration: November 2018Principal place of business: GalabadjaBangui, Commune de BanguiGalabadja, 8eme Arr.[GPS]-> 4.4070, 18.5465 Radio Lengo Sengo is a Central African radio station engaged in online influence operations on behalf of the Wagner Group. Its ultimate objective is to manipulate public opinion. The company conducts disinformation campaigns and promotes the Wagner Group’s presence in the Central African Republic (CAR). Radio Lengo Sengo is financed by Lobaye Invest, a private company connected to the Wagner Group that serves as a cover for its activities in CAR.The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings in several countries including CAR.Radio Lengo Sengo is responsible for supporting and encouraging the acts of the Wagner Group in CAR. 25.2.2023
10. Meroe Gold Co. Ltd(a.k.a.: Meroe For Agricultural & Animal Production; Al-Solag; Al-Sarraj Mining Company Ltd; Al-Sawlaj Mining Company Ltd; Al-Solaj Mining Company; Al-Soladzh Mining Company; Al-Solag Mining Company; Sullaj Mining Company; Al-Sullaj; Al-Solage; Solange; Sullag) Place of registration: Al-jref Gharb Plot 134 Blok 1h, Khartoum, SudanOther information: Mining of other non-ferrous metal oresAssociated with:Al Sawlaj for Mining LtdAswar Multi Activities Co., Ltd Meroe Gold is a cover entity for, and closely linked to, the Wagner Group’s operations in Sudan. By being affiliated with the Sudanese military, the Wagner Group secured the exploiting and exporting of Sudanese gold to Russia.Meroe Gold is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, including torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Sudan. Through its activities, Meroe Gold also provides support for such abuses committed in Sudan. 25.2.2023
11. M-Invest Place of registration: d. 76 korp. 4 litera A ofis N620, prospekt Obukhovskoi Oborony St. Petersburg, Russian FederationRegistration number: 1177847044066Principal place of business: Khartoum, SudanOther information: Tax ID number: 7811636632; Government gazette number: 06513574 M-Invest is a cover entity for the Wagner Group’s operations in Sudan. It was closely linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin. By being affiliated with the Sudanese military, the Wagner Group secured the exploiting and exporting of Sudanese gold to Russia. M-Invest is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Sudan. Through its activities, M-Invest also provides support for such abuses committed in Sudan. 25.2.2023
12. Sewa Security Services Place of registration: Bangui (Central African Republic)Principal place of business: Central African RepublicOther information: subsidiary of Lobaye Invest Sewa Security Services is a Central African Republic (CAR)-based private company that provides protection for senior CAR government officials. It serves as a cover for the Wagner Group’s activities in CAR. It is a subsidiary of Lobaye Invest, managed by Dimitri Sytii, a senior Wagner Group executive and by Yevgeny Khodotov, who was associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin. Sewa Security has been involved alongside the Wagner Group in a series of violent attacks that have occurred in CAR since the presidential elections of December 2020. Sewa Security is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including CAR. Through its activities, Sewa Security Services also provides support for such abuses committed in CAR. 25.2.2023
17. Department of Information Technologies of the City of Moscow Департамент Информационных Технологий города Москвы(Russian spelling) Address: (Legal) Russia, 123100 Moscow, 1-Y Krasnogvardeyskiy Proyezd, 21, bld 1; (Actual) Russia, 105064 Moscow Yakovoapostol’skiy Pereulok, 12с1Telephone: + 7 (495) 957-01-31Fax: + 7 (495) 957-75-42Email: [email protected]:https://www.mos.ru/dit/Telegram: t.me/dit_moscow The Department of Information Technologies of the City of Moscow develops and uses the facial recognition system in Moscow. It transmits data from the facial recognition system to the law enforcement units of the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of the City of Moscow.The Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of the City of Moscow employed the facial recognition system in Moscow as a tool of repression. It used it to monitor and arbitrarily detain independent journalists and opposition activists who participated in peaceful protests in support of Alexei Navalny, against corruption of the government of Russia and in opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The facial recognition system was also used by the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of the City of Moscow to track down and detain draftees seeking to evade mobilisation for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.Therefore, the Department of Information Technologies of the City of Moscow is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests or detentions, and violations or abuses of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association. 20.7.2023’
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 7 December 2020, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 (1).
(2) On the basis of a review of the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999, the measures set out in Articles 2 and 3 of that Decision as regards the natural or legal persons, entities, and bodies listed in that Annex should, except in the case of one deceased person, be extended until 8 December 2025. The entries concerning 31 natural persons and nine entities listed in that Annex should be updated.
(3) Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 should therefore be amended accordingly,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 is amended as follows:

(1) in Article 10, paragraph (1) is replaced by the following:
‘1. This Decision shall apply until 8 December 2026 and shall be kept under constant review. The measures set out in Articles 2 and 3 shall apply as regards the natural or legal persons, entities, and bodies listed in the Annex until 8 December 2025.’
;
(2) the Annex is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.

This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

The Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 is amended as follows:

(1) in section ‘A. Natural persons’, entry 16 is deleted;

(2) in section ‘A Natural persons’, the entries for the following 31 natural persons are replaced by the following:

Names (Transliteration into Latin script)
Names
Identifying information
Reasons for listing
Date of listing
‘1. Alexander (Alexandr) Petrovich KALASHNIKOV
Aлександр Петрович КАЛАШНИКОВ
(Russian spelling)
Position(s): Former director of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN)
DOB: 27.1.1964
POB: Tatarsk, Novosibirsk Region/Oblast, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
ID Number: 771670606787
Alexander Kalashnikov was the director of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) from 8 October 2019 until 25 November 2021. In that position, he oversaw all activities of the FSIN. In his capacity as director of the FSIN, he was responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests and detentions.
While Alexei Navalny was recovering in Germany (September 2020 – January 2021) after having been poisoned with a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group, on 28 December 2020 FSIN demanded that he immediately present himself to a probation officer or face a prison sentence for violating a suspended sentence for fraud conviction. That fraud conviction was found to be arbitrary and unfair by the European Court of Human Rights in 2018. On 17 January 2021, acting on the orders of Alexander Kalashnikov, FSIN officers detained Alexei Navalny upon his arrival at Moscow airport.
Alexei Navalny’s arrest is based on a decision by the Khimki city court, which in turn was issued at the request of FSIN. In late December 2020, FSIN had already requested that a court replace Alexei Nalvany’s suspended sentence with a prison term. On 17 February 2021, the European Court of Human Rights ordered the Government of Russia to release Alexei Navalny.
2.3.2021 2. Alexander (Alexandr) Ivanovich BASTRYKIN
Алексaндр Ивaнович БАСТРЫКИН
Position(s): Chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation
DOB: 27.8.1953
POB: Pskov, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
ID Number: 782618375392
Alexander Bastrykin has served as chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (the “Committee”) since January 2011 (and as acting chairman from October to December 2010). In that position, he oversees all activities of the Committee. Officially, the Committee is presided over by the Russian President. In Alexander Bastrykin’s capacity as chairman of the Committee, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests and detentions.
Alexander Bastrykin is responsible for the Committee’s widespread and systematic repressive campaigns against the Russian opposition, targeting and investigating its members. On 29 December 2020, the Committee launched an investigation into the opposition leader Alexei Navalny, charging him with large-scale fraud. Alexei Navalny and others published articles on Alexander Bastrykin’s ownership of Czech real estate firm LAW Bohemia in the 2000s.
In 2022, the Investigative Committee, which Alexander Bastrykin is still chairing, charged 92 Ukrainian soldiers with crimes against humanity during Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
2.3.2021 4. Viktor Vasilievich (Vasilyevich) ZOLOTOV
Виктор Васильевич ЗОЛОТОВ
Position(s): Director of the Federal Service of National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation (Rosgvardia)
DOB: 27.1.1954
POB: Sasovo, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
ID Number: 770600283509
Viktor Zolotov has been the Director of the Federal Service of National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation (Rosgvardia) since 5 April 2016 and, therefore, Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation, as well as Commander of OMON – the Special Purpose Mobile Unit integrated in Rosgvardia. In that position, he oversees all activities of Rosgvardia and OMON troops. In his capacity as Director of Rosgvardia, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests and detentions and systematic and widespread violations of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, in particular by violently repressing protests and demonstrations.
Rosgvardia was employed to quell the pro-Navalny protests of 23 January and 21 April 2021, and many OMON and National Guard officers were reported to have used brutality and violence against protesters. Dozens of journalists were targeted with aggression by the security forces, including Meduza’s correspondent Kristina Safronova, who was hit by an OMON officer, and Novaya Gazeta’s journalist Yelizaveta Kirpanova, who was hit on the head with a truncheon leaving her bleeding. During the 23 January 2021 protests, security forces arbitrarily detained more than 300 minors.
2.3.2021 6. WANG Junzheng
(Chinese spelling)
Position(s): Member of the 20th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee (December 2022 – December 2026); Deputy of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC, February 2023 – February 2027); Party Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR); Director of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) (since May 2024); former Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), and Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; Political commissar of the XPCC and CEO of the China Xinjian Group
DOB: May 1963
POB: Linyi, Shandong (China)
Nationality: Chinese
Gender: male
Party Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) since October 2021. Member of the 20th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee (December 2022 – December 2026). Deputy of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC, February 2023 – February 2027).
Former Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) and Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) from April 2020 to October 2021, as well as Political commissar of the XPCC from May 2020 to October 2021. Former Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR, from February 2019 to September 2020. Wang Junzheng also held other senior posts in the XPCC.
The XPCC is a state-owned economic and paramilitary organisation in the XUAR, which exercises administrative authority and controls economic activities in Xinjiang.
As Party Secretary and Political commissar of the XPCC, Wang Junzheng was involved in overseeing all policies implemented by the XPCC. In that position, he was responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief, linked, inter alia, to the XPCC’s implementation of a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities.
He was also responsible for the XPCC’s systematic use of Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities as a forced workforce, in particular in cotton fields.
As Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of the XUAR, Wang Junzheng was involved in overseeing all the security policies implemented in Xinjiang, including the aforementioned programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities. As Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR from February 2019 to September 2020, Wang Junzheng was responsible for maintaining internal security and law enforcement in the XUAR. As such, he held a key political position in charge of overseeing and implementing the aforementioned programme.
22.3.2021 7. WANG Mingshan
(Chinese spelling)
Position(s): Deputy of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC, February 2023 – February 2027); Deputy Director of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)
DOB: January 1964
POB: Wuwei, Gansu (China)
Nationality: Chinese
Gender: male
Deputy Director (since February 2024) and former member of the Standing Committee of the Party Committee of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Deputy of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC, February 2023 – February 2027).
Former Director and Deputy Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (XPSB) between 2017 and January 2021. As Deputy Director and former Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the XUAR (September 2020 – February 2024), Wang Mingshan is responsible for maintaining internal security and law enforcement in the XUAR. As such, he holds a key political position in charge of overseeing a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities.
As Former Director and Deputy Party Secretary of the XPSB (2017 to January 2021), he held a key position in Xinjiang’s security apparatus and was directly responsible for implementing the aforementioned programme. In particular, the XPSB has deployed the “Integrated Joint Operations Platform” (IJOP), a big data programme used to track millions of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region and flag those deemed “potentially threatening” to be sent to detention camps.
In his current position and due to his former functions, Wang Mingshan is responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief.
22.3.2021 8. CHEN Mingguo
(Chinese spelling)
Position(s): Secretary of Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR); Member of the CCP Standing Committee of the XUAR.
DOB: October 1966
POB: Yilong, Sichuan (China)
Nationality: Chinese
Gender: male
Secretary of Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and Member of the CCP Standing Committee of the XUAR since February 2024. Former Director of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (XPSB) since January 2021 and Vice-Chairman of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) People’s Government.
As Secretary of Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR), Member of the CCP Standing Committee of the XUAR and former Director of the XPSB, Chen Mingguo holds a key position in Xinjiang’s security apparatus and is directly involved in implementing a large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities. In particular, the XPSB has deployed the “Integrated Joint Operations Platform” (IJOP), a big data programme used to track millions of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region and flag those deemed “potentially threatening” to be sent to detention camps. Chen Mingguo is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in China, in particular arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities, as well as systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief.
22.3.2021 13. Aiub Vakhaevich KATAEV (a.k.a. Ayubkhan Vakhaevich KATAEV)
Аюб Вахаевич КАТАЕВ (a.k.a. Аюбхан Вахаевич КАТАЕВ) (Russian spelling)
Position(s): Former Head of Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in the city of Argun in the Chechen Republic
DOB: 1.12.1983
POB: Ilyinsky, Chechnya
Nationality: Russian
ID Number: 200505588830, 014112081090
Gender: male
Head of Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in the city of Argun in the Chechen Republic until 2018. In his capacity as Head of Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in Argun, Aiub Kataev oversaw the activities of local state security and police agencies. In this position, he personally oversaw widespread and systematic persecutions in Chechnya, which began in 2017. The repressions are directed against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons, those presumed to belong to LGBTI groups, and other individuals suspected of being opponents of the Head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov. Aiub Kataev and forces formerly under his command are responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, as well as arbitrary arrests and detentions and extrajudicial or arbitrary executions and killings.
According to numerous witnesses, Aiub Kataev personally supervised and took part in torturing detainees.
22.3.2021 20. Aleksandr Grigorievitch MALOLETKO
Александр Григорьевич МАЛОЛЕТКО
(Russian spelling)

Aleksandr Maloletko was a close collaborator of Yevgeny Prigozhin. His action as a “defender of the Motherland” and as the Head of the “Veteran’s Interests Defenders League” was publicly hailed by Yevgeny Prigozhin. He has been working as an instructor for the Wagner Group in the Central African Republic (CAR). He is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses in several countries, including in CAR, and is responsible for supporting the acts of the Wagner Group.
25.2.2023 22. Dimitri SYTII
a.k.a.
Dimitri SYTYI
Дмитрий СЫТИЙ
(Russian spelling)
Position(s): Director of the Russian House of Bangui
DOB: 23.3.1989
POB: Minsk (Belarus)
Nationality: Russian
Passport number: 550246878
Gender: male
Address: NA-SYTAIA/A1-TANKISTAZ KHRUSTITSKOGO 62 APT25/ZP-198217/CI St Petersburg, Russian Federation
Dimitri Sytii has a leading role within the Wagner Group in the Central African Republic (CAR), and he had close links to Yevgeny Prigozhin. He is in charge of conducting the Wagner Group’s operations and influence policy in CAR. He is the head of the local branch of the Russian House, the cultural arm of the Russian foreign ministry.
The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including CAR.
Given his influential position in CAR and his leading role in the Wagner Group, he is responsible for serious human rights abuses committed by the Wagner Group in CAR.
25.2.2023 23. Mikhail Sergeyevich POTEPKIN
Михаил Сергеевич ПОТЕПКИН
(Russian spelling)
Position(s): Director Meroe Gold
DOB: 19.9.1981 or 29.9.1981
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
Passport number: 651697952 (Russian passport)
Address: Sudan
Associated companies: Megaline; Concord; IT-Debugger
Mikhail Potepkin is director of Meroe Gold, a cover entity for the Wagner Group’s operations in Sudan, as well as being involved in M-Invest, Meroe’s parent company. He has a leading role within the Wagner Group in Sudan, and he had close links to Yevgeny Prigozhin. By being affiliated with the Sudanese military, the Wagner Group secured the exploiting and exporting of Sudanese gold to Russia. Potepkin is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Sudan. Through his activities, he also provides support for such abuses committed in Sudan.
25.2.2023 25. Vitalii Viktorovitch PERFILEV
Виталий Викторович ПЕРФИЛЬЕВ
(Russian spelling)
DOB: 11.9.1983
POB: Novossibirsk USSR (now Russian Federation)
Nationality: Russian
Address: Bangui (Central African Republic)
Gender: male
Passport number: NR 75 2987491
Date of delivery: 30.3.2016
Expiration date: 30.3.2026
Vitalii Perfilev was the security advisor to the President of the Central African Republic (CAR) until November 2023, and a key figure within the Wagner Group in CAR.
The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including CAR.
Given his former influential position during the period when the human rights abuses were committed in CAR and his leading role in the Wagner Group, Vitalii Perfilev is responsible for serious human rights abuses committed by the Wagner Group in CAR.
25.2.2023 26. Andrei Sergeevich MANDEL
Андрей Сергеевич МАНДЕЛЬ
(Russian spelling)
DOB: 2.3.1990
POB: Germany
Gender: male
Passport number: 753615660
Andrei Mandel is head of M-Invest, a cover entity for the Wagner Group’s operations in Sudan, as well as being involved in its subsidiary Meroe Gold. He has a leading role within the Wagner Group in Sudan, and had close links with Yevgeny Prigozhin. By being closely affiliated with the Sudanese military, the Wagner Group secured the exploiting and exporting of Sudanese gold to Russia. Andrei Mandel is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Sudan. Through his activities, Andrei Mandel also provides support for such abuses committed in Sudan.
25.2.2023 27. Neda Mohammad NADEEM
(Pashto spelling)
Position(s): Acting Taliban Minister for Higher Education
Nationality: Afghan
DOB: 1977
POB: Kandahar, Afghanistan
Gender: male
Neda Mohammed Nadeem has been the acting Taliban Minister for Higher Education since 22 October 2022. Since he took up his position, the Taliban have published decrees banning women from higher education throughout the country. These decrees deprive women of their right to education as well as their equal access to education, violating the principle of equal treatment between men and women.
In his capacity as acting Taliban Minister for Higher Education, Neda Mohammed Nadeem is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Afghanistan, in particular the widespread violation of women’s right to education and the right to equal treatment between men and women in the field of education.
7.3.2023 29. Alexander Georgievich FEDORINOV
Александр Георгиевич ФЕДОРИНОВ
(Russian spelling)
Position(s): commanding officer of Moscow Police Station
Rank: Lieutenant Colonel
DOB: 31.5.1980
POB: Michurinsk, Tambov, Russian Federation
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Fedorinov is a commanding officer of Moscow Police Station.
In his capacity as acting head of the police station in March 2022, he authorised the arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as the subsequent torture, of female anti-war protestors.
Alexander Fedorinov is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrests or detentions as well as systematic sexual and gender-based violence.
7.3.2023 33. Gatluak Nyang HOTH

Nationality: South Sudanese
Gender: male
Gatluak Nyang Hoth was the county commissioner for Mayiandit county (Unity State, South Sudan) from February 2021 until June 2024. In this position, he commanded government-aligned militias to carry out attacks in southern Unity State, between February and May 2022. During this period, troops under his command made widespread and systematic use of sexual violence as a war tactic and instrumentalised it as a reward and entitlement for men participating in the conflict.
In his capacity as county commissioner, Gatluak Nyang Hoth is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in South Sudan, including systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence.
7.3.2023 35. Toe UI
a.k.a. Toe YI

Position(s): Deputy Minister of Home Affairs
Rank: Major-General
DOB: 1966
Nationality: Myanmar/Burma
Gender: male
Major-General Toe Ui was appointed Deputy Minister of Home Affairs on 3 February 2023. He is the former second in command of the Office of the Chief of Military Security Affairs (OCMSA). The OCMSA is responsible for the management of detention and interrogation centres in Myanmar/Burma and is also tasked with intelligence gathering.
OCMSA staff under Ui’s authority use forced nudity, rape, electric shock, burning of genitalia and excessive violence during the arbitrary detention and interrogation of men, women and members of the LGBTIQ community.
In his capacity as second in command of the OCMSA, Major-General Toe Ui is responsible for serious human rights violations in Myanmar/Burma, including arbitrary detentions and torture, as well as for systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence.
7.3.2023 37. Andrei Andreevich ZADACHIN
Андрей Андреевич ЗАДАЧИН
(Russian spelling)
Position(s): Investigator of the Major Investigative Unit at the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation; Major
DOB: 22.8.1990
POB: Moscow, Russian Federation
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
Individual Taxpayer Number: 771577190559
Fiscal Registration Number: YBLWST14JJ39
In his position as Investigator of the Major Investigative Unit at the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, Andrei Zadachin issued a politically motivated criminal accusation against Vladimir Kara-Murza. Andrei Zadachin also asked the court that Vladimir Kara-Murza be detained and provided supporting testimony in court.
Vladimir Kara-Murza is a prominent opposition activist in Russia. Politically motivated court proceedings based on false allegations started against him in 2022 after he accused the Kremlin of committing war crimes in Ukraine and publicly condemned Russian aggression. In April 2023, he was sentenced to 25 years in a high-security prison/labour camp. The court proceedings against him targeted his activism and served as a show trial in Russia to suppress voices critical of the ruling regime in voicing opposition to the war of aggression against Ukraine. The Russian regime is using the judiciary of the country as a widespread tool in numerous serious human rights violations. The justice system is not independent and is used to systematically and severely violate the human rights of individuals opposed to the ruling regime, by violating their freedom of opinion and expression.
Therefore, Andrei Zadachin is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including violations of freedom of opinion and expression.
5.6.2023 40. Diana Igorevna MISHCHENKO
(Maiden name: GARIPOVA)
Диана Игоревнa МИЩЕНКО
(Russian spelling)
Position(s): Judge of the Khamovniki District Court of Moscow
DOB: 12.5.1977
POB: Moscow, Russian Federation
Nationality: Russian
Passport no.: 4508731961
Gender: female
Fiscal registration no.: K7VGTQKBDX68
Individual Taxpayer Number: 771805281790
In her position as Judge of the Khamovniki District Court of Moscow, Diana Mishchenko is involved in the politically motivated court case against Vladimir Kara-Murza. She issued a sentence to approve the administrative arrest of Vladimir Kara-Murza for 15 days.
Vladimir Kara-Murza is a prominent opposition activist in Russia. Politically motivated court proceedings based on false allegations started against him in 2022 after he accused the Kremlin of committing war crimes in Ukraine and publicly condemned Russian aggression. In April 2023, he was sentenced to 25 years in a high-security prison/labour camp. The court proceedings against him targeted his activism and served as a show trial in Russia to suppress voices critical of the ruling regime in voicing opposition to the war of aggression against Ukraine. The Russian regime is using the judiciary of the country as a widespread tool in numerous serious human rights violations. The justice system is not independent and is used to systematically and severely violate the human rights of individuals opposed to the ruling regime, by violating their freedom of opinion and expression.
Therefore, Diana Mishchenko is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including violations of freedom of opinion and expression.
5.6.2023 43. Sergei Gennadievich PODOPRIGOROV
Сергей Геннадьевич ПОДОПРИГОРОВ
(Russian spelling)
Function: Judge of the Moscow City Court
DOB: 8.1.1974
POB: Moscow, Russian Federation
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
Individual Taxpayer Number: 772606428578
Address
Shmitovskiy Proyezd, 16c2, Moscow, Russia, 123100. Apartment 52. (Шмитовский пр-д, 16с2, Москва, Россия, 123100. Квартира 52)
In his position as Judge of the Moscow City Court, Sergei Podoprigorov is involved in the politically motivated court case against Vladimir Kara-Murza. He chaired the collegium of Judges at the Moscow City Court who on 17 April 2023 sentenced opposition activist Vladimir Kara-Murza to 25 years in high-security prison/labour camp.
Vladimir Kara-Murza is a prominent opposition activist in Russia. Politically motivated court proceedings based on false allegations started against him in 2022 after he accused the Kremlin of committing war crimes in Ukraine and publicly condemned Russian aggression. In April 2023, he was sentenced to 25 years in a high-security prison/labour camp. The court proceedings against him targeted his activism and served as a show trial in Russia to suppress voices critical of the ruling regime in voicing opposition to the war of aggression against Ukraine. The Russian regime is using the judiciary of the country as a widespread tool in numerous serious human rights violations. The justice system is not independent and is used to systematically and severely violate the human rights of individuals opposed to the ruling regime, by violating their freedom of opinion and expression.
Previously, Sergei Podoprigorov, as a Judge at Moscow’s Tverskoi district court, made two rulings in relation to Sergei Magnitsky, who exposed corruption and misconduct by Russian government officials, and was later persecuted and died in Russian prison.
Therefore, Sergei Podoprigorov is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including violations of freedom of opinion and expression.
5.6.2023 75. Wadim Konstantinowitsch KALININ
Вадим Kонстантинович КАЛИНИН
Position(s): Head of the IK-3 penal colony
DOB: 7.3.1973
POB: Russian Federation
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
Individual Taxpayer Number: 663401241613
Wadim Kalinin is the Head of the IK-3 penal colony.
Within the chain of command in the IK-3 penal colony, being officially part of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) “senior command staff” and assuming a managerial role, he is directly tasked with executive decisions and therefore responsible for the overall conditions of imprisonment in the IK-3 penal colony. The IK-3 penal colony, commonly known as the “Polar Wolf”, is the location where detained opposition politician Alexei Navalny died under unknown circumstances. The conditions of Alexei Navalny’s imprisonment in the IK-3 penal colony included physical violence such as torture and withholding warm water and adequate clothing in winter, medical assistance and food and water.
Therefore, Wadim Kalinin is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression.
22.3.2024 86. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich MUKHANOV
Александр Александрович МУХАНОВ
Position(s): Director of IK-1
DOB: 7.12.1984
POB: Russian Federation
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
Individual Taxpayer Number: 332806323008
Aleksandr Mukhanov is the Director of correctional colony No1 (IK-1) and he was the Director of correctional colony No2 (IK-2) during the period when Alexei Navalny was held there from March 2021 to June 2022. IK-2 is known for poor conditions of detention. Alexei Navalny, who had recently been poisoned, was refused access to civilian doctors in that colony, despite the threat to his health.
As Director of IK-1, Aleksandr Mukhanov is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as well as the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression.
22.3.2024 87. Roman Alexandrovitch VIDYUKOV
Роман Александрович ВИДЮКОВ
(Russian spelling)
Position(s): Deputy Head of the Main Investigation Department at the State Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation
DOB: 30.7.1980
POB: Russia Federation
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
Roman Vidyukov is Deputy Head of the Main Investigation Department and former investigator at the State Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation.
During the period when he held the position of investigator at the State Investigative Committee, Roman Vidyukov led the investigation in one of the cases in which Alexei Navalny was sentenced to nine years in prison in 2022. Roman Vidyukov also was a member of the preliminary investigation team for the “money laundering” case against Alexei Navalny’s anti-corruption foundation. Roman Vidyukov further led the investigation against Lilia Chanysheva, former Head of Alexei Navalny’s headquarters in Ufa, who was convicted of “creation of an extremist community”. Lilia Chanysheva was sentenced to seven and a half years in prison in 2023. During those court cases, Roman Vidyukov allegedly threatened a witness in order to force him to give testimony that would be favourable to the investigation during Alexei Navalny’s fraud case.
Roman Vidyukov is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests or detentions and the violation of freedom of opinion and expression which is of serious concern as regards the objectives of the common foreign and security policy set out in Article 21 TEU.
22.3.2024 88. Evgenia Sergeevna NIKOLAEVA
Евгения Сергеевна НИКОЛАЕВА
(Russian spelling)
Position(s): Judge at the Basmanny District Court in Moscow
DOB: 9.7.1981
POB: Russian Federation
Nationality: Russian
Gender: female
Individual Taxpayer Number: 771873894393
Evgenia Nikolaeva has been a judge at the Basmanny District Court in Moscow since 2016. She has issued a number of rulings against political opponents (including Alexei Navalny, Ilia Yashin and Vladimir Kara-Murza), thereby contributing to political repression in Russia. In October 2023, she sent Alexei Navalny’s lawyers Alexey Liptser and Igor Sergunin to pre-trial detention for 2 months. Previously, she had repeatedly made life difficult for political prisoners, including by extending the terms of detention in pre-trial detention centre for the former head of Alexei Navalny’s headquarters in Ufa, Lilia Chanysheva. Evgenia Nikolaeva also refused to address complaints about the inaction of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation on the allegation of Alexei Navalny’s poisoning.
In her position, Evgenia Nikolaeva is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests or detentions and the violation of freedom of opinion and expression which is of serious concern as regards the objectives of the common foreign and security policy set out in Article 21 TEU.
22.3.2024 96. Sergey Anatolevich MOROZ
Сергей Анатольевич МОРОЗ
(Russian spelling)
Position(s): Head of the Federal Penitentiary Service of the Russian Federation for Moscow
DOB: 15.9.1968
POB: Berdyansk, Zaporozhye, Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine)
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
Individual Taxpayer Number: 644918369538
Sergey Moroz is a Russian official. He is Head of the Federal Penitentiary Service in Moscow.
In that position, he placed the opposition politician Alexei Navalny on the federal wanted list. Sergey Moroz is accused of having exerted extreme humiliation and violence on detainees upon their arrival in detention.
Therefore, Sergey Moroz is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression.
22.3.2024 97. Elena Evgenievna MOROZOVA
Елена Евгеньевна МОРОЗОВА
(Russian spelling)
Position(s): Judge of the Khimki City Court
DOB: 2.12.1977
Nationality: Russian
Gender: female
Elena Morozova is a Russian judge working in the Khimki City Court.
In her position, she decided to place the opposition politician Alexei Navalny in custody for 30 days after he arrived in Moscow after his treatment for Novichok poisoning. The trial she chaired violated fair trial standards, including the right to review the contents of the indictment and trial documents, the opportunity to consult with a lawyer, and public access to the trial.
Therefore, Elena Morozova is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression.
22.3.2024 99. Mikhail Yurievich PTITSYN
Михаил Юрьевич ПТИЦЫН
(Russian spelling)
Position(s): Chairman of the Moscow City Court
DOB: 21.8.1963
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
Mikhail Ptitsyn is Chairman of the Moscow City Court.
In that position, he positively considered the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service’s proposal to replace opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s probation sentence with a fully fledged sentence. Consequently, Alexei Navalny was deprived of the possibility to act in public life in Russia by being imprisoned in a penal colony.
Therefore, Mikhail Ptitsyn is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression.
22.3.2024 100. Sergey Alekseevich RYABTSEV
Сергей Алексеевич РЯБЦЕВ
(Russian spelling)
Position(s): Judge of the Lefortovo District Court of Moscow
DOB: 4.9.1989
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
Sergey Ryabtsev is a Russian judge working in the Lefortovo District Court of Moscow.
In that position, he was involved in sabotaging the investigation regarding the poisoning of Alexei Navalny by refusing to address the complaint about the inaction of the Investigative Directorate of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB). Moreover, he continuously delivers sentences against freedom of speech in Russia.
Therefore, Sergey Ryabtsev is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression.
22.3.2024 101. Petr Pavlovich SERKOV
Пётр Павлович СЕРКОВ
(Russian spelling)
Position(s): First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
DOB: 7.6.1955
POB: Poldamasovo, Ulyanovsk region, former USSR (now Russian Federation)
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
Individual Taxpayer Number: 732502615730
Petr Serkov is the First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.
In that position, he upheld the verdict against the opposition politician Alexei Navalny in 2018. Consequently, Alexei Navalny was convicted and imprisoned in a high-security penal colony in order to prevent him from engaging in political activity. Placing Alexei Navalny in a penal colony resulted in his death.
Therefore, Petr Serkov is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression.
22.3.2024 103. Nikolay Viktorovich TIMOSHIN
Николай Викторович ТИМОШИН
(Russian spelling)
Position(s): Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
DOB: 14.8.1959
POB: Zhidkoe village, Znamensky district, Oryol region, former USSR (now Russian Federation)
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
Nikolay Timoshin is Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. Previously, he held the position of Member of the Court’s Presidium.
As Member of the Presidium, Nikolay Timoshin upheld the verdict against the opposition politician Alexei Navalny in 2018. Consequently, Alexei Navalny was convicted and imprisoned in a high-security penal colony in order to prevent him from engaging in political activity.
Therefore, Nikolay Timoshin is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detentions, and the systematic violation of freedom of opinion and expression.
22.3.2024 104. Vladimir Yurievich ZAITSEV
Владимир Юрьевич ЗАЙЦЕВ
(Russian spelling)
Position(s): Chairman of the Appellate Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
DOB: 31.3.1957
POB: Valamaz, Krasnogorsk, Udmurtia SSR (now Russian Federation)
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
Vladimir Zaitsev is Chairman of the Appellate Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.
In that position, he excluded Alexei Navalny from running in the presidential election in Russia in 2018 in a politically motivated trial.
Therefore, Vladimir Zaitsev is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including systematic violations of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and freedom of expression and opinion.
22.3.2024 115. Abdel Karim Mahmoud (Mahmood, Mohammad)
IBRAHIM
(Arabic spelling)
Position(s): Chief of staff of the Syrian Army
POB: Tartous, Syria
Nationality: Syrian
Gender: male
Abdel Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim is the chief of staff of the Syrian Army.
The Syrian state, including its military, commits systematic and widespread torture, rape and sexual and gender-based violence against civilians.
As the chief of staff of the Syrian Army, Abdel Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim is responsible for the actions of the armed forces under his command.
Therefore, Abdel Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim is responsible for serious human rights violations, including torture and systematic and widespread sexual and gender-based violence.
22.7.2024’;

(3) in section ‘B. Legal persons, entities and bodies’, the entries for the following nine entities are replaced by the following:

Name (Transliteration into Latin script)
Name
Identifying information
Reasons for listing
Date of listing
‘5. Wagner Group (a.k.a. Expeditionary and Volunteer Corps, Expeditionary Corps, Volunteer Corps, Africa Corps, Vagner Group, PMC Wagner, Liga, League)
Группа Вагнера
(Russian spelling)

The Wagner Group is a Russia-based unincorporated private military entity, which was established in 2014 as a successor organisation of the Slavonic Corps. Through the setting up of local entities, and with the support of local governments, the Wagner Group finances and conducts its operations.
The Wagner Group is responsible for serious human rights abuses in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, Mali and Mozambique, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings.
13.12.2021 6. Lobaye Invest SARLU

Place of registration: Bangui (Central African Republic)
Date of registration: 24.10.2017
Registration number: M 354838 D 0001 (“NIF” number, Tax identification number)
Principal place of business: Central African Republic
Other information: Branch of M-Finans
Lobaye Invest SARLU is a private company registered in the Central African Republic (CAR), subsidiary of the Russian company M-Finans, originally controlled by Yevgeny Prigozhin. It is managed by Dimitri Sytii, a senior Wagner Group executive and by Yevgeny Khodotov, who was associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin. Lobaye Invest operates gold and diamond mines in CAR. It has been linked to the Wagner Group’s operations in CAR. It also finances several media outlets, such as the radio station Lengo Sengo, a Central African radio station conducting disinformation campaigns and promoting the Wagner Group’s presence in CAR.
Lobaye Invest is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including the CAR. Through its activities, Lobaye Invest also provides support for such abuses committed in CAR.
25.2.2023 7. DIAMVILLE

Date of registration: 28.3.2019
Registration number: CA/BG2019B519
Principal place of business: Central African Republic
Other information: associated individuals and entities: Wagner Group, Dimitri Sytii, Valery Zakharov, Perfilev, Svetlana Troitskaya, Lobaye Invest
Diamville is a screen company used by the Wagner Group present in the Central African Republic (CAR) to illegally trade diamonds. It is closely linked to all major actors of the Wagner Group in CAR, such as Dimitri Sytii. Diamville is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including the CAR. Through its activities, it provides support for such abuses committed in CAR.
25.2.2023 8. Foundation for the Defence of National Values (FDNV)
Fund for the Defence of National Values (FDNV)
Foundation/organization for the Protection of National Values (FPNV)/(FZNC)
Foundation for National Values Protection
Organization for the Protection of National Values

Place of registration: Moscow (64 Zemlyanoy Val str., building 2, office 201, Moscow, Russian Federation)
Website: https://en.fznc.ru/
Registration number: 1197700003137
Individual Taxpayer Number: 7709448606
The Foundation for the Defence of National Values (FDNV) is associated with the Wagner Group. The FDNV operates as the public relations arm of the Wagner Group. It steers pro-Wagner Group propaganda and disinformation campaigns, including to enhance the reputation of the Wagner Group and support its deployment, and engages in covert interference on behalf of the Wagner Group in the various countries that it is active in.
The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, including torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Libya, Mali and the Central African Republic.
FDNV is associated with the Wagner Group and is responsible for supporting and encouraging the acts of the Wagner Group through pro-Wagner Group propaganda, political interference and disinformation.
25.2.2023 9. Radio Centrafricaine Lengo Sengo

Place of registration: Bangui, Central African Republic
Date of registration: November 2018
Principal place of business: Galabadja
Bangui, Commune de Bangui
Galabadja, 8eme Arr.
[GPS]-> 4.4070, 18.5465
Radio Lengo Sengo is a Central African radio station engaged in online influence operations on behalf of the Wagner Group. Its ultimate objective is to manipulate public opinion. The company conducts disinformation campaigns and promotes the Wagner Group’s presence in the Central African Republic (CAR). Radio Lengo Sengo is financed by Lobaye Invest, a private company connected to the Wagner Group that serves as a cover for its activities in CAR.
The Wagner Group is listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings in several countries including CAR.
Radio Lengo Sengo is responsible for supporting and encouraging the acts of the Wagner Group in CAR.
25.2.2023 10. Meroe Gold Co. Ltd
(a.k.a.: Meroe For Agricultural & Animal Production; Al-Solag; Al-Sarraj Mining Company Ltd; Al-Sawlaj Mining Company Ltd; Al-Solaj Mining Company; Al-Soladzh Mining Company; Al-Solag Mining Company; Sullaj Mining Company; Al-Sullaj; Al-Solage; Solange; Sullag)

Place of registration: Al-jref Gharb Plot 134 Blok 1h, Khartoum, Sudan
Other information: Mining of other non-ferrous metal ores
Associated with:
Al Sawlaj for Mining Ltd
Aswar Multi Activities Co., Ltd
Meroe Gold is a cover entity for, and closely linked to, the Wagner Group’s operations in Sudan. By being affiliated with the Sudanese military, the Wagner Group secured the exploiting and exporting of Sudanese gold to Russia.
Meroe Gold is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, including torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Sudan. Through its activities, Meroe Gold also provides support for such abuses committed in Sudan.
25.2.2023 11. M-Invest

Place of registration: d. 76 korp. 4 litera A ofis N620, prospekt Obukhovskoi Oborony St. Petersburg, Russian Federation
Registration number: 1177847044066
Principal place of business: Khartoum, Sudan
Other information: Tax ID number: 7811636632; Government gazette number: 06513574
M-Invest is a cover entity for the Wagner Group’s operations in Sudan. It was closely linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin. By being affiliated with the Sudanese military, the Wagner Group secured the exploiting and exporting of Sudanese gold to Russia. M-Invest is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Sudan. Through its activities, M-Invest also provides support for such abuses committed in Sudan.
25.2.2023 12. Sewa Security Services

Place of registration: Bangui (Central African Republic)
Principal place of business: Central African Republic
Other information: subsidiary of Lobaye Invest
Sewa Security Services is a Central African Republic (CAR)-based private company that provides protection for senior CAR government officials. It serves as a cover for the Wagner Group’s activities in CAR. It is a subsidiary of Lobaye Invest, managed by Dimitri Sytii, a senior Wagner Group executive and by Yevgeny Khodotov, who was associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin. Sewa Security has been involved alongside the Wagner Group in a series of violent attacks that have occurred in CAR since the presidential elections of December 2020. Sewa Security is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including CAR. Through its activities, Sewa Security Services also provides support for such abuses committed in CAR.
25.2.2023 17. Department of Information Technologies of the City of Moscow
Департамент Информационных Технологий города Москвы
(Russian spelling)
Address: (Legal) Russia, 123100 Moscow, 1-Y Krasnogvardeyskiy Proyezd, 21, bld 1; (Actual) Russia, 105064 Moscow Yakovoapostol’skiy Pereulok, 12с1
Telephone: + 7 (495) 957-01-31
Fax: + 7 (495) 957-75-42
Email: [email protected]
Website: https://www.mos.ru/dit/
Telegram: t.me/dit_moscow
The Department of Information Technologies of the City of Moscow develops and uses the facial recognition system in Moscow. It transmits data from the facial recognition system to the law enforcement units of the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of the City of Moscow.
The Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of the City of Moscow employed the facial recognition system in Moscow as a tool of repression. It used it to monitor and arbitrarily detain independent journalists and opposition activists who participated in peaceful protests in support of Alexei Navalny, against corruption of the government of Russia and in opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The facial recognition system was also used by the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of the City of Moscow to track down and detain draftees seeking to evade mobilisation for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
Therefore, the Department of Information Technologies of the City of Moscow is responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests or detentions, and violations or abuses of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association.
20.7.2023’

Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/3003 of 2 December 2024 in support of strengthening the capacities of the Ukrainian authorities to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives, in cooperation with the OSCE

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/3003 3.12.2024
(1) On 19 November 2018, the Council adopted the EU Strategy against illicit firearms, small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition, entitled ‘Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens’ (the ‘EU SALW Strategy’). The EU SALW Strategy commits the Union and its Member States to assist in strengthening law enforcement capabilities in order to identify, disrupt and interdict trafficking networks and prevent firearms from reaching terrorists and criminals via the illicit market, inter alia by blocking the illicit financing and transport of arms and enhancing the role of border police, customs and port authorities in tackling illicit arms flows by maritime transport.
(2) On 2 December 2019, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009(1)in support of Ukraine’s efforts to combat illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives, in cooperation with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The Council subsequently adopted Decisions (CFSP) 2022/2276(2), (CFSP) 2024/330(3)and (CFSP) 2024/1805(4), in order to extend the implementation period of Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 until 21 January 2025.
(3) On 2 December 2021, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2021/2133(5), in support of the comprehensive programme on supporting efforts to prevent and combat illicit trafficking of SALW and conventional ammunition in South-Eastern Europe.
(4) The unprecedented security challenges arising from Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine since February 2022 have significantly increased the risk of trafficking and proliferation of weapons, ammunition and explosives in Ukraine. That potentially presents a significant long-term security threat to both the Union and Ukraine. Cooperation between the Union and Ukraine on that issue is therefore of mutual interest.
(5) The implementation of Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 has demonstrated its effectiveness and underlined the imperative for ongoing and expanded support.
(6) In February 2024, the Ukrainian authorities requested the OSCE to continue supporting the strengthening of the capacities of the Ukrainian authorities in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives, in all its aspects.
(7) The Joint security commitments between the European Union and Ukraine of 27 June 2024 state that:—the Union and Ukraine will intensify work to prevent and counter the diversion of firearms and SALW, their ammunition and explosives;—the Union will continue to support Ukraine building up robust capacity to monitor the stocks, the acquisition and possession of firearms and SALW, investigate and prosecute their illegal possession and trafficking, and support international cooperation and assistance in this area;—the Union will support the designation and development of appropriate structures, aiming at an effective control and disposal of firearms and SALW;—the Union and Ukraine will actively expose and counter Russian information manipulation in this area, — the Union and Ukraine will intensify work to prevent and counter the diversion of firearms and SALW, their ammunition and explosives; — the Union will continue to support Ukraine building up robust capacity to monitor the stocks, the acquisition and possession of firearms and SALW, investigate and prosecute their illegal possession and trafficking, and support international cooperation and assistance in this area; — the Union will support the designation and development of appropriate structures, aiming at an effective control and disposal of firearms and SALW; — the Union and Ukraine will actively expose and counter Russian information manipulation in this area,
— the Union and Ukraine will intensify work to prevent and counter the diversion of firearms and SALW, their ammunition and explosives;
— the Union will continue to support Ukraine building up robust capacity to monitor the stocks, the acquisition and possession of firearms and SALW, investigate and prosecute their illegal possession and trafficking, and support international cooperation and assistance in this area;
— the Union will support the designation and development of appropriate structures, aiming at an effective control and disposal of firearms and SALW;
— the Union and Ukraine will actively expose and counter Russian information manipulation in this area,
— the Union and Ukraine will intensify work to prevent and counter the diversion of firearms and SALW, their ammunition and explosives;
— the Union will continue to support Ukraine building up robust capacity to monitor the stocks, the acquisition and possession of firearms and SALW, investigate and prosecute their illegal possession and trafficking, and support international cooperation and assistance in this area;
— the Union will support the designation and development of appropriate structures, aiming at an effective control and disposal of firearms and SALW;
— the Union and Ukraine will actively expose and counter Russian information manipulation in this area,
(a) to enhance the supervisory capacities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine with respect to preventing and combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives;
(b) to enhance the operational capacities of the National Police of Ukraine, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, the State Customs Service of Ukraine and the Security Service of Ukraine with respect to preventing and combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives.
(a) enhancing the relevant normative and legislative framework, including support in developing a national Strategy and Action Plan in relation to small arms and light weapons;
(b) developing the functionality of the Unified Weapons Register of Ukraine;
(c) developing the capacities of relevant institutions through training on and acquisition of specialised equipment and infrastructure;
(d) enhancing national inter-agency coordination and regional and international cooperation and information exchange, in particular through developing the functionality of the Coordination Center for Combating Illicit Trafficking of Firearms, their Parts and Components, and Ammunition;
(e) raising awareness among the general public.
‘— The EU and its Member States will integrate the fight against firearms/SALW trafficking in the context of the dialogue on security matters with partner countries in the neighbourhood, such as Ukraine;
— The EU and its Member States will establish channels of communication between EU and Ukrainian experts, identify a contact point to ensure smooth cooperation, raise awareness, share best practices and expertise, and identify training needs and other support measures to strengthen Ukraine’s capacities in the field; and
— The EU and its Member States will keep working on a permanent technical roundtable with Ukraine to address the pressing problem of the illicit traffic of firearms and the risks associated with such arms falling into the hands of terrorists and organised crime groups.’.
— enhance supervisory capacities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives through improvement of the functionality of the ‘Unified Registry of Weapons’, improvement of legislative mechanisms, raising public awareness and enhancing inter-agency coordination and international cooperation;
— enhance the operational capacities of the National Police of Ukraine in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives;
— enhance the capabilities of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives;
— enhance the capabilities of the State Customs Service of Ukraine in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives;
— enhance the capabilities of the Security Service of Ukraine in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives.
— Facilitation of exchange of experiences and good practices via expert consultations, participation in international subject matter fora and coordination visits;
— Providing technical equipment and software for modernization and improvement of the functionality of the ‘Unified Registry of Weapons’ (URW) improving and expanding the use of ‘URW’;
— Providing technical equipment and software for improving and expanding the use and integrability with the EU systems of automated Ballistics Identification System (BIS);
— Providing legal support and training for improving and expanding the use of ‘URW’ and automated ballistics identification system.
— Facilitation of exchange of experiences and good practices in partnership with the MIA via expert consultations, participation in international subject matter fora and study visits for legislators, policy-makers and leading experts of Ukrainian government authorities on issues related to regulation and controlling the circulation and use of WAE and public awareness on WAE control;
— Implementation of country-wide public opinion surveys and attitude studies on different aspects of WAE control;
— Implementation of public awareness and communication campaigns on risks related to illegal possession, misuse and trafficking in WAE and impact analysis;
— Gender Awareness raising to promote and encourage a general understanding of gender-related challenges in the WAE control contexts.
— Facilitation of exchange of experiences and good practices via expert consultations, participation in international subject matter fora and study visits for policy-makers and leading experts on operation of WAE control coordination centers;
— Providing technical assistance and training for enhancing the operational and analytical capabilities of the Coordination Center for Counteracting the Illicit Trafficking of Firearms, Its Parts, Components, and Ammunition;
— Promoting international cooperation and information-sharing within the MATRIX of international partners in support of SALW control efforts in Ukraine. Organizing annual national conferences on the progress of implementing initiatives and challenges in the domain of WAE;
— Supporting development of the national Strategy and Action Plan in prevention and combating illicit trafficking in WAE.
— Organization of regular biannual governance boards and steering group meetings of the Project.
— Facilitation of exchange of experiences and good practices via expert consultations, participation in international subject matter events and study visits for policy-makers and leading experts from the EOD Department
— Developing the training capabilities in prevention and detection of illicit WAE via procurement of IT classrooms and other educational infrastructure development
— Organization of the ToT enhancing the EOD Department of the NPU trainers’ capacities in detection of illicit WAE
— Enhancing EOD Department`s operational capabilities in prevention and detection of illicit WAE through provision of expert and advisory support, as well as technical equipment
— Facilitation of exchange of experiences and good practices via expert consultations, participation in international subject matter events and study visits for policy-makers and leading experts from the CIU
— Developing the training capabilities in prevention and detection of illicit WAE via procurement of IT classrooms and other training infrastructure, as well as organization of the ToTs for CIU of the NPU officers
— Enhancing CIU operational capabilities in prevention and detection of illicit WAE by equipping temporary checkpoints, mobile and analytical groups
— Facilitation of exchange of experiences and good practices via expert consultations, participation in international subject matter events and study visits for policy-makers and leading experts from the K9 service of the NPU
— Review and update of training methodologies and SOPs related to K9 in the area of combating illicit trafficking of WAE following the best international canine training methods and tactics
— Organization of the ToT enhancing the K9 service of the NPU trainers’ capacities in detection of illicit WAE
— Procurement of technical equipment for the needs of the K9 service in the area of illicit WAE detection
— Facilitation of exchange of experiences and good practices via expert consultations, participation in international subject matter events and study visits for policy-makers and leading experts from the NPU Weapons Control Unit (WCU)
— Public awareness and outreach activities on risks related to illegal possession, misuse and trafficking in WAE
— Providing technical equipment to enhance the capacities of the WCU of the NPU officers to effectively use the URW by the NPU regional departments
— Capacity-building exchange programs for SBGS experts in combating illicit trafficking of WAE
— Development, implementation and evaluation of the specialized training programmes on combating cross-border trafficking in WAE for SBGS border control officers
— Development, implementation and evaluation of the specialized training programmes on combating cross-border trafficking in WAE for SBGS analytical officers
— Organizing national roundtable/workshop on combating illicit trafficking in WAE.
— Providing of technical equipment to SBGS of Ukraine border control units and training centres
— Providing of technical equipment and technologies to SBGS analytical and operative search units.
— Canine capacity building exchange programme / study visit
— Reviewing and updating dog training methodologies, operational procedures and tactics of use through expert mentorship programme
— Providing of equipment and training materials to SBGS canine service to support training and operations in combating illicit trafficking of WAE
— Improvement of dog training infrastructure at SBGS canine training centre.
— Capacity-building exchange programs for SCS experts in combating illicit trafficking in WAE
— Development, implementation and evaluation of the specialized training programmes on combating cross-border trafficking in WAE for SCS personnel
— Development, implementation and evaluation of the specialized ToT module on combatting cross-border trafficking in WAE for the SCS
— Organizing national roundtable/workshop on combating illicit trafficking in WAE
— Providing of technical equipment and technologies to SCS of Ukraine
— Canine capacity building exchange programme
— Reviewing and updating dog training methodologies, operational procedures and tactics of use through expert mentorship programme
— Providing of equipment and training materials to SCS canine service to support training and operations in combating illicit trafficking of WAE
— Improvement of dog training infrastructure at SCS canine training centre
— Capacity-building exchange programs for SSU experts in combating illicit trafficking in WAE
— Development, implementation and evaluation of the specialized training programmes on WAE-related investigations for SSU personnel
— Organizing national roundtable/workshop on combating illicit trafficking in WAE
— Providing of technical equipment and technologies to SSU of Ukraine
— Canine capacity building exchange programme / study visit
— Reviewing and updating dog training methodologies and tactics of use in WAE detection
— Providing of equipment to SSU canine service to support training and operations in combating illicit trafficking of WAE
— managing projects through all steps of the project cycle,
— carrying out day-to-day financial oversight of the projects,
— providing technical and legal expertise, supporting projects’ procurements,
— engaging and coordinating with other international organizations and programmes,
— carrying out quality assurance and quality control of the approved projects’ deliverables,
— supporting the Ukrainian authorities in developing new national measures to strengthen capacities and collective efforts in preventing and combating illicit trafficking of WAE.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 28(1) and Article 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 19 November 2018, the Council adopted the EU Strategy against illicit firearms, small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition, entitled ‘Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens’ (the ‘EU SALW Strategy’). The EU SALW Strategy commits the Union and its Member States to assist in strengthening law enforcement capabilities in order to identify, disrupt and interdict trafficking networks and prevent firearms from reaching terrorists and criminals via the illicit market, inter alia by blocking the illicit financing and transport of arms and enhancing the role of border police, customs and port authorities in tackling illicit arms flows by maritime transport.
(2) On 2 December 2019, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 (1) in support of Ukraine’s efforts to combat illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives, in cooperation with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The Council subsequently adopted Decisions (CFSP) 2022/2276 (2), (CFSP) 2024/330 (3) and (CFSP) 2024/1805 (4), in order to extend the implementation period of Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 until 21 January 2025.
(3) On 2 December 2021, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2021/2133 (5), in support of the comprehensive programme on supporting efforts to prevent and combat illicit trafficking of SALW and conventional ammunition in South-Eastern Europe.
(4) The unprecedented security challenges arising from Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine since February 2022 have significantly increased the risk of trafficking and proliferation of weapons, ammunition and explosives in Ukraine. That potentially presents a significant long-term security threat to both the Union and Ukraine. Cooperation between the Union and Ukraine on that issue is therefore of mutual interest.
(5) The implementation of Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 has demonstrated its effectiveness and underlined the imperative for ongoing and expanded support.
(6) In February 2024, the Ukrainian authorities requested the OSCE to continue supporting the strengthening of the capacities of the Ukrainian authorities in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives, in all its aspects.
(7) The Joint security commitments between the European Union and Ukraine of 27 June 2024 state that:
—
the Union and Ukraine will intensify work to prevent and counter the diversion of firearms and SALW, their ammunition and explosives;
—
the Union will continue to support Ukraine building up robust capacity to monitor the stocks, the acquisition and possession of firearms and SALW, investigate and prosecute their illegal possession and trafficking, and support international cooperation and assistance in this area;
—
the Union will support the designation and development of appropriate structures, aiming at an effective control and disposal of firearms and SALW;
—
the Union and Ukraine will actively expose and counter Russian information manipulation in this area,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
1. The purpose of this Decision is to strengthen the capacities of the authorities of Ukraine in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives, in all its aspects, into and from Ukraine.

2. The objectives of this Decision are the following:
(a) to enhance the supervisory capacities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine with respect to preventing and combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives;
(b) to enhance the operational capacities of the National Police of Ukraine, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, the State Customs Service of Ukraine and the Security Service of Ukraine with respect to preventing and combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives.

3. The Union shall support the objectives set out in paragraph 2 through the following actions:
(a) enhancing the relevant normative and legislative framework, including support in developing a national Strategy and Action Plan in relation to small arms and light weapons;
(b) developing the functionality of the Unified Weapons Register of Ukraine;
(c) developing the capacities of relevant institutions through training on and acquisition of specialised equipment and infrastructure;
(d) enhancing national inter-agency coordination and regional and international cooperation and information exchange, in particular through developing the functionality of the Coordination Center for Combating Illicit Trafficking of Firearms, their Parts and Components, and Ammunition;
(e) raising awareness among the general public.

4. The primary beneficiaries of this Decision shall be the national authorities of Ukraine referred to in paragraph 2. Other mandated national authorities shall be engaged on a case-by-case basis where necessary for the purpose of this Decision.

5. A detailed description of the project is set out in the Annex to this Decision.

1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.

2. The technical implementation of the project referred to in Article 1 shall be carried out by the Secretariat of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (the ‘OSCE Secretariat’).

3. The OSCE Secretariat shall perform its tasks under the responsibility of the High Representative. For that purpose, the High Representative shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the OSCE Secretariat.

1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the project financed by the Union, referred to in Article 1, shall be EUR 5 000 000.
2. The expenditure financed by the reference amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the Union budget.

3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure referred to in paragraph 2. For that purpose, it shall conclude the necessary agreement with the OSCE Secretariat. That agreement shall stipulate that the OSCE Secretariat is to ensure the visibility of the Union’s contribution, appropriate to its size.

4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the agreement.

1. The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of six-monthly reports prepared by the OSCE Secretariat.

2. The Commission shall report on the financial aspects of the project referred to in Article 1.

1. This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

2. This Decision shall expire 36 months after the date of conclusion of the agreement referred to in Article 3(3). However, it shall expire six months after the date of its entry into force if no such agreement has been concluded within that period.

1.   Background

The current and unprecedented security challenges arising from the illegal Russian war of aggression against Ukraine have significantly increased the risk of trafficking and proliferation of weapons, ammunition, and explosives (WAE) in Ukraine. The current context has taken a toll on the availability of human, technical, analytical, political, and other resources available to Ukrainian authorities mandated to implement WAE control tasks.
The war has prompted a change in the wider environment that is correlated to preventing and combating trafficking and the proliferation of WAE. In the arms control and disarmament sector, the need for strengthened weapons registration and accountability measures, such as duly registration and accounting of military, law enforcement, and civilian stocks of weapons, import/export control, and post-shipment checks of arms and ammunition transfers to Ukrainian authorities, is undeniable.
The war has also impacted transnational organized crime, significantly affecting regional illicit economies and criminal networks. The frontline disrupted trafficking routes and hubs, while new illicit markets have emerged, including beyond Ukraine’s border.
The security situation in Ukraine has heightened the urgency for continued support and assistance in addressing the threats of illicit trafficking of SALW in the country and the evolving needs of the region.
Ukraine remains an area of concern and an important challenge in the EU Strategy against illicit firearms, small Arms & light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition (the ‘EU SALW Strategy’). The EU SALW Strategy states that ‘the current instability in Eastern Europe has raised the level of illicit trafficking of firearms in various countries in the region, such as Ukraine. This presents a significant long-term security threat to both Ukraine and the EU. Cooperation between the EU and Ukraine on this issue is thus of mutual interest. The EU is pursuing its bilateral engagement with Ukraine and other countries in the region and systematically integrates the fight against illicit SALW into any dialogue on security matters with partner countries in the neighbourhood.’.
Thus, with the reference to Eastern Neighbourhood in general and Ukraine in particular the EU SALW strategy sets out the following actions:

‘—
The EU and its Member States will integrate the fight against firearms/SALW trafficking in the context of the dialogue on security matters with partner countries in the neighbourhood, such as Ukraine;

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The EU and its Member States will establish channels of communication between EU and Ukrainian experts, identify a contact point to ensure smooth cooperation, raise awareness, share best practices and expertise, and identify training needs and other support measures to strengthen Ukraine’s capacities in the field; and

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The EU and its Member States will keep working on a permanent technical roundtable with Ukraine to address the pressing problem of the illicit traffic of firearms and the risks associated with such arms falling into the hands of terrorists and organised crime groups.’.

The EU 2020-2025 action plan on firearms trafficking contains, among other prioirities, the Priority 4: stepping up international cooperation, in particular, between the EU and non-EU partners considering the high risk of firearms trafficking in south-east Europe (understood as covering non-EU partners of the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova), the specificities being linked to its geopolitical context, the high number and type of national and international players involved, and the current instability in Eastern Europe. The Action Plan also underlines the need to involve Ukraine and Moldova in a broader coherent framework of cooperation against common threats posed by the illicit trafficking of firearms in the whole region. This also answers the Council’s call to involve Ukraine in the relevant Operational Action Plans of the EU Policy Cycle for organised and serious international crime. With regard to Ukraine, the Action Plan takes into account the EU’s support for Ukraine’s efforts to combat illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives in cooperation with the OSCE and SEESAC.
On 2 December 2019, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 ‘in support of Ukraine’s efforts to combat illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives, in cooperation with the OSCE’ – designated as Phase I. Notwithstanding the persistent war in Ukraine, noteworthy achievements have been made toward the anticipated outcomes, facilitated by the intervention of an OSCE-led project. Ukrainian stakeholders enhanced their capabilities in various critical areas (including risk and criminal analysis, detection and investigation techniques, legislative measures, awareness campaigns, canine and explosive ordnance disposal skills, and both coordination and international collaboration) in preventing and combating the illicit trafficking of WAE. The project intervention in Ukraine, as part of Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009 subsequently extended (no cost) until January 2025, has demonstrated its effectiveness and underlined the imperative for ongoing and expanded support. The prevailing security situation in Ukraine underscores the critical need for sustained assistance, highlighting the project’s significance in combating the threats posed by illicit trafficking of SALW within the country and responding to the dynamic requirements of the region.
Joint security commitments between the European Union and Ukraine, dated 27 June 2024, underlined that the European Union and Ukraine will intensify work to prevent and counter the diversion of firearms and small arms and light weapons (SALW), their ammunition and explosives. The European Union will continue to support Ukraine building up robust capacity to monitor the stocks, the acquisition and possession of firearms and SALW, investigate and prosecute their illegal possession and trafficking, and support international cooperation and assistance in this area. The EU will support the designation and development of appropriate structures, aiming at an effective control and disposal of firearms and SALW.
Given the prevailing challenges and the security situation in Ukraine, at the beginning of 2024, the respective project beneficiaries – the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), the National Police (NPU), the State Border Guard Service (SBGS), the State Customs Service (SCS), and the State Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) – have submitted official requests for the continuation of the OSCE assistance.
In response to this request, in March – June 2024 the OSCE carried out ‘The Needs Assessment in Support of Strengthening the Capacities of Ukrainian Authorities in Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Weapons, Ammunition and Explosives in All Its Aspects’ (hereinafter, Needs Assessment), a comprehensive exercise that clearly identified the critical gaps and challenges faced by the target communities, including the threat of illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW). This further justified the necessity for the continuation and expansion of the corresponding assistance. Additionally, the current security situation in Ukraine has heightened the urgency for continued assistance, underscoring the importance of this support in addressing the threats of illicit trafficking of SALW in the country as well as the evolving needs of the region.
2. Overall objective
To assist Ukrainian authorities in preventing and combating illicit trafficking of WAE in all its aspects.
3. Description of Action
The action is based on findings and recommendations of an external evaluation of the OSCE current project intervention in Ukraine, and of the OSCE Secretariat ‘Needs Assessment in support of strengthening the capacities of Ukrainian authorities in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition, and explosives in all its aspects’. The assessment emphasized that a whole-of-government approach and international cooperation are crucial for addressing the issue efficiently, effectively, and with significant impact.
Therefore, the OSCE, in close cooperation with Ukrainian authorities, developed a project addressing various aspects of their mandates related to combatting illicit trafficking in WAE. in all its aspects with a view to strengthen the overall safety and security in Ukraine. This Council Decision will provide core financing of this project; in addition, the OSCE coordinates financial and in-kind contributions of other international donors, which will further support implementing of objectives of this project. These actions will be corelated and coordinated with other activities in the region, such as Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2133 in support of the comprehensive programme on supporting efforts to prevent and combat illicit trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Conventional Ammunition (CA) in South- Eastern Europe.
This proposed multi-year project intervention aims to continue assisting the Ukrainian Government authorities – the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), National Police (NPU), State Border Guard Service (SBGS), State Customs Service (SCS) and Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) – in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in WAE in all its aspects.
These processes verified assistance requests and confirmed the needs for the OSCE support, namely in strengthening mandated authorities’ capabilities to:

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enhance supervisory capacities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives through improvement of the functionality of the ‘Unified Registry of Weapons’, improvement of legislative mechanisms, raising public awareness and enhancing inter-agency coordination and international cooperation;

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enhance the operational capacities of the National Police of Ukraine in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives;

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enhance the capabilities of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives;

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enhance the capabilities of the State Customs Service of Ukraine in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives;

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enhance the capabilities of the Security Service of Ukraine in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives.

4. Expected Results
4.1. Result 1: Supervisory capacities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in WAE is enhanced.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine (MIA) is one of the key national authorities in Ukraine that not only formulates state policy, regulates and controls the use of WAE, but also executes operational – either directly or through its subordinated agencies – as well as coordination measures in preventing and combating illicit trafficking of WAE in all its aspects.
This result aims to enhance the supervisory capacity of the MIA to prevent and combat the illicit trafficking of WAE. It includes promoting and transferring international standards and good practices for the control of the manufacture, marking, and record-keeping of WAE in Ukraine, supporting the improvement of legislative mechanisms for regulating and controlling the circulation and use of WAE, as well as raising public awareness on WAE control. The scope of activities under this result will enhance the MIA role in enabling and facilitating inter-agency coordination in Ukraine, cooperation with international actors, and supporting strategic approaches in the prevention and combating illicit trafficking in WAE in all its aspects.
4.1.1. Activities
4.1.1.1. Promotion and transfer of international standards and good practices for the control of manufacture, marking and record- keeping of WAE in Ukraine
The activity will include:

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Facilitation of exchange of experiences and good practices via expert consultations, participation in international subject matter fora and coordination visits;

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Providing technical equipment and software for modernization and improvement of the functionality of the ‘Unified Registry of Weapons’ (URW) improving and expanding the use of ‘URW’;

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Providing technical equipment and software for improving and expanding the use and integrability with the EU systems of automated Ballistics Identification System (BIS);

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Providing legal support and training for improving and expanding the use of ‘URW’ and automated ballistics identification system.

4.1.1.2. Supporting improvement of legislative mechanisms for regulating and controlling the circulation and use of WAE and its implementation as well as raising public awareness on risks related to illegal possession, misuse and trafficking in WAE
This activity will include:

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Facilitation of exchange of experiences and good practices in partnership with the MIA via expert consultations, participation in international subject matter fora and study visits for legislators, policy-makers and leading experts of Ukrainian government authorities on issues related to regulation and controlling the circulation and use of WAE and public awareness on WAE control;

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Implementation of country-wide public opinion surveys and attitude studies on different aspects of WAE control;

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Implementation of public awareness and communication campaigns on risks related to illegal possession, misuse and trafficking in WAE and impact analysis;

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Gender Awareness raising to promote and encourage a general understanding of gender-related challenges in the WAE control contexts.

4.1.1.3. Enhancing inter-agency coordination and international cooperation and supporting strategic approaches in prevention and combating illicit trafficking in WAE in all its aspects
This activity will include:

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Facilitation of exchange of experiences and good practices via expert consultations, participation in international subject matter fora and study visits for policy-makers and leading experts on operation of WAE control coordination centers;

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Providing technical assistance and training for enhancing the operational and analytical capabilities of the Coordination Center for Counteracting the Illicit Trafficking of Firearms, Its Parts, Components, and Ammunition;

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Promoting international cooperation and information-sharing within the MATRIX of international partners in support of SALW control efforts in Ukraine. Organizing annual national conferences on the progress of implementing initiatives and challenges in the domain of WAE;

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Supporting development of the national Strategy and Action Plan in prevention and combating illicit trafficking in WAE.

4.1.1.4. Facilitation of projects’ governance and coordination
This activity will include:

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Organization of regular biannual governance boards and steering group meetings of the Project.

4.2. Result 2: The operational capacities of the National Police of Ukraine in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in WAE is enhanced
The National Police of Ukraine (NPU) plays a crucial role in preventing and combating the illicit trafficking of WAE in all its aspects in the contexts of national security, public safety, and the rule of law within the country, including through the strategies and collaborations both at the national and international levels.
The result will be achieved through a comprehensive set of project activities, implemented in close collaboration with the NPU. This collaborative approach aims to address the existing complexities and challenges faced by the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), canine (K9), Criminal Investigation (CI), and Weapons Control (WC) units in their day-to-day operations countering the illicit trafficking of WAE. The project will focus on enhancing the training, technical capabilities, and operational efficiency of these specialized units. This will involve capacity-building programs, technological upgrades, operational optimization, development of standard operating procedures, and strengthening interagency cooperation.
4.2.1. Activities
4.2.1.1. Providing advisory support, technical and educational equipment to the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Service
This activity will include:

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Facilitation of exchange of experiences and good practices via expert consultations, participation in international subject matter events and study visits for policy-makers and leading experts from the EOD Department

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Developing the training capabilities in prevention and detection of illicit WAE via procurement of IT classrooms and other educational infrastructure development

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Organization of the ToT enhancing the EOD Department of the NPU trainers’ capacities in detection of illicit WAE

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Enhancing EOD Department`s operational capabilities in prevention and detection of illicit WAE through provision of expert and advisory support, as well as technical equipment

4.2.1.2. Promoting of good practices, knowledge transfer and equipment assistance for Criminal Investigation Units (CIU) in investigating the illicit trafficking in WAE
This activity will include:

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Facilitation of exchange of experiences and good practices via expert consultations, participation in international subject matter events and study visits for policy-makers and leading experts from the CIU

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Developing the training capabilities in prevention and detection of illicit WAE via procurement of IT classrooms and other training infrastructure, as well as organization of the ToTs for CIU of the NPU officers

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Enhancing CIU operational capabilities in prevention and detection of illicit WAE by equipping temporary checkpoints, mobile and analytical groups

4.2.1.3. Promoting good practices, knowledge transfer and equipment assistance for K9 service of the NPU for detection illicit trafficking of WAE
This activity will include:

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Facilitation of exchange of experiences and good practices via expert consultations, participation in international subject matter events and study visits for policy-makers and leading experts from the K9 service of the NPU

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Review and update of training methodologies and SOPs related to K9 in the area of combating illicit trafficking of WAE following the best international canine training methods and tactics

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Organization of the ToT enhancing the K9 service of the NPU trainers’ capacities in detection of illicit WAE

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Procurement of technical equipment for the needs of the K9 service in the area of illicit WAE detection

4.2.1.4. Promoting good practices, knowledge transfer and providing equipment assistance for Weapons Control Units (WCU) in tracing and record keeping of weapons and ammunition
This activity will include:

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Facilitation of exchange of experiences and good practices via expert consultations, participation in international subject matter events and study visits for policy-makers and leading experts from the NPU Weapons Control Unit (WCU)

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Public awareness and outreach activities on risks related to illegal possession, misuse and trafficking in WAE

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Providing technical equipment to enhance the capacities of the WCU of the NPU officers to effectively use the URW by the NPU regional departments

4.3. Result 3: The Capabilities of the State Border Guard Border Guard Service of Ukraine in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in WAE is enhanced
4.3.1. Activities
4.3.1.1. Providing comprehensive training and knowledge transfer in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in WAE for the SBGS personnel
This activity will include:

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Capacity-building exchange programs for SBGS experts in combating illicit trafficking of WAE

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Development, implementation and evaluation of the specialized training programmes on combating cross-border trafficking in WAE for SBGS border control officers

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Development, implementation and evaluation of the specialized training programmes on combating cross-border trafficking in WAE for SBGS analytical officers

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Organizing national roundtable/workshop on combating illicit trafficking in WAE.

4.3.1.2. Providing equipment and technology assistance in combating illicit trafficking in WAE for SBGS of Ukraine
This activity will include:

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Providing of technical equipment to SBGS of Ukraine border control units and training centres

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Providing of technical equipment and technologies to SBGS analytical and operative search units.

4.3.1.3. Providing canine assistance in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in WAE for SBGS of Ukraine
This activity will include:

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Canine capacity building exchange programme / study visit

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Reviewing and updating dog training methodologies, operational procedures and tactics of use through expert mentorship programme

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Providing of equipment and training materials to SBGS canine service to support training and operations in combating illicit trafficking of WAE

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Improvement of dog training infrastructure at SBGS canine training centre.

4.4. Result 4: The capabilities of the State Customs Service of Ukraine in preventing and combating illicit trafficking of WAE is enhanced
4.4.1. Activities
4.4.1.1. Providing comprehensive training and knowledge transfer in preventing and combating illicit trafficking of WAE for the SCS personnel
This activity will include:

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Capacity-building exchange programs for SCS experts in combating illicit trafficking in WAE

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Development, implementation and evaluation of the specialized training programmes on combating cross-border trafficking in WAE for SCS personnel

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Development, implementation and evaluation of the specialized ToT module on combatting cross-border trafficking in WAE for the SCS

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Organizing national roundtable/workshop on combating illicit trafficking in WAE

4.4.1.2. Providing equipment and technology assistance in combating illicit trafficking in WAE for SCS of Ukraine
This activity will include:

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Providing of technical equipment and technologies to SCS of Ukraine

4.4.1.3. Providing canine assistance in combating illicit trafficking in WAE for SCS of Ukraine
This activity will include:

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Canine capacity building exchange programme

—
Reviewing and updating dog training methodologies, operational procedures and tactics of use through expert mentorship programme

—
Providing of equipment and training materials to SCS canine service to support training and operations in combating illicit trafficking of WAE

—
Improvement of dog training infrastructure at SCS canine training centre

4.5. Result 5: The capabilities of the Security Service of Ukraine in preventing and combating illicit trafficking of WAE is enhanced
4.5.1. Activities
4.5.1.1. Providing comprehensive training and knowledge transfer in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in WAE for the SSU personnel
This activity will include:

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Capacity-building exchange programs for SSU experts in combating illicit trafficking in WAE

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Development, implementation and evaluation of the specialized training programmes on WAE-related investigations for SSU personnel

—
Organizing national roundtable/workshop on combating illicit trafficking in WAE

4.5.1.2. Providing equipment and technology assistance in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in WAE for SSU
This activity will include:

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Providing of technical equipment and technologies to SSU of Ukraine

4.5.1.3. Providing canine assistance in preventing and combating illicit trafficking in WAE for SSU
This activity will include:

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Canine capacity building exchange programme / study visit

—
Reviewing and updating dog training methodologies and tactics of use in WAE detection

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Providing of equipment to SSU canine service to support training and operations in combating illicit trafficking of WAE

5. Project management and administrative support for the implementation of the action
The organizational structure for project administration and implementation will be embodied by a Project Implementation Team (PIT), operating under the auspices of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre/Forum for Security Cooperation Support Unit (CPC/FSC SU), with a presence in Vienna and Kyiv.
The effectiveness of the PIT will be augmented through the integration of specialized support components in procurement and asset/travel management. These components will be firmly embedded within the appropriate divisions of the OSCE Secretariat, specifically the Departments of Management and Finance. This structure is designed to bolster the project’s operational efficiency and its capacity to achieve its objectives, ensuring a cohesive and comprehensive approach to project management within the framework of the OSCE’s operational mandates.
The dedicated project personnel will perform the following tasks:

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managing projects through all steps of the project cycle,

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carrying out day-to-day financial oversight of the projects,

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providing technical and legal expertise, supporting projects’ procurements,

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engaging and coordinating with other international organizations and programmes,

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carrying out quality assurance and quality control of the approved projects’ deliverables,

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supporting the Ukrainian authorities in developing new national measures to strengthen capacities and collective efforts in preventing and combating illicit trafficking of WAE.

6. Gender
In order to increase the effectiveness of WAE control policies and to ensure that their implementation improves security for both women and men, the gender perspective will be integrated into the actions supported by this decision and addressed through technical advice and expertise, development of knowledge products and training. Moreover, the project plans to incorporate gender mainstreaming into comprehensive security, recognizing the importance of considering gender dimensions in its activities.
Gender equality and/or women’s empowerment are included in result 2 under the activity 2.2. on ‘Gender Awareness raising to promote and encourage a general understanding of gender-related challenges in the WAE control contexts’ that contributes to the gender mainstreaming of the project by integrating a gender perspective and addressing the specific challenges and impacts that gender norms and roles have on the control of weapons and ammunition. Additionally, the project recognizes the importance of women’s equal participation and inclusion in the program, ensuring that their voices and perspectives are represented, and that capacities are built with employees of both genders.
7. Beneficiaries
The direct beneficiaries of the action will be the national authorities of Ukraine responsible for preventing and combatting illicit trafficking in WAE. Primarily targeted national authorities are: MIA, including its expert and licensing services, NPU, SBGS, SCS and SSU. Beneficiaries can request to include additional recipients in support the implementation of the project activities to be confirmed by donor(s) and implementer FSC SU. The MIA, NPU, SBGS, SCS and SSU are foreseen to be engaged in the project governance as steering board members in the capacity of project beneficiary / customer representative.
The indirect beneficiaries of the action will be the populations in Ukraine and its European neighbourhood that are at risk by the use of illicit WAE in criminal activities, terrorism and violent misuse.
The EU and its Member States will also be indirect beneficiaries of the project as they will benefit from the feedback of the Ukrainian authorities on the identified trafficking routes of illicit weapons,
8. Union visibility
OSCE shall take all appropriate measures to publicize the fact that the action has been funded by the Union. Such measures will be carried out in accordance with the Commission’s Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Actions. OSCE will thus ensure the visibility of the Union’s contribution with appropriate branding and publicity, highlighting the role of the Union, ensuring the transparency of its actions and raising awareness of the reasons for the Decision as well as Union support for the Decision and the results of this support. Material produced by the project will prominently display the European Union flag in accordance with Union guidelines for the accurate use and reproduction of the flag.
Given that planned activities vary greatly in scope and character, a range of promotional tools will be used, including: traditional media; websites; social media; and informational and promotional materials including infographics, leaflets, newsletters, press releases and others, as appropriate. Publications, public events, campaigns, equipment and construction works procured under the project will be branded accordingly. To further amplify the impact by raising awareness among various national governments and the public, the international community and local and international media, each of the project target groups will be addressed using the appropriate language. Additionally, possible special activities such as interviews with media and field trips of donor community will be devised. A photo gallery and short films on the project activities will be developed / produced and used in OSCE-executed visibility measures.
9. Duration
Based on the experience of implementing Decision (CFSP) 2019/2009, and taking into consideration the broad scope of the action, the number of beneficiaries and the number and the complexity of planned activities, the timeframe for implementation is 36 months.
10. Technical implementing entity
The technical implementation of this Decision will be entrusted to the OSCE Secretariat-Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC). The OSCE will implement the activities under this Decision in coordination and cooperation with other international organizations and agencies, in particular with a view to ensuring effective synergies and avoiding duplications of activities.
11. Steering Committee
The Steering Committee for this project will be composed of representatives of the High Representative, of the EU Delegation in Kiev and of the implementing entity referred to in paragraph 6 of this Annex. The implementing entity, thereby helped by the Steering Committee will ensure that the implementation of the project happens in coordination with the EU’s other related assistance to Ukraine, such as the Integrated Border Management Strategy (supported by the Commission’s European Neighbourhood Instrument), Strategy for combating organised crime, the regional cooperation with the Western Balkans in the field of SALW-control implemented by UNDP/SEESAC (supported by Council Decisions (CFSP) 2019/2111 (1) and (CFSP) 2022/2321 (2)), the EU-UA law enforcement cooperation in the field of firearms trafficking (supported by the Commission’s DG HOME, Europol and EMPACT firearms), the work of Conflict Armament Research in Ukraine (supported by Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/387 (3)), the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy missions EUAM Ukraine and EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine and their support activities for border control, and the International Organisation on Migration’s (IOM) work on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of ex-fighters (supported by the Commission’s Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace). The Steering Committee will on a regular basis invite representative of the Ukrainian governmental partners. The Steering Committee can also invite representatives of entities involved in projects in Ukraine that have a similar or related objective. The Steering Committee will review the implementation of this Decision regularly, at least once every 6 months, including by the use of electronic means of communication.

(1) Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2111 of 9 December 2019 in support of SEESAC disarmament and arms control activities in South-East Europe reducing the threat of illicit small arms and light weapons and their ammunition (OJ L 318, 10.12.2019, p. 147).

(2) Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2321 of 25 November 2022 in support of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) for the implementation of the Regional Roadmap on combating illicit arms trafficking in the Western Balkans and in support of disarmament and arms control activities in South-East and East Europe (OJ L 307, 28.11.2022, p. 149).

(3) Corrigendum to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/387 of 20 February 2023 in support of a global reporting mechanism on illicit conventional arms and their ammunition to reduce the risk of their diversion and illicit transfer (‘iTrace V’) (OJ L 73, 10.3.2023, p. 67).

Council Decision (EU) 2024/2998 of 5 November 2024 on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union within the Joint Committee established by the Convention on a common transit procedure as regards the adoption of a decision amending Appendices III and IIIa to that Convention concerning the accession of Georgia

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2998 4.12.2024
(1) The Convention on a common transit procedure(1)(the ‘Convention’) was concluded by means of Council Decision 87/415/EEC(2)and entered into force on 1 January 1988.
(2) Pursuant to Article 15(3)(a) of the Convention, the Joint Committee established by Article 14 of that Convention (the ‘EU-CTC Joint Committee’) is to adopt by decisions amendments to Appendices III and IIIa to the Convention.
(3) Georgia expressed its wish to accede to the Convention, and has been invited to do so by the EU-CTC Joint Committee.
(4) The accession of Georgia will require the adaptation of the guarantee documents provided for by Title II of the Convention, as well as the insertion of certain technical terms in the Georgian language in the Convention.
(5) All Member States of the Union expressed their positive opinion as regards the proposed amendments in the EU-Common Transit Countries Working Group on common transit established by Article 17 of Rules of Procedure of the EU-CTC Joint Committee.
(6) As the EU-CTC Joint Committee decision will amend the Convention, it is appropriate to publish it in theOfficial Journal of the European Unionafter its adoption.
(7) Within the EU-CTC Joint Committee, the Union is to be represented by the Commission, in accordance with Article 17(1) of the Treaty on European Union. The position of the Union concerning the proposed amendment should therefore be based on the attached draft decision,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 207(4), in conjunction with Article 218(9) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Whereas:
(1) The Convention on a common transit procedure (1) (the ‘Convention’) was concluded by means of Council Decision 87/415/EEC (2) and entered into force on 1 January 1988.
(2) Pursuant to Article 15(3)(a) of the Convention, the Joint Committee established by Article 14 of that Convention (the ‘EU-CTC Joint Committee’) is to adopt by decisions amendments to Appendices III and IIIa to the Convention.
(3) Georgia expressed its wish to accede to the Convention, and has been invited to do so by the EU-CTC Joint Committee.
(4) The accession of Georgia will require the adaptation of the guarantee documents provided for by Title II of the Convention, as well as the insertion of certain technical terms in the Georgian language in the Convention.
(5) All Member States of the Union expressed their positive opinion as regards the proposed amendments in the EU-Common Transit Countries Working Group on common transit established by Article 17 of Rules of Procedure of the EU-CTC Joint Committee.
(6) As the EU-CTC Joint Committee decision will amend the Convention, it is appropriate to publish it in the Official Journal of the European Union after its adoption.
(7) Within the EU-CTC Joint Committee, the Union is to be represented by the Commission, in accordance with Article 17(1) of the Treaty on European Union. The position of the Union concerning the proposed amendment should therefore be based on the attached draft decision,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The position to be taken on behalf of the Union at the meeting of the Joint Committee established by the Convention on a common transit procedure (the ‘EU-CTC Joint Committee’) concerning amendments to Appendices III and IIIa to that Convention shall be based on the draft decision of the EU-CTC Joint Committee attached to this Decision.
Minor changes to the draft decision may be agreed to by the representatives of the Union in the EU-CTC Joint Committee, without further decision of the Council.
After its adoption, the decision of the EU-CTC Joint Committee referred to in Article 1 shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

European Council Decision (EU) 2024/2997 of 28 November 2024 appointing the Commission

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2997 29.11.2024
(1) The term of office of the European Commission appointed by European Council Decision (EU) 2019/1989(1)came to an end on 31 October 2024.
(2) In accordance with Article 17(5) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the European Council adopted Decision 2013/272/EU(2)concerning the number of members of the Commission.
(3) A new Commission, consisting of one national of each Member State, including its President and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, should be appointed until 31 October 2029.
(4) By Decision (EU) 2024/1862(3), the European Council proposed Ms Ursula VON DER LEYEN to the European Parliament as the candidate for President of the Commission. The European Parliament elected her as President of the Commission at its plenary session of 18 July 2024.
(5) By Decision (EU) 2024/2086(4), the European Council, with the agreement of the President-elect of the Commission, appointed Ms Kaja KALLAS as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy for the period from the end of the current term of office of the Commission until 31 October 2029.
(6) By Decision (EU) 2024/2517(5), the Council, by common accord with the President-elect of the Commission, adopted the list of the other persons whom it proposes for appointment as Members of the Commission.
(7) By means of a vote held on 27 November 2024, the European Parliament gave its consent to the appointment, as a body, of the President of the Commission, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the other Members of the Commission.
(8) The Commission should therefore be appointed,
— as President:Ms Ursula VON DER LEYEN,
— as Member, Vice-President, pursuant to Article 18(4) TEU:Ms Kaja KALLAS, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
— as Members:Mr Magnus BRUNNERMs Maria Luís CASANOVA MORGADO DIAS DE ALBUQUERQUEMr Valdis DOMBROVSKISMr Raffaele FITTOMr Christophe HANSENMr Wopke Bastiaan HOEKSTRAMr Dan JØRGENSENMr Constantinos KADISMs Marta KOSMr Andrius KUBILIUSMs Hadja LAHBIBMr Michael MCGRATHMr Glenn MICALLEFMs Roxana MÎNZATUMs Teresa RIBERA RODRÍGUEZMs Jessika ROSWALLMr Maroš ŠEFČOVIČMr Stéphane SéjournéMr Piotr Arkadiusz SERAFINMr Jozef SÍKELAMs Ekaterina SPASOVA GECHEVA-ZAHARIEVAMs Dubravka ŠUICAMr Apostolos TZITZIKOSTASMr Olivér VÁRHELYIMs Henna Maria VIRKKUNEN.
THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 17(3) and (7), third subparagraph, thereof,
Whereas:
(1) The term of office of the European Commission appointed by European Council Decision (EU) 2019/1989 (1) came to an end on 31 October 2024.
(2) In accordance with Article 17(5) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the European Council adopted Decision 2013/272/EU (2) concerning the number of members of the Commission.
(3) A new Commission, consisting of one national of each Member State, including its President and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, should be appointed until 31 October 2029.
(4) By Decision (EU) 2024/1862 (3), the European Council proposed Ms Ursula VON DER LEYEN to the European Parliament as the candidate for President of the Commission. The European Parliament elected her as President of the Commission at its plenary session of 18 July 2024.
(5) By Decision (EU) 2024/2086 (4), the European Council, with the agreement of the President-elect of the Commission, appointed Ms Kaja KALLAS as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy for the period from the end of the current term of office of the Commission until 31 October 2029.
(6) By Decision (EU) 2024/2517 (5), the Council, by common accord with the President-elect of the Commission, adopted the list of the other persons whom it proposes for appointment as Members of the Commission.
(7) By means of a vote held on 27 November 2024, the European Parliament gave its consent to the appointment, as a body, of the President of the Commission, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the other Members of the Commission.
(8) The Commission should therefore be appointed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The following are hereby appointed to the Commission for the period from 1 December 2024 to 31 October 2029:

—
as President:
Ms Ursula VON DER LEYEN,
—
as Member, Vice-President, pursuant to Article 18(4) TEU:
Ms Kaja KALLAS, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
—
as Members:
Mr Magnus BRUNNER
Ms Maria Luís CASANOVA MORGADO DIAS DE ALBUQUERQUE
Mr Valdis DOMBROVSKIS
Mr Raffaele FITTO
Mr Christophe HANSEN
Mr Wopke Bastiaan HOEKSTRA
Mr Dan JØRGENSEN
Mr Constantinos KADIS
Ms Marta KOS
Mr Andrius KUBILIUS
Ms Hadja LAHBIB
Mr Michael MCGRATH
Mr Glenn MICALLEF
Ms Roxana MÎNZATU
Ms Teresa RIBERA RODRÍGUEZ
Ms Jessika ROSWALL
Mr Maroš ŠEFČOVIČ
Mr Stéphane Séjourné
Mr Piotr Arkadiusz SERAFIN
Mr Jozef SÍKELA
Ms Ekaterina SPASOVA GECHEVA-ZAHARIEVA
Ms Dubravka ŠUICA
Mr Apostolos TZITZIKOSTAS
Mr Olivér VÁRHELYI
Ms Henna Maria VIRKKUNEN.

This Decision shall enter into force on 1 December 2024.
It shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Council Decision (EU) 2024/2993 of 21 November 2024 on the position to be adopted on behalf of the European Union within the Joint Committee established by the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Iceland, with regard to a decision establishing the general requirements for proofs of origin issued electronically under Article 17(4) of Appendix A to Protocol 3 to that Agreement

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2993 3.12.2024
(1) The Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Iceland (the ‘Agreement’) was concluded by the Union by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2842/72(1)and entered into force on 1 April 1973.
(2) Pursuant to Article 30 of the Agreement, the Joint Committee, established under that Article, (the ‘Joint Committee’) may take decisions in the cases provided for in the Agreement.
(3) At its next meeting, the Joint Committee is to take a decision establishing the general requirements for proofs of origin issued electronically.
(4) It is appropriate to establish the position to be adopted on the Union’s behalf within the Joint Committee as the decision of the Joint Committee will have legal effects.
(5) The Regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin (the ‘Convention’) was concluded by the Union by Council Decision 2013/94/EU(2)and entered into force in relation to the Union on 1 May 2012. By Decision (EU) 2019/2198(3), the Council supported the amendment of the Convention providing for a new set of modernised and more flexible rules of origin (the ‘amendment of the Convention’). The amendment of the Convention will enter into force on 1 January 2025.
(6) At the technical meeting held in Brussels on 5 February 2020, the majority of the Contracting Parties to the Convention agreed to implement an alternative set of rules of origin, based on the amendment of the Convention on a transitional, bilateral basis (the ‘Transitional rules’). The Transitional rules apply in parallel with the rules of the Convention, pending the entry into force of the amendment of the Convention.
(7) The application of the Transitional rules ensures the adaptation of the trade flows and customs practices pending the entry into force of the amendment of the Convention.
(8) Since 1 September 2021, a number of bilateral protocols on rules of origin among several Contracting Parties to the Convention(4)have entered into force, rendering the Transitional rules applicable pending the entry into force of the amendment of the Convention. As regards the Republic of Iceland (‘Iceland’), Protocol 3 to the Agreement was replaced by a new Protocol 3 by Decision No 1/2021 of the EU-Iceland Joint Committee(5). The Transitional rules are set out in Appendix A to that new Protocol 3.
(9) The two main objectives of the Transitional rules are, firstly, to provide for less strict rules, making it easier for goods to qualify for preferential originating status and, secondly, to enable the use of proofs of origin that have been issued electronically and/or submitted electronically.
(10) The Union and Iceland have agreed to apply Article 17(4) of Appendix A to Protocol 3 to the Agreement, as regards proofs of origin issued electronically. Therefore, a framework of general requirements for proofs of origin issued electronically should be determined.
(11) The position of the Union within the Joint Committee should therefore be based on the attached draft decision,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 207(4), first subparagraph in conjunction with Article 218(9) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Whereas:
(1) The Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Iceland (the ‘Agreement’) was concluded by the Union by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2842/72 (1) and entered into force on 1 April 1973.
(2) Pursuant to Article 30 of the Agreement, the Joint Committee, established under that Article, (the ‘Joint Committee’) may take decisions in the cases provided for in the Agreement.
(3) At its next meeting, the Joint Committee is to take a decision establishing the general requirements for proofs of origin issued electronically.
(4) It is appropriate to establish the position to be adopted on the Union’s behalf within the Joint Committee as the decision of the Joint Committee will have legal effects.
(5) The Regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin (the ‘Convention’) was concluded by the Union by Council Decision 2013/94/EU (2) and entered into force in relation to the Union on 1 May 2012. By Decision (EU) 2019/2198 (3), the Council supported the amendment of the Convention providing for a new set of modernised and more flexible rules of origin (the ‘amendment of the Convention’). The amendment of the Convention will enter into force on 1 January 2025.
(6) At the technical meeting held in Brussels on 5 February 2020, the majority of the Contracting Parties to the Convention agreed to implement an alternative set of rules of origin, based on the amendment of the Convention on a transitional, bilateral basis (the ‘Transitional rules’). The Transitional rules apply in parallel with the rules of the Convention, pending the entry into force of the amendment of the Convention.
(7) The application of the Transitional rules ensures the adaptation of the trade flows and customs practices pending the entry into force of the amendment of the Convention.
(8) Since 1 September 2021, a number of bilateral protocols on rules of origin among several Contracting Parties to the Convention (4) have entered into force, rendering the Transitional rules applicable pending the entry into force of the amendment of the Convention. As regards the Republic of Iceland (‘Iceland’), Protocol 3 to the Agreement was replaced by a new Protocol 3 by Decision No 1/2021 of the EU-Iceland Joint Committee (5). The Transitional rules are set out in Appendix A to that new Protocol 3.
(9) The two main objectives of the Transitional rules are, firstly, to provide for less strict rules, making it easier for goods to qualify for preferential originating status and, secondly, to enable the use of proofs of origin that have been issued electronically and/or submitted electronically.
(10) The Union and Iceland have agreed to apply Article 17(4) of Appendix A to Protocol 3 to the Agreement, as regards proofs of origin issued electronically. Therefore, a framework of general requirements for proofs of origin issued electronically should be determined.
(11) The position of the Union within the Joint Committee should therefore be based on the attached draft decision,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The position to be adopted on the Union’s behalf within the Joint Committee established by the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Iceland (the ‘Agreement’) at its next meeting, with regard to a decision establishing the general requirements for proofs of origin issued electronically under Article 17(4) of Appendix A to Protocol 3 to that Agreement, shall be based on the draft decision of the Joint Committee attached to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption and shall expire on 31 December 2025.

Council Decision (EU) 2024/2991 of 21 November 2024 on the position to be adopted on behalf of the European Union within the Stabilisation and Association Council established by the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part, with regard to a decision establishing the general requirements for proofs of origin issued electronically under Article 17(4) of Appendix A to Protocol 4 to that Agreement

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2991 3.12.2024
(1) The Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part, (the ‘Agreement’) was concluded by the Union by Council and Commission Decision 2009/332/EC, Euratom(1)and entered into force on 1 April 2009.
(2) Pursuant to Article 118 of the Agreement, the Stabilisation and Association Council, established under Article 116 of the Agreement (the ‘Stabilisation and Association Council’) may take decisions within the scope of the Agreement.
(3) At its next meeting, the Stabilisation and Association Council is to take a decision establishing the general requirements for proofs of origin issued electronically.
(4) It is appropriate to establish the position to be adopted on the Union’s behalf within the Stabilisation and Association Council as the decision of the Stabilisation and Association Council will have legal effects.
(5) The Regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin (the ‘Convention’) was concluded by the Union by Council Decision 2013/94/EU(2)and entered into force in relation to the Union on 1 May 2012. By Decision (EU) 2019/2198(3), the Council supported the amendment of the Convention providing for a new set of modernised and more flexible rules of origin (the ‘amendment of the Convention’). The amendment of the Convention will enter into force on 1 January 2025.
(6) At the technical meeting held in Brussels on 5 February 2020, the majority of the Contracting Parties to the Convention agreed to implement an alternative set of rules of origin, based on the amendment of the Convention on a transitional, bilateral basis (the ‘Transitional rules’). The Transitional rules apply in parallel with the rules of the Convention, pending the entry into force of the amendment of the Convention.
(7) The application of the Transitional rules ensures the adaptation of the trade flows and customs practices pending the entry into force of the amendment of the Convention.
(8) Since 1 September 2021, a number of bilateral protocols on rules of origin among several Contracting Parties to the Convention(4)have entered into force, rendering the Transitional rules applicable pending the entry into force of the amendment of the Convention. As regards the Republic of Albania (‘Albania’), Protocol 4 to the Agreement was replaced by a new Protocol 4 by Decision No 1/2021 of the EU-Albania Stabilisation and Association Council(5). The Transitional rules are set out in Appendix A to that new Protocol 4.
(9) The two main objectives of the Transitional rules are, firstly, to provide for less strict rules, making it easier for goods to qualify for preferential originating status and, secondly, to enable the use of proofs of origin that have been issued electronically and/or submitted electronically.
(10) The Union and Albania have agreed to apply Article 17(4) of Appendix A to Protocol 4 to the Agreement, as regards proofs of origin issued electronically. Therefore, a framework of general requirements for proofs of origin issued electronically should be determined.
(11) The position of the Union within the Stabilisation and Association Council should therefore be based on the attached draft decision,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 207(4), first subparagraph, in conjunction with Article 218(9) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Whereas:
(1) The Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part, (the ‘Agreement’) was concluded by the Union by Council and Commission Decision 2009/332/EC, Euratom (1) and entered into force on 1 April 2009.
(2) Pursuant to Article 118 of the Agreement, the Stabilisation and Association Council, established under Article 116 of the Agreement (the ‘Stabilisation and Association Council’) may take decisions within the scope of the Agreement.
(3) At its next meeting, the Stabilisation and Association Council is to take a decision establishing the general requirements for proofs of origin issued electronically.
(4) It is appropriate to establish the position to be adopted on the Union’s behalf within the Stabilisation and Association Council as the decision of the Stabilisation and Association Council will have legal effects.
(5) The Regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin (the ‘Convention’) was concluded by the Union by Council Decision 2013/94/EU (2) and entered into force in relation to the Union on 1 May 2012. By Decision (EU) 2019/2198 (3), the Council supported the amendment of the Convention providing for a new set of modernised and more flexible rules of origin (the ‘amendment of the Convention’). The amendment of the Convention will enter into force on 1 January 2025.
(6) At the technical meeting held in Brussels on 5 February 2020, the majority of the Contracting Parties to the Convention agreed to implement an alternative set of rules of origin, based on the amendment of the Convention on a transitional, bilateral basis (the ‘Transitional rules’). The Transitional rules apply in parallel with the rules of the Convention, pending the entry into force of the amendment of the Convention.
(7) The application of the Transitional rules ensures the adaptation of the trade flows and customs practices pending the entry into force of the amendment of the Convention.
(8) Since 1 September 2021, a number of bilateral protocols on rules of origin among several Contracting Parties to the Convention (4) have entered into force, rendering the Transitional rules applicable pending the entry into force of the amendment of the Convention. As regards the Republic of Albania (‘Albania’), Protocol 4 to the Agreement was replaced by a new Protocol 4 by Decision No 1/2021 of the EU-Albania Stabilisation and Association Council (5). The Transitional rules are set out in Appendix A to that new Protocol 4.
(9) The two main objectives of the Transitional rules are, firstly, to provide for less strict rules, making it easier for goods to qualify for preferential originating status and, secondly, to enable the use of proofs of origin that have been issued electronically and/or submitted electronically.
(10) The Union and Albania have agreed to apply Article 17(4) of Appendix A to Protocol 4 to the Agreement, as regards proofs of origin issued electronically. Therefore, a framework of general requirements for proofs of origin issued electronically should be determined.
(11) The position of the Union within the Stabilisation and Association Council should therefore be based on the attached draft decision,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The position to be adopted on the Union’s behalf within the Stabilisation and Association Council established by the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part (the ‘Agreement’) at its next meeting, with regard to a decision establishing the general requirements for proofs of origin issued electronically under Article 17(4) of Appendix A to Protocol 4 to that Agreement, shall be based on the draft decision of the Stabilisation and Association Council attached to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption and shall expire on 31 December 2025.

Council Decision (EU) 2024/2990 of 21 November 2024 on the position to be adopted on behalf of the European Union within the Stabilisation and Association Council established by the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part, with regard to a decision establishing the general requirements for proofs of origin issued electronically under Article 17(4) of Appendix A to Protocol 2 to that Agreement

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2990 3.12.2024
(1) The Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part (the ‘Agreement’), was concluded by the Union by Council and Commission Decision (EU, Euratom) 2015/998(1)and entered into force on 1 June 2015.
(2) Pursuant to Article 117 of the Agreement, the Stabilisation and Association Council, established under Article 115 of the Agreement (the ‘Stabilisation and Association Council’) may take decisions within the scope of the Agreement.
(3) At its next meeting, the Stabilisation and Association Council is to take a decision establishing the general requirements for proofs of origin issued electronically.
(4) It is appropriate to establish the position to be adopted on the Union’s behalf within the Stabilisation and Association Council as the decision of the Stabilisation and Association Council will have legal effects.
(5) The Regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin (the ‘Convention’) was concluded by the Union by Council Decision 2013/94/EU(2)and entered into force in relation to the Union on 1 May 2012. By Decision (EU) 2019/2198(3), the Council supported the amendment of the Convention providing for a new set of modernised and more flexible rules of origin (the ‘amendment of the Convention’). The amendment of the Convention will enter into force on 1 January 2025.
(6) At the technical meeting held in Brussels on 5 February 2020, the majority of the Contracting Parties to the Convention agreed to implement an alternative set of rules of origin, based on the amendment of the Convention on a transitional bilateral basis (the ‘Transitional rules’). The Transitional rules apply in parallel with the rules of the Convention, pending the entry into force of the amendment of the Convention.
(7) The application of the Transitional rules ensures the adaptation of the trade flows and customs practices pending the entry into force of the amendment of the Convention.
(8) Since 1 September 2021, a number of bilateral protocols on rules of origin among several Contracting Parties to the Convention(4)have entered into force, rendering the Transitional rules applicable pending the entry into force of the amendment of the Convention. As regards Bosnia and Herzegovina, Protocol 2 to the Agreement was replaced by a new Protocol 2 by Decision No 1/2023 of the EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Council(5). The Transitional rules are set out in Appendix A to that new Protocol 2.
(9) The two main objectives of the Transitional rules are: firstly, to provide for less strict rules, making it easier for goods to qualify for preferential originating status and, secondly, to enable the use of proofs of origin that have been issued electronically and/or submitted electronically.
(10) The Union and Bosnia and Herzegovina have agreed to apply Article 17(4) of Appendix A to Protocol 2 to the Agreement, as regards proofs of origin issued electronically. Therefore, a framework of general requirements for proofs of origin issued electronically should be determined.
(11) The position of the Union within the Stabilisation and Association Council should therefore be based on the attached draft decision,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 207(4), first subparagraph, in conjunction with Article 218(9) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Whereas:
(1) The Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part (the ‘Agreement’), was concluded by the Union by Council and Commission Decision (EU, Euratom) 2015/998 (1) and entered into force on 1 June 2015.
(2) Pursuant to Article 117 of the Agreement, the Stabilisation and Association Council, established under Article 115 of the Agreement (the ‘Stabilisation and Association Council’) may take decisions within the scope of the Agreement.
(3) At its next meeting, the Stabilisation and Association Council is to take a decision establishing the general requirements for proofs of origin issued electronically.
(4) It is appropriate to establish the position to be adopted on the Union’s behalf within the Stabilisation and Association Council as the decision of the Stabilisation and Association Council will have legal effects.
(5) The Regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin (the ‘Convention’) was concluded by the Union by Council Decision 2013/94/EU (2) and entered into force in relation to the Union on 1 May 2012. By Decision (EU) 2019/2198 (3), the Council supported the amendment of the Convention providing for a new set of modernised and more flexible rules of origin (the ‘amendment of the Convention’). The amendment of the Convention will enter into force on 1 January 2025.
(6) At the technical meeting held in Brussels on 5 February 2020, the majority of the Contracting Parties to the Convention agreed to implement an alternative set of rules of origin, based on the amendment of the Convention on a transitional bilateral basis (the ‘Transitional rules’). The Transitional rules apply in parallel with the rules of the Convention, pending the entry into force of the amendment of the Convention.
(7) The application of the Transitional rules ensures the adaptation of the trade flows and customs practices pending the entry into force of the amendment of the Convention.
(8) Since 1 September 2021, a number of bilateral protocols on rules of origin among several Contracting Parties to the Convention (4) have entered into force, rendering the Transitional rules applicable pending the entry into force of the amendment of the Convention. As regards Bosnia and Herzegovina, Protocol 2 to the Agreement was replaced by a new Protocol 2 by Decision No 1/2023 of the EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Council (5). The Transitional rules are set out in Appendix A to that new Protocol 2.
(9) The two main objectives of the Transitional rules are: firstly, to provide for less strict rules, making it easier for goods to qualify for preferential originating status and, secondly, to enable the use of proofs of origin that have been issued electronically and/or submitted electronically.
(10) The Union and Bosnia and Herzegovina have agreed to apply Article 17(4) of Appendix A to Protocol 2 to the Agreement, as regards proofs of origin issued electronically. Therefore, a framework of general requirements for proofs of origin issued electronically should be determined.
(11) The position of the Union within the Stabilisation and Association Council should therefore be based on the attached draft decision,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The position to be adopted on the Union’s behalf within the Stabilisation and Association Council established by the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part (the ‘Agreement’) at its next meeting, with regard to a decision establishing the general requirements for proofs of origin issued electronically under Article 17(4) of Appendix A to Protocol 2 to the Agreement, shall be based on the draft decision of the Stabilisation and Association Council attached to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption and shall expire on 31 December 2025.

Council Decision (EU) 2024/2989 of 21 November 2024 on the position to be adopted on behalf of the European Union within the Joint Committee established by the Agreement between the European Community, of the one part, and the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands, of the other part, with regard to a decision concerning the amendment of Protocol 3 to that Agreement as regards permeability between the Regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin and the Transitional rules of origin

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2989 3.12.2024
(1) The Agreement between the European Community, of the one part, and the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands, of the other part (the ‘Agreement’) was concluded by the Union by Council Decision 97/126/EC(1)and entered into force on 1 January 1997.
(2) Pursuant to Article 34 of the Agreement and to Article 4 of Protocol 3 to the Agreement, the Joint Committee established under Article 31 of the Agreement (the ‘Joint Committee’) may amend the provisions of that Protocol.
(3) At its next meeting, the Joint Committee is to take a decision on an amendment of Protocol 3 to the Agreement.
(4) It is appropriate to establish the position to be adopted on the Union’s behalf within the Joint Committee as the decision of the Joint Committee will have legal effects.
(5) The Regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin (the ‘Convention’) was concluded by the Union by Council Decision 2013/94/EU(2)and entered into force in relation to the Union on 1 May 2012. By Decision (EU) 2019/2198(3), the Council supported the amendment of the Convention providing for a new set of modernised and more flexible rules of origin (the ‘amendment of the Convention’). The amendment of the Convention will enter into force on 1 January 2025.
(6) At the technical meeting held in Brussels on 5 February 2020, the majority of the Contracting Parties to the Convention agreed to implement an alternative set of rules of origin, based on the amendment of the Convention on a transitional, bilateral basis (the ‘Transitional rules’). The Transitional rules apply in parallel with the rules of the Convention, pending the entry into force of the amendment of the Convention.
(7) The application of the Transitional rules ensures the adaptation of the trade flows and customs practices pending the entry into force of the amendment of the Convention.
(8) Since 1 September 2021, a number of bilateral protocols on rules of origin among several Contracting Parties to the Convention(4)have entered into force, rendering the Transitional rules applicable. As regards the Kingdom of Denmark (‘Denmark’) and the Faroe Islands, Protocol 3 to the Agreement was replaced by a new Protocol 3 by Decision No 1/2021 of the EC/Denmark-Faroe Islands Joint Committee(5). The Transitional rules are set out in Appendix A to that new Protocol 3.
(9) The objective of the Transitional rules is to provide for less strict rules, making it easier for goods to qualify for preferential originating status. As the Transitional rules are, in general, less strict than those of the Convention, goods fulfilling the rules of origin set out in the Convention could also qualify as originating under the Transitional rules, with the exception of certain agricultural products classified under Chapters 2, 4 to 15 and 16 (except for processed fishery products) and Chapters 17 to 24 of the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System. The Transitional rules are applicable in parallel with the rules of origin set out in the Convention, thus creating two distinct zones of cumulation of origin. In that context, it can happen that goods fall under both sets of rules of origin simultaneously. According to the principle of permeability under Article 21(1), point (d), of Appendix A to Protocol 3 to the Agreement (‘permeability’), goods which have acquired originating status under one set of rules of origin can be also considered as originating under the other set of rules of origin. In order to facilitate the application of permeability between the Convention and the Transitional rules, Article 8 of Appendix A to Protocol 3 to the Agreement should be amended.
(10) The position of the Union within the Joint Committee should therefore be based on the attached draft decision,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 207(4), first subparagraph, in conjunction with Article 218(9) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Whereas:
(1) The Agreement between the European Community, of the one part, and the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands, of the other part (the ‘Agreement’) was concluded by the Union by Council Decision 97/126/EC (1) and entered into force on 1 January 1997.
(2) Pursuant to Article 34 of the Agreement and to Article 4 of Protocol 3 to the Agreement, the Joint Committee established under Article 31 of the Agreement (the ‘Joint Committee’) may amend the provisions of that Protocol.
(3) At its next meeting, the Joint Committee is to take a decision on an amendment of Protocol 3 to the Agreement.
(4) It is appropriate to establish the position to be adopted on the Union’s behalf within the Joint Committee as the decision of the Joint Committee will have legal effects.
(5) The Regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin (the ‘Convention’) was concluded by the Union by Council Decision 2013/94/EU (2) and entered into force in relation to the Union on 1 May 2012. By Decision (EU) 2019/2198 (3), the Council supported the amendment of the Convention providing for a new set of modernised and more flexible rules of origin (the ‘amendment of the Convention’). The amendment of the Convention will enter into force on 1 January 2025.
(6) At the technical meeting held in Brussels on 5 February 2020, the majority of the Contracting Parties to the Convention agreed to implement an alternative set of rules of origin, based on the amendment of the Convention on a transitional, bilateral basis (the ‘Transitional rules’). The Transitional rules apply in parallel with the rules of the Convention, pending the entry into force of the amendment of the Convention.
(7) The application of the Transitional rules ensures the adaptation of the trade flows and customs practices pending the entry into force of the amendment of the Convention.
(8) Since 1 September 2021, a number of bilateral protocols on rules of origin among several Contracting Parties to the Convention (4) have entered into force, rendering the Transitional rules applicable. As regards the Kingdom of Denmark (‘Denmark’) and the Faroe Islands, Protocol 3 to the Agreement was replaced by a new Protocol 3 by Decision No 1/2021 of the EC/Denmark-Faroe Islands Joint Committee (5). The Transitional rules are set out in Appendix A to that new Protocol 3.
(9) The objective of the Transitional rules is to provide for less strict rules, making it easier for goods to qualify for preferential originating status. As the Transitional rules are, in general, less strict than those of the Convention, goods fulfilling the rules of origin set out in the Convention could also qualify as originating under the Transitional rules, with the exception of certain agricultural products classified under Chapters 2, 4 to 15 and 16 (except for processed fishery products) and Chapters 17 to 24 of the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System. The Transitional rules are applicable in parallel with the rules of origin set out in the Convention, thus creating two distinct zones of cumulation of origin. In that context, it can happen that goods fall under both sets of rules of origin simultaneously. According to the principle of permeability under Article 21(1), point (d), of Appendix A to Protocol 3 to the Agreement (‘permeability’), goods which have acquired originating status under one set of rules of origin can be also considered as originating under the other set of rules of origin. In order to facilitate the application of permeability between the Convention and the Transitional rules, Article 8 of Appendix A to Protocol 3 to the Agreement should be amended.
(10) The position of the Union within the Joint Committee should therefore be based on the attached draft decision,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The position to be adopted on the Union’s behalf within the Joint Committee established by the Agreement between the European Community, of the one part, and the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands, of the other part (the ‘Agreement’) at its next meeting, with regard to a decision concerning the amendment of Protocol 3 to the Agreement as regards permeability between the Regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin on the one hand and the Transitional rules of origin included in Appendix A to Protocol 3 to the Agreement on the other hand, shall be based on the draft decision of the Joint Committee attached to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption and shall expire on 31 December 2025.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2988 of 2 December 2024 amending Decision 2010/452/CFSP on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2988 3.12.2024
(1) On 12 August 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/452/CFSP(1), which extended the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia), established by Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP(2).
(2) On 25 November 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/2318(3), which extended EUMM Georgia until 14 December 2024.
(3) In the context of the Strategic Review of EUMM Georgia, the Political and Security Committee recommended that the mandate of EUMM Georgia be extended until 14 December 2026.
(4) Decision 2010/452/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly.
(5) EUMM Georgia will be conducted in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union’s external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty,
(1) in Article 14(1), the following subparagraph is added:‘The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the Mission between 15 December 2024 and 14 December 2026 shall be EUR 50 648 747,00.’.
(2) in Article 18, the second paragraph is replaced by the following:‘It shall expire on 14 December 2026.’.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 42(4) and Article 43(2) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 12 August 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/452/CFSP (1), which extended the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia), established by Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP (2).
(2) On 25 November 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/2318 (3), which extended EUMM Georgia until 14 December 2024.
(3) In the context of the Strategic Review of EUMM Georgia, the Political and Security Committee recommended that the mandate of EUMM Georgia be extended until 14 December 2026.
(4) Decision 2010/452/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly.
(5) EUMM Georgia will be conducted in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union’s external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Decision 2010/452/CFSP is amended as follows:

(1) in Article 14(1), the following subparagraph is added:
‘The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the Mission between 15 December 2024 and 14 December 2026 shall be EUR 50 648 747,00.’.
(2) in Article 18, the second paragraph is replaced by the following:
‘It shall expire on 14 December 2026.’.

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Commission Delegated Decision (EU) 2024/2986 of 24 September 2024 on the unilateral inclusion of sectors by Austria in the emissions trading system within the Union for buildings, road transport and additional sectors pursuant to Article 30j of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2024/2986 3.12.2024
(1) Article 30j(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC provides Member States with the possibility, from 2027, to unilaterally extend the application of the emissions trading system within the Union (‘EU ETS’) for buildings, road transport and additional sectors, to sectors that are not listed in Annex III to Directive 2003/87/EC.
(2) When availing themselves of this possibility, Member States are to take into account in particular the effects on the internal market, potential distortions of competition, the environmental integrity of the emissions trading system and the reliability of the planned monitoring and reporting system.
(3) On 31 May 2024, Austria notified a request to expand the application of the emission trading system for buildings, road transport and additional sectors to a list of sectors not yet covered by Annex III to, or by Chapters II and III of, Directive 2003/87/EC.
(4) The Austrian authorities explained that this unilateral extension would facilitate the transition of the national CO2pricing system to the new emission trading system for buildings, road transport and additional sectors. In addition, it will reduce the administrative costs and ease the reporting and monitoring processes for the regulated entities and the national competent authority.
(5) In the Commission’s opinion, expanding the scope of the EU ETS beyond the list of activities listed under Annex III to Directive 2003/87/EC, as Austria has requested, would indeed have environmental benefits, and would bring about an administrative simplification for fuel suppliers acting as regulated entities in Austria.
(6) On the basis of the reviewed greenhouse gas emissions data for the years 2016, 2017 and 2018 carried out in 2020 in accordance with Article 4(3) of Regulation (EU) 2018/842 of the European Parliament and of the Council(2), the average total amount of emissions corresponding to the sectors notified by Austria in the context of this request for unilateral extension amounts to 1 034 563 tCO2. This amount will be used as a basis for calculating the future amount of additional allowances to be issued as of 2027.
(7) The Commission has assessed the reporting and monitoring methodologies planned by Austria and has concluded that these are reliable and in line with the requirements of Article 30j of Directive 2003/87/EC.
(8) The excise duty system in place in Austria, particularly the distribution infrastructures, does not effectively allow regulated entities to differentiate the end use of fuels between, on the one hand, sectors already covered by Annex III to Directive 2003/87/EC and, on the other hand, the sectors concerned by this extension of scope. To facilitate cost-effective monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions and reduce the administrative burden linked with reporting associated with the scope factor in the annual emissions reports and the monitoring plans, regulated entities should not be required to distinguish the reporting of emissions in sectors concerned by the extension of scope from emissions in sectors already covered by Annex III to Directive 2003/87/EC.
(9) In order to comply with the regular annual cycle for monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions in the new emissions trading system for buildings, road transport and additional sectors, it is appropriate for regulated entities to report verified emissions for the extended scope starting on 1 January 2025, in accordance with Article 30f(2) of Directive 2003/87/EC,
IPCC code Sector Content
1 A 3 a Civil Aviation Emissions from international and domestic civil aviation, including take-offs and landings
1 A 3 c Railways Emissions from railway transport for both freight and passenger traffic routes
1 A 3 d(subset) Water-borne Navigation Emissions from fuels used to propel water-borne vessels, including hovercraft and hydrofoils, but excluding commercial activities on the Danube River and on the international lakes (Constance and Neusiedl)
1 A 4 c i Stationary combustion for agriculture/forestry/fishing Emissions from fuels combusted in pumps, grain drying, horticultural greenhouses and other agriculture, forestry or stationary combustion in the fishing industry
1 A 4 c ii Off-road vehicles and other machinery mobile combustion Emissions from fuels combusted in traction vehicles on farmland and in forests, including use of agricultural vehicles on paved roads
1 A 4 c iii(subset) Fishing(mobile combustion) Emissions from fuels combusted for fishing
1 A 5 b(subset) Mobile combustion – military Emissions from vehicles, off-road machinery fuel combustion for military use and military aviation, except for fuel used in multilateral operations
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (1), and in particular Article 30j thereof,
Whereas:
(1) Article 30j(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC provides Member States with the possibility, from 2027, to unilaterally extend the application of the emissions trading system within the Union (‘EU ETS’) for buildings, road transport and additional sectors, to sectors that are not listed in Annex III to Directive 2003/87/EC.
(2) When availing themselves of this possibility, Member States are to take into account in particular the effects on the internal market, potential distortions of competition, the environmental integrity of the emissions trading system and the reliability of the planned monitoring and reporting system.
(3) On 31 May 2024, Austria notified a request to expand the application of the emission trading system for buildings, road transport and additional sectors to a list of sectors not yet covered by Annex III to, or by Chapters II and III of, Directive 2003/87/EC.
(4) The Austrian authorities explained that this unilateral extension would facilitate the transition of the national CO2 pricing system to the new emission trading system for buildings, road transport and additional sectors. In addition, it will reduce the administrative costs and ease the reporting and monitoring processes for the regulated entities and the national competent authority.
(5) In the Commission’s opinion, expanding the scope of the EU ETS beyond the list of activities listed under Annex III to Directive 2003/87/EC, as Austria has requested, would indeed have environmental benefits, and would bring about an administrative simplification for fuel suppliers acting as regulated entities in Austria.
(6) On the basis of the reviewed greenhouse gas emissions data for the years 2016, 2017 and 2018 carried out in 2020 in accordance with Article 4(3) of Regulation (EU) 2018/842 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2), the average total amount of emissions corresponding to the sectors notified by Austria in the context of this request for unilateral extension amounts to 1 034 563 tCO2. This amount will be used as a basis for calculating the future amount of additional allowances to be issued as of 2027.
(7) The Commission has assessed the reporting and monitoring methodologies planned by Austria and has concluded that these are reliable and in line with the requirements of Article 30j of Directive 2003/87/EC.
(8) The excise duty system in place in Austria, particularly the distribution infrastructures, does not effectively allow regulated entities to differentiate the end use of fuels between, on the one hand, sectors already covered by Annex III to Directive 2003/87/EC and, on the other hand, the sectors concerned by this extension of scope. To facilitate cost-effective monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions and reduce the administrative burden linked with reporting associated with the scope factor in the annual emissions reports and the monitoring plans, regulated entities should not be required to distinguish the reporting of emissions in sectors concerned by the extension of scope from emissions in sectors already covered by Annex III to Directive 2003/87/EC.
(9) In order to comply with the regular annual cycle for monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions in the new emissions trading system for buildings, road transport and additional sectors, it is appropriate for regulated entities to report verified emissions for the extended scope starting on 1 January 2025, in accordance with Article 30f(2) of Directive 2003/87/EC,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Scope of the unilateral extension approval

The extension, in Austria, of the activity referred to in Annex III to Directive 2003/87/EC to the sectors listed in the Annex to this Decision is approved subject to the conditions listed in Article 3.

Authorisation of the issue of additional allowances

Additional allowances shall be issued in 2027 on the basis of the average amount of total emissions of 1 034 563 tCO2 reported by Austria for the sectors listed in the Annex to this Decision for the years 2016, 2017 and 2018 in accordance with the rules set in Article 30c(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC.

Monitoring and reporting obligations

Austria shall ensure that each regulated entity monitors and reports, in accordance with Article 30f(2) of Directive 2003/87/EC, to the competent authority, for each calendar year, the emissions corresponding to the quantities of fuels released for consumption in the sectors listed in the Annex to this Decision that have taken place from 1 January 2025.

Entry into force and application

This Decision shall enter into force on the third day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

IPCC code
Sector
Content
1 A 3 a
Civil Aviation
Emissions from international and domestic civil aviation, including take-offs and landings
1 A 3 c
Railways
Emissions from railway transport for both freight and passenger traffic routes
1 A 3 d
(subset)
Water-borne Navigation
Emissions from fuels used to propel water-borne vessels, including hovercraft and hydrofoils, but excluding commercial activities on the Danube River and on the international lakes (Constance and Neusiedl)
1 A 4 c i
Stationary combustion for agriculture/forestry/fishing
Emissions from fuels combusted in pumps, grain drying, horticultural greenhouses and other agriculture, forestry or stationary combustion in the fishing industry
1 A 4 c ii
Off-road vehicles and other machinery mobile combustion
Emissions from fuels combusted in traction vehicles on farmland and in forests, including use of agricultural vehicles on paved roads
1 A 4 c iii
(subset)
Fishing
(mobile combustion)
Emissions from fuels combusted for fishing
1 A 5 b
(subset)
Mobile combustion – military
Emissions from vehicles, off-road machinery fuel combustion for military use and military aviation, except for fuel used in multilateral operations