Council Decision (EU) 2025/702 of 17 March 2025 authorising the European Commission to take part, on behalf of the Union, in the negotiations for an international instrument setting up an International Claims Commission for Ukraine

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/702 8.4.2025
(1) In view of the unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, on 14 November 2022, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted Resolution ES-11/5, entitled ‘Furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine’.
(2) In addition to recalling the obligations of all States under Article 2 of the UN Charter, including that of refraining in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the UN General Assembly expressed grave concern at the loss of life, civilian displacement, destruction of infrastructure and natural resources, loss of public and private property, and economic calamity caused by the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine.
(3) The UN General Assembly recognised that the Russian Federation must be held to account for any violations of international law in or against Ukraine. In addition, it stressed that the Russian Federation must bear the legal consequences of all of its internationally wrongful acts, including making reparation for the injury, including any damage, caused by such acts.
(4) The UN General Assembly recognised the need to establish, in cooperation with Ukraine, an international mechanism for reparation for damage, loss or injury, arising from the internationally wrongful acts of the Russian Federation in or against Ukraine. To that end, it recommended the creation of an international register of damage to serve as a record, in documentary form, of evidence and claims information on damage, loss or injury to all natural and legal persons concerned, as well as the State of Ukraine, caused by internationally wrongful acts of the Russian Federation in or against Ukraine, as well as to promote and coordinate evidence-gathering.
(5) On 12 May 2023, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution CM/Res(2023)3 establishing the Enlarged Partial Agreement on the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine (the ‘Register’).
(6) In order to push forward accountability efforts towards the establishment of an international mechanism for reparation for damage, loss or injury arising from the internationally wrongful acts of the Russian Federation in or against Ukraine, the States that are Participants or Associate Members under the Enlarged Partial Agreement on the Register adopted a stepwise approach, choosing first to establish the Register. This was to be followed by the other elements of the compensation mechanism, namely a claims commission and a compensation fund. That approach was reflected in the Statute of the Register, where it is acknowledged that the Register, including its digital platform with all data about claims and evidence recorded therein, is intended to constitute the first component of a future international compensation mechanism to be established by a separate international instrument in co-operation with Ukraine and relevant international organisations and bodies.
(7) After joining the Register as a founding Associate Member on 11 May 2023 by means of a notification to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, the Union changed its status to Participant in the Register on 22 July 2024.
(8) On 29 February 2024, the European Parliament and the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2024/792(1), establishing the Ukraine Facility, which, inter alia, provided the legal basis for funding for initiatives and bodies involved in supporting and enforcing international justice in Ukraine, such as for the Union’s financial contribution to the Register.
(9) In 2024, the Office of the President of Ukraine, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Register invited the States that supported the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/ES-11/5 to preparatory meetings on an international instrument setting up an International Claims Commission for Ukraine. The first formal negotiation round is expected to take place in March 2025.
(10) The Secretariat of the Register prepared a ‘zero draft’ of an international instrument setting up an International Claims Commission for Ukraine. The ‘zero draft’ includes provisions on the International Claims Commission’s mandate, function, legal status, seat, membership and participation, organisational structure, financing and budget as well as on the procedure for the review of claims, membership of the Russian Federation and transfer of the work of the Register.
(11) Given the interest of the Union in reiterating its firm commitment to ensuring that the Russian Federation bear the legal consequences of its internationally wrongful acts in or against Ukraine, including the obligation to make reparation for any damage, loss or injury caused by those acts, it is appropriate for the Union to participate in the negotiations for an international instrument setting up an International Claims Commission for Ukraine. This is without prejudice to the Member States’ competence to negotiate and conclude such international instrument,
(1) The objective of the international instrument setting up the International Claims Commission for Ukraine shall be to create the legal basis under international law for an administrative body to review, assess and decide eligible claims and determine the amount of compensation due in each case for damage, loss, or injury caused in the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, extending to its territorial sea as well as in its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf to all natural and legal persons concerned, as well as the State of Ukraine, including its regional and local authorities, state-owned or controlled entities, by the Russian Federation’s internationally wrongful acts in or against Ukraine, including its aggression in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as any violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law.
(2) The international instrument shall clearly define the territorial and temporal scope of the Claims Commission.
(3) The international instrument shall provide the legal status and legal personality of the Claims Commission as necessary for the exercise of its functions and fulfilment of its mandate.
(4) The international instrument shall spell out clearly and precisely the titles of membership for States and Regional Integration Organisations and their modalities of participation to the instrument.
(5) The international instrument shall clearly outline the organisational structure of the Claims Commission, in particular, as regards the governance structure and modalities of participation of States and Regional Integration Organisations..
(6) The international instrument shall specify that, in accordance with international law, the Russian Federation shall bear the costs of the Claims Commission. It shall also specify that, until the Russian Federation dischages the said obligation, the Claims Commission shall be financed through the annual assessed contributions of its Members and voluntary contributions, and that Members’ contributions shall be recoverable from the Russian Federation.
(7) The international instrument shall clearly set out the modalities of determination of the annual financial contribution from the Members and the financial rules and procedures governing the Claims Commission.
(8) The international instrument shall include the modalities needed for a smooth and precise transfer of the work of the Register of Damage, and detail the Register’s possible continuation within the framework of the Claims Commission.
(9) The international instrument shall provide that the European Union shall have a right to vote equal to that of other parties; and that it shall excercise its right to vote without prejudice to, and irrespective of, the voting rights of its Member States that are Members of the Claims Commission.
(10) The procedure for negotiations shall be as follows:(a)The negotiations must be prepared for well in advance. To this end, the Commission shall inform the special committee designated in accordance with Article 218(4) TFEU, i.e. the Council Working Party on the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe (COSCE) of the schedule anticipated and the issues to be negotiated, and share the relevant information as early as possible.(b)Where necessary, the negotiating sessions shall be preceded by a meeting of COSCE in order to identify the key issues, formulate opinions and provide guidance, as appropriate.(c)The Commission shall report to COSCE on the outcome of the negotiations after each negotiating session or, when a number of negotiations are conducted in parallel, after a series of negotiation sessions.(d)The Commission shall inform COSCE on any important issue that may arise during the negotiations. (a) The negotiations must be prepared for well in advance. To this end, the Commission shall inform the special committee designated in accordance with Article 218(4) TFEU, i.e. the Council Working Party on the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe (COSCE) of the schedule anticipated and the issues to be negotiated, and share the relevant information as early as possible. (b) Where necessary, the negotiating sessions shall be preceded by a meeting of COSCE in order to identify the key issues, formulate opinions and provide guidance, as appropriate. (c) The Commission shall report to COSCE on the outcome of the negotiations after each negotiating session or, when a number of negotiations are conducted in parallel, after a series of negotiation sessions. (d) The Commission shall inform COSCE on any important issue that may arise during the negotiations.
(a) The negotiations must be prepared for well in advance. To this end, the Commission shall inform the special committee designated in accordance with Article 218(4) TFEU, i.e. the Council Working Party on the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe (COSCE) of the schedule anticipated and the issues to be negotiated, and share the relevant information as early as possible.
(b) Where necessary, the negotiating sessions shall be preceded by a meeting of COSCE in order to identify the key issues, formulate opinions and provide guidance, as appropriate.
(c) The Commission shall report to COSCE on the outcome of the negotiations after each negotiating session or, when a number of negotiations are conducted in parallel, after a series of negotiation sessions.
(d) The Commission shall inform COSCE on any important issue that may arise during the negotiations.
(a) The negotiations must be prepared for well in advance. To this end, the Commission shall inform the special committee designated in accordance with Article 218(4) TFEU, i.e. the Council Working Party on the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe (COSCE) of the schedule anticipated and the issues to be negotiated, and share the relevant information as early as possible.
(b) Where necessary, the negotiating sessions shall be preceded by a meeting of COSCE in order to identify the key issues, formulate opinions and provide guidance, as appropriate.
(c) The Commission shall report to COSCE on the outcome of the negotiations after each negotiating session or, when a number of negotiations are conducted in parallel, after a series of negotiation sessions.
(d) The Commission shall inform COSCE on any important issue that may arise during the negotiations.
1. FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE 6
1.1. Title of the proposal/initiative 6
1.2. Policy area(s) concerned 6
1.3. Objective(s) 6
1.3.1. General objective(s) 6
1.3.2. Specific objective(s) 6
1.3.3. Expected result(s) and impact 6
1.3.4. Indicators of performance 6
1.4. The proposal/initiative relates to: 6
1.5. Grounds for the proposal/initiative 7
1.5.1. Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term including a detailed timeline for roll-out of the implementation of the initiative 7
1.5.2. Added value of EU involvement (it may result from different factors, e.g. coordination gains, legal certainty, greater effectiveness or complementarities). For the purposes of this section ‘added value of EU involvement’ is the value resulting from EU action, that is additional to the value that would have been otherwise created by Member States alone. 7
1.5.3. Lessons learned from similar experiences in the past 7
1.5.4. Compatibility with the multiannual financial framework and possible synergies with other appropriate instruments 8
1.5.5. Assessment of the different available financing options, including scope for redeployment 8
1.6. Duration of the proposal/initiative and of its financial impact 8
1.7. Method(s) of budget implementation planned 8
2. MANAGEMENT MEASURES 9
2.1. Monitoring and reporting rules 9
2.2. Management and control system(s) 9
2.2.1. Justification of the budget implementation method(s), the funding implementation mechanism(s), the payment modalities and the control strategy proposed 9
2.2.2. Information concerning the risks identified and the internal control system(s) set up to mitigate them 9
2.2.3. Estimation and justification of the cost-effectiveness of the controls (ratio between the control costs and the value of the related funds managed), and assessment of the expected levels of risk of error (at payment & at closure) 9
2.3. Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities 10
3. ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE 10
3.1. Heading(s) of the multiannual financial framework and expenditure budget line(s) affected 10
3.2. Estimated financial impact of the proposal on appropriations 10
3.2.1. Summary of estimated impact on operational appropriations 10
3.2.1.1. Appropriations from voted budget 11
3.2.2. Estimated output funded from operational appropriations 12
3.2.3. Summary of estimated impact on administrative appropriations 13
3.2.3.1. Appropriations from voted budget 13
3.2.4. Estimated requirements of human resources 13
3.2.4.1. Financed from voted budget 13
3.2.5. Overview of estimated impact on digital technology-related investments 14
3.2.6. Compatibility with the current multiannual financial framework 15
3.2.7. Third-party contributions 15
3.3. Estimated impact on revenue 15
4. DIGITAL DIMENSIONS 15
4.1. Requirements of digital relevance 15
4.2. Data 16
4.3. Digital solutions 16
4.4. Interoperability assessment 16
4.5. Measures to support digital implementation 16
Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the European Commission to participate, on behalf of the European Union, in negotiations on the international agreement establishing the International Claims Commission for Ukraine.
JusticeFinancial and technical assistance to third countries
1.To ultimately provide the necessary assitance to Ukraine to ensure that the Russian Federation bears the legal consequences of its internationally wrongful acts against Ukraine including the obligation to make reparation for any damage, loss or injury caused by those acts.2.To abide by the Statute of the Register of Damage – in which the EU is a Participant – which provides that the Register, including its digital platform with all data about claims and evidence recorded therein, is meant as the first component of the compensation mechanism to be established by a separate international instrument in co-operation with Ukraine and relevant international organisations and bodies.3.To establish the International Claims Commission and ensure the Union’s participation therein.4.To give the means to the International Claims Commission to review, assess and decide eligible claims recorded in the Register of Damage and determine the amount of compensation due in each case. 1. To ultimately provide the necessary assitance to Ukraine to ensure that the Russian Federation bears the legal consequences of its internationally wrongful acts against Ukraine including the obligation to make reparation for any damage, loss or injury caused by those acts. 2. To abide by the Statute of the Register of Damage – in which the EU is a Participant – which provides that the Register, including its digital platform with all data about claims and evidence recorded therein, is meant as the first component of the compensation mechanism to be established by a separate international instrument in co-operation with Ukraine and relevant international organisations and bodies. 3. To establish the International Claims Commission and ensure the Union’s participation therein. 4. To give the means to the International Claims Commission to review, assess and decide eligible claims recorded in the Register of Damage and determine the amount of compensation due in each case.
1. To ultimately provide the necessary assitance to Ukraine to ensure that the Russian Federation bears the legal consequences of its internationally wrongful acts against Ukraine including the obligation to make reparation for any damage, loss or injury caused by those acts.
2. To abide by the Statute of the Register of Damage – in which the EU is a Participant – which provides that the Register, including its digital platform with all data about claims and evidence recorded therein, is meant as the first component of the compensation mechanism to be established by a separate international instrument in co-operation with Ukraine and relevant international organisations and bodies.
3. To establish the International Claims Commission and ensure the Union’s participation therein.
4. To give the means to the International Claims Commission to review, assess and decide eligible claims recorded in the Register of Damage and determine the amount of compensation due in each case.
1. To ultimately provide the necessary assitance to Ukraine to ensure that the Russian Federation bears the legal consequences of its internationally wrongful acts against Ukraine including the obligation to make reparation for any damage, loss or injury caused by those acts.
2. To abide by the Statute of the Register of Damage – in which the EU is a Participant – which provides that the Register, including its digital platform with all data about claims and evidence recorded therein, is meant as the first component of the compensation mechanism to be established by a separate international instrument in co-operation with Ukraine and relevant international organisations and bodies.
3. To establish the International Claims Commission and ensure the Union’s participation therein.
4. To give the means to the International Claims Commission to review, assess and decide eligible claims recorded in the Register of Damage and determine the amount of compensation due in each case.
The International Claims Commission would work as a fact-finding body and review, assess and decide eligible claims recorded in the Register and determine the amount of compensation due in each case.
The setting up of the International Claims Commission.
□ a new action following a pilot project / preparatory action(1)
□ the extension of an existing action
□ a merger or redirection of one or more actions towards another/a new action
There are two main requirements that can be expected when implementing this initiative. The first one, which is short term, is to formally receive the mandate to participate for the EU in the negotiation process on the setting up of the International Claims Commission. The second one, which is long term, could be assessed only once the International Claims Commission is fully operational. Once this will be case, the efficiency of this instrument could be evaluated against its ability to review, assess and decide eligible claims and determine the amount of compensation due in each case.
Reasons for action at EU level (ex-ante)The Union reiterated on various occasions its commitment to ensure that the Russian Federation bears the legal consequences of its internationally wrongful acts, including the obligation to make reparation for any damage caused by such acts. This commitment notably echoes the call made by the United National General Assembly 2022 resolution entitled ‘Furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine’, which recognised the need for the establishment of an international mechanism for reparation for damage, loss or injury arising from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Answering to this call, on 12 May 2023, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted the Resolution establishing the Enlarged Partial Agreement on the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. States adopted a stepwise approach, choosing to establish the Register first, to be followed by the other elements of the compensation mechanism, namely a claims commission and a compensation fund. This approach was reflected in the Register’s Statute, where it is acknowledged that the Register, including its digital platform with all data about claims and evidence recorded therein, is meant as the first component of the compensation mechanism to be established by a separate international instrument in co-operation with Ukraine and relevant international organisations and bodies. After initially joining the Register of Damage as a founding Associate Member on 11 May 2023 by means of a Commission Decision, the Union, further to a Council Decision adopted on 22 July 2024, changed its status to a fully-fledged Participant. The Union therefore participates within its own role in the Register, together with and in addition to the Member States (except for Hungary). Such participation allows the Union to stand by its commitment to support Ukraine and contribute to the restoration of a rule-based international legal order. At the same time, it allows the Commission to better coordinate its actions related to reparations with the Member States, thus ensuring that the Union can speak with one voice. The possibility for the Commission to participate in the negotiations of the Claims Commission, and ultimately in the Claims Commission itself once established, is thus the natural continuation and development of the existing status quo.Expected generated EU added value (ex-post)By participating in the setting up of the International Claims Commission, the EU would contribute to ensure that the Russian Federation bears the legal consequences of its wrongful acts and that, in such endeavour, the EU can speak with one voice. Whenever necessary, the Commission could ensure coordination with and among Member States in the different phases of the establishment and functioning of the Claims Commission, thus contributing to the efficient management of this new body.
The main lessons learned in the past draw from previous similar instruments. The UN Compensation Commission (UNCC) is the most relevant precedent, which can give some insights on the design and costs of the Claims Commission for Ukraine. It existed for 31 years (1991 to 2022) but its adjudicative activities lasted 12 years. Due to the groundwork already done by the Register and the technological developments in the last decades, the Claims Commission could have a shorter lifespan than the UNCC, currently estimated at 10 years. The Union did not however participate in the UNCC.
The Union’s unwavering support to Ukraine reflects a shared commitment to democratic principles and the safeguarding of the rule-based international order and peace in Europe. The present proposal is therefore consistent with other Union policies that aim to support Ukraine and safeguard the international order and peace in Europe, notably in the context of the current Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The objectives of this proposal are supported by Regulation (EU) 2024/792 establishing the Ukraine Facility. Article 34(3) of the latter provides that assistance under Pillar III of the Ukraine Facility ‘shall also strengthen capacities for conflict prevention, peacebuilding and address pre and post-crisis needs, including through, confidence-building measures and processes that promote justice, truth-seeking, comprehensive post-conflict rehabilitation for an inclusive, peaceful society, as well as collection of evidence of crimes committed during the war. Funding for initiatives and bodies involved in supporting and enforcing international justice in Ukraine may be provided under this Chapter’.
Regulation (EU) 2024/792 establishing the Ukraine Facility provides the legal basis for the Union’s contribution to the International Claims Commission until 2027. On the basis of the objectives set out in Regulation (EU) 2024/792, and in particular under Chapter V, Article 34(3) of said Regulation provides that ‘[a]ssistance under this Chapter shall also strengthen capacities for conflict prevention, peacebuilding and address pre- and post-crisis needs, including through, confidence-building measures and processes that promote justice, truth-seeking, comprehensive post-conflict rehabilitation for an inclusive, peaceful society, as well as collection of evidence of crimes committed during the war. Funding for initiatives and bodies involved in supporting and enforcing international justice in Ukraine may be provided under this Chapter’. Therefore, as the instrument setting up the International Claims Commission aims to enforce international justice in Ukraine by contributing to a mechanism that will compensate the damages suffered by Ukraine and its population and caused by the Russian Federation’s violations of international law, Article 34(3) of Regulation (EU) 2024/792 provides for the appropriate legal basis for the Union to provide its financial contribution to the Claims Commission until 2027. The budget line that would cater for this expenditure would be line 16 06 03 01 — Union accession assistance and other measures, whereby in the relative budget remarks it is explained that this item ‘will also cover support for […] other measures that are complementary to EU action, such as accountability mechanisms for Russia’s war of aggression’. The Union’s contribution to the Register of Damage is also covered by the Ukraine Facility.
— in effect from 2025 to 2035(2) in effect from 2025 to 2035(2)
in effect from 2025 to 2035(2)
in effect from 2025 to 2035(2)
— □financial impact from YYYY to YYYY for commitment appropriations and from YYYY to YYYY for payment appropriations. □ financial impact from YYYY to YYYY for commitment appropriations and from YYYY to YYYY for payment appropriations.
□ financial impact from YYYY to YYYY for commitment appropriations and from YYYY to YYYY for payment appropriations.
□ financial impact from YYYY to YYYY for commitment appropriations and from YYYY to YYYY for payment appropriations.
— Implementation with a start-up period from YYYY to YYYY,
— followed by full-scale operation.
Direct managementby the Commission(4)
— □by its departments, including by its staff in the Union delegations; □ by its departments, including by its staff in the Union delegations;
□ by its departments, including by its staff in the Union delegations;
□ by its departments, including by its staff in the Union delegations;
— □by the executive agencies □ by the executive agencies
□ by the executive agencies
□ by the executive agencies
□ Shared managementwith the Member States
□ Indirect managementby entrusting budget implementation tasks to:
— □third countries or the bodies they have designated □ third countries or the bodies they have designated
□ third countries or the bodies they have designated
□ third countries or the bodies they have designated
— □international organisations and their agencies (to be specified)(5) □ international organisations and their agencies (to be specified)(5)
□ international organisations and their agencies (to be specified)(5)
□ international organisations and their agencies (to be specified)(5)
— □the European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund □ the European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund
□ the European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund
□ the European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund
— □bodies referred to in Articles 70 and 71 of the Financial Regulation □ bodies referred to in Articles 70 and 71 of the Financial Regulation
□ bodies referred to in Articles 70 and 71 of the Financial Regulation
□ bodies referred to in Articles 70 and 71 of the Financial Regulation
— □public law bodies □ public law bodies
□ public law bodies
□ public law bodies
— □bodies governed by private law with a public service mission to the extent that they are provided with adequate financial guarantees □ bodies governed by private law with a public service mission to the extent that they are provided with adequate financial guarantees
□ bodies governed by private law with a public service mission to the extent that they are provided with adequate financial guarantees
□ bodies governed by private law with a public service mission to the extent that they are provided with adequate financial guarantees
— □bodies governed by the private law of a Member State that are entrusted with the implementation of a public-private partnership and that are provided with adequate financial guarantees □ bodies governed by the private law of a Member State that are entrusted with the implementation of a public-private partnership and that are provided with adequate financial guarantees
□ bodies governed by the private law of a Member State that are entrusted with the implementation of a public-private partnership and that are provided with adequate financial guarantees
□ bodies governed by the private law of a Member State that are entrusted with the implementation of a public-private partnership and that are provided with adequate financial guarantees
— □bodies or persons entrusted with the implementation of specific actions in the common foreign and security policy pursuant to Title V of the Treaty on European Union, and identified in the relevant basic act □ bodies or persons entrusted with the implementation of specific actions in the common foreign and security policy pursuant to Title V of the Treaty on European Union, and identified in the relevant basic act
□ bodies or persons entrusted with the implementation of specific actions in the common foreign and security policy pursuant to Title V of the Treaty on European Union, and identified in the relevant basic act
□ bodies or persons entrusted with the implementation of specific actions in the common foreign and security policy pursuant to Title V of the Treaty on European Union, and identified in the relevant basic act
— □bodies established in a Member State, governed by the private law of a Member State or Union law and eligible to be entrusted, in accordance with sector-specific rules, with the implementation of Union funds or budgetary guarantees, to the extent that such bodies are controlled by public law bodies or by bodies governed by private law with a public service mission, and are provided with adequate financial guarantees in the form of joint and several liability by the controlling bodies or equivalent financial guarantees and which may be, for each action, limited to the maximum amount of the Union support. □ bodies established in a Member State, governed by the private law of a Member State or Union law and eligible to be entrusted, in accordance with sector-specific rules, with the implementation of Union funds or budgetary guarantees, to the extent that such bodies are controlled by public law bodies or by bodies governed by private law with a public service mission, and are provided with adequate financial guarantees in the form of joint and several liability by the controlling bodies or equivalent financial guarantees and which may be, for each action, limited to the maximum amount of the Union support.
□ bodies established in a Member State, governed by the private law of a Member State or Union law and eligible to be entrusted, in accordance with sector-specific rules, with the implementation of Union funds or budgetary guarantees, to the extent that such bodies are controlled by public law bodies or by bodies governed by private law with a public service mission, and are provided with adequate financial guarantees in the form of joint and several liability by the controlling bodies or equivalent financial guarantees and which may be, for each action, limited to the maximum amount of the Union support.
□ bodies established in a Member State, governed by the private law of a Member State or Union law and eligible to be entrusted, in accordance with sector-specific rules, with the implementation of Union funds or budgetary guarantees, to the extent that such bodies are controlled by public law bodies or by bodies governed by private law with a public service mission, and are provided with adequate financial guarantees in the form of joint and several liability by the controlling bodies or equivalent financial guarantees and which may be, for each action, limited to the maximum amount of the Union support.
Regarding reporting arrangements, the Union’s participation in the negotiations on setting up the Claims Commission shall be conducted in consultation with a special committee within the meaning of Article 218(4) TFEU. The Commission shall regularly report to the special committee on the steps undertaken pursuant to this Decision and consult it on a regular basis. Whenever so requested by the Council, the Commission shall report to it on the conduct and the outcome of the negotiations, including in writing.
With regard to the method of implementation, Article 245 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6), which enables the Union to pay membership fees to bodies of which the Union is a member, is applicable to the Union’s contribution to the Claims Commission.
No specific risks have been identified at this stage.
Following the Commission central services' guidance, the cost of the controls at Commission level is assessed by the cost of the different control stages. The overall assessment for each management mode is obtained from the ratio between all those costs and the total amount paid in the year for the related management mode.
Standard rules for this type of expenditures apply.
Heading of multiannual financial framework Budget line Type of expenditure Contribution
Number Diff./Non-diff.(7) from EFTA countries(8) from candidate countries and potential candidates(9) From other third countries other assigned revenue
0 16 06 03 01 Diff. NO NO NO NO
— □The proposal/initiative does not require the use of operational appropriations □ The proposal/initiative does not require the use of operational appropriations
□ The proposal/initiative does not require the use of operational appropriations
□ The proposal/initiative does not require the use of operational appropriations
— The proposal/initiative requires the use of operational appropriations, as explained below The proposal/initiative requires the use of operational appropriations, as explained below
The proposal/initiative requires the use of operational appropriations, as explained below
The proposal/initiative requires the use of operational appropriations, as explained below
EUR million (to three decimal places)
Heading of multiannual financial framework 0 Expenditure outside the annual ceilings set out in the Multiannual Financial Framework
DG: European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Year Year Year Year TOTAL MFF 2021-2027
2024 2025 2026 2027
Operational appropriations
16 06 03 01 — Union accession assistance and other measures Commitments (1a) 0,000 0,000 3,000 3,000 6,000
Payments (2a) 0,000 0,000 3,000 3,000 6,000
Appropriations of an administrative nature financed from the envelope of specific programmes(10)
Budget line (3)
TOTAL appropriationsfor DGEuropean Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Commitments =1a+1b+3 0,000 0,000 3,000 3,000 6,000
Payments =2a+2b+3 0,000 0,000 3,000 3,000 6,000(11)
Year Year Year Year TOTAL MFF 2021-2027
2024 2025 2026 2027
TOTAL operational appropriations Commitments (4) 0,000 0,000 3,000 3,000 6,000
Payments (5) 0,000 0,000 3,000 3,000 6,000
TOTAL appropriations of an administrative nature financed from the envelope for specific programmes (6) 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
TOTAL appropriations under HEADING 0of the multiannual financial framework Commitments =4+6 0,000 0,000 3,000 3,000 6,000
Payments =5+6 0,000 0,000 3,000 3,000 6,000
Commitment appropriations in EUR million (to three decimal places)
Indicate objectives and outputs Year2024 Year2025 Year2026 Year2027 Enter as many years as necessary to show the duration of the impact (see Section1.6) TOTAL
OUTPUTS
Type(12) Average cost No Cost No Cost No Cost No Cost No Cost No Cost No Cost Total No Total cost
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE No 1(13)…
—Output — Output
— Output
—Output — Output
— Output
—Output — Output
— Output
Subtotal for specific objective No 1
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE No 2 …
—Output — Output
— Output
Subtotal for specific objective No 2
TOTALS
— Output
— Output
— Output
— Output
— The proposal/initiative does not require the use of appropriations of an administrative nature The proposal/initiative does not require the use of appropriations of an administrative nature
The proposal/initiative does not require the use of appropriations of an administrative nature
The proposal/initiative does not require the use of appropriations of an administrative nature
— □The proposal/initiative requires the use of appropriations of an administrative nature, as explained below □ The proposal/initiative requires the use of appropriations of an administrative nature, as explained below
□ The proposal/initiative requires the use of appropriations of an administrative nature, as explained below
□ The proposal/initiative requires the use of appropriations of an administrative nature, as explained below
VOTED APPROPRIATIONS Year Year Year Year TOTAL 2021 – 2027
2024 2025 2026 2027
HEADING 7
Human resources 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Other administrative expenditure 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Subtotal HEADING 7 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Outside HEADING 7
Human resources 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Other expenditure of an administrative nature 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Subtotal outside HEADING 7 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
TOTAL 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
— The proposal/initiative does not require the use of human resources The proposal/initiative does not require the use of human resources
The proposal/initiative does not require the use of human resources
The proposal/initiative does not require the use of human resources
— □The proposal/initiative requires the use of human resources, as explained below □ The proposal/initiative requires the use of human resources, as explained below
□ The proposal/initiative requires the use of human resources, as explained below
□ The proposal/initiative requires the use of human resources, as explained below
Estimate to be expressed in full-time equivalent units (FTEs)
VOTED APPROPRIATIONS Year Year Year Year
2024 2025 2026 2027
—Establishment plan posts (officials and temporary staff) — Establishment plan posts (officials and temporary staff)
— Establishment plan posts (officials and temporary staff)
20 01 02 01 (Headquarters and Commission’s Representation Offices) 0 0 0 0
20 01 02 03 (EU Delegations) 0 0 0 0
01 01 01 01 (Indirect research) 0 0 0 0
01 01 01 11 (Direct research) 0 0 0 0
Other budget lines (specify) 0 0 0 0
—External staff (inFTEs) — External staff (inFTEs)
— External staff (inFTEs)
20 02 01 (AC, END from the ‘global envelope’) 0 0 0 0
20 02 03 (AC, AL, END and JPD in the EU Delegations) 0 0 0 0
Admin. Support line[XX.01.YY.YY] —at Headquarters — at Headquarters 0 0 0 0
— at Headquarters
—in EU Delegations — in EU Delegations 0 0 0 0
— in EU Delegations
01 01 01 02 (AC, END – Indirect research) 0 0 0 0
01 01 01 12 (AC, END – Direct research) 0 0 0 0
Other budget lines (specify) – Heading 7 0 0 0 0
Other budget lines (specify) – Outside Heading 7 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 0 0 0 0
— Establishment plan posts (officials and temporary staff)
— External staff (inFTEs)
— at Headquarters
— in EU Delegations
To be covered by current staff available in the Commission services Exceptional additional staff*
To be financed under Heading 7 or Research To be financed from BA line To be financed from fees
Establishment plan posts N/A
External staff (CA, SNEs, INT)
Officials and temporary staff
External staff
TOTAL Digital and IT appropriations Year Year Year Year TOTAL MFF 2021 – 2027
2024 2025 2026 2027
HEADING 7
IT expenditure (corporate) 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Subtotal HEADING 7 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Outside HEADING 7
Policy IT expenditure on operational programmes 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Subtotal outside HEADING 7 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
TOTAL 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
— can be fully financed through redeployment within the relevant heading of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) can be fully financed through redeployment within the relevant heading of the multiannual financial framework (MFF)
can be fully financed through redeployment within the relevant heading of the multiannual financial framework (MFF)
can be fully financed through redeployment within the relevant heading of the multiannual financial framework (MFF)
Regulation (EU) 2024/792 establishing the Ukraine Facility provides for the legal basis for the Union’s contribution to the International Claims Commission until 2027. On the basis of the objectives set out in Regulation (EU) 2024/792, and in particular under Chapter V, Article 34(3) of said Regulation provides that ‘[a]ssistance under this Chapter shall also strengthen capacities for conflict prevention, peacebuilding and address pre- and post-crisis needs, including through, confidence-building measures and processes that promote justice, truth-seeking, comprehensive post-conflict rehabilitation for an inclusive, peaceful society, as well as collection of evidence of crimes committed during the war. Funding for initiatives and bodies involved in supporting and enforcing international justice in Ukraine may be provided under this Chapter’. Therefore, as the instrument setting up the Claims Commission aims to enforce international justice in Ukraine by contributing to a mechanism that will compensate the damages suffered by Ukraine and its population and caused by the Russian Federation’s violations of international law, Article 34(3) of Regulation (EU) 2024/792 provides for the appropriate legal basis for the Union to provide its financial contribution to the International Claims Commission until 2027.
— □requires use of the unallocated margin under the relevant heading of the MFF and/or use of the special instruments as defined in the MFF Regulation □ requires use of the unallocated margin under the relevant heading of the MFF and/or use of the special instruments as defined in the MFF Regulation
□ requires use of the unallocated margin under the relevant heading of the MFF and/or use of the special instruments as defined in the MFF Regulation
□ requires use of the unallocated margin under the relevant heading of the MFF and/or use of the special instruments as defined in the MFF Regulation
— □requires a revision of the MFF □ requires a revision of the MFF
□ requires a revision of the MFF
□ requires a revision of the MFF
— does not provide for co-financing by third parties does not provide for co-financing by third parties
does not provide for co-financing by third parties
does not provide for co-financing by third parties
— □provides for the co-financing by third parties estimated below: □ provides for the co-financing by third parties estimated below:
□ provides for the co-financing by third parties estimated below:
□ provides for the co-financing by third parties estimated below:
— The proposal/initiative has no financial impact on revenue. The proposal/initiative has no financial impact on revenue.
The proposal/initiative has no financial impact on revenue.
The proposal/initiative has no financial impact on revenue.
— □The proposal/initiative has the following financial impact:□on own resources□on other revenue□please indicate, if the revenue is assigned to expenditure lines □ The proposal/initiative has the following financial impact:□on own resources□on other revenue□please indicate, if the revenue is assigned to expenditure lines □ on own resources □ on other revenue □ please indicate, if the revenue is assigned to expenditure lines
□ The proposal/initiative has the following financial impact:□on own resources□on other revenue□please indicate, if the revenue is assigned to expenditure lines □ on own resources □ on other revenue □ please indicate, if the revenue is assigned to expenditure lines
□ on own resources
□ on other revenue
□ please indicate, if the revenue is assigned to expenditure lines
□ The proposal/initiative has the following financial impact:□on own resources□on other revenue□please indicate, if the revenue is assigned to expenditure lines □ on own resources □ on other revenue □ please indicate, if the revenue is assigned to expenditure lines
□ on own resources
□ on other revenue
□ please indicate, if the revenue is assigned to expenditure lines
□ on own resources
□ on other revenue
□ please indicate, if the revenue is assigned to expenditure lines
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 212, in conjunction with Article 218(3) and (4) thereof,
Having regard to the recommendation from the European Commission,
Whereas:
(1) In view of the unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, on 14 November 2022, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted Resolution ES-11/5, entitled ‘Furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine’.
(2) In addition to recalling the obligations of all States under Article 2 of the UN Charter, including that of refraining in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the UN General Assembly expressed grave concern at the loss of life, civilian displacement, destruction of infrastructure and natural resources, loss of public and private property, and economic calamity caused by the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine.
(3) The UN General Assembly recognised that the Russian Federation must be held to account for any violations of international law in or against Ukraine. In addition, it stressed that the Russian Federation must bear the legal consequences of all of its internationally wrongful acts, including making reparation for the injury, including any damage, caused by such acts.
(4) The UN General Assembly recognised the need to establish, in cooperation with Ukraine, an international mechanism for reparation for damage, loss or injury, arising from the internationally wrongful acts of the Russian Federation in or against Ukraine. To that end, it recommended the creation of an international register of damage to serve as a record, in documentary form, of evidence and claims information on damage, loss or injury to all natural and legal persons concerned, as well as the State of Ukraine, caused by internationally wrongful acts of the Russian Federation in or against Ukraine, as well as to promote and coordinate evidence-gathering.
(5) On 12 May 2023, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution CM/Res(2023)3 establishing the Enlarged Partial Agreement on the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine (the ‘Register’).
(6) In order to push forward accountability efforts towards the establishment of an international mechanism for reparation for damage, loss or injury arising from the internationally wrongful acts of the Russian Federation in or against Ukraine, the States that are Participants or Associate Members under the Enlarged Partial Agreement on the Register adopted a stepwise approach, choosing first to establish the Register. This was to be followed by the other elements of the compensation mechanism, namely a claims commission and a compensation fund. That approach was reflected in the Statute of the Register, where it is acknowledged that the Register, including its digital platform with all data about claims and evidence recorded therein, is intended to constitute the first component of a future international compensation mechanism to be established by a separate international instrument in co-operation with Ukraine and relevant international organisations and bodies.
(7) After joining the Register as a founding Associate Member on 11 May 2023 by means of a notification to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, the Union changed its status to Participant in the Register on 22 July 2024.
(8) On 29 February 2024, the European Parliament and the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2024/792 (1), establishing the Ukraine Facility, which, inter alia, provided the legal basis for funding for initiatives and bodies involved in supporting and enforcing international justice in Ukraine, such as for the Union’s financial contribution to the Register.
(9) In 2024, the Office of the President of Ukraine, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Register invited the States that supported the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/ES-11/5 to preparatory meetings on an international instrument setting up an International Claims Commission for Ukraine. The first formal negotiation round is expected to take place in March 2025.
(10) The Secretariat of the Register prepared a ‘zero draft’ of an international instrument setting up an International Claims Commission for Ukraine. The ‘zero draft’ includes provisions on the International Claims Commission’s mandate, function, legal status, seat, membership and participation, organisational structure, financing and budget as well as on the procedure for the review of claims, membership of the Russian Federation and transfer of the work of the Register.
(11) Given the interest of the Union in reiterating its firm commitment to ensuring that the Russian Federation bear the legal consequences of its internationally wrongful acts in or against Ukraine, including the obligation to make reparation for any damage, loss or injury caused by those acts, it is appropriate for the Union to participate in the negotiations for an international instrument setting up an International Claims Commission for Ukraine. This is without prejudice to the Member States’ competence to negotiate and conclude such international instrument,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
1. The Commission is hereby authorised to take part, on behalf of the Union, in the negotiations for an international instrument setting up an International Claims Commission for Ukraine.

2. The negotiations shall be conducted on the basis of the negotiating directives of the Council set out in the addendum to this Decision.

The Commission is hereby nominated as the Union negotiator.
The negotiations shall be conducted in consultation with the Council Working Party on Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (COSCE).
The Commission shall regularly report to COSCE on the steps undertaken pursuant to this Decision and shall consult it on a regular basis.
This Decision is addressed to the Commission.

In the course of the negotiations, the Commission should aim to achieve the objectives set out in detail below.

(1) The objective of the international instrument setting up the International Claims Commission for Ukraine shall be to create the legal basis under international law for an administrative body to review, assess and decide eligible claims and determine the amount of compensation due in each case for damage, loss, or injury caused in the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, extending to its territorial sea as well as in its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf to all natural and legal persons concerned, as well as the State of Ukraine, including its regional and local authorities, state-owned or controlled entities, by the Russian Federation’s internationally wrongful acts in or against Ukraine, including its aggression in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as any violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law.

(2) The international instrument shall clearly define the territorial and temporal scope of the Claims Commission.

(3) The international instrument shall provide the legal status and legal personality of the Claims Commission as necessary for the exercise of its functions and fulfilment of its mandate.

(4) The international instrument shall spell out clearly and precisely the titles of membership for States and Regional Integration Organisations and their modalities of participation to the instrument.

(5) The international instrument shall clearly outline the organisational structure of the Claims Commission, in particular, as regards the governance structure and modalities of participation of States and Regional Integration Organisations..

(6) The international instrument shall specify that, in accordance with international law, the Russian Federation shall bear the costs of the Claims Commission. It shall also specify that, until the Russian Federation dischages the said obligation, the Claims Commission shall be financed through the annual assessed contributions of its Members and voluntary contributions, and that Members’ contributions shall be recoverable from the Russian Federation.

(7) The international instrument shall clearly set out the modalities of determination of the annual financial contribution from the Members and the financial rules and procedures governing the Claims Commission.

(8) The international instrument shall include the modalities needed for a smooth and precise transfer of the work of the Register of Damage, and detail the Register’s possible continuation within the framework of the Claims Commission.

(9) The international instrument shall provide that the European Union shall have a right to vote equal to that of other parties; and that it shall excercise its right to vote without prejudice to, and irrespective of, the voting rights of its Member States that are Members of the Claims Commission.

(10) The procedure for negotiations shall be as follows:
(a) The negotiations must be prepared for well in advance. To this end, the Commission shall inform the special committee designated in accordance with Article 218(4) TFEU, i.e. the Council Working Party on the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe (COSCE) of the schedule anticipated and the issues to be negotiated, and share the relevant information as early as possible.
(b) Where necessary, the negotiating sessions shall be preceded by a meeting of COSCE in order to identify the key issues, formulate opinions and provide guidance, as appropriate.
(c) The Commission shall report to COSCE on the outcome of the negotiations after each negotiating session or, when a number of negotiations are conducted in parallel, after a series of negotiation sessions.
(d) The Commission shall inform COSCE on any important issue that may arise during the negotiations.

1.   FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE

1. FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE
6

1.1. Title of the proposal/initiative
6

1.2. Policy area(s) concerned
6

1.3. Objective(s) 6

1.3.1. General objective(s) 6

1.3.2. Specific objective(s) 6

1.3.3. Expected result(s) and impact
6

1.3.4. Indicators of performance
6

1.4. The proposal/initiative relates to:
6

1.5. Grounds for the proposal/initiative
7

1.5.1. Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term including a detailed timeline for roll-out of the implementation of the initiative
7

1.5.2. Added value of EU involvement (it may result from different factors, e.g. coordination gains, legal certainty, greater effectiveness or complementarities). For the purposes of this section ‘added value of EU involvement’ is the value resulting from EU action, that is additional to the value that would have been otherwise created by Member States alone.
7

1.5.3. Lessons learned from similar experiences in the past
7

1.5.4. Compatibility with the multiannual financial framework and possible synergies with other appropriate instruments
8

1.5.5. Assessment of the different available financing options, including scope for redeployment
8

1.6. Duration of the proposal/initiative and of its financial impact
8

1.7. Method(s) of budget implementation planned
8

2. MANAGEMENT MEASURES
9

2.1. Monitoring and reporting rules
9

2.2. Management and control system(s) 9

2.2.1. Justification of the budget implementation method(s), the funding implementation mechanism(s), the payment modalities and the control strategy proposed
9

2.2.2. Information concerning the risks identified and the internal control system(s) set up to mitigate them
9

2.2.3. Estimation and justification of the cost-effectiveness of the controls (ratio between the control costs and the value of the related funds managed), and assessment of the expected levels of risk of error (at payment & at closure)
9

2.3. Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities
10

3. ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE
10

3.1. Heading(s) of the multiannual financial framework and expenditure budget line(s) affected
10

3.2. Estimated financial impact of the proposal on appropriations
10

3.2.1. Summary of estimated impact on operational appropriations
10

3.2.1.1. Appropriations from voted budget
11

3.2.2. Estimated output funded from operational appropriations
12

3.2.3. Summary of estimated impact on administrative appropriations
13

3.2.3.1. Appropriations from voted budget
13

3.2.4. Estimated requirements of human resources
13

3.2.4.1. Financed from voted budget
13

3.2.5. Overview of estimated impact on digital technology-related investments
14

3.2.6. Compatibility with the current multiannual financial framework
15

3.2.7. Third-party contributions
15

3.3. Estimated impact on revenue
15

4. DIGITAL DIMENSIONS
15

4.1. Requirements of digital relevance
15

4.2. Data
16

4.3. Digital solutions
16

4.4. Interoperability assessment
16

4.5. Measures to support digital implementation
16

1.1. Title of the proposal/initiative

Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the European Commission to participate, on behalf of the European Union, in negotiations on the international agreement establishing the International Claims Commission for Ukraine.

1.2. Policy area(s) concerned

Justice
Financial and technical assistance to third countries

1.3. Objective(s)
1.3.1. General objective(s)
The present proposal has the main objective of authorising the Commission to participate, on behalf of the Union, in the negotiations of the international instrument on the setting up of the Claims Commission. The establishment of a Claims Commission will play a critical role in supporting and enforcing international justice for Ukraine as it constitutes an integral part of an international compensation mechanism for victims of the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine.
1.3.2. Specific objective(s)
1. To ultimately provide the necessary assitance to Ukraine to ensure that the Russian Federation bears the legal consequences of its internationally wrongful acts against Ukraine including the obligation to make reparation for any damage, loss or injury caused by those acts. 2. To abide by the Statute of the Register of Damage – in which the EU is a Participant – which provides that the Register, including its digital platform with all data about claims and evidence recorded therein, is meant as the first component of the compensation mechanism to be established by a separate international instrument in co-operation with Ukraine and relevant international organisations and bodies. 3. To establish the International Claims Commission and ensure the Union’s participation therein. 4. To give the means to the International Claims Commission to review, assess and decide eligible claims recorded in the Register of Damage and determine the amount of compensation due in each case.

1.3.3. Expected result(s) and impact

Specify the effects which the proposal/initiative should have on the beneficiaries/groups targeted.

The International Claims Commission would work as a fact-finding body and review, assess and decide eligible claims recorded in the Register and determine the amount of compensation due in each case.

1.3.4. Indicators of performance

Specify the indicators for monitoring progress and achievements.

The setting up of the International Claims Commission.

1.4. The proposal/initiative relates to:

a new action
□
a new action following a pilot project / preparatory action (1)

□
the extension of an existing action

□
a merger or redirection of one or more actions towards another/a new action

1.5. Grounds for the proposal/initiative

1.5.1. Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term including a detailed timeline for roll-out of the implementation of the initiative

There are two main requirements that can be expected when implementing this initiative. The first one, which is short term, is to formally receive the mandate to participate for the EU in the negotiation process on the setting up of the International Claims Commission. The second one, which is long term, could be assessed only once the International Claims Commission is fully operational. Once this will be case, the efficiency of this instrument could be evaluated against its ability to review, assess and decide eligible claims and determine the amount of compensation due in each case.

1.5.2. Added value of EU involvement (it may result from different factors, e.g. coordination gains, legal certainty, greater effectiveness or complementarities). For the purposes of this section ‘added value of EU involvement’ is the value resulting from EU action, that is additional to the value that would have been otherwise created by Member States alone.

Reasons for action at EU level (ex-ante)
The Union reiterated on various occasions its commitment to ensure that the Russian Federation bears the legal consequences of its internationally wrongful acts, including the obligation to make reparation for any damage caused by such acts. This commitment notably echoes the call made by the United National General Assembly 2022 resolution entitled ‘Furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine’, which recognised the need for the establishment of an international mechanism for reparation for damage, loss or injury arising from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Answering to this call, on 12 May 2023, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted the Resolution establishing the Enlarged Partial Agreement on the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. States adopted a stepwise approach, choosing to establish the Register first, to be followed by the other elements of the compensation mechanism, namely a claims commission and a compensation fund. This approach was reflected in the Register’s Statute, where it is acknowledged that the Register, including its digital platform with all data about claims and evidence recorded therein, is meant as the first component of the compensation mechanism to be established by a separate international instrument in co-operation with Ukraine and relevant international organisations and bodies. After initially joining the Register of Damage as a founding Associate Member on 11 May 2023 by means of a Commission Decision, the Union, further to a Council Decision adopted on 22 July 2024, changed its status to a fully-fledged Participant. The Union therefore participates within its own role in the Register, together with and in addition to the Member States (except for Hungary). Such participation allows the Union to stand by its commitment to support Ukraine and contribute to the restoration of a rule-based international legal order. At the same time, it allows the Commission to better coordinate its actions related to reparations with the Member States, thus ensuring that the Union can speak with one voice. The possibility for the Commission to participate in the negotiations of the Claims Commission, and ultimately in the Claims Commission itself once established, is thus the natural continuation and development of the existing status quo.
Expected generated EU added value (ex-post)
By participating in the setting up of the International Claims Commission, the EU would contribute to ensure that the Russian Federation bears the legal consequences of its wrongful acts and that, in such endeavour, the EU can speak with one voice. Whenever necessary, the Commission could ensure coordination with and among Member States in the different phases of the establishment and functioning of the Claims Commission, thus contributing to the efficient management of this new body.

1.5.3. Lessons learned from similar experiences in the past

The main lessons learned in the past draw from previous similar instruments. The UN Compensation Commission (UNCC) is the most relevant precedent, which can give some insights on the design and costs of the Claims Commission for Ukraine. It existed for 31 years (1991 to 2022) but its adjudicative activities lasted 12 years. Due to the groundwork already done by the Register and the technological developments in the last decades, the Claims Commission could have a shorter lifespan than the UNCC, currently estimated at 10 years. The Union did not however participate in the UNCC.

1.5.4. Compatibility with the multiannual financial framework and possible synergies with other appropriate instruments

The Union’s unwavering support to Ukraine reflects a shared commitment to democratic principles and the safeguarding of the rule-based international order and peace in Europe. The present proposal is therefore consistent with other Union policies that aim to support Ukraine and safeguard the international order and peace in Europe, notably in the context of the current Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The objectives of this proposal are supported by Regulation (EU) 2024/792 establishing the Ukraine Facility. Article 34(3) of the latter provides that assistance under Pillar III of the Ukraine Facility ‘shall also strengthen capacities for conflict prevention, peacebuilding and address pre and post-crisis needs, including through, confidence-building measures and processes that promote justice, truth-seeking, comprehensive post-conflict rehabilitation for an inclusive, peaceful society, as well as collection of evidence of crimes committed during the war. Funding for initiatives and bodies involved in supporting and enforcing international justice in Ukraine may be provided under this Chapter’.

1.5.5. Assessment of the different available financing options, including scope for redeployment

Regulation (EU) 2024/792 establishing the Ukraine Facility provides the legal basis for the Union’s contribution to the International Claims Commission until 2027. On the basis of the objectives set out in Regulation (EU) 2024/792, and in particular under Chapter V, Article 34(3) of said Regulation provides that ‘[a]ssistance under this Chapter shall also strengthen capacities for conflict prevention, peacebuilding and address pre- and post-crisis needs, including through, confidence-building measures and processes that promote justice, truth-seeking, comprehensive post-conflict rehabilitation for an inclusive, peaceful society, as well as collection of evidence of crimes committed during the war. Funding for initiatives and bodies involved in supporting and enforcing international justice in Ukraine may be provided under this Chapter’. Therefore, as the instrument setting up the International Claims Commission aims to enforce international justice in Ukraine by contributing to a mechanism that will compensate the damages suffered by Ukraine and its population and caused by the Russian Federation’s violations of international law, Article 34(3) of Regulation (EU) 2024/792 provides for the appropriate legal basis for the Union to provide its financial contribution to the Claims Commission until 2027. The budget line that would cater for this expenditure would be line 16 06 03 01 — Union accession assistance and other measures, whereby in the relative budget remarks it is explained that this item ‘will also cover support for […] other measures that are complementary to EU action, such as accountability mechanisms for Russia’s war of aggression’. The Union’s contribution to the Register of Damage is also covered by the Ukraine Facility.

1.6. Duration of the proposal/initiative and of its financial impact

limited duration

—
in effect from 2025 to 2035 (2)

—
□
financial impact from YYYY to YYYY for commitment appropriations and from YYYY to YYYY for payment appropriations.

□ unlimited duration

—
Implementation with a start-up period from YYYY to YYYY,

—
followed by full-scale operation.

1.7. Method(s) of budget implementation planned (3)

Direct management by the Commission (4)

—
□
by its departments, including by its staff in the Union delegations;

—
□
by the executive agencies

□
Shared management with the Member States

□
Indirect management by entrusting budget implementation tasks to:

—
□
third countries or the bodies they have designated

—
□
international organisations and their agencies (to be specified) (5)

—
□
the European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund

—
□
bodies referred to in Articles 70 and 71 of the Financial Regulation

—
□
public law bodies

—
□
bodies governed by private law with a public service mission to the extent that they are provided with adequate financial guarantees

—
□
bodies governed by the private law of a Member State that are entrusted with the implementation of a public-private partnership and that are provided with adequate financial guarantees

—
□
bodies or persons entrusted with the implementation of specific actions in the common foreign and security policy pursuant to Title V of the Treaty on European Union, and identified in the relevant basic act

—
□
bodies established in a Member State, governed by the private law of a Member State or Union law and eligible to be entrusted, in accordance with sector-specific rules, with the implementation of Union funds or budgetary guarantees, to the extent that such bodies are controlled by public law bodies or by bodies governed by private law with a public service mission, and are provided with adequate financial guarantees in the form of joint and several liability by the controlling bodies or equivalent financial guarantees and which may be, for each action, limited to the maximum amount of the Union support.

2. MANAGEMENT MEASURES

2.1. Monitoring and reporting rules

Regarding reporting arrangements, the Union’s participation in the negotiations on setting up the Claims Commission shall be conducted in consultation with a special committee within the meaning of Article 218(4) TFEU. The Commission shall regularly report to the special committee on the steps undertaken pursuant to this Decision and consult it on a regular basis. Whenever so requested by the Council, the Commission shall report to it on the conduct and the outcome of the negotiations, including in writing.

2.2. Management and control system(s)
2.2.1. Justification of the budget implementation method(s), the funding implementation mechanism(s), the payment modalities and the control strategy proposed

With regard to the method of implementation, Article 245 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council (6), which enables the Union to pay membership fees to bodies of which the Union is a member, is applicable to the Union’s contribution to the Claims Commission.

2.2.2. Information concerning the risks identified and the internal control system(s) set up to mitigate them

No specific risks have been identified at this stage.

2.2.3. Estimation and justification of the cost-effectiveness of the controls (ratio between the control costs and the value of the related funds managed), and assessment of the expected levels of risk of error (at payment & at closure)

Following the Commission central services’ guidance, the cost of the controls at Commission level is assessed by the cost of the different control stages. The overall assessment for each management mode is obtained from the ratio between all those costs and the total amount paid in the year for the related management mode.

2.3. Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities

Standard rules for this type of expenditures apply.

3. ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE

3.1. Heading(s) of the multiannual financial framework and expenditure budget line(s) affected

— Existing budget lines

In order of multiannual financial framework headings and budget lines.

Heading of multiannual financial framework
Budget line
Type of expenditure
Contribution
Number
Diff./Non-diff. (7) from EFTA countries (8) from candidate countries and potential candidates (9) From other third countries
other assigned revenue
0
16 06 03 01
Diff.
NO
NO
NO
NO

3.2. Estimated financial impact of the proposal on appropriations

3.2.1. Summary of estimated impact on operational appropriations

—
□
The proposal/initiative does not require the use of operational appropriations

—
The proposal/initiative requires the use of operational appropriations, as explained below

3.2.1.1. Appropriations from voted budget

EUR million (to three decimal places)
Heading of multiannual financial framework
0
Expenditure outside the annual ceilings set out in the Multiannual Financial Framework

DG: European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations
Year
Year
Year
Year
TOTAL MFF 2021-2027
2024
2025
2026
2027
Operational appropriations
16 06 03 01 — Union accession assistance and other measures
Commitments
(1a)
0,000
0,000
3,000
3,000
6,000
Payments
(2a)
0,000
0,000
3,000
3,000
6,000
Appropriations of an administrative nature financed from the envelope of specific programmes (10) Budget line

(3)

TOTAL appropriations
for DG European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations
Commitments
=1a+1b+3
0,000
0,000
3,000
3,000
6,000
Payments
=2a+2b+3
0,000
0,000
3,000
3,000
6,000
(11)
Year
Year
Year
Year
TOTAL MFF 2021-2027
2024
2025
2026
2027
TOTAL operational appropriations
Commitments
(4) 0,000
0,000
3,000
3,000
6,000
Payments
(5) 0,000
0,000
3,000
3,000
6,000
TOTAL appropriations of an administrative nature financed from the envelope for specific programmes
(6) 0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000
TOTAL appropriations under HEADING 0
of the multiannual financial framework
Commitments
=4+6
0,000
0,000
3,000
3,000
6,000
Payments
=5+6
0,000
0,000
3,000
3,000
6,000

3.2.2. Estimated output funded from operational appropriations (not to be completed for decentralised agencies)

Commitment appropriations in EUR million (to three decimal places)
Indicate objectives and outputs

Year
2024
Year
2025
Year
2026
Year
2027
Enter as many years as necessary to show the duration of the impact (see Section1.6)
TOTAL
OUTPUTS
Type (12) Average cost
No
Cost
No
Cost
No
Cost
No
Cost
No
Cost
No
Cost
No
Cost
Total No
Total cost
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE No 1 (13)…

—
Output

—
Output

—
Output

Subtotal for specific objective No 1

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE No 2 …

—
Output

Subtotal for specific objective No 2

TOTALS

3.2.3. Summary of estimated impact on administrative appropriations

—
The proposal/initiative does not require the use of appropriations of an administrative nature

—
□
The proposal/initiative requires the use of appropriations of an administrative nature, as explained below

3.2.3.1. Appropriations from voted budget

VOTED APPROPRIATIONS
Year
Year
Year
Year
TOTAL 2021 – 2027
2024
2025
2026
2027
HEADING 7
Human resources
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000
Other administrative expenditure
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000
Subtotal HEADING 7
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000
Outside HEADING 7
Human resources
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000
Other expenditure of an administrative nature
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000
Subtotal outside HEADING 7
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000

TOTAL
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000

3.2.4. Estimated requirements of human resources

—
The proposal/initiative does not require the use of human resources

—
□
The proposal/initiative requires the use of human resources, as explained below

3.2.4.1. Financed from voted budget

Estimate to be expressed in full-time equivalent units (FTEs)
VOTED APPROPRIATIONS
Year
Year
Year
Year
2024
2025
2026
2027
—
Establishment plan posts (officials and temporary staff)
20 01 02 01 (Headquarters and Commission’s Representation Offices)
0
0
0
0
20 01 02 03 (EU Delegations)
0
0
0
0
01 01 01 01 (Indirect research)
0
0
0
0
01 01 01 11 (Direct research)
0
0
0
0
Other budget lines (specify)
0
0
0
0
—
External staff (inFTEs)
20 02 01 (AC, END from the ‘global envelope’)
0
0
0
0
20 02 03 (AC, AL, END and JPD in the EU Delegations)
0
0
0
0
Admin. Support line
[XX.01.YY.YY]
—
at Headquarters
0
0
0
0
—
in EU Delegations
0
0
0
0
01 01 01 02 (AC, END – Indirect research)
0
0
0
0
01 01 01 12 (AC, END – Direct research)
0
0
0
0
Other budget lines (specify) – Heading 7
0
0
0
0
Other budget lines (specify) – Outside Heading 7
0
0
0
0
TOTAL
0
0
0
0

The staff required to implement the proposal (in FTEs):

To be covered by current staff available in the Commission services
Exceptional additional staff*

To be financed under Heading 7 or Research
To be financed from BA line
To be financed from fees
Establishment plan posts

N/A

External staff (CA, SNEs, INT)

Description of tasks to be carried out by:

Officials and temporary staff

External staff

3.2.5. Overview of estimated impact on digital technology-related investments

TOTAL Digital and IT appropriations
Year
Year
Year
Year
TOTAL MFF 2021 – 2027
2024
2025
2026
2027
HEADING 7
IT expenditure (corporate)
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000
Subtotal HEADING 7
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000
Outside HEADING 7
Policy IT expenditure on operational programmes
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000
Subtotal outside HEADING 7
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000

TOTAL
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000

3.2.6. Compatibility with the current multiannual financial framework

The proposal/initiative:

—
can be fully financed through redeployment within the relevant heading of the multiannual financial framework (MFF)

Regulation (EU) 2024/792 establishing the Ukraine Facility provides for the legal basis for the Union’s contribution to the International Claims Commission until 2027. On the basis of the objectives set out in Regulation (EU) 2024/792, and in particular under Chapter V, Article 34(3) of said Regulation provides that ‘[a]ssistance under this Chapter shall also strengthen capacities for conflict prevention, peacebuilding and address pre- and post-crisis needs, including through, confidence-building measures and processes that promote justice, truth-seeking, comprehensive post-conflict rehabilitation for an inclusive, peaceful society, as well as collection of evidence of crimes committed during the war. Funding for initiatives and bodies involved in supporting and enforcing international justice in Ukraine may be provided under this Chapter’. Therefore, as the instrument setting up the Claims Commission aims to enforce international justice in Ukraine by contributing to a mechanism that will compensate the damages suffered by Ukraine and its population and caused by the Russian Federation’s violations of international law, Article 34(3) of Regulation (EU) 2024/792 provides for the appropriate legal basis for the Union to provide its financial contribution to the International Claims Commission until 2027.

—
□
requires use of the unallocated margin under the relevant heading of the MFF and/or use of the special instruments as defined in the MFF Regulation

—
□
requires a revision of the MFF

3.2.7. Third-party contributions

The proposal/initiative:

—
does not provide for co-financing by third parties

—
□
provides for the co-financing by third parties estimated below:

3.3. Estimated impact on revenue

—
The proposal/initiative has no financial impact on revenue.

—
□
The proposal/initiative has the following financial impact:
□
on own resources
□
on other revenue
□
please indicate, if the revenue is assigned to expenditure lines

EUR million (to three decimal places)
4. DIGITAL DIMENSIONS

Not applicable.

4.1. Requirements of digital relevance

Not applicable.

4.2. Data

Not applicable.

4.3. Digital solutions

Not applicable.

4.4.
Interoperability assessment

Not applicable.

4.5. Measures to support digital implementation

Not applicable.

(1) As referred to in Article 58(2), point (a) or (b) of the Financial Regulation.

(2) The lifetime of the International Claims Commission is currently estimated at 10 years.

(3) Details of budget implementation methods and references to the Financial Regulation may be found on the BUDGpedia site: https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/funding-management-mode_en.

(4) This contribution will be made via the payment of a membership fee under Article 245 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast), OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj. This is an instrument under direct management.

(5) It is expected that International Claims Commission itself will take care of the budget implementation tasks.

(6) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).

(7) Diff. = Differentiated appropriations / Non-diff. = Non-differentiated appropriations.

(8) EFTA: European Free Trade Association.

(9) Candidate countries and, where applicable, potential candidates from the Western Balkans.

(10) Technical and/or administrative assistance and expenditure in support of the implementation of EU programmes and/or actions (former ‘BA’ lines), indirect research, direct research.

(11) The estimated annual EU’s contribution is likely to range between EUR 2 million and EUR 3 million.

(12) Outputs are products and services to be supplied (e.g. number of student exchanges financed, number of km of roads built, etc.).

(13) As described in Section 1.3.2. ‘Specific objective(s)’

(14) Please specify below the table how many FTEs within the number indicated are already assigned to the management of the action and/or can be redeployed within your DG and what are your net needs.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/700 of 7 April 2025 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/700 8.4.2025
(1) On 31 July 2014, the Council adopted Decision 2014/512/CFSP(1).
(2) On 24 February 2025, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2025/394(2), which amended Decision 2014/512/CFSP and introduced further restrictive measures to suspend the broadcasting activities in the Union, or directed at the Union, of certain media outlets listed in point (3) of the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2025/394. Pursuant to Article 1, point (30) of Decision (CFSP) 2025/394, the applicability of such measures in respect of one or several of those media outlets is subject to a further decision by the Council.
(3) Having examined the respective cases, the Council has concluded that the restrictive measures referred to in Article 4g of Decision 2014/512/CFSP should apply as of 9 April 2025 in respect of all entities listed in point (3) of the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2025/394,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 31 July 2014, the Council adopted Decision 2014/512/CFSP (1).
(2) On 24 February 2025, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2025/394 (2), which amended Decision 2014/512/CFSP and introduced further restrictive measures to suspend the broadcasting activities in the Union, or directed at the Union, of certain media outlets listed in point (3) of the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2025/394. Pursuant to Article 1, point (30) of Decision (CFSP) 2025/394, the applicability of such measures in respect of one or several of those media outlets is subject to a further decision by the Council.
(3) Having examined the respective cases, the Council has concluded that the restrictive measures referred to in Article 4g of Decision 2014/512/CFSP should apply as of 9 April 2025 in respect of all entities listed in point (3) of the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2025/394,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The measures referred to in Article 4g of Decision 2014/512/CFSP shall apply as of 9 April 2025 in respect of all entities listed in point (3) of the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2025/394.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/699 of 9 April 2025 authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP910521 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (notified under document C(2025) 2114)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/699 11.4.2025
(1) On 27 June 2022, Corteva Agriscience Belgium B.V., based in Belgium, on behalf of Corteva Agriscience LLC, based in the United States, submitted an application to the national competent authority of the Netherlands for the placing on the market of foods, food ingredients and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP910521, in accordance with Articles 5 and 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (‘the application’). The application also covered the placing on the market of products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DP910521 for uses other than food and feed, with the exception of cultivation.
(2) Pursuant to Article 5(5) and Article 17(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, the application included information and conclusions about the risk assessment carried out in accordance with the principles set out in Annex II to Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(2). It also included the information required pursuant to Annexes III and IV to that Directive and a monitoring plan for environmental effects in accordance with Annex VII to that Directive.
(3) On 1 August 2024, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) issued a favourable scientific opinion on genetically modified maize DP910521 in accordance with Articles 6 and 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003(3). The Authority concluded that genetically modified maize DP910521, as described in the application, is as safe as its conventional counterpart and the tested non-genetically modified maize reference varieties with respect to the potential effects on human and animal health and the environment. The Authority also concluded that the consumption of genetically modified maize DP910521 does not represent any nutritional concern.
(4) In its scientific opinion, the Authority considered all the questions and concerns raised by the Member States in the context of the consultation of the national competent authorities as provided for in Article 6(4) and Article 18(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(5) The Authority also concluded that the monitoring plan for the environmental effects, submitted by the applicant, consisting of a general surveillance plan, is in line with the intended uses of the products.
(6) Taking into account those conclusions, the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP910521 should be authorised for the uses listed in the application.
(7) A unique identifier should be assigned to genetically modified maize DP910521 in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 65/2004(4).
(8) For the products covered by this Decision, no specific labelling requirements, other than those provided for in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5), appear to be necessary. However, in order to ensure that the use of those products remains within the limits of the authorisation granted by this Decision, the labelling of the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DP910521, with the exception of foods and food ingredients, should contain a clear indication that they are not intended for cultivation.
(9) The authorisation holder should submit annual reports on the implementation and on the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan for environmental effects. Those results should be presented in accordance with the requirements laid down in Commission Decision 2009/770/EC(6).
(10) The opinion of the Authority does not justify the imposition of other specific conditions or restrictions for the placing on the market, for the use and handling of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP910521 or for the protection of particular ecosystems/environment and/or geographical areas, as provided for in Article 6(5), point (e), and Article 18(5), point (e), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(11) All relevant information on the authorisation of the products covered by this Decision should be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(12) This Decision is to be notified through the Biosafety Clearing-House to the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, pursuant to Article 9(1) and Article 15(2), point (c), of Regulation (EC) No 1946/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(7).
(13) The Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed has not delivered an opinion within the time limit laid down by its Chairman. This implementing act was deemed to be necessary and the chair submitted it to the appeal committee for further deliberation. The appeal committee did not deliver an opinion,
(a) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP-91Ø521-2;
(b) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP-91Ø521-2;
(c) products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DP-91Ø521-2 for uses other than those provided for in points (a) and (b), with the exception of cultivation.
Name : Corteva Agriscience LLC
Address : 9330 Zionsville Road, Indianapolis, IN 46268-1054, United States;
(1) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) DP-91Ø521-2;
(2) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) DP-91Ø521-2;
(3) products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) DP-91Ø521-2 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.
(1) For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘maize’.
(2) The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DP-91Ø521-2, with the exception of products referred to in point (b)(1).
(1) event specific real-time PCR based method for the quantification of genetically modified maize DP-91Ø521-2;
(2) validated by the EU reference laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttp://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/StatusOfDossiers.aspx.;
(3) reference material: AOCS 0822-B (for DP-91Ø521-2) and AOCS 0822-A (for its non-GM counterpart), are accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society (AOCS), athttps://www.aocs.org/crm?SSO=True.
Note: links to relevant documents may need to be modified over time. Those modifications will be made available to the public via the updating of the Community register of genetically modified food and feed.
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed (1), and in particular Article 7(3) and Article 19(3) thereof,
Whereas:
(1) On 27 June 2022, Corteva Agriscience Belgium B.V., based in Belgium, on behalf of Corteva Agriscience LLC, based in the United States, submitted an application to the national competent authority of the Netherlands for the placing on the market of foods, food ingredients and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP910521, in accordance with Articles 5 and 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (‘the application’). The application also covered the placing on the market of products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DP910521 for uses other than food and feed, with the exception of cultivation.
(2) Pursuant to Article 5(5) and Article 17(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, the application included information and conclusions about the risk assessment carried out in accordance with the principles set out in Annex II to Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (2). It also included the information required pursuant to Annexes III and IV to that Directive and a monitoring plan for environmental effects in accordance with Annex VII to that Directive.
(3) On 1 August 2024, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) issued a favourable scientific opinion on genetically modified maize DP910521 in accordance with Articles 6 and 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (3). The Authority concluded that genetically modified maize DP910521, as described in the application, is as safe as its conventional counterpart and the tested non-genetically modified maize reference varieties with respect to the potential effects on human and animal health and the environment. The Authority also concluded that the consumption of genetically modified maize DP910521 does not represent any nutritional concern.
(4) In its scientific opinion, the Authority considered all the questions and concerns raised by the Member States in the context of the consultation of the national competent authorities as provided for in Article 6(4) and Article 18(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(5) The Authority also concluded that the monitoring plan for the environmental effects, submitted by the applicant, consisting of a general surveillance plan, is in line with the intended uses of the products.
(6) Taking into account those conclusions, the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP910521 should be authorised for the uses listed in the application.
(7) A unique identifier should be assigned to genetically modified maize DP910521 in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 65/2004 (4).
(8) For the products covered by this Decision, no specific labelling requirements, other than those provided for in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5), appear to be necessary. However, in order to ensure that the use of those products remains within the limits of the authorisation granted by this Decision, the labelling of the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DP910521, with the exception of foods and food ingredients, should contain a clear indication that they are not intended for cultivation.
(9) The authorisation holder should submit annual reports on the implementation and on the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan for environmental effects. Those results should be presented in accordance with the requirements laid down in Commission Decision 2009/770/EC (6).
(10) The opinion of the Authority does not justify the imposition of other specific conditions or restrictions for the placing on the market, for the use and handling of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP910521 or for the protection of particular ecosystems/environment and/or geographical areas, as provided for in Article 6(5), point (e), and Article 18(5), point (e), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(11) All relevant information on the authorisation of the products covered by this Decision should be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(12) This Decision is to be notified through the Biosafety Clearing-House to the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, pursuant to Article 9(1) and Article 15(2), point (c), of Regulation (EC) No 1946/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (7).
(13) The Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed has not delivered an opinion within the time limit laid down by its Chairman. This implementing act was deemed to be necessary and the chair submitted it to the appeal committee for further deliberation. The appeal committee did not deliver an opinion,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Genetically modified organism and unique identifier

Genetically modified maize (Zea mays L.) DP910521, as specified in point (b) of the Annex to this Decision, is assigned the unique identifier DP-91Ø521-2, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 65/2004.

Authorisation

The following products are authorised for the purposes of Article 4(2) and Article 16(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, in accordance with the conditions set out in this Decision:

(a) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP-91Ø521-2;
(b) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP-91Ø521-2;
(c) products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DP-91Ø521-2 for uses other than those provided for in points (a) and (b), with the exception of cultivation.

Labelling

1. For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the name of the organism shall be ‘maize’.

2. The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DP-91Ø521-2 as referred to in Article 1, with the exception of products referred to in Article 2, point (a).

Method for detection

The method set out in point (d) of the Annex shall apply for the detection of genetically modified maize DP-91Ø521-2.

Monitoring plan for environmental effects

1. The authorisation holder shall ensure that the monitoring plan for environmental effects, as set out in point (h) of the Annex, is put in place and implemented.

2. The authorisation holder shall submit to the Commission annual reports on the implementation and the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan in accordance with the format set out in Decision 2009/770/EC.

Community register

The information set out in the Annex shall be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed, as referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.

Authorisation holder

The authorisation holder shall be Corteva Agriscience LLC, represented in the Union by Corteva Agriscience Belgium B.V.

Validity

This Decision shall apply for a period of 10 years from the date of its notification.

Addressee

This Decision is addressed to Corteva Agriscience LLC, 9330 Zionsville Road Indianapolis, Indiana, 46268-1054, United States, represented in the Union by Corteva Agriscience Belgium B.V., rue Montoyer 25, 1000 Brussels, Belgium.

(a)   Applicant and authorisation holder:

Name
:
Corteva Agriscience LLC
Address
:
9330 Zionsville Road, Indianapolis, IN 46268-1054, United States;

represented in the Union by Corteva Agriscience Belgium B.V., rue Montoyer 25, 1000 Brussels, Belgium.
(b) Designation and specification of the products:

(1) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea mays L.) DP-91Ø521-2;

(2) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea mays L.) DP-91Ø521-2;

(3) products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize (Zea mays L.) DP-91Ø521-2 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.

The genetically modified maize DP-91Ø521-2 expresses the mo-pat gene, which confers tolerance to herbicides containing glufosinate-ammonium, the cry1B.34 gene, which confers protection against certain lepidopteran insect pests, and the pmi gene, which was used as a selection marker in the genetic modification process.
(c) Labelling:

(1) For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘maize’.

(2) The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DP-91Ø521-2, with the exception of products referred to in point (b)(1).

(d) Method for detection:

(1) event specific real-time PCR based method for the quantification of genetically modified maize DP-91Ø521-2;

(2) validated by the EU reference laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published at http://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/StatusOfDossiers.aspx.;

(3) reference material: AOCS 0822-B (for DP-91Ø521-2) and AOCS 0822-A (for its non-GM counterpart), are accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society (AOCS), at https://www.aocs.org/crm?SSO=True.

(e) Unique identifier:

DP-91Ø521-2
(f) Information required under Annex II to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity:

[Biosafety Clearing-House, Record ID number: published in the register of genetically modified food and feed when notified].
(g) Conditions or restrictions on the placing on the market, use or handling of the products:

Not required.
(h) Monitoring plan for environmental effects:

Monitoring plan for environmental effects in accordance with Annex VII to Directive 2001/18/EC.
[Link: plan published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed]
(i) Post-market monitoring requirements for the use of the food for human consumption:

Not required.

Note:
links to relevant documents may need to be modified over time. Those modifications will be made available to the public via the updating of the Community register of genetically modified food and feed.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/697 of 7 April 2025 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to support the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/697 8.4.2025
(1) Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509(1)establishes the European Peace Facility (EPF) for the financing by Member States of Union actions under the common foreign and security policy to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security pursuant to Article 21(2), point (c), of the Treaty. In particular, pursuant to Article 1(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, the EPF is to be used for the financing of assistance measures such as actions to strengthen the capacities of third States and regional and international organisations relating to military and defence matters.
(2) The Union is committed to a close relationship with the Republic of Moldova, based on the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part(2)(the ‘Association Agreement’), including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, in support of a strong, independent and prosperous Republic of Moldova, and to promoting political association and economic integration while firmly supporting the Republic of Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. Pursuant to Article 5 of the Association Agreement, the Union and the Republic of Moldova are to intensify their dialogue and cooperation and promote gradual convergence in the area of foreign and security policy, including the common security and defence policy (CSDP), and are to address in particular issues of conflict prevention, peaceful conflict resolution and crisis management, regional stability, disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control and export control.
(3) The Union recognises the Republic of Moldova’s important contribution to the Union’s CSDP.
(4) This Decision builds upon Council Decisions (CFSP) 2021/2136(3), (CFSP) 2022/1093(4), (CFSP) 2023/921(5), (CFSP) 2024/1049(6)and (CFSP) 2024/1713(7)with regard to the Union’s continued commitment to supporting the strengthening of capacities of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova in priority-need areas.
(5) On 29 April 2024, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy received a request from the Republic of Moldova for the Union to assist the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova with the procurement of key equipment to strengthen mobility as well as command and control capacities.
(6) Assistance measures are to be implemented taking into account the principles and requirements set out in Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, in particular compliance with Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP(8), and in line with the rules for the implementation of revenue and expenditure financed under the EPF.
(7) The Council reaffirms its determination to protect, promote and fulfil human rights, fundamental freedoms and democratic principles and to strengthen the rule of law and good governance, in compliance with the Charter of the United Nations, with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with international law, in particular international human rights law and international humanitarian law,
(a) to contribute to strengthening the military and defence capacities of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova in order to enhance national security, stability and resilience, and thereby also better protect civilians in crises and emergencies;
(b) to support cooperation in the area of security and defence between the Union and the Republic of Moldova, with a view to strengthening the Republic of Moldova’s capacities to participate in Union military common security and defence policy missions and operations, accelerating compliance with Union standards and interoperability, and promoting alignment with the Union’s common foreign and security policy.
(a) mobility equipment;
(b) command and control equipment.
(a) compliance of the units of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova supported under the assistance measure with relevant international law, in particular international human rights law and international humanitarian law;
(b) proper and efficient use of any assets provided under the assistance measure for the purposes for which they were provided;
(c) sufficient maintenance of any assets provided under the assistance measure to ensure their usability and operational availability over their life cycle;
(d) that any assets provided under the assistance measure are not lost or transferred to persons or entities other than those identified in those arrangements.
(a) delivery verification, whereby EPF delivery certificates are to be signed by the end-user forces upon transfer of ownership;
(b) reporting on the inventory, whereby the beneficiary is to report annually on the inventory of designated items until such reporting is no longer deemed necessary by the Political and Security Committee (PSC);
(c) on-site visits, whereby the beneficiary is to grant the High Representative and the EPF auditors access to conduct on-site checks and EPF audits, upon request.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 28(1) and Article 41(2) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 (1) establishes the European Peace Facility (EPF) for the financing by Member States of Union actions under the common foreign and security policy to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security pursuant to Article 21(2), point (c), of the Treaty. In particular, pursuant to Article 1(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, the EPF is to be used for the financing of assistance measures such as actions to strengthen the capacities of third States and regional and international organisations relating to military and defence matters.
(2) The Union is committed to a close relationship with the Republic of Moldova, based on the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part (2) (the ‘Association Agreement’), including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, in support of a strong, independent and prosperous Republic of Moldova, and to promoting political association and economic integration while firmly supporting the Republic of Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. Pursuant to Article 5 of the Association Agreement, the Union and the Republic of Moldova are to intensify their dialogue and cooperation and promote gradual convergence in the area of foreign and security policy, including the common security and defence policy (CSDP), and are to address in particular issues of conflict prevention, peaceful conflict resolution and crisis management, regional stability, disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control and export control.
(3) The Union recognises the Republic of Moldova’s important contribution to the Union’s CSDP.
(4) This Decision builds upon Council Decisions (CFSP) 2021/2136 (3), (CFSP) 2022/1093 (4), (CFSP) 2023/921 (5), (CFSP) 2024/1049 (6) and (CFSP) 2024/1713 (7) with regard to the Union’s continued commitment to supporting the strengthening of capacities of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova in priority-need areas.
(5) On 29 April 2024, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy received a request from the Republic of Moldova for the Union to assist the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova with the procurement of key equipment to strengthen mobility as well as command and control capacities.
(6) Assistance measures are to be implemented taking into account the principles and requirements set out in Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, in particular compliance with Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (8), and in line with the rules for the implementation of revenue and expenditure financed under the EPF.
(7) The Council reaffirms its determination to protect, promote and fulfil human rights, fundamental freedoms and democratic principles and to strengthen the rule of law and good governance, in compliance with the Charter of the United Nations, with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with international law, in particular international human rights law and international humanitarian law,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Establishment, objectives, scope and duration

1. An assistance measure benefiting the Republic of Moldova (the ‘beneficiary’) to be financed under the European Peace Facility (EPF) (the ‘assistance measure’) is hereby established.

2. The objectives of the assistance measure are the following:
(a) to contribute to strengthening the military and defence capacities of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova in order to enhance national security, stability and resilience, and thereby also better protect civilians in crises and emergencies;
(b) to support cooperation in the area of security and defence between the Union and the Republic of Moldova, with a view to strengthening the Republic of Moldova’s capacities to participate in Union military common security and defence policy missions and operations, accelerating compliance with Union standards and interoperability, and promoting alignment with the Union’s common foreign and security policy.

3. To achieve the objectives set out in paragraph 2, the assistance measure shall finance the following types of equipment not designed to deliver lethal force:
(a) mobility equipment;
(b) command and control equipment.
The assistance measure shall also finance related supplies and services, including technical training, where needed.

4. The duration of the assistance measure shall be 40 months from the date of adoption of this Decision.

Financial arrangements

1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the assistance measure shall be EUR 40 000 000.
2. All expenditure shall be managed in accordance with Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 and in line with the rules for the implementation of revenue and expenditure financed under the EPF.

Arrangements with the beneficiary

1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) shall make the necessary arrangements with the beneficiary to ensure its compliance with the requirements and conditions established by this Decision as a condition for the provision of support under the assistance measure.

2. The arrangements referred to in paragraph 1 shall include provisions obliging the beneficiary to ensure:
(a) compliance of the units of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova supported under the assistance measure with relevant international law, in particular international human rights law and international humanitarian law;
(b) proper and efficient use of any assets provided under the assistance measure for the purposes for which they were provided;
(c) sufficient maintenance of any assets provided under the assistance measure to ensure their usability and operational availability over their life cycle;
(d) that any assets provided under the assistance measure are not lost or transferred to persons or entities other than those identified in those arrangements.

3. The arrangements referred to in paragraph 1 shall include provisions on the suspension and termination of support under the assistance measure in the event of the beneficiary being found in breach of the obligations set out in paragraph 2.

Implementation

1. The High Representative shall be responsible for ensuring the implementation of this Decision in accordance with Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, and in line with the rules for the implementation of revenue and expenditure financed under the EPF and with the Integrated Methodological Framework for assessing and identifying the required measures and controls for assistance measures under the EPF.

2. The implementation of the activities referred to in Article 1(3) shall be carried out by the Estonian Centre for Defence Investments.

Monitoring, control and evaluation

1. The High Representative shall monitor the compliance by the beneficiary with the obligations set out in Article 3. That monitoring shall be used to provide awareness of the context and the risks of breaches of the obligations set out in Article 3, and to contribute to the prevention of such breaches, including violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by the units of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova supported under the assistance measure.

2. The post-shipment control of equipment and supplies shall be organised as follows:
(a) delivery verification, whereby EPF delivery certificates are to be signed by the end-user forces upon transfer of ownership;
(b) reporting on the inventory, whereby the beneficiary is to report annually on the inventory of designated items until such reporting is no longer deemed necessary by the Political and Security Committee (PSC);
(c) on-site visits, whereby the beneficiary is to grant the High Representative and the EPF auditors access to conduct on-site checks and EPF audits, upon request.

3. The High Representative shall conduct a final evaluation upon completion of the assistance measure to assess whether the assistance measure has contributed to reaching the objectives set out in Article 1(2).

Reporting

During the period of implementation, the High Representative shall provide the PSC with six-monthly reports on the implementation of the assistance measure, in accordance with Article 63 of Decision (CFSP) 2021/509. The administrator for assistance measures shall regularly inform the Facility Committee established by Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 on the implementation of revenue and expenditure in accordance with Article 38 of that Decision, including by providing information on the suppliers and subcontractors involved.

Suspension and termination

1. The PSC may decide to suspend wholly or partially the implementation of the assistance measure in accordance with Article 64 of Decision (CFSP) 2021/509.
2. The PSC may recommend that the Council terminate the assistance measure.

Entry into force

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/696 of 3 April 2025 amending the Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672 concerning certain emergency measures relating to outbreaks of foot and mouth disease in Hungary and Slovakia (notified under document C(2025) 2169)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/696 4.4.2025
(1) Foot and mouth disease is an infectious viral disease affecting animals in the mammal order of Artiodactyla and can have a severe impact on the concerned animal population and the profitability of farming causing disturbance to movements of consignments of those animals and products thereof within the Union and exports to third countries.
(2) In the event of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in animals of listed species, there is a serious risk of the spread of that disease to other establishments keeping animals of listed species.
(3) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687(2)supplements the rules for the control of the listed diseases referred to in Article 9(1), points (a), (b) and (c), of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, and defined as category A, B and C diseases in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1882(3). In particular, Articles 21 and 22 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 provide for the establishment of a restricted zone in the event of an outbreak of a category A disease, including foot and mouth disease, and for certain measures to be applied therein. Article 21(1) of that Delegated Regulation provides that the restricted zone is to comprise a protection zone, a surveillance zone, and, if necessary, further restricted zones around or adjacent to the protection and surveillance zones.
(4) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672(4)was adopted on the basis of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, and it lays down certain emergency measures, relating to outbreaks of foot and mouth disease in establishments keeping bovine animals in the County of Győr-Moson-Sopron in Hungary, close to the border with Austria, and in the region of Trnava in Slovakia, close to the border with Hungary. More particularly, Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672 provides for the establishment of protection, surveillance and further restricted zones in Hungary and Slovakia, and a surveillance zone and further restricted zones in Austria, in accordance with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, following those outbreaks, and that those zones must comprise at least the areas listed in the Annex to that Implementing Decision. Due to the severity of the epidemiological situation, it also provides for certain restrictions on movements of animals of susceptible species.
(5) Since the adoption of Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672, Slovakia and Hungary have informed the Commission of the confirmation of new outbreaks of foot and mouth disease in establishments keeping bovine animals. These new outbreaks are located in the Bratislava region in Slovakia, close to the border with Austria and in the County of Győr-Moson-Sopron in Hungary, close to the border with Slovakia. In accordance with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, Slovakia, Hungary and Austria, in cooperation together, have established new restricted zones, which comprise protection, surveillance zones and further restricted zones in Slovakia and Hungary, and a surveillance zone and a further restricted zone in Austria, where the disease control measures laid down in that Delegated Regulation are applied in order to prevent the further spread of that disease to other parts of those Member States, or to other Member States.
(6) Therefore, the areas included in those restricted zones should be defined, both spatially and temporally, in the Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672, in order to prevent the further spread of the disease, as well as to prevent any unnecessary disturbance to trade within the Union, and to avoid any unjustified barriers to trade being imposed by third countries. Accordingly, regionalisation needs to be updated at Union level, and the areas identified as protection, surveillance and further restricted zones in Slovakia and Hungary, and as surveillance and further restricted zones in Austria, should be set out in the Annex to this Decision, and the duration of those measures fixed, in collaboration with those Member States.
(7) The Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672 should therefore be amended accordingly.
(8) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
Country ADIS reference number of the outbreak Areas established as protection and surveillance zones referred to in Article 1 Date until applicable
Hungary HU-FMD-2025-00001 Protection zone:Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.745480, Long. 17.694840. 30.4.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.745480, Long. 17.694840, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone. 30.4.2025
Slovakia HU-FMD-2025-00001 Surveillance zone:In district Dunajská Streda: the municipalities of Medveďov, Sap, Baloň, Čiližská Radvaň and Kľúčovec.In district Komárno: the municipalities of Číčov, Trávnik and Klížska Nemá. 30.4.2025
Slovakia SK-FMD-2025-00001 Protection zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8049, Long. 17.6666. 30.4.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8049, Long. 17.6666, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone. 30.4.2025
Hungary SK-FMD-2025-00001 Surveillance zone:Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8049, Long. 17.6666. 30.4.2025
Slovakia SK-FMD-2025-00002 Protection zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8433, Long. 17.6214. 30.4.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8433, Long. 17.6214, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone. 30.4.2025
Hungary SK-FMD-2025-00002 Surveillance zone:Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8433, Long. 17.6214. 30.4.2025
Slovakia SK-FMD-2025-00003 Protection zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9097, Long. 17.5387. 30.4.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9097, Long. 17.5387, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone. 30.4.2025
Hungary SK-FMD-2025-00003 Surveillance zone:Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9097, Long. 17.5387. 30.4.2025
Slovakia SK-FMD-2025-00004 Protection zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9704, Long. 17.4947. 2.5.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9704, Long. 17.4947, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone. 2.5.2025
Hungary SK-FMD-2025-00004 Surveillance zone:Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9704, Long. 17.4947. 2.5.2025
Hungary HU-FMD-2025-00002 Protection zone:Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.90917, Long. 17.19819. 17.5.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.90917, Long. 17.19819, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone. 17.5.2025
Austria HU-FMD-2025-00002 Surveillance zone:In the Federal State Burgenland within the district Neusiedl am See the cadastrial communities of Nickelsdorf, Mönchhof, Halbturn and Deutsch Jahrndorf. 17.5.2025
Slovakia SK-FMD-2025-00005 Protection zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 48.3861, Long. 16.9924. 20.5.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 48.3861, Long. 16.9924, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone. 20.5.2025
Austria SK-FMD-2025-00005 Surveillance zone:Those parts of Austria, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 48.3861, Long. 16.9924. 20.5.2025
Hungary HU-FMD-2025-00003 Protection zone:Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8522, Long. 17.41222. 20.5.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8522, Long. 17.41222, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone. 20.5.2025
Slovakia HU-FMD-2025-00003 Surveillance zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8522, Long. 17.41222. 20.5.2025
Hungary HU-FMD-2025-00004 Protection zone:Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.96161, Long. 17.29801. 20.5.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.96161, Long. 17.29801, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone. 20.5.2025
Slovakia HU-FMD-2025-00004 Surveillance zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.96161, Long. 17.29801. 20.5.2025
Country Areas established as further restricted zone, part of the restricted zone, referred to in Article 1 Date until applicable
Hungary County of Győr-Moson-Sopron, and in the County of Komárom-Esztergom the Districts of Komárom, Tata and Esztergom, excluding the areas contained in any protection or surveillance zone. 20.5.2025
Slovakia Regions of Bratislava, Trnava and Nitra, excluding the areas contained in any protection or surveillance zone. 20.5.2025
Austria In the Federal State Niederösterreich the district Gänserdorf and within the district Bruck an der Leitha the municipalities Au am Leithaberge, Bad Deutsch-Altenburg, Berg, Bruck an der Leitha, Enzersdorf an der Fischa, Göttlesbrunn-Arbesthal, Götzendorf an der Leitha, Hainburg a.d. Donau, Haslau-Maria Ellend, Höflein, Hof am Leithaberge, Hundsheim, Mannersdorf am Leithagebirge, Petronell-Carnuntum, Prellenkirchen, Rohrau, Scharndorf, Sommerein, Trautmannsdorf an der Leitha, Wolfsthal, Ebergassing, Fischamend, Klein-Neusiedl, Schwadorf; in the district Mistelbach the municipalities Altlichtenwarth, Bernhardsthal, Bockfließ, Großengersdorf, Großkrut, Hausbrunn, Herrnbaumgarten, Pillichsdorf, Rabensburg, Schrattenberg, Wilfersdorf; in the district Mistelbach within the municipality Drasenhofen the cadastrial communities Drasenhofen, Steinebrunn; in the district Mistelbach within the municipality Geweinstal the cadastrial communities Gaweinstal, Schrick, Martinsdorf; in the district Mistelbach within the minicipality Großebersdorf the cadastrial Community Eibesbrunn; in the district Mistelbach within the community Mistelbach the cadastrial communitry Kettlasbrunn; in the district Mistelbach within the municipality Poysdorf the cadastrial communities Höbertsgrub, Ketzelsdorf, Passauerhof, Poysbrunn, Walterkrichen; in the district Mistelbach within the municipality Wolkersdorf im Weinviertel the cadastrial communities Obersdorf and Wolkersdorf; in the distrikt Wiener Neustadt (Land) the municipalities Lichtenwörth, Zillingdorf.In the Federal State Burgenland the districts Eisenstadt-Stadt, Rust-Stadt, Eisenstadt-Umgebung, Mattersburg, Neusiedl am See (with the exception of the municipalities Nickelsdorf, Mönchhof, Halbturn and Deutsch Jahrndorf) und Oberpullendorf. 20.5.2025
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on transmissible animal diseases and amending and repealing certain acts in the area of animal health (‘Animal Health Law’) (1), and in particular Article 259(1), point (c), thereof,
Whereas:
(1) Foot and mouth disease is an infectious viral disease affecting animals in the mammal order of Artiodactyla and can have a severe impact on the concerned animal population and the profitability of farming causing disturbance to movements of consignments of those animals and products thereof within the Union and exports to third countries.
(2) In the event of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in animals of listed species, there is a serious risk of the spread of that disease to other establishments keeping animals of listed species.
(3) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 (2) supplements the rules for the control of the listed diseases referred to in Article 9(1), points (a), (b) and (c), of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, and defined as category A, B and C diseases in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1882 (3). In particular, Articles 21 and 22 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 provide for the establishment of a restricted zone in the event of an outbreak of a category A disease, including foot and mouth disease, and for certain measures to be applied therein. Article 21(1) of that Delegated Regulation provides that the restricted zone is to comprise a protection zone, a surveillance zone, and, if necessary, further restricted zones around or adjacent to the protection and surveillance zones.
(4) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672 (4) was adopted on the basis of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, and it lays down certain emergency measures, relating to outbreaks of foot and mouth disease in establishments keeping bovine animals in the County of Győr-Moson-Sopron in Hungary, close to the border with Austria, and in the region of Trnava in Slovakia, close to the border with Hungary. More particularly, Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672 provides for the establishment of protection, surveillance and further restricted zones in Hungary and Slovakia, and a surveillance zone and further restricted zones in Austria, in accordance with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, following those outbreaks, and that those zones must comprise at least the areas listed in the Annex to that Implementing Decision. Due to the severity of the epidemiological situation, it also provides for certain restrictions on movements of animals of susceptible species.
(5) Since the adoption of Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672, Slovakia and Hungary have informed the Commission of the confirmation of new outbreaks of foot and mouth disease in establishments keeping bovine animals. These new outbreaks are located in the Bratislava region in Slovakia, close to the border with Austria and in the County of Győr-Moson-Sopron in Hungary, close to the border with Slovakia. In accordance with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, Slovakia, Hungary and Austria, in cooperation together, have established new restricted zones, which comprise protection, surveillance zones and further restricted zones in Slovakia and Hungary, and a surveillance zone and a further restricted zone in Austria, where the disease control measures laid down in that Delegated Regulation are applied in order to prevent the further spread of that disease to other parts of those Member States, or to other Member States.
(6) Therefore, the areas included in those restricted zones should be defined, both spatially and temporally, in the Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672, in order to prevent the further spread of the disease, as well as to prevent any unnecessary disturbance to trade within the Union, and to avoid any unjustified barriers to trade being imposed by third countries. Accordingly, regionalisation needs to be updated at Union level, and the areas identified as protection, surveillance and further restricted zones in Slovakia and Hungary, and as surveillance and further restricted zones in Austria, should be set out in the Annex to this Decision, and the duration of those measures fixed, in collaboration with those Member States.
(7) The Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672 should therefore be amended accordingly.
(8) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The Annex of Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672 is replaced by the text set out in the Annex to this Implementing Decision.
This Decision is addressed to Hungary, the Republic of Austria and the Slovak Republic.

Protection and surveillance zones established around the confirmed outbreaks:

Country
ADIS reference number of the outbreak
Areas established as protection and surveillance zones referred to in Article 1
Date until applicable
Hungary
HU-FMD-2025-00001
Protection zone:
Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.745480, Long. 17.694840. 30.4.2025
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.745480, Long. 17.694840, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.
30.4.2025
Slovakia
HU-FMD-2025-00001
Surveillance zone:
In district Dunajská Streda: the municipalities of Medveďov, Sap, Baloň, Čiližská Radvaň and Kľúčovec.
In district Komárno: the municipalities of Číčov, Trávnik and Klížska Nemá.
30.4.2025
Slovakia
SK-FMD-2025-00001
Protection zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8049, Long. 17.6666. 30.4.2025
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8049, Long. 17.6666, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.
30.4.2025
Hungary
SK-FMD-2025-00001
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8049, Long. 17.6666. 30.4.2025
Slovakia
SK-FMD-2025-00002
Protection zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8433, Long. 17.6214. 30.4.2025
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8433, Long. 17.6214, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.
30.4.2025
Hungary
SK-FMD-2025-00002
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8433, Long. 17.6214. 30.4.2025
Slovakia
SK-FMD-2025-00003
Protection zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9097, Long. 17.5387. 30.4.2025
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9097, Long. 17.5387, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.
30.4.2025
Hungary
SK-FMD-2025-00003
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9097, Long. 17.5387. 30.4.2025
Slovakia
SK-FMD-2025-00004
Protection zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9704, Long. 17.4947. 2.5.2025
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9704, Long. 17.4947, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.
2.5.2025
Hungary
SK-FMD-2025-00004
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9704, Long. 17.4947. 2.5.2025
Hungary
HU-FMD-2025-00002
Protection zone:
Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.90917, Long. 17.19819. 17.5.2025
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.90917, Long. 17.19819, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.
17.5.2025
Austria
HU-FMD-2025-00002
Surveillance zone:
In the Federal State Burgenland within the district Neusiedl am See the cadastrial communities of Nickelsdorf, Mönchhof, Halbturn and Deutsch Jahrndorf.
17.5.2025
Slovakia
SK-FMD-2025-00005
Protection zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 48.3861, Long. 16.9924. 20.5.2025
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 48.3861, Long. 16.9924, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.
20.5.2025
Austria
SK-FMD-2025-00005
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Austria, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 48.3861, Long. 16.9924. 20.5.2025
Hungary
HU-FMD-2025-00003
Protection zone:
Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8522, Long. 17.41222. 20.5.2025
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8522, Long. 17.41222, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.
20.5.2025
Slovakia
HU-FMD-2025-00003
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8522, Long. 17.41222. 20.5.2025
Hungary
HU-FMD-2025-00004
Protection zone:
Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.96161, Long. 17.29801. 20.5.2025
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.96161, Long. 17.29801, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.
20.5.2025
Slovakia
HU-FMD-2025-00004
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.96161, Long. 17.29801. 20.5.2025

Further restricted zones:

Country
Areas established as further restricted zone, part of the restricted zone, referred to in Article 1
Date until applicable
Hungary
County of Győr-Moson-Sopron, and in the County of Komárom-Esztergom the Districts of Komárom, Tata and Esztergom, excluding the areas contained in any protection or surveillance zone.
20.5.2025
Slovakia
Regions of Bratislava, Trnava and Nitra, excluding the areas contained in any protection or surveillance zone.
20.5.2025
Austria
In the Federal State Niederösterreich the district Gänserdorf and within the district Bruck an der Leitha the municipalities Au am Leithaberge, Bad Deutsch-Altenburg, Berg, Bruck an der Leitha, Enzersdorf an der Fischa, Göttlesbrunn-Arbesthal, Götzendorf an der Leitha, Hainburg a.d. Donau, Haslau-Maria Ellend, Höflein, Hof am Leithaberge, Hundsheim, Mannersdorf am Leithagebirge, Petronell-Carnuntum, Prellenkirchen, Rohrau, Scharndorf, Sommerein, Trautmannsdorf an der Leitha, Wolfsthal, Ebergassing, Fischamend, Klein-Neusiedl, Schwadorf; in the district Mistelbach the municipalities Altlichtenwarth, Bernhardsthal, Bockfließ, Großengersdorf, Großkrut, Hausbrunn, Herrnbaumgarten, Pillichsdorf, Rabensburg, Schrattenberg, Wilfersdorf; in the district Mistelbach within the municipality Drasenhofen the cadastrial communities Drasenhofen, Steinebrunn; in the district Mistelbach within the municipality Geweinstal the cadastrial communities Gaweinstal, Schrick, Martinsdorf; in the district Mistelbach within the minicipality Großebersdorf the cadastrial Community Eibesbrunn; in the district Mistelbach within the community Mistelbach the cadastrial communitry Kettlasbrunn; in the district Mistelbach within the municipality Poysdorf the cadastrial communities Höbertsgrub, Ketzelsdorf, Passauerhof, Poysbrunn, Walterkrichen; in the district Mistelbach within the municipality Wolkersdorf im Weinviertel the cadastrial communities Obersdorf and Wolkersdorf; in the distrikt Wiener Neustadt (Land) the municipalities Lichtenwörth, Zillingdorf.
In the Federal State Burgenland the districts Eisenstadt-Stadt, Rust-Stadt, Eisenstadt-Umgebung, Mattersburg, Neusiedl am See (with the exception of the municipalities Nickelsdorf, Mönchhof, Halbturn and Deutsch Jahrndorf) und Oberpullendorf.
20.5.2025

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/694 of 9 April 2025 authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 95275 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (notified under document C(2025) 2115)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/694 11.4.2025
(1) On 29 April 2022, Bayer Agriculture B.V., based in Belgium, on behalf of Bayer CropScience LP, based in the United States, submitted an application to the national competent authority of the Netherlands for the placing on the market of foods, food ingredients and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 95275, in accordance with Articles 5 and 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (‘the application’). The application also covered the placing on the market of products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON 95275 for uses other than food and feed, with the exception of cultivation.
(2) Pursuant to Article 5(5) and Article 17(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, the application included information and conclusions about the risk assessment carried out in accordance with the principles set out in Annex II to Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(2). It also included the information required pursuant to Annexes III and IV to that Directive and a monitoring plan for environmental effects in accordance with Annex VII to that Directive.
(3) On 1 August 2024, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) issued a favourable scientific opinion on genetically modified maize MON 95275 in accordance with Articles 6 and 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003(3). The Authority concluded that genetically modified maize MON 95275, as described in the application, is as safe as its conventional counterpart and the tested non-genetically modified maize reference varieties with respect to the potential effects on human and animal health and the environment. The Authority also concluded that the consumption of genetically modified maize MON 95275 does not represent any nutritional concern.
(4) In its scientific opinion, the Authority considered all the questions and concerns raised by the Member States in the context of the consultation of the national competent authorities as provided for in Article 6(4) and Article 18(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(5) The Authority also concluded that the monitoring plan for the environmental effects, submitted by the applicant, consisting of a general surveillance plan, is in line with the intended uses of the products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 95275.
(6) Taking into account those conclusions, the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 95275 should be authorised for the uses listed in the application.
(7) A unique identifier should be assigned to genetically modified maize MON 95275 in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 65/2004(4).
(8) For the products covered by this Decision, no specific labelling requirements, other than those provided for in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5), appear to be necessary. However, in order to ensure that the use of those products remains within the limits of the authorisation granted by this Decision, the labelling of the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON 95275, with the exception of foods and food ingredients, should contain a clear indication that they are not intended for cultivation.
(9) The authorisation holder should submit annual reports on the implementation and on the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan for environmental effects. Those results should be presented in accordance with the requirements laid down in Commission Decision 2009/770/EC(6).
(10) The opinion of the Authority does not justify the imposition of other specific conditions or restrictions for the placing on the market, for the use and handling of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 95275 or for the protection of particular ecosystems/environment and/or geographical areas, as provided for in Article 6(5), point (e), and Article 18(5), point (e), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(11) All relevant information on the authorisation of the products covered by this Decision should be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(12) This Decision is to be notified through the Biosafety Clearing-House to the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, pursuant to Article 9(1) and Article 15(2), point (c), of Regulation (EC) No 1946/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(7).
(13) The Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed has not delivered an opinion within the time limit laid down by its Chairman. This implementing act was deemed to be necessary and the chair submitted it to the appeal committee for further deliberation. The appeal committee did not deliver an opinion,
(a) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON-95275-7;
(b) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON-95275-7;
(c) products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON-95275-7 for uses other than those provided for in points (a) and (b), with the exception of cultivation.
(a) Applicant and authorisation holder:Name:Bayer CropScience LPAddress:800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St Louis, MO, 63167, United States,represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Scheldelaan 460, 2040, Antwerp, Belgium. Name : Bayer CropScience LP Address : 800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St Louis, MO, 63167, United States,
Name : Bayer CropScience LP
Address : 800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St Louis, MO, 63167, United States,
Name : Bayer CropScience LP
Address : 800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St Louis, MO, 63167, United States,
(b) Designation and specification of the products:(1)foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-95275-7;(2)feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-95275-7;(3)products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-95275-7 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.The genetically modified maize MON-95275-7 expresses thempp75Aa1.1andvpb4Da2genes and the double-stranded RNA DvSnf7, which confer protection against certain coleopteran insect pests. (1) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-95275-7; (2) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-95275-7; (3) products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-95275-7 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.
(1) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-95275-7;
(2) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-95275-7;
(3) products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-95275-7 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.
(1) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-95275-7;
(2) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-95275-7;
(3) products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-95275-7 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.
(c) Labelling:(1)For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘maize’.(2)The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON-95275-7, with the exception of products referred to in point (b)(1). (1) For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘maize’. (2) The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON-95275-7, with the exception of products referred to in point (b)(1).
(1) For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘maize’.
(2) The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON-95275-7, with the exception of products referred to in point (b)(1).
(1) For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘maize’.
(2) The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON-95275-7, with the exception of products referred to in point (b)(1).
(d) Method for detection:(1)Event specific real-time PCR based method for the quantification of genetically modified maize MON-95275-7.(2)Validated by the EU reference laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttp://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/StatusOfDossiers.aspx.(3)Reference Material: AOCS 1221-A (for MON-95275-7) and AOCS 0406-A (for its non-GM counterpart), are accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society (AOCS), athttps://www.aocs.org/crm?SSO=True. (1) Event specific real-time PCR based method for the quantification of genetically modified maize MON-95275-7. (2) Validated by the EU reference laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttp://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/StatusOfDossiers.aspx. (3) Reference Material: AOCS 1221-A (for MON-95275-7) and AOCS 0406-A (for its non-GM counterpart), are accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society (AOCS), athttps://www.aocs.org/crm?SSO=True.
(1) Event specific real-time PCR based method for the quantification of genetically modified maize MON-95275-7.
(2) Validated by the EU reference laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttp://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/StatusOfDossiers.aspx.
(3) Reference Material: AOCS 1221-A (for MON-95275-7) and AOCS 0406-A (for its non-GM counterpart), are accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society (AOCS), athttps://www.aocs.org/crm?SSO=True.
(1) Event specific real-time PCR based method for the quantification of genetically modified maize MON-95275-7.
(2) Validated by the EU reference laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttp://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/StatusOfDossiers.aspx.
(3) Reference Material: AOCS 1221-A (for MON-95275-7) and AOCS 0406-A (for its non-GM counterpart), are accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society (AOCS), athttps://www.aocs.org/crm?SSO=True.
(e) Unique identifier:MON-95275-7
(f) Information required under Annex II to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity:[Biosafety Clearing-House, Record ID number:published in the register of genetically modified food and feed when notified].
(g) Conditions or restrictions on the placing on the market, use or handling of the products:Not required.
(h) Monitoring plan for environmental effects:Monitoring plan for environmental effects in accordance with Annex VII to Directive 2001/18/EC.[Link:plan published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed]
(i) Post-market monitoring requirements for the use of the food for human consumption:Not required.
Note: links to relevant documents may need to be modified over time. Those modifications will be made available to the public via the updating of the Community register of genetically modified food and feed.
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed (1), and in particular Article 7(3) and Article 19(3) thereof,
Whereas:
(1) On 29 April 2022, Bayer Agriculture B.V., based in Belgium, on behalf of Bayer CropScience LP, based in the United States, submitted an application to the national competent authority of the Netherlands for the placing on the market of foods, food ingredients and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 95275, in accordance with Articles 5 and 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (‘the application’). The application also covered the placing on the market of products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON 95275 for uses other than food and feed, with the exception of cultivation.
(2) Pursuant to Article 5(5) and Article 17(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, the application included information and conclusions about the risk assessment carried out in accordance with the principles set out in Annex II to Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (2). It also included the information required pursuant to Annexes III and IV to that Directive and a monitoring plan for environmental effects in accordance with Annex VII to that Directive.
(3) On 1 August 2024, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) issued a favourable scientific opinion on genetically modified maize MON 95275 in accordance with Articles 6 and 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (3). The Authority concluded that genetically modified maize MON 95275, as described in the application, is as safe as its conventional counterpart and the tested non-genetically modified maize reference varieties with respect to the potential effects on human and animal health and the environment. The Authority also concluded that the consumption of genetically modified maize MON 95275 does not represent any nutritional concern.
(4) In its scientific opinion, the Authority considered all the questions and concerns raised by the Member States in the context of the consultation of the national competent authorities as provided for in Article 6(4) and Article 18(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(5) The Authority also concluded that the monitoring plan for the environmental effects, submitted by the applicant, consisting of a general surveillance plan, is in line with the intended uses of the products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 95275.
(6) Taking into account those conclusions, the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 95275 should be authorised for the uses listed in the application.
(7) A unique identifier should be assigned to genetically modified maize MON 95275 in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 65/2004 (4).
(8) For the products covered by this Decision, no specific labelling requirements, other than those provided for in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5), appear to be necessary. However, in order to ensure that the use of those products remains within the limits of the authorisation granted by this Decision, the labelling of the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON 95275, with the exception of foods and food ingredients, should contain a clear indication that they are not intended for cultivation.
(9) The authorisation holder should submit annual reports on the implementation and on the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan for environmental effects. Those results should be presented in accordance with the requirements laid down in Commission Decision 2009/770/EC (6).
(10) The opinion of the Authority does not justify the imposition of other specific conditions or restrictions for the placing on the market, for the use and handling of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 95275 or for the protection of particular ecosystems/environment and/or geographical areas, as provided for in Article 6(5), point (e), and Article 18(5), point (e), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(11) All relevant information on the authorisation of the products covered by this Decision should be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(12) This Decision is to be notified through the Biosafety Clearing-House to the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, pursuant to Article 9(1) and Article 15(2), point (c), of Regulation (EC) No 1946/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (7).
(13) The Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed has not delivered an opinion within the time limit laid down by its Chairman. This implementing act was deemed to be necessary and the chair submitted it to the appeal committee for further deliberation. The appeal committee did not deliver an opinion,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Genetically modified organism and unique identifier

Genetically modified maize (Zea mays L.) MON 95275, as specified in point (b) of the Annex to this Decision, is assigned the unique identifier MON-95275-7, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 65/2004.

Authorisation

The following products are authorised for the purposes of Article 4(2) and Article 16(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, in accordance with the conditions set out in this Decision:

(a) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON-95275-7;
(b) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON-95275-7;
(c) products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON-95275-7 for uses other than those provided for in points (a) and (b), with the exception of cultivation.

Labelling

1. For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the name of the organism shall be ‘maize’.

2. The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON-95275-7 as referred to in Article 1, with the exception of products referred to in Article 2, point (a).

Method for detection

The method set out in point (d) of the Annex shall apply for the detection of genetically modified maize MON-95275-7.

Monitoring plan for environmental effects

1. The authorisation holder shall ensure that the monitoring plan for environmental effects, as set out in point (h) of the Annex, is put in place and implemented.

2. The authorisation holder shall submit to the Commission annual reports on the implementation and the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan in accordance with the format set out in Decision 2009/770/EC.

Community register

The information set out in the Annex shall be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed, as referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.

Authorisation holder

The authorisation holder shall be Bayer CropScience LP, represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V.

Validity

This Decision shall apply for a period of 10 years from the date of its notification.

Addressee

This Decision is addressed to Bayer CropScience LP, 800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St Louis, MO 63167, United States, represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Scheldelaan 460, 2040, Antwerp, Belgium.

(a) Applicant and authorisation holder:
Name
:
Bayer CropScience LP
Address
:
800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St Louis, MO, 63167, United States,
represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Scheldelaan 460, 2040, Antwerp, Belgium.

(b) Designation and specification of the products:
(1) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea mays L.) MON-95275-7;
(2) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea mays L.) MON-95275-7;
(3) products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize (Zea mays L.) MON-95275-7 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.
The genetically modified maize MON-95275-7 expresses the mpp75Aa1.1 and vpb4Da2 genes and the double-stranded RNA DvSnf7, which confer protection against certain coleopteran insect pests.

(c) Labelling:
(1) For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘maize’.
(2) The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON-95275-7, with the exception of products referred to in point (b)(1).

(d) Method for detection:
(1) Event specific real-time PCR based method for the quantification of genetically modified maize MON-95275-7. (2) Validated by the EU reference laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published at http://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/StatusOfDossiers.aspx.
(3) Reference Material: AOCS 1221-A (for MON-95275-7) and AOCS 0406-A (for its non-GM counterpart), are accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society (AOCS), at https://www.aocs.org/crm?SSO=True.

(e) Unique identifier:
MON-95275-7

(f) Information required under Annex II to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity:
[Biosafety Clearing-House, Record ID number: published in the register of genetically modified food and feed when notified].

(g) Conditions or restrictions on the placing on the market, use or handling of the products:
Not required.

(h) Monitoring plan for environmental effects:
Monitoring plan for environmental effects in accordance with Annex VII to Directive 2001/18/EC.
[Link: plan published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed]

(i) Post-market monitoring requirements for the use of the food for human consumption:
Not required.

Note:
links to relevant documents may need to be modified over time. Those modifications will be made available to the public via the updating of the Community register of genetically modified food and feed.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/692 of 9 April 2025 authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 94804 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (notified under document C(2025) 2116)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/692 11.4.2025
(1) On 14 February 2023, Bayer Agriculture BV, based in Belgium, submitted on behalf of Bayer CropScience LP, based in the United States, an application to the national competent authority of the Netherlands for the placing on the market of foods, food ingredients and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 94804, in accordance with Articles 5 and 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (‘the application’). The application also covered the placing on the market of products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON 94804 for uses other than food and feed, with the exception of cultivation.
(2) In accordance with Article 5(5) and Article 17(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, the application included information and conclusions about the risk assessment carried out in accordance with the principles set out in Annex II to Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(2). It also included the information required pursuant to Annexes III and IV to that Directive and a monitoring plan for environmental effects in accordance with Annex VII to that Directive.
(3) On 26 April 2024, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) issued a favourable scientific opinion on the genetically modified maize MON 94804 in accordance with Articles 6 and 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003(3). The Authority concluded that genetically modified maize MON 94804, as described in the application, is as safe as its conventional counterpart and the tested non-genetically modified maize reference varieties with respect to the potential effects on human and animal health and the environment. The Authority also concluded that the consumption of genetically modified maize MON 94804 does not represent any nutritional concern.
(4) In its scientific opinion, the Authority considered all the questions and concerns raised by the Member States in the context of the consultation of the national competent authorities as provided for in Article 6(4) and Article 18(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(5) The Authority also concluded that the monitoring plan for the environmental effects, submitted by the applicant, consisting of a general surveillance plan, is in line with the intended uses of the products.
(6) Taking into account those conclusions, the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 94804 should be authorised for the uses listed in the application.
(7) A unique identifier should be assigned to genetically modified maize MON 94804 in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 65/2004(4).
(8) For the products covered by this Decision, no specific labelling requirements, other than those provided for in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5), appear to be necessary. However, in order to ensure that the use of those products remains within the limits of the authorisation granted by this Decision, the labelling of the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON 94804, with the exception of foods and food ingredients, should contain a clear indication that they are not intended for cultivation.
(9) The authorisation holder should submit annual reports on the implementation and on the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan for environmental effects. Those results should be presented in accordance with the requirements laid down in Commission Decision 2009/770/EC(6).
(10) The opinion of the Authority does not justify the imposition of other specific conditions or restrictions for the placing on the market, for the use and handling or for the protection of particular ecosystems/environment and/or geographical areas, as provided for in Article 6(5), point (e), and Article 18(5), point (e), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(11) All relevant information on the authorisation of the products covered by this Decision should be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(12) This Decision is to be notified through the Biosafety Clearing-House to the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, pursuant to Article 9(1) and Article 15(2), point (c), of Regulation (EC) No 1946/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(7).
(13) The Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed has not delivered an opinion within the time limit laid down by its Chairman. This implementing act was deemed to be necessary and the chair submitted it to the appeal committee for further deliberation. The appeal committee did not deliver an opinion,
(a) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON-948Ø4-4;
(b) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON-948Ø4-4;
(c) products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON-948Ø4-4 for uses other than those provided for in points (a) and (b), with the exception of cultivation.
Name : Bayer CropScience LP
Address : 800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard St. Louis, Missouri 63167, United States,
(1) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize as referred to in point (e);
(2) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize as referred to in point (e);
(3) products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize as referred to in point (e), for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.
(1) For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘maize’;
(2) The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of the genetically modified maize referred to in point (e), with the exception of the products referred to in point (b)(1).
(1) Event specific real-time PCR based method for the quantification of genetically modified maize MON-948Ø4-4.
(2) Validated by the EU reference laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttp://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/StatusOfDossiers.aspx.
(3) Reference Material: AOCS 1221-B is accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society athttps://www.aocs.org/crm.
Note: links to the relevant documents may need to be modified over time. Those modifications will be made available to the public via the updating of the Community register of genetically modified food and feed.
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed (1), and in particular Article 7(3) and Article 19(3) thereof,
Whereas:
(1) On 14 February 2023, Bayer Agriculture BV, based in Belgium, submitted on behalf of Bayer CropScience LP, based in the United States, an application to the national competent authority of the Netherlands for the placing on the market of foods, food ingredients and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 94804, in accordance with Articles 5 and 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (‘the application’). The application also covered the placing on the market of products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON 94804 for uses other than food and feed, with the exception of cultivation.
(2) In accordance with Article 5(5) and Article 17(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, the application included information and conclusions about the risk assessment carried out in accordance with the principles set out in Annex II to Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (2). It also included the information required pursuant to Annexes III and IV to that Directive and a monitoring plan for environmental effects in accordance with Annex VII to that Directive.
(3) On 26 April 2024, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) issued a favourable scientific opinion on the genetically modified maize MON 94804 in accordance with Articles 6 and 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (3). The Authority concluded that genetically modified maize MON 94804, as described in the application, is as safe as its conventional counterpart and the tested non-genetically modified maize reference varieties with respect to the potential effects on human and animal health and the environment. The Authority also concluded that the consumption of genetically modified maize MON 94804 does not represent any nutritional concern.
(4) In its scientific opinion, the Authority considered all the questions and concerns raised by the Member States in the context of the consultation of the national competent authorities as provided for in Article 6(4) and Article 18(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(5) The Authority also concluded that the monitoring plan for the environmental effects, submitted by the applicant, consisting of a general surveillance plan, is in line with the intended uses of the products.
(6) Taking into account those conclusions, the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 94804 should be authorised for the uses listed in the application.
(7) A unique identifier should be assigned to genetically modified maize MON 94804 in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 65/2004 (4).
(8) For the products covered by this Decision, no specific labelling requirements, other than those provided for in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5), appear to be necessary. However, in order to ensure that the use of those products remains within the limits of the authorisation granted by this Decision, the labelling of the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON 94804, with the exception of foods and food ingredients, should contain a clear indication that they are not intended for cultivation.
(9) The authorisation holder should submit annual reports on the implementation and on the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan for environmental effects. Those results should be presented in accordance with the requirements laid down in Commission Decision 2009/770/EC (6).
(10) The opinion of the Authority does not justify the imposition of other specific conditions or restrictions for the placing on the market, for the use and handling or for the protection of particular ecosystems/environment and/or geographical areas, as provided for in Article 6(5), point (e), and Article 18(5), point (e), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(11) All relevant information on the authorisation of the products covered by this Decision should be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(12) This Decision is to be notified through the Biosafety Clearing-House to the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, pursuant to Article 9(1) and Article 15(2), point (c), of Regulation (EC) No 1946/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (7).
(13) The Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed has not delivered an opinion within the time limit laid down by its Chairman. This implementing act was deemed to be necessary and the chair submitted it to the appeal committee for further deliberation. The appeal committee did not deliver an opinion,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Genetically modified organism and unique identifier

Genetically modified maize (Zea mays L.) MON 94804, as specified in point (b) of the Annex to this Decision, is assigned the unique identifier MON-948Ø4-4, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 65/2004.

Authorisation

The following products are authorised for the purposes of Article 4(2) and Article 16(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, in accordance with the conditions set out in this Decision:

(a) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON-948Ø4-4;
(b) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON-948Ø4-4;
(c) products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON-948Ø4-4 for uses other than those provided for in points (a) and (b), with the exception of cultivation.

Labelling

1. For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the name of the organism shall be ‘maize’.

2. The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON-948Ø4-4 referred to in Article 1, with the exception of products referred to in Article 2, point (a).

Method for detection

The method set out in point (d) of the Annex shall apply for the detection of genetically modified maize MON-948Ø4-4.

Monitoring plan for environmental effects

1. The authorisation holder shall ensure that the monitoring plan for environmental effects set out in point (h) of the Annex, is put in place and implemented.

2. The authorisation holder shall submit to the Commission annual reports on the implementation and the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan in accordance with the format set out in Decision 2009/770/EC.

Community register

The information set out in the Annex shall be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.

Authorisation holder

The authorisation holder shall be Bayer CropScience LP, represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture BV.

Validity

This Decision shall apply for a period of 10 years from the date of its notification.

Addressee

This Decision is addressed to Bayer CropScience LP, 800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard St. Louis, Missouri 63167, United States, represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture BV, Haven 627, Scheldelaan 460, 2040 Antwerp, Belgium.

(a)   Applicant and authorisation holder:

Name
:
Bayer CropScience LP
Address
:
800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard St. Louis, Missouri 63167, United States,

represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture BV, Haven 627, Scheldelaan 460, 2040 Antwerp, Belgium.
(b) Designation and specification of the products:

(1) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize as referred to in point (e);

(2) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize as referred to in point (e);

(3) products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize as referred to in point (e), for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.

The genetically modified maize MON-948Ø4-4 expresses the GA20ox_SUP microRNA (miRNA), which leads to a reduction in the overall plant height.
(c) Labelling:

(1) For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘maize’;

(2) The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of the genetically modified maize referred to in point (e), with the exception of the products referred to in point (b)(1).

(d) Method for detection:

(1) Event specific real-time PCR based method for the quantification of genetically modified maize MON-948Ø4-4.

(2) Validated by the EU reference laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published at http://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/StatusOfDossiers.aspx.

(3) Reference Material: AOCS 1221-B is accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society at https://www.aocs.org/crm.

(e) Unique identifier:

MON-948Ø4-4
(f) Information required under Annex II to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity:

[Biosafety Clearing-House, Record ID number: published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed when notified].
(g) Conditions or restrictions on the placing on the market, use or handling of the products:

Not required.
(h) Monitoring plan for environmental effects:

Monitoring plan for environmental effects in accordance with Annex VII to Directive 2001/18/EC.
[Link: plan published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed]
(i) Post-market monitoring requirements for the use of the food for human consumption:

Not required.

Note:
links to the relevant documents may need to be modified over time. Those modifications will be made available to the public via the updating of the Community register of genetically modified food and feed.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/690 of 4 April 2025 amending Decision 2011/235/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Iran

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/690 7.4.2025
(1) On 12 April 2011, the Council adopted Decision 2011/235/CFSP(1).
(2) On the basis of a review of Decision 2011/235/CFSP, the Council considers that the restrictive measures set out therein should be renewed until 13 April 2026.
(3) The Council has concluded that the entries concerning two persons designated in the Annex to Decision 2011/235/CFSP should be removed, and that the entries concerning 20 persons should be updated.
(4) Decision 2011/235/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,
(1) in Article 6, paragraph 2, the date ‘13 April 2025’ is replaced by that of ‘13 April 2026’;
(2) the Annex is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
(1) in the list headed ‘Persons’, entries 68 (concerning RAMIN Mohammad-Ali) and 169 (concerning NILFRUSHAN Abbas Mortaza) are deleted;
(2) in the list headed ‘Persons’, the entries for the following 20 persons are replaced by the following:PersonsNameIdentifying informationReasonsDate of listing‘23.PIR-ABASSI AbbasGender: maleFunction: Judge at the Shahid Muftah Judicial Complex; former magistrate of a criminal chamber; former judge, Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 26Judge at the Shahid Muftah Judicial Complex. Former magistrate of a criminal chamber. Former judge, Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 26. He was in charge of post-election cases. He issued long prison sentences during unfair trials against human rights activists and issued several death sentences for protesters.12.4.201129.BOZORGNIA MostafaGender: maleFunction: Head of ward 350 of Evin PrisonHead of ward 350 of Evin Prison, known for being the place of imprisonment of the regime’s political prisoners and for its particularly poor detention conditions. He unleashed on a number of occasions disproportionate violence upon prisoners.12.4.201133.ABBASZADEH-MESHKINI MahmoudGender: maleMember of Parliament from February 2020 to 2024 and Speaker of the Parliament’s Committee for National Security and Foreign Affairs who continues to support the Iranian regime, including by justifying the abuses committed by the regime against the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement.Advisor to Iran’s High Council for Human Rights until 2019. Former secretary of the High Council for Human Rights. Former Governor of Ilam Province. Former Political Director of the Interior Ministry. As Head of the Article 10 Committee of the Law on Activities of Political Parties and Groups, he was in charge of authorising demonstrations and other public events and registering political parties.In 2010, he suspended the activities of two reformist political parties linked to Mir-Hossein Mousavi – the Islamic Iran Participation Front and the Islamic Revolution Mujahedeen Organisation. From 2009 onwards, he has consistently and continuously prohibited all non-governmental gatherings, and has therefore denied the constitutional right to protest and caused many arrests of peaceful demonstrators in contravention of the right to freedom of assembly.In 2009, he also denied the opposition a permit for a ceremony to mourn people killed in protests over the presidential elections.10.10.201140.HABIBI Mohammad RezaGender: maleFunction: Chief Justice of Isfahan; former Attorney General of Isfahan; former Deputy Prosecutor of Isfahan; former Head of the Ministry of Justice office in YazdChief Justice of Isfahan, former Attorney General of Isfahan, former Deputy Prosecutor of Isfahan and former Head of the Ministry of Justice office in Yazd. In his various roles in the judiciaries of Isfahan and Yazd, including in his current role as Chief Justice of Isfahan, he has directly participated in and is responsible for the violation of citizens’ rights, in particular the right to freedom of speech, the right to protest, the right to life, and the violation of the prohibition on torture. Mohammad Reza Habibi also played a direct role in the suppression and gross violation of the right to protest during the nationwide protests in January 2017 and November 2019. Therefore, in his role as Chief Justice of Isfahan, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.10.10.201146.KAMALIAN Behrouz(a.k.a. Hackers Brain, Behrooz_Ice)POB: Tehran (Iran)DOB: 1983Gender: maleFunction: Head of the “Ashiyaneh” cyber groupHead of the “Ashiyaneh” cyber group linked with the Iranian regime. “Ashiyaneh” Digital Security, founded by Behrouz Kamalian, is responsible for intensive cyber-attacks on both domestic opponents and reformists and foreign institutions. Kamalian’s “Ashiyaneh” organisation’s work has assisted the regime’s crackdown against the opposition, which has involved numerous serious human rights violations.10.10.201148.MAHSOULI Sadeq(a.k.a. MAHSULI Sadeq)POB: Oroumieh (Iran)DOB: 1959/1960Gender: maleFunction: Secretary-General (and former Deputy Secretary-General) of the Paydari Front (Front of Islamic Stability)Secretary-General of the Paydari Front (Front of Islamic Stability) since 2021 and Deputy Secretary-General of the Paydari Front before 2021. The Paydari Front has long been active in state capture practices, infiltrating institutions and indoctrinating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In the wake of the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement, launched in September 2022, the Paydari Front, under the leadership of Mahsouli, played a critical role in pushing through the draconian hijab and chastity laws.Mahsouli is a former advisor to former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He is also a former member of the Expediency Council and former Deputy Chief of the Perseverance Front. He was Minister of Welfare and Social Security between 2009 and 2011 and Minister of the Interior until August 2009. As Minister of the Interior, Mahsouli had authority over all police forces, interior ministry security agents, and plain-clothes agents. The forces under his direction were responsible for attacks on the dormitories of Tehran University on 14 June 2009 and the torture of students in the basement of the Ministry (the notorious basement level 4). Other protestors were severely abused at the Kahrizak Detention Centre, which was operated by police under Mahsouli’s control.10.10.201154.TAMADDON Morteza(a.k.a. TAMADON Morteza)POB: Shahr Kord-Isfahan (Iran)DOB: 1959Gender: maleFunction: Board member at Khajeh Nasireddin Tusi University of Technology; former Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council; former IRGC Governor-General of Tehran ProvincePolitician closely associated with former Iranian President Ahmadinejad. Board member at Khajeh Nasireddin Tusi University of Technology. Former Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council. Former IRGC Governor-General of Tehran Province. In his capacity as Governor and Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council, he bore overall responsibility for all repressive activities undertaken by the IRGC in Tehran Province, including cracking down on political protests since June 2009.10.10.201157.HAJMOHAM-MADI Aziz(a.k.a. Aziz Hajmohammadi, Noorollah Azizmohammadi)POB: Tehran (Iran)DOB: 1948Gender: maleFunction: Attorney in Tehran since 2020; former judge at branch 71 of the Tehran Provincial Criminal CourtAttorney in Tehran since 2020. Former judge at branch 71 of the Tehran Provincial Criminal Court. Working for the judiciary since 1971, he has been involved in several trials of demonstrators, including that of Abdol-Reza Ghanbari, a teacher arrested in January 2010 and sentenced to death for his political activities. He has a track record of human rights violations, including the issuing of inhumane sentences, death sentences and prison sentences for political prisoners.10.10.201158.BAGHERI Mohammad-BagherDOB: 1941Gender: maleFunction: Deputy Head of the Judiciary for International Affairs and Secretary of the Human Rights StaffIn 2019, Mohammad-Bagher Bagheri was appointed Deputy Head of the Judiciary for International Affairs and Secretary of the Human Rights Staff, replacing Mohammad Javad Larijani in this position by a decree of Ebrahim Raisi. He was judge at the Supreme court between December 2015 and 2019. Former vice-chairman of the judiciary administration of South Khorasan province, in charge of crime prevention. In addition to his acknowledging, in June 2011, 140 executions for capital offences between March 2010 and March 2011, approximately 100 other executions are reported to have taken place in the same period and in the same province of South Khorasan without either the families or the lawyers of those executed being notified. He was, therefore, complicit in a grave violation of the right to due process, contributing to a high number of death sentences.10.10.201173.FARHADI AliGender: maleFunction: Head of the Government Penal Organization; former Deputy Head of Inspectorate of Legal Affairs and Public Inspection of the Ministry of Justice of Tehran;.former prosecutor of KarajIn 2024, Ali Farhadi was appointed by the Iranian Minister of Justice as head of the Government Penal Organization, which is an organization lacking impartiality and disrespecting citizens’ rights. Former Deputy Head of Inspectorate of Legal Affairs and Public Inspection of the Ministry of Justice of Tehran. Former prosecutor of Karaj. Responsible for grave violations of human rights, including prosecuting trials in which the death penalty was handed down. There were a high number of executions in Karaj region during his time as prosecutor.23.3.201279.RASHIDI AGHDAM Ali AshrafGender: maleFunction: Deputy Director of Health, Correction and Education for Tehran Prisons; former head of Evin Prison; former head of Diesel Abad Prison in KermanshahDeputy Director of Health, Correction and Education for Tehran Prisons since 2015. Former head of Evin Prison (2012-2015) and Diesel Abad Prison in Kermanshah. During his tenure, conditions in the prisons deteriorated and reports referenced intensified ill-treatment of prisoners. In October 2012, nine female prisoners went on hunger strike in Evin Prison in protest at the violation of their rights and their violent treatment by prison guards.12.3.2013107.VAHIDI Ahmadوحیدى احمدPOB: Shiraz (Iran)DOB: 27.7.1958Nationality: IranianGender: maleFunction: Member of Expediency Council; former Minister of InteriorAhmad Vahidi was appointed member of the Expediency Council for a 5-year term on 22 September 2022. He was the Iranian Minister of Interior from 25 August 2021 until 2024. As such, he was responsible for Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF).During his time in office, an unprecedented number of military and security officials were appointed to provincial governorships who continue to play key roles in coordinating crowd-control activities by police special forces, the Basij militia and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).Blatant and severe human rights violations by the LEF, such as indiscriminate shooting with live ammunition at peaceful protesters, including children, have been widely documented since protests surrounding the death of Mahsa Amini started in mid-September 2022. Over 70 protesters have died and hundreds have been seriously injured, including children. Since the beginning of the demonstrations, police forces have also arbitrarily detained numerous human rights defenders and journalists. Vahidi has also publicly advocated for a harsh approach towards persons participating in the demonstrations.He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.14.11.2022125.MOHAMMADIAN Abbas-Aliمحمدیان عباس-علیNationality: IranianGender: maleFunction: Police commander of Greater Tehran; former head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Alborz (Karaj) provinceAbbas-Ali Mohammadian has been the police commander of Greater Tehran since January 2023. He is the former head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Alborz (Karaj) province, a position he held from 2017 to 2023.Alborz (Karaj) is a province where major demonstrations have been taking place since September 2022 that have been met with excessive police violence. Security forces have frequently shot directly at peaceful protestors, leading to many deaths, including of children.As police commander of Greater Tehran, he is responsible for implementing policies violating women’s rights.As former head of the LEF in Alborz (Karaj) province and current police commander of Greater Tehran, Abbas-Ali Mohammadian is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.14.11.2022140.MIRAHMADI Seyyed Majidمجید سید میراحمدىPOB: IranNationality: IranianGender: maleRank: Brigadier GeneralFunction: Head of Arbaeen Central Headquarters; former Deputy Minister of Interior of IranBrigadier General Seyyed Majid Mirahmadi is head of Arbaeen Central Headquarters – a position traditionally held by members of the security forces. He was Iran’s Deputy Minister of Interior until 2024, responsible for overseeing Iran’s security and police forces, actors that are involved in serious human rights violations in Iran.Iran’s security and police forces are violently clamping down on protests, shooting directly at peaceful protesters and arbitrarily arresting people with total disregard for their human rights.In his statements, Mirahmadi refers to the protests as riots that have to end, and criminalises and threatens those participating in peaceful protests. He is also personally whitewashing the serious human rights violations committed by forces under his authority, for example, by claiming that 16-year-old protester Nika Shakrami committed suicide. Reports indicate that it is very likely that she died at the hands of security forces.He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.12.12.2022145.KARIMI Mohsenمحصن کریمیNationality: IranianGender: maleRank: Brigadier-GeneralFunction: Senior Advisor to the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces; former Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Markazi provinceSince May 2024, Brigadier-General Mohsen Karimi is the Senior Advisor to the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces. He is the former commander of the IRGC in Markazi province, also known as the Ruhollah Corps. The Ruhollah Corps is a military unit of the IRGC with its headquarters located in Arak and is responsible for commanding and controlling all units of the IRGC and Basij located in Markazi province.He is responsible for the security forces’ violent repression of protests in 2022, which led to the death of 19-year-old Mehrshad Shahidi in an IRGC detention centre in Arak.He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.12.12.2022177.MOSTAFAVI Seyed Mojtabaسید مجتبی مصطفوى(a.k.a. MORTAZAVI, Mojtaba; MOSTAF, Mojtaba)DOB: 2.4.1987POB: Tehran, IranNationality: IranianGender: maleNational ID: No 0080467741 (Iran)Function: Member of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS); co-founder and CEO of Ravin AcademySeyed Mojtaba Mostafavi is a member of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and co-founder and CEO of EU-listed Ravin Academy, an entity that trains individuals in cyber security and hacking, and recruits from among these trainees for the MOIS.The MOIS is widely involved in infiltrating internal opposition groups, monitoring domestic threats and expatriate dissents and arresting alleged spies and dissidents.Seyed Mojtaba Mostafavi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.20.2.2023185.NESARI Habibollah JanPOB: IranNationality: IranianGender: maleRank: Brigadier GeneralFunction: Commander of Imam Hassan Mujtaba Police Officer Training University; former deputy in charge of training and education for the Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF)Brigadier General Habibollah Jan Nesari has been the commander of Imam Hassan Mujtaba Police Officer Training University since the end of 2023. He is the former deputy in charge of training and education for the EU-listed Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF), a position he held from 2019 to 2023).Between 2016 and 30 December 2019, he served as a deputy commander of the Special Units of the LEF.In his capacity as deputy commander, he was responsible for supervising the forces in using lethal and non-lethal weapons during the nationwide protests in November 2019, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of protestors. He was found guilty of crimes against humanity by the International People’s Tribunal on Iran’s Atrocities for his role in the crackdown on protesters in his capacity as deputy commander. As part of the security forces, the police forces are found to have designed and implemented a plan to commit crimes against humanity as well as murder, imprisonment, enforced disappearances, torture and sexual violence in order to quell the protests and conceal the crimes committed during the November 2019 protests.As deputy commander in charge of training and education for the LEF and as commander of Imam Hassan Mujtaba Police Officer Training University, Nesari has been personally responsible for the human rights violations carried out by the LEF. The LEF, which he has trained, took part in the violent crackdown on protestors during the protests that erupted in September 2022, including by the deadly use of force against Iranian protesters.He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.20.2.2023202.SHARIF Ramezanشریف رمظانPOB: IranNationality: IranianGender: maleFunction: Head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Sacred Defense Documentation and Research Center; former IRGC spokesmanRamezan Sharif has been the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Sacred Defense Documentation and Research Center since July 2024. He is a former spokesman of the IRGC.The IRGC has been heavily involved in the active and violent suppression of the protests in Iran in 2022 and 2023 and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations.In his role, Sharif is covering up and condoning serious human rights violations committed by the IRGC.Therefore, Ramezan Sharif is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.20.2.2023203.JOMEIRI FathollahPOB: IranNationality: IranianGender: maleRank: Brigadier GeneralFunction: Head of Intelligence Protection Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)/Security Unit of the IRGCBrigadier General Fathollah Jomeiri is the head of the Intelligence Protection Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), also called the Security Unit of the IRGC.This unit is responsible for protecting vital infrastructure and key areas of the country, important individuals, such as regime VIPs, but above all protecting the regime.The IRGC has been heavily involved in the active and violent suppression of the protests in Iran in 2022 and 2023 and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations.In his role, Jomeiri is steering, facilitating and condoning serious human rights violations committed by the IRGC.Therefore, Fathollah Jomeiri is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.20.2.2023224.NIKVARZ Mohsenمحسن نیک ورزPOB: IranGender: maleNationality: IranianFunction: Head of the Judicial Protection and Information Department of the Prosecutor’s Office in Kerman Province; former Public Prosecutor of SirjanMohsen Nikvarz has been the head of the Judicial Protection and Information Department of the Prosecutor’s Office in Kerman Province since January 2024.As the Public Prosecutor of Sirjan, Mohsen Nikvarz was responsible for several arbitrary arrests of lawyers and for securing death sentences in Sirjan during the 2019 protests. In 2023, he was promoted to Head of the Center for Protection and Intelligence of the Judiciary of Kerman province.In the context of the protests that erupted in September 2022, Nikvarz was involved in the Maryam Arvin case, prosecuting her for her activities as a defence lawyer for protesters. Following her arrest, for which Nikvarz carries personal responsibility, Maryam Arvin was brutally tortured in prison.Mohsen Nikvarz is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.22.5.2023’ Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing ‘23. PIR-ABASSI Abbas Gender: maleFunction: Judge at the Shahid Muftah Judicial Complex; former magistrate of a criminal chamber; former judge, Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 26 Judge at the Shahid Muftah Judicial Complex. Former magistrate of a criminal chamber. Former judge, Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 26. He was in charge of post-election cases. He issued long prison sentences during unfair trials against human rights activists and issued several death sentences for protesters. 12.4.2011 29. BOZORGNIA Mostafa Gender: maleFunction: Head of ward 350 of Evin Prison Head of ward 350 of Evin Prison, known for being the place of imprisonment of the regime’s political prisoners and for its particularly poor detention conditions. He unleashed on a number of occasions disproportionate violence upon prisoners. 12.4.2011 33. ABBASZADEH-MESHKINI Mahmoud Gender: male Member of Parliament from February 2020 to 2024 and Speaker of the Parliament’s Committee for National Security and Foreign Affairs who continues to support the Iranian regime, including by justifying the abuses committed by the regime against the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement.Advisor to Iran’s High Council for Human Rights until 2019. Former secretary of the High Council for Human Rights. Former Governor of Ilam Province. Former Political Director of the Interior Ministry. As Head of the Article 10 Committee of the Law on Activities of Political Parties and Groups, he was in charge of authorising demonstrations and other public events and registering political parties.In 2010, he suspended the activities of two reformist political parties linked to Mir-Hossein Mousavi – the Islamic Iran Participation Front and the Islamic Revolution Mujahedeen Organisation. From 2009 onwards, he has consistently and continuously prohibited all non-governmental gatherings, and has therefore denied the constitutional right to protest and caused many arrests of peaceful demonstrators in contravention of the right to freedom of assembly.In 2009, he also denied the opposition a permit for a ceremony to mourn people killed in protests over the presidential elections. 10.10.2011 40. HABIBI Mohammad Reza Gender: maleFunction: Chief Justice of Isfahan; former Attorney General of Isfahan; former Deputy Prosecutor of Isfahan; former Head of the Ministry of Justice office in Yazd Chief Justice of Isfahan, former Attorney General of Isfahan, former Deputy Prosecutor of Isfahan and former Head of the Ministry of Justice office in Yazd. In his various roles in the judiciaries of Isfahan and Yazd, including in his current role as Chief Justice of Isfahan, he has directly participated in and is responsible for the violation of citizens’ rights, in particular the right to freedom of speech, the right to protest, the right to life, and the violation of the prohibition on torture. Mohammad Reza Habibi also played a direct role in the suppression and gross violation of the right to protest during the nationwide protests in January 2017 and November 2019. Therefore, in his role as Chief Justice of Isfahan, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 10.10.2011 46. KAMALIAN Behrouz(a.k.a. Hackers Brain, Behrooz_Ice) POB: Tehran (Iran)DOB: 1983Gender: maleFunction: Head of the “Ashiyaneh” cyber group Head of the “Ashiyaneh” cyber group linked with the Iranian regime. “Ashiyaneh” Digital Security, founded by Behrouz Kamalian, is responsible for intensive cyber-attacks on both domestic opponents and reformists and foreign institutions. Kamalian’s “Ashiyaneh” organisation’s work has assisted the regime’s crackdown against the opposition, which has involved numerous serious human rights violations. 10.10.2011 48. MAHSOULI Sadeq(a.k.a. MAHSULI Sadeq) POB: Oroumieh (Iran)DOB: 1959/1960Gender: maleFunction: Secretary-General (and former Deputy Secretary-General) of the Paydari Front (Front of Islamic Stability) Secretary-General of the Paydari Front (Front of Islamic Stability) since 2021 and Deputy Secretary-General of the Paydari Front before 2021. The Paydari Front has long been active in state capture practices, infiltrating institutions and indoctrinating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In the wake of the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement, launched in September 2022, the Paydari Front, under the leadership of Mahsouli, played a critical role in pushing through the draconian hijab and chastity laws.Mahsouli is a former advisor to former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He is also a former member of the Expediency Council and former Deputy Chief of the Perseverance Front. He was Minister of Welfare and Social Security between 2009 and 2011 and Minister of the Interior until August 2009. As Minister of the Interior, Mahsouli had authority over all police forces, interior ministry security agents, and plain-clothes agents. The forces under his direction were responsible for attacks on the dormitories of Tehran University on 14 June 2009 and the torture of students in the basement of the Ministry (the notorious basement level 4). Other protestors were severely abused at the Kahrizak Detention Centre, which was operated by police under Mahsouli’s control. 10.10.2011 54. TAMADDON Morteza(a.k.a. TAMADON Morteza) POB: Shahr Kord-Isfahan (Iran)DOB: 1959Gender: maleFunction: Board member at Khajeh Nasireddin Tusi University of Technology; former Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council; former IRGC Governor-General of Tehran Province Politician closely associated with former Iranian President Ahmadinejad. Board member at Khajeh Nasireddin Tusi University of Technology. Former Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council. Former IRGC Governor-General of Tehran Province. In his capacity as Governor and Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council, he bore overall responsibility for all repressive activities undertaken by the IRGC in Tehran Province, including cracking down on political protests since June 2009. 10.10.2011 57. HAJMOHAM-MADI Aziz(a.k.a. Aziz Hajmohammadi, Noorollah Azizmohammadi) POB: Tehran (Iran)DOB: 1948Gender: maleFunction: Attorney in Tehran since 2020; former judge at branch 71 of the Tehran Provincial Criminal Court Attorney in Tehran since 2020. Former judge at branch 71 of the Tehran Provincial Criminal Court. Working for the judiciary since 1971, he has been involved in several trials of demonstrators, including that of Abdol-Reza Ghanbari, a teacher arrested in January 2010 and sentenced to death for his political activities. He has a track record of human rights violations, including the issuing of inhumane sentences, death sentences and prison sentences for political prisoners. 10.10.2011 58. BAGHERI Mohammad-Bagher DOB: 1941Gender: maleFunction: Deputy Head of the Judiciary for International Affairs and Secretary of the Human Rights Staff In 2019, Mohammad-Bagher Bagheri was appointed Deputy Head of the Judiciary for International Affairs and Secretary of the Human Rights Staff, replacing Mohammad Javad Larijani in this position by a decree of Ebrahim Raisi. He was judge at the Supreme court between December 2015 and 2019. Former vice-chairman of the judiciary administration of South Khorasan province, in charge of crime prevention. In addition to his acknowledging, in June 2011, 140 executions for capital offences between March 2010 and March 2011, approximately 100 other executions are reported to have taken place in the same period and in the same province of South Khorasan without either the families or the lawyers of those executed being notified. He was, therefore, complicit in a grave violation of the right to due process, contributing to a high number of death sentences. 10.10.2011 73. FARHADI Ali Gender: maleFunction: Head of the Government Penal Organization; former Deputy Head of Inspectorate of Legal Affairs and Public Inspection of the Ministry of Justice of Tehran;.former prosecutor of Karaj In 2024, Ali Farhadi was appointed by the Iranian Minister of Justice as head of the Government Penal Organization, which is an organization lacking impartiality and disrespecting citizens’ rights. Former Deputy Head of Inspectorate of Legal Affairs and Public Inspection of the Ministry of Justice of Tehran. Former prosecutor of Karaj. Responsible for grave violations of human rights, including prosecuting trials in which the death penalty was handed down. There were a high number of executions in Karaj region during his time as prosecutor. 23.3.2012 79. RASHIDI AGHDAM Ali Ashraf Gender: maleFunction: Deputy Director of Health, Correction and Education for Tehran Prisons; former head of Evin Prison; former head of Diesel Abad Prison in Kermanshah Deputy Director of Health, Correction and Education for Tehran Prisons since 2015. Former head of Evin Prison (2012-2015) and Diesel Abad Prison in Kermanshah. During his tenure, conditions in the prisons deteriorated and reports referenced intensified ill-treatment of prisoners. In October 2012, nine female prisoners went on hunger strike in Evin Prison in protest at the violation of their rights and their violent treatment by prison guards. 12.3.2013 107. VAHIDI Ahmadوحیدى احمد POB: Shiraz (Iran)DOB: 27.7.1958Nationality: IranianGender: maleFunction: Member of Expediency Council; former Minister of Interior Ahmad Vahidi was appointed member of the Expediency Council for a 5-year term on 22 September 2022. He was the Iranian Minister of Interior from 25 August 2021 until 2024. As such, he was responsible for Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF).During his time in office, an unprecedented number of military and security officials were appointed to provincial governorships who continue to play key roles in coordinating crowd-control activities by police special forces, the Basij militia and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).Blatant and severe human rights violations by the LEF, such as indiscriminate shooting with live ammunition at peaceful protesters, including children, have been widely documented since protests surrounding the death of Mahsa Amini started in mid-September 2022. Over 70 protesters have died and hundreds have been seriously injured, including children. Since the beginning of the demonstrations, police forces have also arbitrarily detained numerous human rights defenders and journalists. Vahidi has also publicly advocated for a harsh approach towards persons participating in the demonstrations.He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 14.11.2022 125. MOHAMMADIAN Abbas-Aliمحمدیان عباس-علی Nationality: IranianGender: maleFunction: Police commander of Greater Tehran; former head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Alborz (Karaj) province Abbas-Ali Mohammadian has been the police commander of Greater Tehran since January 2023. He is the former head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Alborz (Karaj) province, a position he held from 2017 to 2023.Alborz (Karaj) is a province where major demonstrations have been taking place since September 2022 that have been met with excessive police violence. Security forces have frequently shot directly at peaceful protestors, leading to many deaths, including of children.As police commander of Greater Tehran, he is responsible for implementing policies violating women’s rights.As former head of the LEF in Alborz (Karaj) province and current police commander of Greater Tehran, Abbas-Ali Mohammadian is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 14.11.2022 140. MIRAHMADI Seyyed Majidمجید سید میراحمدى POB: IranNationality: IranianGender: maleRank: Brigadier GeneralFunction: Head of Arbaeen Central Headquarters; former Deputy Minister of Interior of Iran Brigadier General Seyyed Majid Mirahmadi is head of Arbaeen Central Headquarters – a position traditionally held by members of the security forces. He was Iran’s Deputy Minister of Interior until 2024, responsible for overseeing Iran’s security and police forces, actors that are involved in serious human rights violations in Iran.Iran’s security and police forces are violently clamping down on protests, shooting directly at peaceful protesters and arbitrarily arresting people with total disregard for their human rights.In his statements, Mirahmadi refers to the protests as riots that have to end, and criminalises and threatens those participating in peaceful protests. He is also personally whitewashing the serious human rights violations committed by forces under his authority, for example, by claiming that 16-year-old protester Nika Shakrami committed suicide. Reports indicate that it is very likely that she died at the hands of security forces.He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 12.12.2022 145. KARIMI Mohsenمحصن کریمی Nationality: IranianGender: maleRank: Brigadier-GeneralFunction: Senior Advisor to the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces; former Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Markazi province Since May 2024, Brigadier-General Mohsen Karimi is the Senior Advisor to the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces. He is the former commander of the IRGC in Markazi province, also known as the Ruhollah Corps. The Ruhollah Corps is a military unit of the IRGC with its headquarters located in Arak and is responsible for commanding and controlling all units of the IRGC and Basij located in Markazi province.He is responsible for the security forces’ violent repression of protests in 2022, which led to the death of 19-year-old Mehrshad Shahidi in an IRGC detention centre in Arak.He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 12.12.2022 177. MOSTAFAVI Seyed Mojtabaسید مجتبی مصطفوى(a.k.a. MORTAZAVI, Mojtaba; MOSTAF, Mojtaba) DOB: 2.4.1987POB: Tehran, IranNationality: IranianGender: maleNational ID: No 0080467741 (Iran)Function: Member of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS); co-founder and CEO of Ravin Academy Seyed Mojtaba Mostafavi is a member of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and co-founder and CEO of EU-listed Ravin Academy, an entity that trains individuals in cyber security and hacking, and recruits from among these trainees for the MOIS.The MOIS is widely involved in infiltrating internal opposition groups, monitoring domestic threats and expatriate dissents and arresting alleged spies and dissidents.Seyed Mojtaba Mostafavi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 20.2.2023 185. NESARI Habibollah Jan POB: IranNationality: IranianGender: maleRank: Brigadier GeneralFunction: Commander of Imam Hassan Mujtaba Police Officer Training University; former deputy in charge of training and education for the Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) Brigadier General Habibollah Jan Nesari has been the commander of Imam Hassan Mujtaba Police Officer Training University since the end of 2023. He is the former deputy in charge of training and education for the EU-listed Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF), a position he held from 2019 to 2023).Between 2016 and 30 December 2019, he served as a deputy commander of the Special Units of the LEF.In his capacity as deputy commander, he was responsible for supervising the forces in using lethal and non-lethal weapons during the nationwide protests in November 2019, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of protestors. He was found guilty of crimes against humanity by the International People’s Tribunal on Iran’s Atrocities for his role in the crackdown on protesters in his capacity as deputy commander. As part of the security forces, the police forces are found to have designed and implemented a plan to commit crimes against humanity as well as murder, imprisonment, enforced disappearances, torture and sexual violence in order to quell the protests and conceal the crimes committed during the November 2019 protests.As deputy commander in charge of training and education for the LEF and as commander of Imam Hassan Mujtaba Police Officer Training University, Nesari has been personally responsible for the human rights violations carried out by the LEF. The LEF, which he has trained, took part in the violent crackdown on protestors during the protests that erupted in September 2022, including by the deadly use of force against Iranian protesters.He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 20.2.2023 202. SHARIF Ramezanشریف رمظان POB: IranNationality: IranianGender: maleFunction: Head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Sacred Defense Documentation and Research Center; former IRGC spokesman Ramezan Sharif has been the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Sacred Defense Documentation and Research Center since July 2024. He is a former spokesman of the IRGC.The IRGC has been heavily involved in the active and violent suppression of the protests in Iran in 2022 and 2023 and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations.In his role, Sharif is covering up and condoning serious human rights violations committed by the IRGC.Therefore, Ramezan Sharif is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 20.2.2023 203. JOMEIRI Fathollah POB: IranNationality: IranianGender: maleRank: Brigadier GeneralFunction: Head of Intelligence Protection Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)/Security Unit of the IRGC Brigadier General Fathollah Jomeiri is the head of the Intelligence Protection Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), also called the Security Unit of the IRGC.This unit is responsible for protecting vital infrastructure and key areas of the country, important individuals, such as regime VIPs, but above all protecting the regime.The IRGC has been heavily involved in the active and violent suppression of the protests in Iran in 2022 and 2023 and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations.In his role, Jomeiri is steering, facilitating and condoning serious human rights violations committed by the IRGC.Therefore, Fathollah Jomeiri is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 20.2.2023 224. NIKVARZ Mohsenمحسن نیک ورز POB: IranGender: maleNationality: IranianFunction: Head of the Judicial Protection and Information Department of the Prosecutor’s Office in Kerman Province; former Public Prosecutor of Sirjan Mohsen Nikvarz has been the head of the Judicial Protection and Information Department of the Prosecutor’s Office in Kerman Province since January 2024.As the Public Prosecutor of Sirjan, Mohsen Nikvarz was responsible for several arbitrary arrests of lawyers and for securing death sentences in Sirjan during the 2019 protests. In 2023, he was promoted to Head of the Center for Protection and Intelligence of the Judiciary of Kerman province.In the context of the protests that erupted in September 2022, Nikvarz was involved in the Maryam Arvin case, prosecuting her for her activities as a defence lawyer for protesters. Following her arrest, for which Nikvarz carries personal responsibility, Maryam Arvin was brutally tortured in prison.Mohsen Nikvarz is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 22.5.2023’
Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing
‘23. PIR-ABASSI Abbas Gender: maleFunction: Judge at the Shahid Muftah Judicial Complex; former magistrate of a criminal chamber; former judge, Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 26 Judge at the Shahid Muftah Judicial Complex. Former magistrate of a criminal chamber. Former judge, Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 26. He was in charge of post-election cases. He issued long prison sentences during unfair trials against human rights activists and issued several death sentences for protesters. 12.4.2011
29. BOZORGNIA Mostafa Gender: maleFunction: Head of ward 350 of Evin Prison Head of ward 350 of Evin Prison, known for being the place of imprisonment of the regime’s political prisoners and for its particularly poor detention conditions. He unleashed on a number of occasions disproportionate violence upon prisoners. 12.4.2011
33. ABBASZADEH-MESHKINI Mahmoud Gender: male Member of Parliament from February 2020 to 2024 and Speaker of the Parliament’s Committee for National Security and Foreign Affairs who continues to support the Iranian regime, including by justifying the abuses committed by the regime against the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement.Advisor to Iran’s High Council for Human Rights until 2019. Former secretary of the High Council for Human Rights. Former Governor of Ilam Province. Former Political Director of the Interior Ministry. As Head of the Article 10 Committee of the Law on Activities of Political Parties and Groups, he was in charge of authorising demonstrations and other public events and registering political parties.In 2010, he suspended the activities of two reformist political parties linked to Mir-Hossein Mousavi – the Islamic Iran Participation Front and the Islamic Revolution Mujahedeen Organisation. From 2009 onwards, he has consistently and continuously prohibited all non-governmental gatherings, and has therefore denied the constitutional right to protest and caused many arrests of peaceful demonstrators in contravention of the right to freedom of assembly.In 2009, he also denied the opposition a permit for a ceremony to mourn people killed in protests over the presidential elections. 10.10.2011
40. HABIBI Mohammad Reza Gender: maleFunction: Chief Justice of Isfahan; former Attorney General of Isfahan; former Deputy Prosecutor of Isfahan; former Head of the Ministry of Justice office in Yazd Chief Justice of Isfahan, former Attorney General of Isfahan, former Deputy Prosecutor of Isfahan and former Head of the Ministry of Justice office in Yazd. In his various roles in the judiciaries of Isfahan and Yazd, including in his current role as Chief Justice of Isfahan, he has directly participated in and is responsible for the violation of citizens’ rights, in particular the right to freedom of speech, the right to protest, the right to life, and the violation of the prohibition on torture. Mohammad Reza Habibi also played a direct role in the suppression and gross violation of the right to protest during the nationwide protests in January 2017 and November 2019. Therefore, in his role as Chief Justice of Isfahan, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 10.10.2011
46. KAMALIAN Behrouz(a.k.a. Hackers Brain, Behrooz_Ice) POB: Tehran (Iran)DOB: 1983Gender: maleFunction: Head of the “Ashiyaneh” cyber group Head of the “Ashiyaneh” cyber group linked with the Iranian regime. “Ashiyaneh” Digital Security, founded by Behrouz Kamalian, is responsible for intensive cyber-attacks on both domestic opponents and reformists and foreign institutions. Kamalian’s “Ashiyaneh” organisation’s work has assisted the regime’s crackdown against the opposition, which has involved numerous serious human rights violations. 10.10.2011
48. MAHSOULI Sadeq(a.k.a. MAHSULI Sadeq) POB: Oroumieh (Iran)DOB: 1959/1960Gender: maleFunction: Secretary-General (and former Deputy Secretary-General) of the Paydari Front (Front of Islamic Stability) Secretary-General of the Paydari Front (Front of Islamic Stability) since 2021 and Deputy Secretary-General of the Paydari Front before 2021. The Paydari Front has long been active in state capture practices, infiltrating institutions and indoctrinating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In the wake of the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement, launched in September 2022, the Paydari Front, under the leadership of Mahsouli, played a critical role in pushing through the draconian hijab and chastity laws.Mahsouli is a former advisor to former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He is also a former member of the Expediency Council and former Deputy Chief of the Perseverance Front. He was Minister of Welfare and Social Security between 2009 and 2011 and Minister of the Interior until August 2009. As Minister of the Interior, Mahsouli had authority over all police forces, interior ministry security agents, and plain-clothes agents. The forces under his direction were responsible for attacks on the dormitories of Tehran University on 14 June 2009 and the torture of students in the basement of the Ministry (the notorious basement level 4). Other protestors were severely abused at the Kahrizak Detention Centre, which was operated by police under Mahsouli’s control. 10.10.2011
54. TAMADDON Morteza(a.k.a. TAMADON Morteza) POB: Shahr Kord-Isfahan (Iran)DOB: 1959Gender: maleFunction: Board member at Khajeh Nasireddin Tusi University of Technology; former Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council; former IRGC Governor-General of Tehran Province Politician closely associated with former Iranian President Ahmadinejad. Board member at Khajeh Nasireddin Tusi University of Technology. Former Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council. Former IRGC Governor-General of Tehran Province. In his capacity as Governor and Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council, he bore overall responsibility for all repressive activities undertaken by the IRGC in Tehran Province, including cracking down on political protests since June 2009. 10.10.2011
57. HAJMOHAM-MADI Aziz(a.k.a. Aziz Hajmohammadi, Noorollah Azizmohammadi) POB: Tehran (Iran)DOB: 1948Gender: maleFunction: Attorney in Tehran since 2020; former judge at branch 71 of the Tehran Provincial Criminal Court Attorney in Tehran since 2020. Former judge at branch 71 of the Tehran Provincial Criminal Court. Working for the judiciary since 1971, he has been involved in several trials of demonstrators, including that of Abdol-Reza Ghanbari, a teacher arrested in January 2010 and sentenced to death for his political activities. He has a track record of human rights violations, including the issuing of inhumane sentences, death sentences and prison sentences for political prisoners. 10.10.2011
58. BAGHERI Mohammad-Bagher DOB: 1941Gender: maleFunction: Deputy Head of the Judiciary for International Affairs and Secretary of the Human Rights Staff In 2019, Mohammad-Bagher Bagheri was appointed Deputy Head of the Judiciary for International Affairs and Secretary of the Human Rights Staff, replacing Mohammad Javad Larijani in this position by a decree of Ebrahim Raisi. He was judge at the Supreme court between December 2015 and 2019. Former vice-chairman of the judiciary administration of South Khorasan province, in charge of crime prevention. In addition to his acknowledging, in June 2011, 140 executions for capital offences between March 2010 and March 2011, approximately 100 other executions are reported to have taken place in the same period and in the same province of South Khorasan without either the families or the lawyers of those executed being notified. He was, therefore, complicit in a grave violation of the right to due process, contributing to a high number of death sentences. 10.10.2011
73. FARHADI Ali Gender: maleFunction: Head of the Government Penal Organization; former Deputy Head of Inspectorate of Legal Affairs and Public Inspection of the Ministry of Justice of Tehran;.former prosecutor of Karaj In 2024, Ali Farhadi was appointed by the Iranian Minister of Justice as head of the Government Penal Organization, which is an organization lacking impartiality and disrespecting citizens’ rights. Former Deputy Head of Inspectorate of Legal Affairs and Public Inspection of the Ministry of Justice of Tehran. Former prosecutor of Karaj. Responsible for grave violations of human rights, including prosecuting trials in which the death penalty was handed down. There were a high number of executions in Karaj region during his time as prosecutor. 23.3.2012
79. RASHIDI AGHDAM Ali Ashraf Gender: maleFunction: Deputy Director of Health, Correction and Education for Tehran Prisons; former head of Evin Prison; former head of Diesel Abad Prison in Kermanshah Deputy Director of Health, Correction and Education for Tehran Prisons since 2015. Former head of Evin Prison (2012-2015) and Diesel Abad Prison in Kermanshah. During his tenure, conditions in the prisons deteriorated and reports referenced intensified ill-treatment of prisoners. In October 2012, nine female prisoners went on hunger strike in Evin Prison in protest at the violation of their rights and their violent treatment by prison guards. 12.3.2013
107. VAHIDI Ahmadوحیدى احمد POB: Shiraz (Iran)DOB: 27.7.1958Nationality: IranianGender: maleFunction: Member of Expediency Council; former Minister of Interior Ahmad Vahidi was appointed member of the Expediency Council for a 5-year term on 22 September 2022. He was the Iranian Minister of Interior from 25 August 2021 until 2024. As such, he was responsible for Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF).During his time in office, an unprecedented number of military and security officials were appointed to provincial governorships who continue to play key roles in coordinating crowd-control activities by police special forces, the Basij militia and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).Blatant and severe human rights violations by the LEF, such as indiscriminate shooting with live ammunition at peaceful protesters, including children, have been widely documented since protests surrounding the death of Mahsa Amini started in mid-September 2022. Over 70 protesters have died and hundreds have been seriously injured, including children. Since the beginning of the demonstrations, police forces have also arbitrarily detained numerous human rights defenders and journalists. Vahidi has also publicly advocated for a harsh approach towards persons participating in the demonstrations.He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 14.11.2022
125. MOHAMMADIAN Abbas-Aliمحمدیان عباس-علی Nationality: IranianGender: maleFunction: Police commander of Greater Tehran; former head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Alborz (Karaj) province Abbas-Ali Mohammadian has been the police commander of Greater Tehran since January 2023. He is the former head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Alborz (Karaj) province, a position he held from 2017 to 2023.Alborz (Karaj) is a province where major demonstrations have been taking place since September 2022 that have been met with excessive police violence. Security forces have frequently shot directly at peaceful protestors, leading to many deaths, including of children.As police commander of Greater Tehran, he is responsible for implementing policies violating women’s rights.As former head of the LEF in Alborz (Karaj) province and current police commander of Greater Tehran, Abbas-Ali Mohammadian is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 14.11.2022
140. MIRAHMADI Seyyed Majidمجید سید میراحمدى POB: IranNationality: IranianGender: maleRank: Brigadier GeneralFunction: Head of Arbaeen Central Headquarters; former Deputy Minister of Interior of Iran Brigadier General Seyyed Majid Mirahmadi is head of Arbaeen Central Headquarters – a position traditionally held by members of the security forces. He was Iran’s Deputy Minister of Interior until 2024, responsible for overseeing Iran’s security and police forces, actors that are involved in serious human rights violations in Iran.Iran’s security and police forces are violently clamping down on protests, shooting directly at peaceful protesters and arbitrarily arresting people with total disregard for their human rights.In his statements, Mirahmadi refers to the protests as riots that have to end, and criminalises and threatens those participating in peaceful protests. He is also personally whitewashing the serious human rights violations committed by forces under his authority, for example, by claiming that 16-year-old protester Nika Shakrami committed suicide. Reports indicate that it is very likely that she died at the hands of security forces.He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 12.12.2022
145. KARIMI Mohsenمحصن کریمی Nationality: IranianGender: maleRank: Brigadier-GeneralFunction: Senior Advisor to the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces; former Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Markazi province Since May 2024, Brigadier-General Mohsen Karimi is the Senior Advisor to the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces. He is the former commander of the IRGC in Markazi province, also known as the Ruhollah Corps. The Ruhollah Corps is a military unit of the IRGC with its headquarters located in Arak and is responsible for commanding and controlling all units of the IRGC and Basij located in Markazi province.He is responsible for the security forces’ violent repression of protests in 2022, which led to the death of 19-year-old Mehrshad Shahidi in an IRGC detention centre in Arak.He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 12.12.2022
177. MOSTAFAVI Seyed Mojtabaسید مجتبی مصطفوى(a.k.a. MORTAZAVI, Mojtaba; MOSTAF, Mojtaba) DOB: 2.4.1987POB: Tehran, IranNationality: IranianGender: maleNational ID: No 0080467741 (Iran)Function: Member of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS); co-founder and CEO of Ravin Academy Seyed Mojtaba Mostafavi is a member of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and co-founder and CEO of EU-listed Ravin Academy, an entity that trains individuals in cyber security and hacking, and recruits from among these trainees for the MOIS.The MOIS is widely involved in infiltrating internal opposition groups, monitoring domestic threats and expatriate dissents and arresting alleged spies and dissidents.Seyed Mojtaba Mostafavi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 20.2.2023
185. NESARI Habibollah Jan POB: IranNationality: IranianGender: maleRank: Brigadier GeneralFunction: Commander of Imam Hassan Mujtaba Police Officer Training University; former deputy in charge of training and education for the Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) Brigadier General Habibollah Jan Nesari has been the commander of Imam Hassan Mujtaba Police Officer Training University since the end of 2023. He is the former deputy in charge of training and education for the EU-listed Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF), a position he held from 2019 to 2023).Between 2016 and 30 December 2019, he served as a deputy commander of the Special Units of the LEF.In his capacity as deputy commander, he was responsible for supervising the forces in using lethal and non-lethal weapons during the nationwide protests in November 2019, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of protestors. He was found guilty of crimes against humanity by the International People’s Tribunal on Iran’s Atrocities for his role in the crackdown on protesters in his capacity as deputy commander. As part of the security forces, the police forces are found to have designed and implemented a plan to commit crimes against humanity as well as murder, imprisonment, enforced disappearances, torture and sexual violence in order to quell the protests and conceal the crimes committed during the November 2019 protests.As deputy commander in charge of training and education for the LEF and as commander of Imam Hassan Mujtaba Police Officer Training University, Nesari has been personally responsible for the human rights violations carried out by the LEF. The LEF, which he has trained, took part in the violent crackdown on protestors during the protests that erupted in September 2022, including by the deadly use of force against Iranian protesters.He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 20.2.2023
202. SHARIF Ramezanشریف رمظان POB: IranNationality: IranianGender: maleFunction: Head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Sacred Defense Documentation and Research Center; former IRGC spokesman Ramezan Sharif has been the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Sacred Defense Documentation and Research Center since July 2024. He is a former spokesman of the IRGC.The IRGC has been heavily involved in the active and violent suppression of the protests in Iran in 2022 and 2023 and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations.In his role, Sharif is covering up and condoning serious human rights violations committed by the IRGC.Therefore, Ramezan Sharif is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 20.2.2023
203. JOMEIRI Fathollah POB: IranNationality: IranianGender: maleRank: Brigadier GeneralFunction: Head of Intelligence Protection Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)/Security Unit of the IRGC Brigadier General Fathollah Jomeiri is the head of the Intelligence Protection Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), also called the Security Unit of the IRGC.This unit is responsible for protecting vital infrastructure and key areas of the country, important individuals, such as regime VIPs, but above all protecting the regime.The IRGC has been heavily involved in the active and violent suppression of the protests in Iran in 2022 and 2023 and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations.In his role, Jomeiri is steering, facilitating and condoning serious human rights violations committed by the IRGC.Therefore, Fathollah Jomeiri is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 20.2.2023
224. NIKVARZ Mohsenمحسن نیک ورز POB: IranGender: maleNationality: IranianFunction: Head of the Judicial Protection and Information Department of the Prosecutor’s Office in Kerman Province; former Public Prosecutor of Sirjan Mohsen Nikvarz has been the head of the Judicial Protection and Information Department of the Prosecutor’s Office in Kerman Province since January 2024.As the Public Prosecutor of Sirjan, Mohsen Nikvarz was responsible for several arbitrary arrests of lawyers and for securing death sentences in Sirjan during the 2019 protests. In 2023, he was promoted to Head of the Center for Protection and Intelligence of the Judiciary of Kerman province.In the context of the protests that erupted in September 2022, Nikvarz was involved in the Maryam Arvin case, prosecuting her for her activities as a defence lawyer for protesters. Following her arrest, for which Nikvarz carries personal responsibility, Maryam Arvin was brutally tortured in prison.Mohsen Nikvarz is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 22.5.2023’
Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing
‘23. PIR-ABASSI Abbas Gender: maleFunction: Judge at the Shahid Muftah Judicial Complex; former magistrate of a criminal chamber; former judge, Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 26 Judge at the Shahid Muftah Judicial Complex. Former magistrate of a criminal chamber. Former judge, Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 26. He was in charge of post-election cases. He issued long prison sentences during unfair trials against human rights activists and issued several death sentences for protesters. 12.4.2011
29. BOZORGNIA Mostafa Gender: maleFunction: Head of ward 350 of Evin Prison Head of ward 350 of Evin Prison, known for being the place of imprisonment of the regime’s political prisoners and for its particularly poor detention conditions. He unleashed on a number of occasions disproportionate violence upon prisoners. 12.4.2011
33. ABBASZADEH-MESHKINI Mahmoud Gender: male Member of Parliament from February 2020 to 2024 and Speaker of the Parliament’s Committee for National Security and Foreign Affairs who continues to support the Iranian regime, including by justifying the abuses committed by the regime against the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement.Advisor to Iran’s High Council for Human Rights until 2019. Former secretary of the High Council for Human Rights. Former Governor of Ilam Province. Former Political Director of the Interior Ministry. As Head of the Article 10 Committee of the Law on Activities of Political Parties and Groups, he was in charge of authorising demonstrations and other public events and registering political parties.In 2010, he suspended the activities of two reformist political parties linked to Mir-Hossein Mousavi – the Islamic Iran Participation Front and the Islamic Revolution Mujahedeen Organisation. From 2009 onwards, he has consistently and continuously prohibited all non-governmental gatherings, and has therefore denied the constitutional right to protest and caused many arrests of peaceful demonstrators in contravention of the right to freedom of assembly.In 2009, he also denied the opposition a permit for a ceremony to mourn people killed in protests over the presidential elections. 10.10.2011
40. HABIBI Mohammad Reza Gender: maleFunction: Chief Justice of Isfahan; former Attorney General of Isfahan; former Deputy Prosecutor of Isfahan; former Head of the Ministry of Justice office in Yazd Chief Justice of Isfahan, former Attorney General of Isfahan, former Deputy Prosecutor of Isfahan and former Head of the Ministry of Justice office in Yazd. In his various roles in the judiciaries of Isfahan and Yazd, including in his current role as Chief Justice of Isfahan, he has directly participated in and is responsible for the violation of citizens’ rights, in particular the right to freedom of speech, the right to protest, the right to life, and the violation of the prohibition on torture. Mohammad Reza Habibi also played a direct role in the suppression and gross violation of the right to protest during the nationwide protests in January 2017 and November 2019. Therefore, in his role as Chief Justice of Isfahan, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 10.10.2011
46. KAMALIAN Behrouz(a.k.a. Hackers Brain, Behrooz_Ice) POB: Tehran (Iran)DOB: 1983Gender: maleFunction: Head of the “Ashiyaneh” cyber group Head of the “Ashiyaneh” cyber group linked with the Iranian regime. “Ashiyaneh” Digital Security, founded by Behrouz Kamalian, is responsible for intensive cyber-attacks on both domestic opponents and reformists and foreign institutions. Kamalian’s “Ashiyaneh” organisation’s work has assisted the regime’s crackdown against the opposition, which has involved numerous serious human rights violations. 10.10.2011
48. MAHSOULI Sadeq(a.k.a. MAHSULI Sadeq) POB: Oroumieh (Iran)DOB: 1959/1960Gender: maleFunction: Secretary-General (and former Deputy Secretary-General) of the Paydari Front (Front of Islamic Stability) Secretary-General of the Paydari Front (Front of Islamic Stability) since 2021 and Deputy Secretary-General of the Paydari Front before 2021. The Paydari Front has long been active in state capture practices, infiltrating institutions and indoctrinating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In the wake of the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement, launched in September 2022, the Paydari Front, under the leadership of Mahsouli, played a critical role in pushing through the draconian hijab and chastity laws.Mahsouli is a former advisor to former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He is also a former member of the Expediency Council and former Deputy Chief of the Perseverance Front. He was Minister of Welfare and Social Security between 2009 and 2011 and Minister of the Interior until August 2009. As Minister of the Interior, Mahsouli had authority over all police forces, interior ministry security agents, and plain-clothes agents. The forces under his direction were responsible for attacks on the dormitories of Tehran University on 14 June 2009 and the torture of students in the basement of the Ministry (the notorious basement level 4). Other protestors were severely abused at the Kahrizak Detention Centre, which was operated by police under Mahsouli’s control. 10.10.2011
54. TAMADDON Morteza(a.k.a. TAMADON Morteza) POB: Shahr Kord-Isfahan (Iran)DOB: 1959Gender: maleFunction: Board member at Khajeh Nasireddin Tusi University of Technology; former Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council; former IRGC Governor-General of Tehran Province Politician closely associated with former Iranian President Ahmadinejad. Board member at Khajeh Nasireddin Tusi University of Technology. Former Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council. Former IRGC Governor-General of Tehran Province. In his capacity as Governor and Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council, he bore overall responsibility for all repressive activities undertaken by the IRGC in Tehran Province, including cracking down on political protests since June 2009. 10.10.2011
57. HAJMOHAM-MADI Aziz(a.k.a. Aziz Hajmohammadi, Noorollah Azizmohammadi) POB: Tehran (Iran)DOB: 1948Gender: maleFunction: Attorney in Tehran since 2020; former judge at branch 71 of the Tehran Provincial Criminal Court Attorney in Tehran since 2020. Former judge at branch 71 of the Tehran Provincial Criminal Court. Working for the judiciary since 1971, he has been involved in several trials of demonstrators, including that of Abdol-Reza Ghanbari, a teacher arrested in January 2010 and sentenced to death for his political activities. He has a track record of human rights violations, including the issuing of inhumane sentences, death sentences and prison sentences for political prisoners. 10.10.2011
58. BAGHERI Mohammad-Bagher DOB: 1941Gender: maleFunction: Deputy Head of the Judiciary for International Affairs and Secretary of the Human Rights Staff In 2019, Mohammad-Bagher Bagheri was appointed Deputy Head of the Judiciary for International Affairs and Secretary of the Human Rights Staff, replacing Mohammad Javad Larijani in this position by a decree of Ebrahim Raisi. He was judge at the Supreme court between December 2015 and 2019. Former vice-chairman of the judiciary administration of South Khorasan province, in charge of crime prevention. In addition to his acknowledging, in June 2011, 140 executions for capital offences between March 2010 and March 2011, approximately 100 other executions are reported to have taken place in the same period and in the same province of South Khorasan without either the families or the lawyers of those executed being notified. He was, therefore, complicit in a grave violation of the right to due process, contributing to a high number of death sentences. 10.10.2011
73. FARHADI Ali Gender: maleFunction: Head of the Government Penal Organization; former Deputy Head of Inspectorate of Legal Affairs and Public Inspection of the Ministry of Justice of Tehran;.former prosecutor of Karaj In 2024, Ali Farhadi was appointed by the Iranian Minister of Justice as head of the Government Penal Organization, which is an organization lacking impartiality and disrespecting citizens’ rights. Former Deputy Head of Inspectorate of Legal Affairs and Public Inspection of the Ministry of Justice of Tehran. Former prosecutor of Karaj. Responsible for grave violations of human rights, including prosecuting trials in which the death penalty was handed down. There were a high number of executions in Karaj region during his time as prosecutor. 23.3.2012
79. RASHIDI AGHDAM Ali Ashraf Gender: maleFunction: Deputy Director of Health, Correction and Education for Tehran Prisons; former head of Evin Prison; former head of Diesel Abad Prison in Kermanshah Deputy Director of Health, Correction and Education for Tehran Prisons since 2015. Former head of Evin Prison (2012-2015) and Diesel Abad Prison in Kermanshah. During his tenure, conditions in the prisons deteriorated and reports referenced intensified ill-treatment of prisoners. In October 2012, nine female prisoners went on hunger strike in Evin Prison in protest at the violation of their rights and their violent treatment by prison guards. 12.3.2013
107. VAHIDI Ahmadوحیدى احمد POB: Shiraz (Iran)DOB: 27.7.1958Nationality: IranianGender: maleFunction: Member of Expediency Council; former Minister of Interior Ahmad Vahidi was appointed member of the Expediency Council for a 5-year term on 22 September 2022. He was the Iranian Minister of Interior from 25 August 2021 until 2024. As such, he was responsible for Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF).During his time in office, an unprecedented number of military and security officials were appointed to provincial governorships who continue to play key roles in coordinating crowd-control activities by police special forces, the Basij militia and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).Blatant and severe human rights violations by the LEF, such as indiscriminate shooting with live ammunition at peaceful protesters, including children, have been widely documented since protests surrounding the death of Mahsa Amini started in mid-September 2022. Over 70 protesters have died and hundreds have been seriously injured, including children. Since the beginning of the demonstrations, police forces have also arbitrarily detained numerous human rights defenders and journalists. Vahidi has also publicly advocated for a harsh approach towards persons participating in the demonstrations.He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 14.11.2022
125. MOHAMMADIAN Abbas-Aliمحمدیان عباس-علی Nationality: IranianGender: maleFunction: Police commander of Greater Tehran; former head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Alborz (Karaj) province Abbas-Ali Mohammadian has been the police commander of Greater Tehran since January 2023. He is the former head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Alborz (Karaj) province, a position he held from 2017 to 2023.Alborz (Karaj) is a province where major demonstrations have been taking place since September 2022 that have been met with excessive police violence. Security forces have frequently shot directly at peaceful protestors, leading to many deaths, including of children.As police commander of Greater Tehran, he is responsible for implementing policies violating women’s rights.As former head of the LEF in Alborz (Karaj) province and current police commander of Greater Tehran, Abbas-Ali Mohammadian is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 14.11.2022
140. MIRAHMADI Seyyed Majidمجید سید میراحمدى POB: IranNationality: IranianGender: maleRank: Brigadier GeneralFunction: Head of Arbaeen Central Headquarters; former Deputy Minister of Interior of Iran Brigadier General Seyyed Majid Mirahmadi is head of Arbaeen Central Headquarters – a position traditionally held by members of the security forces. He was Iran’s Deputy Minister of Interior until 2024, responsible for overseeing Iran’s security and police forces, actors that are involved in serious human rights violations in Iran.Iran’s security and police forces are violently clamping down on protests, shooting directly at peaceful protesters and arbitrarily arresting people with total disregard for their human rights.In his statements, Mirahmadi refers to the protests as riots that have to end, and criminalises and threatens those participating in peaceful protests. He is also personally whitewashing the serious human rights violations committed by forces under his authority, for example, by claiming that 16-year-old protester Nika Shakrami committed suicide. Reports indicate that it is very likely that she died at the hands of security forces.He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 12.12.2022
145. KARIMI Mohsenمحصن کریمی Nationality: IranianGender: maleRank: Brigadier-GeneralFunction: Senior Advisor to the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces; former Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Markazi province Since May 2024, Brigadier-General Mohsen Karimi is the Senior Advisor to the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces. He is the former commander of the IRGC in Markazi province, also known as the Ruhollah Corps. The Ruhollah Corps is a military unit of the IRGC with its headquarters located in Arak and is responsible for commanding and controlling all units of the IRGC and Basij located in Markazi province.He is responsible for the security forces’ violent repression of protests in 2022, which led to the death of 19-year-old Mehrshad Shahidi in an IRGC detention centre in Arak.He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 12.12.2022
177. MOSTAFAVI Seyed Mojtabaسید مجتبی مصطفوى(a.k.a. MORTAZAVI, Mojtaba; MOSTAF, Mojtaba) DOB: 2.4.1987POB: Tehran, IranNationality: IranianGender: maleNational ID: No 0080467741 (Iran)Function: Member of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS); co-founder and CEO of Ravin Academy Seyed Mojtaba Mostafavi is a member of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and co-founder and CEO of EU-listed Ravin Academy, an entity that trains individuals in cyber security and hacking, and recruits from among these trainees for the MOIS.The MOIS is widely involved in infiltrating internal opposition groups, monitoring domestic threats and expatriate dissents and arresting alleged spies and dissidents.Seyed Mojtaba Mostafavi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 20.2.2023
185. NESARI Habibollah Jan POB: IranNationality: IranianGender: maleRank: Brigadier GeneralFunction: Commander of Imam Hassan Mujtaba Police Officer Training University; former deputy in charge of training and education for the Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) Brigadier General Habibollah Jan Nesari has been the commander of Imam Hassan Mujtaba Police Officer Training University since the end of 2023. He is the former deputy in charge of training and education for the EU-listed Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF), a position he held from 2019 to 2023).Between 2016 and 30 December 2019, he served as a deputy commander of the Special Units of the LEF.In his capacity as deputy commander, he was responsible for supervising the forces in using lethal and non-lethal weapons during the nationwide protests in November 2019, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of protestors. He was found guilty of crimes against humanity by the International People’s Tribunal on Iran’s Atrocities for his role in the crackdown on protesters in his capacity as deputy commander. As part of the security forces, the police forces are found to have designed and implemented a plan to commit crimes against humanity as well as murder, imprisonment, enforced disappearances, torture and sexual violence in order to quell the protests and conceal the crimes committed during the November 2019 protests.As deputy commander in charge of training and education for the LEF and as commander of Imam Hassan Mujtaba Police Officer Training University, Nesari has been personally responsible for the human rights violations carried out by the LEF. The LEF, which he has trained, took part in the violent crackdown on protestors during the protests that erupted in September 2022, including by the deadly use of force against Iranian protesters.He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 20.2.2023
202. SHARIF Ramezanشریف رمظان POB: IranNationality: IranianGender: maleFunction: Head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Sacred Defense Documentation and Research Center; former IRGC spokesman Ramezan Sharif has been the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Sacred Defense Documentation and Research Center since July 2024. He is a former spokesman of the IRGC.The IRGC has been heavily involved in the active and violent suppression of the protests in Iran in 2022 and 2023 and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations.In his role, Sharif is covering up and condoning serious human rights violations committed by the IRGC.Therefore, Ramezan Sharif is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 20.2.2023
203. JOMEIRI Fathollah POB: IranNationality: IranianGender: maleRank: Brigadier GeneralFunction: Head of Intelligence Protection Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)/Security Unit of the IRGC Brigadier General Fathollah Jomeiri is the head of the Intelligence Protection Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), also called the Security Unit of the IRGC.This unit is responsible for protecting vital infrastructure and key areas of the country, important individuals, such as regime VIPs, but above all protecting the regime.The IRGC has been heavily involved in the active and violent suppression of the protests in Iran in 2022 and 2023 and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations.In his role, Jomeiri is steering, facilitating and condoning serious human rights violations committed by the IRGC.Therefore, Fathollah Jomeiri is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 20.2.2023
224. NIKVARZ Mohsenمحسن نیک ورز POB: IranGender: maleNationality: IranianFunction: Head of the Judicial Protection and Information Department of the Prosecutor’s Office in Kerman Province; former Public Prosecutor of Sirjan Mohsen Nikvarz has been the head of the Judicial Protection and Information Department of the Prosecutor’s Office in Kerman Province since January 2024.As the Public Prosecutor of Sirjan, Mohsen Nikvarz was responsible for several arbitrary arrests of lawyers and for securing death sentences in Sirjan during the 2019 protests. In 2023, he was promoted to Head of the Center for Protection and Intelligence of the Judiciary of Kerman province.In the context of the protests that erupted in September 2022, Nikvarz was involved in the Maryam Arvin case, prosecuting her for her activities as a defence lawyer for protesters. Following her arrest, for which Nikvarz carries personal responsibility, Maryam Arvin was brutally tortured in prison.Mohsen Nikvarz is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran. 22.5.2023’
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 12 April 2011, the Council adopted Decision 2011/235/CFSP (1).
(2) On the basis of a review of Decision 2011/235/CFSP, the Council considers that the restrictive measures set out therein should be renewed until 13 April 2026.
(3) The Council has concluded that the entries concerning two persons designated in the Annex to Decision 2011/235/CFSP should be removed, and that the entries concerning 20 persons should be updated.
(4) Decision 2011/235/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Decision 2011/235/CFSP is amended as follows:

(1) in Article 6, paragraph 2, the date ‘13 April 2025’ is replaced by that of ‘13 April 2026’;
(2) the Annex is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.

This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

The Annex to Decision 2011/235/CFSP (‘List of persons and entities referred to in Articles 1 and 2’) is amended as follows:

(1) in the list headed ‘Persons’, entries 68 (concerning RAMIN Mohammad-Ali) and 169 (concerning NILFRUSHAN Abbas Mortaza) are deleted;

(2) in the list headed ‘Persons’, the entries for the following 20 persons are replaced by the following:
Persons

Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing
‘23. PIR-ABASSI Abbas
Gender: male
Function: Judge at the Shahid Muftah Judicial Complex; former magistrate of a criminal chamber; former judge, Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 26
Judge at the Shahid Muftah Judicial Complex. Former magistrate of a criminal chamber. Former judge, Tehran Revolutionary Court, branch 26. He was in charge of post-election cases. He issued long prison sentences during unfair trials against human rights activists and issued several death sentences for protesters.
12.4.2011 29. BOZORGNIA Mostafa
Gender: male
Function: Head of ward 350 of Evin Prison
Head of ward 350 of Evin Prison, known for being the place of imprisonment of the regime’s political prisoners and for its particularly poor detention conditions. He unleashed on a number of occasions disproportionate violence upon prisoners.
12.4.2011 33. ABBASZADEH-MESHKINI Mahmoud
Gender: male
Member of Parliament from February 2020 to 2024 and Speaker of the Parliament’s Committee for National Security and Foreign Affairs who continues to support the Iranian regime, including by justifying the abuses committed by the regime against the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement.
Advisor to Iran’s High Council for Human Rights until 2019. Former secretary of the High Council for Human Rights. Former Governor of Ilam Province. Former Political Director of the Interior Ministry. As Head of the Article 10 Committee of the Law on Activities of Political Parties and Groups, he was in charge of authorising demonstrations and other public events and registering political parties.
In 2010, he suspended the activities of two reformist political parties linked to Mir-Hossein Mousavi – the Islamic Iran Participation Front and the Islamic Revolution Mujahedeen Organisation. From 2009 onwards, he has consistently and continuously prohibited all non-governmental gatherings, and has therefore denied the constitutional right to protest and caused many arrests of peaceful demonstrators in contravention of the right to freedom of assembly.
In 2009, he also denied the opposition a permit for a ceremony to mourn people killed in protests over the presidential elections.
10.10.2011 40. HABIBI Mohammad Reza
Gender: male
Function: Chief Justice of Isfahan; former Attorney General of Isfahan; former Deputy Prosecutor of Isfahan; former Head of the Ministry of Justice office in Yazd
Chief Justice of Isfahan, former Attorney General of Isfahan, former Deputy Prosecutor of Isfahan and former Head of the Ministry of Justice office in Yazd. In his various roles in the judiciaries of Isfahan and Yazd, including in his current role as Chief Justice of Isfahan, he has directly participated in and is responsible for the violation of citizens’ rights, in particular the right to freedom of speech, the right to protest, the right to life, and the violation of the prohibition on torture. Mohammad Reza Habibi also played a direct role in the suppression and gross violation of the right to protest during the nationwide protests in January 2017 and November 2019. Therefore, in his role as Chief Justice of Isfahan, he is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
10.10.2011 46. KAMALIAN Behrouz
(a.k.a. Hackers Brain, Behrooz_Ice)
POB: Tehran (Iran)
DOB: 1983
Gender: male
Function: Head of the “Ashiyaneh” cyber group
Head of the “Ashiyaneh” cyber group linked with the Iranian regime. “Ashiyaneh” Digital Security, founded by Behrouz Kamalian, is responsible for intensive cyber-attacks on both domestic opponents and reformists and foreign institutions. Kamalian’s “Ashiyaneh” organisation’s work has assisted the regime’s crackdown against the opposition, which has involved numerous serious human rights violations.
10.10.2011 48. MAHSOULI Sadeq
(a.k.a. MAHSULI Sadeq)
POB: Oroumieh (Iran)
DOB: 1959/1960
Gender: male
Function: Secretary-General (and former Deputy Secretary-General) of the Paydari Front (Front of Islamic Stability)
Secretary-General of the Paydari Front (Front of Islamic Stability) since 2021 and Deputy Secretary-General of the Paydari Front before 2021. The Paydari Front has long been active in state capture practices, infiltrating institutions and indoctrinating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In the wake of the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement, launched in September 2022, the Paydari Front, under the leadership of Mahsouli, played a critical role in pushing through the draconian hijab and chastity laws.
Mahsouli is a former advisor to former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He is also a former member of the Expediency Council and former Deputy Chief of the Perseverance Front. He was Minister of Welfare and Social Security between 2009 and 2011 and Minister of the Interior until August 2009. As Minister of the Interior, Mahsouli had authority over all police forces, interior ministry security agents, and plain-clothes agents. The forces under his direction were responsible for attacks on the dormitories of Tehran University on 14 June 2009 and the torture of students in the basement of the Ministry (the notorious basement level 4). Other protestors were severely abused at the Kahrizak Detention Centre, which was operated by police under Mahsouli’s control.
10.10.2011 54. TAMADDON Morteza
(a.k.a. TAMADON Morteza)
POB: Shahr Kord-Isfahan (Iran)
DOB: 1959
Gender: male
Function: Board member at Khajeh Nasireddin Tusi University of Technology; former Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council; former IRGC Governor-General of Tehran Province
Politician closely associated with former Iranian President Ahmadinejad. Board member at Khajeh Nasireddin Tusi University of Technology. Former Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council. Former IRGC Governor-General of Tehran Province. In his capacity as Governor and Head of Tehran provincial Public Security Council, he bore overall responsibility for all repressive activities undertaken by the IRGC in Tehran Province, including cracking down on political protests since June 2009. 10.10.2011 57. HAJMOHAM-MADI Aziz
(a.k.a. Aziz Hajmohammadi, Noorollah Azizmohammadi)
POB: Tehran (Iran)
DOB: 1948
Gender: male
Function: Attorney in Tehran since 2020; former judge at branch 71 of the Tehran Provincial Criminal Court
Attorney in Tehran since 2020. Former judge at branch 71 of the Tehran Provincial Criminal Court. Working for the judiciary since 1971, he has been involved in several trials of demonstrators, including that of Abdol-Reza Ghanbari, a teacher arrested in January 2010 and sentenced to death for his political activities. He has a track record of human rights violations, including the issuing of inhumane sentences, death sentences and prison sentences for political prisoners.
10.10.2011 58. BAGHERI Mohammad-Bagher
DOB: 1941
Gender: male
Function: Deputy Head of the Judiciary for International Affairs and Secretary of the Human Rights Staff
In 2019, Mohammad-Bagher Bagheri was appointed Deputy Head of the Judiciary for International Affairs and Secretary of the Human Rights Staff, replacing Mohammad Javad Larijani in this position by a decree of Ebrahim Raisi. He was judge at the Supreme court between December 2015 and 2019. Former vice-chairman of the judiciary administration of South Khorasan province, in charge of crime prevention. In addition to his acknowledging, in June 2011, 140 executions for capital offences between March 2010 and March 2011, approximately 100 other executions are reported to have taken place in the same period and in the same province of South Khorasan without either the families or the lawyers of those executed being notified. He was, therefore, complicit in a grave violation of the right to due process, contributing to a high number of death sentences.
10.10.2011 73. FARHADI Ali
Gender: male
Function: Head of the Government Penal Organization; former Deputy Head of Inspectorate of Legal Affairs and Public Inspection of the Ministry of Justice of Tehran;.former prosecutor of Karaj
In 2024, Ali Farhadi was appointed by the Iranian Minister of Justice as head of the Government Penal Organization, which is an organization lacking impartiality and disrespecting citizens’ rights. Former Deputy Head of Inspectorate of Legal Affairs and Public Inspection of the Ministry of Justice of Tehran. Former prosecutor of Karaj. Responsible for grave violations of human rights, including prosecuting trials in which the death penalty was handed down. There were a high number of executions in Karaj region during his time as prosecutor.
23.3.2012 79. RASHIDI AGHDAM Ali Ashraf
Gender: male
Function: Deputy Director of Health, Correction and Education for Tehran Prisons; former head of Evin Prison; former head of Diesel Abad Prison in Kermanshah
Deputy Director of Health, Correction and Education for Tehran Prisons since 2015. Former head of Evin Prison (2012-2015) and Diesel Abad Prison in Kermanshah. During his tenure, conditions in the prisons deteriorated and reports referenced intensified ill-treatment of prisoners. In October 2012, nine female prisoners went on hunger strike in Evin Prison in protest at the violation of their rights and their violent treatment by prison guards.
12.3.2013 107. VAHIDI Ahmad
وحیدى احمد
POB: Shiraz (Iran)
DOB: 27.7.1958
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Function: Member of Expediency Council; former Minister of Interior
Ahmad Vahidi was appointed member of the Expediency Council for a 5-year term on 22 September 2022. He was the Iranian Minister of Interior from 25 August 2021 until 2024. As such, he was responsible for Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF).
During his time in office, an unprecedented number of military and security officials were appointed to provincial governorships who continue to play key roles in coordinating crowd-control activities by police special forces, the Basij militia and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Blatant and severe human rights violations by the LEF, such as indiscriminate shooting with live ammunition at peaceful protesters, including children, have been widely documented since protests surrounding the death of Mahsa Amini started in mid-September 2022. Over 70 protesters have died and hundreds have been seriously injured, including children. Since the beginning of the demonstrations, police forces have also arbitrarily detained numerous human rights defenders and journalists. Vahidi has also publicly advocated for a harsh approach towards persons participating in the demonstrations.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
14.11.2022 125. MOHAMMADIAN Abbas-Ali
محمدیان عباس-علی
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Function: Police commander of Greater Tehran; former head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Alborz (Karaj) province
Abbas-Ali Mohammadian has been the police commander of Greater Tehran since January 2023. He is the former head of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) in Alborz (Karaj) province, a position he held from 2017 to 2023. Alborz (Karaj) is a province where major demonstrations have been taking place since September 2022 that have been met with excessive police violence. Security forces have frequently shot directly at peaceful protestors, leading to many deaths, including of children.
As police commander of Greater Tehran, he is responsible for implementing policies violating women’s rights.
As former head of the LEF in Alborz (Karaj) province and current police commander of Greater Tehran, Abbas-Ali Mohammadian is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
14.11.2022 140. MIRAHMADI Seyyed Majid
مجید سید میراحمدى
POB: Iran
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier General
Function: Head of Arbaeen Central Headquarters; former Deputy Minister of Interior of Iran
Brigadier General Seyyed Majid Mirahmadi is head of Arbaeen Central Headquarters – a position traditionally held by members of the security forces. He was Iran’s Deputy Minister of Interior until 2024, responsible for overseeing Iran’s security and police forces, actors that are involved in serious human rights violations in Iran.
Iran’s security and police forces are violently clamping down on protests, shooting directly at peaceful protesters and arbitrarily arresting people with total disregard for their human rights.
In his statements, Mirahmadi refers to the protests as riots that have to end, and criminalises and threatens those participating in peaceful protests. He is also personally whitewashing the serious human rights violations committed by forces under his authority, for example, by claiming that 16-year-old protester Nika Shakrami committed suicide. Reports indicate that it is very likely that she died at the hands of security forces.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
12.12.2022 145. KARIMI Mohsen
محصن کریمی
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier-General
Function: Senior Advisor to the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces; former Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Markazi province
Since May 2024, Brigadier-General Mohsen Karimi is the Senior Advisor to the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces. He is the former commander of the IRGC in Markazi province, also known as the Ruhollah Corps. The Ruhollah Corps is a military unit of the IRGC with its headquarters located in Arak and is responsible for commanding and controlling all units of the IRGC and Basij located in Markazi province.
He is responsible for the security forces’ violent repression of protests in 2022, which led to the death of 19-year-old Mehrshad Shahidi in an IRGC detention centre in Arak.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
12.12.2022 177. MOSTAFAVI Seyed Mojtaba
سید مجتبی مصطفوى
(a.k.a. MORTAZAVI, Mojtaba; MOSTAF, Mojtaba)
DOB: 2.4.1987
POB: Tehran, Iran
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
National ID: No 0080467741 (Iran)
Function: Member of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS); co-founder and CEO of Ravin Academy
Seyed Mojtaba Mostafavi is a member of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and co-founder and CEO of EU-listed Ravin Academy, an entity that trains individuals in cyber security and hacking, and recruits from among these trainees for the MOIS.
The MOIS is widely involved in infiltrating internal opposition groups, monitoring domestic threats and expatriate dissents and arresting alleged spies and dissidents.
Seyed Mojtaba Mostafavi is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
20.2.2023 185. NESARI Habibollah Jan
POB: Iran
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier General
Function: Commander of Imam Hassan Mujtaba Police Officer Training University; former deputy in charge of training and education for the Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF)
Brigadier General Habibollah Jan Nesari has been the commander of Imam Hassan Mujtaba Police Officer Training University since the end of 2023. He is the former deputy in charge of training and education for the EU-listed Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF), a position he held from 2019 to 2023).
Between 2016 and 30 December 2019, he served as a deputy commander of the Special Units of the LEF.
In his capacity as deputy commander, he was responsible for supervising the forces in using lethal and non-lethal weapons during the nationwide protests in November 2019, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of protestors. He was found guilty of crimes against humanity by the International People’s Tribunal on Iran’s Atrocities for his role in the crackdown on protesters in his capacity as deputy commander. As part of the security forces, the police forces are found to have designed and implemented a plan to commit crimes against humanity as well as murder, imprisonment, enforced disappearances, torture and sexual violence in order to quell the protests and conceal the crimes committed during the November 2019 protests.
As deputy commander in charge of training and education for the LEF and as commander of Imam Hassan Mujtaba Police Officer Training University, Nesari has been personally responsible for the human rights violations carried out by the LEF. The LEF, which he has trained, took part in the violent crackdown on protestors during the protests that erupted in September 2022, including by the deadly use of force against Iranian protesters.
He is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
20.2.2023 202. SHARIF Ramezan
شریف رمظان
POB: Iran
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Function: Head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Sacred Defense Documentation and Research Center; former IRGC spokesman
Ramezan Sharif has been the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Sacred Defense Documentation and Research Center since July 2024. He is a former spokesman of the IRGC.
The IRGC has been heavily involved in the active and violent suppression of the protests in Iran in 2022 and 2023 and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations.
In his role, Sharif is covering up and condoning serious human rights violations committed by the IRGC.
Therefore, Ramezan Sharif is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
20.2.2023 203. JOMEIRI Fathollah
POB: Iran
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Rank: Brigadier General
Function: Head of Intelligence Protection Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)/Security Unit of the IRGC
Brigadier General Fathollah Jomeiri is the head of the Intelligence Protection Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), also called the Security Unit of the IRGC.
This unit is responsible for protecting vital infrastructure and key areas of the country, important individuals, such as regime VIPs, but above all protecting the regime.
The IRGC has been heavily involved in the active and violent suppression of the protests in Iran in 2022 and 2023 and is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations.
In his role, Jomeiri is steering, facilitating and condoning serious human rights violations committed by the IRGC.
Therefore, Fathollah Jomeiri is responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
20.2.2023 224. NIKVARZ Mohsen
محسن نیک ورز
POB: Iran
Gender: male
Nationality: Iranian
Function: Head of the Judicial Protection and Information Department of the Prosecutor’s Office in Kerman Province; former Public Prosecutor of Sirjan
Mohsen Nikvarz has been the head of the Judicial Protection and Information Department of the Prosecutor’s Office in Kerman Province since January 2024. As the Public Prosecutor of Sirjan, Mohsen Nikvarz was responsible for several arbitrary arrests of lawyers and for securing death sentences in Sirjan during the 2019 protests. In 2023, he was promoted to Head of the Center for Protection and Intelligence of the Judiciary of Kerman province.
In the context of the protests that erupted in September 2022, Nikvarz was involved in the Maryam Arvin case, prosecuting her for her activities as a defence lawyer for protesters. Following her arrest, for which Nikvarz carries personal responsibility, Maryam Arvin was brutally tortured in prison.
Mohsen Nikvarz is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations in Iran.
22.5.2023’

Political and Security Committee Decision (CFSP) 2025/686 of 1 April 2025 extending the mandate of the Head of Mission of the European Union Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova) (EUPM Moldova/1/2025)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/686 3.4.2025
(1) Pursuant to Article 8(1) of Decision (CFSP) 2023/855, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) is authorised by the Council, in accordance with Article 38, third paragraph, of the Treaty, to take the relevant decisions for the purpose of exercising the political control and strategic direction of the European Union Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova), including the power to appoint a Head of Mission upon a proposal of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security policy (the ‘High Representative’).
(2) On 27 April 2023, the PSC adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/871(2), appointing Mr Cosmin DINESCU as Head of Mission of EUPM Moldova from 25 April 2023 to 24 April 2024.
(3) On 23 April 2024, the PSC adopted Decision (CFSP) 2024/1202(3)extending the mandate of Mr Cosmin DINESCU as Head of Mission of EUPM Moldova from 25 April 2024 to 24 April 2025.
(4) On 20 February 2025, the High Representative proposed to extend the mandate of Mr Cosmin DINESCU as Head of Mission of EUPM Moldova from 25 April 2025 to 24 April 2026,
THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY COMMITTEE,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 38, third paragraph, thereof,
Having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/855 of 24 April 2023 on a European Union Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova) (1), and in particular Article 8(1) thereof,
Whereas:
(1) Pursuant to Article 8(1) of Decision (CFSP) 2023/855, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) is authorised by the Council, in accordance with Article 38, third paragraph, of the Treaty, to take the relevant decisions for the purpose of exercising the political control and strategic direction of the European Union Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova), including the power to appoint a Head of Mission upon a proposal of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security policy (the ‘High Representative’).
(2) On 27 April 2023, the PSC adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/871 (2), appointing Mr Cosmin DINESCU as Head of Mission of EUPM Moldova from 25 April 2023 to 24 April 2024.
(3) On 23 April 2024, the PSC adopted Decision (CFSP) 2024/1202 (3) extending the mandate of Mr Cosmin DINESCU as Head of Mission of EUPM Moldova from 25 April 2024 to 24 April 2025.
(4) On 20 February 2025, the High Representative proposed to extend the mandate of Mr Cosmin DINESCU as Head of Mission of EUPM Moldova from 25 April 2025 to 24 April 2026,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The mandate of Mr Cosmin DINESCU as Head of Mission of the European Union Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova) is hereby extended from 25 April 2025 to 24 April 2026.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Council Decision (EU) 2025/685 of 27 March 2025 on the conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Kingdom of Norway amending the Agreement of the European Union and the Kingdom of Norway pursuant to Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 relating to the modification of concessions on all the tariff-rate quotas included in the EU Schedule CLXXV as a consequence of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/685 4.4.2025
(1) In accordance with Council Decision (EU) 2023/2577(2), the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Kingdom of Norway amending the Agreement of the European Union and the Kingdom of Norway pursuant to Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 relating to the modification of concessions on all the tariff-rate quotas included in the EU Schedule CLXXV as a consequence of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the Union (the ‘Agreement’) was signed on behalf of the Union on 14 November 2024, subject to its conclusion at a later date.
(2) The objective of the Agreement is to amend the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Kingdom of Norway pursuant to Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 relating to the modification of concessions on all the tariff-rate quotas included in the EU Schedule CLXXV as a consequence of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union(3)signed on 17 December 2020 in relation to the volume of three tariff-rate quotas, and to provide for the apportionment of the tariff-rate quotas included in the EU Schedule CLXXV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 as a consequence of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the Union, pursuant to Article XXVIII of GATT 1994.
(3) The Agreement should be approved,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 207(4), first subparagraph, in conjunction with Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a)(v), thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Having regard to the consent of the European Parliament (1),
Whereas:
(1) In accordance with Council Decision (EU) 2023/2577 (2), the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Kingdom of Norway amending the Agreement of the European Union and the Kingdom of Norway pursuant to Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 relating to the modification of concessions on all the tariff-rate quotas included in the EU Schedule CLXXV as a consequence of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the Union (the ‘Agreement’) was signed on behalf of the Union on 14 November 2024, subject to its conclusion at a later date.
(2) The objective of the Agreement is to amend the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Kingdom of Norway pursuant to Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 relating to the modification of concessions on all the tariff-rate quotas included in the EU Schedule CLXXV as a consequence of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (3) signed on 17 December 2020 in relation to the volume of three tariff-rate quotas, and to provide for the apportionment of the tariff-rate quotas included in the EU Schedule CLXXV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 as a consequence of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the Union, pursuant to Article XXVIII of GATT 1994.
(3) The Agreement should be approved,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Kingdom of Norway amending the Agreement of the European Union and the Kingdom of Norway pursuant to Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 relating to the modification of concessions on all the tariff-rate quotas included in the EU Schedule CLXXV as a consequence of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (the ‘Agreement’) is hereby approved on behalf of the Union (4).
The President of the Council shall, on behalf of the Union, give the notification provided for in the Agreement (5).
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.