Council Decision (EU) 2025/800 of 14 April 2025 establishing the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union within the Joint Committee established by the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community as regards the adoption of a decision adding a newly adopted Union act to Annex 2 to the Windsor Framework

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/800 28.4.2025
(1) The Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community(1)(the ‘Withdrawal Agreement’) was concluded by the Union by Council Decision (EU) 2020/135(2)and entered into force on 1 February 2020.
(2) Pursuant to Article 13(4) of the Windsor Framework(3), which forms an integral part of the Withdrawal Agreement, the Joint Committee established under Article 164(1) thereof (the ‘Joint Committee’) is empowered to adopt decisions to amend the relevant Annexes to the Windsor Framework by adding newly adopted Union acts that fall within the scope of the Windsor Framework, but which neither amend nor replace Union acts listed in the Annexes to the Windsor Framework.
(3) Articles 103 to 107 and Article 109 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council(4)are applicable pursuant to Article 13(3) of the Windsor Framework. The remainder of the provisions of that Regulation, provided that they contain conditions and technical specifications for the placing on the market of products, or relate to the provision of services that may affect the free movement of products, are provisions of a newly adopted Union act falling within the scope of the Windsor Framework which should be added to Annex 2 to the Windsor Framework. This does not apply to Articles 102, 108 and 110 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689.
(4) The Joint Committee, at its next meeting, should adopt a decision pursuant to Article 13(4) of the Windsor Framework adding this newly adopted Union act, as regards provisions which contain conditions and technical specifications for the placing on the market of products or relate to the provision of services that may affect the free movement of products, and with the exception of Articles 102, 108 and 110 thereof, to Annex 2 to the Windsor Framework.
(5) It is appropriate to establish the position to be taken on the Union’s behalf within the Joint Committee as regards the adoption of a decision adding the newly adopted Union act to Annex 2 to the Windsor Framework,
(1) Article 13(4) of the Windsor Framework empowers the Joint Committee established under Article 164(1) of the Withdrawal Agreement (the ‘Joint Committee’) to adopt decisions adding newly adopted Union acts falling within the scope of the Windsor Framework to the relevant Annexes to the Windsor Framework.
(2) Pursuant to Article 166(2) of the Withdrawal Agreement, the decisions adopted by the Joint Committee are binding on the Union and the United Kingdom. The Union and the United Kingdom are to implement such decisions, which have the same legal effect as the Withdrawal Agreement.
(3) Articles 103 to 107 and Article 109 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council(3)are applicable pursuant to Article 13(3) of the Windsor Framework. The remainder of the provisions of that Regulation, provided that they contain conditions and technical specifications for the placing on the market of products, or relate to the provision of services that may affect the free movement of products, and with the exception of Articles 102, 108 and 110 thereof, are provisions of a newly adopted Union act falling within the scope of the Windsor Framework which should be added to Annex 2 to the Windsor Framework,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 50(2) thereof,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 218(9) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Whereas:
(1) The Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (1) (the ‘Withdrawal Agreement’) was concluded by the Union by Council Decision (EU) 2020/135 (2) and entered into force on 1 February 2020.
(2) Pursuant to Article 13(4) of the Windsor Framework (3), which forms an integral part of the Withdrawal Agreement, the Joint Committee established under Article 164(1) thereof (the ‘Joint Committee’) is empowered to adopt decisions to amend the relevant Annexes to the Windsor Framework by adding newly adopted Union acts that fall within the scope of the Windsor Framework, but which neither amend nor replace Union acts listed in the Annexes to the Windsor Framework.
(3) Articles 103 to 107 and Article 109 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) are applicable pursuant to Article 13(3) of the Windsor Framework. The remainder of the provisions of that Regulation, provided that they contain conditions and technical specifications for the placing on the market of products, or relate to the provision of services that may affect the free movement of products, are provisions of a newly adopted Union act falling within the scope of the Windsor Framework which should be added to Annex 2 to the Windsor Framework. This does not apply to Articles 102, 108 and 110 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689.
(4) The Joint Committee, at its next meeting, should adopt a decision pursuant to Article 13(4) of the Windsor Framework adding this newly adopted Union act, as regards provisions which contain conditions and technical specifications for the placing on the market of products or relate to the provision of services that may affect the free movement of products, and with the exception of Articles 102, 108 and 110 thereof, to Annex 2 to the Windsor Framework.
(5) It is appropriate to establish the position to be taken on the Union’s behalf within the Joint Committee as regards the adoption of a decision adding the newly adopted Union act to Annex 2 to the Windsor Framework,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The position to be taken on behalf of the European Union within the Joint Committee established under Article 164(1) of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (the ‘Joint Committee’) is set out in the draft decision of the Joint Committee attached to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act), as regards conditions and technical specifications for the placing on the market of products, and for their putting into service insofar as the free movement of products is concerned, and with the exception of Articles 102, 108 and 110 thereof, shall be added to Annex 2 to the Windsor Framework under point 47 ‘Other’.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day following the date of its adoption.

Council Decision (EU) 2025/799 of 14 April 2025 establishing the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union within the Joint Committee established by the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community as regards the adoption of a decision adding a newly adopted Union act to Annex 2 to the Windsor Framework

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/799 25.4.2025
(1) The Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community(1)(the ‘Withdrawal Agreement’) was concluded by the Union by Council Decision (EU) 2020/135(2)and entered into force on 1 February 2020.
(2) Pursuant to Article 13(4) of the Windsor Framework(3), which forms an integral part of the Withdrawal Agreement, the Joint Committee established under Article 164(1) thereof (the ‘Joint Committee’) is empowered to adopt decisions to amend the relevant Annexes to the Windsor Framework by adding newly adopted Union acts that fall within the scope of the Windsor Framework, but which neither amend nor replace Union acts listed in the Annexes to the Windsor Framework.
(3) Articles 66 and 68 of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council(4)are applicable pursuant to Article 13(3) of the Windsor Framework. The remainder of the provisions of that Regulation are provisions of a newly adopted Union act falling within the scope of the Windsor Framework which should be added to Annex 2 to the Windsor Framework. This does not apply to Articles 5 and 67 of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847.
(4) The Joint Committee, at its next meeting, should adopt a decision pursuant to Article 13(4) of the Windsor Framework adding this newly adopted Union act, with the exception of Articles 5 and 67 thereof, to Annex 2 to the Windsor Framework.
(5) It is appropriate to establish the position to be taken on the Union’s behalf within the Joint Committee as regards the adoption of a decision adding the newly adopted Union act to Annex 2 to the Windsor Framework,
(1) Article 13(4) of the Windsor Framework empowers the Joint Committee established under Article 164(1) of the Withdrawal Agreement (the ‘Joint Committee’) to adopt decisions adding newly adopted Union acts falling within the scope of the Windsor Framework to the relevant Annexes to the Windsor Framework.
(2) Pursuant to Article 166(2) of the Withdrawal Agreement, the decisions adopted by the Joint Committee are binding on the Union and the United Kingdom. The Union and the United Kingdom are to implement such decisions, which have the same legal effect as the Withdrawal Agreement.
(3) Articles 66 and 68 of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013 and (EU) 2019/1020 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 (Cyber Resilience Act)(3)are applicable pursuant to Article 13(3) of the Windsor Framework. The remainder of the provisions of that Regulation, with the exception of Articles 5 and 67 thereof, are provisions of a newly adopted Union act falling within the scope of the Windsor Framework which should be added to Annex 2 to the Windsor Framework,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 50(2) thereof,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 218(9) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Whereas:
(1) The Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (1) (the ‘Withdrawal Agreement’) was concluded by the Union by Council Decision (EU) 2020/135 (2) and entered into force on 1 February 2020.
(2) Pursuant to Article 13(4) of the Windsor Framework (3), which forms an integral part of the Withdrawal Agreement, the Joint Committee established under Article 164(1) thereof (the ‘Joint Committee’) is empowered to adopt decisions to amend the relevant Annexes to the Windsor Framework by adding newly adopted Union acts that fall within the scope of the Windsor Framework, but which neither amend nor replace Union acts listed in the Annexes to the Windsor Framework.
(3) Articles 66 and 68 of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) are applicable pursuant to Article 13(3) of the Windsor Framework. The remainder of the provisions of that Regulation are provisions of a newly adopted Union act falling within the scope of the Windsor Framework which should be added to Annex 2 to the Windsor Framework. This does not apply to Articles 5 and 67 of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847.
(4) The Joint Committee, at its next meeting, should adopt a decision pursuant to Article 13(4) of the Windsor Framework adding this newly adopted Union act, with the exception of Articles 5 and 67 thereof, to Annex 2 to the Windsor Framework.
(5) It is appropriate to establish the position to be taken on the Union’s behalf within the Joint Committee as regards the adoption of a decision adding the newly adopted Union act to Annex 2 to the Windsor Framework,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The position to be taken on behalf of the European Union within the Joint Committee established under Article 164(1) of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (the ‘Joint Committee’) is set out in the draft decision of the Joint Committee attached to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013 and (EU) 2019/1020 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 (Cyber Resilience Act), with the exception of Articles 5 and 67 thereof, shall be added to Annex 2 to the Windsor Framework under point 47 ‘Other’.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day following the date of its adoption.

Council Decision (EU) 2025/798 of 14 April 2025 on the signing, on behalf of the Union, of the Agreement on Digital Trade between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/798 25.4.2025
(1) On 27 June 2023, the Council authorised the Commission to open negotiations with the Republic of Singapore for an agreement on digital trade disciplines. The Commission has negotiated, on behalf of the Union, the Agreement on Digital Trade between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore (the ‘Agreement’).
(2) The Agreement is a modern, self-standing agreement that will complement the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore(1), with ambitious and binding commitments on digital trade. The Agreement will enhance consumer protection online, provide legal certainty for businesses, ensure trusted data flows and address unjustified barriers to digital trade, in line with the Union’s digital trade policy that aims to contribute to the Union’s digital transformation and its economic security.
(3) Therefore, the Agreement should be signed.
(4) The European Data Protection Supervisor was consulted in accordance with Article 42(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council(2)and delivered an opinion on 21 March 2025,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 207(4), first subparagraph, in conjunction with Article 218(5) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Whereas:
(1) On 27 June 2023, the Council authorised the Commission to open negotiations with the Republic of Singapore for an agreement on digital trade disciplines. The Commission has negotiated, on behalf of the Union, the Agreement on Digital Trade between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore (the ‘Agreement’).
(2) The Agreement is a modern, self-standing agreement that will complement the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore (1), with ambitious and binding commitments on digital trade. The Agreement will enhance consumer protection online, provide legal certainty for businesses, ensure trusted data flows and address unjustified barriers to digital trade, in line with the Union’s digital trade policy that aims to contribute to the Union’s digital transformation and its economic security.
(3) Therefore, the Agreement should be signed.
(4) The European Data Protection Supervisor was consulted in accordance with Article 42(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) and delivered an opinion on 21 March 2025,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The signing of the Agreement on Digital Trade between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore (3) is hereby authorised on behalf of the Union, subject to the conclusion of the said Agreement.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/795 of 14 April 2025 amending the Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672 concerning certain emergency measures relating to outbreaks of foot and mouth disease in Hungary and Slovakia (notified under document C(2025) 2427)

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/795 15.4.2025
(1) Foot and mouth disease is an infectious viral disease affecting animals in the mammal order of Artiodactyla and can have a severe impact on the concerned animal population and the profitability of farming causing disturbance to movements of consignments of those animals and products thereof within the Union and exports to third countries.
(2) In the event of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in animals of listed species, there is a serious risk of the spread of that disease to other establishments keeping animals of listed species.
(3) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687(2)supplements the rules for the control of the listed diseases referred to in Article 9(1), points (a), (b) and (c), of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, and defined as category A, B and C diseases in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1882(3). In particular, Articles 21 and 22 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 provide for the establishment of a restricted zone in the event of an outbreak of a category A disease, including foot and mouth disease, and for certain measures to be applied therein. Article 21(1) of that Delegated Regulation provides that the restricted zone is to comprise a protection zone, a surveillance zone, and, if necessary, further restricted zones around or adjacent to the protection and surveillance zones.
(4) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672(4)was adopted on the basis of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, and it lays down certain emergency measures, relating to outbreaks of foot and mouth disease in establishments keeping bovine animals in the County of Győr-Moson-Sopron in Hungary, close to the border with Austria, and in the region of Trnava in Slovakia, close to the border with Hungary. More particularly, Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672 provides for the establishment of protection, surveillance and further restricted zones in Hungary and Slovakia, and a surveillance zone and further restricted zones in Austria, in accordance with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, following those outbreaks, and that those zones must comprise at least the areas listed in the Annex to that Implementing Decision. Due to the severity of the epidemiological situation, it also provides for certain restrictions on movements of animals of susceptible species.
(5) Since the last amendment of Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672, done through the adoption of Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/696(5), Slovakia has informed the Commission of the confirmation of a new outbreak of foot and mouth disease in an establishment keeping bovine animals. This new outbreak is located in the Bratislava region in Slovakia, close to the border with Hungary. In accordance with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, Slovakia and Hungary, in cooperation together, have established new restricted zones, which comprise protection, surveillance zones and a further restricted zone in Slovakia and a surveillance zone and a further restricted zone in Hungary where the disease control measures laid down in that Delegated Regulation are applied in order to prevent the further spread of that disease to other parts of those Member States, or to other Member States.
(6) Therefore, the areas included in those restricted zones should be defined, both spatially and temporally, in the Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672, in order to prevent the further spread of the disease, as well as to prevent any unnecessary disturbance to trade within the Union, and to avoid any unjustified barriers to trade being imposed by third countries. Accordingly, regionalisation needs to be updated at Union level, and the areas identified as protection, surveillance and further restricted zones in Slovakia and Hungary, and as surveillance and further restricted zones in Austria, should be set out in the Annex to this Decision, and the duration of those measures fixed, in collaboration with those Member States.
(7) The Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672 should therefore be amended accordingly.
(8) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
Country ADIS reference number of the outbreak Areas established as protection and surveillance zones referred to in Article 1 Date until applicable
Hungary HU-FMD-2025-00001 Protection zone:Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.745480, Long. 17.694840. 30.4.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.745480, Long. 17.694840, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone. 30.4.2025
Slovakia HU-FMD-2025-00001 Surveillance zone:In district Dunajská Streda: the municipalities of Medveďov, Sap, Baloň, Čiližská Radvaň and Kľúčovec.In district Komárno: the municipalities of Číčov, Trávnik and Klížska Nemá. 30.4.2025
Slovakia SK-FMD-2025-00001 Protection zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8049, Long. 17.6666. 30.4.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8049, Long. 17.6666, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone. 30.4.2025
Hungary SK-FMD-2025-00001 Surveillance zone:Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8049, Long. 17.6666. 30.4.2025
Slovakia SK-FMD-2025-00002 Protection zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8433, Long. 17.6214. 30.4.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8433, Long. 17.6214, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone. 30.4.2025
Hungary SK-FMD-2025-00002 Surveillance zone:Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8433, Long. 17.6214. 30.4.2025
Slovakia SK-FMD-2025-00003 Protection zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9097, Long. 17.5387. 30.4.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9097, Long. 17.5387, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone. 30.4.2025
Hungary SK-FMD-2025-00003 Surveillance zone:Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9097, Long. 17.5387. 30.4.2025
Slovakia SK-FMD-2025-00004 Protection zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9704, Long. 17.4947. 2.5.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9704, Long. 17.4947, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone. 2.5.2025
Hungary SK-FMD-2025-00004 Surveillance zone:Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9704, Long. 17.4947. 2.5.2025
Hungary HU-FMD-2025-00002 Protection zone:Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.90917, Long. 17.19819. 17.5.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.90917, Long. 17.19819, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone. 17.5.2025
Austria HU-FMD-2025-00002 Surveillance zone:In the Federal State Burgenland within the district Neusiedl am See the cadastrial communities of Nickelsdorf, Mönchhof, Halbturn and Deutsch Jahrndorf. 17.5.2025
Slovakia SK-FMD-2025-00005 Protection zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 48.3861, Long. 16.9924. 20.5.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 48.3861, Long. 16.9924, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone. 20.5.2025
Austria SK-FMD-2025-00005 Surveillance zone:Those parts of Austria, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 48.3861, Long. 16.9924. 20.5.2025
Hungary HU-FMD-2025-00003 Protection zone:Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8522, Long. 17.41222. 20.5.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8522, Long. 17.41222, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone. 20.5.2025
Slovakia HU-FMD-2025-00003 Surveillance zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8522, Long. 17.41222. 20.5.2025
Hungary HU-FMD-2025-00004 Protection zone:Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.96161, Long. 17.29801. 20.5.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.96161, Long. 17.29801, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone. 20.5.2025
Slovakia HU-FMD-2025-00004 Surveillance zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.96161, Long. 17.29801. 20.5.2025
Slovakia SK-FMD-2025-00006 Protection zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9395, Long. 17.5353. 25.5.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9395, Long. 17.5353, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone. 25.5.2025
Hungary SK-FMD-2025-00006 Surveillance zone:Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9395, Long. 17.5353. 25.5.2025
Country Areas established as further restricted zone, part of the restricted zone, referred to in Article 1 Date until applicable
Hungary County of Győr-Moson-Sopron, and in the County of Komárom-Esztergom the Districts of Komárom, Tata and Esztergom, excluding the areas contained in any protection or surveillance zone. 25.5.2025
Slovakia Regions of Bratislava, Trnava and Nitra, excluding the areas contained in any protection or surveillance zone. 25.5.2025
Austria In the Federal State Niederösterreich the district Gänserdorf and within the district Bruck an der Leitha the municipalities Au am Leithaberge, Bad Deutsch-Altenburg, Berg, Bruck an der Leitha, Enzersdorf an der Fischa, Göttlesbrunn-Arbesthal, Götzendorf an der Leitha, Hainburg a.d. Donau, Haslau-Maria Ellend, Höflein, Hof am Leithaberge, Hundsheim, Mannersdorf am Leithagebirge, Petronell-Carnuntum, Prellenkirchen, Rohrau, Scharndorf, Sommerein, Trautmannsdorf an der Leitha, Wolfsthal, Ebergassing, Fischamend, Klein-Neusiedl, Schwadorf;in the district Mistelbach the municipalities Altlichtenwarth, Bernhardsthal, Bockfließ, Großengersdorf, Großkrut, Hausbrunn, Herrnbaumgarten, Pillichsdorf, Rabensburg, Schrattenberg, Wilfersdorf;in the district Mistelbach within the municipality Drasenhofen the cadastrial communities Drasenhofen, Steinebrunn;in the district Mistelbach within the municipality Geweinstal the cadastrial communities Gaweinstal, Schrick, Martinsdorf;in the district Mistelbach within the minicipality Großebersdorf the cadastrial Community Eibesbrunn;in the district Mistelbach within the community Mistelbach the cadastrial communitry Kettlasbrunn; in the district Mistelbach within the municipality Poysdorf the cadastrial communities Höbertsgrub, Ketzelsdorf, Passauerhof, Poysbrunn, Walterkrichen;in the district Mistelbach within the municipality Wolkersdorf im Weinviertel the cadastrial communities Obersdorf and Wolkersdorf;in the distrikt Wiener Neustadt (Land) the municipalities Lichtenwörth, Zillingdorf.In the Federal State Burgenland the districts Eisenstadt-Stadt, Rust-Stadt, Eisenstadt-Umgebung, Mattersburg, Neusiedl am See (with the exception of the municipalities Nickelsdorf, Mönchhof, Halbturn and Deutsch Jahrndorf) und Oberpullendorf. 20.5.2025
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on transmissible animal diseases and amending and repealing certain acts in the area of animal health (‘Animal Health Law’) (1), and in particular Article 259(1), point (c), thereof,
Whereas:
(1) Foot and mouth disease is an infectious viral disease affecting animals in the mammal order of Artiodactyla and can have a severe impact on the concerned animal population and the profitability of farming causing disturbance to movements of consignments of those animals and products thereof within the Union and exports to third countries.
(2) In the event of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in animals of listed species, there is a serious risk of the spread of that disease to other establishments keeping animals of listed species.
(3) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 (2) supplements the rules for the control of the listed diseases referred to in Article 9(1), points (a), (b) and (c), of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, and defined as category A, B and C diseases in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1882 (3). In particular, Articles 21 and 22 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 provide for the establishment of a restricted zone in the event of an outbreak of a category A disease, including foot and mouth disease, and for certain measures to be applied therein. Article 21(1) of that Delegated Regulation provides that the restricted zone is to comprise a protection zone, a surveillance zone, and, if necessary, further restricted zones around or adjacent to the protection and surveillance zones.
(4) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672 (4) was adopted on the basis of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, and it lays down certain emergency measures, relating to outbreaks of foot and mouth disease in establishments keeping bovine animals in the County of Győr-Moson-Sopron in Hungary, close to the border with Austria, and in the region of Trnava in Slovakia, close to the border with Hungary. More particularly, Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672 provides for the establishment of protection, surveillance and further restricted zones in Hungary and Slovakia, and a surveillance zone and further restricted zones in Austria, in accordance with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, following those outbreaks, and that those zones must comprise at least the areas listed in the Annex to that Implementing Decision. Due to the severity of the epidemiological situation, it also provides for certain restrictions on movements of animals of susceptible species.
(5) Since the last amendment of Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672, done through the adoption of Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/696 (5), Slovakia has informed the Commission of the confirmation of a new outbreak of foot and mouth disease in an establishment keeping bovine animals. This new outbreak is located in the Bratislava region in Slovakia, close to the border with Hungary. In accordance with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, Slovakia and Hungary, in cooperation together, have established new restricted zones, which comprise protection, surveillance zones and a further restricted zone in Slovakia and a surveillance zone and a further restricted zone in Hungary where the disease control measures laid down in that Delegated Regulation are applied in order to prevent the further spread of that disease to other parts of those Member States, or to other Member States.
(6) Therefore, the areas included in those restricted zones should be defined, both spatially and temporally, in the Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672, in order to prevent the further spread of the disease, as well as to prevent any unnecessary disturbance to trade within the Union, and to avoid any unjustified barriers to trade being imposed by third countries. Accordingly, regionalisation needs to be updated at Union level, and the areas identified as protection, surveillance and further restricted zones in Slovakia and Hungary, and as surveillance and further restricted zones in Austria, should be set out in the Annex to this Decision, and the duration of those measures fixed, in collaboration with those Member States.
(7) The Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672 should therefore be amended accordingly.
(8) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The Annex of Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/672 is replaced by the text set out in the Annex to this Implementing Decision.
This Decision is addressed to Hungary, the Republic of Austria and the Slovak Republic.

Protection and surveillance zones established around the confirmed outbreaks

Country
ADIS reference number of the outbreak
Areas established as protection and surveillance zones referred to in Article 1
Date until applicable
Hungary
HU-FMD-2025-00001
Protection zone:
Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.745480, Long. 17.694840. 30.4.2025
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.745480, Long. 17.694840, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.
30.4.2025
Slovakia
HU-FMD-2025-00001
Surveillance zone:
In district Dunajská Streda: the municipalities of Medveďov, Sap, Baloň, Čiližská Radvaň and Kľúčovec.
In district Komárno: the municipalities of Číčov, Trávnik and Klížska Nemá.
30.4.2025
Slovakia
SK-FMD-2025-00001
Protection zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8049, Long. 17.6666. 30.4.2025
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8049, Long. 17.6666, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.
30.4.2025
Hungary
SK-FMD-2025-00001
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8049, Long. 17.6666. 30.4.2025
Slovakia
SK-FMD-2025-00002
Protection zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8433, Long. 17.6214. 30.4.2025
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8433, Long. 17.6214, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.
30.4.2025
Hungary
SK-FMD-2025-00002
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8433, Long. 17.6214. 30.4.2025
Slovakia
SK-FMD-2025-00003
Protection zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9097, Long. 17.5387. 30.4.2025
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9097, Long. 17.5387, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.
30.4.2025
Hungary
SK-FMD-2025-00003
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9097, Long. 17.5387. 30.4.2025
Slovakia
SK-FMD-2025-00004
Protection zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9704, Long. 17.4947. 2.5.2025
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9704, Long. 17.4947, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.
2.5.2025
Hungary
SK-FMD-2025-00004
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9704, Long. 17.4947. 2.5.2025
Hungary
HU-FMD-2025-00002
Protection zone:
Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.90917, Long. 17.19819. 17.5.2025
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.90917, Long. 17.19819, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.
17.5.2025
Austria
HU-FMD-2025-00002
Surveillance zone:
In the Federal State Burgenland within the district Neusiedl am See the cadastrial communities of Nickelsdorf, Mönchhof, Halbturn and Deutsch Jahrndorf.
17.5.2025
Slovakia
SK-FMD-2025-00005
Protection zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 48.3861, Long. 16.9924. 20.5.2025
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 48.3861, Long. 16.9924, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.
20.5.2025
Austria
SK-FMD-2025-00005
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Austria, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 48.3861, Long. 16.9924. 20.5.2025
Hungary
HU-FMD-2025-00003
Protection zone:
Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8522, Long. 17.41222. 20.5.2025
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8522, Long. 17.41222, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.
20.5.2025
Slovakia
HU-FMD-2025-00003
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.8522, Long. 17.41222. 20.5.2025
Hungary
HU-FMD-2025-00004
Protection zone:
Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.96161, Long. 17.29801. 20.5.2025
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.96161, Long. 17.29801, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.
20.5.2025
Slovakia
HU-FMD-2025-00004
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.96161, Long. 17.29801. 20.5.2025
Slovakia
SK-FMD-2025-00006
Protection zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 3 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9395, Long. 17.5353. 25.5.2025
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Slovakia, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9395, Long. 17.5353, excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.
25.5.2025
Hungary
SK-FMD-2025-00006
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Hungary, contained within a circle of a radius of 10 kilometres, centred on ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 47.9395, Long. 17.5353. 25.5.2025

Further restricted zones

Country
Areas established as further restricted zone, part of the restricted zone, referred to in Article 1
Date until applicable
Hungary
County of Győr-Moson-Sopron, and in the County of Komárom-Esztergom the Districts of Komárom, Tata and Esztergom, excluding the areas contained in any protection or surveillance zone.
25.5.2025
Slovakia
Regions of Bratislava, Trnava and Nitra, excluding the areas contained in any protection or surveillance zone.
25.5.2025
Austria
In the Federal State Niederösterreich the district Gänserdorf and within the district Bruck an der Leitha the municipalities Au am Leithaberge, Bad Deutsch-Altenburg, Berg, Bruck an der Leitha, Enzersdorf an der Fischa, Göttlesbrunn-Arbesthal, Götzendorf an der Leitha, Hainburg a.d. Donau, Haslau-Maria Ellend, Höflein, Hof am Leithaberge, Hundsheim, Mannersdorf am Leithagebirge, Petronell-Carnuntum, Prellenkirchen, Rohrau, Scharndorf, Sommerein, Trautmannsdorf an der Leitha, Wolfsthal, Ebergassing, Fischamend, Klein-Neusiedl, Schwadorf;
in the district Mistelbach the municipalities Altlichtenwarth, Bernhardsthal, Bockfließ, Großengersdorf, Großkrut, Hausbrunn, Herrnbaumgarten, Pillichsdorf, Rabensburg, Schrattenberg, Wilfersdorf;
in the district Mistelbach within the municipality Drasenhofen the cadastrial communities Drasenhofen, Steinebrunn;
in the district Mistelbach within the municipality Geweinstal the cadastrial communities Gaweinstal, Schrick, Martinsdorf;
in the district Mistelbach within the minicipality Großebersdorf the cadastrial Community Eibesbrunn;
in the district Mistelbach within the community Mistelbach the cadastrial communitry Kettlasbrunn; in the district Mistelbach within the municipality Poysdorf the cadastrial communities Höbertsgrub, Ketzelsdorf, Passauerhof, Poysbrunn, Walterkrichen;
in the district Mistelbach within the municipality Wolkersdorf im Weinviertel the cadastrial communities Obersdorf and Wolkersdorf;
in the distrikt Wiener Neustadt (Land) the municipalities Lichtenwörth, Zillingdorf.
In the Federal State Burgenland the districts Eisenstadt-Stadt, Rust-Stadt, Eisenstadt-Umgebung, Mattersburg, Neusiedl am See (with the exception of the municipalities Nickelsdorf, Mönchhof, Halbturn and Deutsch Jahrndorf) und Oberpullendorf.
20.5.2025

Decision (EU) 2025/793 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 April 2025 providing macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/793 22.4.2025
(1) Relations between the Union and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Jordan) are developing within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). On 24 November 1997, Jordan signed the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the other part(2)(the ‘Association Agreement’), which entered into force on 1 May 2002. Under the Association Agreement, the Union and Jordan gradually established a Free Trade Area over a transitional period of 12 years. In addition, an Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Community and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan concerning reciprocal liberalisation measures and amending the EC-Jordan Association Agreement as well as replacing Annexes I, II, III and IV and Protocols 1 and 2 to that Agreement(3)entered into force in 2007. In 2010, an Advanced Status partnership was agreed between the Union and Jordan that entails expanded areas of cooperation. A protocol between the European Union and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan establishing a dispute settlement mechanism applicable to disputes under the trade provisions of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the other part(4), was initialled in December 2009 and entered into force on 1 July 2011. Bilateral political dialogue and economic cooperation have been further developed within the framework of the Association Agreement and the EU-Jordan Partnership Priorities adopted for 2022-2027.
(2) Since 2011, Jordan has embarked on a number of political reforms to strengthen parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. A Constitutional Court and an Independent Election Commission have been set up and a number of major laws, including the Electoral Act and the Political Parties Act, as well as laws on decentralisation and municipalities, have been passed by the Jordanian Parliament. In addition, legislative improvements as regards the independence of the judiciary and women’s rights have been adopted.
(3) The Jordanian economy has suffered significantly from protracted conflicts in the region, in particular in neighbouring Syria, and most recently also in Israel-Gaza and in the Red Sea area. Since the commencement of the war in Syria, the Jordanian economy has been impacted by a large inflow of Syrian refugees, which has increased pressure on Jordan’s fiscal position, public services and infrastructure. In addition to regional instability, the macroeconomic and fiscal challenges related to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-2021, commodity price developments following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, high exposure to trade fluctuations and the increase in borrowing costs for emerging markets globally continued to weigh on the Jordanian economy. As a result, Jordan experienced an economic contraction in 2020, followed by a slow economic recovery, as unemployment increased significantly in 2020 and remained high, and new fiscal and external financing needs emerged.
(4) The war in Israel-Gaza that commenced in October 2023 brings with it very substantial downside risk to the economic outlook, in particular due to the increased level of uncertainty in the region and the possible impact on the important tourism sector and consumer sentiment. The ongoing Houthi attacks on cargo and energy vessels in the Red Sea hinder vessel traffic to Asia, impacting Jordan’s exports, in particular those of minerals and chemicals, and its imports. In January 2024, the Jordanian authorities and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed on a new economic adjustment programme supported by a four-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) in the amount of USD 1 200 million, which followed a USD 1 700 million four-year EFF from 2020-2023, including a loan under the Rapid Financing Instrument. The IMF Executive Board approved the new four-year EFF in January 2024. The first review mission was conducted in April and May 2024 and the mission report was published in July 2024.
(5) In January 2020, the Union adopted a third macro-financial assistance programme(5)(MFA-III) of EUR 500 million in the form of loans, in response to a request from Jordan in July 2019 and following the completion of the second macro-financial assistance programme of EUR 200 million in 2019. MFA-II(6)came as a follow-up to MFA-I(7)of EUR 180 million implemented in 2015. In May 2020, MFA-III was topped up by EUR 200 million pursuant to Decision (EU) 2020/701 of the European Parliament and of the Council(8)in response to the socio-economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic. The first instalment of MFA-III was released on 25 October 2020, the second instalment on 20 July 2021 and the third instalment on 3 May 2023, following the implementation of the agreed policy measures. The assistance was fully disbursed during 2020-2023.
(6) MFA-III included a joint statement by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission in which the Commission, in light of the fiscal challenges and extraordinary circumstances Jordan faced, committed to submit, if appropriate, a new proposal for extending and increasing macro-financial assistance to Jordan, provided that the usual requirements for that type of assistance, including its exceptional character, political preconditions, complementarity, conditionality and financial discipline, and an updated assessment by the Commission of Jordan’s external financing needs, were met.
(7) In that challenging context, the Union and the international community expressed their commitment to supporting Jordan on several occasions, in particular during annual Brussels Conferences on Supporting the future of Syria and the region, and at the EU-Jordan Association Council in June 2022.
(8) Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2011, the Union has made available approximately EUR 3 500 million to Jordan under various instruments, including EUR 1 080 million under the three macro-financial assistance operations, to help Jordan preserve economic stability, sustain political and economic reform and address its related humanitarian, development and security needs. In addition, the European Investment Bank has allocated approximately EUR 1 100 million in project loans to Jordan since 2011.
(9) For the period 2021-2024, the Union bilateral indicative allocation (grants) to Jordan under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-GE) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council(9)amounted to EUR 364 million, and was complemented by the Union support to help Jordan address the impact of the Syrian crisis (EUR 214 million from 2021 to 2023), in addition to assistance from other regional and thematic programmes. During the period 2014-2020, the Union support to Jordan, provided mainly through the European Neighbourhood Instrument, amounted to EUR 765 million. During the same period, Jordan also benefitted from an additional EUR 126 million channelled via the Neighbourhood Investment Platform, which leveraged approximately EUR 580 million in investments.
(10) In October 2023, in view of the persisting difficult economic situation and outlook, Jordan requested additional macro-financial assistance from the Union.
(11) Given that Jordan is a country covered by the ENP, it is considered eligible to receive macro-financial assistance from the Union.
(12) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be an exceptional financial instrument of untied and undesignated balance-of-payments support, which aims to address Jordan’s immediate external financing needs, and it should underpin the implementation of a policy programme containing strong immediate adjustment and structural reform measures designed to improve Jordan’s balance-of-payments position in the short term.
(13) Given that a residual financing gap remains in Jordan’s balance of payments over and above the resources provided by the IMF and other multilateral institutions, the provision by the Union of macro-financial assistance to Jordan is, under the current exceptional circumstances, considered to be an appropriate response to Jordan’s request to the Union to support Jordan’s economic stabilisation, in conjunction with the IMF programme. The Union’s macro-financial assistance would support the economic stabilisation and the structural reform agenda of Jordan, supplementing resources made available under the IMF’s financial arrangement.
(14) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should aim to support the restoration of a sustainable external financing situation for Jordan, thereby supporting its economic and social development.
(15) The Union’s macro-financial assistance is expected to go hand-in-hand with the implementation of budget support operations under NDICI-GE.
(16) The determination of the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should be based on a complete quantitative assessment of Jordan’s residual external financing needs, and should take into account Jordan’s capacity to finance itself with its own resources, in particular the international reserves at its disposal. The Union’s macro-financial assistance should complement the programmes and resources provided by the IMF and the World Bank. The determination of the amount of the assistance should also take into account expected financial contributions from bilateral and multilateral donors and the need to ensure fair burden sharing between the Union and other donors, as well as the pre-existing deployment of the Union’s other external financing instruments in Jordan and the added value of the Union’s overall involvement in Jordan.
(17) The Commission should ensure that the Union’s macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in accordance with the key principles and objectives of the different areas of external action, with the measures taken in respect of those areas, and with other relevant Union policies.
(18) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should support the Union’s external policy towards Jordan. The Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) should work closely together throughout the macro-financial assistance operation in order to coordinate, and to ensure the consistency of, the Union’s external policy.
(19) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should support Jordan’s commitment to values shared with the Union, including democracy, the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, sustainable development and poverty reduction, as well as its commitment to the principles of open, rule-based and fair trade.
(20) A precondition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance should be that Jordan respect effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guarantee respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Jordan, and promote structural reforms that aim to support sustainable and inclusive growth, employment creation and fiscal consolidation. The Commission and the EEAS should regularly monitor both the fulfilment of that precondition and the achievement of those specific objectives.
(21) In order to ensure that the Union’s financial interests linked to the Union’s macro-financial assistance are protected efficiently, Jordan should take appropriate measures relating to the prevention of, and fight against, fraud, corruption and any other irregularities linked to that assistance. In addition, a loan agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the Jordanian authorities should contain provisions authorising the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to carry out investigations, including on-the-spot checks and inspections, in accordance with the provisions and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(10)and Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96(11), the Commission and the Court of Auditors to carry out audits, and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to exercise its competences with regard to the provision of the Union’s macro-financial assistance during and after the availability period of that assistance.
(22) The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance is without prejudice to the powers of the European Parliament and the Council as budgetary authority.
(23) The amounts of provisioning required for the Union’s macro-financial assistance should be consistent with the budgetary appropriations provided for in the multiannual financial framework.
(24) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them of developments relating to that assistance and provide them with the relevant documents.
(25) In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Decision, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council(12).
(26) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to economic policy and financial conditions, to be set out in a memorandum of understanding (MoU). In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Jordanian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially significant impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure as specified in Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Jordan, that examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the MoU, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of that assistance,
(a) the precondition set out in Article 2(1);
(b) a continuous satisfactory track record of implementing a policy programme that contains strong adjustment and structural reform measures supported by a non-precautionary IMF credit arrangement; and
(c) the satisfactory implementation of the economic policy and financial conditions agreed in the MoU.
(a) examine progress made in implementing the Union’s macro-financial assistance;
(b) assess the economic situation and prospects of Jordan, as well as progress made in implementing the economic policy and financial conditions referred to in Article 3(1);
(c) indicate the connection between the economic policy and financial conditions set out in the MoU, Jordan’s ongoing economic and fiscal performance, and the Commission’s decisions to release the instalments of the Union’s macro-financial assistance.
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 212(2) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,
Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure (1),
Whereas:
(1) Relations between the Union and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Jordan) are developing within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). On 24 November 1997, Jordan signed the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the other part (2) (the ‘Association Agreement’), which entered into force on 1 May 2002. Under the Association Agreement, the Union and Jordan gradually established a Free Trade Area over a transitional period of 12 years. In addition, an Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Community and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan concerning reciprocal liberalisation measures and amending the EC-Jordan Association Agreement as well as replacing Annexes I, II, III and IV and Protocols 1 and 2 to that Agreement (3) entered into force in 2007. In 2010, an Advanced Status partnership was agreed between the Union and Jordan that entails expanded areas of cooperation. A protocol between the European Union and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan establishing a dispute settlement mechanism applicable to disputes under the trade provisions of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the other part (4), was initialled in December 2009 and entered into force on 1 July 2011. Bilateral political dialogue and economic cooperation have been further developed within the framework of the Association Agreement and the EU-Jordan Partnership Priorities adopted for 2022-2027.
(2) Since 2011, Jordan has embarked on a number of political reforms to strengthen parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. A Constitutional Court and an Independent Election Commission have been set up and a number of major laws, including the Electoral Act and the Political Parties Act, as well as laws on decentralisation and municipalities, have been passed by the Jordanian Parliament. In addition, legislative improvements as regards the independence of the judiciary and women’s rights have been adopted.
(3) The Jordanian economy has suffered significantly from protracted conflicts in the region, in particular in neighbouring Syria, and most recently also in Israel-Gaza and in the Red Sea area. Since the commencement of the war in Syria, the Jordanian economy has been impacted by a large inflow of Syrian refugees, which has increased pressure on Jordan’s fiscal position, public services and infrastructure. In addition to regional instability, the macroeconomic and fiscal challenges related to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-2021, commodity price developments following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, high exposure to trade fluctuations and the increase in borrowing costs for emerging markets globally continued to weigh on the Jordanian economy. As a result, Jordan experienced an economic contraction in 2020, followed by a slow economic recovery, as unemployment increased significantly in 2020 and remained high, and new fiscal and external financing needs emerged.
(4) The war in Israel-Gaza that commenced in October 2023 brings with it very substantial downside risk to the economic outlook, in particular due to the increased level of uncertainty in the region and the possible impact on the important tourism sector and consumer sentiment. The ongoing Houthi attacks on cargo and energy vessels in the Red Sea hinder vessel traffic to Asia, impacting Jordan’s exports, in particular those of minerals and chemicals, and its imports. In January 2024, the Jordanian authorities and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed on a new economic adjustment programme supported by a four-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) in the amount of USD 1 200 million, which followed a USD 1 700 million four-year EFF from 2020-2023, including a loan under the Rapid Financing Instrument. The IMF Executive Board approved the new four-year EFF in January 2024. The first review mission was conducted in April and May 2024 and the mission report was published in July 2024.
(5) In January 2020, the Union adopted a third macro-financial assistance programme (5) (MFA-III) of EUR 500 million in the form of loans, in response to a request from Jordan in July 2019 and following the completion of the second macro-financial assistance programme of EUR 200 million in 2019. MFA-II (6) came as a follow-up to MFA-I (7) of EUR 180 million implemented in 2015. In May 2020, MFA-III was topped up by EUR 200 million pursuant to Decision (EU) 2020/701 of the European Parliament and of the Council (8) in response to the socio-economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic. The first instalment of MFA-III was released on 25 October 2020, the second instalment on 20 July 2021 and the third instalment on 3 May 2023, following the implementation of the agreed policy measures. The assistance was fully disbursed during 2020-2023.
(6) MFA-III included a joint statement by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission in which the Commission, in light of the fiscal challenges and extraordinary circumstances Jordan faced, committed to submit, if appropriate, a new proposal for extending and increasing macro-financial assistance to Jordan, provided that the usual requirements for that type of assistance, including its exceptional character, political preconditions, complementarity, conditionality and financial discipline, and an updated assessment by the Commission of Jordan’s external financing needs, were met.
(7) In that challenging context, the Union and the international community expressed their commitment to supporting Jordan on several occasions, in particular during annual Brussels Conferences on Supporting the future of Syria and the region, and at the EU-Jordan Association Council in June 2022.
(8) Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2011, the Union has made available approximately EUR 3 500 million to Jordan under various instruments, including EUR 1 080 million under the three macro-financial assistance operations, to help Jordan preserve economic stability, sustain political and economic reform and address its related humanitarian, development and security needs. In addition, the European Investment Bank has allocated approximately EUR 1 100 million in project loans to Jordan since 2011.
(9) For the period 2021-2024, the Union bilateral indicative allocation (grants) to Jordan under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-GE) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council (9) amounted to EUR 364 million, and was complemented by the Union support to help Jordan address the impact of the Syrian crisis (EUR 214 million from 2021 to 2023), in addition to assistance from other regional and thematic programmes. During the period 2014-2020, the Union support to Jordan, provided mainly through the European Neighbourhood Instrument, amounted to EUR 765 million. During the same period, Jordan also benefitted from an additional EUR 126 million channelled via the Neighbourhood Investment Platform, which leveraged approximately EUR 580 million in investments.
(10) In October 2023, in view of the persisting difficult economic situation and outlook, Jordan requested additional macro-financial assistance from the Union.
(11) Given that Jordan is a country covered by the ENP, it is considered eligible to receive macro-financial assistance from the Union.
(12) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be an exceptional financial instrument of untied and undesignated balance-of-payments support, which aims to address Jordan’s immediate external financing needs, and it should underpin the implementation of a policy programme containing strong immediate adjustment and structural reform measures designed to improve Jordan’s balance-of-payments position in the short term.
(13) Given that a residual financing gap remains in Jordan’s balance of payments over and above the resources provided by the IMF and other multilateral institutions, the provision by the Union of macro-financial assistance to Jordan is, under the current exceptional circumstances, considered to be an appropriate response to Jordan’s request to the Union to support Jordan’s economic stabilisation, in conjunction with the IMF programme. The Union’s macro-financial assistance would support the economic stabilisation and the structural reform agenda of Jordan, supplementing resources made available under the IMF’s financial arrangement.
(14) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should aim to support the restoration of a sustainable external financing situation for Jordan, thereby supporting its economic and social development.
(15) The Union’s macro-financial assistance is expected to go hand-in-hand with the implementation of budget support operations under NDICI-GE.
(16) The determination of the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should be based on a complete quantitative assessment of Jordan’s residual external financing needs, and should take into account Jordan’s capacity to finance itself with its own resources, in particular the international reserves at its disposal. The Union’s macro-financial assistance should complement the programmes and resources provided by the IMF and the World Bank. The determination of the amount of the assistance should also take into account expected financial contributions from bilateral and multilateral donors and the need to ensure fair burden sharing between the Union and other donors, as well as the pre-existing deployment of the Union’s other external financing instruments in Jordan and the added value of the Union’s overall involvement in Jordan.
(17) The Commission should ensure that the Union’s macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in accordance with the key principles and objectives of the different areas of external action, with the measures taken in respect of those areas, and with other relevant Union policies.
(18) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should support the Union’s external policy towards Jordan. The Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) should work closely together throughout the macro-financial assistance operation in order to coordinate, and to ensure the consistency of, the Union’s external policy.
(19) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should support Jordan’s commitment to values shared with the Union, including democracy, the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, sustainable development and poverty reduction, as well as its commitment to the principles of open, rule-based and fair trade.
(20) A precondition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance should be that Jordan respect effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guarantee respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Jordan, and promote structural reforms that aim to support sustainable and inclusive growth, employment creation and fiscal consolidation. The Commission and the EEAS should regularly monitor both the fulfilment of that precondition and the achievement of those specific objectives.
(21) In order to ensure that the Union’s financial interests linked to the Union’s macro-financial assistance are protected efficiently, Jordan should take appropriate measures relating to the prevention of, and fight against, fraud, corruption and any other irregularities linked to that assistance. In addition, a loan agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the Jordanian authorities should contain provisions authorising the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to carry out investigations, including on-the-spot checks and inspections, in accordance with the provisions and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (10) and Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 (11), the Commission and the Court of Auditors to carry out audits, and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to exercise its competences with regard to the provision of the Union’s macro-financial assistance during and after the availability period of that assistance.
(22) The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance is without prejudice to the powers of the European Parliament and the Council as budgetary authority.
(23) The amounts of provisioning required for the Union’s macro-financial assistance should be consistent with the budgetary appropriations provided for in the multiannual financial framework.
(24) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them of developments relating to that assistance and provide them with the relevant documents.
(25) In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Decision, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (12).
(26) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to economic policy and financial conditions, to be set out in a memorandum of understanding (MoU). In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Jordanian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially significant impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure as specified in Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Jordan, that examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the MoU, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of that assistance,
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
1. The Union shall make macro-financial assistance of a maximum amount of EUR 500 million available to Jordan (the ‘Union’s macro-financial assistance’), with a view to supporting Jordan’s economic stabilisation and a substantive reform agenda. The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall contribute to covering Jordan’s balance-of-payments needs as identified in the IMF programme.

2. The full amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be provided to Jordan in the form of loans.

3. The Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions and to on-lend them to Jordan.

4. The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be managed by the Commission in a manner consistent with the agreements or understandings reached between the IMF and Jordan, and with the key principles and objectives of economic reforms set out in the Association Agreement.

5. The Commission shall regularly inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments regarding the Union’s macro-financial assistance, including disbursements thereof, and shall provide those institutions with the relevant documents in due time.

6. The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be made available for a period of two and a half years, starting from the first day after the date of entry into force of the memorandum of understanding referred to in Article 3(1).

7. If the financing needs of Jordan decrease fundamentally during the period of the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance compared to the initial projections, the Commission, acting in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall reduce the amount of the assistance, suspend or cancel it.

1. A precondition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be that Jordan respect effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guarantee respect for human rights.

2. The Commission and the EEAS shall monitor the fulfilment of the precondition set out in paragraph 1 throughout the life cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance.

3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall apply in accordance with Council Decision 2010/427/EU (13).

1. The Commission, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall agree with the Jordanian authorities on clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances, to which the Union’s macro-financial assistance is to be subject. Those economic policy and financial conditions shall be set out in a memorandum of understanding (MoU) which shall include a timeframe for their fulfilment. Those economic policy and financial conditions shall be consistent with the agreements or understandings referred to in Article 1(4), including the macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform programmes implemented by Jordan with the support of the IMF.

2. The conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, to enhance the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Jordan, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, the development of rule-based and fair trade, and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. The Commission shall regularly monitor Jordan’s progress in attaining those objectives.

3. The detailed financial terms of the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be laid down in a loan agreement in accordance with Article 223 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council (14), to be concluded between the Commission and the Jordanian authorities (the ‘loan agreement’).

4. The Commission shall verify, at regular intervals, that the conditions referred to in Article 4(3), first subparagraph, continue to be met, including whether the economic policies of Jordan are in accordance with the objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. In so doing, the Commission shall coordinate closely with the IMF and the World Bank, and, where necessary, with the European Parliament and the Council.

1. Subject to the conditions referred to in paragraph 3, first subparagraph, the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be made available by the Commission in three loan instalments. The size of each of those instalments shall be laid down in the MoU.

2. The amounts of the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be provisioned, where required, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/947.
3. The Commission shall decide on the release of the instalments subject to the fulfilment of all of the following conditions:
(a) the precondition set out in Article 2(1);
(b) a continuous satisfactory track record of implementing a policy programme that contains strong adjustment and structural reform measures supported by a non-precautionary IMF credit arrangement; and
(c) the satisfactory implementation of the economic policy and financial conditions agreed in the MoU.
The release of the second instalment shall not, in principle, take place earlier than three months after the release of the first instalment. The release of the third instalment shall not, in principle, take place earlier than three months after the release of the second instalment.

4. Where the conditions referred to in paragraph 3, first subparagraph, are not met, the Commission shall temporarily suspend or cancel the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. In such cases, it shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the reasons for such suspension or cancellation.

5. The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be disbursed to the Central Bank of Jordan. Subject to the agreed provisions set out in the MoU, including a confirmation of residual budgetary financing needs, the Union funds may be transferred by the Central Bank of Jordan to the Jordanian Ministry of Finance as the final beneficiary.

1. In order to finance the Union’s macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions in accordance with Article 223 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509.
2. The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement with Jordan in respect of the amount referred to in Article 1. The loan agreement shall lay down the availability period and the detailed terms of the Union’s macro-financial assistance, including in relation to the internal control systems. The loans shall be granted on terms that allow Jordan to repay the loans over a long period, including a possible grace period. The maximum duration of the loans shall be 35 years.

3. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments in the operations referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2.

1. The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509.
2. The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented under direct management.

3. Before the implementation of the Union’s macro-financial assistance, the Commission shall assess, by means of an operational assessment, the soundness of Jordan’s financial arrangements, administrative procedures, and internal and external control mechanisms which are relevant to the assistance.

1. The Commission shall be assisted by a committee. That committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.
2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.
1. By 30 June of each year, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the implementation of this Decision in the preceding year, including an evaluation of that implementation. That report shall:
(a) examine progress made in implementing the Union’s macro-financial assistance;
(b) assess the economic situation and prospects of Jordan, as well as progress made in implementing the economic policy and financial conditions referred to in Article 3(1);
(c) indicate the connection between the economic policy and financial conditions set out in the MoU, Jordan’s ongoing economic and fiscal performance, and the Commission’s decisions to release the instalments of the Union’s macro-financial assistance.

2. Not later than two years after the expiry of the availability period referred to in Article 1(6), the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council an ex post evaluation report, assessing the results and efficiency of the completed Union’s macro-financial assistance and the extent to which it has contributed to the aims of the assistance.

This Decision shall enter into force on the third day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/792 of 24 April 2025 on the publication of a list indicating certain CO2 emissions values per manufacturer as well as average specific CO2 emissions of all new heavy-duty vehicles registered in the Union pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/1242 of the European Parliament and of the Council for the reporting period of the year 2022 (notified under document C(2025) 2307)

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/792 25.4.2025
(1) The average specific CO2emissions of a manufacturer should be determined on the basis of data reported by Member States and manufacturers pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2018/956 of the European Parliament and of the Council(2)for vehicles of that manufacturer.
(2) The average specific CO2emissions of all new heavy-duty vehicles registered in the Union should be based on the data reported for vehicles from all manufacturers.
(3) The zero- and low-emission factor for each manufacturer should be determined taking into account the zero- and low-emission heavy-duty vehicles reported.
(4) The CO2emission reduction trajectory and the emission credits per manufacturer should be determined on the basis of the number of new heavy-duty vehicles excluding vocational vehicles reported. Those vehicles, which were certified as vocational vehicles, but not registered as such, were identified and the necessary corrections to the annual average specific CO2emissions of a manufacturer in accordance with Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/941(3)were applied to them.
(5) The data presented in the Annex to this Decision is based on the data available to the Commission on 12 September 2024.
(6) The Commission may have to update the data published herein, should it receive additional data which would affect the results of those calculations,
(1) DAF TRUCKS N.V.P.O. Box 900655600 PT EindhovenThe Netherlands DAF TRUCKS N.V. P.O. Box 90065 5600 PT Eindhoven The Netherlands
DAF TRUCKS N.V.
P.O. Box 90065
5600 PT Eindhoven
The Netherlands
DAF TRUCKS N.V.
P.O. Box 90065
5600 PT Eindhoven
The Netherlands
(2) DAIMLER TRUCK AGFasanenweg 1070771 Leinfelden-EchterdingenGermany DAIMLER TRUCK AG Fasanenweg 10 70771 Leinfelden-Echterdingen Germany
DAIMLER TRUCK AG
Fasanenweg 10
70771 Leinfelden-Echterdingen
Germany
DAIMLER TRUCK AG
Fasanenweg 10
70771 Leinfelden-Echterdingen
Germany
(3) FORD OTOMOTIV SANAYI A.Ş.Akpınar Mahallesi Hasan Basri Caddesi No: 234885 Sancaktepe/IstanbulTürkiye FORD OTOMOTIV SANAYI A.Ş. Akpınar Mahallesi Hasan Basri Caddesi No: 2 34885 Sancaktepe/Istanbul Türkiye
FORD OTOMOTIV SANAYI A.Ş.
Akpınar Mahallesi Hasan Basri Caddesi No: 2
34885 Sancaktepe/Istanbul
Türkiye
FORD OTOMOTIV SANAYI A.Ş.
Akpınar Mahallesi Hasan Basri Caddesi No: 2
34885 Sancaktepe/Istanbul
Türkiye
(4) HYUNDAI HYDROGEN MOBILITY AGHagenholzstrasse 608004 ZürichSwitzerland HYUNDAI HYDROGEN MOBILITY AG Hagenholzstrasse 60 8004 Zürich Switzerland
HYUNDAI HYDROGEN MOBILITY AG
Hagenholzstrasse 60
8004 Zürich
Switzerland
HYUNDAI HYDROGEN MOBILITY AG
Hagenholzstrasse 60
8004 Zürich
Switzerland
(5) IVECO MAGIRUS AGNicolaus-Otto-Straße 2789079 UlmGermany IVECO MAGIRUS AG Nicolaus-Otto-Straße 27 89079 Ulm Germany
IVECO MAGIRUS AG
Nicolaus-Otto-Straße 27
89079 Ulm
Germany
IVECO MAGIRUS AG
Nicolaus-Otto-Straße 27
89079 Ulm
Germany
(6) IVECO S.P.A.Via Puglia 3510156 TorinoItaly IVECO S.P.A. Via Puglia 35 10156 Torino Italy
IVECO S.P.A.
Via Puglia 35
10156 Torino
Italy
IVECO S.P.A.
Via Puglia 35
10156 Torino
Italy
(7) MAN TRUCK & BUS SEDachauer Straße 66780995 MünchenGermany MAN TRUCK & BUS SE Dachauer Straße 667 80995 München Germany
MAN TRUCK & BUS SE
Dachauer Straße 667
80995 München
Germany
MAN TRUCK & BUS SE
Dachauer Straße 667
80995 München
Germany
(8) RENAULT TRUCKS SAS99 route de Lyon69800 Saint-PriestFrance RENAULT TRUCKS SAS 99 route de Lyon 69800 Saint-Priest France
RENAULT TRUCKS SAS
99 route de Lyon
69800 Saint-Priest
France
RENAULT TRUCKS SAS
99 route de Lyon
69800 Saint-Priest
France
(9) SCANIA CV ABVagnmakarvägen 1SE-151 87 SödertäljeSweden SCANIA CV AB Vagnmakarvägen 1 SE-151 87 Södertälje Sweden
SCANIA CV AB
Vagnmakarvägen 1
SE-151 87 Södertälje
Sweden
SCANIA CV AB
Vagnmakarvägen 1
SE-151 87 Södertälje
Sweden
(10) VOLVO TRUCK CORPORATIONHerkulesgatan 75SE-405 08 GöteborgSweden VOLVO TRUCK CORPORATION Herkulesgatan 75 SE-405 08 Göteborg Sweden
VOLVO TRUCK CORPORATION
Herkulesgatan 75
SE-405 08 Göteborg
Sweden
VOLVO TRUCK CORPORATION
Herkulesgatan 75
SE-405 08 Göteborg
Sweden
Manufacturer Average specific CO2emissions, as referred to in Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1242, in g/tkm Zero- and low emission factor, as referred to in Article 5(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1242 CO2emissions reduction trajectory, as referred to in Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1242, in g/tkm Emission credits, as referred to in Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1242, in g/tkm
DAF TRUCKS N.V. 49,12 0,999 51,40 89 410
DAIMLER TRUCK AG 50,35 0,996 49,43 –
FORD OTOMOTIV SANAYI A.Ş. 53,95 1,000 50,12 –
HYUNDAI HYDROGEN MOBILITY AG 0,00 0,970 54,32 1 032
IVECO MAGIRUS AG 51,93 1,000 48,30 –
IVECO S.P.A. 48,92 0,995 46,39 –
MAN TRUCK & BUS SE 48,89 0,999 49,37 15 524
RENAULT TRUCKS SAS 46,46 0,984 47,11 13 773
SCANIA CV AB 45,54 0,994 49,56 131 300
VOLVO TRUCK CORPORATION 47,50 0,986 50,21 108 616
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/1242 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 setting CO2 emission performance standards for new heavy-duty vehicles and amending Regulations (EC) No 595/2009 and (EU) 2018/956 of the European Parliament and the Council and Council Directive 96/53/EC (1), and in particular Article 11(1), first subparagraph, points (a), (b), (d) and (f) thereof,
Whereas:
(1) The average specific CO2 emissions of a manufacturer should be determined on the basis of data reported by Member States and manufacturers pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2018/956 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) for vehicles of that manufacturer.
(2) The average specific CO2 emissions of all new heavy-duty vehicles registered in the Union should be based on the data reported for vehicles from all manufacturers.
(3) The zero- and low-emission factor for each manufacturer should be determined taking into account the zero- and low-emission heavy-duty vehicles reported.
(4) The CO2 emission reduction trajectory and the emission credits per manufacturer should be determined on the basis of the number of new heavy-duty vehicles excluding vocational vehicles reported. Those vehicles, which were certified as vocational vehicles, but not registered as such, were identified and the necessary corrections to the annual average specific CO2 emissions of a manufacturer in accordance with Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/941 (3) were applied to them.
(5) The data presented in the Annex to this Decision is based on the data available to the Commission on 12 September 2024.
(6) The Commission may have to update the data published herein, should it receive additional data which would affect the results of those calculations,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Average specific CO2 emissions per manufacturer

The average specific CO2 emissions per manufacturer, as referred to in Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1242, in the reporting period of the year 2022, are indicated in the second column of the table of the Annex to this Decision.

Zero- and low-emission factor per manufacturer

The zero- and low-emission factor per manufacturer, as referred to in Article 5(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1242, in the reporting period of the year 2022, is indicated in the third column of the table of the Annex to this Decision.

CO2 emissions reduction trajectory and emissions credits per manufacturer

The CO2 emissions reduction trajectory and the emission credits per manufacturer, as referred to in Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1242, in the reporting period of the year 2022, are indicated in the fourth and fifth columns, respectively, of the table of the Annex to this Decision.

Average specific CO2 emissions of all new heavy-duty vehicles

The average specific CO2 emissions of all new heavy-duty vehicles registered in the Union in the reporting period of the year 2022, as calculated by applying the formula of Annex I, point 2.7, to Regulation (EU) 2019/1242 taking into account the new heavy-duty vehicles of all manufacturers, is 48,8 g/tkm.

Addressees

This Decision is addressed to the following manufacturers:

(1) DAF TRUCKS N.V.
P.O. Box 90065
5600 PT Eindhoven
The Netherlands
(2) DAIMLER TRUCK AG
Fasanenweg 10
70771 Leinfelden-Echterdingen
Germany
(3) FORD OTOMOTIV SANAYI A.Ş.
Akpınar Mahallesi Hasan Basri Caddesi No: 2
34885 Sancaktepe/Istanbul
Türkiye
(4) HYUNDAI HYDROGEN MOBILITY AG
Hagenholzstrasse 60
8004 Zürich
Switzerland
(5) IVECO MAGIRUS AG
Nicolaus-Otto-Straße 27
89079 Ulm
Germany
(6) IVECO S.P.A.
Via Puglia 35
10156 Torino
Italy
(7) MAN TRUCK & BUS SE
Dachauer Straße 667
80995 München
Germany
(8) RENAULT TRUCKS SAS
99 route de Lyon
69800 Saint-Priest
France
(9) SCANIA CV AB
Vagnmakarvägen 1
SE-151 87 Södertälje
Sweden
(10) VOLVO TRUCK CORPORATION
Herkulesgatan 75
SE-405 08 Göteborg
Sweden

All entries refer to the reporting period of the year 2022.

Manufacturer
Average specific CO2 emissions, as referred to in Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1242, in g/tkm
Zero- and low emission factor, as referred to in Article 5(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1242
CO2 emissions reduction trajectory, as referred to in Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1242, in g/tkm
Emission credits, as referred to in Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1242, in g/tkm
DAF TRUCKS N.V.
49,12
0,999
51,40
89 410
DAIMLER TRUCK AG
50,35
0,996
49,43
–
FORD OTOMOTIV SANAYI A.Ş.
53,95
1,000
50,12
–
HYUNDAI HYDROGEN MOBILITY AG
0,00
0,970
54,32
1 032
IVECO MAGIRUS AG
51,93
1,000
48,30
–
IVECO S.P.A.
48,92
0,995
46,39
–
MAN TRUCK & BUS SE
48,89
0,999
49,37
15 524
RENAULT TRUCKS SAS
46,46
0,984
47,11
13 773
SCANIA CV AB
45,54
0,994
49,56
131 300
VOLVO TRUCK CORPORATION
47,50
0,986
50,21
108 616

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/785 of 14 April 2025 amending Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/638 concerning certain emergency measures relating to infection with peste des petits ruminants virus in Romania (notified under document C(2025) 2350)

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/785 16.4.2025
(1) Infection with peste des petits ruminants virus is an infectious disease affecting caprine and ovine animals and can have a severe impact on the concerned animal population and the profitability of farming causing disturbance to movements of consignments of those animals and products thereof within the Union and exports to third countries.
(2) In the event of an outbreak of infection with peste des petits ruminants virus in caprine or ovine animals, there is a serious risk of the spread of that disease to other establishments of caprine or ovine animals.
(3) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687(2)supplements the rules for the control of the listed diseases referred to in Article 9(1), points (a), (b) and (c), of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, and defined as category A, B and C diseases in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1882(3). In particular, Articles 21 and 22 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 provide for the establishment of a restricted zone in the event of an outbreak of a category A disease, including infection with peste des petits ruminants virus, and for certain measures to be applied therein. In addition, Article 21(1) of that Delegated Regulation provides that the restricted zone is to comprise a protection zone, a surveillance zone, and, if necessary, further restricted zones around or adjacent to the protection and surveillance zones.
(4) Commission Implementing Decision 2025/638(4)was adopted on the basis of Regulation (EU) 2016/429 and lays down certain emergency measures relating to infection with peste des petits ruminants virus in Romania in response to the outbreak confirmed on 5 March 2025 in Bihor county. More particularly, Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/638 provides that the protection, surveillance and further restricted zones to be established by that Member State, in accordance with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, following the outbreak of that disease are to comprise at least the areas listed in the Annex to that Implementing Decision.
(5) In addition, Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/638 establishes the areas in the territory of Romania where further measures, such as those applicable to further restricted zones, as provided for in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, must be applied, and where movements of ovine and caprine animals outside the external perimeters of those areas are to be prohibited, for a certain period of time, after the expiry of the dates for the measures foreseen in the protection and surveillance zones.
(6) Since the date of adoption of Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/638, Romania informed the Commission that disease surveillance in Arad county has shown no evidence of disease circulation in that area, whereas the epidemiological situation in the rest of the country remains uncertain and available disease surveillance data are not yet sufficient to evaluate the epidemiological situation regarding infection with peste des petits ruminants virus.
(7) In view of the favourable epidemiological situation in Arad county, and in order to prevent any additional burden due to unnecessary restrictions of movements of ovine and caprine animals, from that area to the rest of Romania, it is necessary to remove this county from the areas in Romania where further measures, such as those applicable to further restricted zones, as provided for in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, should apply, and from where movements of ovine and caprine animals outside the external perimeters of those areas should be prohibited, for a certain period of time, after the expiry of the dates for the measures which apply in all the protection and surveillance zones, as listed in Annex II to Implementing Decision 2025/638.
(8) In addition, in view of the lack of sufficient surveillance data, the continued uncertainty and the estimated time needed to assess the epidemiological situation in the rest of Romania, it is necessary to prolong the prohibition of movements of ovine and caprine animals from the entire territory of Romania to other Member States, until 30 September 2025.
(9) Given the urgency of the epidemiological situation in the Union as regards the spread of infection with peste des petits ruminants virus, and the need to prevent the disease from spreading from the affected establishments in Romania to other parts of that Member State or to other Member States, the measures laid down in this Implementing Decision should apply as soon as possible.
(10) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
1. in Article 1, point(c), the date ‘9 June 2025’ is replaced by ‘30 September 2025’;
2. Annex II is replaced by the text set out in the Annex to this Decision.
Country Administrative area Areas referred to in Article 2 Date until applicable
Romania Bihor county The entire territory of Bihor county 11.4.2025 – 10.5.2025
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on transmissible animal diseases and amending and repealing certain acts in the area of animal health (‘Animal Health Law’) (1), and in particular Article 259(1) thereof,
Whereas:
(1) Infection with peste des petits ruminants virus is an infectious disease affecting caprine and ovine animals and can have a severe impact on the concerned animal population and the profitability of farming causing disturbance to movements of consignments of those animals and products thereof within the Union and exports to third countries.
(2) In the event of an outbreak of infection with peste des petits ruminants virus in caprine or ovine animals, there is a serious risk of the spread of that disease to other establishments of caprine or ovine animals.
(3) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 (2) supplements the rules for the control of the listed diseases referred to in Article 9(1), points (a), (b) and (c), of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, and defined as category A, B and C diseases in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1882 (3). In particular, Articles 21 and 22 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 provide for the establishment of a restricted zone in the event of an outbreak of a category A disease, including infection with peste des petits ruminants virus, and for certain measures to be applied therein. In addition, Article 21(1) of that Delegated Regulation provides that the restricted zone is to comprise a protection zone, a surveillance zone, and, if necessary, further restricted zones around or adjacent to the protection and surveillance zones.
(4) Commission Implementing Decision 2025/638 (4) was adopted on the basis of Regulation (EU) 2016/429 and lays down certain emergency measures relating to infection with peste des petits ruminants virus in Romania in response to the outbreak confirmed on 5 March 2025 in Bihor county. More particularly, Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/638 provides that the protection, surveillance and further restricted zones to be established by that Member State, in accordance with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, following the outbreak of that disease are to comprise at least the areas listed in the Annex to that Implementing Decision.
(5) In addition, Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/638 establishes the areas in the territory of Romania where further measures, such as those applicable to further restricted zones, as provided for in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, must be applied, and where movements of ovine and caprine animals outside the external perimeters of those areas are to be prohibited, for a certain period of time, after the expiry of the dates for the measures foreseen in the protection and surveillance zones.
(6) Since the date of adoption of Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/638, Romania informed the Commission that disease surveillance in Arad county has shown no evidence of disease circulation in that area, whereas the epidemiological situation in the rest of the country remains uncertain and available disease surveillance data are not yet sufficient to evaluate the epidemiological situation regarding infection with peste des petits ruminants virus.
(7) In view of the favourable epidemiological situation in Arad county, and in order to prevent any additional burden due to unnecessary restrictions of movements of ovine and caprine animals, from that area to the rest of Romania, it is necessary to remove this county from the areas in Romania where further measures, such as those applicable to further restricted zones, as provided for in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, should apply, and from where movements of ovine and caprine animals outside the external perimeters of those areas should be prohibited, for a certain period of time, after the expiry of the dates for the measures which apply in all the protection and surveillance zones, as listed in Annex II to Implementing Decision 2025/638.
(8) In addition, in view of the lack of sufficient surveillance data, the continued uncertainty and the estimated time needed to assess the epidemiological situation in the rest of Romania, it is necessary to prolong the prohibition of movements of ovine and caprine animals from the entire territory of Romania to other Member States, until 30 September 2025.
(9) Given the urgency of the epidemiological situation in the Union as regards the spread of infection with peste des petits ruminants virus, and the need to prevent the disease from spreading from the affected establishments in Romania to other parts of that Member State or to other Member States, the measures laid down in this Implementing Decision should apply as soon as possible.
(10) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/638 is amended as follows:
1. in Article 1, point(c), the date ‘9 June 2025’ is replaced by ‘30 September 2025’;

2. Annex II is replaced by the text set out in the Annex to this Decision.

This Decision is addressed to Romania.

‘ANNEX II
Country
Administrative area
Areas referred to in Article 2
Date until applicable
Romania
Bihor county
The entire territory of Bihor county
11.4.2025 – 10.5.2025
’

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/784 of 14 April 2025 amending Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/3238 concerning certain emergency measures relating to infection with peste des petits ruminants virus in Bulgaria (notified under document C(2025) 2349)

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/784 16.4.2025
(1) Infection with peste des petits ruminants virus is an infectious disease affecting caprine and ovine animals and can have a severe impact on the concerned animal population and the profitability of farming causing disturbance to movements of consignments of those animals and products thereof within the Union and exports to third countries.
(2) In the event of an outbreak of infection with peste des petits ruminants virus in caprine or ovine animals, there is a serious risk of the spread of that disease to other establishments of caprine or ovine animals.
(3) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687(2)supplements the rules for the control of the listed diseases referred to in Article 9(1), points (a), (b) and (c), of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, and defined as category A, B and C diseases in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1882(3). In particular, Articles 21 and 22 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 provide for the establishment of a restricted zone in the event of an outbreak of a category A disease, including infection with peste des petits ruminants virus, and for certain measures to be applied therein. Article 21(1) of that Delegated Regulation provides that the restricted zone is to comprise a protection zone, a surveillance zone, and, if necessary, further restricted zones around or adjacent to the protection and surveillance zones.
(4) Commission Implementing Decision 2024/3238(4)was adopted on the basis of Regulation (EU) 2016/429 and lays down certain emergency measures relating to infection with peste des petits ruminants virus in Bulgaria in response to an outbreak confirmed, on 25 November 2024, in Velingrad municipality in the region of Pazardzhik. More specifically, Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/3238 provides that the protection, surveillance and further restricted zones to be established by that Member State, in accordance with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 are to comprise at least the areas listed in the Annex to that Implementing Decision.
(5) Since the last amendment of Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/3238, Bulgaria has notified the Commission of continued delays in the implementation of the disease control measures required to be applied in the event of official confirmation of an outbreak of a category A disease in kept animals in an establishment in accordance with Article 12 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, as regards the outbreak that was confirmed in Velingrad municipality, in the region of Pazardzhik.
(6) In light of the current epidemiological situation, and the urgent need to effectively mitigate the risk of disease spread both within Bulgaria and to other Member States, it is crucial to adjust the duration of the control measures in the restricted zones listed as protection, surveillance and further restricted zones for Bulgaria, in the Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/3238. These adjustments address the significant risk posed by the continued circulation and potential spread of the disease beyond the currently affected areas as long as the disease control measures have not been completed.
(7) The duration of the protection, surveillance and further restricted zones is based on the criteria set out in Article 64(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, and on the rules laid down in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687. In addition, the epidemiological situation regarding infection with peste des petits ruminants virus in the affected areas as well as the overall epidemiological situation of infection with peste des petits ruminants virus in Bulgaria, as well as the level of risk for further spread of that disease within that Member State and in the Union is taken into account. Furthermore, the duration of the measures provided for by this decision has been determined in line with international standards set out in the Terrestrial Animal Health Code of the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH).
(8) In addition, in view of the continued delay in the application of the disease control measures required to be applied in the event of official confirmation of an outbreak of a category A disease in kept animals in an establishment in accordance with Article 12 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, more than four months since the confirmation of infection with peste des petits ruminants virus in the region of Pazardzhik, it is necessary to prohibit movements of ovine and caprine animals from the entire territory of Bulgaria to other Member States for a certain period of time.
(9) Taking into account the current epidemiological situation in the Union as regards infection with peste des petits ruminants virus and the period during which the measures provided for by Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/3238 need to apply, the application of that Decision should be prolonged until 31 December 2025.
(10) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
1. in Article 2, the following point (d) is added:‘(d)movements of sheep and goats from the entire territory of Bulgaria to a destination located in another Member State are prohibited until 30 September 2025.’; ‘(d) movements of sheep and goats from the entire territory of Bulgaria to a destination located in another Member State are prohibited until 30 September 2025.’;
‘(d) movements of sheep and goats from the entire territory of Bulgaria to a destination located in another Member State are prohibited until 30 September 2025.’;
‘(d) movements of sheep and goats from the entire territory of Bulgaria to a destination located in another Member State are prohibited until 30 September 2025.’;
2. in Article 4, the date ‘31 July 2025’ is replaced by ‘31 December 2025’;
3. the Annex is replaced by the text set out in the Annex to this Decision.
Regional unit and ADIS reference number of the outbreak Areas established as protection and surveillance zones, part of the restricted zone in Bulgaria referred to in Article 1 Date until applicable
Pazardzhik regionBG-PPR-2024-00001 Protection zone:Those parts of Pazardzhik region, contained within a circle of a radius of 5 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.0156, Long. 23.9989 (2024/1) 22.8.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of Pazardzhik region, contained within a circle of a radius of 20 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.0156, Long. 23.9989 (2024/1) excluding the areas contained in the protection zone 31.8.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of Pazardzhik region, contained within a circle of a radius of 20 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.0156, Long. 23.9989 (2024/1) 23.8.2025 – 31.8.2025
Regional unit Areas included in the further restricted zone established in Bulgaria as referred to in Article 1 Date until applicable
Region of Pazardzhik —Entire territory of Pazardzhik region, excluding the areas included in any protection or surveillance zone. — Entire territory of Pazardzhik region, excluding the areas included in any protection or surveillance zone. 31.8.2025
— Entire territory of Pazardzhik region, excluding the areas included in any protection or surveillance zone.
—Entire territory of Pazardzhik region — Entire territory of Pazardzhik region 1.9.2025 – 30.9.2025
— Entire territory of Pazardzhik region
Region of Blagoevgrad —Municipalities Razlog, Satovcha, Garmen, Bansko, Belitsa, Yakoruda — Municipalities Razlog, Satovcha, Garmen, Bansko, Belitsa, Yakoruda 30.9.2025
— Municipalities Razlog, Satovcha, Garmen, Bansko, Belitsa, Yakoruda
Region of Smolyan —Dospat Municipality — Dospat Municipality 30.9.2025
— Dospat Municipality
Region of Sofia oblast —Municipalities Kostenets and Dolna Banya — Municipalities Kostenets and Dolna Banya 30.9.2025
— Municipalities Kostenets and Dolna Banya
— Entire territory of Pazardzhik region, excluding the areas included in any protection or surveillance zone.
— Entire territory of Pazardzhik region
— Municipalities Razlog, Satovcha, Garmen, Bansko, Belitsa, Yakoruda
— Dospat Municipality
— Municipalities Kostenets and Dolna Banya
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on transmissible animal diseases and amending and repealing certain acts in the area of animal health (‘Animal Health Law’) (1), and in particular Article 259(1) thereof,
Whereas:
(1) Infection with peste des petits ruminants virus is an infectious disease affecting caprine and ovine animals and can have a severe impact on the concerned animal population and the profitability of farming causing disturbance to movements of consignments of those animals and products thereof within the Union and exports to third countries.
(2) In the event of an outbreak of infection with peste des petits ruminants virus in caprine or ovine animals, there is a serious risk of the spread of that disease to other establishments of caprine or ovine animals.
(3) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 (2) supplements the rules for the control of the listed diseases referred to in Article 9(1), points (a), (b) and (c), of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, and defined as category A, B and C diseases in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1882 (3). In particular, Articles 21 and 22 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 provide for the establishment of a restricted zone in the event of an outbreak of a category A disease, including infection with peste des petits ruminants virus, and for certain measures to be applied therein. Article 21(1) of that Delegated Regulation provides that the restricted zone is to comprise a protection zone, a surveillance zone, and, if necessary, further restricted zones around or adjacent to the protection and surveillance zones.
(4) Commission Implementing Decision 2024/3238 (4) was adopted on the basis of Regulation (EU) 2016/429 and lays down certain emergency measures relating to infection with peste des petits ruminants virus in Bulgaria in response to an outbreak confirmed, on 25 November 2024, in Velingrad municipality in the region of Pazardzhik. More specifically, Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/3238 provides that the protection, surveillance and further restricted zones to be established by that Member State, in accordance with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 are to comprise at least the areas listed in the Annex to that Implementing Decision.
(5) Since the last amendment of Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/3238, Bulgaria has notified the Commission of continued delays in the implementation of the disease control measures required to be applied in the event of official confirmation of an outbreak of a category A disease in kept animals in an establishment in accordance with Article 12 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, as regards the outbreak that was confirmed in Velingrad municipality, in the region of Pazardzhik.
(6) In light of the current epidemiological situation, and the urgent need to effectively mitigate the risk of disease spread both within Bulgaria and to other Member States, it is crucial to adjust the duration of the control measures in the restricted zones listed as protection, surveillance and further restricted zones for Bulgaria, in the Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/3238. These adjustments address the significant risk posed by the continued circulation and potential spread of the disease beyond the currently affected areas as long as the disease control measures have not been completed.
(7) The duration of the protection, surveillance and further restricted zones is based on the criteria set out in Article 64(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, and on the rules laid down in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687. In addition, the epidemiological situation regarding infection with peste des petits ruminants virus in the affected areas as well as the overall epidemiological situation of infection with peste des petits ruminants virus in Bulgaria, as well as the level of risk for further spread of that disease within that Member State and in the Union is taken into account. Furthermore, the duration of the measures provided for by this decision has been determined in line with international standards set out in the Terrestrial Animal Health Code of the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH).
(8) In addition, in view of the continued delay in the application of the disease control measures required to be applied in the event of official confirmation of an outbreak of a category A disease in kept animals in an establishment in accordance with Article 12 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, more than four months since the confirmation of infection with peste des petits ruminants virus in the region of Pazardzhik, it is necessary to prohibit movements of ovine and caprine animals from the entire territory of Bulgaria to other Member States for a certain period of time.
(9) Taking into account the current epidemiological situation in the Union as regards infection with peste des petits ruminants virus and the period during which the measures provided for by Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/3238 need to apply, the application of that Decision should be prolonged until 31 December 2025.
(10) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Amendments to Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/3238

Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/3238 is amended as follows:
1. in Article 2, the following point (d) is added:
‘(d) movements of sheep and goats from the entire territory of Bulgaria to a destination located in another Member State are prohibited until 30 September 2025.’;

2. in Article 4, the date ‘31 July 2025’ is replaced by ‘31 December 2025’;

3. the Annex is replaced by the text set out in the Annex to this Decision.

Addressee

This Decision is addressed to the Republic of Bulgaria.

A.   Protection and surveillance zones established around the confirmed outbreak

Regional unit and ADIS reference number of the outbreak
Areas established as protection and surveillance zones, part of the restricted zone in Bulgaria referred to in Article 1
Date until applicable
Pazardzhik region
BG-PPR-2024-00001
Protection zone:
Those parts of Pazardzhik region, contained within a circle of a radius of 5 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.0156, Long. 23.9989 (2024/1)
22.8.2025
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Pazardzhik region, contained within a circle of a radius of 20 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.0156, Long. 23.9989 (2024/1) excluding the areas contained in the protection zone
31.8.2025
Surveillance zone:
Those parts of Pazardzhik region, contained within a circle of a radius of 20 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.0156, Long. 23.9989 (2024/1)
23.8.2025 – 31.8.2025

B. Further restricted zones

Regional unit
Areas included in the further restricted zone established in Bulgaria as referred to in Article 1
Date until applicable
Region of Pazardzhik
—
Entire territory of Pazardzhik region, excluding the areas included in any protection or surveillance zone.
31.8.2025
—
Entire territory of Pazardzhik region
1.9.2025 – 30.9.2025
Region of Blagoevgrad
—
Municipalities Razlog, Satovcha, Garmen, Bansko, Belitsa, Yakoruda
30.9.2025
Region of Smolyan
—
Dospat Municipality
30.9.2025
Region of Sofia oblast
—
Municipalities Kostenets and Dolna Banya
30.9.2025

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/781 of 14 April 2025 in support of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan for the implementation of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/781 15.4.2025
(1) The Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy of 2016 identifies global challenges and threats and calls for a rule-based international order based on effective multilateralism and well-functioning international institutions. Support for the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (‘the Convention’) contributes to greater human security as envisioned by the Global Strategy.
(2) The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction entered into force on 1 March 1999. It constitutes the only international instrument providing a comprehensive response to end the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, including by prohibiting their use, stockpiling, production, trade and transfer and ensuring their destruction, as well as ensuring victim assistance.
(3) On 27 May 2024, the Council adopted Conclusions on an EU position on strengthening the ban against anti-personnel mines in view of the Fifth Review Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.
(4) The Union has contributed to the universalisation and implementation of the Convention through Council Joint Action 2008/487/CFSP(1); Council Decision 2012/700/CFSP(2); Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1428(3)(amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/905(4)); and Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/257(5).
(5) At the Fifth Review Conference of the Convention in Siem Reap (Cambodia) in 2024, the States Parties adopted the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029. The Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan provides a road map for States Parties in the implementation and universalisation of the Convention, building on the achievements of the previous Action Plans,
(a) greater implementation of Article 5 of the Convention;
(b) greater implementation of a rights-based approach to ‘victim assistance’ (Article 6.3 of the Convention);
(c) fostering promotion of and adherence to the Convention and its norm;
(d) compliance with Article 3 of the Convention including through the fostering of cooperation and assistance;
(e) promoting implementation of National legislation under Article 9 of the Convention; and
(f) demonstrating the commitment of the Union and Member States to the Convention.
— As it relates to Article 5, relevant authorities:—gain better understanding to address contamination by improvised anti-personnel mines within the framework of the Convention including reporting, mine risk education and risk reduction, survey and clearance;—improve knowledge on the need to ensure sustainable capacities to address new/residual contamination well ahead of completion;—enhance learning on context-specific risk education;—gain increased knowledge on the importance of exploring sustainable innovative technology and methodologies for survey and clearance;—learn/improve implementation of best practices and other relevant actions of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025-2029. — gain better understanding to address contamination by improvised anti-personnel mines within the framework of the Convention including reporting, mine risk education and risk reduction, survey and clearance; — improve knowledge on the need to ensure sustainable capacities to address new/residual contamination well ahead of completion; — enhance learning on context-specific risk education; — gain increased knowledge on the importance of exploring sustainable innovative technology and methodologies for survey and clearance; — learn/improve implementation of best practices and other relevant actions of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025-2029.
— gain better understanding to address contamination by improvised anti-personnel mines within the framework of the Convention including reporting, mine risk education and risk reduction, survey and clearance;
— improve knowledge on the need to ensure sustainable capacities to address new/residual contamination well ahead of completion;
— enhance learning on context-specific risk education;
— gain increased knowledge on the importance of exploring sustainable innovative technology and methodologies for survey and clearance;
— learn/improve implementation of best practices and other relevant actions of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025-2029.
— gain better understanding to address contamination by improvised anti-personnel mines within the framework of the Convention including reporting, mine risk education and risk reduction, survey and clearance;
— improve knowledge on the need to ensure sustainable capacities to address new/residual contamination well ahead of completion;
— enhance learning on context-specific risk education;
— gain increased knowledge on the importance of exploring sustainable innovative technology and methodologies for survey and clearance;
— learn/improve implementation of best practices and other relevant actions of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025-2029.
— As it relates to Article 6, relevant authorities:—foster partnerships for completion and/or the establishment of National Mine Action Platforms;—increase consultation with stakeholders including civil society;—improve integration of gender and the diverse needs of mine-affected communities in national for as well as environmental considerations;—increase capacities and meaningful participation of beneficiary communities. — foster partnerships for completion and/or the establishment of National Mine Action Platforms; — increase consultation with stakeholders including civil society; — improve integration of gender and the diverse needs of mine-affected communities in national for as well as environmental considerations; — increase capacities and meaningful participation of beneficiary communities.
— foster partnerships for completion and/or the establishment of National Mine Action Platforms;
— increase consultation with stakeholders including civil society;
— improve integration of gender and the diverse needs of mine-affected communities in national for as well as environmental considerations;
— increase capacities and meaningful participation of beneficiary communities.
— foster partnerships for completion and/or the establishment of National Mine Action Platforms;
— increase consultation with stakeholders including civil society;
— improve integration of gender and the diverse needs of mine-affected communities in national for as well as environmental considerations;
— increase capacities and meaningful participation of beneficiary communities.
— As it relates to Article 7 relevant authorities:—increase transparency through the submission of timely and high quality reports;—improve exchange of information with stakeholders through discussions in national and/or regional Dialogues. — increase transparency through the submission of timely and high quality reports; — improve exchange of information with stakeholders through discussions in national and/or regional Dialogues.
— increase transparency through the submission of timely and high quality reports;
— improve exchange of information with stakeholders through discussions in national and/or regional Dialogues.
— increase transparency through the submission of timely and high quality reports;
— improve exchange of information with stakeholders through discussions in national and/or regional Dialogues.
— The 30+ States Parties in the process of implementing Article 5 obligations(1)or those that have recently fulfilled or are nearing fulfilment of such obligations or that find themselves with new or previously unknown contamination, including by anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature.
— Women, girls, boys, and men whose lives are affected by the presence or suspected presence of anti-personnel mines, including those of an improvised nature, in mine affected States Parties.
— Up to four (4) regional or National stakeholder Dialogues to address matters related to Article 5 / human security, including the use of and humanitarian consequences caused by improvised anti-personnel mines or with upcoming mine clearance deadlines that require support or that want to improve dialogue with stakeholders.
— Up to four (4) follow-up support actions/activities.
— As it relates to Article 6.3 relevant authorities:—develop or improve victim assistance/disability plans with specific, measurable, realistic and time-bound objectives;—increase national synergies with efforts under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) as well as other national frameworks;—promote the need for rehabilitation, psychosocial or peer-to-peer support, and centralised database;—empower and further develop the capacity of mine survivors and/or their representative organisations;—learn/improve understanding on the implementation of best practices and other relevant actions of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025-2029. — develop or improve victim assistance/disability plans with specific, measurable, realistic and time-bound objectives; — increase national synergies with efforts under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) as well as other national frameworks; — promote the need for rehabilitation, psychosocial or peer-to-peer support, and centralised database; — empower and further develop the capacity of mine survivors and/or their representative organisations; — learn/improve understanding on the implementation of best practices and other relevant actions of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025-2029.
— develop or improve victim assistance/disability plans with specific, measurable, realistic and time-bound objectives;
— increase national synergies with efforts under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) as well as other national frameworks;
— promote the need for rehabilitation, psychosocial or peer-to-peer support, and centralised database;
— empower and further develop the capacity of mine survivors and/or their representative organisations;
— learn/improve understanding on the implementation of best practices and other relevant actions of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025-2029.
— develop or improve victim assistance/disability plans with specific, measurable, realistic and time-bound objectives;
— increase national synergies with efforts under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) as well as other national frameworks;
— promote the need for rehabilitation, psychosocial or peer-to-peer support, and centralised database;
— empower and further develop the capacity of mine survivors and/or their representative organisations;
— learn/improve understanding on the implementation of best practices and other relevant actions of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025-2029.
— As it relates to Article 6 relevant authorities:—increase partnerships and cooperation (international, regional, triangular, south-south and/or with civil society organisations, as well as cross-sectoral);—increase capacities and meaningful participation of beneficiary communities. — increase partnerships and cooperation (international, regional, triangular, south-south and/or with civil society organisations, as well as cross-sectoral); — increase capacities and meaningful participation of beneficiary communities.
— increase partnerships and cooperation (international, regional, triangular, south-south and/or with civil society organisations, as well as cross-sectoral);
— increase capacities and meaningful participation of beneficiary communities.
— increase partnerships and cooperation (international, regional, triangular, south-south and/or with civil society organisations, as well as cross-sectoral);
— increase capacities and meaningful participation of beneficiary communities.
— As it relates to Article 7 relevant authorities:—increase transparency through the submission of timely quality reports;—improve exchange of information with stakeholders through discussions in national and/or regional Dialogues. — increase transparency through the submission of timely quality reports; — improve exchange of information with stakeholders through discussions in national and/or regional Dialogues.
— increase transparency through the submission of timely quality reports;
— improve exchange of information with stakeholders through discussions in national and/or regional Dialogues.
— increase transparency through the submission of timely quality reports;
— improve exchange of information with stakeholders through discussions in national and/or regional Dialogues.
— The 30+ States Parties(2)that have reported mine victims in territory under their jurisdiction or control and disability rights practitioners working in these States Parties.
— Women, girls, boys, and men who have fallen victim to mines and other explosive remnants of war and/or affected communities.
— One (1) Global Conference – the fourth such conference unique in its kind benefitting theConvention communityand beyondUp to three (3) national or regional stakeholder Dialogues
— Up to two (2) Victim Assistance Expert Meetings
— Up to three (3) follow-up support actions/activities
— Increased awareness of the Convention and its norms by high-level diplomats and/or officials in States not party;
— Greater understanding of support available for accession by technocrats;
— Gains obtained on either moratorium or UNGA voting record by States not party;
— Improved/new engagement with the Convention by States not party;
— Renewed commitment by Convention stakeholders for universalization according to the SRAAP.
— 30+ States which have not yet ratified, approved, accepted, or acceded to the Convention.
— States Parties to the Convention and international and non-governmental organisations involved in efforts to promote the universalisation of the Convention.
— Women, girls, boys, and men in states where a mine ban is put into place.
— Up to two (2) high-level missions involving the Convention’s Special Envoys and/or President, or other state-official in a position to engage at a high-level in States not party, or ambassadorial-level meetings at the United Nations (UN) headquarters or regional headquarters, or in a State Party as relevant; or,
— Up to two (2) national or regional diplomatic or technical meetings with States not party; or,
— A combination of a high-level and technical meeting.
— Increase compliance resulting from greater understandings of Article 3 obligations;
— Increased transparency and reporting through annual reports and statements;
— Reduce the number of mines retained as a result of the intervention;
— Renew cooperation to either explore alternatives to live anti-personnel mines or destroy retained mines.
— The 60+ States Parties with Article 3 commitments and personnel with responsibility for said mines.
— States Parties wanting to provide cooperation and assistance in this regard.
— Women, girls, boy and men in states where retained mines are destroyed.
— Up to one (1) regional, national, online technical workshop, or national support
— Up to one (1) follow-up action – including sponsorship of relevant officials from target States to attend Convention meetings or to other States Parties for further exploration of techniques or of experts to visit said states.
— Increased compliance of Article 9 obligations by States Parties that have not established national implementation measures or reported whether they consider existing legislation to be sufficient;
— Increased transparency and reporting through annual reports and statements by States Parties;
— Renewed cooperation among States Parties or with organisations to explore compliance.
— The 40+ States Parties with outstanding Article 9 obligations(3)and personnel with responsibility for said laws.
— States Parties wanting to provide cooperation and assistance in this regard.
— Women, girls, boy and men in states where sufficient legislation exists.
— Up to one (1) regional, national, or online technical workshop
— Up to one (1) follow up support action
— Increased affinity gained by the Convention and mine action community on role of the European Union and its Member States;
— Increased awareness of the Convention among the general public.
— The + 190 UN Member States including the 164 States Parties to the Convention
— European Union Delegations and structures, states and international and non-governmental organisations and general public in places where activities take place
— Up to two (2) high visibility or promotional activities; and
— Up to four (4) briefings – such as launch and/or closing of the project plus annual briefings during the implementation phase.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 28(1) and Article 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) The Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy of 2016 identifies global challenges and threats and calls for a rule-based international order based on effective multilateralism and well-functioning international institutions. Support for the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (‘the Convention’) contributes to greater human security as envisioned by the Global Strategy.
(2) The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction entered into force on 1 March 1999. It constitutes the only international instrument providing a comprehensive response to end the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, including by prohibiting their use, stockpiling, production, trade and transfer and ensuring their destruction, as well as ensuring victim assistance.
(3) On 27 May 2024, the Council adopted Conclusions on an EU position on strengthening the ban against anti-personnel mines in view of the Fifth Review Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.
(4) The Union has contributed to the universalisation and implementation of the Convention through Council Joint Action 2008/487/CFSP (1); Council Decision 2012/700/CFSP (2); Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1428 (3) (amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/905 (4)); and Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/257 (5).
(5) At the Fifth Review Conference of the Convention in Siem Reap (Cambodia) in 2024, the States Parties adopted the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029. The Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan provides a road map for States Parties in the implementation and universalisation of the Convention, building on the achievements of the previous Action Plans,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
1. The Union shall further contribute to the implementation and universalisation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (‘the Convention’) through an operational action supporting the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029.
2. The objectives of the action referred to in paragraph 1 shall be to support:
(a) greater implementation of Article 5 of the Convention;
(b) greater implementation of a rights-based approach to ‘victim assistance’ (Article 6.3 of the Convention);
(c) fostering promotion of and adherence to the Convention and its norm;
(d) compliance with Article 3 of the Convention including through the fostering of cooperation and assistance;
(e) promoting implementation of National legislation under Article 9 of the Convention; and
(f) demonstrating the commitment of the Union and Member States to the Convention.

3. The objectives referred to in paragraph 2 shall be pursued in such a way as to reinforce the Convention’s tradition of partnership and collaboration between States, non-governmental organisations and other organisations, including representatives from mine-affected communities. All actions shall ensure an inclusive approach at all levels.

4. A detailed description of the action referred to in paragraph 1 is set out in the Annex to this Decision.

1. The High Representative for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.

2. The technical implementation of the action referred to in Article 1 shall be entrusted to the Implementation Support Unit (ISU), represented by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).

3. The ISU shall perform the tasks referred to in paragraph 2 under the responsibility of the High Representative. For that purpose, the High Representative shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the GICHD.

1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the action referred to in Article 1 shall be EUR 2 700 000,00.
2. The expenditure financed by the reference amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.

3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure financed by the reference amount set out in paragraph 1. For that purpose, it shall conclude a financing agreement with the GICHD, stipulating that the ISU is to ensure the visibility of the Union’s contribution, appropriate to its size.

4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in the process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.

5. The ISU shall implement the action referred to in Article 1 in accordance with the Decision on strengthening financial governance and transparency within the ISU, taken at the Fourteenth Meeting of the States Parties in 2015. The ISU shall provide, amongst other reporting, narrative and quarterly reports, as well as a logical framework and activity matrix as set out in the Annex.

1. The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular reports prepared by the ISU. Those reports shall form the basis for the evaluation by the Council.

2. The Commission shall provide information on the financial aspects of the implementation of this Decision.

1. This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

2. This Decision shall expire 48 months after the date of conclusion of the financing agreement referred to in Article 3(3) or six months after the date of its adoption if no financing agreement has been concluded within that period.

PROJECT DOCUMENT

Action in support of the Implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and its Siem Reap – Angkor Action Plan 2025-2029

1. Goal

To contribute to greater human security by promoting acceptance of the norms, greater national ownership, and implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (‘the AP Mine Ban Convention’, or ‘the Convention’).
The European Union (EU)-backed project would support States Parties’ efforts to implement the Text of the Convention and the various aspects of the Siem Reap – Angkor Action Plan (SRAAP) 2025-2029.
The proposed Project would build on the work carried out under the Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/257 – itself building upon the successes and lessons learnt through Council Decisions (CFSP) 2017/1428, 2012/700/CFSP, and Joint Action 2008/487/CFSP, all projects implemented by the Convention’s Implementation Support Unit (ISU).
The proposed project would contribute to further implementing the Women, Peace and Security Agenda of the 1325 UN Security Council Resolution.
2. Project

2.1.
Greater Article 5 Implementation

2.1.1. Objective

Promoting greater national ownership and understandings of obligations under Article 5 and ways to achieve them including through the fostering of cooperation (international, regional, triangular, south south) under Article 6, and need for transparency and the exchange of information under Article 7; including by applying relevant Best Practices and Actions enshrined in the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025-2029.
2.1.2. Results

—
As it relates to Article 5, relevant authorities:
—
gain better understanding to address contamination by improvised anti-personnel mines within the framework of the Convention including reporting, mine risk education and risk reduction, survey and clearance;
—
improve knowledge on the need to ensure sustainable capacities to address new/residual contamination well ahead of completion;
—
enhance learning on context-specific risk education;
—
gain increased knowledge on the importance of exploring sustainable innovative technology and methodologies for survey and clearance;
—
learn/improve implementation of best practices and other relevant actions of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025-2029.

—
As it relates to Article 6, relevant authorities:
—
foster partnerships for completion and/or the establishment of National Mine Action Platforms;
—
increase consultation with stakeholders including civil society;
—
improve integration of gender and the diverse needs of mine-affected communities in national for as well as environmental considerations;
—
increase capacities and meaningful participation of beneficiary communities.

—
As it relates to Article 7 relevant authorities:
—
increase transparency through the submission of timely and high quality reports;
—
improve exchange of information with stakeholders through discussions in national and/or regional Dialogues.

2.1.3. Beneficiaries

—
The 30+ States Parties in the process of implementing Article 5 obligations (1) or those that have recently fulfilled or are nearing fulfilment of such obligations or that find themselves with new or previously unknown contamination, including by anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature.

—
Women, girls, boys, and men whose lives are affected by the presence or suspected presence of anti-personnel mines, including those of an improvised nature, in mine affected States Parties.

2.1.4. Activities

Beneficiary States Parties may either express interest or be nominated to host national or regional activities. Either way, the process would benefit from input from the Committee on Article 5 Implementation. Dialogues would be organised and co-facilitated by the ISU and the beneficiary State Party. In the spirit of cooperation that has been a staple of the Convention and the Project, relevant States, international and non-governmental organisations would be consulted and/or involved in the activities. This would also apply when the beneficiary State is involved in a country ‘coalition’ or partnership with the European Union or Member States.
Follow-up actions may be undertaken in response to recommendations stemming from the Dialogues, Committee’s Observations, and/or relevant Decision of the States Parties (e.g. on extension requests).

—
Up to four (4) regional or National stakeholder Dialogues to address matters related to Article 5 / human security, including the use of and humanitarian consequences caused by improvised anti-personnel mines or with upcoming mine clearance deadlines that require support or that want to improve dialogue with stakeholders.

—
Up to four (4) follow-up support actions/activities.

Follow-up actions may be undertaken in response to recommendations stemming from the Dialogues, Committee’s Observations, and/or relevant Decisions of the States Parties, or to better align with Mine Action Standards or the SRAAP.
2.2.
Greater implementation of a rights-based approach to ‘victim assistance’ (Article 6.3)

2.2.1. Objective

Promoting greater national ownership, understandings, and implementation of obligations under Article 6.3 and enhanced cooperation and assistance (Article 6) bearing in mind the 2030 development agenda, and transparency and the exchange of information under Article 7, including by applying relevant Best Practices and Actions of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025-2029.
2.2.2. Results

—
As it relates to Article 6.3 relevant authorities:
—
develop or improve victim assistance/disability plans with specific, measurable, realistic and time-bound objectives;
—
increase national synergies with efforts under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) as well as other national frameworks;
—
promote the need for rehabilitation, psychosocial or peer-to-peer support, and centralised database;
—
empower and further develop the capacity of mine survivors and/or their representative organisations;
—
learn/improve understanding on the implementation of best practices and other relevant actions of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025-2029.

—
As it relates to Article 6 relevant authorities:
—
increase partnerships and cooperation (international, regional, triangular, south-south and/or with civil society organisations, as well as cross-sectoral);
—
increase capacities and meaningful participation of beneficiary communities.

—
As it relates to Article 7 relevant authorities:
—
increase transparency through the submission of timely quality reports;
—
improve exchange of information with stakeholders through discussions in national and/or regional Dialogues.

2.2.3. Beneficiaries

—
The 30+ States Parties (2) that have reported mine victims in territory under their jurisdiction or control and disability rights practitioners working in these States Parties.

—
Women, girls, boys, and men who have fallen victim to mines and other explosive remnants of war and/or affected communities.

2.2.4. Activities

Beneficiary States Parties may either express interest or be nominated to host national or regional activities. Either way, the process would benefit input from the Committee on Victim Assistance. Dialogues would be organised and co-facilitated by the ISU and the beneficiary State. In the spirit of cooperation that has been a staple of the Convention and the Action, relevant States, international and non-governmental organisations would be consulted and/or involved in the activities. This would also apply when the beneficiary State is involved in a country ‘coalition’ or partnership with the European Union or Member States.

—
One (1) Global Conference – the fourth such conference unique in its kind benefitting the Convention community and beyond
Up to three (3) national or regional stakeholder Dialogues

—
Up to two (2) Victim Assistance Expert Meetings

—
Up to three (3) follow-up support actions/activities

Follow-up actions may be undertaken in response to recommendations stemming from the Dialogues, Committee’s Observations, and/or relevant Decision of the States Parties, or to better align victim assistance efforts to those carried out to meet the CRPD obligations.
2.3.
Fostering promotion of and adherence to the Convention and its norm

2.3.1. Objective

Promoting accession and understandings of the Convention and its norm at high- and technical-level in States not party.
2.3.2. Results

—
Increased awareness of the Convention and its norms by high-level diplomats and/or officials in States not party;

—
Greater understanding of support available for accession by technocrats;

—
Gains obtained on either moratorium or UNGA voting record by States not party;

—
Improved/new engagement with the Convention by States not party;

—
Renewed commitment by Convention stakeholders for universalization according to the SRAAP.

2.3.3. Beneficiaries and targets

—
30+ States which have not yet ratified, approved, accepted, or acceded to the Convention.

—
States Parties to the Convention and international and non-governmental organisations involved in efforts to promote the universalisation of the Convention.

—
Women, girls, boys, and men in states where a mine ban is put into place.

2.3.4. Activities

For this purpose, and with input from the Convention’s President – and informal universalization group as relevant – the Project would support high-level and technical universalization efforts. In the spirit of cooperation that has been a staple of the Convention and the Project, relevant States and international organisations would be consulted and/or involved in the activities. This would also apply when the beneficiary State is involved in a country ‘coalition’ or partnership with the European Union or Member States.
Activities would include:

—
Up to two (2) high-level missions involving the Convention’s Special Envoys and/or President, or other state-official in a position to engage at a high-level in States not party, or ambassadorial-level meetings at the United Nations (UN) headquarters or regional headquarters, or in a State Party as relevant; or,

—
Up to two (2) national or regional diplomatic or technical meetings with States not party; or,

—
A combination of a high-level and technical meeting.

Follow-up actions – including sponsorship of relevant officials from target States to attend Convention meetings – may be undertaken in response to recommendations stemming from the universalization missions, President’s Observations, informal and/or national group(s) strategies, and/or relevant Decision of the States Parties.
2.4.
Compliance with Article 3 including through the fostering of cooperation and assistance

2.4.1. Objective

Fostering implementation of Article 3, Article 7, and Article 8 (compliance) by promoting: that retained anti-personnel mines should be used as intended, their destruction, or considering alternatives to said mines in accordance with the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025-2029.
2.4.2. Results

States Parties:

—
Increase compliance resulting from greater understandings of Article 3 obligations;

—
Increased transparency and reporting through annual reports and statements;

—
Reduce the number of mines retained as a result of the intervention;

—
Renew cooperation to either explore alternatives to live anti-personnel mines or destroy retained mines.

2.4.3. Beneficiaries

—
The 60+ States Parties with Article 3 commitments and personnel with responsibility for said mines.

—
States Parties wanting to provide cooperation and assistance in this regard.

—
Women, girls, boy and men in states where retained mines are destroyed.

2.4.4. Activities

Beneficiary States Parties may either express interest or be nominated to host or participate in activities. Either way, the process is to benefit from input by the Convention’s President and Committee on Cooperative Compliance.
Activities would be organised and co-facilitated by the ISU and beneficiary or host State. In the spirit of cooperation that has been a staple of the Convention and the Project, relevant States, international and non-governmental organisations would be consulted and/or involved in the activities. This would also apply when the beneficiary State is involved in a country ‘coalition’ or partnership with the European Union or Member States.
Activities would include:

—
Up to one (1) regional, national, online technical workshop, or national support

—
Up to one (1) follow-up action – including sponsorship of relevant officials from target States to attend Convention meetings or to other States Parties for further exploration of techniques or of experts to visit said states.

Follow up may be undertaken in response to recommendations stemming from the workshop conclusions, President’s Observations, and/or relevant Decision of the States Parties.
2.5.
Promoting implementation of National Legislation under Article 9

2.5.1. Objective

Promoting compliance with Article 9, by fostering information and support for national legislation banning any activity prohibited to a State Party by any person or on territory under its jurisdiction or control. Supporting States Parties with implementation of their commitment under Article 9 and to report under Article 7 on the measures taken in accordance with the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025-2029.
2.5.2. Results

—
Increased compliance of Article 9 obligations by States Parties that have not established national implementation measures or reported whether they consider existing legislation to be sufficient;

—
Increased transparency and reporting through annual reports and statements by States Parties;

—
Renewed cooperation among States Parties or with organisations to explore compliance.

2.5.3. Beneficiaries

—
The 40+ States Parties with outstanding Article 9 obligations (3) and personnel with responsibility for said laws.

—
States Parties wanting to provide cooperation and assistance in this regard.

—
Women, girls, boy and men in states where sufficient legislation exists.

2.5.4. Activities

Beneficiary States Parties may either express interest or be nominated to host a national workshop. Either way, the process is to benefit from the Convention’s President and Committee on Cooperative Compliance input. Activities would be organised and co-facilitated by the ISU and beneficiary or host State. In the spirit of cooperation that has been a staple of the Convention and the Project, relevant States, international and non-governmental organisations (e.g. the International Committee of the Red Cross) would be consulted and/or involved in the activities.
Activities would include:

—
Up to one (1) regional, national, or online technical workshop

—
Up to one (1) follow up support action

Follow-up action – including sponsorship of relevant officials from target States to attend Convention meetings and engage in discussions on matters related to Article 9 or of international experts to visit said states – may be undertaken in response to recommendations stemming from the workshop conclusions, President’s Observations and/or relevant Decision of the States Parties.
2.6.
Demonstrating the commitment of the Union and Member States to the Convention

2.6.1. Objective

Promoting the Convention and highlighting the contribution of the European Union and its Member States towards its implementation.
2.6.2. Results

—
Increased affinity gained by the Convention and mine action community on role of the European Union and its Member States;

—
Increased awareness of the Convention among the general public.

2.6.3. Beneficiaries and target

—
The + 190 UN Member States including the 164 States Parties to the Convention

—
European Union Delegations and structures, states and international and non-governmental organisations and general public in places where activities take place

2.6.4. Activities

As per the previous EU projects, the ISU would undertake to highlight the role of the Union and Member States among the Convention community and in beneficiary and target States. For this purpose and under the Communication and Visibility Plan, the ISU would hold the following activities,

—
Up to two (2) high visibility or promotional activities; and

—
Up to four (4) briefings – such as launch and/or closing of the project plus annual briefings during the implementation phase.

(1) Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, State of Palestine, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

(2) Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, State of Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

(3) Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Eswatini, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Haiti, Jamaica, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Nauru, Nigeria, Palau, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Suriname, Togo, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Uruguay and Vanuatu.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/779 of 14 April 2025 amending Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/779 15.4.2025
(1) On 8 December 2008, the Council adopted Common Position 2008/944/CFSP(1), which updated and replaced the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports adopted by the Council on 8 June 1998.
(2) Common Position 2008/944/CFSP outlines the foreign and security policy criteria that each Member State must use to assess, on a case-by-case basis, export licence applications. Since the adoption of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, a number of developments both at international and Union level have resulted in a need to revisit those criteria and to impose new obligations and commitments for assessing export licence applications.
(3) On 16 September 2019, the Council adopted conclusions on the review of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, tasking the Working Party on Conventional Arms Export Controls (COARM) with reassessing the implementation of that Common Position.
(4) Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union provides that the Union’s action on the international scene is to be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world. These include democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.
(5) In accordance with Article 21(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the Union is to work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, including to consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law, as well as to preserve peace and international security.
(6) In accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 21(3) of the Treaty on European Union, the Union is required to ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action. In this respect, the Council takes note, inter alia, of Regulations (EU) 2021/821(2)and (EU) 2025/41(3)of the European Parliament and of the Council.
(7) In order to maximise the effectiveness of this Common Position, Member States should work within the framework of the common foreign and security policy to reinforce their cooperation and to promote their convergence in the field of exports of military technology and equipment, inter alia, by exchanging relevant information, including information on specific destinations and on denial notifications, arms export policies and, where appropriate, end-use monitoring, by consulting on their risk assessment, as well as by identifying possible measures to further increase convergence and to promote unity and coherence in the Union’s external action.
(8) It is therefore appropriate to further reinforce cooperation among Member States on rules relating to export licencing and promote convergence in the field of exports of military technology and equipment. It is also necessary to set and uphold revised criteria against which the control of the transfer of such technology is to be assessed. These aims can be achieved by updating Common Position 2008/944/CFSP to ensure high common standards in the implementation of the control of transfers of such technology and equipment.
(9) Common Position 2008/944/CFSP should therefore be amended,
(1) Article 2 is replaced by the following:‘Article 2Criteria1.   Criterion One: Respect for the international obligations and commitments of Member States, in particular the restrictive measures adopted by the United Nations Security Council or by the European Union, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations and commitments.An export licence shall be denied if approval would be inconsistent with the international obligations and commitments of Member States, including:(a)the obligations of Member States and their commitments to enforce United Nations, European Union and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe arms embargoes;(b)the obligations of Member States under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention;(c)the obligations of Member States under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the relevant Protocols annexed thereto;(d)the obligations of Member States under the Arms Trade Treaty;(e)the obligations of Member States under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention);(f)the commitments of Member States under the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects;(g)the commitments of Member States under the Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management;(h)the commitments of Member States in the framework of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.2.   Criterion Two: Respect for human rights in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country of international humanitarian law.—Having assessed the recipient country’s attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, including the human rights situation in that country, Member States shall:(a)deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used to commit or facilitate internal repression, serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women, children, or other serious violations of human rights;(b)exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the military technology or equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the United Nations, by the European Union or by the Council of Europe;For these purposes, technology or equipment which might be used for internal repression includes, inter alia, technology or equipment where there is evidence of the use of that or similar technology or equipment for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the technology or equipment will be diverted from its stated end use or end-user and be used for internal repression. In line with Article 1, the nature of the technology or equipment shall be considered carefully, particularly if it is intended for internal security purposes. Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, summary or arbitrary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detentions, and other serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.—Having assessed the recipient country’s attitude towards relevant principles established by instruments of international humanitarian law and respect for international humanitarian law, Member States shall:(c)deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law, including against protected groups under international humanitarian law, such as women and children.3.   Criterion Three: Internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts.Member States shall deny an export licence for military technology or equipment which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or armed conflicts within the country of final destination, without prejudice to the legitimate and lawful security and defence of that country.4.   Criterion Four: Preservation of regional peace, security and stability.Member States shall deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the military technology or equipment to be exported aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim. When considering these risks, Member States shall take into account inter alia:(a)the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country;(b)a territorial claim which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force;(c)the likelihood of the military technology or equipment being used other than for the legitimate and lawful national security and defence of the recipient country, or the exercise of the inherent right of self-defence of the recipient country in accordance with international law, enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;(d)the need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way.5.   Criterion Five: National security of the Member States and of territories whose external relations are the responsibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly and allied countries.Member States shall take into account:(a)the potential effects of the military technology or equipment to be exported on their defence and security interests as well as those of other Member States, those of friendly and allied countries, without prejudice to the consideration of the criteria on respect for human rights and international humanitarian law as well as on regional peace, security and stability;(b)the risk of use of the military technology or equipment concerned against their forces or those of Member States and those of friendly and allied countries.6.   Criterion Six: Behaviour of the buyer or recipient country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and its respect for international law.Member States shall take into account, inter alia, the record of the buyer or recipient country with regard to:(a)its support for or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime;(b)its compliance with its international commitments, in particular those regarding the non-use of force, and with international humanitarian law;(c)its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament conventions referred to in points (b) to (d) of Criterion One.7.   Criterion Seven: Existence of a risk that the military technology or equipment will be diverted within the recipient country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.In assessing the impact on the recipient country of the military technology or equipment to be exported, and the risk that such technology or equipment might be diverted to an undesirable end-user or for an undesirable end use, the following shall be considered:(a)the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any participation in United Nations or other peace-keeping activity;(b)the technical capability of the recipient country to use and protect such technology or equipment;(c)the capability of the recipient country to apply effective export controls, including where the military technology or equipment to be exported include or are goods to be incorporated into products for subsequent export by the recipient country;(d)the risk of such technology or equipment being re-exported to undesirable destinations, and the record of the recipient country in respecting any re-export provision or consent prior to re-export which the exporting Member State considers appropriate to impose;(e)the risk of such technology or equipment being diverted to terrorist organisations or to individual terrorists;(f)the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer;(g)the risk of such technology or equipment being used to circumvent restrictive measures adopted by the United Nations or by the European Union;(h)the risk of aggravating conflict, violence, and illegal activities due to the specific nature of the technology and equipment to be exported, in particular with respect to the risk of diversion of small arms and light weapons.8.   Criterion Eight: Compatibility of the exports of the military technology or equipment with the technical and economic capacity of the country of final destination, taking into account the desirability that states should meet their legitimate security and defence needs with the least diversion of human and economic resources for armaments.Member States shall take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as reports from the United Nations Development Programme, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, whether the proposed export would seriously hamper the sustainable development of the country of final destination. They shall consider in this context that country’s relative levels of military and social expenditure, also taking into account any Union or bilateral aid.’; (a) the obligations of Member States and their commitments to enforce United Nations, European Union and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe arms embargoes; (b) the obligations of Member States under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention; (c) the obligations of Member States under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the relevant Protocols annexed thereto; (d) the obligations of Member States under the Arms Trade Treaty; (e) the obligations of Member States under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention); (f) the commitments of Member States under the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects; (g) the commitments of Member States under the Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management; (h) the commitments of Member States in the framework of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. — Having assessed the recipient country’s attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, including the human rights situation in that country, Member States shall:(a)deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used to commit or facilitate internal repression, serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women, children, or other serious violations of human rights;(b)exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the military technology or equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the United Nations, by the European Union or by the Council of Europe;For these purposes, technology or equipment which might be used for internal repression includes, inter alia, technology or equipment where there is evidence of the use of that or similar technology or equipment for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the technology or equipment will be diverted from its stated end use or end-user and be used for internal repression. In line with Article 1, the nature of the technology or equipment shall be considered carefully, particularly if it is intended for internal security purposes. Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, summary or arbitrary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detentions, and other serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (a) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used to commit or facilitate internal repression, serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women, children, or other serious violations of human rights; (b) exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the military technology or equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the United Nations, by the European Union or by the Council of Europe; — Having assessed the recipient country’s attitude towards relevant principles established by instruments of international humanitarian law and respect for international humanitarian law, Member States shall:(c)deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law, including against protected groups under international humanitarian law, such as women and children. (c) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law, including against protected groups under international humanitarian law, such as women and children. (a) the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country; (b) a territorial claim which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force; (c) the likelihood of the military technology or equipment being used other than for the legitimate and lawful national security and defence of the recipient country, or the exercise of the inherent right of self-defence of the recipient country in accordance with international law, enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations; (d) the need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way. (a) the potential effects of the military technology or equipment to be exported on their defence and security interests as well as those of other Member States, those of friendly and allied countries, without prejudice to the consideration of the criteria on respect for human rights and international humanitarian law as well as on regional peace, security and stability; (b) the risk of use of the military technology or equipment concerned against their forces or those of Member States and those of friendly and allied countries. (a) its support for or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime; (b) its compliance with its international commitments, in particular those regarding the non-use of force, and with international humanitarian law; (c) its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament conventions referred to in points (b) to (d) of Criterion One. (a) the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any participation in United Nations or other peace-keeping activity; (b) the technical capability of the recipient country to use and protect such technology or equipment; (c) the capability of the recipient country to apply effective export controls, including where the military technology or equipment to be exported include or are goods to be incorporated into products for subsequent export by the recipient country; (d) the risk of such technology or equipment being re-exported to undesirable destinations, and the record of the recipient country in respecting any re-export provision or consent prior to re-export which the exporting Member State considers appropriate to impose; (e) the risk of such technology or equipment being diverted to terrorist organisations or to individual terrorists; (f) the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer; (g) the risk of such technology or equipment being used to circumvent restrictive measures adopted by the United Nations or by the European Union; (h) the risk of aggravating conflict, violence, and illegal activities due to the specific nature of the technology and equipment to be exported, in particular with respect to the risk of diversion of small arms and light weapons.
(a) the obligations of Member States and their commitments to enforce United Nations, European Union and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe arms embargoes;
(b) the obligations of Member States under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention;
(c) the obligations of Member States under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the relevant Protocols annexed thereto;
(d) the obligations of Member States under the Arms Trade Treaty;
(e) the obligations of Member States under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention);
(f) the commitments of Member States under the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects;
(g) the commitments of Member States under the Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management;
(h) the commitments of Member States in the framework of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.
— Having assessed the recipient country’s attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, including the human rights situation in that country, Member States shall:(a)deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used to commit or facilitate internal repression, serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women, children, or other serious violations of human rights;(b)exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the military technology or equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the United Nations, by the European Union or by the Council of Europe;For these purposes, technology or equipment which might be used for internal repression includes, inter alia, technology or equipment where there is evidence of the use of that or similar technology or equipment for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the technology or equipment will be diverted from its stated end use or end-user and be used for internal repression. In line with Article 1, the nature of the technology or equipment shall be considered carefully, particularly if it is intended for internal security purposes. Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, summary or arbitrary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detentions, and other serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (a) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used to commit or facilitate internal repression, serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women, children, or other serious violations of human rights; (b) exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the military technology or equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the United Nations, by the European Union or by the Council of Europe;
(a) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used to commit or facilitate internal repression, serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women, children, or other serious violations of human rights;
(b) exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the military technology or equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the United Nations, by the European Union or by the Council of Europe;
— Having assessed the recipient country’s attitude towards relevant principles established by instruments of international humanitarian law and respect for international humanitarian law, Member States shall:(c)deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law, including against protected groups under international humanitarian law, such as women and children. (c) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law, including against protected groups under international humanitarian law, such as women and children.
(c) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law, including against protected groups under international humanitarian law, such as women and children.
(a) the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country;
(b) a territorial claim which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force;
(c) the likelihood of the military technology or equipment being used other than for the legitimate and lawful national security and defence of the recipient country, or the exercise of the inherent right of self-defence of the recipient country in accordance with international law, enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;
(d) the need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way.
(a) the potential effects of the military technology or equipment to be exported on their defence and security interests as well as those of other Member States, those of friendly and allied countries, without prejudice to the consideration of the criteria on respect for human rights and international humanitarian law as well as on regional peace, security and stability;
(b) the risk of use of the military technology or equipment concerned against their forces or those of Member States and those of friendly and allied countries.
(a) its support for or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime;
(b) its compliance with its international commitments, in particular those regarding the non-use of force, and with international humanitarian law;
(c) its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament conventions referred to in points (b) to (d) of Criterion One.
(a) the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any participation in United Nations or other peace-keeping activity;
(b) the technical capability of the recipient country to use and protect such technology or equipment;
(c) the capability of the recipient country to apply effective export controls, including where the military technology or equipment to be exported include or are goods to be incorporated into products for subsequent export by the recipient country;
(d) the risk of such technology or equipment being re-exported to undesirable destinations, and the record of the recipient country in respecting any re-export provision or consent prior to re-export which the exporting Member State considers appropriate to impose;
(e) the risk of such technology or equipment being diverted to terrorist organisations or to individual terrorists;
(f) the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer;
(g) the risk of such technology or equipment being used to circumvent restrictive measures adopted by the United Nations or by the European Union;
(h) the risk of aggravating conflict, violence, and illegal activities due to the specific nature of the technology and equipment to be exported, in particular with respect to the risk of diversion of small arms and light weapons.
(a) the obligations of Member States and their commitments to enforce United Nations, European Union and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe arms embargoes;
(b) the obligations of Member States under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention;
(c) the obligations of Member States under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the relevant Protocols annexed thereto;
(d) the obligations of Member States under the Arms Trade Treaty;
(e) the obligations of Member States under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention);
(f) the commitments of Member States under the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects;
(g) the commitments of Member States under the Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management;
(h) the commitments of Member States in the framework of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.
— Having assessed the recipient country’s attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, including the human rights situation in that country, Member States shall:(a)deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used to commit or facilitate internal repression, serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women, children, or other serious violations of human rights;(b)exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the military technology or equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the United Nations, by the European Union or by the Council of Europe;For these purposes, technology or equipment which might be used for internal repression includes, inter alia, technology or equipment where there is evidence of the use of that or similar technology or equipment for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the technology or equipment will be diverted from its stated end use or end-user and be used for internal repression. In line with Article 1, the nature of the technology or equipment shall be considered carefully, particularly if it is intended for internal security purposes. Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, summary or arbitrary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detentions, and other serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (a) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used to commit or facilitate internal repression, serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women, children, or other serious violations of human rights; (b) exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the military technology or equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the United Nations, by the European Union or by the Council of Europe;
(a) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used to commit or facilitate internal repression, serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women, children, or other serious violations of human rights;
(b) exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the military technology or equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the United Nations, by the European Union or by the Council of Europe;
(a) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used to commit or facilitate internal repression, serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women, children, or other serious violations of human rights;
(b) exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the military technology or equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the United Nations, by the European Union or by the Council of Europe;
— Having assessed the recipient country’s attitude towards relevant principles established by instruments of international humanitarian law and respect for international humanitarian law, Member States shall:(c)deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law, including against protected groups under international humanitarian law, such as women and children. (c) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law, including against protected groups under international humanitarian law, such as women and children.
(c) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law, including against protected groups under international humanitarian law, such as women and children.
(c) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law, including against protected groups under international humanitarian law, such as women and children.
(a) the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country;
(b) a territorial claim which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force;
(c) the likelihood of the military technology or equipment being used other than for the legitimate and lawful national security and defence of the recipient country, or the exercise of the inherent right of self-defence of the recipient country in accordance with international law, enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;
(d) the need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way.
(a) the potential effects of the military technology or equipment to be exported on their defence and security interests as well as those of other Member States, those of friendly and allied countries, without prejudice to the consideration of the criteria on respect for human rights and international humanitarian law as well as on regional peace, security and stability;
(b) the risk of use of the military technology or equipment concerned against their forces or those of Member States and those of friendly and allied countries.
(a) its support for or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime;
(b) its compliance with its international commitments, in particular those regarding the non-use of force, and with international humanitarian law;
(c) its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament conventions referred to in points (b) to (d) of Criterion One.
(a) the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any participation in United Nations or other peace-keeping activity;
(b) the technical capability of the recipient country to use and protect such technology or equipment;
(c) the capability of the recipient country to apply effective export controls, including where the military technology or equipment to be exported include or are goods to be incorporated into products for subsequent export by the recipient country;
(d) the risk of such technology or equipment being re-exported to undesirable destinations, and the record of the recipient country in respecting any re-export provision or consent prior to re-export which the exporting Member State considers appropriate to impose;
(e) the risk of such technology or equipment being diverted to terrorist organisations or to individual terrorists;
(f) the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer;
(g) the risk of such technology or equipment being used to circumvent restrictive measures adopted by the United Nations or by the European Union;
(h) the risk of aggravating conflict, violence, and illegal activities due to the specific nature of the technology and equipment to be exported, in particular with respect to the risk of diversion of small arms and light weapons.
(2) Article 5 is replaced by the following:‘Article 5Export licences shall be granted only on the basis of reliable prior knowledge of end use in the country of final destination. This will generally require a thoroughly checked end-user certificate or appropriate documentation and/or some form of official authorisation issued by the country of final destination. Member States may use other end-user monitoring tools, including requiring end-users to agree to specific verification mechanisms. When assessing applications for licences to export military technology or equipment for the purposes of production in third countries, Member States shall in particular take account of the potential use of the finished product in the country of production and of the risk that the finished product might be diverted or exported to an undesirable end-user.’;
(3) Article 6 is replaced by the following:‘Article 6Without prejudice to Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council(*1), the criteria set out in Article 2 of this Common Position and the consultation procedure provided for in Article 4 of this Common Position are also to apply to Member States in respect of dual-use goods and technology as specified in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821 where there are serious grounds for believing that the end-user of such goods and technology will be the armed forces or internal security forces or similar entities in the country concerned. References in this Common Position to military technology or equipment shall be understood to include such goods and technology.(*1)Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items (OJ L 206, 11.6.2021, p. 1, ELI:http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/821/oj).’;"
(4) Article 7 is replaced by the following:‘Article 71.   In order to maximise the effectiveness of this Common Position, Member States shall work within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to reinforce their cooperation and to promote their convergence in the field of exports of military technology and equipment, inter alia, by exchanging relevant information, including information on specific destinations and on denial notifications, arms export policies and, where appropriate, end-use monitoring, by consulting regarding their risk assessment, as well as by identifying possible measures to further increase convergence and to promote unity and coherence in Union external action.2.   In order to promote convergence and facilitate decision-making on exports of jointly funded and produced military equipment or technology, Member States participating in a joint defence project may use facilitating mechanisms to that effect. Member States participating in a joint defence project are encouraged to consult with each other on their risk assessment.’;
(5) Article 15 is replaced by the following:‘Article 15This Common Position shall be reviewed by 15 April 2030.’.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 8 December 2008, the Council adopted Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (1), which updated and replaced the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports adopted by the Council on 8 June 1998.
(2) Common Position 2008/944/CFSP outlines the foreign and security policy criteria that each Member State must use to assess, on a case-by-case basis, export licence applications. Since the adoption of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, a number of developments both at international and Union level have resulted in a need to revisit those criteria and to impose new obligations and commitments for assessing export licence applications.
(3) On 16 September 2019, the Council adopted conclusions on the review of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, tasking the Working Party on Conventional Arms Export Controls (COARM) with reassessing the implementation of that Common Position.
(4) Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union provides that the Union’s action on the international scene is to be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world. These include democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.
(5) In accordance with Article 21(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the Union is to work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, including to consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law, as well as to preserve peace and international security.
(6) In accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 21(3) of the Treaty on European Union, the Union is required to ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action. In this respect, the Council takes note, inter alia, of Regulations (EU) 2021/821 (2) and (EU) 2025/41 (3) of the European Parliament and of the Council.
(7) In order to maximise the effectiveness of this Common Position, Member States should work within the framework of the common foreign and security policy to reinforce their cooperation and to promote their convergence in the field of exports of military technology and equipment, inter alia, by exchanging relevant information, including information on specific destinations and on denial notifications, arms export policies and, where appropriate, end-use monitoring, by consulting on their risk assessment, as well as by identifying possible measures to further increase convergence and to promote unity and coherence in the Union’s external action.
(8) It is therefore appropriate to further reinforce cooperation among Member States on rules relating to export licencing and promote convergence in the field of exports of military technology and equipment. It is also necessary to set and uphold revised criteria against which the control of the transfer of such technology is to be assessed. These aims can be achieved by updating Common Position 2008/944/CFSP to ensure high common standards in the implementation of the control of transfers of such technology and equipment.
(9) Common Position 2008/944/CFSP should therefore be amended,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Common Position 2008/944/CFSP is amended as follows:

(1) Article 2 is replaced by the following:
‘Article 2
Criteria 1. Criterion One: Respect for the international obligations and commitments of Member States, in particular the restrictive measures adopted by the United Nations Security Council or by the European Union, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations and commitments.
An export licence shall be denied if approval would be inconsistent with the international obligations and commitments of Member States, including:
(a) the obligations of Member States and their commitments to enforce United Nations, European Union and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe arms embargoes;
(b) the obligations of Member States under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention;
(c) the obligations of Member States under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the relevant Protocols annexed thereto;
(d) the obligations of Member States under the Arms Trade Treaty;
(e) the obligations of Member States under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention);
(f) the commitments of Member States under the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects;
(g) the commitments of Member States under the Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management;
(h) the commitments of Member States in the framework of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. 2. Criterion Two: Respect for human rights in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country of international humanitarian law.
—
Having assessed the recipient country’s attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, including the human rights situation in that country, Member States shall:
(a) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used to commit or facilitate internal repression, serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women, children, or other serious violations of human rights;
(b) exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the military technology or equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the United Nations, by the European Union or by the Council of Europe;
For these purposes, technology or equipment which might be used for internal repression includes, inter alia, technology or equipment where there is evidence of the use of that or similar technology or equipment for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the technology or equipment will be diverted from its stated end use or end-user and be used for internal repression. In line with Article 1, the nature of the technology or equipment shall be considered carefully, particularly if it is intended for internal security purposes. Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, summary or arbitrary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detentions, and other serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
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Having assessed the recipient country’s attitude towards relevant principles established by instruments of international humanitarian law and respect for international humanitarian law, Member States shall:
(c) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law, including against protected groups under international humanitarian law, such as women and children. 3. Criterion Three: Internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts.
Member States shall deny an export licence for military technology or equipment which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or armed conflicts within the country of final destination, without prejudice to the legitimate and lawful security and defence of that country. 4. Criterion Four: Preservation of regional peace, security and stability.
Member States shall deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the military technology or equipment to be exported aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim. When considering these risks, Member States shall take into account inter alia:
(a) the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country;
(b) a territorial claim which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force;
(c) the likelihood of the military technology or equipment being used other than for the legitimate and lawful national security and defence of the recipient country, or the exercise of the inherent right of self-defence of the recipient country in accordance with international law, enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;
(d) the need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way. 5. Criterion Five: National security of the Member States and of territories whose external relations are the responsibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly and allied countries.
Member States shall take into account:
(a) the potential effects of the military technology or equipment to be exported on their defence and security interests as well as those of other Member States, those of friendly and allied countries, without prejudice to the consideration of the criteria on respect for human rights and international humanitarian law as well as on regional peace, security and stability;
(b) the risk of use of the military technology or equipment concerned against their forces or those of Member States and those of friendly and allied countries. 6. Criterion Six: Behaviour of the buyer or recipient country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and its respect for international law.
Member States shall take into account, inter alia, the record of the buyer or recipient country with regard to:
(a) its support for or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime;
(b) its compliance with its international commitments, in particular those regarding the non-use of force, and with international humanitarian law;
(c) its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament conventions referred to in points (b) to (d) of Criterion One. 7. Criterion Seven: Existence of a risk that the military technology or equipment will be diverted within the recipient country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.
In assessing the impact on the recipient country of the military technology or equipment to be exported, and the risk that such technology or equipment might be diverted to an undesirable end-user or for an undesirable end use, the following shall be considered:
(a) the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any participation in United Nations or other peace-keeping activity;
(b) the technical capability of the recipient country to use and protect such technology or equipment;
(c) the capability of the recipient country to apply effective export controls, including where the military technology or equipment to be exported include or are goods to be incorporated into products for subsequent export by the recipient country;
(d) the risk of such technology or equipment being re-exported to undesirable destinations, and the record of the recipient country in respecting any re-export provision or consent prior to re-export which the exporting Member State considers appropriate to impose;
(e) the risk of such technology or equipment being diverted to terrorist organisations or to individual terrorists;
(f) the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer;
(g) the risk of such technology or equipment being used to circumvent restrictive measures adopted by the United Nations or by the European Union;
(h) the risk of aggravating conflict, violence, and illegal activities due to the specific nature of the technology and equipment to be exported, in particular with respect to the risk of diversion of small arms and light weapons. 8. Criterion Eight: Compatibility of the exports of the military technology or equipment with the technical and economic capacity of the country of final destination, taking into account the desirability that states should meet their legitimate security and defence needs with the least diversion of human and economic resources for armaments.
Member States shall take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as reports from the United Nations Development Programme, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, whether the proposed export would seriously hamper the sustainable development of the country of final destination. They shall consider in this context that country’s relative levels of military and social expenditure, also taking into account any Union or bilateral aid.’
;
(2) Article 5 is replaced by the following:
‘Article 5
Export licences shall be granted only on the basis of reliable prior knowledge of end use in the country of final destination. This will generally require a thoroughly checked end-user certificate or appropriate documentation and/or some form of official authorisation issued by the country of final destination. Member States may use other end-user monitoring tools, including requiring end-users to agree to specific verification mechanisms. When assessing applications for licences to export military technology or equipment for the purposes of production in third countries, Member States shall in particular take account of the potential use of the finished product in the country of production and of the risk that the finished product might be diverted or exported to an undesirable end-user.’
;
(3) Article 6 is replaced by the following:
‘Article 6
Without prejudice to Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council (*1), the criteria set out in Article 2 of this Common Position and the consultation procedure provided for in Article 4 of this Common Position are also to apply to Member States in respect of dual-use goods and technology as specified in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821 where there are serious grounds for believing that the end-user of such goods and technology will be the armed forces or internal security forces or similar entities in the country concerned. References in this Common Position to military technology or equipment shall be understood to include such goods and technology.
(*1) Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items (OJ L 206, 11.6.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/821/oj).’;”

(4) Article 7 is replaced by the following:
‘Article 7 1. In order to maximise the effectiveness of this Common Position, Member States shall work within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to reinforce their cooperation and to promote their convergence in the field of exports of military technology and equipment, inter alia, by exchanging relevant information, including information on specific destinations and on denial notifications, arms export policies and, where appropriate, end-use monitoring, by consulting regarding their risk assessment, as well as by identifying possible measures to further increase convergence and to promote unity and coherence in Union external action. 2. In order to promote convergence and facilitate decision-making on exports of jointly funded and produced military equipment or technology, Member States participating in a joint defence project may use facilitating mechanisms to that effect. Member States participating in a joint defence project are encouraged to consult with each other on their risk assessment.’
;
(5) Article 15 is replaced by the following:
‘Article 15
This Common Position shall be reviewed by 15 April 2030.’.

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.