Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/998 of 22 May 2025 postponing the expiry date of the approval of bis(N-cyclohexyl-diazenium-dioxy)-copper (Cu-HDO) for use in biocidal products of product-type 8 in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/998 23.5.2025
(1) Bis(N-cyclohexyl-diazenium-dioxy)-copper (Cu-HDO) was approved as an active substance for use in biocidal products of product-type 8 by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 89/2014(2)subject to the conditions set out in the Annex to that Regulation.
(2) The approval of Cu-HDO for use in biocidal products of product-type 8 (‘the approval’) is to expire on 31 August 2025. On 19 February 2024, an application was submitted in accordance with Article 13(1) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 for the renewal of the approval (‘the application’).
(3) On 28 May 2024, the evaluating competent authority of Austria informed the Commission that it had decided, pursuant to Article 14(1) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012, that a full evaluation of the application was necessary. Pursuant to Article 8(1) of that Regulation, the evaluating competent authority is to perform a full evaluation of the application within 365 days of its validation.
(4) The evaluating competent authority may, as appropriate, require the applicant to provide sufficient data to carry out the evaluation, in accordance with Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012. In that event, the 365-day period is suspended for a period that may not exceed 180 days in total unless a longer suspension is justified by the nature of the data requested or by exceptional circumstances.
(5) Within 270 days of receipt of a recommendation from the evaluating competent authority, the European Chemicals Agency is to prepare and submit to the Commission an opinion on renewal of the approval of the active substance in accordance with Article 14(3) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012.
(6) Consequently, for reasons beyond the control of the applicant, the approval is likely to expire before a decision has been taken on its renewal. It is therefore appropriate to postpone the expiry date of the approval for a period of time sufficient to enable the examination of the application. Taking into account the time-limits for evaluation by the evaluating competent authority, for preparation and submission by the European Chemicals Agency of its opinion and the time needed for the Commission to decide whether to renew the approval, the expiry date should be postponed to 29 February 2028.
(7) After the postponement of the expiry date of the approval, Cu-HDO remains approved for use in biocidal products of product-type 8 subject to the conditions set out in the Annex to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 89/2014,
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 concerning the making available on the market and use of biocidal products (1), and in particular Article 14(5) thereof,
After consulting the Standing Committee on Biocidal Products,
Whereas:
(1) Bis(N-cyclohexyl-diazenium-dioxy)-copper (Cu-HDO) was approved as an active substance for use in biocidal products of product-type 8 by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 89/2014 (2) subject to the conditions set out in the Annex to that Regulation.
(2) The approval of Cu-HDO for use in biocidal products of product-type 8 (‘the approval’) is to expire on 31 August 2025. On 19 February 2024, an application was submitted in accordance with Article 13(1) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 for the renewal of the approval (‘the application’).
(3) On 28 May 2024, the evaluating competent authority of Austria informed the Commission that it had decided, pursuant to Article 14(1) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012, that a full evaluation of the application was necessary. Pursuant to Article 8(1) of that Regulation, the evaluating competent authority is to perform a full evaluation of the application within 365 days of its validation.
(4) The evaluating competent authority may, as appropriate, require the applicant to provide sufficient data to carry out the evaluation, in accordance with Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012. In that event, the 365-day period is suspended for a period that may not exceed 180 days in total unless a longer suspension is justified by the nature of the data requested or by exceptional circumstances.
(5) Within 270 days of receipt of a recommendation from the evaluating competent authority, the European Chemicals Agency is to prepare and submit to the Commission an opinion on renewal of the approval of the active substance in accordance with Article 14(3) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012.
(6) Consequently, for reasons beyond the control of the applicant, the approval is likely to expire before a decision has been taken on its renewal. It is therefore appropriate to postpone the expiry date of the approval for a period of time sufficient to enable the examination of the application. Taking into account the time-limits for evaluation by the evaluating competent authority, for preparation and submission by the European Chemicals Agency of its opinion and the time needed for the Commission to decide whether to renew the approval, the expiry date should be postponed to 29 February 2028.
(7) After the postponement of the expiry date of the approval, Cu-HDO remains approved for use in biocidal products of product-type 8 subject to the conditions set out in the Annex to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 89/2014,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The expiry date of the approval of bis(N-cyclohexyl-diazenium-dioxy)-copper (Cu-HDO) for use in biocidal products of product-type 8 set out in the Annex to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 89/2014, is postponed to 29 February 2028.
This Decision shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/997 of 23 May 2025 on the clearance of the accounts of the paying agencies of Member States concerning expenditure within the CAP Strategic Plan financed by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) in the period 2023-2027 for the financial year 2024 (notified under document C(2025) 3159)

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/997 27.5.2025
(1) Pursuant to Article 53 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116, the Commission, on the basis of the annual accounts submitted by the Member States, accompanied by the information required for the clearance of accounts and an audit opinion regarding the completeness, accuracy and veracity of the accounts and the reports established by the certification bodies, is to clear the accounts of the paying agencies referred to in Article 9 of that Regulation prior to 31 May of the year following the budget year in question.
(2) In accordance with Article 35 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116, the financial year begins on 16 October of year N-1 and ends on 15 October of year N. When clearing the accounts for the financial year 2024, for the purpose of aligning the reference period for the EAFRD expenditure with that of the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund, account should be taken of expenditure incurred by the Member States between 16 October 2023 and 15 October 2024, in accordance with Article 11(1) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128(2).
(3) Article 35(2), second subparagraph, of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128 provides that the amounts that are recoverable from, or payable to, each Member State, in accordance with the accounts clearance decision referred to in Article 35(1) of that Implementing Regulation, are to be established by deducting the intermediate payments for the financial year concerned from the expenditure recognised for that year in accordance with that Article 35(1). Article 35(2), third subparagraph, of that Implementing Regulation provides that the Commission is to deduct that amount from or add it to the next intermediate payment.
(4) The Commission has checked the information submitted by the Member States and has communicated the results of its checks to the Member States, together with the amendments it proposes.
(5) For all paying agencies, the annual accounts and the accompanying documents permit the Commission to take a decision on the completeness, accuracy and veracity of the annual accounts submitted.
(6) The rules on payment deadlines for measures under rural development in the context of the integrated administration and control system provided for in Article 44(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 apply from the claim year 2023. The reductions for non-compliance with the latest payment deadlines, calculated in accordance with Article 5 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/127(3), follow the procedure laid down in Article 39 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 and are to be taken into account in this Decision for the financial year 2024. Those reductions may be examined, where appropriate, under conformity clearance proceedings pursuant to Article 55 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116.
(7) In accordance with Article 53 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116, this Decision should be without prejudice to the decisions the Commission may take subsequently pursuant to Articles 54 and 55 of that Regulation,
In Euro
Member State CCI Expenditure FY2024 Corrections Total Non-reusable amounts Accepted amount cleared for FY2024 Interim payments reimbursed to the Member State for the financial year Amount to be recovered from (-) or paid to (+) the Member State(*1)
i ii iii = i + ii iv v = iii – iv vi vii = v – vi
AT 2023AT06AFSP001 236 554 703,85 0,00 236 554 703,85 0,00 236 554 703,85 236 554 703,85 0,00
BE 2023BE06AFSP001 7 315 331,20 0,00 7 315 331,20 0,00 7 315 331,20 7 354 033,34 -38 702,14
BE 2023BE06AFSP002 15 354 099,78 0,00 15 354 099,78 0,00 15 354 099,78 15 354 099,78 0,00
BG 2023BG06AFSP001 41 549 938,21 0,00 41 549 938,21 0,00 41 549 938,21 41 549 910,31 27,90
CY 2023CY06AFSP001 15 166 625,59 0,00 15 166 625,59 0,00 15 166 625,59 15 166 625,59 0,00
CZ 2023CZ06AFSP001 138 680 708,39 0,00 138 680 708,39 0,00 138 680 708,39 138 680 783,15 -74,76
DE 2023DE06AFSP001 513 063 943,46 0,00 513 063 943,46 0,00 513 063 943,46 513 125 771,19 -61 827,73
DK 2023DK06AFSP001 44 961 708,98 0,00 44 961 708,98 0,00 44 961 708,98 44 961 708,98 0,00
EE 2023EE06AFSP001 28 484 839,61 0,00 28 484 839,61 0,00 28 484 839,61 28 585 105,10 – 100 265,49
ES 2023ES06AFSP001 356 147 959,34 0,00 356 147 959,34 0,00 356 147 959,34 357 025 719,99 – 877 760,65
FI 2023FI06AFSP001 246 782 103,83 0,00 246 782 103,83 0,00 246 782 103,83 246 782 193,26 -89,43
FR 2023FR06AFSP001 1 033 425 693,62 0,00 1 033 425 693,62 0,00 1 033 425 693,62 1 033 629 669,05 – 203 975,43
EL 2023EL06AFSP001 157 529 586,36 0,00 157 529 586,36 0,00 157 529 586,36 157 529 601,21 -14,85
HR 2023HR06AFSP001 115 754 708,93 0,00 115 754 708,93 0,00 115 754 708,93 115 755 552,33 – 843,40
HU 2023HU06AFSP001 220 631 811,58 0,00 220 631 811,58 0,00 220 631 811,58 220 631 830,20 -18,62
IE 2023IE06AFSP001 309 018 458,47 0,00 309 018 458,47 0,00 309 018 458,47 309 018 458,47 0,00
IT 2023IT06AFSP001 467 957 355,50 0,00 467 957 355,50 0,00 467 957 355,50 468 122 339,43 – 164 983,93
LT 2023LT06AFSP001 56 036 737,08 0,00 56 036 737,08 0,00 56 036 737,08 56 036 738,95 -1,87
LU 2023LU06AFSP001 9 103 485,58 0,00 9 103 485,58 0,00 9 103 485,58 8 879 485,57 224 000,01
LV 2023LV06AFSP001 46 011 507,60 0,00 46 011 507,60 0,00 46 011 507,60 46 011 507,60 0,00
MT 2023MT06AFSP001 2 323 343,04 0,00 2 323 343,04 0,00 2 323 343,04 2 323 615,75 – 272,71
NL 2023NL06AFSP001 126 476 696,16 0,00 126 476 696,16 0,00 126 476 696,16 126 451 587,77 25 108,39
PL 2023PL06AFSP001 105 933 014,77 0,00 105 933 014,77 0,00 105 933 014,77 108 779 598,74 -2 846 583,97
PT 2023PT06AFSP001 122 907 001,35 0,00 122 907 001,35 0,00 122 907 001,35 130 524 049,96 -7 617 048,61
RO 2023RO06AFSP001 223 040 990,59 0,00 223 040 990,59 0,00 223 040 990,59 222 917 219,46 123 771,13
SE 2023SE06AFSP001 122 379 428,00 0,00 122 379 428,00 0,00 122 379 428,00 122 399 835,95 -20 407,95
SI 2023SI06AFSP001 61 140 675,42 0,00 61 140 675,42 0,00 61 140 675,42 61 140 679,38 -3,96
SK 2023SK06AFSP001 119 955 638,51 0,00 119 955 638,51 0,00 119 955 638,51 119 957 497,84 -1 859,33
In Euro
Member State CCI Reductions for non-compliance with latest payment deadlines for FY2024
AT 2023AT06AFSP001 0,00
BE 2023BE06AFSP001 0,00
BE 2023BE06AFSP002 0,00
BG 2023BG06AFSP001 0,00
CY 2023CY06AFSP001 0,00
CZ 2023CZ06AFSP001 0,00
DE 2023DE06AFSP001 0,00
DK 2023DK06AFSP001 0,00
EE 2023EE06AFSP001 0,00
ES 2023ES06AFSP001 0,00
FI 2023FI06AFSP001 0,00
FR 2023FR06AFSP001 0,00
EL 2023EL06AFSP001 0,00
HR 2023HR06AFSP001 0,00
HU 2023HU06AFSP001 0,00
IE 2023IE06AFSP001 0,00
IT 2023IT06AFSP001 0,00
LT 2023LT06AFSP001 0,00
LU 2023LU06AFSP001 0,00
LV 2023LV06AFSP001 0,00
MT 2023MT06AFSP001 0,00
NL 2023NL06AFSP001 0,00
PL 2023PL06AFSP001 0,00
PT 2023PT06AFSP001 0,00
RO 2023RO06AFSP001 0,00
SE 2023SE06AFSP001 0,00
SI 2023SI06AFSP001 0,00
SK 2023SK06AFSP001 0,00
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 (1), and in particular Article 53(1), first subparagraph, thereof,
After consulting the Committee on the Agricultural Funds,
Whereas:
(1) Pursuant to Article 53 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116, the Commission, on the basis of the annual accounts submitted by the Member States, accompanied by the information required for the clearance of accounts and an audit opinion regarding the completeness, accuracy and veracity of the accounts and the reports established by the certification bodies, is to clear the accounts of the paying agencies referred to in Article 9 of that Regulation prior to 31 May of the year following the budget year in question.
(2) In accordance with Article 35 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116, the financial year begins on 16 October of year N-1 and ends on 15 October of year N. When clearing the accounts for the financial year 2024, for the purpose of aligning the reference period for the EAFRD expenditure with that of the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund, account should be taken of expenditure incurred by the Member States between 16 October 2023 and 15 October 2024, in accordance with Article 11(1) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128 (2).
(3) Article 35(2), second subparagraph, of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128 provides that the amounts that are recoverable from, or payable to, each Member State, in accordance with the accounts clearance decision referred to in Article 35(1) of that Implementing Regulation, are to be established by deducting the intermediate payments for the financial year concerned from the expenditure recognised for that year in accordance with that Article 35(1). Article 35(2), third subparagraph, of that Implementing Regulation provides that the Commission is to deduct that amount from or add it to the next intermediate payment.
(4) The Commission has checked the information submitted by the Member States and has communicated the results of its checks to the Member States, together with the amendments it proposes.
(5) For all paying agencies, the annual accounts and the accompanying documents permit the Commission to take a decision on the completeness, accuracy and veracity of the annual accounts submitted.
(6) The rules on payment deadlines for measures under rural development in the context of the integrated administration and control system provided for in Article 44(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 apply from the claim year 2023. The reductions for non-compliance with the latest payment deadlines, calculated in accordance with Article 5 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/127 (3), follow the procedure laid down in Article 39 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 and are to be taken into account in this Decision for the financial year 2024. Those reductions may be examined, where appropriate, under conformity clearance proceedings pursuant to Article 55 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116.
(7) In accordance with Article 53 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116, this Decision should be without prejudice to the decisions the Commission may take subsequently pursuant to Articles 54 and 55 of that Regulation,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The accounts of the Member States’ paying agencies are hereby cleared as regards expenditure within the CAP Strategic Plan financed by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) in respect of the financial year 2024 and relating to the period 2023-2027.
The EAFRD amounts recoverable from, or payable to, each Member State under the CAP Strategic Plans for the period 2023-2027 pursuant to this Decision, are set out in Annex I to this Decision.
The reductions for non-compliance with the latest payment deadlines in accordance with Article 44(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 under each CAP Strategic Plan are set out in Annex II to this Decision.
This Decision is without prejudice to future conformity clearance decisions that the Commission may take pursuant to Article 55 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 to exclude from Union financing expenditure not effected in conformity with Union law, and to future annual performance clearance decisions that the Commission may take pursuant to Article 54 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 to exclude from Union financing expenditure that does not have a corresponding output as reported in the annual performance report.
This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Cleared EAFRD expenditure by CAP Strategic Plan for financial year FY2024

Amount to be recovered from or paid to the Member State per CAP Strategic Plan

Approved CAP Strategic Plan with declared expenditure for EAFRD 2023-2027

In Euro
Member State
CCI
Expenditure FY2024
Corrections
Total
Non-reusable amounts
Accepted amount cleared for FY2024
Interim payments reimbursed to the Member State for the financial year
Amount to be recovered from (-) or paid to (+) the Member State
(*1)

i
ii
iii = i + ii
iv
v = iii – iv
vi
vii = v – vi
AT
2023AT06AFSP001
236 554 703,85
0,00
236 554 703,85
0,00
236 554 703,85
236 554 703,85
0,00
BE
2023BE06AFSP001
7 315 331,20
0,00
7 315 331,20
0,00
7 315 331,20
7 354 033,34
-38 702,14
BE
2023BE06AFSP002
15 354 099,78
0,00
15 354 099,78
0,00
15 354 099,78
15 354 099,78
0,00
BG
2023BG06AFSP001
41 549 938,21
0,00
41 549 938,21
0,00
41 549 938,21
41 549 910,31
27,90
CY
2023CY06AFSP001
15 166 625,59
0,00
15 166 625,59
0,00
15 166 625,59
15 166 625,59
0,00
CZ
2023CZ06AFSP001
138 680 708,39
0,00
138 680 708,39
0,00
138 680 708,39
138 680 783,15
-74,76
DE
2023DE06AFSP001
513 063 943,46
0,00
513 063 943,46
0,00
513 063 943,46
513 125 771,19
-61 827,73
DK
2023DK06AFSP001
44 961 708,98
0,00
44 961 708,98
0,00
44 961 708,98
44 961 708,98
0,00
EE
2023EE06AFSP001
28 484 839,61
0,00
28 484 839,61
0,00
28 484 839,61
28 585 105,10
– 100 265,49
ES
2023ES06AFSP001
356 147 959,34
0,00
356 147 959,34
0,00
356 147 959,34
357 025 719,99
– 877 760,65
FI
2023FI06AFSP001
246 782 103,83
0,00
246 782 103,83
0,00
246 782 103,83
246 782 193,26
-89,43
FR
2023FR06AFSP001
1 033 425 693,62
0,00
1 033 425 693,62
0,00
1 033 425 693,62
1 033 629 669,05
– 203 975,43
EL
2023EL06AFSP001
157 529 586,36
0,00
157 529 586,36
0,00
157 529 586,36
157 529 601,21
-14,85
HR
2023HR06AFSP001
115 754 708,93
0,00
115 754 708,93
0,00
115 754 708,93
115 755 552,33
– 843,40
HU
2023HU06AFSP001
220 631 811,58
0,00
220 631 811,58
0,00
220 631 811,58
220 631 830,20
-18,62
IE
2023IE06AFSP001
309 018 458,47
0,00
309 018 458,47
0,00
309 018 458,47
309 018 458,47
0,00
IT
2023IT06AFSP001
467 957 355,50
0,00
467 957 355,50
0,00
467 957 355,50
468 122 339,43
– 164 983,93
LT
2023LT06AFSP001
56 036 737,08
0,00
56 036 737,08
0,00
56 036 737,08
56 036 738,95
-1,87
LU
2023LU06AFSP001
9 103 485,58
0,00
9 103 485,58
0,00
9 103 485,58
8 879 485,57
224 000,01
LV
2023LV06AFSP001
46 011 507,60
0,00
46 011 507,60
0,00
46 011 507,60
46 011 507,60
0,00
MT
2023MT06AFSP001
2 323 343,04
0,00
2 323 343,04
0,00
2 323 343,04
2 323 615,75
– 272,71
NL
2023NL06AFSP001
126 476 696,16
0,00
126 476 696,16
0,00
126 476 696,16
126 451 587,77
25 108,39
PL
2023PL06AFSP001
105 933 014,77
0,00
105 933 014,77
0,00
105 933 014,77
108 779 598,74
-2 846 583,97
PT
2023PT06AFSP001
122 907 001,35
0,00
122 907 001,35
0,00
122 907 001,35
130 524 049,96
-7 617 048,61
RO
2023RO06AFSP001
223 040 990,59
0,00
223 040 990,59
0,00
223 040 990,59
222 917 219,46
123 771,13
SE
2023SE06AFSP001
122 379 428,00
0,00
122 379 428,00
0,00
122 379 428,00
122 399 835,95
-20 407,95
SI
2023SI06AFSP001
61 140 675,42
0,00
61 140 675,42
0,00
61 140 675,42
61 140 679,38
-3,96
SK
2023SK06AFSP001
119 955 638,51
0,00
119 955 638,51
0,00
119 955 638,51
119 957 497,84
-1 859,33

(*1) The amounts to be recovered from (-) or paid to (+) the MS include the funds which are reusable by reallocation by the Member State

Clearance of the Paying Agencies' accounts

Financial year FY2024 – EAFRD

Reductions for non-compliance with the latest payment deadlines in accordance with Article 44 (2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116

In Euro
Member State
CCI
Reductions for non-compliance with latest payment deadlines for FY2024
AT
2023AT06AFSP001
0,00
BE
2023BE06AFSP001
0,00
BE
2023BE06AFSP002
0,00
BG
2023BG06AFSP001
0,00
CY
2023CY06AFSP001
0,00
CZ
2023CZ06AFSP001
0,00
DE
2023DE06AFSP001
0,00
DK
2023DK06AFSP001
0,00
EE
2023EE06AFSP001
0,00
ES
2023ES06AFSP001
0,00
FI
2023FI06AFSP001
0,00
FR
2023FR06AFSP001
0,00
EL
2023EL06AFSP001
0,00
HR
2023HR06AFSP001
0,00
HU
2023HU06AFSP001
0,00
IE
2023IE06AFSP001
0,00
IT
2023IT06AFSP001
0,00
LT
2023LT06AFSP001
0,00
LU
2023LU06AFSP001
0,00
LV
2023LV06AFSP001
0,00
MT
2023MT06AFSP001
0,00
NL
2023NL06AFSP001
0,00
PL
2023PL06AFSP001
0,00
PT
2023PT06AFSP001
0,00
RO
2023RO06AFSP001
0,00
SE
2023SE06AFSP001
0,00
SI
2023SI06AFSP001
0,00
SK
2023SK06AFSP001
0,00

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/976 of 20 May 2025 appointing the European Union Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/976 21.5.2025
(1) On 25 November 1996, the Council agreed to appoint a European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Middle East Peace Process.
(2) On 28 February 2025, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2025/443(1), appointing Mr Luigi DI MAIO as the EUSR for the Middle East Peace Process. The EUSR’s mandate expires on 1 June 2025.
(3) The resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a strategic priority for the Union and the Union must remain actively engaged until that conflict is solved on the basis of the two-state solution.
(4) The Union is committed to a comprehensive and lasting peace for the entire Middle East region and stands ready to work to that end together with regional and international partners.
(5) An EUSR for the Middle East Peace Process should be appointed for a period of 12 months.
(6) The EUSR will implement the mandate in the context of a challenging regional situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union’s external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty,
(a) provide an active and efficient Union contribution to actions and initiatives leading to a final settlement of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict based on the two-state solution and in line with the Union parameters and relevant UNSC Resolutions, including UNSC Resolution 2334 (2016), and put forward proposals for Union action in this regard;
(b) facilitate and maintain close contacts with all the parties to the peace process, in particular Israel and the Palestinian Authority, relevant political actors and countries of the region, and other relevant countries, as well as the UN and other relevant international organisations, like the League of Arab States or the Gulf Cooperation Council, in order to work with them in strengthening the peace process;
(c) take advantage of the evolving regional landscape in the Middle East and in particular the normalisation of relations between Israel and a number of Arab countries, in order to further advance the peace process and thus contribute to regional stability;
(d) pay particular attention to factors affecting the regional dimension of the peace process, including the developments related to the conflict in Gaza and in the region following the brutal and indiscriminate terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel on 7 October 2023, to the engagement with Arab partners and to the implementation of the Arab Peace Initiative;
(e) actively support and contribute to peace negotiations between the parties, including by putting forward proposals on behalf of the Union and in line with its consolidated longstanding policy in the context of those negotiations;
(f) ensure the continued presence of the Union in relevant international fora;
(g) contribute to crisis management and early warning;
(h) contribute to the implementation of international agreements reached between the parties and engage with them diplomatically in the event of non-compliance with the terms of those agreements;
(i) contribute to political efforts to promote a sustainable solution for the Day After in the Gaza Strip which is an integral part of a future Palestinian State, to support the Palestinian Authority’s return to Gaza, including by facilitating discussions between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and to promote humanitarian efforts;
(j) engage constructively with signatories to agreements within the framework of the peace process in order to promote compliance with the basic norms of democracy, including respect for international humanitarian law, human rights and the rule of law;
(k) make proposals for Union intervention in the peace process and on the best way of pursuing Union initiatives and ongoing peace-process-related Union efforts, such as the Union’s contribution to Palestinian reforms and the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two state solution, and including the political aspects of relevant Union development projects;
(l) engage the parties in refraining from unilateral actions threatening the viability of the two-State solution, notably in the occupied Palestinian territory, including settlement policy and incitement to violence and hate speech;
(m) contribute to the implementation of the Union’s human rights policy in cooperation with the EUSR for Human Rights, including the Union Guidelines on human rights, in particular the Union Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict as well as on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them, and Union policy regarding UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security;
(n) contribute to a better understanding and visibility of the role of the Union among opinion leaders in the region;
(o) engage with representatives of civil society, including women and young people, as well as with those involved in measures to build confidence between the parties.
(a) establishing a specific security plan based on guidance from the EEAS, including specific physical, organisational and procedural security measures, governing management of the secure movement of personnel to, and within, the area of responsibility, as well as management of security incidents and a mission contingency and evacuation plan;
(b) ensuring that all personnel deployed outside the Union are covered by high-risk insurance as required by the conditions in the area of responsibility;
(c) ensuring that all personnel to be deployed outside the Union, including locally contracted personnel, have received appropriate security training before or upon arriving in the area of responsibility, based on the risk ratings assigned to that area by the EEAS;
(d) ensuring that all agreed recommendations made following regular security assessments are implemented and providing the High Representative, the Council and the Commission with written reports on their implementation and on other security issues within the framework of the regular progress reports and the final comprehensive mandate implementation report referred to in Article 15.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 33, in conjunction with Article 31(2) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 25 November 1996, the Council agreed to appoint a European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Middle East Peace Process.
(2) On 28 February 2025, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2025/443 (1), appointing Mr Luigi DI MAIO as the EUSR for the Middle East Peace Process. The EUSR’s mandate expires on 1 June 2025.
(3) The resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a strategic priority for the Union and the Union must remain actively engaged until that conflict is solved on the basis of the two-state solution.
(4) The Union is committed to a comprehensive and lasting peace for the entire Middle East region and stands ready to work to that end together with regional and international partners.
(5) An EUSR for the Middle East Peace Process should be appointed for a period of 12 months.
(6) The EUSR will implement the mandate in the context of a challenging regional situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union’s external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

European Union Special Representative

Mr Christophe Bigot is hereby appointed as the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Middle East Peace Process from 2 June 2025 to 31 May 2026. The Council may decide that the mandate of the EUSR be terminated earlier, on the basis of an assessment by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’).

Policy objectives

1. The mandate of the EUSR shall be based on the overall policy objective of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace that should be achieved on the basis of a two-state solution, with Israel and a democratic, contiguous, viable, peaceful and sovereign Palestinian State living side by side within secure and recognised borders, enjoying normal relations with their neighbours in accordance with the relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), and recalling other relevant resolutions, including UNSC Resolution 2334 (2016), the Madrid principles, including land for peace, the Roadmap, the agreements previously reached by the parties, the Arab Peace Initiative and the recommendations of the Middle East Quartet (the ‘Quartet’) of 1 July 2016. In light of the different strands of Israeli-Arab relations, the regional dimension constitutes an essential component for a comprehensive peace.

2. In achieving the objective set out in paragraph 1, the policy priorities are preserving the two-state solution and relaunching and supporting the peace process. Clear parameters defining the basis for negotiations are key elements for a successful outcome and the Union has set out its position with regard to such parameters in the Council conclusions of December 2009, December 2010 and July 2014, which it will continue to actively promote. The Union is committed to working with the parties and with partners in the international community and in the region, and to actively pursuing appropriate international initiatives to create a new dynamic for the negotiations.

Mandate

1. In order to achieve the policy objective set out in Article 2, the mandate shall be to:
(a) provide an active and efficient Union contribution to actions and initiatives leading to a final settlement of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict based on the two-state solution and in line with the Union parameters and relevant UNSC Resolutions, including UNSC Resolution 2334 (2016), and put forward proposals for Union action in this regard;
(b) facilitate and maintain close contacts with all the parties to the peace process, in particular Israel and the Palestinian Authority, relevant political actors and countries of the region, and other relevant countries, as well as the UN and other relevant international organisations, like the League of Arab States or the Gulf Cooperation Council, in order to work with them in strengthening the peace process;
(c) take advantage of the evolving regional landscape in the Middle East and in particular the normalisation of relations between Israel and a number of Arab countries, in order to further advance the peace process and thus contribute to regional stability;
(d) pay particular attention to factors affecting the regional dimension of the peace process, including the developments related to the conflict in Gaza and in the region following the brutal and indiscriminate terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel on 7 October 2023, to the engagement with Arab partners and to the implementation of the Arab Peace Initiative;
(e) actively support and contribute to peace negotiations between the parties, including by putting forward proposals on behalf of the Union and in line with its consolidated longstanding policy in the context of those negotiations;
(f) ensure the continued presence of the Union in relevant international fora;
(g) contribute to crisis management and early warning;
(h) contribute to the implementation of international agreements reached between the parties and engage with them diplomatically in the event of non-compliance with the terms of those agreements;
(i) contribute to political efforts to promote a sustainable solution for the Day After in the Gaza Strip which is an integral part of a future Palestinian State, to support the Palestinian Authority’s return to Gaza, including by facilitating discussions between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and to promote humanitarian efforts;
(j) engage constructively with signatories to agreements within the framework of the peace process in order to promote compliance with the basic norms of democracy, including respect for international humanitarian law, human rights and the rule of law;
(k) make proposals for Union intervention in the peace process and on the best way of pursuing Union initiatives and ongoing peace-process-related Union efforts, such as the Union’s contribution to Palestinian reforms and the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two state solution, and including the political aspects of relevant Union development projects;
(l) engage the parties in refraining from unilateral actions threatening the viability of the two-State solution, notably in the occupied Palestinian territory, including settlement policy and incitement to violence and hate speech;
(m) contribute to the implementation of the Union’s human rights policy in cooperation with the EUSR for Human Rights, including the Union Guidelines on human rights, in particular the Union Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict as well as on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them, and Union policy regarding UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security;
(n) contribute to a better understanding and visibility of the role of the Union among opinion leaders in the region;
(o) engage with representatives of civil society, including women and young people, as well as with those involved in measures to build confidence between the parties.

2. The EUSR shall support the work of the HR, while maintaining an overview of all activities of the Union in the region related to the Middle East Peace Process.

Implementation of the mandate

1. The EUSR shall be responsible for the implementation of the mandate, acting under the authority of the High Representative.

2. The PSC shall maintain a privileged link with the EUSR and shall be the EUSR’s primary point of contact within the Council. The PSC shall provide the EUSR with strategic guidance and political direction within the framework of the mandate, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative.

3. The EUSR shall ensure regular, systematic, thorough and clear action and cooperation with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the relevant departments thereof.

4. The EUSR will undertake regular visits to the region and will ensure close coordination with relevant Union Delegations across the region, including the Union Representative Office in Jerusalem, the Union Delegation in Tel Aviv and, through them, with Member States’ diplomatic representations.

Financing

1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the mandate (the ‘expenditure’) for the period from 2 June 2025 until 31 May 2026 shall be EUR 1 368 570,22.
2. The expenditure shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.

3. The management of the expenditure shall be subject to a contract between the EUSR and the Commission. The EUSR shall be accountable to the Commission for all expenditure.

Composition of the EUSR’s team

1. Within the limits of the mandate and the corresponding financial means made available, the EUSR shall be responsible for constituting a team. The EUSR’s team shall include the expertise on specific policy issues as required by the mandate. The EUSR shall keep the Council and the Commission promptly informed of the composition of the team.

2. Member States, institutions of the Union and the EEAS may propose the secondment of personnel to work on the EUSR’s team. The salaries of such seconded personnel shall be covered by the seconding Member State, by the institution of the Union concerned or by the EEAS, as appropriate. Experts seconded by Member States to the institutions of the Union or to the EEAS may also be seconded to work with the EUSR’s team. International contracted personnel shall have the nationality of a Member State.

3. All seconded personnel shall remain under the administrative authority of the seconding Member State, of the institution of the Union concerned or of the EEAS and shall carry out their duties and act in the interest of the mandate.

4. The EUSR’s team shall be co-located with the relevant EEAS department, Union Delegation in Tel Aviv and Union Representative Office in Jerusalem in order to ensure the coherence and consistency of their respective activities.

Privileges and immunities of the EUSR and members of the EUSR’s team

The privileges, immunities and further guarantees relating to the EUSR and to the members of the EUSR’s team necessary for the completion and smooth functioning of the EUSR’s mandate shall be agreed with the host parties, as appropriate. Member States and the EEAS shall grant all necessary support to that effect.

Security of EU classified information

The EUSR and the members of the EUSR’s team shall respect the security principles and minimum standards established by Council Decision 2013/488/EU (2).

Access to information and logistical support

1. Member States, the Commission, the EEAS, and the General Secretariat of the Council shall ensure that the EUSR is given access to any relevant information.

2. The Union Delegations in the region and Member States, as appropriate, shall provide logistical support to the EUSR and to the members of the EUSR’s team.

Security

In accordance with the Union’s policy on the security of personnel deployed outside the Union in an operational capacity under Title V of the Treaty, the EUSR shall take all reasonably practicable measures, in conformity with the mandate and on the basis of the security situation in the area of responsibility, for the security of all personnel under the EUSR’s direct authority, in particular by:

(a) establishing a specific security plan based on guidance from the EEAS, including specific physical, organisational and procedural security measures, governing management of the secure movement of personnel to, and within, the area of responsibility, as well as management of security incidents and a mission contingency and evacuation plan;
(b) ensuring that all personnel deployed outside the Union are covered by high-risk insurance as required by the conditions in the area of responsibility;
(c) ensuring that all personnel to be deployed outside the Union, including locally contracted personnel, have received appropriate security training before or upon arriving in the area of responsibility, based on the risk ratings assigned to that area by the EEAS;
(d) ensuring that all agreed recommendations made following regular security assessments are implemented and providing the High Representative, the Council and the Commission with written reports on their implementation and on other security issues within the framework of the regular progress reports and the final comprehensive mandate implementation report referred to in Article 15.

Reporting

The EUSR shall regularly provide the High Representative with reports. The EUSR shall report regularly to the PSC and as necessary to Council working parties. Regular reports shall be circulated through the COREU network. The EEAS shall be fully informed at all times. The EUSR may provide the Foreign Affairs Council with reports. In accordance with Article 36 of the Treaty, the EUSR may be involved in providing information to the European Parliament.

Access to documents and data protection

1. The EUSR shall apply the rules laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3), as well as the relevant implementing rules adopted by the High Representative.

2. The EUSR shall protect individuals with regard to the processing of their personal data in accordance with the rules laid down in Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4), as well as the relevant implementing rules adopted by the High Representative.

Coordination

1. The EUSR shall contribute to the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the Union’s action and shall help ensure that all Union instruments and Member States’ actions are engaged consistently, to attain the Union’s policy objectives. Liaison with Member States shall be sought where appropriate. The activities of the EUSR shall be coordinated with those of the EEAS and Commission services. The EUSR shall provide regular briefings to the Union’s Delegations and to Member States’ diplomatic representations, including the Union Representative Office in Jerusalem and the Union Delegation in Tel Aviv.

2. In the field, close liaison shall be maintained with the relevant Heads of Member States’ Missions, Heads of Union Delegations and Heads of common security and defence policy Missions. They shall make every effort to assist the EUSR in the implementation of the mandate. The EUSR, in close coordination with the Head of Union Delegation in Tel Aviv and the Union Representative Office in Jerusalem, shall provide the Heads of the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) and of the European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah) with local political guidance. The EUSR shall also liaise with other international and regional actors in the field.

Assistance in relation to claims

The EUSR and the members of the EUSR’s team shall provide assistance in responding to any claims and obligations arising from the mandates of the previous EUSRs for the Middle East Peace Process, and shall provide administrative assistance and access to relevant documents for such purposes.

Review

The implementation of this Decision and its consistency with other contributions from the Union to the region shall be kept under regular review. The EUSR shall present the High Representative, the Council and the Commission with regular progress reports and a final comprehensive mandate implementation report by 28 February 2026.

Entry into force

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/972 of 23 May 2025 on the clearance of the accounts of the paying agencies of Member States concerning expenditure financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) for the financial year 2024 (notified under document C(2025) 3167)

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/972 27.5.2025
(1) Article 104(1), second subparagraph, point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 provides that Article 4(1), point (b), Article 5, Article 7(3), Articles 9, 17, 21 and 34, Article 35(4), Articles 36, 37, 38, 40 to 43, 51, 52, 54, 56, 59, 63, 64, 67, 68, 70 to 75, 77, 91 to 97, 99 and 100, Article 102(2) and Articles 110 and 111 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 continue to apply, as regards the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF), in relation to expenditure incurred and payments made for the financial year 2024.
(2) Article 64, second paragraph, point (a), of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128(3)provides that Article 2, Article 3(1), first subparagraph, Article 3(2), Article 4(1), point (b), Article 5, Article 6, Article 7, Articles 21 to 25, Article 27, Article 28, Article 29, Article 30(1), points (a), (b) and (c), Article 30(2), (3) and (4), and Articles 31 to 40 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014(4)continue to apply, as regards the EAGF, in relation to expenditure incurred and payments made for the financial year 2024.
(3) Article 64, second paragraph, point (c), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128 provides that Annexes II and III to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014 continue to apply for the purposes of Article 32, points (f) and (g), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128 for the financial year 2024.
(4) Article 40, second paragraph, of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/127(5)provides that Article 5, Article 5a, Article 7(3) and (4), Article 10, Article 11(1), second subparagraph, Article 11(2), Article 12, Article 13 and Article 41(5) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 907/2014(6)continue to apply, as regards the EAGF, in relation to expenditure incurred and payments made for the financial year 2024.
(5) Pursuant to Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 and Article 53 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116, the Commission, on the basis of the annual accounts submitted by the Member States, accompanied by the information required for the clearance of accounts and an audit opinion regarding the completeness, accuracy and veracity of the accounts and the reports established by the certification bodies, is to clear the accounts of the paying agencies referred to in Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 and Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 prior to 31 May of the year following the budget year in question.
(6) In accordance with Article 35 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116, the agricultural financial year begins on 16 October of year N-1 and ends on 15 October of year N. When clearing the accounts for the financial year 2024, account should be taken of expenditure incurred by the Member States between 16 October 2023 and 15 October 2024, in accordance with Article 11(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128.
(7) Article 33(2), first subparagraph, of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014 and Article 35(2), first subparagraph, of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128 provide that the amounts that are recoverable from, or payable to, each Member State, in accordance with the accounts clearance decision referred to in Article 33(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014 and in Article 35(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128, are to be established by deducting the monthly payments for the financial year concerned, from the expenditure recognised for that year, in accordance with Article 33(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014 and Article 35(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128. The Commission is to deduct that amount from or add it to the monthly payment relating to the expenditure effected in the second month following the clearance of accounts decision.
(8) The Commission has checked the information submitted by the Member States and has communicated the results of its checks to the Member States, together with the amendments it proposes.
(9) For all paying agencies, the annual accounts and the accompanying documents permit the Commission to take a decision on the completeness, accuracy and veracity of the annual accounts submitted.
(10) Pursuant to Article 41(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 and Article 39(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116, the Commission is to verify compliance by the Member States with the payment periods and financial ceilings laid down in Union legislation for the payment of aid to beneficiaries and to decide on possible reductions of monthly payments to the Member States.
(11) Pursuant to Article 40, first subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 and Article 38 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 in conjunction with Article 5(1) of Delegated Regulation (EU) No 907/2014 and Article 5(1) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/127, respectively, where payments have been made after the latest possible date of payment, the Commission is to reduce the amount of the monthly payments granted to the Member States and adjust the financial impact of the reduction in proportion to the delay in payment by applying the different rates provided for in Article 5(2) and (3) of Delegated Regulation (EU) No 907/2014 and Article 5(2) and (3) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/127. In accordance with Article 5(5), second subparagraph, of Delegated Regulation (EU) No 907/2014 and with Article 5(5), second subparagraph, of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/127, any overrun of payment deadlines is to be taken into account, at the latest, in the accounts clearance decision. Some of the expenditure declared by certain Member States during the financial year 2024 was effected after the applicable deadlines. This Decision should therefore fix the relevant reductions.
(12) Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(7), continues to apply in respect of aid applications relating to claim years starting before 1 January 2023, pursuant to Article 154(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council(8). Several Commission Regulations supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 set financial ceilings for certain measures financed in respect of direct payments under the EAGF. Any overrun of such ceilings, after taking into account the linear reduction, the financial discipline and the reduction of payments laid down in Articles 7, 8 and 11, respectively, of Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013, gives rise to reductions of the monthly payments to be made to the Member State concerned pursuant to Article 41(1), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013. Following a final assessment after submission of the annual accounts, any overruns of the ceilings detected and not deducted from the monthly payments should be taken into account in this Decision.
(13) Pursuant to Article 41 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 and Article 39 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116, the Commission has already reduced a number of monthly payments for the financial year 2024 due to expenditure not effected in accordance with Union rules. In this Decision, the Commission should consider such reduced amounts in order to avoid making any inappropriate, or untimely, payments or reimbursements which could later be subject to a financial correction. The amounts in question should be examined, where appropriate, under conformity clearance proceedings pursuant to Article 52 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 and to Article 55 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116
(14) The Commission has already reduced the relevant monthly payments for the financial year 2024 for the amounts due to the EAGF as a result of financial and conformity clearance decisions, pursuant to Articles 51 and 52 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 and Articles 53 and 55 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 executed by the Commission in the financial year 2024. Any such amounts are considered in this Decision.
(15) Pursuant to Article 54(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, 50 % of the financial consequences of the non-recovery of irregularities is to be borne by the Member State concerned, if the recovery has not taken place within four years from the date of the recovery request, or within eight years where the recovery is taken in the national courts. Article 54(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 requires Member States to attach to the annual accounts that they are to submit to the Commission, pursuant to Article 29 of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014, a certified table reflecting the amounts to be borne by them under Article 54(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013. Rules on the application of the Member States’ obligation to report the amounts to be recovered are laid down in Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014. Annex II to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014 sets out the model of the table that Member States should use to provide information about amounts to be recovered. On the basis of the tables completed by the Member States, the Commission should decide on the financial consequences of the non-recovery of irregularities older than four or eight years respectively.
(16) Pursuant to Article 54(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, on duly justified grounds, Member States may decide not to pursue recovery. Such a decision may be taken only if the costs already incurred, and likely to be incurred, total more than the amount to be recovered, or if the recovery proves impossible owing to the insolvency, recorded and recognised under national law, of the debtor or the persons legally responsible for the irregularity. If the decision has been taken within four years from the date of the recovery request, or within eight years where the recovery is taken in the national courts, 100 % of the financial consequences of the non-recovery should be borne by the Union budget. The amounts for which a particular Member State decided not to pursue recovery and the grounds for its decision are to be included in the summary report referred to in Article 54(4) of that Regulation. Therefore, such amounts should not be charged to the Member States concerned and are consequently to be borne by the Union budget.
(17) In accordance with Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 and with Article 53 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116, this Decision should be without prejudice to the decisions the Commission may take subsequently to exclude from Union financing expenditure pursuant to Article 52 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 and Articles 54 and 55 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116,
Member State 2024 – Expenditure / Assigned Revenue for the Paying Agencies for which the accounts are Total a + b Reductions and suspensions for the whole financial year(1) Amount to be charged in accordance with Article 54(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 Total including reductions and suspensions Payments made to the Member State for the financial year Amount to be recovered from (-) or paid to (+) the Member State(2)
cleared disjoined
= expenditure / assigned revenue declared in the annual declaration = total of the expenditure / assigned revenue in the monthly declarations
a b c=a+b d e f=c+d+e g h=f-g
AT EUR 696 565 001,42 0,00 696 565 001,42 994 767,54 -1 249,82 697 558 519,14 697 559 768,96 -1 249,82
BE EUR 553 789 267,80 0,00 553 789 267,80 – 378 546,79 – 712,96 553 410 008,05 555 112 173,33 -1 702 165,28
BG BGN 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -2 373,84 -2 373,84 0,00 -2 373,84
BG EUR 831 485 950,98 0,00 831 485 950,98 -7 338 177,33 0,00 824 147 773,65 824 072 466,75 75 306,90
CY EUR 51 421 473,92 0,00 51 421 473,92 – 420 889,28 0,00 51 000 584,64 50 966 053,22 34 531,42
CZ CZK 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -6 066 994,45 -6 066 994,45 0,00 -6 066 994,45
CZ EUR 841 755 023,99 0,00 841 755 023,99 -6 586 634,66 0,00 835 168 389,33 835 162 223,53 6 165,80
DE EUR 4 482 474 369,03 0,00 4 482 474 369,03 – 735 627,02 – 127 844,49 4 481 610 897,52 4 482 069 049,38 – 458 151,86
DK DKK 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DK EUR 828 180 124,86 0,00 828 180 124,86 -2 505 738,30 0,00 825 674 386,56 825 664 394,95 9 991,61
EE EUR 195 875 127,07 0,00 195 875 127,07 – 979 787,87 0,00 194 895 339,20 194 873 329,16 22 010,04
ES EUR 5 739 832 659,22 0,00 5 739 832 659,22 -79 833 500,17 – 339 847,31 5 659 659 311,74 5 658 623 885,05 1 035 426,69
FI EUR 529 451 605,11 0,00 529 451 605,11 – 171 237,27 -25 137,06 529 255 230,78 529 277 936,12 -22 705,34
FR EUR 7 408 295 093,00 0,00 7 408 295 093,00 -75 214 939,35 – 153 763,59 7 332 926 390,06 7 335 636 287,96 -2 709 897,90
EL EUR 1 924 234 937,08 0,00 1 924 234 937,08 -32 408 441,27 – 330 284,96 1 891 496 210,85 1 902 226 963,94 -10 730 753,09
HR EUR 380 706 854,55 0,00 380 706 854,55 -8 684 204,31 -17 188,53 372 005 461,71 371 808 187,11 197 274,60
HU EUR 1 383 976 095,60 0,00 1 383 976 095,60 -7 670 199,90 0,00 1 376 305 895,70 1 376 356 298,97 -50 403,27
HU HUF 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -45 707 987,00 -45 707 987,00 0,00 -45 707 987,00
IE EUR 1 192 122 143,92 0,00 1 192 122 143,92 -2 084 482,60 -2 428,52 1 190 035 232,80 1 188 889 885,20 1 145 347,60
IT EUR 4 107 883 194,34 0,00 4 107 883 194,34 -42 222 430,09 -3 010 533,40 4 062 650 230,85 4 074 933 568,17 -12 283 337,32
LT EUR 588 647 735,15 0,00 588 647 735,15 -5 578 381,94 -1 313,60 583 068 039,61 583 069 353,21 -1 313,60
LU EUR 31 462 153,17 0,00 31 462 153,17 50 566,72 0,00 31 512 719,89 31 492 387,65 20 332,24
LV EUR 338 523 858,99 0,00 338 523 858,99 -5 763,41 -1 588,29 338 516 507,29 338 518 095,58 -1 588,29
MT EUR 10 121 490,08 0,00 10 121 490,08 – 324 309,63 0,00 9 797 180,45 9 797 177,40 3,05
NL EUR 747 093 956,37 0,00 747 093 956,37 -22 504 736,93 -4 889,62 724 584 329,82 724 667 434,10 -83 104,28
PL EUR 3 461 737 961,80 0,00 3 461 737 961,80 -1 318 807,21 0,00 3 460 419 154,59 3 460 445 279,99 -26 125,40
PL PLN 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -4 708 511,63 -4 708 511,63 0,00 -4 708 511,63
PT EUR 864 560 699,11 0,00 864 560 699,11 -34 017 288,50 – 147 306,92 830 396 103,69 831 160 474,30 – 764 370,61
RO EUR 1 964 397 334,11 0,00 1 964 397 334,11 -82 392 071,80 0,00 1 882 005 262,31 1 882 181 707,49 – 176 445,18
RO RON 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -3 238 745,29 -3 238 745,29 0,00 -3 238 745,29
SE EUR 702 105 230,79 0,00 702 105 230,79 – 374 711,81 0,00 701 730 518,98 701 726 652,57 3 866,41
SE SEK 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
SI EUR 144 810 799,94 0,00 144 810 799,94 0,00 0,00 144 810 799,94 144 810 799,94 0,00
SK EUR 407 254 054,62 0,00 407 254 054,62 – 380 686,22 – 247 925,07 406 625 443,33 407 315 696,94 – 690 253,61
Member State Expenditure(3) Assigned revenue(3) Article 54(2) (=e) Total (=h)
08 02 06 01 6200 6200
i j k l=i+j+k
AT EUR 0,00 0,00 -1 249,82 -1 249,82
BE EUR 0,00 -1 701 452,32 – 712,96 -1 702 165,28
BG BGN 0,00 0,00 -2 373,84 -2 373,84
BG EUR 75 306,90 0,00 0,00 75 306,90
CY EUR 46 988,56 -12 457,14 0,00 34 531,42
CZ CZK 0,00 0,00 -6 066 994,45 -6 066 994,45
CZ EUR 6 165,80 0,00 0,00 6 165,80
DE EUR 0,00 – 330 307,37 – 127 844,49 – 458 151,86
DK DKK 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DK EUR 9 991,61 0,00 0,00 9 991,61
EE EUR 22 010,04 0,00 0,00 22 010,04
ES EUR 1 409 290,03 -34 016,03 – 339 847,31 1 035 426,69
FI EUR 46 781,65 -44 349,93 -25 137,06 -22 705,34
FR EUR 0,00 -2 556 134,31 – 153 763,59 -2 709 897,90
EL EUR 0,00 -10 400 468,13 – 330 284,96 -10 730 753,09
HR EUR 257 773,69 -43 310,56 -17 188,53 197 274,60
HU EUR 0,00 -50 403,27 0,00 -50 403,27
HU HUF 0,00 0,00 -45 707 987,00 -45 707 987,00
IE EUR 1 147 776,12 0,00 -2 428,52 1 145 347,60
IT EUR 0,00 -9 272 803,92 -3 010 533,40 -12 283 337,32
LT EUR 0,00 0,00 -1 313,60 -1 313,60
LU EUR 20 332,24 0,00 0,00 20 332,24
LV EUR 0,00 0,00 -1 588,29 -1 588,29
MT EUR 3,05 0,00 0,00 3,05
NL EUR 0,00 -78 214,66 -4 889,62 -83 104,28
PL EUR 0,00 -26 125,40 0,00 -26 125,40
PL PLN 0,00 0,00 -4 708 511,63 -4 708 511,63
PT EUR 0,00 – 617 063,69 – 147 306,92 – 764 370,61
RO EUR 0,00 – 176 445,18 0,00 – 176 445,18
RO RON 0,00 0,00 -3 238 745,29 -3 238 745,29
SE EUR 12 981,47 -9 115,06 0,00 3 866,41
SE SEK 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
SI EUR 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
SK EUR 0,00 – 442 328,54 – 247 925,07 – 690 253,61
NB:Nomenclature 2025 : 08 02 06 01 , 6200 NB: Nomenclature 2025 : 08 02 06 01 , 6200
NB: Nomenclature 2025 : 08 02 06 01 , 6200
NB: Nomenclature 2025 : 08 02 06 01 , 6200
Member State Currency In National currency In Euro
CY EUR 0,00 0,00
CZ CZK 0,00 0,00
ES EUR 0,00 0,00
HU HUF 0,00 0,00
LT EUR 0,00 0,00
LV EUR 0,00 0,00
MT EUR 0,00 0,00
PL PLN 112 564,14 0,00
SI EUR 0,00 0,00
SK EUR 0,00 0,00
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 (1), and in particular Article 53(1), first subparagraph, and Article 104 thereof,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No 2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, (EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 485/2008 (2), and in particular Article 51 thereof,
After consulting the Committee on the Agricultural Funds,
Whereas:
(1) Article 104(1), second subparagraph, point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 provides that Article 4(1), point (b), Article 5, Article 7(3), Articles 9, 17, 21 and 34, Article 35(4), Articles 36, 37, 38, 40 to 43, 51, 52, 54, 56, 59, 63, 64, 67, 68, 70 to 75, 77, 91 to 97, 99 and 100, Article 102(2) and Articles 110 and 111 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 continue to apply, as regards the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF), in relation to expenditure incurred and payments made for the financial year 2024.
(2) Article 64, second paragraph, point (a), of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128 (3) provides that Article 2, Article 3(1), first subparagraph, Article 3(2), Article 4(1), point (b), Article 5, Article 6, Article 7, Articles 21 to 25, Article 27, Article 28, Article 29, Article 30(1), points (a), (b) and (c), Article 30(2), (3) and (4), and Articles 31 to 40 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014 (4) continue to apply, as regards the EAGF, in relation to expenditure incurred and payments made for the financial year 2024.
(3) Article 64, second paragraph, point (c), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128 provides that Annexes II and III to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014 continue to apply for the purposes of Article 32, points (f) and (g), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128 for the financial year 2024.
(4) Article 40, second paragraph, of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/127 (5) provides that Article 5, Article 5a, Article 7(3) and (4), Article 10, Article 11(1), second subparagraph, Article 11(2), Article 12, Article 13 and Article 41(5) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 907/2014 (6) continue to apply, as regards the EAGF, in relation to expenditure incurred and payments made for the financial year 2024.
(5) Pursuant to Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 and Article 53 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116, the Commission, on the basis of the annual accounts submitted by the Member States, accompanied by the information required for the clearance of accounts and an audit opinion regarding the completeness, accuracy and veracity of the accounts and the reports established by the certification bodies, is to clear the accounts of the paying agencies referred to in Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 and Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 prior to 31 May of the year following the budget year in question.
(6) In accordance with Article 35 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116, the agricultural financial year begins on 16 October of year N-1 and ends on 15 October of year N. When clearing the accounts for the financial year 2024, account should be taken of expenditure incurred by the Member States between 16 October 2023 and 15 October 2024, in accordance with Article 11(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128.
(7) Article 33(2), first subparagraph, of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014 and Article 35(2), first subparagraph, of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128 provide that the amounts that are recoverable from, or payable to, each Member State, in accordance with the accounts clearance decision referred to in Article 33(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014 and in Article 35(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128, are to be established by deducting the monthly payments for the financial year concerned, from the expenditure recognised for that year, in accordance with Article 33(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014 and Article 35(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128. The Commission is to deduct that amount from or add it to the monthly payment relating to the expenditure effected in the second month following the clearance of accounts decision.
(8) The Commission has checked the information submitted by the Member States and has communicated the results of its checks to the Member States, together with the amendments it proposes.
(9) For all paying agencies, the annual accounts and the accompanying documents permit the Commission to take a decision on the completeness, accuracy and veracity of the annual accounts submitted.
(10) Pursuant to Article 41(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 and Article 39(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116, the Commission is to verify compliance by the Member States with the payment periods and financial ceilings laid down in Union legislation for the payment of aid to beneficiaries and to decide on possible reductions of monthly payments to the Member States.
(11) Pursuant to Article 40, first subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 and Article 38 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 in conjunction with Article 5(1) of Delegated Regulation (EU) No 907/2014 and Article 5(1) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/127, respectively, where payments have been made after the latest possible date of payment, the Commission is to reduce the amount of the monthly payments granted to the Member States and adjust the financial impact of the reduction in proportion to the delay in payment by applying the different rates provided for in Article 5(2) and (3) of Delegated Regulation (EU) No 907/2014 and Article 5(2) and (3) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/127. In accordance with Article 5(5), second subparagraph, of Delegated Regulation (EU) No 907/2014 and with Article 5(5), second subparagraph, of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/127, any overrun of payment deadlines is to be taken into account, at the latest, in the accounts clearance decision. Some of the expenditure declared by certain Member States during the financial year 2024 was effected after the applicable deadlines. This Decision should therefore fix the relevant reductions.
(12) Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (7), continues to apply in respect of aid applications relating to claim years starting before 1 January 2023, pursuant to Article 154(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council (8). Several Commission Regulations supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 set financial ceilings for certain measures financed in respect of direct payments under the EAGF. Any overrun of such ceilings, after taking into account the linear reduction, the financial discipline and the reduction of payments laid down in Articles 7, 8 and 11, respectively, of Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013, gives rise to reductions of the monthly payments to be made to the Member State concerned pursuant to Article 41(1), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013. Following a final assessment after submission of the annual accounts, any overruns of the ceilings detected and not deducted from the monthly payments should be taken into account in this Decision.
(13) Pursuant to Article 41 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 and Article 39 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116, the Commission has already reduced a number of monthly payments for the financial year 2024 due to expenditure not effected in accordance with Union rules. In this Decision, the Commission should consider such reduced amounts in order to avoid making any inappropriate, or untimely, payments or reimbursements which could later be subject to a financial correction. The amounts in question should be examined, where appropriate, under conformity clearance proceedings pursuant to Article 52 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 and to Article 55 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116
(14) The Commission has already reduced the relevant monthly payments for the financial year 2024 for the amounts due to the EAGF as a result of financial and conformity clearance decisions, pursuant to Articles 51 and 52 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 and Articles 53 and 55 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 executed by the Commission in the financial year 2024. Any such amounts are considered in this Decision.
(15) Pursuant to Article 54(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, 50 % of the financial consequences of the non-recovery of irregularities is to be borne by the Member State concerned, if the recovery has not taken place within four years from the date of the recovery request, or within eight years where the recovery is taken in the national courts. Article 54(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 requires Member States to attach to the annual accounts that they are to submit to the Commission, pursuant to Article 29 of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014, a certified table reflecting the amounts to be borne by them under Article 54(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013. Rules on the application of the Member States’ obligation to report the amounts to be recovered are laid down in Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014. Annex II to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014 sets out the model of the table that Member States should use to provide information about amounts to be recovered. On the basis of the tables completed by the Member States, the Commission should decide on the financial consequences of the non-recovery of irregularities older than four or eight years respectively.
(16) Pursuant to Article 54(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, on duly justified grounds, Member States may decide not to pursue recovery. Such a decision may be taken only if the costs already incurred, and likely to be incurred, total more than the amount to be recovered, or if the recovery proves impossible owing to the insolvency, recorded and recognised under national law, of the debtor or the persons legally responsible for the irregularity. If the decision has been taken within four years from the date of the recovery request, or within eight years where the recovery is taken in the national courts, 100 % of the financial consequences of the non-recovery should be borne by the Union budget. The amounts for which a particular Member State decided not to pursue recovery and the grounds for its decision are to be included in the summary report referred to in Article 54(4) of that Regulation. Therefore, such amounts should not be charged to the Member States concerned and are consequently to be borne by the Union budget.
(17) In accordance with Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 and with Article 53 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116, this Decision should be without prejudice to the decisions the Commission may take subsequently to exclude from Union financing expenditure pursuant to Article 52 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 and Articles 54 and 55 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The accounts of the Member States’ paying agencies are hereby cleared as regards expenditure financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) in respect of the financial year 2024.
The amounts recoverable from, or payable to, each Member State pursuant to this Decision, including those resulting from the application of Article 54(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, are set out in Annexes I and II to this Decision.
This Decision is without prejudice to future conformity clearance decisions that the Commission may take pursuant to Article 52 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 and Article 55 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 to exclude from Union financing expenditure not effected in conformity with Union law, and to future annual performance clearance decisions that the Commission may take pursuant to Article 54 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 to exclude from Union financing expenditure that does not have a corresponding output as reported in the annual performance report.
This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Member State

2024 – Expenditure / Assigned Revenue for the Paying Agencies for which the accounts are
Total a + b
Reductions and suspensions for the whole financial year (1) Amount to be charged in accordance with Article 54(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013
Total including reductions and suspensions
Payments made to the Member State for the financial year
Amount to be recovered from (-) or paid to (+) the Member State (2) cleared
disjoined
= expenditure / assigned revenue declared in the annual declaration
= total of the expenditure / assigned revenue in the monthly declarations
a
b
c=a+b
d
e
f=c+d+e
g
h=f-g
AT
EUR
696 565 001,42
0,00
696 565 001,42
994 767,54
-1 249,82
697 558 519,14
697 559 768,96
-1 249,82
BE
EUR
553 789 267,80
0,00
553 789 267,80
– 378 546,79
– 712,96
553 410 008,05
555 112 173,33
-1 702 165,28
BG
BGN
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
-2 373,84
-2 373,84
0,00
-2 373,84
BG
EUR
831 485 950,98
0,00
831 485 950,98
-7 338 177,33
0,00
824 147 773,65
824 072 466,75
75 306,90
CY
EUR
51 421 473,92
0,00
51 421 473,92
– 420 889,28
0,00
51 000 584,64
50 966 053,22
34 531,42
CZ
CZK
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
-6 066 994,45
-6 066 994,45
0,00
-6 066 994,45
CZ
EUR
841 755 023,99
0,00
841 755 023,99
-6 586 634,66
0,00
835 168 389,33
835 162 223,53
6 165,80
DE
EUR
4 482 474 369,03
0,00
4 482 474 369,03
– 735 627,02
– 127 844,49
4 481 610 897,52
4 482 069 049,38
– 458 151,86
DK
DKK
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
DK
EUR
828 180 124,86
0,00
828 180 124,86
-2 505 738,30
0,00
825 674 386,56
825 664 394,95
9 991,61
EE
EUR
195 875 127,07
0,00
195 875 127,07
– 979 787,87
0,00
194 895 339,20
194 873 329,16
22 010,04
ES
EUR
5 739 832 659,22
0,00
5 739 832 659,22
-79 833 500,17
– 339 847,31
5 659 659 311,74
5 658 623 885,05
1 035 426,69
FI
EUR
529 451 605,11
0,00
529 451 605,11
– 171 237,27
-25 137,06
529 255 230,78
529 277 936,12
-22 705,34
FR
EUR
7 408 295 093,00
0,00
7 408 295 093,00
-75 214 939,35
– 153 763,59
7 332 926 390,06
7 335 636 287,96
-2 709 897,90
EL
EUR
1 924 234 937,08
0,00
1 924 234 937,08
-32 408 441,27
– 330 284,96
1 891 496 210,85
1 902 226 963,94
-10 730 753,09
HR
EUR
380 706 854,55
0,00
380 706 854,55
-8 684 204,31
-17 188,53
372 005 461,71
371 808 187,11
197 274,60
HU
EUR
1 383 976 095,60
0,00
1 383 976 095,60
-7 670 199,90
0,00
1 376 305 895,70
1 376 356 298,97
-50 403,27
HU
HUF
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
-45 707 987,00
-45 707 987,00
0,00
-45 707 987,00
IE
EUR
1 192 122 143,92
0,00
1 192 122 143,92
-2 084 482,60
-2 428,52
1 190 035 232,80
1 188 889 885,20
1 145 347,60
IT
EUR
4 107 883 194,34
0,00
4 107 883 194,34
-42 222 430,09
-3 010 533,40
4 062 650 230,85
4 074 933 568,17
-12 283 337,32
LT
EUR
588 647 735,15
0,00
588 647 735,15
-5 578 381,94
-1 313,60
583 068 039,61
583 069 353,21
-1 313,60
LU
EUR
31 462 153,17
0,00
31 462 153,17
50 566,72
0,00
31 512 719,89
31 492 387,65
20 332,24
LV
EUR
338 523 858,99
0,00
338 523 858,99
-5 763,41
-1 588,29
338 516 507,29
338 518 095,58
-1 588,29
MT
EUR
10 121 490,08
0,00
10 121 490,08
– 324 309,63
0,00
9 797 180,45
9 797 177,40
3,05
NL
EUR
747 093 956,37
0,00
747 093 956,37
-22 504 736,93
-4 889,62
724 584 329,82
724 667 434,10
-83 104,28
PL
EUR
3 461 737 961,80
0,00
3 461 737 961,80
-1 318 807,21
0,00
3 460 419 154,59
3 460 445 279,99
-26 125,40
PL
PLN
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
-4 708 511,63
-4 708 511,63
0,00
-4 708 511,63
PT
EUR
864 560 699,11
0,00
864 560 699,11
-34 017 288,50
– 147 306,92
830 396 103,69
831 160 474,30
– 764 370,61
RO
EUR
1 964 397 334,11
0,00
1 964 397 334,11
-82 392 071,80
0,00
1 882 005 262,31
1 882 181 707,49
– 176 445,18
RO
RON
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
-3 238 745,29
-3 238 745,29
0,00
-3 238 745,29
SE
EUR
702 105 230,79
0,00
702 105 230,79
– 374 711,81
0,00
701 730 518,98
701 726 652,57
3 866,41
SE
SEK
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
SI
EUR
144 810 799,94
0,00
144 810 799,94
0,00
0,00
144 810 799,94
144 810 799,94
0,00
SK
EUR
407 254 054,62
0,00
407 254 054,62
– 380 686,22
– 247 925,07
406 625 443,33
407 315 696,94
– 690 253,61

Member State

Expenditure (3) Assigned revenue (3) Article 54(2) (=e)
Total (=h)
08 02 06 01
6200
6200
i
j
k
l=i+j+k
AT
EUR
0,00
0,00
-1 249,82
-1 249,82
BE
EUR
0,00
-1 701 452,32
– 712,96
-1 702 165,28
BG
BGN
0,00
0,00
-2 373,84
-2 373,84
BG
EUR
75 306,90
0,00
0,00
75 306,90
CY
EUR
46 988,56
-12 457,14
0,00
34 531,42
CZ
CZK
0,00
0,00
-6 066 994,45
-6 066 994,45
CZ
EUR
6 165,80
0,00
0,00
6 165,80
DE
EUR
0,00
– 330 307,37
– 127 844,49
– 458 151,86
DK
DKK
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
DK
EUR
9 991,61
0,00
0,00
9 991,61
EE
EUR
22 010,04
0,00
0,00
22 010,04
ES
EUR
1 409 290,03
-34 016,03
– 339 847,31
1 035 426,69
FI
EUR
46 781,65
-44 349,93
-25 137,06
-22 705,34
FR
EUR
0,00
-2 556 134,31
– 153 763,59
-2 709 897,90
EL
EUR
0,00
-10 400 468,13
– 330 284,96
-10 730 753,09
HR
EUR
257 773,69
-43 310,56
-17 188,53
197 274,60
HU
EUR
0,00
-50 403,27
0,00
-50 403,27
HU
HUF
0,00
0,00
-45 707 987,00
-45 707 987,00
IE
EUR
1 147 776,12
0,00
-2 428,52
1 145 347,60
IT
EUR
0,00
-9 272 803,92
-3 010 533,40
-12 283 337,32
LT
EUR
0,00
0,00
-1 313,60
-1 313,60
LU
EUR
20 332,24
0,00
0,00
20 332,24
LV
EUR
0,00
0,00
-1 588,29
-1 588,29
MT
EUR
3,05
0,00
0,00
3,05
NL
EUR
0,00
-78 214,66
-4 889,62
-83 104,28
PL
EUR
0,00
-26 125,40
0,00
-26 125,40
PL
PLN
0,00
0,00
-4 708 511,63
-4 708 511,63
PT
EUR
0,00
– 617 063,69
– 147 306,92
– 764 370,61
RO
EUR
0,00
– 176 445,18
0,00
– 176 445,18
RO
RON
0,00
0,00
-3 238 745,29
-3 238 745,29
SE
EUR
12 981,47
-9 115,06
0,00
3 866,41
SE
SEK
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
SI
EUR
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
SK
EUR
0,00
– 442 328,54
– 247 925,07
– 690 253,61

NB:
Nomenclature 2025 : 08 02 06 01 , 6200

(1) The reductions and suspensions are those taken into account in the payment system, to which are added in particular the corrections for the non respect of payment deadlines and other reductions referred to in Article 41 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 and Articles 39-42 of Regulation (EU) No 2021/2116.

(2) For the calculation of the amount to be recovered from or paid to the Member State the amount taken into account is, the total of the annual declaration for the expenditure cleared and the total of the monthly payments made for the cleared expenditure. Applicable exchange rate in accordance with Article 12(3) of Regulation (EU) 2022/127.

(3) BL 08 02 06 01 shall be split between the negative corrections which become assigned revenue in BL 62 00 and the positive ones in favour of MS which shall now be included on the expenditure side 08 02 06 01 as referred to in Article 43 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 and Article 45 of Regulation (EU) No 2021/2116.

Clearance of the Paying Agencies' accounts

Financial year 2024 – EAGF

Corrections in accordance with Article 54(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013
(*1)

Member State
Currency
In National currency
In Euro
CY
EUR
0,00
0,00
CZ
CZK
0,00
0,00
ES
EUR
0,00
0,00
HU
HUF
0,00
0,00
LT
EUR
0,00
0,00
LV
EUR
0,00
0,00
MT
EUR
0,00
0,00
PL
PLN
112 564,14
0,00
SI
EUR
0,00
0,00
SK
EUR
0,00
0,00

(*1) Amounts to be charged to the Member States as a result of the application of Article 54(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 in relation to the Temporary Rural Development Instrument (TRDI) funded by the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) (Commission Regulation (EC) No 27/2004 of 5 January 2004 laying down transitional detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999 as regards the financing by the EAGGF Guarantee Section of rural development measures in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia (OJL 5, 9.1.2004, p. 36)).

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/971 of 23 May 2025 on the clearance of the accounts of the paying agencies of Member States concerning expenditure financed by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) in the programming period 2014-2022 for the financial year 2024 (notified under document C(2025) 3160)

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/971 27.5.2025
(1) Article 104(1), second subparagraph, point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 provides that Article 4(1), point (b), Article 5, Article 7(3), Articles 9, 17, 21 and 34, Article 35(4), Articles 36, 37, 38, 40 to 43, 51, 52, 54, 56, 59, 63, 64, 67, 68, 70 to 75, 77, 91 to 97, 99 and 100, Article 102(2) and Articles 110 and 111 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 continue to apply, as regards the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), in relation to expenditure incurred by the beneficiaries and payments made by the paying agency in the framework of the implementation of rural development programmes pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(3)for the financial year 2024.
(2) Article 64, second paragraph, point (a), of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128(4)provides that Article 2, Article 3(1), first subparagraph, Article 3(2), Article 4(1), point (b), Article 5, Article 6, Article 7, Articles 21 to 25, Article 27, Article 28, Article 29, Article 30(1), points (a), (b) and (c), Article 30(2), (3) and (4), and Articles 31 to 40 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014(5)continue to apply, as regards the EAFRD, in relation to expenditure incurred by the beneficiaries and payments made by the paying agency in the framework of the implementation of rural development programmes pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 for the financial year 2024.
(3) Article 64, second paragraph, point (c), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128 provides that Annexes II and III to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014 continue to apply for the purposes of Article 32, points (f) and (g), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128 for the financial year 2024.
(4) Article 40, second paragraph, point (a), of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/127(6)provides that Article 5, Article 5a, Article 7(3) and (4), Article 10, Article 11(1), second subparagraph, Article 11(2), Article 12, Article 13 and Article 41(5) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 907/2014(7)continue to apply as regards the EAFRD in relation to expenditure incurred by the beneficiaries and payments made by the paying agency in the framework of the implementation of rural development programmes pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 for the financial year 2024.
(5) Pursuant to Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, the Commission, on the basis of the annual accounts submitted by the Member States, accompanied by the information required for the clearance of accounts and an audit opinion regarding the completeness, accuracy and veracity of the accounts and the reports established by the certification bodies, is to clear the accounts of the paying agencies referred to in Article 7 of that Regulation prior to 31 May of the year following the budget year in question.
(6) In accordance with Article 35 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116, the agricultural financial year begins on 16 October of year N-1 and ends on 15 October of year N. When clearing the accounts for financial year 2024, for the purpose of aligning the reference period for the EAFRD expenditure with that of the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF), account should be taken of expenditure incurred by the Member States between 16 October 2023 and 15 October 2024, in accordance with Article 11(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128.
(7) Article 33(2), second subparagraph, of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014 provides that the amounts that are recoverable from, or payable to, each Member State, in accordance with the accounts clearance decision referred to in Article 33(1) of that Implementing Regulation, are to be established by deducting the intermediate payments for the financial year concerned from the expenditure recognised for that year in accordance with that Article 33(1). Article 33(2), third subparagraph, of that Implementing Regulation provides that the Commission is to deduct that amount from or add it to the next intermediate payment.
(8) The Commission has checked the information submitted by the Member States and has communicated the results of its checks to the Member States, together with the amendments it proposes.
(9) For all paying agencies, the annual accounts and the accompanying documents permit the Commission to take a decision on the completeness, accuracy and veracity of the annual accounts submitted.
(10) In accordance with Article 83 of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(8), the deadline for interim payments referred to in Article 36(5) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 may be interrupted for a maximum period of six months in order to carry out additional verifications following information that these payments are linked to an irregularity having serious financial consequences. In adopting this Decision, the Commission should consider the amounts affected by such interruption in order to avoid making any inappropriate or untimely payments.
(11) Pursuant to Article 41 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, the Commission has already reduced or suspended a number of interim payments for financial year 2024 due to expenditure not effected in accordance with Union rules. In this Decision, the Commission should consider such amounts reduced or suspended on the basis of Article 41 of that Regulation, in order to avoid making any undue or untimely payments or reimbursements that could later be subject to a financial correction.
(12) Article 36(3), first subparagraph, point (b), of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 provides that interim payments are to be made without overrun of the total programmed EAFRD contribution. Pursuant to Article 23(2) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014, where the combined total of declarations of expenditure exceeds the total programmed contribution for a rural development programme, the amount to be paid is to be capped at the programmed amount, without prejudice to the ceiling provided for in Article 34(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013. The capped amount will be subject to a later reimbursement by the Commission following the adoption of the amended financial plan, at the latest at the closure of the programme.
(13) In accordance with Article 39c(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013, support for exceptional temporary aid to farmers and SMEs particularly affected by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is to be paid by 15 October 2023. Payments made after this deadline are considered ineligible and should be duly reflected in this Decision.
(14) Article 41(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 sets thresholds for payments related to financial instruments, providing that each interim payment request during the eligibility period is not to exceed 25 % of the total programme contributions committed to the financial instrument under the funding agreement. Any expenditure exceeding these thresholds is considered ineligible for reimbursement.
(15) In accordance with Article 75(1), fourth subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, the rules on payment deadlines for measures under rural development in the context of the integrated administration and control system apply from claim year 2019. The reductions for non-compliance with the latest payment deadlines, calculated in accordance with Article 5a of Delegated Regulation (EU) No 907/2014, follow the procedure laid down in Articles 40 and 41 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 and are to be taken into account in this Decision for the financial year 2024. Those reductions may be examined, where appropriate, under conformity clearance proceedings pursuant to Article 52 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013.
(16) This Decision should also cover the additional resources referred to in Article 58a of Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013.
(17) Pursuant to Article 34(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, the combined total of prefinancing and interim payments are not to exceed 95 % of the EAFRD’s contribution to each rural development programme. The following programmes have reached their thresholds: 2014AT06RDNP001, 2014CZ06RDNP001, 2014DE06RDRP003, 2014DE06RDRP004, 2014FI06RDRP001, 2014FR06RDNP001, 2014FR06RDRP074, 2014FR06RDRP082, 2014FR06RDRP083, 2014HU06RDNP001, 2014IE06RDNP001, 2014LU06RDNP001, 2014PT06RDRP002. The outstanding balance of those programmes will be settled at the closure of the programme.
(18) Pursuant to Article 54(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, 50 % of the financial consequences of the non-recovery of irregularities is to be borne by the Member State concerned, if the recovery has not taken place within four years from the date of the recovery request, or within eight years where the recovery is taken in the national courts. Article 54(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 requires Member States to attach to the annual accounts that they are to submit to the Commission, pursuant to Article 29 of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014, a certified table reflecting the amounts to be borne by them under Article 54(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013. Rules on the application of the Member States’ obligation to report the amounts to be recovered are laid down in Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014. Annex II to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014 sets out the model of the table that Member States are to use to provide information about amounts to be recovered. On the basis of the tables completed by the Member States, the Commission should decide on the financial consequences of the non-recovery of irregularities older than four or eight years respectively.
(19) Pursuant to Article 54(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, on duly justified grounds, Member States may decide not to pursue recovery. Such a decision may be taken only if the costs already incurred, and likely to be incurred, total more than the amount to be recovered, or if the recovery proves impossible owing to the insolvency, recorded and recognised under national law, of the debtor or the persons legally responsible for the irregularity. If the decision has been taken within four years from the date of the recovery request, or within eight years where the recovery is taken in the national courts, 100 % of the financial consequences of the non-recovery should be borne by the Union budget. The amounts for which a particular Member State decided not to pursue recovery and the grounds for its decision are to be included in the summary report referred to in Article 54(4) of that Regulation. Therefore, such amounts should not be charged to the Member States concerned and are consequently to be borne by the Union budget.
(20) This Decision should also take into account the amounts that are still to be charged to the Member States as a result of the application of Article 54(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 in relation to the 2007-2013 programming period for the EAFRD.
(21) In accordance with Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, this Decision should be without prejudice to the decisions the Commission may take subsequently to exclude from Union financing expenditure not effected in accordance with Union rules,
(in Euro)
Member State CCI Expenditure 2024 Corrections(*1) Total Non-reusable amounts Accepted amount cleared for FY 2024 Interim payments reimbursed to the Member State for the financial year(*2) Balance to be settled at closure of programming period due to 95 % threshold reached(*3) Amount to be recovered from (-) or paid to (+) the Member State
i ii iii = i + ii iv v = iii – iv vi vii viii = v – vi – vii
AT 2014AT06RDNP001 385 717 094,18 – 925 533,74 384 791 560,44 0,00 384 791 560,44 377 901 744,19 7 805 048,13 – 915 231,88
BE 2014BE06RDRP001 64 484 765,23 0,00 64 484 765,23 0,00 64 484 765,23 64 484 760,31 0,00 4,92
BE 2014BE06RDRP002 26 049 135,48 – 296 326,69 25 752 808,79 0,00 25 752 808,79 25 755 670,37 0,00 -2 861,58
BG 2014BG06RDNP001 306 463 437,81 -15 476,70 306 447 961,11 0,00 306 447 961,11 306 447 959,61 0,00 1,50
CY 2014CY06RDNP001 11 534 876,35 -3 221,06 11 531 655,29 0,00 11 531 655,29 11 292 763,57 0,00 238 891,72
CZ 2014CZ06RDNP001 103 582 421,56 494 242,95 104 076 664,51 0,00 104 076 664,51 51 970 573,41 52 106 162,31 -71,21
DE 2014DE06RDRP003 66 573 538,54 – 961 710,21 65 611 828,33 0,00 65 611 828,33 63 179 368,04 2 434 424,09 -1 963,80
DE 2014DE06RDRP004 164 239 573,89 -3 661 077,06 160 578 496,83 0,00 160 578 496,83 160 574 203,54 4 293,29 0,00
DE 2014DE06RDRP007 156 038 784,26 0,00 156 038 784,26 0,00 156 038 784,26 156 038 828,07 0,00 -43,81
DE 2014DE06RDRP010 16 146 024,47 0,00 16 146 024,47 0,00 16 146 024,47 16 178 923,26 0,00 -32 898,79
DE 2014DE06RDRP011 105 157 959,72 0,00 105 157 959,72 0,00 105 157 959,72 105 157 959,72 0,00 0,00
DE 2014DE06RDRP012 172 412 940,50 0,00 172 412 940,50 0,00 172 412 940,50 172 412 940,50 0,00 0,00
DE 2014DE06RDRP015 81 446 949,83 -84 904,95 81 362 044,88 0,00 81 362 044,88 81 383 880,23 0,00 -21 835,35
DE 2014DE06RDRP017 52 502 120,88 0,00 52 502 120,88 0,00 52 502 120,88 52 333 444,40 0,00 168 676,48
DE 2014DE06RDRP018 2 801 287,83 0,00 2 801 287,83 0,00 2 801 287,83 2 801 291,19 0,00 -3,36
DE 2014DE06RDRP019 97 648 474,83 -3 665 288,98 93 983 185,85 0,00 93 983 185,85 93 983 182,10 0,00 3,75
DE 2014DE06RDRP020 142 000 108,42 0,00 142 000 108,42 0,00 142 000 108,42 142 000 108,42 0,00 0,00
DE 2014DE06RDRP021 49 639 337,77 0,00 49 639 337,77 0,00 49 639 337,77 49 639 344,72 0,00 -6,95
DE 2014DE06RDRP023 74 101 415,28 0,00 74 101 415,28 0,00 74 101 415,28 74 103 283,04 0,00 -1 867,76
DK 2014DK06RDNP001 122 481 196,30 -37 907,26 122 443 289,04 0,00 122 443 289,04 122 443 289,04 0,00 0,00
EE 2014EE06RDNP001 69 443 519,50 0,00 69 443 519,50 0,00 69 443 519,50 69 419 475,58 0,00 24 043,92
ES 2014ES06RDNP001 26 286 097,25 0,00 26 286 097,25 0,00 26 286 097,25 26 292 294,65 0,00 -6 197,40
ES 2014ES06RDRP001 225 875 127,97 0,00 225 875 127,97 0,00 225 875 127,97 226 008 945,95 0,00 – 133 817,98
ES 2014ES06RDRP002 64 659 703,04 0,00 64 659 703,04 0,00 64 659 703,04 64 659 752,31 0,00 -49,27
ES 2014ES06RDRP003 50 526 385,53 0,00 50 526 385,53 0,00 50 526 385,53 50 549 617,19 0,00 -23 231,66
ES 2014ES06RDRP004 3 842 502,92 -1 853,49 3 840 649,43 0,00 3 840 649,43 3 840 649,43 0,00 0,00
ES 2014ES06RDRP005 22 913 078,49 0,00 22 913 078,49 0,00 22 913 078,49 22 935 073,84 0,00 -21 995,35
ES 2014ES06RDRP006 6 394 945,36 0,00 6 394 945,36 0,00 6 394 945,36 6 387 826,13 0,00 7 119,23
ES 2014ES06RDRP007 151 545 662,21 360 675,05 151 906 337,26 0,00 151 906 337,26 152 047 511,45 0,00 – 141 174,19
ES 2014ES06RDRP008 113 612 124,47 0,00 113 612 124,47 0,00 113 612 124,47 113 634 119,86 0,00 -21 995,39
ES 2014ES06RDRP009 49 782 755,35 0,00 49 782 755,35 0,00 49 782 755,35 49 845 657,43 0,00 -62 902,08
ES 2014ES06RDRP010 120 815 338,60 0,00 120 815 338,60 0,00 120 815 338,60 120 899 956,31 0,00 -84 617,71
ES 2014ES06RDRP011 106 738 455,16 – 337 206,80 106 401 248,36 0,00 106 401 248,36 106 401 244,71 0,00 3,65
ES 2014ES06RDRP012 10 029 487,66 812,39 10 030 300,05 0,00 10 030 300,05 10 030 299,64 0,00 0,41
ES 2014ES06RDRP013 26 253 547,78 -0,01 26 253 547,77 0,00 26 253 547,77 26 253 546,76 0,00 1,01
ES 2014ES06RDRP014 24 609 217,14 -20 183,05 24 589 034,09 0,00 24 589 034,09 24 589 033,62 0,00 0,47
ES 2014ES06RDRP015 7 326 909,73 0,00 7 326 909,73 0,00 7 326 909,73 7 326 910,38 0,00 -0,65
ES 2014ES06RDRP016 8 035 044,02 0,00 8 035 044,02 0,00 8 035 044,02 8 035 042,37 0,00 1,65
ES 2014ES06RDRP017 36 627 179,53 0,00 36 627 179,53 0,00 36 627 179,53 36 681 600,46 0,00 -54 420,93
FI 2014FI06RDRP001 58 567 581,32 0,00 58 567 581,32 0,00 58 567 581,32 16 157 575,35 42 410 799,62 – 793,65
FI 2014FI06RDRP002 804 168,88 0,00 804 168,88 0,00 804 168,88 804 168,88 0,00 0,00
FR 2014FR06RDNP001 31 368,35 0,00 31 368,35 0,00 31 368,35 0,00 31 368,35 0,00
FR 2014FR06RDRN001 1 367 157,09 0,00 1 367 157,09 0,00 1 367 157,09 1 367 157,10 0,00 -0,01
FR 2014FR06RDRP001 32 256 259,43 0,00 32 256 259,43 0,00 32 256 259,43 32 256 259,42 0,00 0,01
FR 2014FR06RDRP002 14 346 561,85 -37 944,75 14 308 617,10 0,00 14 308 617,10 14 308 617,11 0,00 -0,01
FR 2014FR06RDRP003 21 896 073,23 0,00 21 896 073,23 0,00 21 896 073,23 21 896 073,21 0,00 0,02
FR 2014FR06RDRP004 69 581 910,47 -1 477 586,49 68 104 323,98 0,00 68 104 323,98 68 104 323,98 0,00 0,00
FR 2014FR06RDRP006 13 778 570,61 0,00 13 778 570,61 0,00 13 778 570,61 13 778 570,60 0,00 0,01
FR 2014FR06RDRP011 10 433 534,21 0,00 10 433 534,21 0,00 10 433 534,21 10 433 534,21 0,00 0,00
FR 2014FR06RDRP021 37 444 468,98 0,00 37 444 468,98 0,00 37 444 468,98 37 444 468,97 0,00 0,01
FR 2014FR06RDRP022 25 045 270,93 0,00 25 045 270,93 0,00 25 045 270,93 25 045 270,97 0,00 -0,04
FR 2014FR06RDRP023 15 906 575,74 0,00 15 906 575,74 0,00 15 906 575,74 15 906 575,75 0,00 -0,01
FR 2014FR06RDRP024 42 406 052,00 0,00 42 406 052,00 0,00 42 406 052,00 42 406 052,02 0,00 -0,02
FR 2014FR06RDRP025 51 738 052,80 0,00 51 738 052,80 0,00 51 738 052,80 51 738 052,80 0,00 0,00
FR 2014FR06RDRP026 51 657 547,70 0,00 51 657 547,70 0,00 51 657 547,70 51 657 547,71 0,00 -0,01
FR 2014FR06RDRP031 21 858 414,42 0,00 21 858 414,42 0,00 21 858 414,42 21 858 414,45 0,00 -0,03
FR 2014FR06RDRP041 46 763 676,53 0,00 46 763 676,53 0,00 46 763 676,53 46 763 676,52 0,00 0,01
FR 2014FR06RDRP042 20 098 137,00 0,00 20 098 137,00 0,00 20 098 137,00 20 098 137,00 0,00 0,00
FR 2014FR06RDRP043 40 051 048,77 0,00 40 051 048,77 0,00 40 051 048,77 40 051 048,78 0,00 -0,01
FR 2014FR06RDRP052 65 231 877,96 0,00 65 231 877,96 0,00 65 231 877,96 65 231 877,96 0,00 0,00
FR 2014FR06RDRP053 54 459 195,16 – 109 087,00 54 350 108,16 0,00 54 350 108,16 54 350 108,15 0,00 0,01
FR 2014FR06RDRP054 36 890 541,71 0,00 36 890 541,71 0,00 36 890 541,71 36 890 541,77 0,00 -0,06
FR 2014FR06RDRP072 62 495 695,42 0,00 62 495 695,42 0,00 62 495 695,42 62 495 695,41 0,00 0,01
FR 2014FR06RDRP073 92 161 380,84 1 151 154,04 93 312 534,88 0,00 93 312 534,88 93 312 534,89 0,00 -0,01
FR 2014FR06RDRP074 34 246 497,12 0,00 34 246 497,12 0,00 34 246 497,12 32 456 932,82 1 789 564,28 0,02
FR 2014FR06RDRP082 68 841 421,40 2 997 486,22 71 838 907,62 0,00 71 838 907,62 67 356 927,57 4 481 980,05 0,00
FR 2014FR06RDRP083 63 434 608,44 3 239 497,71 66 674 106,15 0,00 66 674 106,15 57 767 202,75 8 906 903,37 0,03
FR 2014FR06RDRP091 67 058 094,83 0,00 67 058 094,83 0,00 67 058 094,83 67 184 094,85 0,00 – 126 000,02
FR 2014FR06RDRP093 29 397 046,89 1 339 138,48 30 736 185,37 0,00 30 736 185,37 30 736 185,33 0,00 0,04
FR 2014FR06RDRP094 10 227 258,02 0,00 10 227 258,02 0,00 10 227 258,02 10 227 258,96 0,00 -0,94
EL 2014GR06RDNP001 504 678 350,36 32 642 119,30 537 320 469,66 0,00 537 320 469,66 537 320 469,58 0,00 0,08
HR 2014HR06RDNP001 141 875 684,81 39 618 406,16 181 494 090,97 0,00 181 494 090,97 181 518 788,68 0,00 -24 697,71
HU 2014HU06RDNP001 393 670 715,33 -27 290 613,98 366 380 101,35 0,00 366 380 101,35 361 945 324,20 4 434 779,09 -1,94
IE 2014IE06RDNP001 111 555 724,23 0,00 111 555 724,23 0,00 111 555 724,23 61 689 186,13 49 866 538,10 0,00
IT 2014IT06RDNP001 55 011 176,63 0,00 55 011 176,63 0,00 55 011 176,63 55 023 137,68 0,00 -11 961,05
IT 2014IT06RDRN001 8 508 782,33 0,00 8 508 782,33 0,00 8 508 782,33 8 508 782,33 0,00 0,00
IT 2014IT06RDRP001 40 641 826,72 0,00 40 641 826,72 0,00 40 641 826,72 40 688 057,46 0,00 -46 230,74
IT 2014IT06RDRP002 11 570 453,72 0,00 11 570 453,72 0,00 11 570 453,72 11 570 453,93 0,00 -0,21
IT 2014IT06RDRP003 67 973 466,78 0,00 67 973 466,78 0,00 67 973 466,78 67 973 467,98 0,00 -1,20
IT 2014IT06RDRP004 20 135 811,06 0,00 20 135 811,06 0,00 20 135 811,06 19 128 071,01 0,00 1 007 740,05
IT 2014IT06RDRP005 55 755 877,28 0,00 55 755 877,28 0,00 55 755 877,28 55 895 828,98 0,00 – 139 951,70
IT 2014IT06RDRP006 19 432 339,00 -1 561,91 19 430 777,09 0,00 19 430 777,09 19 565 613,27 0,00 – 134 836,18
IT 2014IT06RDRP007 88 032 338,34 0,00 88 032 338,34 0,00 88 032 338,34 88 032 338,34 0,00 0,00
IT 2014IT06RDRP008 54 254 167,33 0,00 54 254 167,33 0,00 54 254 167,33 54 256 561,12 0,00 -2 393,79
IT 2014IT06RDRP009 77 460 532,17 0,00 77 460 532,17 0,00 77 460 532,17 77 460 533,26 0,00 -1,09
IT 2014IT06RDRP010 60 808 350,80 0,00 60 808 350,80 0,00 60 808 350,80 60 806 790,68 0,00 1 560,12
IT 2014IT06RDRP011 16 553 188,39 0,00 16 553 188,39 0,00 16 553 188,39 16 553 188,79 0,00 -0,40
IT 2014IT06RDRP012 54 704 018,50 0,00 54 704 018,50 0,00 54 704 018,50 55 460 455,47 0,00 – 756 436,97
IT 2014IT06RDRP013 5 438 935,88 0,00 5 438 935,88 0,00 5 438 935,88 5 468 051,30 0,00 -29 115,42
IT 2014IT06RDRP014 66 552 848,69 -0,03 66 552 848,66 0,00 66 552 848,66 66 596 045,23 0,00 -43 196,57
IT 2014IT06RDRP015 3 436 743,10 0,00 3 436 743,10 0,00 3 436 743,10 3 046 743,05 0,00 390 000,05
IT 2014IT06RDRP016 44 760 926,72 1 414 363,61 46 175 290,33 0,00 46 175 290,33 46 175 402,93 0,00 – 112,60
IT 2014IT06RDRP017 57 657 643,81 -1 749,76 57 655 894,05 0,00 57 655 894,05 57 769 076,38 0,00 – 113 182,33
IT 2014IT06RDRP018 36 903 344,53 0,00 36 903 344,53 0,00 36 903 344,53 37 016 394,90 0,00 – 113 050,37
IT 2014IT06RDRP019 117 465 033,59 -36 290,73 117 428 742,86 0,00 117 428 742,86 118 059 428,88 0,00 – 630 686,02
IT 2014IT06RDRP020 127 544 950,82 -15 684,43 127 529 266,39 0,00 127 529 266,39 127 757 380,43 0,00 – 228 114,04
IT 2014IT06RDRP021 203 563 284,95 0,00 203 563 284,95 0,00 203 563 284,95 204 455 354,86 0,00 – 892 069,91
LT 2014LT06RDNP001 207 057 881,77 0,00 207 057 881,77 0,00 207 057 881,77 207 057 950,19 0,00 -68,42
LU 2014LU06RDNP001 887 292,35 14 280,52 901 572,87 0,00 901 572,87 12 047,19 889 525,68 0,00
LV 2014LV06RDNP001 79 846 517,64 0,00 79 846 517,64 0,00 79 846 517,64 79 846 517,64 0,00 0,00
MT 2014MT06RDNP001 22 868 822,08 – 183 809,60 22 685 012,48 0,00 22 685 012,48 22 816 384,85 0,00 – 131 372,37
NL 2014NL06RDNP001 86 732 798,53 0,00 86 732 798,53 0,00 86 732 798,53 86 873 897,23 0,00 – 141 098,70
PL 2014PL06RDNP001 1 160 085 806,40 23 604,41 1 160 109 410,81 0,00 1 160 109 410,81 1 160 113 045,14 0,00 -3 634,33
PT 2014PT06RDRP001 25 824 941,97 0,00 25 824 941,97 0,00 25 824 941,97 25 817 715,06 0,00 7 226,91
PT 2014PT06RDRP002 449 014 995,35 -17 105 659,93 431 909 335,42 0,00 431 909 335,42 431 571 431,40 3 077 609,37 -2 739 705,35
PT 2014PT06RDRP003 16 216 623,03 0,00 16 216 623,03 0,00 16 216 623,03 16 269 932,68 0,00 -53 309,65
RO 2014RO06RDNP001 822 692 339,95 – 490 411,24 822 201 928,71 0,00 822 201 928,71 822 255 167,94 0,00 -53 239,23
SE 2014SE06RDNP001 75 509 293,38 0,00 75 509 293,38 0,00 75 509 293,38 75 548 896,17 0,00 -39 602,79
SI 2014SI06RDNP001 107 098 898,36 0,00 107 098 898,36 0,00 107 098 898,36 107 173 576,18 0,00 -74 677,82
SK 2014SK06RDNP001 92 169 711,64 14 585 954,70 106 755 666,34 0,00 106 755 666,34 106 755 925,70 0,00 – 259,36
Corrections according to Article 54(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013
Corrections Related to the 2014-2020 Programming Period Corrections Related to the 2007-2013 Programming Period
Member State Currency In National currency In Euro In National currency In Euro
AT EUR 0,00 0,00 0,00 48 809,50
BE EUR 0,00 6 476,63 0,00 262,41
BG BGN 271 870,41 0,00 7 760 293,71 0,00
CY EUR 0,00 0,00 0,00 23 051,47
CZ CZK 55 359,09 0,00 5 858 080,30 0,00
DE EUR 0,00 42 409,04 0,00 399 728,51
DK DKK 56 468,14 0,00 20 738,74 0,00
EE EUR 0,00 935 525,85 0,00 158 200,00
ES EUR 0,00 424 364,90 0,00 83 364,70
FI EUR 0,00 30 232,93 0,00 104 371,25
FR EUR 0,00 52 670,76 0,00 147 923,75
EL EUR 0,00 53 156,57 0,00 1 093 549,19
HR EUR 0,00 52 256,11 0,00 0,00
HU HUF 15 436 304,00 0,00 136 989 605,00 0,00
IE EUR 0,00 23 592,69 0,00 95 468,23
IT EUR 0,00 134 014,22 0,00 1 751 002,33
LT EUR 0,00 0,00 0,00 1 388 515,94
LU EUR 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
LV EUR 0,00 49 231,65 0,00 85 577,31
MT EUR 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
NL EUR 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
PL PLN 895 960,15 0,00 4 712 892,02 0,00
PT EUR 0,00 615 371,09 0,00 3 226 604,41
RO RON 11,65 0,00 35 096 469,70 0,00
SE SEK 36 402,78 0,00 6 357,88 0,00
SI EUR 0,00 505,21 0,00 31 698,12
SK EUR 0,00 112,43 0,00 437 933,57
(in Euro)
Member State CCI Reductions for non-compliance with latest payment deadlines for FY2024
AT 2014AT06RDNP001 0,00
BE 2014BE06RDRP001 0,00
BE 2014BE06RDRP002 0,00
BG 2014BG06RDNP001 201 578,10
CY 2014CY06RDNP001 0,00
CZ 2014CZ06RDNP001 0,00
DE 2014DE06RDRP003 0,00
DE 2014DE06RDRP004 0,00
DE 2014DE06RDRP007 0,00
DE 2014DE06RDRP010 0,00
DE 2014DE06RDRP011 0,00
DE 2014DE06RDRP012 0,00
DE 2014DE06RDRP015 0,00
DE 2014DE06RDRP017 0,00
DE 2014DE06RDRP018 1 173,50
DE 2014DE06RDRP019 0,00
DE 2014DE06RDRP020 0,00
DE 2014DE06RDRP021 0,00
DE 2014DE06RDRP023 0,00
DK 2014DK06RDNP001 465 198,34
EE 2014EE06RDNP001 0,00
ES 2014ES06RDNP001 0,00
ES 2014ES06RDRP001 517 241,22
ES 2014ES06RDRP002 0,00
ES 2014ES06RDRP003 0,00
ES 2014ES06RDRP004 25 760,44
ES 2014ES06RDRP005 0,00
ES 2014ES06RDRP006 0,00
ES 2014ES06RDRP007 513 247,62
ES 2014ES06RDRP008 66 442,55
ES 2014ES06RDRP009 0,00
ES 2014ES06RDRP010 34 497,99
ES 2014ES06RDRP011 0,00
ES 2014ES06RDRP012 0,00
ES 2014ES06RDRP013 148 642,23
ES 2014ES06RDRP014 0,00
ES 2014ES06RDRP015 0,00
ES 2014ES06RDRP016 0,00
ES 2014ES06RDRP017 7 703,37
FI 2014FI06RDRP001 0,00
FI 2014FI06RDRP002 0,00
FR 2014FR06RDNP001 0,00
FR 2014FR06RDRN001 0,00
FR 2014FR06RDRP001 712 163,61
FR 2014FR06RDRP002 417 256,40
FR 2014FR06RDRP003 206 495,56
FR 2014FR06RDRP004 0,00
FR 2014FR06RDRP006 0,00
FR 2014FR06RDRP011 2 465,84
FR 2014FR06RDRP021 191 767,45
FR 2014FR06RDRP022 336 462,64
FR 2014FR06RDRP023 50 514,08
FR 2014FR06RDRP024 694 761,78
FR 2014FR06RDRP025 82 024,75
FR 2014FR06RDRP026 37 219,78
FR 2014FR06RDRP031 43 904,57
FR 2014FR06RDRP041 270 999,35
FR 2014FR06RDRP042 110 378,36
FR 2014FR06RDRP043 101 833,63
FR 2014FR06RDRP052 1 245 344,80
FR 2014FR06RDRP053 152 198,84
FR 2014FR06RDRP054 489 604,48
FR 2014FR06RDRP072 804 182,28
FR 2014FR06RDRP073 179 824,05
FR 2014FR06RDRP074 125 344,00
FR 2014FR06RDRP082 287 834,11
FR 2014FR06RDRP083 35 659,91
FR 2014FR06RDRP091 810 921,80
FR 2014FR06RDRP093 70 472,31
FR 2014FR06RDRP094 646 495,44
EL 2014GR06RDNP001 20 090 022,97
HR 2014HR06RDNP001 1 181 740,90
HU 2014HU06RDNP001 1 418 800,85
IE 2014IE06RDNP001 0,00
IT 2014IT06RDNP001 0,00
IT 2014IT06RDRN001 0,00
IT 2014IT06RDRP001 1 277,21
IT 2014IT06RDRP002 0,00
IT 2014IT06RDRP003 0,00
IT 2014IT06RDRP004 0,00
IT 2014IT06RDRP005 0,00
IT 2014IT06RDRP006 0,00
IT 2014IT06RDRP007 0,00
IT 2014IT06RDRP008 0,00
IT 2014IT06RDRP009 0,00
IT 2014IT06RDRP010 8 134,77
IT 2014IT06RDRP011 0,00
IT 2014IT06RDRP012 0,00
IT 2014IT06RDRP013 492,90
IT 2014IT06RDRP014 853,88
IT 2014IT06RDRP015 6 980,14
IT 2014IT06RDRP016 3 327 417,22
IT 2014IT06RDRP017 0,00
IT 2014IT06RDRP018 122,02
IT 2014IT06RDRP019 3 385,07
IT 2014IT06RDRP020 94 640,03
IT 2014IT06RDRP021 0,00
LT 2014LT06RDNP001 0,00
LU 2014LU06RDNP001 568,52
LV 2014LV06RDNP001 25 144,05
MT 2014MT06RDNP001 38 921,70
NL 2014NL06RDNP001 0,00
PL 2014PL06RDNP001 0,00
PT 2014PT06RDRP001 0,00
PT 2014PT06RDRP002 0,00
PT 2014PT06RDRP003 0,00
RO 2014RO06RDNP001 4 942 083,46
SE 2014SE06RDNP001 0,00
SI 2014SI06RDNP001 0,00
SK 2014SK06RDNP001 2 000 346,66
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 (1), and in particular Article 104 thereof,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No 2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, (EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 485/2008 (2), and in particular Article 51 thereof,
After consulting the Committee on the Agricultural Funds,
Whereas:
(1) Article 104(1), second subparagraph, point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 provides that Article 4(1), point (b), Article 5, Article 7(3), Articles 9, 17, 21 and 34, Article 35(4), Articles 36, 37, 38, 40 to 43, 51, 52, 54, 56, 59, 63, 64, 67, 68, 70 to 75, 77, 91 to 97, 99 and 100, Article 102(2) and Articles 110 and 111 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 continue to apply, as regards the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), in relation to expenditure incurred by the beneficiaries and payments made by the paying agency in the framework of the implementation of rural development programmes pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3) for the financial year 2024.
(2) Article 64, second paragraph, point (a), of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128 (4) provides that Article 2, Article 3(1), first subparagraph, Article 3(2), Article 4(1), point (b), Article 5, Article 6, Article 7, Articles 21 to 25, Article 27, Article 28, Article 29, Article 30(1), points (a), (b) and (c), Article 30(2), (3) and (4), and Articles 31 to 40 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014 (5) continue to apply, as regards the EAFRD, in relation to expenditure incurred by the beneficiaries and payments made by the paying agency in the framework of the implementation of rural development programmes pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 for the financial year 2024.
(3) Article 64, second paragraph, point (c), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128 provides that Annexes II and III to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014 continue to apply for the purposes of Article 32, points (f) and (g), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128 for the financial year 2024.
(4) Article 40, second paragraph, point (a), of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/127 (6) provides that Article 5, Article 5a, Article 7(3) and (4), Article 10, Article 11(1), second subparagraph, Article 11(2), Article 12, Article 13 and Article 41(5) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 907/2014 (7) continue to apply as regards the EAFRD in relation to expenditure incurred by the beneficiaries and payments made by the paying agency in the framework of the implementation of rural development programmes pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 for the financial year 2024.
(5) Pursuant to Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, the Commission, on the basis of the annual accounts submitted by the Member States, accompanied by the information required for the clearance of accounts and an audit opinion regarding the completeness, accuracy and veracity of the accounts and the reports established by the certification bodies, is to clear the accounts of the paying agencies referred to in Article 7 of that Regulation prior to 31 May of the year following the budget year in question.
(6) In accordance with Article 35 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2116, the agricultural financial year begins on 16 October of year N-1 and ends on 15 October of year N. When clearing the accounts for financial year 2024, for the purpose of aligning the reference period for the EAFRD expenditure with that of the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF), account should be taken of expenditure incurred by the Member States between 16 October 2023 and 15 October 2024, in accordance with Article 11(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128.
(7) Article 33(2), second subparagraph, of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014 provides that the amounts that are recoverable from, or payable to, each Member State, in accordance with the accounts clearance decision referred to in Article 33(1) of that Implementing Regulation, are to be established by deducting the intermediate payments for the financial year concerned from the expenditure recognised for that year in accordance with that Article 33(1). Article 33(2), third subparagraph, of that Implementing Regulation provides that the Commission is to deduct that amount from or add it to the next intermediate payment.
(8) The Commission has checked the information submitted by the Member States and has communicated the results of its checks to the Member States, together with the amendments it proposes.
(9) For all paying agencies, the annual accounts and the accompanying documents permit the Commission to take a decision on the completeness, accuracy and veracity of the annual accounts submitted.
(10) In accordance with Article 83 of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (8), the deadline for interim payments referred to in Article 36(5) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 may be interrupted for a maximum period of six months in order to carry out additional verifications following information that these payments are linked to an irregularity having serious financial consequences. In adopting this Decision, the Commission should consider the amounts affected by such interruption in order to avoid making any inappropriate or untimely payments.
(11) Pursuant to Article 41 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, the Commission has already reduced or suspended a number of interim payments for financial year 2024 due to expenditure not effected in accordance with Union rules. In this Decision, the Commission should consider such amounts reduced or suspended on the basis of Article 41 of that Regulation, in order to avoid making any undue or untimely payments or reimbursements that could later be subject to a financial correction.
(12) Article 36(3), first subparagraph, point (b), of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 provides that interim payments are to be made without overrun of the total programmed EAFRD contribution. Pursuant to Article 23(2) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014, where the combined total of declarations of expenditure exceeds the total programmed contribution for a rural development programme, the amount to be paid is to be capped at the programmed amount, without prejudice to the ceiling provided for in Article 34(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013. The capped amount will be subject to a later reimbursement by the Commission following the adoption of the amended financial plan, at the latest at the closure of the programme.
(13) In accordance with Article 39c(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013, support for exceptional temporary aid to farmers and SMEs particularly affected by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is to be paid by 15 October 2023. Payments made after this deadline are considered ineligible and should be duly reflected in this Decision.
(14) Article 41(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 sets thresholds for payments related to financial instruments, providing that each interim payment request during the eligibility period is not to exceed 25 % of the total programme contributions committed to the financial instrument under the funding agreement. Any expenditure exceeding these thresholds is considered ineligible for reimbursement.
(15) In accordance with Article 75(1), fourth subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, the rules on payment deadlines for measures under rural development in the context of the integrated administration and control system apply from claim year 2019. The reductions for non-compliance with the latest payment deadlines, calculated in accordance with Article 5a of Delegated Regulation (EU) No 907/2014, follow the procedure laid down in Articles 40 and 41 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 and are to be taken into account in this Decision for the financial year 2024. Those reductions may be examined, where appropriate, under conformity clearance proceedings pursuant to Article 52 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013.
(16) This Decision should also cover the additional resources referred to in Article 58a of Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013.
(17) Pursuant to Article 34(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, the combined total of prefinancing and interim payments are not to exceed 95 % of the EAFRD’s contribution to each rural development programme. The following programmes have reached their thresholds: 2014AT06RDNP001, 2014CZ06RDNP001, 2014DE06RDRP003, 2014DE06RDRP004, 2014FI06RDRP001, 2014FR06RDNP001, 2014FR06RDRP074, 2014FR06RDRP082, 2014FR06RDRP083, 2014HU06RDNP001, 2014IE06RDNP001, 2014LU06RDNP001, 2014PT06RDRP002. The outstanding balance of those programmes will be settled at the closure of the programme.
(18) Pursuant to Article 54(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, 50 % of the financial consequences of the non-recovery of irregularities is to be borne by the Member State concerned, if the recovery has not taken place within four years from the date of the recovery request, or within eight years where the recovery is taken in the national courts. Article 54(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 requires Member States to attach to the annual accounts that they are to submit to the Commission, pursuant to Article 29 of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014, a certified table reflecting the amounts to be borne by them under Article 54(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013. Rules on the application of the Member States’ obligation to report the amounts to be recovered are laid down in Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014. Annex II to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 908/2014 sets out the model of the table that Member States are to use to provide information about amounts to be recovered. On the basis of the tables completed by the Member States, the Commission should decide on the financial consequences of the non-recovery of irregularities older than four or eight years respectively.
(19) Pursuant to Article 54(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, on duly justified grounds, Member States may decide not to pursue recovery. Such a decision may be taken only if the costs already incurred, and likely to be incurred, total more than the amount to be recovered, or if the recovery proves impossible owing to the insolvency, recorded and recognised under national law, of the debtor or the persons legally responsible for the irregularity. If the decision has been taken within four years from the date of the recovery request, or within eight years where the recovery is taken in the national courts, 100 % of the financial consequences of the non-recovery should be borne by the Union budget. The amounts for which a particular Member State decided not to pursue recovery and the grounds for its decision are to be included in the summary report referred to in Article 54(4) of that Regulation. Therefore, such amounts should not be charged to the Member States concerned and are consequently to be borne by the Union budget.
(20) This Decision should also take into account the amounts that are still to be charged to the Member States as a result of the application of Article 54(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 in relation to the 2007-2013 programming period for the EAFRD.
(21) In accordance with Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, this Decision should be without prejudice to the decisions the Commission may take subsequently to exclude from Union financing expenditure not effected in accordance with Union rules,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The accounts of the Member States’ paying agencies are hereby cleared as regards expenditure financed by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), taking also into account the additional resources referred to in Article 58a of Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013, in respect of the financial year 2024 and relating to the 2014-2022 programming period.
The amounts recoverable from, or payable to, each Member State under each rural development programme pursuant to this Decision, are set out in Annex I to this Decision.
The amounts to be charged to the Member States, as a result of the application of Article 54(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 relating to the 2014-2022 programming period and to the 2007-2013 programming period for the EAFRD, are set out in Annex II to this Decision.
The reductions for non-compliance with the latest payment deadlines in accordance with Article 75(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 under each rural development programme are set out in Annex III to this Decision.
This Decision is without prejudice to future conformity clearance decisions that the Commission may take pursuant to Article 52 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 to exclude from Union financing expenditure not effected in accordance with Union rules.
This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

(in Euro)
Member State
CCI
Expenditure 2024
Corrections (*1)
Total
Non-reusable amounts
Accepted amount cleared for FY 2024
Interim payments reimbursed to the Member State for the financial year (*2)
Balance to be settled at closure of programming period due to 95 % threshold reached (*3)
Amount to be recovered from (-) or paid to (+) the Member State

i
ii
iii = i + ii
iv
v = iii – iv
vi
vii
viii = v – vi – vii
AT
2014AT06RDNP001
385 717 094,18
– 925 533,74
384 791 560,44
0,00
384 791 560,44
377 901 744,19
7 805 048,13
– 915 231,88
BE
2014BE06RDRP001
64 484 765,23
0,00
64 484 765,23
0,00
64 484 765,23
64 484 760,31
0,00
4,92
BE
2014BE06RDRP002
26 049 135,48
– 296 326,69
25 752 808,79
0,00
25 752 808,79
25 755 670,37
0,00
-2 861,58
BG
2014BG06RDNP001
306 463 437,81
-15 476,70
306 447 961,11
0,00
306 447 961,11
306 447 959,61
0,00
1,50
CY
2014CY06RDNP001
11 534 876,35
-3 221,06
11 531 655,29
0,00
11 531 655,29
11 292 763,57
0,00
238 891,72
CZ
2014CZ06RDNP001
103 582 421,56
494 242,95
104 076 664,51
0,00
104 076 664,51
51 970 573,41
52 106 162,31
-71,21
DE
2014DE06RDRP003
66 573 538,54
– 961 710,21
65 611 828,33
0,00
65 611 828,33
63 179 368,04
2 434 424,09
-1 963,80
DE
2014DE06RDRP004
164 239 573,89
-3 661 077,06
160 578 496,83
0,00
160 578 496,83
160 574 203,54
4 293,29
0,00
DE
2014DE06RDRP007
156 038 784,26
0,00
156 038 784,26
0,00
156 038 784,26
156 038 828,07
0,00
-43,81
DE
2014DE06RDRP010
16 146 024,47
0,00
16 146 024,47
0,00
16 146 024,47
16 178 923,26
0,00
-32 898,79
DE
2014DE06RDRP011
105 157 959,72
0,00
105 157 959,72
0,00
105 157 959,72
105 157 959,72
0,00
0,00
DE
2014DE06RDRP012
172 412 940,50
0,00
172 412 940,50
0,00
172 412 940,50
172 412 940,50
0,00
0,00
DE
2014DE06RDRP015
81 446 949,83
-84 904,95
81 362 044,88
0,00
81 362 044,88
81 383 880,23
0,00
-21 835,35
DE
2014DE06RDRP017
52 502 120,88
0,00
52 502 120,88
0,00
52 502 120,88
52 333 444,40
0,00
168 676,48
DE
2014DE06RDRP018
2 801 287,83
0,00
2 801 287,83
0,00
2 801 287,83
2 801 291,19
0,00
-3,36
DE
2014DE06RDRP019
97 648 474,83
-3 665 288,98
93 983 185,85
0,00
93 983 185,85
93 983 182,10
0,00
3,75
DE
2014DE06RDRP020
142 000 108,42
0,00
142 000 108,42
0,00
142 000 108,42
142 000 108,42
0,00
0,00
DE
2014DE06RDRP021
49 639 337,77
0,00
49 639 337,77
0,00
49 639 337,77
49 639 344,72
0,00
-6,95
DE
2014DE06RDRP023
74 101 415,28
0,00
74 101 415,28
0,00
74 101 415,28
74 103 283,04
0,00
-1 867,76
DK
2014DK06RDNP001
122 481 196,30
-37 907,26
122 443 289,04
0,00
122 443 289,04
122 443 289,04
0,00
0,00
EE
2014EE06RDNP001
69 443 519,50
0,00
69 443 519,50
0,00
69 443 519,50
69 419 475,58
0,00
24 043,92
ES
2014ES06RDNP001
26 286 097,25
0,00
26 286 097,25
0,00
26 286 097,25
26 292 294,65
0,00
-6 197,40
ES
2014ES06RDRP001
225 875 127,97
0,00
225 875 127,97
0,00
225 875 127,97
226 008 945,95
0,00
– 133 817,98
ES
2014ES06RDRP002
64 659 703,04
0,00
64 659 703,04
0,00
64 659 703,04
64 659 752,31
0,00
-49,27
ES
2014ES06RDRP003
50 526 385,53
0,00
50 526 385,53
0,00
50 526 385,53
50 549 617,19
0,00
-23 231,66
ES
2014ES06RDRP004
3 842 502,92
-1 853,49
3 840 649,43
0,00
3 840 649,43
3 840 649,43
0,00
0,00
ES
2014ES06RDRP005
22 913 078,49
0,00
22 913 078,49
0,00
22 913 078,49
22 935 073,84
0,00
-21 995,35
ES
2014ES06RDRP006
6 394 945,36
0,00
6 394 945,36
0,00
6 394 945,36
6 387 826,13
0,00
7 119,23
ES
2014ES06RDRP007
151 545 662,21
360 675,05
151 906 337,26
0,00
151 906 337,26
152 047 511,45
0,00
– 141 174,19
ES
2014ES06RDRP008
113 612 124,47
0,00
113 612 124,47
0,00
113 612 124,47
113 634 119,86
0,00
-21 995,39
ES
2014ES06RDRP009
49 782 755,35
0,00
49 782 755,35
0,00
49 782 755,35
49 845 657,43
0,00
-62 902,08
ES
2014ES06RDRP010
120 815 338,60
0,00
120 815 338,60
0,00
120 815 338,60
120 899 956,31
0,00
-84 617,71
ES
2014ES06RDRP011
106 738 455,16
– 337 206,80
106 401 248,36
0,00
106 401 248,36
106 401 244,71
0,00
3,65
ES
2014ES06RDRP012
10 029 487,66
812,39
10 030 300,05
0,00
10 030 300,05
10 030 299,64
0,00
0,41
ES
2014ES06RDRP013
26 253 547,78
-0,01
26 253 547,77
0,00
26 253 547,77
26 253 546,76
0,00
1,01
ES
2014ES06RDRP014
24 609 217,14
-20 183,05
24 589 034,09
0,00
24 589 034,09
24 589 033,62
0,00
0,47
ES
2014ES06RDRP015
7 326 909,73
0,00
7 326 909,73
0,00
7 326 909,73
7 326 910,38
0,00
-0,65
ES
2014ES06RDRP016
8 035 044,02
0,00
8 035 044,02
0,00
8 035 044,02
8 035 042,37
0,00
1,65
ES
2014ES06RDRP017
36 627 179,53
0,00
36 627 179,53
0,00
36 627 179,53
36 681 600,46
0,00
-54 420,93
FI
2014FI06RDRP001
58 567 581,32
0,00
58 567 581,32
0,00
58 567 581,32
16 157 575,35
42 410 799,62
– 793,65
FI
2014FI06RDRP002
804 168,88
0,00
804 168,88
0,00
804 168,88
804 168,88
0,00
0,00
FR
2014FR06RDNP001
31 368,35
0,00
31 368,35
0,00
31 368,35
0,00
31 368,35
0,00
FR
2014FR06RDRN001
1 367 157,09
0,00
1 367 157,09
0,00
1 367 157,09
1 367 157,10
0,00
-0,01
FR
2014FR06RDRP001
32 256 259,43
0,00
32 256 259,43
0,00
32 256 259,43
32 256 259,42
0,00
0,01
FR
2014FR06RDRP002
14 346 561,85
-37 944,75
14 308 617,10
0,00
14 308 617,10
14 308 617,11
0,00
-0,01
FR
2014FR06RDRP003
21 896 073,23
0,00
21 896 073,23
0,00
21 896 073,23
21 896 073,21
0,00
0,02
FR
2014FR06RDRP004
69 581 910,47
-1 477 586,49
68 104 323,98
0,00
68 104 323,98
68 104 323,98
0,00
0,00
FR
2014FR06RDRP006
13 778 570,61
0,00
13 778 570,61
0,00
13 778 570,61
13 778 570,60
0,00
0,01
FR
2014FR06RDRP011
10 433 534,21
0,00
10 433 534,21
0,00
10 433 534,21
10 433 534,21
0,00
0,00
FR
2014FR06RDRP021
37 444 468,98
0,00
37 444 468,98
0,00
37 444 468,98
37 444 468,97
0,00
0,01
FR
2014FR06RDRP022
25 045 270,93
0,00
25 045 270,93
0,00
25 045 270,93
25 045 270,97
0,00
-0,04
FR
2014FR06RDRP023
15 906 575,74
0,00
15 906 575,74
0,00
15 906 575,74
15 906 575,75
0,00
-0,01
FR
2014FR06RDRP024
42 406 052,00
0,00
42 406 052,00
0,00
42 406 052,00
42 406 052,02
0,00
-0,02
FR
2014FR06RDRP025
51 738 052,80
0,00
51 738 052,80
0,00
51 738 052,80
51 738 052,80
0,00
0,00
FR
2014FR06RDRP026
51 657 547,70
0,00
51 657 547,70
0,00
51 657 547,70
51 657 547,71
0,00
-0,01
FR
2014FR06RDRP031
21 858 414,42
0,00
21 858 414,42
0,00
21 858 414,42
21 858 414,45
0,00
-0,03
FR
2014FR06RDRP041
46 763 676,53
0,00
46 763 676,53
0,00
46 763 676,53
46 763 676,52
0,00
0,01
FR
2014FR06RDRP042
20 098 137,00
0,00
20 098 137,00
0,00
20 098 137,00
20 098 137,00
0,00
0,00
FR
2014FR06RDRP043
40 051 048,77
0,00
40 051 048,77
0,00
40 051 048,77
40 051 048,78
0,00
-0,01
FR
2014FR06RDRP052
65 231 877,96
0,00
65 231 877,96
0,00
65 231 877,96
65 231 877,96
0,00
0,00
FR
2014FR06RDRP053
54 459 195,16
– 109 087,00
54 350 108,16
0,00
54 350 108,16
54 350 108,15
0,00
0,01
FR
2014FR06RDRP054
36 890 541,71
0,00
36 890 541,71
0,00
36 890 541,71
36 890 541,77
0,00
-0,06
FR
2014FR06RDRP072
62 495 695,42
0,00
62 495 695,42
0,00
62 495 695,42
62 495 695,41
0,00
0,01
FR
2014FR06RDRP073
92 161 380,84
1 151 154,04
93 312 534,88
0,00
93 312 534,88
93 312 534,89
0,00
-0,01
FR
2014FR06RDRP074
34 246 497,12
0,00
34 246 497,12
0,00
34 246 497,12
32 456 932,82
1 789 564,28
0,02
FR
2014FR06RDRP082
68 841 421,40
2 997 486,22
71 838 907,62
0,00
71 838 907,62
67 356 927,57
4 481 980,05
0,00
FR
2014FR06RDRP083
63 434 608,44
3 239 497,71
66 674 106,15
0,00
66 674 106,15
57 767 202,75
8 906 903,37
0,03
FR
2014FR06RDRP091
67 058 094,83
0,00
67 058 094,83
0,00
67 058 094,83
67 184 094,85
0,00
– 126 000,02
FR
2014FR06RDRP093
29 397 046,89
1 339 138,48
30 736 185,37
0,00
30 736 185,37
30 736 185,33
0,00
0,04
FR
2014FR06RDRP094
10 227 258,02
0,00
10 227 258,02
0,00
10 227 258,02
10 227 258,96
0,00
-0,94
EL
2014GR06RDNP001
504 678 350,36
32 642 119,30
537 320 469,66
0,00
537 320 469,66
537 320 469,58
0,00
0,08
HR
2014HR06RDNP001
141 875 684,81
39 618 406,16
181 494 090,97
0,00
181 494 090,97
181 518 788,68
0,00
-24 697,71
HU
2014HU06RDNP001
393 670 715,33
-27 290 613,98
366 380 101,35
0,00
366 380 101,35
361 945 324,20
4 434 779,09
-1,94
IE
2014IE06RDNP001
111 555 724,23
0,00
111 555 724,23
0,00
111 555 724,23
61 689 186,13
49 866 538,10
0,00
IT
2014IT06RDNP001
55 011 176,63
0,00
55 011 176,63
0,00
55 011 176,63
55 023 137,68
0,00
-11 961,05
IT
2014IT06RDRN001
8 508 782,33
0,00
8 508 782,33
0,00
8 508 782,33
8 508 782,33
0,00
0,00
IT
2014IT06RDRP001
40 641 826,72
0,00
40 641 826,72
0,00
40 641 826,72
40 688 057,46
0,00
-46 230,74
IT
2014IT06RDRP002
11 570 453,72
0,00
11 570 453,72
0,00
11 570 453,72
11 570 453,93
0,00
-0,21
IT
2014IT06RDRP003
67 973 466,78
0,00
67 973 466,78
0,00
67 973 466,78
67 973 467,98
0,00
-1,20
IT
2014IT06RDRP004
20 135 811,06
0,00
20 135 811,06
0,00
20 135 811,06
19 128 071,01
0,00
1 007 740,05
IT
2014IT06RDRP005
55 755 877,28
0,00
55 755 877,28
0,00
55 755 877,28
55 895 828,98
0,00
– 139 951,70
IT
2014IT06RDRP006
19 432 339,00
-1 561,91
19 430 777,09
0,00
19 430 777,09
19 565 613,27
0,00
– 134 836,18
IT
2014IT06RDRP007
88 032 338,34
0,00
88 032 338,34
0,00
88 032 338,34
88 032 338,34
0,00
0,00
IT
2014IT06RDRP008
54 254 167,33
0,00
54 254 167,33
0,00
54 254 167,33
54 256 561,12
0,00
-2 393,79
IT
2014IT06RDRP009
77 460 532,17
0,00
77 460 532,17
0,00
77 460 532,17
77 460 533,26
0,00
-1,09
IT
2014IT06RDRP010
60 808 350,80
0,00
60 808 350,80
0,00
60 808 350,80
60 806 790,68
0,00
1 560,12
IT
2014IT06RDRP011
16 553 188,39
0,00
16 553 188,39
0,00
16 553 188,39
16 553 188,79
0,00
-0,40
IT
2014IT06RDRP012
54 704 018,50
0,00
54 704 018,50
0,00
54 704 018,50
55 460 455,47
0,00
– 756 436,97
IT
2014IT06RDRP013
5 438 935,88
0,00
5 438 935,88
0,00
5 438 935,88
5 468 051,30
0,00
-29 115,42
IT
2014IT06RDRP014
66 552 848,69
-0,03
66 552 848,66
0,00
66 552 848,66
66 596 045,23
0,00
-43 196,57
IT
2014IT06RDRP015
3 436 743,10
0,00
3 436 743,10
0,00
3 436 743,10
3 046 743,05
0,00
390 000,05
IT
2014IT06RDRP016
44 760 926,72
1 414 363,61
46 175 290,33
0,00
46 175 290,33
46 175 402,93
0,00
– 112,60
IT
2014IT06RDRP017
57 657 643,81
-1 749,76
57 655 894,05
0,00
57 655 894,05
57 769 076,38
0,00
– 113 182,33
IT
2014IT06RDRP018
36 903 344,53
0,00
36 903 344,53
0,00
36 903 344,53
37 016 394,90
0,00
– 113 050,37
IT
2014IT06RDRP019
117 465 033,59
-36 290,73
117 428 742,86
0,00
117 428 742,86
118 059 428,88
0,00
– 630 686,02
IT
2014IT06RDRP020
127 544 950,82
-15 684,43
127 529 266,39
0,00
127 529 266,39
127 757 380,43
0,00
– 228 114,04
IT
2014IT06RDRP021
203 563 284,95
0,00
203 563 284,95
0,00
203 563 284,95
204 455 354,86
0,00
– 892 069,91
LT
2014LT06RDNP001
207 057 881,77
0,00
207 057 881,77
0,00
207 057 881,77
207 057 950,19
0,00
-68,42
LU
2014LU06RDNP001
887 292,35
14 280,52
901 572,87
0,00
901 572,87
12 047,19
889 525,68
0,00
LV
2014LV06RDNP001
79 846 517,64
0,00
79 846 517,64
0,00
79 846 517,64
79 846 517,64
0,00
0,00
MT
2014MT06RDNP001
22 868 822,08
– 183 809,60
22 685 012,48
0,00
22 685 012,48
22 816 384,85
0,00
– 131 372,37
NL
2014NL06RDNP001
86 732 798,53
0,00
86 732 798,53
0,00
86 732 798,53
86 873 897,23
0,00
– 141 098,70
PL
2014PL06RDNP001
1 160 085 806,40
23 604,41
1 160 109 410,81
0,00
1 160 109 410,81
1 160 113 045,14
0,00
-3 634,33
PT
2014PT06RDRP001
25 824 941,97
0,00
25 824 941,97
0,00
25 824 941,97
25 817 715,06
0,00
7 226,91
PT
2014PT06RDRP002
449 014 995,35
-17 105 659,93
431 909 335,42
0,00
431 909 335,42
431 571 431,40
3 077 609,37
-2 739 705,35
PT
2014PT06RDRP003
16 216 623,03
0,00
16 216 623,03
0,00
16 216 623,03
16 269 932,68
0,00
-53 309,65
RO
2014RO06RDNP001
822 692 339,95
– 490 411,24
822 201 928,71
0,00
822 201 928,71
822 255 167,94
0,00
-53 239,23
SE
2014SE06RDNP001
75 509 293,38
0,00
75 509 293,38
0,00
75 509 293,38
75 548 896,17
0,00
-39 602,79
SI
2014SI06RDNP001
107 098 898,36
0,00
107 098 898,36
0,00
107 098 898,36
107 173 576,18
0,00
-74 677,82
SK
2014SK06RDNP001
92 169 711,64
14 585 954,70
106 755 666,34
0,00
106 755 666,34
106 755 925,70
0,00
– 259,36

(*1) Expenditure declared in the Annual Declarations for certain programmes triggers overruns or liftings at measure level. The capping or liftings of these overruns will be considered in the assessment of future quarterly declarations.

(*2) Interim payments reimbursed to the Member State for the financial year including clearing of pre-financing, include negative amounts declared in financial year 2024. These negative amounts have been, or will be, offset against the quarterly payments to the Member States concerned.

(*3) Where payments have reached 95 % of the total EAFRD contribution for a rural development programme in accordance with Article 34(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, the balance will be settled during the closure of the programme.

Corrections according to Article 54(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013
Corrections Related to the 2014-2020 Programming Period
Corrections Related to the 2007-2013 Programming Period
Member State
Currency
In National currency
In Euro
In National currency
In Euro
AT
EUR
0,00
0,00
0,00
48 809,50
BE
EUR
0,00
6 476,63
0,00
262,41
BG
BGN
271 870,41
0,00
7 760 293,71
0,00
CY
EUR
0,00
0,00
0,00
23 051,47
CZ
CZK
55 359,09
0,00
5 858 080,30
0,00
DE
EUR
0,00
42 409,04
0,00
399 728,51
DK
DKK
56 468,14
0,00
20 738,74
0,00
EE
EUR
0,00
935 525,85
0,00
158 200,00
ES
EUR
0,00
424 364,90
0,00
83 364,70
FI
EUR
0,00
30 232,93
0,00
104 371,25
FR
EUR
0,00
52 670,76
0,00
147 923,75
EL
EUR
0,00
53 156,57
0,00
1 093 549,19
HR
EUR
0,00
52 256,11
0,00
0,00
HU
HUF
15 436 304,00
0,00
136 989 605,00
0,00
IE
EUR
0,00
23 592,69
0,00
95 468,23
IT
EUR
0,00
134 014,22
0,00
1 751 002,33
LT
EUR
0,00
0,00
0,00
1 388 515,94
LU
EUR
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
LV
EUR
0,00
49 231,65
0,00
85 577,31
MT
EUR
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
NL
EUR
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
PL
PLN
895 960,15
0,00
4 712 892,02
0,00
PT
EUR
0,00
615 371,09
0,00
3 226 604,41
RO
RON
11,65
0,00
35 096 469,70
0,00
SE
SEK
36 402,78
0,00
6 357,88
0,00
SI
EUR
0,00
505,21
0,00
31 698,12
SK
EUR
0,00
112,43
0,00
437 933,57

(in Euro)
Member State
CCI
Reductions for non-compliance with latest payment deadlines for FY2024
AT
2014AT06RDNP001
0,00
BE
2014BE06RDRP001
0,00
BE
2014BE06RDRP002
0,00
BG
2014BG06RDNP001
201 578,10
CY
2014CY06RDNP001
0,00
CZ
2014CZ06RDNP001
0,00
DE
2014DE06RDRP003
0,00
DE
2014DE06RDRP004
0,00
DE
2014DE06RDRP007
0,00
DE
2014DE06RDRP010
0,00
DE
2014DE06RDRP011
0,00
DE
2014DE06RDRP012
0,00
DE
2014DE06RDRP015
0,00
DE
2014DE06RDRP017
0,00
DE
2014DE06RDRP018
1 173,50
DE
2014DE06RDRP019
0,00
DE
2014DE06RDRP020
0,00
DE
2014DE06RDRP021
0,00
DE
2014DE06RDRP023
0,00
DK
2014DK06RDNP001
465 198,34
EE
2014EE06RDNP001
0,00
ES
2014ES06RDNP001
0,00
ES
2014ES06RDRP001
517 241,22
ES
2014ES06RDRP002
0,00
ES
2014ES06RDRP003
0,00
ES
2014ES06RDRP004
25 760,44
ES
2014ES06RDRP005
0,00
ES
2014ES06RDRP006
0,00
ES
2014ES06RDRP007
513 247,62
ES
2014ES06RDRP008
66 442,55
ES
2014ES06RDRP009
0,00
ES
2014ES06RDRP010
34 497,99
ES
2014ES06RDRP011
0,00
ES
2014ES06RDRP012
0,00
ES
2014ES06RDRP013
148 642,23
ES
2014ES06RDRP014
0,00
ES
2014ES06RDRP015
0,00
ES
2014ES06RDRP016
0,00
ES
2014ES06RDRP017
7 703,37
FI
2014FI06RDRP001
0,00
FI
2014FI06RDRP002
0,00
FR
2014FR06RDNP001
0,00
FR
2014FR06RDRN001
0,00
FR
2014FR06RDRP001
712 163,61
FR
2014FR06RDRP002
417 256,40
FR
2014FR06RDRP003
206 495,56
FR
2014FR06RDRP004
0,00
FR
2014FR06RDRP006
0,00
FR
2014FR06RDRP011
2 465,84
FR
2014FR06RDRP021
191 767,45
FR
2014FR06RDRP022
336 462,64
FR
2014FR06RDRP023
50 514,08
FR
2014FR06RDRP024
694 761,78
FR
2014FR06RDRP025
82 024,75
FR
2014FR06RDRP026
37 219,78
FR
2014FR06RDRP031
43 904,57
FR
2014FR06RDRP041
270 999,35
FR
2014FR06RDRP042
110 378,36
FR
2014FR06RDRP043
101 833,63
FR
2014FR06RDRP052
1 245 344,80
FR
2014FR06RDRP053
152 198,84
FR
2014FR06RDRP054
489 604,48
FR
2014FR06RDRP072
804 182,28
FR
2014FR06RDRP073
179 824,05
FR
2014FR06RDRP074
125 344,00
FR
2014FR06RDRP082
287 834,11
FR
2014FR06RDRP083
35 659,91
FR
2014FR06RDRP091
810 921,80
FR
2014FR06RDRP093
70 472,31
FR
2014FR06RDRP094
646 495,44
EL
2014GR06RDNP001
20 090 022,97
HR
2014HR06RDNP001
1 181 740,90
HU
2014HU06RDNP001
1 418 800,85
IE
2014IE06RDNP001
0,00
IT
2014IT06RDNP001
0,00
IT
2014IT06RDRN001
0,00
IT
2014IT06RDRP001
1 277,21
IT
2014IT06RDRP002
0,00
IT
2014IT06RDRP003
0,00
IT
2014IT06RDRP004
0,00
IT
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2014LT06RDNP001
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2014LU06RDNP001
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2014MT06RDNP001
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2014PL06RDNP001
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2014PT06RDRP001
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2014PT06RDRP003
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Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/970 of 22 May 2025 postponing the expiry date of the approval of IPBC for use in biocidal products of product-type 8 in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/970 23.5.2025
(1) IPBC was included in Annex I to Directive 98/8/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(2)as an active substance for use in biocidal products of product-type 8. Pursuant to Article 86 of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012, it was therefore considered approved until 30 June 2020 under that Regulation subject to the conditions set out in Annex I to Directive 98/8/EC.
(2) On 20 December 2018, an application was submitted in accordance with Article 13(1) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 for the renewal of the approval of IPBC for use in biocidal products of product-type 8 (‘the application’).
(3) On 11 April 2019, the evaluating competent authority of Denmark informed the Commission that it had decided, pursuant to Article 14(1) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012, that a full evaluation of the application was necessary. Pursuant to Article 8(1) of that Regulation, the evaluating competent authority is to perform a full evaluation of the application within 365 days of its validation.
(4) The evaluating competent authority may, as appropriate, require the applicant to provide sufficient data to carry out the evaluation, in accordance with Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012. In that event, the 365-day period is suspended for a period that may not exceed 180 days in total unless a longer suspension is justified by the nature of the data requested or by exceptional circumstances.
(5) Within 270 days of receipt of a recommendation from the evaluating competent authority, the European Chemicals Agency (‘the Agency’) is to prepare and submit to the Commission an opinion on renewal of the approval of the active substance in accordance with Article 14(3) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012.
(6) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1969(3)postponed the expiry date of the approval of IPBC for use in biocidal products of product-type 8 to 31 December 2022, in order to allow sufficient time for the examination of the application.
(7) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/1485(4)further postponed the expiry date of the approval of IPBC for use in biocidal products of product-type 8 to 31 July 2025 due to the need of the evaluating competent authority to assess additional data requested from the applicant related to the criteria for the determination of endocrine-disrupting properties for non-target organisms.
(8) The evaluating competent authority submitted the renewal assessment report to the Agency on 5 July 2024. The Agency plans to submit to the Commission an opinion on renewal of the approval of the active substance in the first quarter of 2025.
(9) Consequently, for reasons beyond the control of the applicant, the approval is likely to expire before a decision has been taken on its renewal. It is therefore appropriate to further postpone the expiry date of the approval for a period of time sufficient to enable the examination of the application. Taking into account the time-limits for preparation and submission by the Agency of its opinion and the time needed for the Commission to decide whether to renew the approval of IPBC for use in biocidal products of product-type 8, the expiry date should be postponed to 31 July 2026.
(10) After the further postponement of the expiry date of the approval, IPBC remains approved for use in biocidal products of product-type 8 subject to the conditions set out in Annex I to Directive 98/8/EC,
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 concerning the making available on the market and use of biocidal products (1), and in particular Article 14(5) thereof,
After consulting the Standing Committee on Biocidal Products,
Whereas:
(1) IPBC was included in Annex I to Directive 98/8/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) as an active substance for use in biocidal products of product-type 8. Pursuant to Article 86 of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012, it was therefore considered approved until 30 June 2020 under that Regulation subject to the conditions set out in Annex I to Directive 98/8/EC.
(2) On 20 December 2018, an application was submitted in accordance with Article 13(1) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 for the renewal of the approval of IPBC for use in biocidal products of product-type 8 (‘the application’).
(3) On 11 April 2019, the evaluating competent authority of Denmark informed the Commission that it had decided, pursuant to Article 14(1) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012, that a full evaluation of the application was necessary. Pursuant to Article 8(1) of that Regulation, the evaluating competent authority is to perform a full evaluation of the application within 365 days of its validation.
(4) The evaluating competent authority may, as appropriate, require the applicant to provide sufficient data to carry out the evaluation, in accordance with Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012. In that event, the 365-day period is suspended for a period that may not exceed 180 days in total unless a longer suspension is justified by the nature of the data requested or by exceptional circumstances.
(5) Within 270 days of receipt of a recommendation from the evaluating competent authority, the European Chemicals Agency (‘the Agency’) is to prepare and submit to the Commission an opinion on renewal of the approval of the active substance in accordance with Article 14(3) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012.
(6) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/1969 (3) postponed the expiry date of the approval of IPBC for use in biocidal products of product-type 8 to 31 December 2022, in order to allow sufficient time for the examination of the application.
(7) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/1485 (4) further postponed the expiry date of the approval of IPBC for use in biocidal products of product-type 8 to 31 July 2025 due to the need of the evaluating competent authority to assess additional data requested from the applicant related to the criteria for the determination of endocrine-disrupting properties for non-target organisms.
(8) The evaluating competent authority submitted the renewal assessment report to the Agency on 5 July 2024. The Agency plans to submit to the Commission an opinion on renewal of the approval of the active substance in the first quarter of 2025.
(9) Consequently, for reasons beyond the control of the applicant, the approval is likely to expire before a decision has been taken on its renewal. It is therefore appropriate to further postpone the expiry date of the approval for a period of time sufficient to enable the examination of the application. Taking into account the time-limits for preparation and submission by the Agency of its opinion and the time needed for the Commission to decide whether to renew the approval of IPBC for use in biocidal products of product-type 8, the expiry date should be postponed to 31 July 2026.
(10) After the further postponement of the expiry date of the approval, IPBC remains approved for use in biocidal products of product-type 8 subject to the conditions set out in Annex I to Directive 98/8/EC,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The expiry date of the approval of IPBC for use in biocidal products of product-type 8 set out in Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/1485 is postponed to 31 July 2026.
This Decision shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/969 of 20 May 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/969 21.5.2025
(1) On 8 October 2024, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643(1).
(2) On the basis of a review of Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643, the Council considers that the identifying information and the statement of reasons in the entry for one natural person in the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 should be amended.
(3) Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 should therefore be amended accordingly,
Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing
‘14. Anatolii PRIZENKO BusinessmanDOB: 26.11.1974POB: Moldovan SSR (now Republic of Moldova)Nationality: MoldovanGender: male Anatolii Prizenko is a businessman in the Republic of Moldova. In late October 2023, he coordinated the dispatch of several citizens of the Republic of Moldova to France, where they painted the Star of David on the streets in exchange for financial compensation. That operation was widely reported by the media and had a significant destabilising effect in the context of the conflict between Israel and Hamas following the attacks on 7 October 2023. Images of that operation were first spread by the Recent Reliable News media network, which is associated with the Government of the Russian Federation and used by Russian actors to conduct disinformation campaigns.Anatolii Prizenko publicly took responsibility for his role as the organiser of that operation. According to media reports, that destabilising operation was carried out for the benefit of the Russian military intelligence service, the GRU, and aimed at fuelling tensions in French society.Therefore, Anatolii Prizenko is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability in a Member State and, therefore, in the Union by planning, directing, or engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 16.12.2024’
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 8 October 2024, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 (1).
(2) On the basis of a review of Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643, the Council considers that the identifying information and the statement of reasons in the entry for one natural person in the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 should be amended.
(3) Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 should therefore be amended accordingly,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

In the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643, under the heading ‘A. Natural persons’, the following entry is replaced:

Name
Identifying information
Statement of Reasons
Date of listing
‘14. Anatolii PRIZENKO
Businessman
DOB: 26.11.1974
POB: Moldovan SSR (now Republic of Moldova)
Nationality: Moldovan
Gender: male
Anatolii Prizenko is a businessman in the Republic of Moldova. In late October 2023, he coordinated the dispatch of several citizens of the Republic of Moldova to France, where they painted the Star of David on the streets in exchange for financial compensation. That operation was widely reported by the media and had a significant destabilising effect in the context of the conflict between Israel and Hamas following the attacks on 7 October 2023. Images of that operation were first spread by the Recent Reliable News media network, which is associated with the Government of the Russian Federation and used by Russian actors to conduct disinformation campaigns.
Anatolii Prizenko publicly took responsibility for his role as the organiser of that operation. According to media reports, that destabilising operation was carried out for the benefit of the Russian military intelligence service, the GRU, and aimed at fuelling tensions in French society.
Therefore, Anatolii Prizenko is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability in a Member State and, therefore, in the Union by planning, directing, or engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.
16.12.2024’

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/967 of 20 May 2025 on the participation of Switzerland in the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/967 21.5.2025
(1) Article 9(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 provides that the Council is to decide, in accordance with Article 46(6) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), whether a third State, which the participating Member States taking part in a permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) project wish to invite to take part in that project, meets the requirements to be established by the Council.
(2) On 6 March 2018, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2018/340(3), which established the list of projects to be developed under PESCO. Article 1 of that Decision provides for a project entitled ‘Cyber Ranges Federations’, which has eight project members, including Estonia as project coordinator.
(3) On 5 November 2020, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, which established the general conditions under which third States could exceptionally be invited to participate in individual PESCO projects. Article 2(4) of that Decision provides that, based on a notification by the coordinator or coordinators of a PESCO project, and following an opinion by the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Council is to take a decision in accordance with Article 46(6) TEU and Article 9(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 as to whether the participation of the third State in that project meets the conditions set out in Article 3 of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639.
(4) On 3 October 2024, Switzerland sent to the coordinator of the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations its request for participation in that PESCO project, in accordance with Article 2(1) of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639. The project members then assessed, on the basis of the information provided by Switzerland, whether it complies with the general conditions set out in Article 3 of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, in accordance with Article 2(2) thereof.
(5) On 14 February 2025, the coordinator of the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations notified the Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in accordance with Article 2(3) of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, that the project members of that PESCO project had unanimously agreed: that they wish to invite Switzerland to participate in that project; on the scope, form and relevant stages of the participation of Switzerland in that project; and that Switzerland complies with the general conditions set out in Article 3 of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639.
(6) On 15 April 2025, the PSC agreed on an opinion on the notification from the coordinator of the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations regarding the request by Switzerland to participate in that project (the ‘notification’). In particular, the PSC took note of the description of the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations as provided in the notification, including its objectives, organisation and decision making as well as focus areas of work. It also noted that no EU classified or sensitive information is shared within the project and that the project is not implemented with the support of the European Defence Agency (EDA) within the meaning of Article 3, point (g), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639. Furthermore, it noted that the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations does not involve armament procurement, research and capability development, or the use and export of arms or capabilities and technology. It also noted that it does not involve entities, investments or funding from Member States participating in PESCO or requests for Union funding for project activities.
(7) The PSC agreed with the proposed scope, form and extent of the participation of Switzerland in the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations as described in the notification. It acknowledged that Switzerland had expressed that it fully supports the scope of that project as defined in the notification.
(8) In the same opinion, the PSC confirmed the view unanimously agreed by the project members that Switzerland complies with the general conditions set out in Article 3 of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, as follows:—Switzerland meets the condition set out in Article 3, point (a), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, which requires: sharing of the values on which the Union is founded, as laid down in Article 2 TEU, and the principles referred to in Article 21(1) TEU, as well as the objectives of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) as laid down in Article 21(2), points (a), (b), (c) and (h), TEU; not contravening the security and defence interests of the Union and its Member States, including respect for the principle of good neighbourly relations with the Member States; and having a political dialogue with the Union, which should also cover security and defence aspects when participating in a PESCO project;—as regards the condition set out in Article 3, point (b), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 on the substantial added value of Switzerland to the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations, the notification provides a detailed outline of Switzerland’s contribution, including on the scope, form and extent of its participation in the project, which substantiates the fulfilment of that condition;—as regards the condition set out in Article 3, point (c), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, Switzerland’s participation in the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations will contribute to strengthening the common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the Union’s level of ambition, including in support of CSDP missions and operations, as also specified in the notification;—as regards the condition set out in Article 3, point (d), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations does not involve armament procurement, research and capability development, or the use and export of arms or capabilities and technology; it does not develop any capability or technology. Consequently, Switzerland’s participation in the project will not lead to dependencies on it or to restrictions imposed by it against any Member State of the Union;—the condition set out in Article 3, point (e), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 as regards the consistency of Switzerland’s participation with the relevant more binding PESCO commitments, as specified in the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315, is also met, as further detailed in the notification. As the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations is not a capability-orientated project, the condition concerning the contribution of Switzerland’s participation to fulfilling priorities derived from the Capability Development Plan and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) or having a positive impact on the European Defence Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB) is not applicable in this context;—the requirement set out in Article 3, point (f), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 is fulfilled as the Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the European Union on the security procedures for the exchange of classified information(4)has been in force since 1 June 2008;—the condition set out in Article 3, point (g), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 is not applicable in this case, as the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations is not implemented with the support of the EDA and therefore an administrative arrangement which has taken effect with the EDA is not required;—as regards the condition set out in Article 3, point (h), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, Switzerland has committed to seeking to conclude a project-specific administrative arrangement and any other necessary documentation in accordance with Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 and Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/909(5)concerning PESCO governance rules. — Switzerland meets the condition set out in Article 3, point (a), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, which requires: sharing of the values on which the Union is founded, as laid down in Article 2 TEU, and the principles referred to in Article 21(1) TEU, as well as the objectives of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) as laid down in Article 21(2), points (a), (b), (c) and (h), TEU; not contravening the security and defence interests of the Union and its Member States, including respect for the principle of good neighbourly relations with the Member States; and having a political dialogue with the Union, which should also cover security and defence aspects when participating in a PESCO project; — as regards the condition set out in Article 3, point (b), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 on the substantial added value of Switzerland to the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations, the notification provides a detailed outline of Switzerland’s contribution, including on the scope, form and extent of its participation in the project, which substantiates the fulfilment of that condition; — as regards the condition set out in Article 3, point (c), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, Switzerland’s participation in the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations will contribute to strengthening the common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the Union’s level of ambition, including in support of CSDP missions and operations, as also specified in the notification; — as regards the condition set out in Article 3, point (d), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations does not involve armament procurement, research and capability development, or the use and export of arms or capabilities and technology; it does not develop any capability or technology. Consequently, Switzerland’s participation in the project will not lead to dependencies on it or to restrictions imposed by it against any Member State of the Union; — the condition set out in Article 3, point (e), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 as regards the consistency of Switzerland’s participation with the relevant more binding PESCO commitments, as specified in the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315, is also met, as further detailed in the notification. As the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations is not a capability-orientated project, the condition concerning the contribution of Switzerland’s participation to fulfilling priorities derived from the Capability Development Plan and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) or having a positive impact on the European Defence Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB) is not applicable in this context; — the requirement set out in Article 3, point (f), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 is fulfilled as the Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the European Union on the security procedures for the exchange of classified information(4)has been in force since 1 June 2008; — the condition set out in Article 3, point (g), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 is not applicable in this case, as the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations is not implemented with the support of the EDA and therefore an administrative arrangement which has taken effect with the EDA is not required; — as regards the condition set out in Article 3, point (h), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, Switzerland has committed to seeking to conclude a project-specific administrative arrangement and any other necessary documentation in accordance with Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 and Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/909(5)concerning PESCO governance rules.
— Switzerland meets the condition set out in Article 3, point (a), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, which requires: sharing of the values on which the Union is founded, as laid down in Article 2 TEU, and the principles referred to in Article 21(1) TEU, as well as the objectives of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) as laid down in Article 21(2), points (a), (b), (c) and (h), TEU; not contravening the security and defence interests of the Union and its Member States, including respect for the principle of good neighbourly relations with the Member States; and having a political dialogue with the Union, which should also cover security and defence aspects when participating in a PESCO project;
— as regards the condition set out in Article 3, point (b), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 on the substantial added value of Switzerland to the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations, the notification provides a detailed outline of Switzerland’s contribution, including on the scope, form and extent of its participation in the project, which substantiates the fulfilment of that condition;
— as regards the condition set out in Article 3, point (c), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, Switzerland’s participation in the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations will contribute to strengthening the common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the Union’s level of ambition, including in support of CSDP missions and operations, as also specified in the notification;
— as regards the condition set out in Article 3, point (d), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations does not involve armament procurement, research and capability development, or the use and export of arms or capabilities and technology; it does not develop any capability or technology. Consequently, Switzerland’s participation in the project will not lead to dependencies on it or to restrictions imposed by it against any Member State of the Union;
— the condition set out in Article 3, point (e), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 as regards the consistency of Switzerland’s participation with the relevant more binding PESCO commitments, as specified in the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315, is also met, as further detailed in the notification. As the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations is not a capability-orientated project, the condition concerning the contribution of Switzerland’s participation to fulfilling priorities derived from the Capability Development Plan and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) or having a positive impact on the European Defence Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB) is not applicable in this context;
— the requirement set out in Article 3, point (f), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 is fulfilled as the Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the European Union on the security procedures for the exchange of classified information(4)has been in force since 1 June 2008;
— the condition set out in Article 3, point (g), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 is not applicable in this case, as the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations is not implemented with the support of the EDA and therefore an administrative arrangement which has taken effect with the EDA is not required;
— as regards the condition set out in Article 3, point (h), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, Switzerland has committed to seeking to conclude a project-specific administrative arrangement and any other necessary documentation in accordance with Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 and Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/909(5)concerning PESCO governance rules.
— Switzerland meets the condition set out in Article 3, point (a), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, which requires: sharing of the values on which the Union is founded, as laid down in Article 2 TEU, and the principles referred to in Article 21(1) TEU, as well as the objectives of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) as laid down in Article 21(2), points (a), (b), (c) and (h), TEU; not contravening the security and defence interests of the Union and its Member States, including respect for the principle of good neighbourly relations with the Member States; and having a political dialogue with the Union, which should also cover security and defence aspects when participating in a PESCO project;
— as regards the condition set out in Article 3, point (b), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 on the substantial added value of Switzerland to the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations, the notification provides a detailed outline of Switzerland’s contribution, including on the scope, form and extent of its participation in the project, which substantiates the fulfilment of that condition;
— as regards the condition set out in Article 3, point (c), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, Switzerland’s participation in the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations will contribute to strengthening the common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the Union’s level of ambition, including in support of CSDP missions and operations, as also specified in the notification;
— as regards the condition set out in Article 3, point (d), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations does not involve armament procurement, research and capability development, or the use and export of arms or capabilities and technology; it does not develop any capability or technology. Consequently, Switzerland’s participation in the project will not lead to dependencies on it or to restrictions imposed by it against any Member State of the Union;
— the condition set out in Article 3, point (e), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 as regards the consistency of Switzerland’s participation with the relevant more binding PESCO commitments, as specified in the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315, is also met, as further detailed in the notification. As the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations is not a capability-orientated project, the condition concerning the contribution of Switzerland’s participation to fulfilling priorities derived from the Capability Development Plan and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) or having a positive impact on the European Defence Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB) is not applicable in this context;
— the requirement set out in Article 3, point (f), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 is fulfilled as the Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the European Union on the security procedures for the exchange of classified information(4)has been in force since 1 June 2008;
— the condition set out in Article 3, point (g), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 is not applicable in this case, as the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations is not implemented with the support of the EDA and therefore an administrative arrangement which has taken effect with the EDA is not required;
— as regards the condition set out in Article 3, point (h), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, Switzerland has committed to seeking to conclude a project-specific administrative arrangement and any other necessary documentation in accordance with Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 and Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/909(5)concerning PESCO governance rules.
(9) In its opinion, the PSC recommended that the Council take a positive decision as to whether the participation of Switzerland in the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations meets the conditions set out in Article 3 of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639.
(10) The Council should therefore decide that the participation of Switzerland in the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations meets the conditions set out in Article 3 of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639. Switzerland will join that project on the date specified in the administrative arrangement to be entered into by Switzerland and the project members, in accordance with Article 2(7) of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639. The Council will exercise its oversight in accordance with Article 5(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 and can take further decisions in accordance with Article 6(2) and (3) thereof,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 46(6) thereof,
Having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States (1), and in particular Article 9(2) thereof,
Having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 of 5 November 2020 establishing the general conditions under which third States could exceptionally be invited to participate in individual PESCO projects (2), and in particular Article 2(4) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) Article 9(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 provides that the Council is to decide, in accordance with Article 46(6) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), whether a third State, which the participating Member States taking part in a permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) project wish to invite to take part in that project, meets the requirements to be established by the Council.
(2) On 6 March 2018, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2018/340 (3), which established the list of projects to be developed under PESCO. Article 1 of that Decision provides for a project entitled ‘Cyber Ranges Federations’, which has eight project members, including Estonia as project coordinator.
(3) On 5 November 2020, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, which established the general conditions under which third States could exceptionally be invited to participate in individual PESCO projects. Article 2(4) of that Decision provides that, based on a notification by the coordinator or coordinators of a PESCO project, and following an opinion by the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Council is to take a decision in accordance with Article 46(6) TEU and Article 9(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 as to whether the participation of the third State in that project meets the conditions set out in Article 3 of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639.
(4) On 3 October 2024, Switzerland sent to the coordinator of the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations its request for participation in that PESCO project, in accordance with Article 2(1) of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639. The project members then assessed, on the basis of the information provided by Switzerland, whether it complies with the general conditions set out in Article 3 of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, in accordance with Article 2(2) thereof.
(5) On 14 February 2025, the coordinator of the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations notified the Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in accordance with Article 2(3) of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, that the project members of that PESCO project had unanimously agreed: that they wish to invite Switzerland to participate in that project; on the scope, form and relevant stages of the participation of Switzerland in that project; and that Switzerland complies with the general conditions set out in Article 3 of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639.
(6) On 15 April 2025, the PSC agreed on an opinion on the notification from the coordinator of the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations regarding the request by Switzerland to participate in that project (the ‘notification’). In particular, the PSC took note of the description of the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations as provided in the notification, including its objectives, organisation and decision making as well as focus areas of work. It also noted that no EU classified or sensitive information is shared within the project and that the project is not implemented with the support of the European Defence Agency (EDA) within the meaning of Article 3, point (g), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639. Furthermore, it noted that the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations does not involve armament procurement, research and capability development, or the use and export of arms or capabilities and technology. It also noted that it does not involve entities, investments or funding from Member States participating in PESCO or requests for Union funding for project activities.
(7) The PSC agreed with the proposed scope, form and extent of the participation of Switzerland in the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations as described in the notification. It acknowledged that Switzerland had expressed that it fully supports the scope of that project as defined in the notification.
(8) In the same opinion, the PSC confirmed the view unanimously agreed by the project members that Switzerland complies with the general conditions set out in Article 3 of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, as follows:
—
Switzerland meets the condition set out in Article 3, point (a), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, which requires: sharing of the values on which the Union is founded, as laid down in Article 2 TEU, and the principles referred to in Article 21(1) TEU, as well as the objectives of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) as laid down in Article 21(2), points (a), (b), (c) and (h), TEU; not contravening the security and defence interests of the Union and its Member States, including respect for the principle of good neighbourly relations with the Member States; and having a political dialogue with the Union, which should also cover security and defence aspects when participating in a PESCO project;
—
as regards the condition set out in Article 3, point (b), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 on the substantial added value of Switzerland to the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations, the notification provides a detailed outline of Switzerland’s contribution, including on the scope, form and extent of its participation in the project, which substantiates the fulfilment of that condition;
—
as regards the condition set out in Article 3, point (c), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, Switzerland’s participation in the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations will contribute to strengthening the common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the Union’s level of ambition, including in support of CSDP missions and operations, as also specified in the notification;
—
as regards the condition set out in Article 3, point (d), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations does not involve armament procurement, research and capability development, or the use and export of arms or capabilities and technology; it does not develop any capability or technology. Consequently, Switzerland’s participation in the project will not lead to dependencies on it or to restrictions imposed by it against any Member State of the Union;
—
the condition set out in Article 3, point (e), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 as regards the consistency of Switzerland’s participation with the relevant more binding PESCO commitments, as specified in the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315, is also met, as further detailed in the notification. As the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations is not a capability-orientated project, the condition concerning the contribution of Switzerland’s participation to fulfilling priorities derived from the Capability Development Plan and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) or having a positive impact on the European Defence Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB) is not applicable in this context;
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the requirement set out in Article 3, point (f), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 is fulfilled as the Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the European Union on the security procedures for the exchange of classified information (4) has been in force since 1 June 2008;
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the condition set out in Article 3, point (g), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 is not applicable in this case, as the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations is not implemented with the support of the EDA and therefore an administrative arrangement which has taken effect with the EDA is not required;
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as regards the condition set out in Article 3, point (h), of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, Switzerland has committed to seeking to conclude a project-specific administrative arrangement and any other necessary documentation in accordance with Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 and Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/909 (5) concerning PESCO governance rules.
(9) In its opinion, the PSC recommended that the Council take a positive decision as to whether the participation of Switzerland in the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations meets the conditions set out in Article 3 of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639.
(10) The Council should therefore decide that the participation of Switzerland in the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations meets the conditions set out in Article 3 of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639. Switzerland will join that project on the date specified in the administrative arrangement to be entered into by Switzerland and the project members, in accordance with Article 2(7) of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639. The Council will exercise its oversight in accordance with Article 5(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 and can take further decisions in accordance with Article 6(2) and (3) thereof,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The participation of Switzerland in the PESCO project Cyber Ranges Federations meets the conditions set out in Article 3 of Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/966 of 20 May 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/966 20.5.2025
(1) On 8 October 2024, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643(1).
(2) The Union remains unwavering in its condemnation of Russia’s malign activities directed against the Union, its Member States, international organisations and third countries.
(3) In view of the gravity of the situation, the Council considers that 21 natural persons and 6 legal persons, entities or bodies should be added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643.
(4) Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 should therefore be amended accordingly,
(1) The following entries are added under the heading ‘A. Natural persons’:NameIdentifying informationStatement of ReasonsDate of listing‘17.Alik Yuryevich KHUCHBAROVAlik Yuryevich HUCHBAROVAlik HUTŠBAROV(Russian: Алик Юрьевич ХУЧБАРОВ)Function: GRU operativeDOB: 12.11.1992Nationality: Russian, EstonianGender: maleTax identification number: 601515903509Alik Khuchbarov was reponsible for planning and preparing an operation in Estonia, which entailed damaging the property of public figures who have spoken out against the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as defacing monuments related to World War II. In doing so, he acted under the direction, in the interests and at the request of Russia’s military foreign intelligence agency (GRU) to hire perpetrators to carry out the attacks. In the attacks, vehicles of the Estonian Minister of the Interior as well as of the editor-in-chief of a Russian-language newspaper were targetted. The security services of Estonia prevented further attacks targeting more public figures. In addition, several war memorials in Estonia were defaced, with paint thrown on them and swastikas drawn on them. The aim of the operation was to create fear, panic and tension in Estonian society, and to intimidate persons critical of Russian actions and policies.As a collaborator in the GRU’s network, Alik Khuchbarov is responsible for implementing actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a Member State through planning and directing acts of violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation.20.5.202518.Ilya Sergeevich BOCHAROVIlja BOTŠAROV(Russian: Илья Сергеевич БОЧАРОВ)Function: GRU operativeDOB: 29.6.1991Nationality: RussianGender: maleTax identification number: 561410364291Ilya Bocharov was reponsible for planning and preparing an operation in Estonia, which entailed damaging the property of public figures who have spoken out against the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as defacing monuments related to World War II. In doing so, he acted under the direction, in the interests and at the request of Russia’s military foreign intelligence agency (GRU) to hire perpetrators to carry out the attacks. In the attacks, vehicles of the Estonian Minister of the Interior as well as of the editor-in-chief of a Russian-language newspaper were targetted. The security services of Estonia prevented further attacks targeting more public figures. In addition, several war memorials in Estonia were defaced, with paint thrown on them and swastikas drawn on them. The aim of the operation was to create fear, panic and tension in Estonian society, and to intimidate persons critical of Russian actions and policies.As a collaborator in the GRU’s network, Ilya Bocharov is responsible for implementing actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a Member State through planning and directing acts of violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation.20.5.202519.Elena KOLBASNIKOVA(Russian: Елена КОЛБАСНИКОВА)Nationality: Ukrainian, RussianDOB: 20.3.1975POB: Dnipro, Ukraine SSR (now Ukraine)Gender: femaleElena Kolbasnikova is a Russian national who has close ties with, and is financially supported by, Rossotrudnitschestwo, a Russian state entity. Kolbasnikova formed political structures with the German anti-democratic extreme political right in support of Russia’s destabilisation of Ukraine. She was sentenced for hate speech in a court of final instance in Germany in regard to her undermining of Ukrainian sovereignty and denouncement of German public institutions. Criminal investigations are ongoing in regard to her support of separatists in the Donbas with military hardware, through fundraisers and the provision of aid to separatist groups. Moreover, Kolbasnikova promoted violent acts committed by her husband, Rostislav Teslyuk, against counter-demonstrators, and organised car rallies to intimidate Ukrainian minors seeking refuge in Germany.She thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of a Member State through activities aimed at undermining the democratic political process in Germany. She also supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the security of a third country (Ukraine), through instigating or facilitating an armed conflict, by supporting separatist movements in Ukraine.Elena Kolbasnikova is associated with Rostislav Teslyuk, through joint efforts in destabilising activities.20.5.202520.Hüseyin DOGRUAddress: Kavacık Mahallesi, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Caddesi, Tonoglu Block No.: 3, Beykoz, Istanbul, TürkiyeNationality: TurkishGender: maleHüseyin Doğru is the founder and representative of AFA Medya A.Ş. which is a media company based in Istanbul. AFA Medya A.Ş. operates “RED”, which comprises a number of media platforms, and which has close financial and organisational connections with Russian state propaganda entities and actors, and shares deep structural ties, including interlinkages between, and rotation of, individual personnel with Russian state media organisations.RED has used its media platforms – often publishing under “redstreamnet” or “thered.stream” – to systematically spread false information on politically controversial subjects with the intent of creating ethnic, political and religious discord amongst its predominantly German target audience, including by disseminating the narratives of radical Islamic terrorist groups such as Hamas.During a violent occupation of a German university by anti-Israel rioters, RED personnel coordinated with the occupiers to disseminate images of their vandalism – which included the use of Hamas symbols – through their online channels, thus providing them with an exclusive media platform, facilitating the violent nature of the protest.Through AFA Medya, Hüseyin Doğru thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability and security in the Union and in one or several of its Member States, including by indirectly supporting and facilitating violent demonstrations and engaging in coordinated information manipulation.20.5.202521.Yulia Sergeevna PROKHOROVA(Russian: Юлия Сергеевна ПРОХОРОВА)Nationality: RussianDOB: 18.2.1992Address: Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates.Formerly Landshut, Bavaria, GermanyGender: femaleYulia Prokhorova is a Russian citizen. She resided in Germany until 2024. Yulia Prokhorova sustains a social media campaign in which she promoted the intentional wasting of energy in Germany, seeking to support Russia’s war of aggression. In parallel, she disseminates misinformation in Russian state media about the energy supply, the rule of law, and Ukrainian refugees in Germany.In addition, Yulia Prokhorova intimidated Ukrainian refugees in Europe through public assaults and other forms of harassment, which she recorded and disseminated online.Yulia Prokhorova thus supports actions and policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one Member State by engaging in the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference and indirectly supporting actions targeted at economic activities and services of public interest.20.5.202522.Rostislav TESLYUK(Russian: Ростислав ТЕСЛЮК)AliasMax SCHLUND(Russian: Макс ШЛУНД)Nationality: RussianDOB: 23.4.1982POB: MoscowGender: maleRostislav Teslyuk is a Russian national who has close ties with, and is financially supported by, Rossotrudnitschestwo, a Russian state entity. Rostislav Teslyuk formed political structures with the German anti-democratic extreme political right in support of Russia’s destabilisation of Ukraine. Criminal investigations in regard to his support of separatists in the Donbas with military hardware are ongoing. Rostislav Teslyuk committed violent acts against counter-demonstrators and organised car rallies to intimidate Ukrainian minors seeking refuge in Germany, together with Elena Kolbasnikova.He thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of a Member State (Germany) through activities aimed at undermining the democratic political process in Germany. He is also responsible for actions by the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine the security of a third country (Ukraine) through instigating or facilitating an armed conflict, by his support for separatist movements in Ukraine.Rostislav Teslyuk is associated with Elena Kolbasnikova, who is subject to restrictive measures, through joint efforts in destabilising activities.20.5.202523.Alina LIPPFunction: war correspondentDOB: 17.9.1993POB: HamburgNationality: GermanGender: femaleAlina Lipp runs the blog “Neues aus Russland”, in which she systematically disseminates misinformation about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and delegitimises the Ukrainian government, especially with a view to manipulating German public sentiment as regards support for Ukraine.Furthermore, she is using her role as a war correspondent with the Russian armed forces in eastern Ukraine to spread Russian war propaganda. She regularly appears in troop entertainment and propaganda shows on the Russian military TV channel Zvezda.Thus, Alina Lipp is engaging in and supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten security and stability in the Union and in a third country (Ukraine) through the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference, and through facilitating an armed conflict in a third country.20.5.202524.Viktor Volodymyrovych MEDVEDCHUK(Ukrainian: Віктор Володимирович МЕДВЕДЧУК)(Russian: Виктор Владимирович МЕДВЕДЧУК)Function: Politician, businessman, de facto media ownerDOB: 7.8.1954POB: Pochet, Krasnoyarskyi Krai, Russian SFSR, USSRNationality: RussianGender: maleAddress: MoscowUkrainian Tax ID (Код ДРФО): 1994214296 (void)Viktor Medvedchuk is a former Ukrainian politician and businessman, who has been the leading proponent of a pro-Russian policy in Ukraine and who has promoted policies and actions intended to erode the credibility and legitimacy of the Government of Ukraine. Viktor Medvedchuk has close personal ties to, and is associated with, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin.Through his associates, including Artem Marchevskyi, Viktor Medvedchuk controlled Ukrainian media outlets and used them to disseminate pro-Russian propaganda in Ukraine and beyond. After the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Viktor Medvedchuk spread Russian propaganda narratives about the war, undermining Ukrainian sovereignty. To that end, in April 2023, Viktor Medvedchuk founded a political movement in Russia called “Another Ukraine”.With his associates and associated entities, including Artem Marchevskyi and the Voice of Europe media channel, and in close coordination with the Russian authorities, Viktor Medvedchuk has continued funding and carrying out influence operations targeting political parties and individual politicians in Europe. Those activities aimed to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and to spread its influence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections. Those activities included providing financial resources to individual political actors in Europe, including selected candidates in the European Parliament elections, and for cooperation with journalists. Viktor Medvedchuk has directed and maintained control over the malign activities of Artem Marchevskyi and Voice of Europe, using Artem Marchevskyi’s de facto direction of Voice of Europe.Therefore, Viktor Medvedchuk is responsible for, implementing, supporting, or benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in a third country, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through planning, directing, engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process, including the 2024 European Parliament elections, and through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference.20.5.202525.Artem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKYIArtem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKIJArtem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKIYArtěm Pavlovič MARČEVSKIJ(Ukrainian: Артем Павлович МАРЧЕВСЬКИЙ)(Russian: Артем Павлович МАРЧЕВСКИЙ)Function: Politician, media producer, propagandistDOB: 5.7.1988POB: Kyiv, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, (now Ukraine)Nationality: Ukrainian, IsraeliGender: maleAddress: Hovorčovická 1079, 250 65 Líbeznice, Czech RepublicUkrainian Tax ID (Код ДРФО): 3232824038Artem Marchevskyi is a former Ukrainian politician closely associated with Viktor Medvedchuk, a former Ukrainian politician and businessperson with close connections to the Government of the Russian Federation. By virtue of his position in the pro-Russian party “Opposition Platform – For Life” and in a TV channel involved in pro-Russian propaganda, Artem Marchevskyi supported and provided assistance to Viktor Medvedchuk in the years 2018 to 2021. Artem Marchevskyi and Viktor Medvedchuk continued to coordinate after they both left Ukraine following the Russian invasion in 2022, with Viktor Medvedchuk directing and controlling Artem Marchevskyi’s activities facilitating construction of Medvedchuk’s influence network in the Union and its Member States.Artem Marchevskyi has played an instrumental role in disseminating concerted disinformation and biased narratives aimed at supporting the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and spreading its influence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections, by undermining the credibility and public image of Ukraine and its efforts to defend itself against Russia’s war of aggression. Artem Marchevskyi played a key role in the acquisition of the media brand “Voice of Europe” and the incorporation of its activity in a company of the same name. As the concealed head of Voice of Europe, Artem Marchevskyi has used the company to funnel financial resources designated for the remuneration of propagandists, and to build an influence network connecting Medvedchuk and his associates with representatives of political parties in Europe.Therefore, Artem Marchevskyi is responsible for actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process and through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference.20.5.202526.Natallia SUDLIANKOVAA.k.a.:Natallia SUDLENKOVANatalia SUDLENKOVANatalia SUDLIANKOVÁ (ŠEVKOVÁ)Natalija SUDLIANKOVÁ (ŠEVKOVÁ)(Russian: Наталья СУДЛЕНКОВА (ШЕВКО))Alias:Natalyia KORNELYUK(Russian: Наталья КОРНЕЛЮК)Function: Journalist, Media and PR Consultant, CoordinatorDOB: 9.6.1964POB: BelarusNationality: BelarusianGender: femaleAddress: Borovanského 2381/22, 155 00 Prague, Czech RepublicIdentity documents: Travel document: U0002974, valid until 18.3.2031Residence Permit: 001631077, valid until 13.3.2034Natallia Sudliankova is a journalist and a media and PR consultant who has been producing custom-made media products that included information manipulation and spreading misleading narratives aiming to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and aiming to undermine the public trust towards Czech national and European Union democratic values and processes. Sudliankova has been receiving assignments over a long period of time and has been financially rewarded.She plays a significant role in planning and directing coordinated information manipulation intended for the public in the Czech Republic and in other Member States, and cooperates with Russian state entities (Rosatom, Pravfond), entities representing the interests of the Russian Federation (Immortal Regiment of Russia), and Alexey Nikolayevich Shavrov, an officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU).Therefore, Natallia Sudliankova is responsible for actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation.20.5.202527.Iurie NECULITI(Russian: Юрие НЕКУЛИТИ)Function: CEO of Stark IndustriesNationality: of the Republic of MoldovaGender: maleAddress: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom; Chisinau, Republic of MoldovaPOB: Bender, Republic of MoldovaIurie Neculiti is CEO of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world.Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against the Union and third countries by providing services intended to hide these activities from European law enforcement and security agencies.Therefore, as CEO of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., Neculiti is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and a third country, by facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest.Iurie Neculiti is associated with Ivan Neculiti and Stark Industries.20.5.202528.Ivan NECULITI(Russian: Иван НЕКУЛИТИ)Function: Owner of Stark Industries and PQ HostingNationality: of the Republic of MoldovaGender: maleAddress: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom; Chisinau, Republic of MoldovaPOB: Bender, Republic of MoldovaIvan Neculiti is the owner of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world.Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities, including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against Union and third countries, by providing services intended to hide these activities from European law enforcement and security agencies.Ivan Neculiti is associated with Iurie Neculiti and Stark Industries.Therefore, as the owner of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. Ivan Neculiti is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and in a third country, by facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest.20.5.202529.Andrei KHARKOVSKY(Russian: Андрей ХАРКОВСКИЙ)Function: Leading member of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and AbroadNationality: RussianPOB: Tomsk Region, RussiaGender: maleAddress: GermanyAndrei Kharkovsky is a Russian citizen living in Germany. In Germany, Kharkovsky functions as a representative of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad, including by organising military-style gatherings for its members. The Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad is an entity linked to the Government of the Russian Federation, and partaking in Russia’s war of aggression and acts of violence in Ukraine in support of pro-Russian separatists under the premise of a “historical mission” to reinstate Russian control over southern and eastern Ukraine. As a member of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad, Kharkovsky is engaging in acts of violence.Andrei Kharkovsky is therefore supporting actions of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the sovereignty and security of Ukraine by attempting to overthrow the constitutional order of Ukraine.20.5.202530.Anatoli Yurevich ABRAMOV(Russian: Анатолий Юрьевич АБРАМОВ)Function: Director of the General Radio Frequency Centre branch in the Northwestern Federal DistrictNationality: RussianGender: maleAnatoly Abramov is the director of the General Radio Frequency Centre’s Northwestern Federal District branch. Branch heads are appointed and dismissed by the Director of the GRFC in agreement with Roskomnadzor, and act on behalf of the GRFC.He oversees the use of radio frequencies and devices in the Kaliningrad region.Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC.Therefore, Anatoly Abramov is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States, through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure.20.5.202531.Ruslan Vasilyevich NESTERENKO(Russian: Руслан Васильевич НЕСТЕРЕНКО)Function: Acting General Director of the GRFCNationality: RussianGender: maleRuslan Nesterenko is the acting general director of the General Radio Frequency Centre (GRFC). He oversees the use of radio frequencies and ensures compliance with legislation.Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, Russia, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States and disrupting civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC.Under Nesterenko’s direction, the GRFC is involved in planning and supporting information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States. As per the GRFC Charter, the general director represents the enterprise’s interests within Russia and beyond its borders.Therefore, Ruslan Nesterenko is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure and through supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.20.5.202532.Viktor Aleksandrovitch LUKOVENKO(Russian: Виктор Александрович ЛУКОВЕНКО)AliasViktor VASILEV(Russian: Виктор ВАСИЛЬЕВ)Function: Head of the news agency “African Initiative”DOB: 6.4.1985Nationality: UzbekGender: maleViktor Lukovenko has been active on the African continent for several years, previously as a member of the Wagner Group and now as the head of the news agency “African Initiative”. He is involved in spreading Russian propaganda on the continent. He is linked to well known figures of Russian propaganda in Africa. Additionally, Viktor Lukovenko was sent to Ukraine in 2022 before the war, under the supervision of a GRU colonel, in order to recruit pro-Russian sympathisers.Viktor Lukovenko is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly and indirectly, supporting and facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.20.5.202533.Oleg Anatoliyovych VOLOSHIN(Ukrainian: Олег Анатолійович ВОЛОШИН)(Russian: Олег Анатольевич ВОЛОШИН)Nationality: RussianDOB: 7.4.1981POB: Nikolaev, USSR (now Ukraine)Passport No.: ET870130ID-No.: 1981040705733; 2968200719Gender: maleOleg Voloshin is a former Ukrainian member of parliament and a member of the pro-Russian political party “Opposition Platform – For Life” (OPFL). He is part of the network behind “Voice of Europe” and is active at Golos.eu and PolitWera, both platforms spreading disinformation and pro-Russian narratives. He was involved in bribe payments made to Western politicians.Oleg Voloshin has used his position as Ukrainian delegate to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2019-2023) to implement the strategy of Russian interference in Europe led by pro-Russian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, who leads OPFL.In particular, Voloshin has promoted Medvedchuk’s “peace plan” for Ukraine, which is linked to the Russian narrative regarding Russia’s war of aggression. In order to win-over European elected representatives to his cause, he has organised conferences with French and German parliamentarians, arguing that the “Normandy format” (France, Germany, Ukraine, Russia) has a so-called parliamentary dimension outside any official framework. The most recent event was organised by Voloshin at the French Senate on 11 February 2022 (“Peace process in Ukraine: how to break the deadlock”), a few days before the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian army.Thus, Oleg Voloshin is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union and its Member States, including Germany, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly and indirectly, the obstruction and undermining of the democratic political process.20.5.202534.Justin Blaise TAGOUH(Russian: Жюстин Блез ТАГУ)Function: CEO of press group International Afrique Media (IAM), which includes the TV channel Afrique Média, IAM press review, and Courrier ConfidentielDOB: 1959Gender: maleJustin Tagouh is CEO of the press group International Africa Media. This media group has direct links with the Russian authorities, and spreads Russian narrative and anti-western narrative in African countries.Justin Tagouh is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.20.5.202535.Mikhaïl Mikhaïlovich PRUDNIKOVAlias“Micha”(Russian: Михаил Михайлович ПРУДНИКОВ)Function: Member of Africa Politology, entity responsible for disinformation and Russian propaganda in the Central African RepublicPOB: Tambov OblastNationality: RussianGender: maleMikhaïl Prudnikov is a Russian disinformation activist operating in the Central African Republic (CAR) who has close links with the Wagner galaxy and disinformation campaign holdings in CAR through various newspapers and networks. In particular, he developed a narrative against western countries and participated in communication actions in order to undermine and threaten the Union’s image in the CAR.Mikhaïl Prudnikov is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.20.5.202536.Sylvain AFOUA(Russian: Сильвен АФУА)AliasEgountchi BEHANZIN(Russian: Эгунчи БЕХАНЗИН)Function: Founder of the pan-African group “Ligue de défense noire Africaine” (LDNA); influencer/activist known by the pseudonym “Egountchi Behanzin”DOB: 5.11.1988POB: Madjikpeto, TogoNationality: French, TogoleseGender: maleWebsite: www.egountchibehanzin.comSylvain Afoua is a pro-Russian activist, founder of the “Ligue de défense noire Africaine” (LDNA) (Black African Defence League), a group involved in hit actions on French territory. The structure was dissolved by a French ministerial decree of 29 September 2021 for spreading an ideology calling for hatred, discrimination and violence. Sylvain Afoua spreads Russian narratives and misinformation on the war of aggression against Ukraine, which he carries out in particular on the African continent. His message is transmitted via social networks and his association’s website. He is regularly invited to Russian fora and is, furthermore, financially linked to the Wagner Group.Sylvain Afoua is therefore responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.20.5.202537.Thomas RÖPER(Russian: Томас РЁПЕР)Function: war correspondentDOB: 26.11.1971POB: BremenNationality: GermanGender: maleThomas Röper is a German blogger. Through his network of online channels named “Anti-Spiegel”, he systematically disseminates misinformation about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and delegitimises the Ukrainian government, especially with a view to manipulating German public sentiment regarding support to Ukraine.Furthermore, he legitimises Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory by serving as an election “observer” and participating in a campaign to promote Russia’s illegal referendum on the secession from Ukraine of the Russian-occupied territories. Moreover, he has served as a spokesperson for the Government of the Russian Federationto disseminate Russian propaganda narratives, including at the UN Arria-forum.Thomas Röper is therefore engaging in and supporting the use of information manipulation and interference and facilitates an armed conflict in a third country.20.5.2025’; Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing ‘17. Alik Yuryevich KHUCHBAROVAlik Yuryevich HUCHBAROVAlik HUTŠBAROV(Russian: Алик Юрьевич ХУЧБАРОВ) Function: GRU operativeDOB: 12.11.1992Nationality: Russian, EstonianGender: maleTax identification number: 601515903509 Alik Khuchbarov was reponsible for planning and preparing an operation in Estonia, which entailed damaging the property of public figures who have spoken out against the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as defacing monuments related to World War II. In doing so, he acted under the direction, in the interests and at the request of Russia’s military foreign intelligence agency (GRU) to hire perpetrators to carry out the attacks. In the attacks, vehicles of the Estonian Minister of the Interior as well as of the editor-in-chief of a Russian-language newspaper were targetted. The security services of Estonia prevented further attacks targeting more public figures. In addition, several war memorials in Estonia were defaced, with paint thrown on them and swastikas drawn on them. The aim of the operation was to create fear, panic and tension in Estonian society, and to intimidate persons critical of Russian actions and policies.As a collaborator in the GRU’s network, Alik Khuchbarov is responsible for implementing actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a Member State through planning and directing acts of violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation. 20.5.2025 18. Ilya Sergeevich BOCHAROVIlja BOTŠAROV(Russian: Илья Сергеевич БОЧАРОВ) Function: GRU operativeDOB: 29.6.1991Nationality: RussianGender: maleTax identification number: 561410364291 Ilya Bocharov was reponsible for planning and preparing an operation in Estonia, which entailed damaging the property of public figures who have spoken out against the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as defacing monuments related to World War II. In doing so, he acted under the direction, in the interests and at the request of Russia’s military foreign intelligence agency (GRU) to hire perpetrators to carry out the attacks. In the attacks, vehicles of the Estonian Minister of the Interior as well as of the editor-in-chief of a Russian-language newspaper were targetted. The security services of Estonia prevented further attacks targeting more public figures. In addition, several war memorials in Estonia were defaced, with paint thrown on them and swastikas drawn on them. The aim of the operation was to create fear, panic and tension in Estonian society, and to intimidate persons critical of Russian actions and policies.As a collaborator in the GRU’s network, Ilya Bocharov is responsible for implementing actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a Member State through planning and directing acts of violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation. 20.5.2025 19. Elena KOLBASNIKOVA(Russian: Елена КОЛБАСНИКОВА) Nationality: Ukrainian, RussianDOB: 20.3.1975POB: Dnipro, Ukraine SSR (now Ukraine)Gender: female Elena Kolbasnikova is a Russian national who has close ties with, and is financially supported by, Rossotrudnitschestwo, a Russian state entity. Kolbasnikova formed political structures with the German anti-democratic extreme political right in support of Russia’s destabilisation of Ukraine. She was sentenced for hate speech in a court of final instance in Germany in regard to her undermining of Ukrainian sovereignty and denouncement of German public institutions. Criminal investigations are ongoing in regard to her support of separatists in the Donbas with military hardware, through fundraisers and the provision of aid to separatist groups. Moreover, Kolbasnikova promoted violent acts committed by her husband, Rostislav Teslyuk, against counter-demonstrators, and organised car rallies to intimidate Ukrainian minors seeking refuge in Germany.She thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of a Member State through activities aimed at undermining the democratic political process in Germany. She also supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the security of a third country (Ukraine), through instigating or facilitating an armed conflict, by supporting separatist movements in Ukraine.Elena Kolbasnikova is associated with Rostislav Teslyuk, through joint efforts in destabilising activities. 20.5.2025 20. Hüseyin DOGRU Address: Kavacık Mahallesi, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Caddesi, Tonoglu Block No.: 3, Beykoz, Istanbul, TürkiyeNationality: TurkishGender: male Hüseyin Doğru is the founder and representative of AFA Medya A.Ş. which is a media company based in Istanbul. AFA Medya A.Ş. operates “RED”, which comprises a number of media platforms, and which has close financial and organisational connections with Russian state propaganda entities and actors, and shares deep structural ties, including interlinkages between, and rotation of, individual personnel with Russian state media organisations.RED has used its media platforms – often publishing under “redstreamnet” or “thered.stream” – to systematically spread false information on politically controversial subjects with the intent of creating ethnic, political and religious discord amongst its predominantly German target audience, including by disseminating the narratives of radical Islamic terrorist groups such as Hamas.During a violent occupation of a German university by anti-Israel rioters, RED personnel coordinated with the occupiers to disseminate images of their vandalism – which included the use of Hamas symbols – through their online channels, thus providing them with an exclusive media platform, facilitating the violent nature of the protest.Through AFA Medya, Hüseyin Doğru thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability and security in the Union and in one or several of its Member States, including by indirectly supporting and facilitating violent demonstrations and engaging in coordinated information manipulation. 20.5.2025 21. Yulia Sergeevna PROKHOROVA(Russian: Юлия Сергеевна ПРОХОРОВА) Nationality: RussianDOB: 18.2.1992Address: Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates.Formerly Landshut, Bavaria, GermanyGender: female Yulia Prokhorova is a Russian citizen. She resided in Germany until 2024. Yulia Prokhorova sustains a social media campaign in which she promoted the intentional wasting of energy in Germany, seeking to support Russia’s war of aggression. In parallel, she disseminates misinformation in Russian state media about the energy supply, the rule of law, and Ukrainian refugees in Germany.In addition, Yulia Prokhorova intimidated Ukrainian refugees in Europe through public assaults and other forms of harassment, which she recorded and disseminated online.Yulia Prokhorova thus supports actions and policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one Member State by engaging in the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference and indirectly supporting actions targeted at economic activities and services of public interest. 20.5.2025 22. Rostislav TESLYUK(Russian: Ростислав ТЕСЛЮК)AliasMax SCHLUND(Russian: Макс ШЛУНД) Nationality: RussianDOB: 23.4.1982POB: MoscowGender: male Rostislav Teslyuk is a Russian national who has close ties with, and is financially supported by, Rossotrudnitschestwo, a Russian state entity. Rostislav Teslyuk formed political structures with the German anti-democratic extreme political right in support of Russia’s destabilisation of Ukraine. Criminal investigations in regard to his support of separatists in the Donbas with military hardware are ongoing. Rostislav Teslyuk committed violent acts against counter-demonstrators and organised car rallies to intimidate Ukrainian minors seeking refuge in Germany, together with Elena Kolbasnikova.He thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of a Member State (Germany) through activities aimed at undermining the democratic political process in Germany. He is also responsible for actions by the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine the security of a third country (Ukraine) through instigating or facilitating an armed conflict, by his support for separatist movements in Ukraine.Rostislav Teslyuk is associated with Elena Kolbasnikova, who is subject to restrictive measures, through joint efforts in destabilising activities. 20.5.2025 23. Alina LIPP Function: war correspondentDOB: 17.9.1993POB: HamburgNationality: GermanGender: female Alina Lipp runs the blog “Neues aus Russland”, in which she systematically disseminates misinformation about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and delegitimises the Ukrainian government, especially with a view to manipulating German public sentiment as regards support for Ukraine.Furthermore, she is using her role as a war correspondent with the Russian armed forces in eastern Ukraine to spread Russian war propaganda. She regularly appears in troop entertainment and propaganda shows on the Russian military TV channel Zvezda.Thus, Alina Lipp is engaging in and supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten security and stability in the Union and in a third country (Ukraine) through the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference, and through facilitating an armed conflict in a third country. 20.5.2025 24. Viktor Volodymyrovych MEDVEDCHUK(Ukrainian: Віктор Володимирович МЕДВЕДЧУК)(Russian: Виктор Владимирович МЕДВЕДЧУК) Function: Politician, businessman, de facto media ownerDOB: 7.8.1954POB: Pochet, Krasnoyarskyi Krai, Russian SFSR, USSRNationality: RussianGender: maleAddress: MoscowUkrainian Tax ID (Код ДРФО): 1994214296 (void) Viktor Medvedchuk is a former Ukrainian politician and businessman, who has been the leading proponent of a pro-Russian policy in Ukraine and who has promoted policies and actions intended to erode the credibility and legitimacy of the Government of Ukraine. Viktor Medvedchuk has close personal ties to, and is associated with, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin.Through his associates, including Artem Marchevskyi, Viktor Medvedchuk controlled Ukrainian media outlets and used them to disseminate pro-Russian propaganda in Ukraine and beyond. After the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Viktor Medvedchuk spread Russian propaganda narratives about the war, undermining Ukrainian sovereignty. To that end, in April 2023, Viktor Medvedchuk founded a political movement in Russia called “Another Ukraine”.With his associates and associated entities, including Artem Marchevskyi and the Voice of Europe media channel, and in close coordination with the Russian authorities, Viktor Medvedchuk has continued funding and carrying out influence operations targeting political parties and individual politicians in Europe. Those activities aimed to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and to spread its influence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections. Those activities included providing financial resources to individual political actors in Europe, including selected candidates in the European Parliament elections, and for cooperation with journalists. Viktor Medvedchuk has directed and maintained control over the malign activities of Artem Marchevskyi and Voice of Europe, using Artem Marchevskyi’s de facto direction of Voice of Europe.Therefore, Viktor Medvedchuk is responsible for, implementing, supporting, or benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in a third country, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through planning, directing, engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process, including the 2024 European Parliament elections, and through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025 25. Artem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKYIArtem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKIJArtem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKIYArtěm Pavlovič MARČEVSKIJ(Ukrainian: Артем Павлович МАРЧЕВСЬКИЙ)(Russian: Артем Павлович МАРЧЕВСКИЙ) Function: Politician, media producer, propagandistDOB: 5.7.1988POB: Kyiv, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, (now Ukraine)Nationality: Ukrainian, IsraeliGender: maleAddress: Hovorčovická 1079, 250 65 Líbeznice, Czech RepublicUkrainian Tax ID (Код ДРФО): 3232824038 Artem Marchevskyi is a former Ukrainian politician closely associated with Viktor Medvedchuk, a former Ukrainian politician and businessperson with close connections to the Government of the Russian Federation. By virtue of his position in the pro-Russian party “Opposition Platform – For Life” and in a TV channel involved in pro-Russian propaganda, Artem Marchevskyi supported and provided assistance to Viktor Medvedchuk in the years 2018 to 2021. Artem Marchevskyi and Viktor Medvedchuk continued to coordinate after they both left Ukraine following the Russian invasion in 2022, with Viktor Medvedchuk directing and controlling Artem Marchevskyi’s activities facilitating construction of Medvedchuk’s influence network in the Union and its Member States.Artem Marchevskyi has played an instrumental role in disseminating concerted disinformation and biased narratives aimed at supporting the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and spreading its influence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections, by undermining the credibility and public image of Ukraine and its efforts to defend itself against Russia’s war of aggression. Artem Marchevskyi played a key role in the acquisition of the media brand “Voice of Europe” and the incorporation of its activity in a company of the same name. As the concealed head of Voice of Europe, Artem Marchevskyi has used the company to funnel financial resources designated for the remuneration of propagandists, and to build an influence network connecting Medvedchuk and his associates with representatives of political parties in Europe.Therefore, Artem Marchevskyi is responsible for actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process and through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025 26. Natallia SUDLIANKOVAA.k.a.:Natallia SUDLENKOVANatalia SUDLENKOVANatalia SUDLIANKOVÁ (ŠEVKOVÁ)Natalija SUDLIANKOVÁ (ŠEVKOVÁ)(Russian: Наталья СУДЛЕНКОВА (ШЕВКО))Alias:Natalyia KORNELYUK(Russian: Наталья КОРНЕЛЮК) Function: Journalist, Media and PR Consultant, CoordinatorDOB: 9.6.1964POB: BelarusNationality: BelarusianGender: femaleAddress: Borovanského 2381/22, 155 00 Prague, Czech RepublicIdentity documents: Travel document: U0002974, valid until 18.3.2031Residence Permit: 001631077, valid until 13.3.2034 Natallia Sudliankova is a journalist and a media and PR consultant who has been producing custom-made media products that included information manipulation and spreading misleading narratives aiming to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and aiming to undermine the public trust towards Czech national and European Union democratic values and processes. Sudliankova has been receiving assignments over a long period of time and has been financially rewarded.She plays a significant role in planning and directing coordinated information manipulation intended for the public in the Czech Republic and in other Member States, and cooperates with Russian state entities (Rosatom, Pravfond), entities representing the interests of the Russian Federation (Immortal Regiment of Russia), and Alexey Nikolayevich Shavrov, an officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU).Therefore, Natallia Sudliankova is responsible for actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation. 20.5.2025 27. Iurie NECULITI(Russian: Юрие НЕКУЛИТИ) Function: CEO of Stark IndustriesNationality: of the Republic of MoldovaGender: maleAddress: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom; Chisinau, Republic of MoldovaPOB: Bender, Republic of Moldova Iurie Neculiti is CEO of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world.Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against the Union and third countries by providing services intended to hide these activities from European law enforcement and security agencies.Therefore, as CEO of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., Neculiti is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and a third country, by facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest.Iurie Neculiti is associated with Ivan Neculiti and Stark Industries. 20.5.2025 28. Ivan NECULITI(Russian: Иван НЕКУЛИТИ) Function: Owner of Stark Industries and PQ HostingNationality: of the Republic of MoldovaGender: maleAddress: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom; Chisinau, Republic of MoldovaPOB: Bender, Republic of Moldova Ivan Neculiti is the owner of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world.Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities, including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against Union and third countries, by providing services intended to hide these activities from European law enforcement and security agencies.Ivan Neculiti is associated with Iurie Neculiti and Stark Industries.Therefore, as the owner of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. Ivan Neculiti is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and in a third country, by facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest. 20.5.2025 29. Andrei KHARKOVSKY(Russian: Андрей ХАРКОВСКИЙ) Function: Leading member of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and AbroadNationality: RussianPOB: Tomsk Region, RussiaGender: maleAddress: Germany Andrei Kharkovsky is a Russian citizen living in Germany. In Germany, Kharkovsky functions as a representative of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad, including by organising military-style gatherings for its members. The Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad is an entity linked to the Government of the Russian Federation, and partaking in Russia’s war of aggression and acts of violence in Ukraine in support of pro-Russian separatists under the premise of a “historical mission” to reinstate Russian control over southern and eastern Ukraine. As a member of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad, Kharkovsky is engaging in acts of violence.Andrei Kharkovsky is therefore supporting actions of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the sovereignty and security of Ukraine by attempting to overthrow the constitutional order of Ukraine. 20.5.2025 30. Anatoli Yurevich ABRAMOV(Russian: Анатолий Юрьевич АБРАМОВ) Function: Director of the General Radio Frequency Centre branch in the Northwestern Federal DistrictNationality: RussianGender: male Anatoly Abramov is the director of the General Radio Frequency Centre’s Northwestern Federal District branch. Branch heads are appointed and dismissed by the Director of the GRFC in agreement with Roskomnadzor, and act on behalf of the GRFC.He oversees the use of radio frequencies and devices in the Kaliningrad region.Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC.Therefore, Anatoly Abramov is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States, through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure. 20.5.2025 31. Ruslan Vasilyevich NESTERENKO(Russian: Руслан Васильевич НЕСТЕРЕНКО) Function: Acting General Director of the GRFCNationality: RussianGender: male Ruslan Nesterenko is the acting general director of the General Radio Frequency Centre (GRFC). He oversees the use of radio frequencies and ensures compliance with legislation.Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, Russia, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States and disrupting civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC.Under Nesterenko’s direction, the GRFC is involved in planning and supporting information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States. As per the GRFC Charter, the general director represents the enterprise’s interests within Russia and beyond its borders.Therefore, Ruslan Nesterenko is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure and through supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025 32. Viktor Aleksandrovitch LUKOVENKO(Russian: Виктор Александрович ЛУКОВЕНКО)AliasViktor VASILEV(Russian: Виктор ВАСИЛЬЕВ) Function: Head of the news agency “African Initiative”DOB: 6.4.1985Nationality: UzbekGender: male Viktor Lukovenko has been active on the African continent for several years, previously as a member of the Wagner Group and now as the head of the news agency “African Initiative”. He is involved in spreading Russian propaganda on the continent. He is linked to well known figures of Russian propaganda in Africa. Additionally, Viktor Lukovenko was sent to Ukraine in 2022 before the war, under the supervision of a GRU colonel, in order to recruit pro-Russian sympathisers.Viktor Lukovenko is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly and indirectly, supporting and facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025 33. Oleg Anatoliyovych VOLOSHIN(Ukrainian: Олег Анатолійович ВОЛОШИН)(Russian: Олег Анатольевич ВОЛОШИН) Nationality: RussianDOB: 7.4.1981POB: Nikolaev, USSR (now Ukraine)Passport No.: ET870130ID-No.: 1981040705733; 2968200719Gender: male Oleg Voloshin is a former Ukrainian member of parliament and a member of the pro-Russian political party “Opposition Platform – For Life” (OPFL). He is part of the network behind “Voice of Europe” and is active at Golos.eu and PolitWera, both platforms spreading disinformation and pro-Russian narratives. He was involved in bribe payments made to Western politicians.Oleg Voloshin has used his position as Ukrainian delegate to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2019-2023) to implement the strategy of Russian interference in Europe led by pro-Russian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, who leads OPFL.In particular, Voloshin has promoted Medvedchuk’s “peace plan” for Ukraine, which is linked to the Russian narrative regarding Russia’s war of aggression. In order to win-over European elected representatives to his cause, he has organised conferences with French and German parliamentarians, arguing that the “Normandy format” (France, Germany, Ukraine, Russia) has a so-called parliamentary dimension outside any official framework. The most recent event was organised by Voloshin at the French Senate on 11 February 2022 (“Peace process in Ukraine: how to break the deadlock”), a few days before the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian army.Thus, Oleg Voloshin is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union and its Member States, including Germany, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly and indirectly, the obstruction and undermining of the democratic political process. 20.5.2025 34. Justin Blaise TAGOUH(Russian: Жюстин Блез ТАГУ) Function: CEO of press group International Afrique Media (IAM), which includes the TV channel Afrique Média, IAM press review, and Courrier ConfidentielDOB: 1959Gender: male Justin Tagouh is CEO of the press group International Africa Media. This media group has direct links with the Russian authorities, and spreads Russian narrative and anti-western narrative in African countries.Justin Tagouh is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025 35. Mikhaïl Mikhaïlovich PRUDNIKOVAlias“Micha”(Russian: Михаил Михайлович ПРУДНИКОВ) Function: Member of Africa Politology, entity responsible for disinformation and Russian propaganda in the Central African RepublicPOB: Tambov OblastNationality: RussianGender: male Mikhaïl Prudnikov is a Russian disinformation activist operating in the Central African Republic (CAR) who has close links with the Wagner galaxy and disinformation campaign holdings in CAR through various newspapers and networks. In particular, he developed a narrative against western countries and participated in communication actions in order to undermine and threaten the Union’s image in the CAR.Mikhaïl Prudnikov is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025 36. Sylvain AFOUA(Russian: Сильвен АФУА)AliasEgountchi BEHANZIN(Russian: Эгунчи БЕХАНЗИН) Function: Founder of the pan-African group “Ligue de défense noire Africaine” (LDNA); influencer/activist known by the pseudonym “Egountchi Behanzin”DOB: 5.11.1988POB: Madjikpeto, TogoNationality: French, TogoleseGender: maleWebsite: www.egountchibehanzin.com Sylvain Afoua is a pro-Russian activist, founder of the “Ligue de défense noire Africaine” (LDNA) (Black African Defence League), a group involved in hit actions on French territory. The structure was dissolved by a French ministerial decree of 29 September 2021 for spreading an ideology calling for hatred, discrimination and violence. Sylvain Afoua spreads Russian narratives and misinformation on the war of aggression against Ukraine, which he carries out in particular on the African continent. His message is transmitted via social networks and his association’s website. He is regularly invited to Russian fora and is, furthermore, financially linked to the Wagner Group.Sylvain Afoua is therefore responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025 37. Thomas RÖPER(Russian: Томас РЁПЕР) Function: war correspondentDOB: 26.11.1971POB: BremenNationality: GermanGender: male Thomas Röper is a German blogger. Through his network of online channels named “Anti-Spiegel”, he systematically disseminates misinformation about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and delegitimises the Ukrainian government, especially with a view to manipulating German public sentiment regarding support to Ukraine.Furthermore, he legitimises Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory by serving as an election “observer” and participating in a campaign to promote Russia’s illegal referendum on the secession from Ukraine of the Russian-occupied territories. Moreover, he has served as a spokesperson for the Government of the Russian Federationto disseminate Russian propaganda narratives, including at the UN Arria-forum.Thomas Röper is therefore engaging in and supporting the use of information manipulation and interference and facilitates an armed conflict in a third country. 20.5.2025’;
Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing
‘17. Alik Yuryevich KHUCHBAROVAlik Yuryevich HUCHBAROVAlik HUTŠBAROV(Russian: Алик Юрьевич ХУЧБАРОВ) Function: GRU operativeDOB: 12.11.1992Nationality: Russian, EstonianGender: maleTax identification number: 601515903509 Alik Khuchbarov was reponsible for planning and preparing an operation in Estonia, which entailed damaging the property of public figures who have spoken out against the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as defacing monuments related to World War II. In doing so, he acted under the direction, in the interests and at the request of Russia’s military foreign intelligence agency (GRU) to hire perpetrators to carry out the attacks. In the attacks, vehicles of the Estonian Minister of the Interior as well as of the editor-in-chief of a Russian-language newspaper were targetted. The security services of Estonia prevented further attacks targeting more public figures. In addition, several war memorials in Estonia were defaced, with paint thrown on them and swastikas drawn on them. The aim of the operation was to create fear, panic and tension in Estonian society, and to intimidate persons critical of Russian actions and policies.As a collaborator in the GRU’s network, Alik Khuchbarov is responsible for implementing actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a Member State through planning and directing acts of violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation. 20.5.2025
18. Ilya Sergeevich BOCHAROVIlja BOTŠAROV(Russian: Илья Сергеевич БОЧАРОВ) Function: GRU operativeDOB: 29.6.1991Nationality: RussianGender: maleTax identification number: 561410364291 Ilya Bocharov was reponsible for planning and preparing an operation in Estonia, which entailed damaging the property of public figures who have spoken out against the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as defacing monuments related to World War II. In doing so, he acted under the direction, in the interests and at the request of Russia’s military foreign intelligence agency (GRU) to hire perpetrators to carry out the attacks. In the attacks, vehicles of the Estonian Minister of the Interior as well as of the editor-in-chief of a Russian-language newspaper were targetted. The security services of Estonia prevented further attacks targeting more public figures. In addition, several war memorials in Estonia were defaced, with paint thrown on them and swastikas drawn on them. The aim of the operation was to create fear, panic and tension in Estonian society, and to intimidate persons critical of Russian actions and policies.As a collaborator in the GRU’s network, Ilya Bocharov is responsible for implementing actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a Member State through planning and directing acts of violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation. 20.5.2025
19. Elena KOLBASNIKOVA(Russian: Елена КОЛБАСНИКОВА) Nationality: Ukrainian, RussianDOB: 20.3.1975POB: Dnipro, Ukraine SSR (now Ukraine)Gender: female Elena Kolbasnikova is a Russian national who has close ties with, and is financially supported by, Rossotrudnitschestwo, a Russian state entity. Kolbasnikova formed political structures with the German anti-democratic extreme political right in support of Russia’s destabilisation of Ukraine. She was sentenced for hate speech in a court of final instance in Germany in regard to her undermining of Ukrainian sovereignty and denouncement of German public institutions. Criminal investigations are ongoing in regard to her support of separatists in the Donbas with military hardware, through fundraisers and the provision of aid to separatist groups. Moreover, Kolbasnikova promoted violent acts committed by her husband, Rostislav Teslyuk, against counter-demonstrators, and organised car rallies to intimidate Ukrainian minors seeking refuge in Germany.She thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of a Member State through activities aimed at undermining the democratic political process in Germany. She also supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the security of a third country (Ukraine), through instigating or facilitating an armed conflict, by supporting separatist movements in Ukraine.Elena Kolbasnikova is associated with Rostislav Teslyuk, through joint efforts in destabilising activities. 20.5.2025
20. Hüseyin DOGRU Address: Kavacık Mahallesi, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Caddesi, Tonoglu Block No.: 3, Beykoz, Istanbul, TürkiyeNationality: TurkishGender: male Hüseyin Doğru is the founder and representative of AFA Medya A.Ş. which is a media company based in Istanbul. AFA Medya A.Ş. operates “RED”, which comprises a number of media platforms, and which has close financial and organisational connections with Russian state propaganda entities and actors, and shares deep structural ties, including interlinkages between, and rotation of, individual personnel with Russian state media organisations.RED has used its media platforms – often publishing under “redstreamnet” or “thered.stream” – to systematically spread false information on politically controversial subjects with the intent of creating ethnic, political and religious discord amongst its predominantly German target audience, including by disseminating the narratives of radical Islamic terrorist groups such as Hamas.During a violent occupation of a German university by anti-Israel rioters, RED personnel coordinated with the occupiers to disseminate images of their vandalism – which included the use of Hamas symbols – through their online channels, thus providing them with an exclusive media platform, facilitating the violent nature of the protest.Through AFA Medya, Hüseyin Doğru thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability and security in the Union and in one or several of its Member States, including by indirectly supporting and facilitating violent demonstrations and engaging in coordinated information manipulation. 20.5.2025
21. Yulia Sergeevna PROKHOROVA(Russian: Юлия Сергеевна ПРОХОРОВА) Nationality: RussianDOB: 18.2.1992Address: Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates.Formerly Landshut, Bavaria, GermanyGender: female Yulia Prokhorova is a Russian citizen. She resided in Germany until 2024. Yulia Prokhorova sustains a social media campaign in which she promoted the intentional wasting of energy in Germany, seeking to support Russia’s war of aggression. In parallel, she disseminates misinformation in Russian state media about the energy supply, the rule of law, and Ukrainian refugees in Germany.In addition, Yulia Prokhorova intimidated Ukrainian refugees in Europe through public assaults and other forms of harassment, which she recorded and disseminated online.Yulia Prokhorova thus supports actions and policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one Member State by engaging in the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference and indirectly supporting actions targeted at economic activities and services of public interest. 20.5.2025
22. Rostislav TESLYUK(Russian: Ростислав ТЕСЛЮК)AliasMax SCHLUND(Russian: Макс ШЛУНД) Nationality: RussianDOB: 23.4.1982POB: MoscowGender: male Rostislav Teslyuk is a Russian national who has close ties with, and is financially supported by, Rossotrudnitschestwo, a Russian state entity. Rostislav Teslyuk formed political structures with the German anti-democratic extreme political right in support of Russia’s destabilisation of Ukraine. Criminal investigations in regard to his support of separatists in the Donbas with military hardware are ongoing. Rostislav Teslyuk committed violent acts against counter-demonstrators and organised car rallies to intimidate Ukrainian minors seeking refuge in Germany, together with Elena Kolbasnikova.He thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of a Member State (Germany) through activities aimed at undermining the democratic political process in Germany. He is also responsible for actions by the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine the security of a third country (Ukraine) through instigating or facilitating an armed conflict, by his support for separatist movements in Ukraine.Rostislav Teslyuk is associated with Elena Kolbasnikova, who is subject to restrictive measures, through joint efforts in destabilising activities. 20.5.2025
23. Alina LIPP Function: war correspondentDOB: 17.9.1993POB: HamburgNationality: GermanGender: female Alina Lipp runs the blog “Neues aus Russland”, in which she systematically disseminates misinformation about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and delegitimises the Ukrainian government, especially with a view to manipulating German public sentiment as regards support for Ukraine.Furthermore, she is using her role as a war correspondent with the Russian armed forces in eastern Ukraine to spread Russian war propaganda. She regularly appears in troop entertainment and propaganda shows on the Russian military TV channel Zvezda.Thus, Alina Lipp is engaging in and supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten security and stability in the Union and in a third country (Ukraine) through the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference, and through facilitating an armed conflict in a third country. 20.5.2025
24. Viktor Volodymyrovych MEDVEDCHUK(Ukrainian: Віктор Володимирович МЕДВЕДЧУК)(Russian: Виктор Владимирович МЕДВЕДЧУК) Function: Politician, businessman, de facto media ownerDOB: 7.8.1954POB: Pochet, Krasnoyarskyi Krai, Russian SFSR, USSRNationality: RussianGender: maleAddress: MoscowUkrainian Tax ID (Код ДРФО): 1994214296 (void) Viktor Medvedchuk is a former Ukrainian politician and businessman, who has been the leading proponent of a pro-Russian policy in Ukraine and who has promoted policies and actions intended to erode the credibility and legitimacy of the Government of Ukraine. Viktor Medvedchuk has close personal ties to, and is associated with, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin.Through his associates, including Artem Marchevskyi, Viktor Medvedchuk controlled Ukrainian media outlets and used them to disseminate pro-Russian propaganda in Ukraine and beyond. After the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Viktor Medvedchuk spread Russian propaganda narratives about the war, undermining Ukrainian sovereignty. To that end, in April 2023, Viktor Medvedchuk founded a political movement in Russia called “Another Ukraine”.With his associates and associated entities, including Artem Marchevskyi and the Voice of Europe media channel, and in close coordination with the Russian authorities, Viktor Medvedchuk has continued funding and carrying out influence operations targeting political parties and individual politicians in Europe. Those activities aimed to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and to spread its influence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections. Those activities included providing financial resources to individual political actors in Europe, including selected candidates in the European Parliament elections, and for cooperation with journalists. Viktor Medvedchuk has directed and maintained control over the malign activities of Artem Marchevskyi and Voice of Europe, using Artem Marchevskyi’s de facto direction of Voice of Europe.Therefore, Viktor Medvedchuk is responsible for, implementing, supporting, or benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in a third country, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through planning, directing, engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process, including the 2024 European Parliament elections, and through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025
25. Artem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKYIArtem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKIJArtem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKIYArtěm Pavlovič MARČEVSKIJ(Ukrainian: Артем Павлович МАРЧЕВСЬКИЙ)(Russian: Артем Павлович МАРЧЕВСКИЙ) Function: Politician, media producer, propagandistDOB: 5.7.1988POB: Kyiv, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, (now Ukraine)Nationality: Ukrainian, IsraeliGender: maleAddress: Hovorčovická 1079, 250 65 Líbeznice, Czech RepublicUkrainian Tax ID (Код ДРФО): 3232824038 Artem Marchevskyi is a former Ukrainian politician closely associated with Viktor Medvedchuk, a former Ukrainian politician and businessperson with close connections to the Government of the Russian Federation. By virtue of his position in the pro-Russian party “Opposition Platform – For Life” and in a TV channel involved in pro-Russian propaganda, Artem Marchevskyi supported and provided assistance to Viktor Medvedchuk in the years 2018 to 2021. Artem Marchevskyi and Viktor Medvedchuk continued to coordinate after they both left Ukraine following the Russian invasion in 2022, with Viktor Medvedchuk directing and controlling Artem Marchevskyi’s activities facilitating construction of Medvedchuk’s influence network in the Union and its Member States.Artem Marchevskyi has played an instrumental role in disseminating concerted disinformation and biased narratives aimed at supporting the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and spreading its influence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections, by undermining the credibility and public image of Ukraine and its efforts to defend itself against Russia’s war of aggression. Artem Marchevskyi played a key role in the acquisition of the media brand “Voice of Europe” and the incorporation of its activity in a company of the same name. As the concealed head of Voice of Europe, Artem Marchevskyi has used the company to funnel financial resources designated for the remuneration of propagandists, and to build an influence network connecting Medvedchuk and his associates with representatives of political parties in Europe.Therefore, Artem Marchevskyi is responsible for actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process and through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025
26. Natallia SUDLIANKOVAA.k.a.:Natallia SUDLENKOVANatalia SUDLENKOVANatalia SUDLIANKOVÁ (ŠEVKOVÁ)Natalija SUDLIANKOVÁ (ŠEVKOVÁ)(Russian: Наталья СУДЛЕНКОВА (ШЕВКО))Alias:Natalyia KORNELYUK(Russian: Наталья КОРНЕЛЮК) Function: Journalist, Media and PR Consultant, CoordinatorDOB: 9.6.1964POB: BelarusNationality: BelarusianGender: femaleAddress: Borovanského 2381/22, 155 00 Prague, Czech RepublicIdentity documents: Travel document: U0002974, valid until 18.3.2031Residence Permit: 001631077, valid until 13.3.2034 Natallia Sudliankova is a journalist and a media and PR consultant who has been producing custom-made media products that included information manipulation and spreading misleading narratives aiming to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and aiming to undermine the public trust towards Czech national and European Union democratic values and processes. Sudliankova has been receiving assignments over a long period of time and has been financially rewarded.She plays a significant role in planning and directing coordinated information manipulation intended for the public in the Czech Republic and in other Member States, and cooperates with Russian state entities (Rosatom, Pravfond), entities representing the interests of the Russian Federation (Immortal Regiment of Russia), and Alexey Nikolayevich Shavrov, an officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU).Therefore, Natallia Sudliankova is responsible for actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation. 20.5.2025
27. Iurie NECULITI(Russian: Юрие НЕКУЛИТИ) Function: CEO of Stark IndustriesNationality: of the Republic of MoldovaGender: maleAddress: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom; Chisinau, Republic of MoldovaPOB: Bender, Republic of Moldova Iurie Neculiti is CEO of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world.Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against the Union and third countries by providing services intended to hide these activities from European law enforcement and security agencies.Therefore, as CEO of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., Neculiti is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and a third country, by facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest.Iurie Neculiti is associated with Ivan Neculiti and Stark Industries. 20.5.2025
28. Ivan NECULITI(Russian: Иван НЕКУЛИТИ) Function: Owner of Stark Industries and PQ HostingNationality: of the Republic of MoldovaGender: maleAddress: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom; Chisinau, Republic of MoldovaPOB: Bender, Republic of Moldova Ivan Neculiti is the owner of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world.Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities, including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against Union and third countries, by providing services intended to hide these activities from European law enforcement and security agencies.Ivan Neculiti is associated with Iurie Neculiti and Stark Industries.Therefore, as the owner of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. Ivan Neculiti is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and in a third country, by facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest. 20.5.2025
29. Andrei KHARKOVSKY(Russian: Андрей ХАРКОВСКИЙ) Function: Leading member of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and AbroadNationality: RussianPOB: Tomsk Region, RussiaGender: maleAddress: Germany Andrei Kharkovsky is a Russian citizen living in Germany. In Germany, Kharkovsky functions as a representative of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad, including by organising military-style gatherings for its members. The Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad is an entity linked to the Government of the Russian Federation, and partaking in Russia’s war of aggression and acts of violence in Ukraine in support of pro-Russian separatists under the premise of a “historical mission” to reinstate Russian control over southern and eastern Ukraine. As a member of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad, Kharkovsky is engaging in acts of violence.Andrei Kharkovsky is therefore supporting actions of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the sovereignty and security of Ukraine by attempting to overthrow the constitutional order of Ukraine. 20.5.2025
30. Anatoli Yurevich ABRAMOV(Russian: Анатолий Юрьевич АБРАМОВ) Function: Director of the General Radio Frequency Centre branch in the Northwestern Federal DistrictNationality: RussianGender: male Anatoly Abramov is the director of the General Radio Frequency Centre’s Northwestern Federal District branch. Branch heads are appointed and dismissed by the Director of the GRFC in agreement with Roskomnadzor, and act on behalf of the GRFC.He oversees the use of radio frequencies and devices in the Kaliningrad region.Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC.Therefore, Anatoly Abramov is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States, through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure. 20.5.2025
31. Ruslan Vasilyevich NESTERENKO(Russian: Руслан Васильевич НЕСТЕРЕНКО) Function: Acting General Director of the GRFCNationality: RussianGender: male Ruslan Nesterenko is the acting general director of the General Radio Frequency Centre (GRFC). He oversees the use of radio frequencies and ensures compliance with legislation.Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, Russia, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States and disrupting civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC.Under Nesterenko’s direction, the GRFC is involved in planning and supporting information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States. As per the GRFC Charter, the general director represents the enterprise’s interests within Russia and beyond its borders.Therefore, Ruslan Nesterenko is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure and through supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025
32. Viktor Aleksandrovitch LUKOVENKO(Russian: Виктор Александрович ЛУКОВЕНКО)AliasViktor VASILEV(Russian: Виктор ВАСИЛЬЕВ) Function: Head of the news agency “African Initiative”DOB: 6.4.1985Nationality: UzbekGender: male Viktor Lukovenko has been active on the African continent for several years, previously as a member of the Wagner Group and now as the head of the news agency “African Initiative”. He is involved in spreading Russian propaganda on the continent. He is linked to well known figures of Russian propaganda in Africa. Additionally, Viktor Lukovenko was sent to Ukraine in 2022 before the war, under the supervision of a GRU colonel, in order to recruit pro-Russian sympathisers.Viktor Lukovenko is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly and indirectly, supporting and facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025
33. Oleg Anatoliyovych VOLOSHIN(Ukrainian: Олег Анатолійович ВОЛОШИН)(Russian: Олег Анатольевич ВОЛОШИН) Nationality: RussianDOB: 7.4.1981POB: Nikolaev, USSR (now Ukraine)Passport No.: ET870130ID-No.: 1981040705733; 2968200719Gender: male Oleg Voloshin is a former Ukrainian member of parliament and a member of the pro-Russian political party “Opposition Platform – For Life” (OPFL). He is part of the network behind “Voice of Europe” and is active at Golos.eu and PolitWera, both platforms spreading disinformation and pro-Russian narratives. He was involved in bribe payments made to Western politicians.Oleg Voloshin has used his position as Ukrainian delegate to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2019-2023) to implement the strategy of Russian interference in Europe led by pro-Russian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, who leads OPFL.In particular, Voloshin has promoted Medvedchuk’s “peace plan” for Ukraine, which is linked to the Russian narrative regarding Russia’s war of aggression. In order to win-over European elected representatives to his cause, he has organised conferences with French and German parliamentarians, arguing that the “Normandy format” (France, Germany, Ukraine, Russia) has a so-called parliamentary dimension outside any official framework. The most recent event was organised by Voloshin at the French Senate on 11 February 2022 (“Peace process in Ukraine: how to break the deadlock”), a few days before the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian army.Thus, Oleg Voloshin is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union and its Member States, including Germany, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly and indirectly, the obstruction and undermining of the democratic political process. 20.5.2025
34. Justin Blaise TAGOUH(Russian: Жюстин Блез ТАГУ) Function: CEO of press group International Afrique Media (IAM), which includes the TV channel Afrique Média, IAM press review, and Courrier ConfidentielDOB: 1959Gender: male Justin Tagouh is CEO of the press group International Africa Media. This media group has direct links with the Russian authorities, and spreads Russian narrative and anti-western narrative in African countries.Justin Tagouh is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025
35. Mikhaïl Mikhaïlovich PRUDNIKOVAlias“Micha”(Russian: Михаил Михайлович ПРУДНИКОВ) Function: Member of Africa Politology, entity responsible for disinformation and Russian propaganda in the Central African RepublicPOB: Tambov OblastNationality: RussianGender: male Mikhaïl Prudnikov is a Russian disinformation activist operating in the Central African Republic (CAR) who has close links with the Wagner galaxy and disinformation campaign holdings in CAR through various newspapers and networks. In particular, he developed a narrative against western countries and participated in communication actions in order to undermine and threaten the Union’s image in the CAR.Mikhaïl Prudnikov is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025
36. Sylvain AFOUA(Russian: Сильвен АФУА)AliasEgountchi BEHANZIN(Russian: Эгунчи БЕХАНЗИН) Function: Founder of the pan-African group “Ligue de défense noire Africaine” (LDNA); influencer/activist known by the pseudonym “Egountchi Behanzin”DOB: 5.11.1988POB: Madjikpeto, TogoNationality: French, TogoleseGender: maleWebsite: www.egountchibehanzin.com Sylvain Afoua is a pro-Russian activist, founder of the “Ligue de défense noire Africaine” (LDNA) (Black African Defence League), a group involved in hit actions on French territory. The structure was dissolved by a French ministerial decree of 29 September 2021 for spreading an ideology calling for hatred, discrimination and violence. Sylvain Afoua spreads Russian narratives and misinformation on the war of aggression against Ukraine, which he carries out in particular on the African continent. His message is transmitted via social networks and his association’s website. He is regularly invited to Russian fora and is, furthermore, financially linked to the Wagner Group.Sylvain Afoua is therefore responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025
37. Thomas RÖPER(Russian: Томас РЁПЕР) Function: war correspondentDOB: 26.11.1971POB: BremenNationality: GermanGender: male Thomas Röper is a German blogger. Through his network of online channels named “Anti-Spiegel”, he systematically disseminates misinformation about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and delegitimises the Ukrainian government, especially with a view to manipulating German public sentiment regarding support to Ukraine.Furthermore, he legitimises Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory by serving as an election “observer” and participating in a campaign to promote Russia’s illegal referendum on the secession from Ukraine of the Russian-occupied territories. Moreover, he has served as a spokesperson for the Government of the Russian Federationto disseminate Russian propaganda narratives, including at the UN Arria-forum.Thomas Röper is therefore engaging in and supporting the use of information manipulation and interference and facilitates an armed conflict in a third country. 20.5.2025’;
Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing
‘17. Alik Yuryevich KHUCHBAROVAlik Yuryevich HUCHBAROVAlik HUTŠBAROV(Russian: Алик Юрьевич ХУЧБАРОВ) Function: GRU operativeDOB: 12.11.1992Nationality: Russian, EstonianGender: maleTax identification number: 601515903509 Alik Khuchbarov was reponsible for planning and preparing an operation in Estonia, which entailed damaging the property of public figures who have spoken out against the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as defacing monuments related to World War II. In doing so, he acted under the direction, in the interests and at the request of Russia’s military foreign intelligence agency (GRU) to hire perpetrators to carry out the attacks. In the attacks, vehicles of the Estonian Minister of the Interior as well as of the editor-in-chief of a Russian-language newspaper were targetted. The security services of Estonia prevented further attacks targeting more public figures. In addition, several war memorials in Estonia were defaced, with paint thrown on them and swastikas drawn on them. The aim of the operation was to create fear, panic and tension in Estonian society, and to intimidate persons critical of Russian actions and policies.As a collaborator in the GRU’s network, Alik Khuchbarov is responsible for implementing actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a Member State through planning and directing acts of violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation. 20.5.2025
18. Ilya Sergeevich BOCHAROVIlja BOTŠAROV(Russian: Илья Сергеевич БОЧАРОВ) Function: GRU operativeDOB: 29.6.1991Nationality: RussianGender: maleTax identification number: 561410364291 Ilya Bocharov was reponsible for planning and preparing an operation in Estonia, which entailed damaging the property of public figures who have spoken out against the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as defacing monuments related to World War II. In doing so, he acted under the direction, in the interests and at the request of Russia’s military foreign intelligence agency (GRU) to hire perpetrators to carry out the attacks. In the attacks, vehicles of the Estonian Minister of the Interior as well as of the editor-in-chief of a Russian-language newspaper were targetted. The security services of Estonia prevented further attacks targeting more public figures. In addition, several war memorials in Estonia were defaced, with paint thrown on them and swastikas drawn on them. The aim of the operation was to create fear, panic and tension in Estonian society, and to intimidate persons critical of Russian actions and policies.As a collaborator in the GRU’s network, Ilya Bocharov is responsible for implementing actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a Member State through planning and directing acts of violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation. 20.5.2025
19. Elena KOLBASNIKOVA(Russian: Елена КОЛБАСНИКОВА) Nationality: Ukrainian, RussianDOB: 20.3.1975POB: Dnipro, Ukraine SSR (now Ukraine)Gender: female Elena Kolbasnikova is a Russian national who has close ties with, and is financially supported by, Rossotrudnitschestwo, a Russian state entity. Kolbasnikova formed political structures with the German anti-democratic extreme political right in support of Russia’s destabilisation of Ukraine. She was sentenced for hate speech in a court of final instance in Germany in regard to her undermining of Ukrainian sovereignty and denouncement of German public institutions. Criminal investigations are ongoing in regard to her support of separatists in the Donbas with military hardware, through fundraisers and the provision of aid to separatist groups. Moreover, Kolbasnikova promoted violent acts committed by her husband, Rostislav Teslyuk, against counter-demonstrators, and organised car rallies to intimidate Ukrainian minors seeking refuge in Germany.She thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of a Member State through activities aimed at undermining the democratic political process in Germany. She also supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the security of a third country (Ukraine), through instigating or facilitating an armed conflict, by supporting separatist movements in Ukraine.Elena Kolbasnikova is associated with Rostislav Teslyuk, through joint efforts in destabilising activities. 20.5.2025
20. Hüseyin DOGRU Address: Kavacık Mahallesi, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Caddesi, Tonoglu Block No.: 3, Beykoz, Istanbul, TürkiyeNationality: TurkishGender: male Hüseyin Doğru is the founder and representative of AFA Medya A.Ş. which is a media company based in Istanbul. AFA Medya A.Ş. operates “RED”, which comprises a number of media platforms, and which has close financial and organisational connections with Russian state propaganda entities and actors, and shares deep structural ties, including interlinkages between, and rotation of, individual personnel with Russian state media organisations.RED has used its media platforms – often publishing under “redstreamnet” or “thered.stream” – to systematically spread false information on politically controversial subjects with the intent of creating ethnic, political and religious discord amongst its predominantly German target audience, including by disseminating the narratives of radical Islamic terrorist groups such as Hamas.During a violent occupation of a German university by anti-Israel rioters, RED personnel coordinated with the occupiers to disseminate images of their vandalism – which included the use of Hamas symbols – through their online channels, thus providing them with an exclusive media platform, facilitating the violent nature of the protest.Through AFA Medya, Hüseyin Doğru thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability and security in the Union and in one or several of its Member States, including by indirectly supporting and facilitating violent demonstrations and engaging in coordinated information manipulation. 20.5.2025
21. Yulia Sergeevna PROKHOROVA(Russian: Юлия Сергеевна ПРОХОРОВА) Nationality: RussianDOB: 18.2.1992Address: Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates.Formerly Landshut, Bavaria, GermanyGender: female Yulia Prokhorova is a Russian citizen. She resided in Germany until 2024. Yulia Prokhorova sustains a social media campaign in which she promoted the intentional wasting of energy in Germany, seeking to support Russia’s war of aggression. In parallel, she disseminates misinformation in Russian state media about the energy supply, the rule of law, and Ukrainian refugees in Germany.In addition, Yulia Prokhorova intimidated Ukrainian refugees in Europe through public assaults and other forms of harassment, which she recorded and disseminated online.Yulia Prokhorova thus supports actions and policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one Member State by engaging in the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference and indirectly supporting actions targeted at economic activities and services of public interest. 20.5.2025
22. Rostislav TESLYUK(Russian: Ростислав ТЕСЛЮК)AliasMax SCHLUND(Russian: Макс ШЛУНД) Nationality: RussianDOB: 23.4.1982POB: MoscowGender: male Rostislav Teslyuk is a Russian national who has close ties with, and is financially supported by, Rossotrudnitschestwo, a Russian state entity. Rostislav Teslyuk formed political structures with the German anti-democratic extreme political right in support of Russia’s destabilisation of Ukraine. Criminal investigations in regard to his support of separatists in the Donbas with military hardware are ongoing. Rostislav Teslyuk committed violent acts against counter-demonstrators and organised car rallies to intimidate Ukrainian minors seeking refuge in Germany, together with Elena Kolbasnikova.He thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of a Member State (Germany) through activities aimed at undermining the democratic political process in Germany. He is also responsible for actions by the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine the security of a third country (Ukraine) through instigating or facilitating an armed conflict, by his support for separatist movements in Ukraine.Rostislav Teslyuk is associated with Elena Kolbasnikova, who is subject to restrictive measures, through joint efforts in destabilising activities. 20.5.2025
23. Alina LIPP Function: war correspondentDOB: 17.9.1993POB: HamburgNationality: GermanGender: female Alina Lipp runs the blog “Neues aus Russland”, in which she systematically disseminates misinformation about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and delegitimises the Ukrainian government, especially with a view to manipulating German public sentiment as regards support for Ukraine.Furthermore, she is using her role as a war correspondent with the Russian armed forces in eastern Ukraine to spread Russian war propaganda. She regularly appears in troop entertainment and propaganda shows on the Russian military TV channel Zvezda.Thus, Alina Lipp is engaging in and supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten security and stability in the Union and in a third country (Ukraine) through the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference, and through facilitating an armed conflict in a third country. 20.5.2025
24. Viktor Volodymyrovych MEDVEDCHUK(Ukrainian: Віктор Володимирович МЕДВЕДЧУК)(Russian: Виктор Владимирович МЕДВЕДЧУК) Function: Politician, businessman, de facto media ownerDOB: 7.8.1954POB: Pochet, Krasnoyarskyi Krai, Russian SFSR, USSRNationality: RussianGender: maleAddress: MoscowUkrainian Tax ID (Код ДРФО): 1994214296 (void) Viktor Medvedchuk is a former Ukrainian politician and businessman, who has been the leading proponent of a pro-Russian policy in Ukraine and who has promoted policies and actions intended to erode the credibility and legitimacy of the Government of Ukraine. Viktor Medvedchuk has close personal ties to, and is associated with, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin.Through his associates, including Artem Marchevskyi, Viktor Medvedchuk controlled Ukrainian media outlets and used them to disseminate pro-Russian propaganda in Ukraine and beyond. After the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Viktor Medvedchuk spread Russian propaganda narratives about the war, undermining Ukrainian sovereignty. To that end, in April 2023, Viktor Medvedchuk founded a political movement in Russia called “Another Ukraine”.With his associates and associated entities, including Artem Marchevskyi and the Voice of Europe media channel, and in close coordination with the Russian authorities, Viktor Medvedchuk has continued funding and carrying out influence operations targeting political parties and individual politicians in Europe. Those activities aimed to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and to spread its influence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections. Those activities included providing financial resources to individual political actors in Europe, including selected candidates in the European Parliament elections, and for cooperation with journalists. Viktor Medvedchuk has directed and maintained control over the malign activities of Artem Marchevskyi and Voice of Europe, using Artem Marchevskyi’s de facto direction of Voice of Europe.Therefore, Viktor Medvedchuk is responsible for, implementing, supporting, or benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in a third country, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through planning, directing, engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process, including the 2024 European Parliament elections, and through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025
25. Artem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKYIArtem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKIJArtem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKIYArtěm Pavlovič MARČEVSKIJ(Ukrainian: Артем Павлович МАРЧЕВСЬКИЙ)(Russian: Артем Павлович МАРЧЕВСКИЙ) Function: Politician, media producer, propagandistDOB: 5.7.1988POB: Kyiv, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, (now Ukraine)Nationality: Ukrainian, IsraeliGender: maleAddress: Hovorčovická 1079, 250 65 Líbeznice, Czech RepublicUkrainian Tax ID (Код ДРФО): 3232824038 Artem Marchevskyi is a former Ukrainian politician closely associated with Viktor Medvedchuk, a former Ukrainian politician and businessperson with close connections to the Government of the Russian Federation. By virtue of his position in the pro-Russian party “Opposition Platform – For Life” and in a TV channel involved in pro-Russian propaganda, Artem Marchevskyi supported and provided assistance to Viktor Medvedchuk in the years 2018 to 2021. Artem Marchevskyi and Viktor Medvedchuk continued to coordinate after they both left Ukraine following the Russian invasion in 2022, with Viktor Medvedchuk directing and controlling Artem Marchevskyi’s activities facilitating construction of Medvedchuk’s influence network in the Union and its Member States.Artem Marchevskyi has played an instrumental role in disseminating concerted disinformation and biased narratives aimed at supporting the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and spreading its influence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections, by undermining the credibility and public image of Ukraine and its efforts to defend itself against Russia’s war of aggression. Artem Marchevskyi played a key role in the acquisition of the media brand “Voice of Europe” and the incorporation of its activity in a company of the same name. As the concealed head of Voice of Europe, Artem Marchevskyi has used the company to funnel financial resources designated for the remuneration of propagandists, and to build an influence network connecting Medvedchuk and his associates with representatives of political parties in Europe.Therefore, Artem Marchevskyi is responsible for actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process and through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025
26. Natallia SUDLIANKOVAA.k.a.:Natallia SUDLENKOVANatalia SUDLENKOVANatalia SUDLIANKOVÁ (ŠEVKOVÁ)Natalija SUDLIANKOVÁ (ŠEVKOVÁ)(Russian: Наталья СУДЛЕНКОВА (ШЕВКО))Alias:Natalyia KORNELYUK(Russian: Наталья КОРНЕЛЮК) Function: Journalist, Media and PR Consultant, CoordinatorDOB: 9.6.1964POB: BelarusNationality: BelarusianGender: femaleAddress: Borovanského 2381/22, 155 00 Prague, Czech RepublicIdentity documents: Travel document: U0002974, valid until 18.3.2031Residence Permit: 001631077, valid until 13.3.2034 Natallia Sudliankova is a journalist and a media and PR consultant who has been producing custom-made media products that included information manipulation and spreading misleading narratives aiming to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and aiming to undermine the public trust towards Czech national and European Union democratic values and processes. Sudliankova has been receiving assignments over a long period of time and has been financially rewarded.She plays a significant role in planning and directing coordinated information manipulation intended for the public in the Czech Republic and in other Member States, and cooperates with Russian state entities (Rosatom, Pravfond), entities representing the interests of the Russian Federation (Immortal Regiment of Russia), and Alexey Nikolayevich Shavrov, an officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU).Therefore, Natallia Sudliankova is responsible for actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation. 20.5.2025
27. Iurie NECULITI(Russian: Юрие НЕКУЛИТИ) Function: CEO of Stark IndustriesNationality: of the Republic of MoldovaGender: maleAddress: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom; Chisinau, Republic of MoldovaPOB: Bender, Republic of Moldova Iurie Neculiti is CEO of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world.Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against the Union and third countries by providing services intended to hide these activities from European law enforcement and security agencies.Therefore, as CEO of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., Neculiti is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and a third country, by facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest.Iurie Neculiti is associated with Ivan Neculiti and Stark Industries. 20.5.2025
28. Ivan NECULITI(Russian: Иван НЕКУЛИТИ) Function: Owner of Stark Industries and PQ HostingNationality: of the Republic of MoldovaGender: maleAddress: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom; Chisinau, Republic of MoldovaPOB: Bender, Republic of Moldova Ivan Neculiti is the owner of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world.Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities, including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against Union and third countries, by providing services intended to hide these activities from European law enforcement and security agencies.Ivan Neculiti is associated with Iurie Neculiti and Stark Industries.Therefore, as the owner of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. Ivan Neculiti is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and in a third country, by facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest. 20.5.2025
29. Andrei KHARKOVSKY(Russian: Андрей ХАРКОВСКИЙ) Function: Leading member of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and AbroadNationality: RussianPOB: Tomsk Region, RussiaGender: maleAddress: Germany Andrei Kharkovsky is a Russian citizen living in Germany. In Germany, Kharkovsky functions as a representative of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad, including by organising military-style gatherings for its members. The Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad is an entity linked to the Government of the Russian Federation, and partaking in Russia’s war of aggression and acts of violence in Ukraine in support of pro-Russian separatists under the premise of a “historical mission” to reinstate Russian control over southern and eastern Ukraine. As a member of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad, Kharkovsky is engaging in acts of violence.Andrei Kharkovsky is therefore supporting actions of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the sovereignty and security of Ukraine by attempting to overthrow the constitutional order of Ukraine. 20.5.2025
30. Anatoli Yurevich ABRAMOV(Russian: Анатолий Юрьевич АБРАМОВ) Function: Director of the General Radio Frequency Centre branch in the Northwestern Federal DistrictNationality: RussianGender: male Anatoly Abramov is the director of the General Radio Frequency Centre’s Northwestern Federal District branch. Branch heads are appointed and dismissed by the Director of the GRFC in agreement with Roskomnadzor, and act on behalf of the GRFC.He oversees the use of radio frequencies and devices in the Kaliningrad region.Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC.Therefore, Anatoly Abramov is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States, through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure. 20.5.2025
31. Ruslan Vasilyevich NESTERENKO(Russian: Руслан Васильевич НЕСТЕРЕНКО) Function: Acting General Director of the GRFCNationality: RussianGender: male Ruslan Nesterenko is the acting general director of the General Radio Frequency Centre (GRFC). He oversees the use of radio frequencies and ensures compliance with legislation.Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, Russia, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States and disrupting civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC.Under Nesterenko’s direction, the GRFC is involved in planning and supporting information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States. As per the GRFC Charter, the general director represents the enterprise’s interests within Russia and beyond its borders.Therefore, Ruslan Nesterenko is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure and through supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025
32. Viktor Aleksandrovitch LUKOVENKO(Russian: Виктор Александрович ЛУКОВЕНКО)AliasViktor VASILEV(Russian: Виктор ВАСИЛЬЕВ) Function: Head of the news agency “African Initiative”DOB: 6.4.1985Nationality: UzbekGender: male Viktor Lukovenko has been active on the African continent for several years, previously as a member of the Wagner Group and now as the head of the news agency “African Initiative”. He is involved in spreading Russian propaganda on the continent. He is linked to well known figures of Russian propaganda in Africa. Additionally, Viktor Lukovenko was sent to Ukraine in 2022 before the war, under the supervision of a GRU colonel, in order to recruit pro-Russian sympathisers.Viktor Lukovenko is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly and indirectly, supporting and facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025
33. Oleg Anatoliyovych VOLOSHIN(Ukrainian: Олег Анатолійович ВОЛОШИН)(Russian: Олег Анатольевич ВОЛОШИН) Nationality: RussianDOB: 7.4.1981POB: Nikolaev, USSR (now Ukraine)Passport No.: ET870130ID-No.: 1981040705733; 2968200719Gender: male Oleg Voloshin is a former Ukrainian member of parliament and a member of the pro-Russian political party “Opposition Platform – For Life” (OPFL). He is part of the network behind “Voice of Europe” and is active at Golos.eu and PolitWera, both platforms spreading disinformation and pro-Russian narratives. He was involved in bribe payments made to Western politicians.Oleg Voloshin has used his position as Ukrainian delegate to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2019-2023) to implement the strategy of Russian interference in Europe led by pro-Russian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, who leads OPFL.In particular, Voloshin has promoted Medvedchuk’s “peace plan” for Ukraine, which is linked to the Russian narrative regarding Russia’s war of aggression. In order to win-over European elected representatives to his cause, he has organised conferences with French and German parliamentarians, arguing that the “Normandy format” (France, Germany, Ukraine, Russia) has a so-called parliamentary dimension outside any official framework. The most recent event was organised by Voloshin at the French Senate on 11 February 2022 (“Peace process in Ukraine: how to break the deadlock”), a few days before the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian army.Thus, Oleg Voloshin is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union and its Member States, including Germany, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly and indirectly, the obstruction and undermining of the democratic political process. 20.5.2025
34. Justin Blaise TAGOUH(Russian: Жюстин Блез ТАГУ) Function: CEO of press group International Afrique Media (IAM), which includes the TV channel Afrique Média, IAM press review, and Courrier ConfidentielDOB: 1959Gender: male Justin Tagouh is CEO of the press group International Africa Media. This media group has direct links with the Russian authorities, and spreads Russian narrative and anti-western narrative in African countries.Justin Tagouh is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025
35. Mikhaïl Mikhaïlovich PRUDNIKOVAlias“Micha”(Russian: Михаил Михайлович ПРУДНИКОВ) Function: Member of Africa Politology, entity responsible for disinformation and Russian propaganda in the Central African RepublicPOB: Tambov OblastNationality: RussianGender: male Mikhaïl Prudnikov is a Russian disinformation activist operating in the Central African Republic (CAR) who has close links with the Wagner galaxy and disinformation campaign holdings in CAR through various newspapers and networks. In particular, he developed a narrative against western countries and participated in communication actions in order to undermine and threaten the Union’s image in the CAR.Mikhaïl Prudnikov is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025
36. Sylvain AFOUA(Russian: Сильвен АФУА)AliasEgountchi BEHANZIN(Russian: Эгунчи БЕХАНЗИН) Function: Founder of the pan-African group “Ligue de défense noire Africaine” (LDNA); influencer/activist known by the pseudonym “Egountchi Behanzin”DOB: 5.11.1988POB: Madjikpeto, TogoNationality: French, TogoleseGender: maleWebsite: www.egountchibehanzin.com Sylvain Afoua is a pro-Russian activist, founder of the “Ligue de défense noire Africaine” (LDNA) (Black African Defence League), a group involved in hit actions on French territory. The structure was dissolved by a French ministerial decree of 29 September 2021 for spreading an ideology calling for hatred, discrimination and violence. Sylvain Afoua spreads Russian narratives and misinformation on the war of aggression against Ukraine, which he carries out in particular on the African continent. His message is transmitted via social networks and his association’s website. He is regularly invited to Russian fora and is, furthermore, financially linked to the Wagner Group.Sylvain Afoua is therefore responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025
37. Thomas RÖPER(Russian: Томас РЁПЕР) Function: war correspondentDOB: 26.11.1971POB: BremenNationality: GermanGender: male Thomas Röper is a German blogger. Through his network of online channels named “Anti-Spiegel”, he systematically disseminates misinformation about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and delegitimises the Ukrainian government, especially with a view to manipulating German public sentiment regarding support to Ukraine.Furthermore, he legitimises Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory by serving as an election “observer” and participating in a campaign to promote Russia’s illegal referendum on the secession from Ukraine of the Russian-occupied territories. Moreover, he has served as a spokesperson for the Government of the Russian Federationto disseminate Russian propaganda narratives, including at the UN Arria-forum.Thomas Röper is therefore engaging in and supporting the use of information manipulation and interference and facilitates an armed conflict in a third country. 20.5.2025’;
(2) The following entries are added under the heading ‘B. Legal persons, entities and bodies’:NameIdentifying informationStatement of ReasonsDate of listing‘4.AFA Media aka REDAFA Medya Anonim Şirketi aka REDAFA МедиаAddress: Kavacık Mahallesi, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Caddesi, Tonoglu Block No.: 3, Beykoz, Istanbul, TürkiyeType of entity: media companyPlace of registration: IstanbulDate of registration: 22.11.2022VAT Nr.: 0081804196Registration number 423277-5Principle place of business: TürkiyeWebsite:https://thered.stream/imprint/Founder: Hüseyin DogruAFA Medya A.Ş. is a media company based in Istanbul. AFA Medya A.Ş. operates “RED”, which comprises a number of media platforms, and which has close financial and organisational connections with Russian state propaganda entities and actors, and which shares deep structural ties including interlinkages between, and rotation of, individual personnel with Russian state media organisations.RED has used its media platforms – often publishing under “redstreamnet” or “thered.stream” – to systematically spread false information on politically controversial subjects with the intent of creating ethnic, political and religious discord amongst its predominantly German target audience, including by disseminating the narratives of radical Islamic terrorist groups such as Hamas.During the violent occupation of a German university by anti-Israel rioters, Red personnel coordinated with the occupiers to disseminate their vandalism – which included the use of Hamas symbols – through RED’s online channels, thus providing them with an exclusive media platform.AFA Medya Anonim Şirketi thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation that undermine stability and security in the Union and in one or several of its Member States, including by indirectly supporting and facilitating violent demonstrations and engaging in information manipulation.20.5.20255.Voice of Europe(Russian: Голос Европы)Address: Krakovská 583/9, 110 00 Prague, Czech RepublicWebsite: www.voiceofeurope.com, www.voiceofeurope.euType of entity: Limited Liability Company (s.r.o.)Place of registration: PragueDate of registration: 14.3.2023Registration number: CZ05185327Principal place of business: Czech RepublicVoice of Europe is an online media outlet, engaged in a systematic international campaign of media manipulation and distortion of facts through its website and accounts on Facebook, YouTube, Telegram and X. Voice of Europe disseminated concerted disinformation related to Ukraine, the Union and its Member States with the aim of supporting the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation. It systematically undermined the public image of Ukraine and its efforts to defend itself against Russia’s war of aggression, and the credibility of the assistance of the Union and its Member States to Ukraine’s defence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections.Through its activities, Voice of Europe is implementing and supporting actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States, through engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process, including the 2024 European Parliament elections, and through engaging in the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.Voice of Europe was secretly financed and directed by Viktor Medvedchuk, a pro-Russian Ukrainian politician and businessperson with close ties to the leadership of the Russian Federation, through his associate Artem Marchevskyi. Voice of Europe was used to funnel financial resources designated for the remuneration of propagandists and the building an influence network connecting Medvedchuk and his associates with representatives of political parties in Europe. Therefore, Voice of Europe was involved in activities facilitating the construction of Viktor Medvedchuk’s influence network in the Union and its Member States.20.5.20256.Norebo JSCAddress: Office 510, 43 Schmidta Street, 183038 Murmansk, Russian FederationType of entity: Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: MurmanskDate of registration: 2.11.2007Registration number: 1201000007889TIN / KPP: 2901170107 / 519001001Norebo JSC is a Russian fishing company. Vessels owned and operated by Norebo JSC show particular movement patterns that are inconsistent with regular economic practices and fishing activities. The movement patterns align with malign objectives, such as repeatedly being in the vicinity of or loitering near critical infrastructure and military sites. The movement patterns have been linked, including by Member States and the authorities of third states, to the Russian state-sponsored surveillance campaign that employs inter alia, civilian fishing trawlers, to conduct espionage missions directed against civilian and military infrastructure in the North and Baltic Sea. Those activities can facilitate future sabotage operations. Shipping vessels owned and operated by Norebo JSC have also been equipped with technology that may be used for espionage. A Norebo JSC vessel has been banned from entering Dutch port facilities due to espionage.Norebo JSC has also received several loans from Sberbank, a Russian state-owned bank.Moreover, in July 2022, Russia released its new “maritime doctrine”, which emphasises the strategic importance of civilian ships and their crews for maritime readiness, including by preparing them for wartime, and allowing them to be used by the armed forces in peace time.Norebo JSC thus implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine or threaten the security in the Union, several of its Member States and third countries by engaging in and supporting actions aimed at interfering with critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure.20.5.20257.Murman SeaFood(Russian: Мурман СиФуд, Мурманские морепродукты)Address: Ulitsa Karla Marksa, 28, Murmansk, Murmansk Oblast, Russian Federation, 183025Type of entity: limited liability companyPlace of registration: MurmanskMurman SeaFood (MSF) is a Russian fishing company. Melkart-5 (Russian: Мелькарт-5), a vessel owned and operated by MSF, has repeatedly shown untypical behaviour inconsistent with its regular economic practices and fishing activities, including its presence in close vicinity to an ongoing NATO military exercise, and regular presence close to Norwegian critical infrastructure and military sites. In particular Melkart-5 showed highly unusual navigation practices in the immediate vicinity of a subsea cable in the Norwegian North Sea, crossing the cable multiple times, immediately before the cable was severely damaged. In addition, crew of Melkart-5 violated Norwegian on-shoring regulations while being caught setting off to investigate a Norwegian bridge critical for military logistic purposes in a clandestine manner.Moreover, in July 2022, Russia released its new “maritime doctrine”, which emphasises the strategic importance of civilian ships and their crews for maritime readiness, including by preparing them for wartime, and allowing them to be used by the armed forces in peace time.MSF thus implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the security in the Union, several of its Member States and third countries by engaging in and supporting actions aimed at interfering with critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure.20.5.20258.Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Main Radio Frequency Centre”General Radio Frequency CentreGRFCФедеральное Государственное Унитарное Предприятие “Главный Радиочастотный Центр”ФГУП “ГРЧЦ”Address: 7, Derbenevskaya nab. 7 p., Moscow 115114. 15115114, город Москва, Дербеневская наб, д. 7 стр. 15Type of entity: Federal agencyPlace of registration: Moscow, Russian FederationDate of registration: 30.3.2001BIN: 1027739334479INN: 7706228218KPP: 772501001Principal place of business: RussiaThe General Radio Frequency Centre (GRFC) is responsible for ensuring the proper use of radio frequencies and devices for civil purposes, and monitors compliance with legislation. It is one of the main organisations which contribute to decisions about the use and supervision of the radio frequency sector.Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC.The electronic warfare centre in Kaliningrad has received new jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas.Therefore, GRFC is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure and through supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.20.5.20259.Stark Industries Solutions Ltd.Date of registration: 10.2.2022Address: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom(maildrop address)Registration number: 13906017Website:https://stark-industries.solutions/Website:https://pq.hosting/Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is owned and operated by the Moldavian nationals Ivan Neculiti and Iurie Neculiti, through the web hosting service PQ Hosting. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world.Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities, including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against the Union and third countries, by providing services intended to hide those activities from European law enforcement and security agencies.Therefore, Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and a third country, by facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest.Stark is associated with Ivan Neculiti and Iurie Neculiti.20.5.2025’. Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing ‘4. AFA Media aka REDAFA Medya Anonim Şirketi aka REDAFA Медиа Address: Kavacık Mahallesi, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Caddesi, Tonoglu Block No.: 3, Beykoz, Istanbul, TürkiyeType of entity: media companyPlace of registration: IstanbulDate of registration: 22.11.2022VAT Nr.: 0081804196Registration number 423277-5Principle place of business: TürkiyeWebsite:https://thered.stream/imprint/Founder: Hüseyin Dogru AFA Medya A.Ş. is a media company based in Istanbul. AFA Medya A.Ş. operates “RED”, which comprises a number of media platforms, and which has close financial and organisational connections with Russian state propaganda entities and actors, and which shares deep structural ties including interlinkages between, and rotation of, individual personnel with Russian state media organisations.RED has used its media platforms – often publishing under “redstreamnet” or “thered.stream” – to systematically spread false information on politically controversial subjects with the intent of creating ethnic, political and religious discord amongst its predominantly German target audience, including by disseminating the narratives of radical Islamic terrorist groups such as Hamas.During the violent occupation of a German university by anti-Israel rioters, Red personnel coordinated with the occupiers to disseminate their vandalism – which included the use of Hamas symbols – through RED’s online channels, thus providing them with an exclusive media platform.AFA Medya Anonim Şirketi thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation that undermine stability and security in the Union and in one or several of its Member States, including by indirectly supporting and facilitating violent demonstrations and engaging in information manipulation. 20.5.2025 5. Voice of Europe(Russian: Голос Европы) Address: Krakovská 583/9, 110 00 Prague, Czech RepublicWebsite: www.voiceofeurope.com, www.voiceofeurope.euType of entity: Limited Liability Company (s.r.o.)Place of registration: PragueDate of registration: 14.3.2023Registration number: CZ05185327Principal place of business: Czech Republic Voice of Europe is an online media outlet, engaged in a systematic international campaign of media manipulation and distortion of facts through its website and accounts on Facebook, YouTube, Telegram and X. Voice of Europe disseminated concerted disinformation related to Ukraine, the Union and its Member States with the aim of supporting the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation. It systematically undermined the public image of Ukraine and its efforts to defend itself against Russia’s war of aggression, and the credibility of the assistance of the Union and its Member States to Ukraine’s defence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections.Through its activities, Voice of Europe is implementing and supporting actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States, through engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process, including the 2024 European Parliament elections, and through engaging in the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.Voice of Europe was secretly financed and directed by Viktor Medvedchuk, a pro-Russian Ukrainian politician and businessperson with close ties to the leadership of the Russian Federation, through his associate Artem Marchevskyi. Voice of Europe was used to funnel financial resources designated for the remuneration of propagandists and the building an influence network connecting Medvedchuk and his associates with representatives of political parties in Europe. Therefore, Voice of Europe was involved in activities facilitating the construction of Viktor Medvedchuk’s influence network in the Union and its Member States. 20.5.2025 6. Norebo JSC Address: Office 510, 43 Schmidta Street, 183038 Murmansk, Russian FederationType of entity: Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: MurmanskDate of registration: 2.11.2007Registration number: 1201000007889TIN / KPP: 2901170107 / 519001001 Norebo JSC is a Russian fishing company. Vessels owned and operated by Norebo JSC show particular movement patterns that are inconsistent with regular economic practices and fishing activities. The movement patterns align with malign objectives, such as repeatedly being in the vicinity of or loitering near critical infrastructure and military sites. The movement patterns have been linked, including by Member States and the authorities of third states, to the Russian state-sponsored surveillance campaign that employs inter alia, civilian fishing trawlers, to conduct espionage missions directed against civilian and military infrastructure in the North and Baltic Sea. Those activities can facilitate future sabotage operations. Shipping vessels owned and operated by Norebo JSC have also been equipped with technology that may be used for espionage. A Norebo JSC vessel has been banned from entering Dutch port facilities due to espionage.Norebo JSC has also received several loans from Sberbank, a Russian state-owned bank.Moreover, in July 2022, Russia released its new “maritime doctrine”, which emphasises the strategic importance of civilian ships and their crews for maritime readiness, including by preparing them for wartime, and allowing them to be used by the armed forces in peace time.Norebo JSC thus implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine or threaten the security in the Union, several of its Member States and third countries by engaging in and supporting actions aimed at interfering with critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure. 20.5.2025 7. Murman SeaFood(Russian: Мурман СиФуд, Мурманские морепродукты) Address: Ulitsa Karla Marksa, 28, Murmansk, Murmansk Oblast, Russian Federation, 183025Type of entity: limited liability companyPlace of registration: Murmansk Murman SeaFood (MSF) is a Russian fishing company. Melkart-5 (Russian: Мелькарт-5), a vessel owned and operated by MSF, has repeatedly shown untypical behaviour inconsistent with its regular economic practices and fishing activities, including its presence in close vicinity to an ongoing NATO military exercise, and regular presence close to Norwegian critical infrastructure and military sites. In particular Melkart-5 showed highly unusual navigation practices in the immediate vicinity of a subsea cable in the Norwegian North Sea, crossing the cable multiple times, immediately before the cable was severely damaged. In addition, crew of Melkart-5 violated Norwegian on-shoring regulations while being caught setting off to investigate a Norwegian bridge critical for military logistic purposes in a clandestine manner.Moreover, in July 2022, Russia released its new “maritime doctrine”, which emphasises the strategic importance of civilian ships and their crews for maritime readiness, including by preparing them for wartime, and allowing them to be used by the armed forces in peace time.MSF thus implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the security in the Union, several of its Member States and third countries by engaging in and supporting actions aimed at interfering with critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure. 20.5.2025 8. Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Main Radio Frequency Centre”General Radio Frequency CentreGRFCФедеральное Государственное Унитарное Предприятие “Главный Радиочастотный Центр”ФГУП “ГРЧЦ” Address: 7, Derbenevskaya nab. 7 p., Moscow 115114. 15115114, город Москва, Дербеневская наб, д. 7 стр. 15Type of entity: Federal agencyPlace of registration: Moscow, Russian FederationDate of registration: 30.3.2001BIN: 1027739334479INN: 7706228218KPP: 772501001Principal place of business: Russia The General Radio Frequency Centre (GRFC) is responsible for ensuring the proper use of radio frequencies and devices for civil purposes, and monitors compliance with legislation. It is one of the main organisations which contribute to decisions about the use and supervision of the radio frequency sector.Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC.The electronic warfare centre in Kaliningrad has received new jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas.Therefore, GRFC is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure and through supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025 9. Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. Date of registration: 10.2.2022Address: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom(maildrop address)Registration number: 13906017Website:https://stark-industries.solutions/Website:https://pq.hosting/ Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is owned and operated by the Moldavian nationals Ivan Neculiti and Iurie Neculiti, through the web hosting service PQ Hosting. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world.Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities, including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against the Union and third countries, by providing services intended to hide those activities from European law enforcement and security agencies.Therefore, Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and a third country, by facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest.Stark is associated with Ivan Neculiti and Iurie Neculiti. 20.5.2025’.
Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing
‘4. AFA Media aka REDAFA Medya Anonim Şirketi aka REDAFA Медиа Address: Kavacık Mahallesi, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Caddesi, Tonoglu Block No.: 3, Beykoz, Istanbul, TürkiyeType of entity: media companyPlace of registration: IstanbulDate of registration: 22.11.2022VAT Nr.: 0081804196Registration number 423277-5Principle place of business: TürkiyeWebsite:https://thered.stream/imprint/Founder: Hüseyin Dogru AFA Medya A.Ş. is a media company based in Istanbul. AFA Medya A.Ş. operates “RED”, which comprises a number of media platforms, and which has close financial and organisational connections with Russian state propaganda entities and actors, and which shares deep structural ties including interlinkages between, and rotation of, individual personnel with Russian state media organisations.RED has used its media platforms – often publishing under “redstreamnet” or “thered.stream” – to systematically spread false information on politically controversial subjects with the intent of creating ethnic, political and religious discord amongst its predominantly German target audience, including by disseminating the narratives of radical Islamic terrorist groups such as Hamas.During the violent occupation of a German university by anti-Israel rioters, Red personnel coordinated with the occupiers to disseminate their vandalism – which included the use of Hamas symbols – through RED’s online channels, thus providing them with an exclusive media platform.AFA Medya Anonim Şirketi thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation that undermine stability and security in the Union and in one or several of its Member States, including by indirectly supporting and facilitating violent demonstrations and engaging in information manipulation. 20.5.2025
5. Voice of Europe(Russian: Голос Европы) Address: Krakovská 583/9, 110 00 Prague, Czech RepublicWebsite: www.voiceofeurope.com, www.voiceofeurope.euType of entity: Limited Liability Company (s.r.o.)Place of registration: PragueDate of registration: 14.3.2023Registration number: CZ05185327Principal place of business: Czech Republic Voice of Europe is an online media outlet, engaged in a systematic international campaign of media manipulation and distortion of facts through its website and accounts on Facebook, YouTube, Telegram and X. Voice of Europe disseminated concerted disinformation related to Ukraine, the Union and its Member States with the aim of supporting the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation. It systematically undermined the public image of Ukraine and its efforts to defend itself against Russia’s war of aggression, and the credibility of the assistance of the Union and its Member States to Ukraine’s defence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections.Through its activities, Voice of Europe is implementing and supporting actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States, through engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process, including the 2024 European Parliament elections, and through engaging in the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.Voice of Europe was secretly financed and directed by Viktor Medvedchuk, a pro-Russian Ukrainian politician and businessperson with close ties to the leadership of the Russian Federation, through his associate Artem Marchevskyi. Voice of Europe was used to funnel financial resources designated for the remuneration of propagandists and the building an influence network connecting Medvedchuk and his associates with representatives of political parties in Europe. Therefore, Voice of Europe was involved in activities facilitating the construction of Viktor Medvedchuk’s influence network in the Union and its Member States. 20.5.2025
6. Norebo JSC Address: Office 510, 43 Schmidta Street, 183038 Murmansk, Russian FederationType of entity: Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: MurmanskDate of registration: 2.11.2007Registration number: 1201000007889TIN / KPP: 2901170107 / 519001001 Norebo JSC is a Russian fishing company. Vessels owned and operated by Norebo JSC show particular movement patterns that are inconsistent with regular economic practices and fishing activities. The movement patterns align with malign objectives, such as repeatedly being in the vicinity of or loitering near critical infrastructure and military sites. The movement patterns have been linked, including by Member States and the authorities of third states, to the Russian state-sponsored surveillance campaign that employs inter alia, civilian fishing trawlers, to conduct espionage missions directed against civilian and military infrastructure in the North and Baltic Sea. Those activities can facilitate future sabotage operations. Shipping vessels owned and operated by Norebo JSC have also been equipped with technology that may be used for espionage. A Norebo JSC vessel has been banned from entering Dutch port facilities due to espionage.Norebo JSC has also received several loans from Sberbank, a Russian state-owned bank.Moreover, in July 2022, Russia released its new “maritime doctrine”, which emphasises the strategic importance of civilian ships and their crews for maritime readiness, including by preparing them for wartime, and allowing them to be used by the armed forces in peace time.Norebo JSC thus implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine or threaten the security in the Union, several of its Member States and third countries by engaging in and supporting actions aimed at interfering with critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure. 20.5.2025
7. Murman SeaFood(Russian: Мурман СиФуд, Мурманские морепродукты) Address: Ulitsa Karla Marksa, 28, Murmansk, Murmansk Oblast, Russian Federation, 183025Type of entity: limited liability companyPlace of registration: Murmansk Murman SeaFood (MSF) is a Russian fishing company. Melkart-5 (Russian: Мелькарт-5), a vessel owned and operated by MSF, has repeatedly shown untypical behaviour inconsistent with its regular economic practices and fishing activities, including its presence in close vicinity to an ongoing NATO military exercise, and regular presence close to Norwegian critical infrastructure and military sites. In particular Melkart-5 showed highly unusual navigation practices in the immediate vicinity of a subsea cable in the Norwegian North Sea, crossing the cable multiple times, immediately before the cable was severely damaged. In addition, crew of Melkart-5 violated Norwegian on-shoring regulations while being caught setting off to investigate a Norwegian bridge critical for military logistic purposes in a clandestine manner.Moreover, in July 2022, Russia released its new “maritime doctrine”, which emphasises the strategic importance of civilian ships and their crews for maritime readiness, including by preparing them for wartime, and allowing them to be used by the armed forces in peace time.MSF thus implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the security in the Union, several of its Member States and third countries by engaging in and supporting actions aimed at interfering with critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure. 20.5.2025
8. Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Main Radio Frequency Centre”General Radio Frequency CentreGRFCФедеральное Государственное Унитарное Предприятие “Главный Радиочастотный Центр”ФГУП “ГРЧЦ” Address: 7, Derbenevskaya nab. 7 p., Moscow 115114. 15115114, город Москва, Дербеневская наб, д. 7 стр. 15Type of entity: Federal agencyPlace of registration: Moscow, Russian FederationDate of registration: 30.3.2001BIN: 1027739334479INN: 7706228218KPP: 772501001Principal place of business: Russia The General Radio Frequency Centre (GRFC) is responsible for ensuring the proper use of radio frequencies and devices for civil purposes, and monitors compliance with legislation. It is one of the main organisations which contribute to decisions about the use and supervision of the radio frequency sector.Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC.The electronic warfare centre in Kaliningrad has received new jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas.Therefore, GRFC is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure and through supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025
9. Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. Date of registration: 10.2.2022Address: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom(maildrop address)Registration number: 13906017Website:https://stark-industries.solutions/Website:https://pq.hosting/ Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is owned and operated by the Moldavian nationals Ivan Neculiti and Iurie Neculiti, through the web hosting service PQ Hosting. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world.Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities, including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against the Union and third countries, by providing services intended to hide those activities from European law enforcement and security agencies.Therefore, Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and a third country, by facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest.Stark is associated with Ivan Neculiti and Iurie Neculiti. 20.5.2025’.
Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing
‘4. AFA Media aka REDAFA Medya Anonim Şirketi aka REDAFA Медиа Address: Kavacık Mahallesi, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Caddesi, Tonoglu Block No.: 3, Beykoz, Istanbul, TürkiyeType of entity: media companyPlace of registration: IstanbulDate of registration: 22.11.2022VAT Nr.: 0081804196Registration number 423277-5Principle place of business: TürkiyeWebsite:https://thered.stream/imprint/Founder: Hüseyin Dogru AFA Medya A.Ş. is a media company based in Istanbul. AFA Medya A.Ş. operates “RED”, which comprises a number of media platforms, and which has close financial and organisational connections with Russian state propaganda entities and actors, and which shares deep structural ties including interlinkages between, and rotation of, individual personnel with Russian state media organisations.RED has used its media platforms – often publishing under “redstreamnet” or “thered.stream” – to systematically spread false information on politically controversial subjects with the intent of creating ethnic, political and religious discord amongst its predominantly German target audience, including by disseminating the narratives of radical Islamic terrorist groups such as Hamas.During the violent occupation of a German university by anti-Israel rioters, Red personnel coordinated with the occupiers to disseminate their vandalism – which included the use of Hamas symbols – through RED’s online channels, thus providing them with an exclusive media platform.AFA Medya Anonim Şirketi thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation that undermine stability and security in the Union and in one or several of its Member States, including by indirectly supporting and facilitating violent demonstrations and engaging in information manipulation. 20.5.2025
5. Voice of Europe(Russian: Голос Европы) Address: Krakovská 583/9, 110 00 Prague, Czech RepublicWebsite: www.voiceofeurope.com, www.voiceofeurope.euType of entity: Limited Liability Company (s.r.o.)Place of registration: PragueDate of registration: 14.3.2023Registration number: CZ05185327Principal place of business: Czech Republic Voice of Europe is an online media outlet, engaged in a systematic international campaign of media manipulation and distortion of facts through its website and accounts on Facebook, YouTube, Telegram and X. Voice of Europe disseminated concerted disinformation related to Ukraine, the Union and its Member States with the aim of supporting the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation. It systematically undermined the public image of Ukraine and its efforts to defend itself against Russia’s war of aggression, and the credibility of the assistance of the Union and its Member States to Ukraine’s defence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections.Through its activities, Voice of Europe is implementing and supporting actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States, through engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process, including the 2024 European Parliament elections, and through engaging in the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.Voice of Europe was secretly financed and directed by Viktor Medvedchuk, a pro-Russian Ukrainian politician and businessperson with close ties to the leadership of the Russian Federation, through his associate Artem Marchevskyi. Voice of Europe was used to funnel financial resources designated for the remuneration of propagandists and the building an influence network connecting Medvedchuk and his associates with representatives of political parties in Europe. Therefore, Voice of Europe was involved in activities facilitating the construction of Viktor Medvedchuk’s influence network in the Union and its Member States. 20.5.2025
6. Norebo JSC Address: Office 510, 43 Schmidta Street, 183038 Murmansk, Russian FederationType of entity: Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: MurmanskDate of registration: 2.11.2007Registration number: 1201000007889TIN / KPP: 2901170107 / 519001001 Norebo JSC is a Russian fishing company. Vessels owned and operated by Norebo JSC show particular movement patterns that are inconsistent with regular economic practices and fishing activities. The movement patterns align with malign objectives, such as repeatedly being in the vicinity of or loitering near critical infrastructure and military sites. The movement patterns have been linked, including by Member States and the authorities of third states, to the Russian state-sponsored surveillance campaign that employs inter alia, civilian fishing trawlers, to conduct espionage missions directed against civilian and military infrastructure in the North and Baltic Sea. Those activities can facilitate future sabotage operations. Shipping vessels owned and operated by Norebo JSC have also been equipped with technology that may be used for espionage. A Norebo JSC vessel has been banned from entering Dutch port facilities due to espionage.Norebo JSC has also received several loans from Sberbank, a Russian state-owned bank.Moreover, in July 2022, Russia released its new “maritime doctrine”, which emphasises the strategic importance of civilian ships and their crews for maritime readiness, including by preparing them for wartime, and allowing them to be used by the armed forces in peace time.Norebo JSC thus implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine or threaten the security in the Union, several of its Member States and third countries by engaging in and supporting actions aimed at interfering with critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure. 20.5.2025
7. Murman SeaFood(Russian: Мурман СиФуд, Мурманские морепродукты) Address: Ulitsa Karla Marksa, 28, Murmansk, Murmansk Oblast, Russian Federation, 183025Type of entity: limited liability companyPlace of registration: Murmansk Murman SeaFood (MSF) is a Russian fishing company. Melkart-5 (Russian: Мелькарт-5), a vessel owned and operated by MSF, has repeatedly shown untypical behaviour inconsistent with its regular economic practices and fishing activities, including its presence in close vicinity to an ongoing NATO military exercise, and regular presence close to Norwegian critical infrastructure and military sites. In particular Melkart-5 showed highly unusual navigation practices in the immediate vicinity of a subsea cable in the Norwegian North Sea, crossing the cable multiple times, immediately before the cable was severely damaged. In addition, crew of Melkart-5 violated Norwegian on-shoring regulations while being caught setting off to investigate a Norwegian bridge critical for military logistic purposes in a clandestine manner.Moreover, in July 2022, Russia released its new “maritime doctrine”, which emphasises the strategic importance of civilian ships and their crews for maritime readiness, including by preparing them for wartime, and allowing them to be used by the armed forces in peace time.MSF thus implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the security in the Union, several of its Member States and third countries by engaging in and supporting actions aimed at interfering with critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure. 20.5.2025
8. Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Main Radio Frequency Centre”General Radio Frequency CentreGRFCФедеральное Государственное Унитарное Предприятие “Главный Радиочастотный Центр”ФГУП “ГРЧЦ” Address: 7, Derbenevskaya nab. 7 p., Moscow 115114. 15115114, город Москва, Дербеневская наб, д. 7 стр. 15Type of entity: Federal agencyPlace of registration: Moscow, Russian FederationDate of registration: 30.3.2001BIN: 1027739334479INN: 7706228218KPP: 772501001Principal place of business: Russia The General Radio Frequency Centre (GRFC) is responsible for ensuring the proper use of radio frequencies and devices for civil purposes, and monitors compliance with legislation. It is one of the main organisations which contribute to decisions about the use and supervision of the radio frequency sector.Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC.The electronic warfare centre in Kaliningrad has received new jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas.Therefore, GRFC is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure and through supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 20.5.2025
9. Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. Date of registration: 10.2.2022Address: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom(maildrop address)Registration number: 13906017Website:https://stark-industries.solutions/Website:https://pq.hosting/ Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is owned and operated by the Moldavian nationals Ivan Neculiti and Iurie Neculiti, through the web hosting service PQ Hosting. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world.Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities, including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against the Union and third countries, by providing services intended to hide those activities from European law enforcement and security agencies.Therefore, Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and a third country, by facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest.Stark is associated with Ivan Neculiti and Iurie Neculiti. 20.5.2025’.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 8 October 2024, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 (1).
(2) The Union remains unwavering in its condemnation of Russia’s malign activities directed against the Union, its Member States, international organisations and third countries.
(3) In view of the gravity of the situation, the Council considers that 21 natural persons and 6 legal persons, entities or bodies should be added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643.
(4) Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 should therefore be amended accordingly,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

The Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 is amended as follows:

(1) The following entries are added under the heading ‘A. Natural persons’:

Name
Identifying information
Statement of Reasons
Date of listing
‘17. Alik Yuryevich KHUCHBAROV
Alik Yuryevich HUCHBAROV
Alik HUTŠBAROV
(Russian: Алик Юрьевич ХУЧБАРОВ)
Function: GRU operative
DOB: 12.11.1992
Nationality: Russian, Estonian
Gender: male
Tax identification number: 601515903509
Alik Khuchbarov was reponsible for planning and preparing an operation in Estonia, which entailed damaging the property of public figures who have spoken out against the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as defacing monuments related to World War II. In doing so, he acted under the direction, in the interests and at the request of Russia’s military foreign intelligence agency (GRU) to hire perpetrators to carry out the attacks. In the attacks, vehicles of the Estonian Minister of the Interior as well as of the editor-in-chief of a Russian-language newspaper were targetted. The security services of Estonia prevented further attacks targeting more public figures. In addition, several war memorials in Estonia were defaced, with paint thrown on them and swastikas drawn on them. The aim of the operation was to create fear, panic and tension in Estonian society, and to intimidate persons critical of Russian actions and policies.As a collaborator in the GRU’s network, Alik Khuchbarov is responsible for implementing actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a Member State through planning and directing acts of violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation.
20.5.2025 18. Ilya Sergeevich BOCHAROV
Ilja BOTŠAROV
(Russian: Илья Сергеевич БОЧАРОВ)
Function: GRU operative
DOB: 29.6.1991
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
Tax identification number: 561410364291
Ilya Bocharov was reponsible for planning and preparing an operation in Estonia, which entailed damaging the property of public figures who have spoken out against the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as defacing monuments related to World War II. In doing so, he acted under the direction, in the interests and at the request of Russia’s military foreign intelligence agency (GRU) to hire perpetrators to carry out the attacks. In the attacks, vehicles of the Estonian Minister of the Interior as well as of the editor-in-chief of a Russian-language newspaper were targetted. The security services of Estonia prevented further attacks targeting more public figures. In addition, several war memorials in Estonia were defaced, with paint thrown on them and swastikas drawn on them. The aim of the operation was to create fear, panic and tension in Estonian society, and to intimidate persons critical of Russian actions and policies.As a collaborator in the GRU’s network, Ilya Bocharov is responsible for implementing actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a Member State through planning and directing acts of violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation.
20.5.2025 19. Elena KOLBASNIKOVA
(Russian: Елена КОЛБАСНИКОВА)
Nationality: Ukrainian, Russian
DOB: 20.3.1975
POB: Dnipro, Ukraine SSR (now Ukraine)
Gender: female
Elena Kolbasnikova is a Russian national who has close ties with, and is financially supported by, Rossotrudnitschestwo, a Russian state entity. Kolbasnikova formed political structures with the German anti-democratic extreme political right in support of Russia’s destabilisation of Ukraine. She was sentenced for hate speech in a court of final instance in Germany in regard to her undermining of Ukrainian sovereignty and denouncement of German public institutions. Criminal investigations are ongoing in regard to her support of separatists in the Donbas with military hardware, through fundraisers and the provision of aid to separatist groups. Moreover, Kolbasnikova promoted violent acts committed by her husband, Rostislav Teslyuk, against counter-demonstrators, and organised car rallies to intimidate Ukrainian minors seeking refuge in Germany.
She thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of a Member State through activities aimed at undermining the democratic political process in Germany. She also supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the security of a third country (Ukraine), through instigating or facilitating an armed conflict, by supporting separatist movements in Ukraine.
Elena Kolbasnikova is associated with Rostislav Teslyuk, through joint efforts in destabilising activities.
20.5.2025 20. Hüseyin DOGRU
Address: Kavacık Mahallesi, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Caddesi, Tonoglu Block No.: 3, Beykoz, Istanbul, Türkiye
Nationality: Turkish
Gender: male
Hüseyin Doğru is the founder and representative of AFA Medya A.Ş. which is a media company based in Istanbul. AFA Medya A.Ş. operates “RED”, which comprises a number of media platforms, and which has close financial and organisational connections with Russian state propaganda entities and actors, and shares deep structural ties, including interlinkages between, and rotation of, individual personnel with Russian state media organisations.
RED has used its media platforms – often publishing under “redstreamnet” or “thered.stream” – to systematically spread false information on politically controversial subjects with the intent of creating ethnic, political and religious discord amongst its predominantly German target audience, including by disseminating the narratives of radical Islamic terrorist groups such as Hamas.
During a violent occupation of a German university by anti-Israel rioters, RED personnel coordinated with the occupiers to disseminate images of their vandalism – which included the use of Hamas symbols – through their online channels, thus providing them with an exclusive media platform, facilitating the violent nature of the protest.
Through AFA Medya, Hüseyin Doğru thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability and security in the Union and in one or several of its Member States, including by indirectly supporting and facilitating violent demonstrations and engaging in coordinated information manipulation.
20.5.2025 21. Yulia Sergeevna PROKHOROVA
(Russian: Юлия Сергеевна ПРОХОРОВА)
Nationality: Russian
DOB: 18.2.1992
Address: Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates.
Formerly Landshut, Bavaria, Germany
Gender: female
Yulia Prokhorova is a Russian citizen. She resided in Germany until 2024. Yulia Prokhorova sustains a social media campaign in which she promoted the intentional wasting of energy in Germany, seeking to support Russia’s war of aggression. In parallel, she disseminates misinformation in Russian state media about the energy supply, the rule of law, and Ukrainian refugees in Germany.
In addition, Yulia Prokhorova intimidated Ukrainian refugees in Europe through public assaults and other forms of harassment, which she recorded and disseminated online.
Yulia Prokhorova thus supports actions and policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one Member State by engaging in the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference and indirectly supporting actions targeted at economic activities and services of public interest.
20.5.2025 22. Rostislav TESLYUK
(Russian: Ростислав ТЕСЛЮК)
Alias
Max SCHLUND
(Russian: Макс ШЛУНД)
Nationality: Russian
DOB: 23.4.1982
POB: Moscow
Gender: male
Rostislav Teslyuk is a Russian national who has close ties with, and is financially supported by, Rossotrudnitschestwo, a Russian state entity. Rostislav Teslyuk formed political structures with the German anti-democratic extreme political right in support of Russia’s destabilisation of Ukraine. Criminal investigations in regard to his support of separatists in the Donbas with military hardware are ongoing. Rostislav Teslyuk committed violent acts against counter-demonstrators and organised car rallies to intimidate Ukrainian minors seeking refuge in Germany, together with Elena Kolbasnikova.
He thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of a Member State (Germany) through activities aimed at undermining the democratic political process in Germany. He is also responsible for actions by the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine the security of a third country (Ukraine) through instigating or facilitating an armed conflict, by his support for separatist movements in Ukraine.
Rostislav Teslyuk is associated with Elena Kolbasnikova, who is subject to restrictive measures, through joint efforts in destabilising activities.
20.5.2025 23. Alina LIPP
Function: war correspondent
DOB: 17.9.1993
POB: Hamburg
Nationality: German
Gender: female
Alina Lipp runs the blog “Neues aus Russland”, in which she systematically disseminates misinformation about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and delegitimises the Ukrainian government, especially with a view to manipulating German public sentiment as regards support for Ukraine.
Furthermore, she is using her role as a war correspondent with the Russian armed forces in eastern Ukraine to spread Russian war propaganda. She regularly appears in troop entertainment and propaganda shows on the Russian military TV channel Zvezda.
Thus, Alina Lipp is engaging in and supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten security and stability in the Union and in a third country (Ukraine) through the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference, and through facilitating an armed conflict in a third country.
20.5.2025 24. Viktor Volodymyrovych MEDVEDCHUK
(Ukrainian: Віктор Володимирович МЕДВЕДЧУК)
(Russian: Виктор Владимирович МЕДВЕДЧУК)
Function: Politician, businessman, de facto media owner
DOB: 7.8.1954
POB: Pochet, Krasnoyarskyi Krai, Russian SFSR, USSR
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
Address: Moscow
Ukrainian Tax ID (Код ДРФО): 1994214296 (void)
Viktor Medvedchuk is a former Ukrainian politician and businessman, who has been the leading proponent of a pro-Russian policy in Ukraine and who has promoted policies and actions intended to erode the credibility and legitimacy of the Government of Ukraine. Viktor Medvedchuk has close personal ties to, and is associated with, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin.
Through his associates, including Artem Marchevskyi, Viktor Medvedchuk controlled Ukrainian media outlets and used them to disseminate pro-Russian propaganda in Ukraine and beyond. After the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Viktor Medvedchuk spread Russian propaganda narratives about the war, undermining Ukrainian sovereignty. To that end, in April 2023, Viktor Medvedchuk founded a political movement in Russia called “Another Ukraine”.
With his associates and associated entities, including Artem Marchevskyi and the Voice of Europe media channel, and in close coordination with the Russian authorities, Viktor Medvedchuk has continued funding and carrying out influence operations targeting political parties and individual politicians in Europe. Those activities aimed to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and to spread its influence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections. Those activities included providing financial resources to individual political actors in Europe, including selected candidates in the European Parliament elections, and for cooperation with journalists. Viktor Medvedchuk has directed and maintained control over the malign activities of Artem Marchevskyi and Voice of Europe, using Artem Marchevskyi’s de facto direction of Voice of Europe.
Therefore, Viktor Medvedchuk is responsible for, implementing, supporting, or benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in a third country, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through planning, directing, engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process, including the 2024 European Parliament elections, and through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference.
20.5.2025 25. Artem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKYI
Artem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKIJ
Artem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKIY
Artěm Pavlovič MARČEVSKIJ
(Ukrainian: Артем Павлович МАРЧЕВСЬКИЙ)
(Russian: Артем Павлович МАРЧЕВСКИЙ)
Function: Politician, media producer, propagandist
DOB: 5.7.1988
POB: Kyiv, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, (now Ukraine)
Nationality: Ukrainian, Israeli
Gender: male
Address: Hovorčovická 1079, 250 65 Líbeznice, Czech Republic
Ukrainian Tax ID (Код ДРФО): 3232824038
Artem Marchevskyi is a former Ukrainian politician closely associated with Viktor Medvedchuk, a former Ukrainian politician and businessperson with close connections to the Government of the Russian Federation. By virtue of his position in the pro-Russian party “Opposition Platform – For Life” and in a TV channel involved in pro-Russian propaganda, Artem Marchevskyi supported and provided assistance to Viktor Medvedchuk in the years 2018 to 2021. Artem Marchevskyi and Viktor Medvedchuk continued to coordinate after they both left Ukraine following the Russian invasion in 2022, with Viktor Medvedchuk directing and controlling Artem Marchevskyi’s activities facilitating construction of Medvedchuk’s influence network in the Union and its Member States.
Artem Marchevskyi has played an instrumental role in disseminating concerted disinformation and biased narratives aimed at supporting the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and spreading its influence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections, by undermining the credibility and public image of Ukraine and its efforts to defend itself against Russia’s war of aggression. Artem Marchevskyi played a key role in the acquisition of the media brand “Voice of Europe” and the incorporation of its activity in a company of the same name. As the concealed head of Voice of Europe, Artem Marchevskyi has used the company to funnel financial resources designated for the remuneration of propagandists, and to build an influence network connecting Medvedchuk and his associates with representatives of political parties in Europe.
Therefore, Artem Marchevskyi is responsible for actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process and through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference.
20.5.2025 26. Natallia SUDLIANKOVA
A.k.a.:
Natallia SUDLENKOVA
Natalia SUDLENKOVA
Natalia SUDLIANKOVÁ (ŠEVKOVÁ)
Natalija SUDLIANKOVÁ (ŠEVKOVÁ)
(Russian: Наталья СУДЛЕНКОВА (ШЕВКО))
Alias:
Natalyia KORNELYUK
(Russian: Наталья КОРНЕЛЮК)
Function: Journalist, Media and PR Consultant, Coordinator
DOB: 9.6.1964
POB: Belarus
Nationality: Belarusian
Gender: female
Address: Borovanského 2381/22, 155 00 Prague, Czech Republic
Identity documents: Travel document: U0002974, valid until 18.3.2031
Residence Permit: 001631077, valid until 13.3.2034
Natallia Sudliankova is a journalist and a media and PR consultant who has been producing custom-made media products that included information manipulation and spreading misleading narratives aiming to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and aiming to undermine the public trust towards Czech national and European Union democratic values and processes. Sudliankova has been receiving assignments over a long period of time and has been financially rewarded.
She plays a significant role in planning and directing coordinated information manipulation intended for the public in the Czech Republic and in other Member States, and cooperates with Russian state entities (Rosatom, Pravfond), entities representing the interests of the Russian Federation (Immortal Regiment of Russia), and Alexey Nikolayevich Shavrov, an officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU).
Therefore, Natallia Sudliankova is responsible for actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation.
20.5.2025 27. Iurie NECULITI
(Russian: Юрие НЕКУЛИТИ)
Function: CEO of Stark Industries
Nationality: of the Republic of Moldova
Gender: male
Address: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom; Chisinau, Republic of Moldova
POB: Bender, Republic of Moldova
Iurie Neculiti is CEO of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world.
Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against the Union and third countries by providing services intended to hide these activities from European law enforcement and security agencies.
Therefore, as CEO of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., Neculiti is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and a third country, by facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest.
Iurie Neculiti is associated with Ivan Neculiti and Stark Industries.
20.5.2025 28. Ivan NECULITI
(Russian: Иван НЕКУЛИТИ)
Function: Owner of Stark Industries and PQ Hosting
Nationality: of the Republic of Moldova
Gender: male
Address: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom; Chisinau, Republic of Moldova
POB: Bender, Republic of Moldova
Ivan Neculiti is the owner of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world.
Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities, including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against Union and third countries, by providing services intended to hide these activities from European law enforcement and security agencies.
Ivan Neculiti is associated with Iurie Neculiti and Stark Industries.
Therefore, as the owner of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. Ivan Neculiti is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and in a third country, by facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest.
20.5.2025 29. Andrei KHARKOVSKY
(Russian: Андрей ХАРКОВСКИЙ)
Function: Leading member of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad
Nationality: Russian
POB: Tomsk Region, Russia
Gender: male
Address: Germany
Andrei Kharkovsky is a Russian citizen living in Germany. In Germany, Kharkovsky functions as a representative of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad, including by organising military-style gatherings for its members. The Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad is an entity linked to the Government of the Russian Federation, and partaking in Russia’s war of aggression and acts of violence in Ukraine in support of pro-Russian separatists under the premise of a “historical mission” to reinstate Russian control over southern and eastern Ukraine. As a member of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad, Kharkovsky is engaging in acts of violence.
Andrei Kharkovsky is therefore supporting actions of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the sovereignty and security of Ukraine by attempting to overthrow the constitutional order of Ukraine.
20.5.2025 30. Anatoli Yurevich ABRAMOV
(Russian: Анатолий Юрьевич АБРАМОВ)
Function: Director of the General Radio Frequency Centre branch in the Northwestern Federal District
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
Anatoly Abramov is the director of the General Radio Frequency Centre’s Northwestern Federal District branch. Branch heads are appointed and dismissed by the Director of the GRFC in agreement with Roskomnadzor, and act on behalf of the GRFC.
He oversees the use of radio frequencies and devices in the Kaliningrad region.
Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC.
Therefore, Anatoly Abramov is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States, through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure.
20.5.2025 31. Ruslan Vasilyevich NESTERENKO
(Russian: Руслан Васильевич НЕСТЕРЕНКО)
Function: Acting General Director of the GRFC
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
Ruslan Nesterenko is the acting general director of the General Radio Frequency Centre (GRFC). He oversees the use of radio frequencies and ensures compliance with legislation.
Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, Russia, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States and disrupting civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC.
Under Nesterenko’s direction, the GRFC is involved in planning and supporting information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States. As per the GRFC Charter, the general director represents the enterprise’s interests within Russia and beyond its borders.
Therefore, Ruslan Nesterenko is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure and through supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.
20.5.2025 32. Viktor Aleksandrovitch LUKOVENKO
(Russian: Виктор Александрович ЛУКОВЕНКО)
Alias
Viktor VASILEV
(Russian: Виктор ВАСИЛЬЕВ)
Function: Head of the news agency “African Initiative”
DOB: 6.4.1985
Nationality: Uzbek
Gender: male
Viktor Lukovenko has been active on the African continent for several years, previously as a member of the Wagner Group and now as the head of the news agency “African Initiative”. He is involved in spreading Russian propaganda on the continent. He is linked to well known figures of Russian propaganda in Africa. Additionally, Viktor Lukovenko was sent to Ukraine in 2022 before the war, under the supervision of a GRU colonel, in order to recruit pro-Russian sympathisers.
Viktor Lukovenko is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly and indirectly, supporting and facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.
20.5.2025 33. Oleg Anatoliyovych VOLOSHIN
(Ukrainian: Олег Анатолійович ВОЛОШИН)
(Russian: Олег Анатольевич ВОЛОШИН)
Nationality: Russian
DOB: 7.4.1981
POB: Nikolaev, USSR (now Ukraine)
Passport No.: ET870130
ID-No.: 1981040705733; 2968200719
Gender: male
Oleg Voloshin is a former Ukrainian member of parliament and a member of the pro-Russian political party “Opposition Platform – For Life” (OPFL). He is part of the network behind “Voice of Europe” and is active at Golos.eu and PolitWera, both platforms spreading disinformation and pro-Russian narratives. He was involved in bribe payments made to Western politicians.
Oleg Voloshin has used his position as Ukrainian delegate to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2019-2023) to implement the strategy of Russian interference in Europe led by pro-Russian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, who leads OPFL.
In particular, Voloshin has promoted Medvedchuk’s “peace plan” for Ukraine, which is linked to the Russian narrative regarding Russia’s war of aggression. In order to win-over European elected representatives to his cause, he has organised conferences with French and German parliamentarians, arguing that the “Normandy format” (France, Germany, Ukraine, Russia) has a so-called parliamentary dimension outside any official framework. The most recent event was organised by Voloshin at the French Senate on 11 February 2022 (“Peace process in Ukraine: how to break the deadlock”), a few days before the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian army.
Thus, Oleg Voloshin is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union and its Member States, including Germany, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly and indirectly, the obstruction and undermining of the democratic political process.
20.5.2025 34. Justin Blaise TAGOUH
(Russian: Жюстин Блез ТАГУ)
Function: CEO of press group International Afrique Media (IAM), which includes the TV channel Afrique Média, IAM press review, and Courrier Confidentiel
DOB: 1959
Gender: male
Justin Tagouh is CEO of the press group International Africa Media. This media group has direct links with the Russian authorities, and spreads Russian narrative and anti-western narrative in African countries.
Justin Tagouh is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.
20.5.2025 35. Mikhaïl Mikhaïlovich PRUDNIKOV
Alias
“Micha”
(Russian: Михаил Михайлович ПРУДНИКОВ)
Function: Member of Africa Politology, entity responsible for disinformation and Russian propaganda in the Central African Republic
POB: Tambov Oblast
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
Mikhaïl Prudnikov is a Russian disinformation activist operating in the Central African Republic (CAR) who has close links with the Wagner galaxy and disinformation campaign holdings in CAR through various newspapers and networks. In particular, he developed a narrative against western countries and participated in communication actions in order to undermine and threaten the Union’s image in the CAR.
Mikhaïl Prudnikov is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.
20.5.2025 36. Sylvain AFOUA
(Russian: Сильвен АФУА)
Alias
Egountchi BEHANZIN
(Russian: Эгунчи БЕХАНЗИН)
Function: Founder of the pan-African group “Ligue de défense noire Africaine” (LDNA); influencer/activist known by the pseudonym “Egountchi Behanzin”
DOB: 5.11.1988
POB: Madjikpeto, Togo
Nationality: French, Togolese
Gender: male
Website: www.egountchibehanzin.com
Sylvain Afoua is a pro-Russian activist, founder of the “Ligue de défense noire Africaine” (LDNA) (Black African Defence League), a group involved in hit actions on French territory. The structure was dissolved by a French ministerial decree of 29 September 2021 for spreading an ideology calling for hatred, discrimination and violence. Sylvain Afoua spreads Russian narratives and misinformation on the war of aggression against Ukraine, which he carries out in particular on the African continent. His message is transmitted via social networks and his association’s website. He is regularly invited to Russian fora and is, furthermore, financially linked to the Wagner Group.
Sylvain Afoua is therefore responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.
20.5.2025 37. Thomas RÖPER
(Russian: Томас РЁПЕР)
Function: war correspondent
DOB: 26.11.1971
POB: Bremen
Nationality: German
Gender: male
Thomas Röper is a German blogger. Through his network of online channels named “Anti-Spiegel”, he systematically disseminates misinformation about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and delegitimises the Ukrainian government, especially with a view to manipulating German public sentiment regarding support to Ukraine.
Furthermore, he legitimises Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory by serving as an election “observer” and participating in a campaign to promote Russia’s illegal referendum on the secession from Ukraine of the Russian-occupied territories. Moreover, he has served as a spokesperson for the Government of the Russian Federationto disseminate Russian propaganda narratives, including at the UN Arria-forum.
Thomas Röper is therefore engaging in and supporting the use of information manipulation and interference and facilitates an armed conflict in a third country.
20.5.2025’;

(2) The following entries are added under the heading ‘B. Legal persons, entities and bodies’:

Name
Identifying information
Statement of Reasons
Date of listing
‘4. AFA Media aka RED
AFA Medya Anonim Şirketi aka RED
AFA Медиа
Address: Kavacık Mahallesi, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Caddesi, Tonoglu Block No.: 3, Beykoz, Istanbul, Türkiye
Type of entity: media company
Place of registration: Istanbul
Date of registration: 22.11.2022
VAT Nr.: 0081804196
Registration number 423277-5
Principle place of business: Türkiye
Website: https://thered.stream/imprint/
Founder: Hüseyin Dogru
AFA Medya A.Ş. is a media company based in Istanbul. AFA Medya A.Ş. operates “RED”, which comprises a number of media platforms, and which has close financial and organisational connections with Russian state propaganda entities and actors, and which shares deep structural ties including interlinkages between, and rotation of, individual personnel with Russian state media organisations.
RED has used its media platforms – often publishing under “redstreamnet” or “thered.stream” – to systematically spread false information on politically controversial subjects with the intent of creating ethnic, political and religious discord amongst its predominantly German target audience, including by disseminating the narratives of radical Islamic terrorist groups such as Hamas.
During the violent occupation of a German university by anti-Israel rioters, Red personnel coordinated with the occupiers to disseminate their vandalism – which included the use of Hamas symbols – through RED’s online channels, thus providing them with an exclusive media platform.
AFA Medya Anonim Şirketi thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation that undermine stability and security in the Union and in one or several of its Member States, including by indirectly supporting and facilitating violent demonstrations and engaging in information manipulation.
20.5.2025 5. Voice of Europe
(Russian: Голос Европы)
Address: Krakovská 583/9, 110 00 Prague, Czech Republic
Website: www.voiceofeurope.com, www.voiceofeurope.eu
Type of entity: Limited Liability Company (s.r.o.)
Place of registration: Prague
Date of registration: 14.3.2023
Registration number: CZ05185327
Principal place of business: Czech Republic
Voice of Europe is an online media outlet, engaged in a systematic international campaign of media manipulation and distortion of facts through its website and accounts on Facebook, YouTube, Telegram and X. Voice of Europe disseminated concerted disinformation related to Ukraine, the Union and its Member States with the aim of supporting the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation. It systematically undermined the public image of Ukraine and its efforts to defend itself against Russia’s war of aggression, and the credibility of the assistance of the Union and its Member States to Ukraine’s defence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections.
Through its activities, Voice of Europe is implementing and supporting actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States, through engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process, including the 2024 European Parliament elections, and through engaging in the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.
Voice of Europe was secretly financed and directed by Viktor Medvedchuk, a pro-Russian Ukrainian politician and businessperson with close ties to the leadership of the Russian Federation, through his associate Artem Marchevskyi. Voice of Europe was used to funnel financial resources designated for the remuneration of propagandists and the building an influence network connecting Medvedchuk and his associates with representatives of political parties in Europe. Therefore, Voice of Europe was involved in activities facilitating the construction of Viktor Medvedchuk’s influence network in the Union and its Member States.
20.5.2025 6. Norebo JSC
Address: Office 510, 43 Schmidta Street, 183038 Murmansk, Russian Federation
Type of entity: Joint Stock Company
Place of registration: Murmansk
Date of registration: 2.11.2007
Registration number: 1201000007889
TIN / KPP: 2901170107 / 519001001
Norebo JSC is a Russian fishing company. Vessels owned and operated by Norebo JSC show particular movement patterns that are inconsistent with regular economic practices and fishing activities. The movement patterns align with malign objectives, such as repeatedly being in the vicinity of or loitering near critical infrastructure and military sites. The movement patterns have been linked, including by Member States and the authorities of third states, to the Russian state-sponsored surveillance campaign that employs inter alia, civilian fishing trawlers, to conduct espionage missions directed against civilian and military infrastructure in the North and Baltic Sea. Those activities can facilitate future sabotage operations. Shipping vessels owned and operated by Norebo JSC have also been equipped with technology that may be used for espionage. A Norebo JSC vessel has been banned from entering Dutch port facilities due to espionage.
Norebo JSC has also received several loans from Sberbank, a Russian state-owned bank.
Moreover, in July 2022, Russia released its new “maritime doctrine”, which emphasises the strategic importance of civilian ships and their crews for maritime readiness, including by preparing them for wartime, and allowing them to be used by the armed forces in peace time.
Norebo JSC thus implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine or threaten the security in the Union, several of its Member States and third countries by engaging in and supporting actions aimed at interfering with critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure.
20.5.2025 7. Murman SeaFood
(Russian: Мурман СиФуд, Мурманские морепродукты)
Address: Ulitsa Karla Marksa, 28, Murmansk, Murmansk Oblast, Russian Federation, 183025
Type of entity: limited liability company
Place of registration: Murmansk
Murman SeaFood (MSF) is a Russian fishing company. Melkart-5 (Russian: Мелькарт-5), a vessel owned and operated by MSF, has repeatedly shown untypical behaviour inconsistent with its regular economic practices and fishing activities, including its presence in close vicinity to an ongoing NATO military exercise, and regular presence close to Norwegian critical infrastructure and military sites. In particular Melkart-5 showed highly unusual navigation practices in the immediate vicinity of a subsea cable in the Norwegian North Sea, crossing the cable multiple times, immediately before the cable was severely damaged. In addition, crew of Melkart-5 violated Norwegian on-shoring regulations while being caught setting off to investigate a Norwegian bridge critical for military logistic purposes in a clandestine manner.
Moreover, in July 2022, Russia released its new “maritime doctrine”, which emphasises the strategic importance of civilian ships and their crews for maritime readiness, including by preparing them for wartime, and allowing them to be used by the armed forces in peace time.
MSF thus implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the security in the Union, several of its Member States and third countries by engaging in and supporting actions aimed at interfering with critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure.
20.5.2025 8. Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Main Radio Frequency Centre”
General Radio Frequency Centre
GRFC
Федеральное Государственное Унитарное Предприятие “Главный Радиочастотный Центр”
ФГУП “ГРЧЦ”
Address: 7, Derbenevskaya nab. 7 p., Moscow 115114. 15
115114, город Москва, Дербеневская наб, д. 7 стр. 15
Type of entity: Federal agency
Place of registration: Moscow, Russian Federation
Date of registration: 30.3.2001
BIN: 1027739334479
INN: 7706228218
KPP: 772501001
Principal place of business: Russia
The General Radio Frequency Centre (GRFC) is responsible for ensuring the proper use of radio frequencies and devices for civil purposes, and monitors compliance with legislation. It is one of the main organisations which contribute to decisions about the use and supervision of the radio frequency sector.
Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC.
The electronic warfare centre in Kaliningrad has received new jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas.
Therefore, GRFC is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure and through supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.
20.5.2025 9. Stark Industries Solutions Ltd.
Date of registration: 10.2.2022
Address: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom
(maildrop address)
Registration number: 13906017
Website: https://stark-industries.solutions/
Website: https://pq.hosting/
Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is owned and operated by the Moldavian nationals Ivan Neculiti and Iurie Neculiti, through the web hosting service PQ Hosting. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world.
Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities, including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against the Union and third countries, by providing services intended to hide those activities from European law enforcement and security agencies.
Therefore, Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and a third country, by facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest.
Stark is associated with Ivan Neculiti and Iurie Neculiti.
20.5.2025’.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/963 of 20 May 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/963 20.5.2025
(1) On 8 October 2024, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643(1).
(2) In its conclusions of 19 December 2024, the European Council condemned Russia’s hybrid campaign, including sabotage, disruption of critical infrastructure, cyber-attacks, information manipulation and interference, and attempts to undermine democracy, including in the electoral process, against the European Union and its Member States. The Council declared that it would continue to strengthen their resilience and make full use of all means available to prevent, deter and respond to Russia’s hybrid activities.
(3) On 27 January 2025, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy noted that Russia’s hybrid actions are increasing in frequency and intensity.
(4) On 12 March 2025, the European Parliament, in its resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence, underlined that the protection of Union land, air and maritime borders contributes to the security of the entire Union, and called for immediate measures to enhance the security and defence of the Union’s north-eastern border with Russia and Belarus by establishing a comprehensive and resilient defence line across land, air and maritime domains to counter military and hybrid threats including energy weaponisation, infrastructure sabotage and the instrumentalisation of migration.
(5) It is therefore appropriate to introduce a prohibition on transactions related to tangible assets linked to Russia’s destabilising activities, including vessels, aircraft, real estate, and physical elements of digital and communication networks. Such tangible assets include both those of a movable nature, and those of an immovable nature. The tangible assets should be adequately identifiable, in order to support the effective implementation of the prohibition.
(6) It is also appropriate to introduce a prohibition on transactions of credit institutions, financial institutions and entities providing crypto-assets services that directly or indirectly facilitate activities by, or otherwise benefit, persons, entities or bodies engaged in Russia’s destabilising activities.
(7) Russia has engaged in a systematic, international campaign of media manipulation and distortion of facts in order to enhance its strategy of destabilising its neighbouring countries and the Union and its Member States. In particular, the propaganda and disinformation have repeatedly and consistently targeted European political parties, especially during election periods, as well as civil society, minority communities, refugees, and the functioning of democratic institutions in the Union and its Member States.
(8) The hybrid actions by Russia have been channelled through a number of media outlets under the permanent direct or indirect control of the Russian leadership. Such actions constitute a significant and direct threat to the Union’s public order and security. Those media outlets are essential and instrumental, inter alia, in pursuing information manipulation and interference by Russia against the Union, or its Member States, international organisations, or third countries.
(9) In view of the gravity of the situation, and in response to Russia’s destabilising actions, it is necessary to introduce restrictive measures to suspend the broadcasting licences in the Union of Russian media outlets under the permanent control of the Russian leadership, and to prohibit them from broadcasting their content in the Union, or directed at the Union. These measures should be maintained until Russia and those media outlets cease to conduct propaganda actions against the Union, one or more of its Member States, an international organisation or a third country.
(10) These measures are consistent with the fundamental rights and freedoms recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular with the right to freedom of expression and information, the freedom to conduct a business and the right to property as recognised in Articles 11, 16 and 17, respectively. The introduction of these restrictive measures does not prevent those media outlets or their staff from carrying out activities in the Union other than broadcasting, such as research and interviews. In particular, these restrictive measures do not modify the obligation to respect the rights, freedoms and principles referred to in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union, including those in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and in the constitutions of the Member States, within their respective fields of application.
(11) Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 should therefore be amended accordingly,
(1) in Article 1, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:‘1.   Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of natural persons, as listed in Annex I, who are:(a)responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process or public order and safety, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating acts of physical or non-physical violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation;(iv)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(v)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure;(vi)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359;(vii)exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation of, or trade in, natural resources and wildlife in a third country;(viii)instigating, supporting or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict in a third country;(b)associated with the natural persons listed under point (a);(c)supporting the natural persons engaged in activities referred to in point (a).’; (a) responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process or public order and safety, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating acts of physical or non-physical violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation;(iv)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(v)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure;(vi)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359;(vii)exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation of, or trade in, natural resources and wildlife in a third country;(viii)instigating, supporting or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict in a third country; (i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process or public order and safety, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order; (ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations; (iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating acts of physical or non-physical violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation; (iv) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference; (v) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure; (vi) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359; (vii) exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation of, or trade in, natural resources and wildlife in a third country; (viii) instigating, supporting or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict in a third country; (b) associated with the natural persons listed under point (a); (c) supporting the natural persons engaged in activities referred to in point (a).’
(a) responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process or public order and safety, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating acts of physical or non-physical violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation;(iv)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(v)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure;(vi)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359;(vii)exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation of, or trade in, natural resources and wildlife in a third country;(viii)instigating, supporting or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict in a third country; (i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process or public order and safety, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order; (ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations; (iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating acts of physical or non-physical violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation; (iv) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference; (v) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure; (vi) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359; (vii) exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation of, or trade in, natural resources and wildlife in a third country; (viii) instigating, supporting or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict in a third country;
(i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process or public order and safety, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order;
(ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations;
(iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating acts of physical or non-physical violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation;
(iv) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;
(v) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure;
(vi) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359;
(vii) exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation of, or trade in, natural resources and wildlife in a third country;
(viii) instigating, supporting or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict in a third country;
(b) associated with the natural persons listed under point (a);
(c) supporting the natural persons engaged in activities referred to in point (a).’
(a) responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process or public order and safety, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating acts of physical or non-physical violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation;(iv)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(v)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure;(vi)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359;(vii)exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation of, or trade in, natural resources and wildlife in a third country;(viii)instigating, supporting or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict in a third country; (i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process or public order and safety, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order; (ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations; (iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating acts of physical or non-physical violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation; (iv) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference; (v) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure; (vi) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359; (vii) exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation of, or trade in, natural resources and wildlife in a third country; (viii) instigating, supporting or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict in a third country;
(i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process or public order and safety, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order;
(ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations;
(iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating acts of physical or non-physical violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation;
(iv) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;
(v) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure;
(vi) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359;
(vii) exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation of, or trade in, natural resources and wildlife in a third country;
(viii) instigating, supporting or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict in a third country;
(i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process or public order and safety, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order;
(ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations;
(iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating acts of physical or non-physical violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation;
(iv) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;
(v) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure;
(vi) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359;
(vii) exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation of, or trade in, natural resources and wildlife in a third country;
(viii) instigating, supporting or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict in a third country;
(b) associated with the natural persons listed under point (a);
(c) supporting the natural persons engaged in activities referred to in point (a).’
(2) in Article 2, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:‘1.   All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by natural or legal persons, entities or bodies that are:(a)responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process or public order and safety, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating acts of physical or non-physical violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation;(iv)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(v)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure;(vi)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359;(vii)exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation of, or trade in, natural resources and wildlife in a third country;(viii)instigating, supporting or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict in a third country;(b)associated with the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed under point (a);(c)supporting the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in point (a), as listed in Annex I, shall be frozen.’; (a) responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process or public order and safety, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating acts of physical or non-physical violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation;(iv)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(v)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure;(vi)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359;(vii)exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation of, or trade in, natural resources and wildlife in a third country;(viii)instigating, supporting or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict in a third country; (i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process or public order and safety, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order; (ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations; (iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating acts of physical or non-physical violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation; (iv) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference; (v) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure; (vi) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359; (vii) exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation of, or trade in, natural resources and wildlife in a third country; (viii) instigating, supporting or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict in a third country; (b) associated with the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed under point (a); (c) supporting the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in point (a), as listed in Annex I, shall be frozen.’
(a) responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process or public order and safety, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating acts of physical or non-physical violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation;(iv)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(v)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure;(vi)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359;(vii)exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation of, or trade in, natural resources and wildlife in a third country;(viii)instigating, supporting or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict in a third country; (i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process or public order and safety, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order; (ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations; (iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating acts of physical or non-physical violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation; (iv) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference; (v) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure; (vi) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359; (vii) exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation of, or trade in, natural resources and wildlife in a third country; (viii) instigating, supporting or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict in a third country;
(i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process or public order and safety, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order;
(ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations;
(iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating acts of physical or non-physical violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation;
(iv) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;
(v) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure;
(vi) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359;
(vii) exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation of, or trade in, natural resources and wildlife in a third country;
(viii) instigating, supporting or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict in a third country;
(b) associated with the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed under point (a);
(c) supporting the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in point (a), as listed in Annex I, shall be frozen.’
(a) responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process or public order and safety, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating acts of physical or non-physical violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation;(iv)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(v)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure;(vi)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359;(vii)exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation of, or trade in, natural resources and wildlife in a third country;(viii)instigating, supporting or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict in a third country; (i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process or public order and safety, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order; (ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations; (iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating acts of physical or non-physical violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation; (iv) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference; (v) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure; (vi) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359; (vii) exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation of, or trade in, natural resources and wildlife in a third country; (viii) instigating, supporting or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict in a third country;
(i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process or public order and safety, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order;
(ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations;
(iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating acts of physical or non-physical violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation;
(iv) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;
(v) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure;
(vi) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359;
(vii) exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation of, or trade in, natural resources and wildlife in a third country;
(viii) instigating, supporting or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict in a third country;
(i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process or public order and safety, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order;
(ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations;
(iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating acts of physical or non-physical violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation;
(iv) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;
(v) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure;
(vi) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359;
(vii) exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation of, or trade in, natural resources and wildlife in a third country;
(viii) instigating, supporting or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict in a third country;
(b) associated with the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed under point (a);
(c) supporting the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in point (a), as listed in Annex I, shall be frozen.’
(3) the following articles are inserted:‘Article 2a1.   It shall be prohibited to engage, directly or indirectly, in any transaction relating to or involving any tangible asset, such as vessels, aircraft, real estate, ports, airports, and physical elements of digital and communication networks, as listed in Annex II.2.   The list in Annex II shall include tangible assets which are:(a)used in activities of a destabilising character that endanger or damage critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure, and that are attributable to or benefitting the Government of the Russian Federation;(b)used in the context of activities of a destabilising character that violate Union, national, or international air, marine or land traffic regulations, and that are attributable to or benefitting the Government of the Russian Federation;(c)used in activities of a destabilising character, including espionage and surveillance, the transport of weapons or military equipment and personnel, information manipulation and interference, and that are attributable to or benefitting the Government of the Russian Federation;(d)owned, chartered or operated by natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I, or is otherwise used in the name of, on behalf of, in relation with, or for the benefit of, such persons.3.   The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to transactions for reasons of maritime or aviation safety, or necessary for humanitarian purposes, or for the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or on the environment, or as a response to natural disasters.4.   The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to transactions resulting from the recognition or enforcement of a judgment or an arbitral award rendered in a Member State, or to transactions carried out for the purposes of an investigation into infringements of this Decision or of an investigation into other illicit activity.5.   By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities of a Member State may authorise transactions relating to or involving tangible assets listed in Annex II, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined, on a case by case basis, that the transaction is necessary for any purpose consistent with the objectives of this Decision.The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any such authorisation granted within two weeks thereof.Article 2b1.   It shall be prohibited to engage, directly or indirectly, in any transaction with:(a)a legal person, entity or body established outside the Union that is a credit or financial institution or an entity providing crypto assets services, involved in transactions that facilitate, directly or indirectly, activities referred to in Article 1(1) or Article 2(1) or otherwise supporting persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in Article 1(1) or Article 2(1); or;(b)a legal person, entity or body providing technical or operational assistance to natural or legal persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to Article 1(1) or Article 2(1), as listed in Annex III to this Decision.2.   The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to transactions that are:(a)necessary for the export, sale, supply, transfer or transport of pharmaceutical, medical, or agricultural and food products, including wheat and fertilisers;(b)strictly necessary to ensure access to judicial, administrative or arbitral proceedings in a Member State, as well as for the recognition or enforcement of a judgment or an arbitration award rendered in a Member State, provided that such transactions are consistent with the objectives of this Decision and those of Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2642(*1); or(c)necessary for humanitarian purposes, such as delivering, or facilitating the delivery of, assistance, including medical supplies, food, or the transfer of humanitarian workers and related assistance, or for evacuations.Article 2c1.   It shall be prohibited for operators to broadcast or to enable, facilitate or otherwise contribute to broadcasting, any content by the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex IV, including through transmission or distribution by any means, such as cable, satellite, IP-TV, internet service providers, internet video-sharing platforms or applications, whether new or pre-installed.2.   Any broadcasting licence or authorisation, transmission or distribution arrangement with the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex IV shall be suspended.3.   It shall be prohibited to advertise products or services in any content produced or broadcast by the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex IV, including through transmission or distribution by any of the means referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.(*1)Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 of 8 October 2024 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities (OJ L, 2024/2642, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2642/oj).’;" (a) used in activities of a destabilising character that endanger or damage critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure, and that are attributable to or benefitting the Government of the Russian Federation; (b) used in the context of activities of a destabilising character that violate Union, national, or international air, marine or land traffic regulations, and that are attributable to or benefitting the Government of the Russian Federation; (c) used in activities of a destabilising character, including espionage and surveillance, the transport of weapons or military equipment and personnel, information manipulation and interference, and that are attributable to or benefitting the Government of the Russian Federation; (d) owned, chartered or operated by natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I, or is otherwise used in the name of, on behalf of, in relation with, or for the benefit of, such persons. (a) a legal person, entity or body established outside the Union that is a credit or financial institution or an entity providing crypto assets services, involved in transactions that facilitate, directly or indirectly, activities referred to in Article 1(1) or Article 2(1) or otherwise supporting persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in Article 1(1) or Article 2(1); or; (b) a legal person, entity or body providing technical or operational assistance to natural or legal persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to Article 1(1) or Article 2(1), as listed in Annex III to this Decision. (a) necessary for the export, sale, supply, transfer or transport of pharmaceutical, medical, or agricultural and food products, including wheat and fertilisers; (b) strictly necessary to ensure access to judicial, administrative or arbitral proceedings in a Member State, as well as for the recognition or enforcement of a judgment or an arbitration award rendered in a Member State, provided that such transactions are consistent with the objectives of this Decision and those of Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2642(*1); or (c) necessary for humanitarian purposes, such as delivering, or facilitating the delivery of, assistance, including medical supplies, food, or the transfer of humanitarian workers and related assistance, or for evacuations.
(a) used in activities of a destabilising character that endanger or damage critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure, and that are attributable to or benefitting the Government of the Russian Federation;
(b) used in the context of activities of a destabilising character that violate Union, national, or international air, marine or land traffic regulations, and that are attributable to or benefitting the Government of the Russian Federation;
(c) used in activities of a destabilising character, including espionage and surveillance, the transport of weapons or military equipment and personnel, information manipulation and interference, and that are attributable to or benefitting the Government of the Russian Federation;
(d) owned, chartered or operated by natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I, or is otherwise used in the name of, on behalf of, in relation with, or for the benefit of, such persons.
(a) a legal person, entity or body established outside the Union that is a credit or financial institution or an entity providing crypto assets services, involved in transactions that facilitate, directly or indirectly, activities referred to in Article 1(1) or Article 2(1) or otherwise supporting persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in Article 1(1) or Article 2(1); or;
(b) a legal person, entity or body providing technical or operational assistance to natural or legal persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to Article 1(1) or Article 2(1), as listed in Annex III to this Decision.
(a) necessary for the export, sale, supply, transfer or transport of pharmaceutical, medical, or agricultural and food products, including wheat and fertilisers;
(b) strictly necessary to ensure access to judicial, administrative or arbitral proceedings in a Member State, as well as for the recognition or enforcement of a judgment or an arbitration award rendered in a Member State, provided that such transactions are consistent with the objectives of this Decision and those of Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2642(*1); or
(c) necessary for humanitarian purposes, such as delivering, or facilitating the delivery of, assistance, including medical supplies, food, or the transfer of humanitarian workers and related assistance, or for evacuations.
(a) used in activities of a destabilising character that endanger or damage critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure, and that are attributable to or benefitting the Government of the Russian Federation;
(b) used in the context of activities of a destabilising character that violate Union, national, or international air, marine or land traffic regulations, and that are attributable to or benefitting the Government of the Russian Federation;
(c) used in activities of a destabilising character, including espionage and surveillance, the transport of weapons or military equipment and personnel, information manipulation and interference, and that are attributable to or benefitting the Government of the Russian Federation;
(d) owned, chartered or operated by natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I, or is otherwise used in the name of, on behalf of, in relation with, or for the benefit of, such persons.
(a) a legal person, entity or body established outside the Union that is a credit or financial institution or an entity providing crypto assets services, involved in transactions that facilitate, directly or indirectly, activities referred to in Article 1(1) or Article 2(1) or otherwise supporting persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in Article 1(1) or Article 2(1); or;
(b) a legal person, entity or body providing technical or operational assistance to natural or legal persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to Article 1(1) or Article 2(1), as listed in Annex III to this Decision.
(a) necessary for the export, sale, supply, transfer or transport of pharmaceutical, medical, or agricultural and food products, including wheat and fertilisers;
(b) strictly necessary to ensure access to judicial, administrative or arbitral proceedings in a Member State, as well as for the recognition or enforcement of a judgment or an arbitration award rendered in a Member State, provided that such transactions are consistent with the objectives of this Decision and those of Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2642(*1); or
(c) necessary for humanitarian purposes, such as delivering, or facilitating the delivery of, assistance, including medical supplies, food, or the transfer of humanitarian workers and related assistance, or for evacuations.
(4) the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
(1) the Annex is renamed ‘Annex I’;
(2) the following Annexes are added:‘ANNEX IIList of tangible assets referred to in Article 2a[…]ANNEX IIIList of legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 2b[…]ANNEX IVList of legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 2c[…]’.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 8 October 2024, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 (1).
(2) In its conclusions of 19 December 2024, the European Council condemned Russia’s hybrid campaign, including sabotage, disruption of critical infrastructure, cyber-attacks, information manipulation and interference, and attempts to undermine democracy, including in the electoral process, against the European Union and its Member States. The Council declared that it would continue to strengthen their resilience and make full use of all means available to prevent, deter and respond to Russia’s hybrid activities.
(3) On 27 January 2025, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy noted that Russia’s hybrid actions are increasing in frequency and intensity.
(4) On 12 March 2025, the European Parliament, in its resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence, underlined that the protection of Union land, air and maritime borders contributes to the security of the entire Union, and called for immediate measures to enhance the security and defence of the Union’s north-eastern border with Russia and Belarus by establishing a comprehensive and resilient defence line across land, air and maritime domains to counter military and hybrid threats including energy weaponisation, infrastructure sabotage and the instrumentalisation of migration.
(5) It is therefore appropriate to introduce a prohibition on transactions related to tangible assets linked to Russia’s destabilising activities, including vessels, aircraft, real estate, and physical elements of digital and communication networks. Such tangible assets include both those of a movable nature, and those of an immovable nature. The tangible assets should be adequately identifiable, in order to support the effective implementation of the prohibition.
(6) It is also appropriate to introduce a prohibition on transactions of credit institutions, financial institutions and entities providing crypto-assets services that directly or indirectly facilitate activities by, or otherwise benefit, persons, entities or bodies engaged in Russia’s destabilising activities.
(7) Russia has engaged in a systematic, international campaign of media manipulation and distortion of facts in order to enhance its strategy of destabilising its neighbouring countries and the Union and its Member States. In particular, the propaganda and disinformation have repeatedly and consistently targeted European political parties, especially during election periods, as well as civil society, minority communities, refugees, and the functioning of democratic institutions in the Union and its Member States.
(8) The hybrid actions by Russia have been channelled through a number of media outlets under the permanent direct or indirect control of the Russian leadership. Such actions constitute a significant and direct threat to the Union’s public order and security. Those media outlets are essential and instrumental, inter alia, in pursuing information manipulation and interference by Russia against the Union, or its Member States, international organisations, or third countries.
(9) In view of the gravity of the situation, and in response to Russia’s destabilising actions, it is necessary to introduce restrictive measures to suspend the broadcasting licences in the Union of Russian media outlets under the permanent control of the Russian leadership, and to prohibit them from broadcasting their content in the Union, or directed at the Union. These measures should be maintained until Russia and those media outlets cease to conduct propaganda actions against the Union, one or more of its Member States, an international organisation or a third country.
(10) These measures are consistent with the fundamental rights and freedoms recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular with the right to freedom of expression and information, the freedom to conduct a business and the right to property as recognised in Articles 11, 16 and 17, respectively. The introduction of these restrictive measures does not prevent those media outlets or their staff from carrying out activities in the Union other than broadcasting, such as research and interviews. In particular, these restrictive measures do not modify the obligation to respect the rights, freedoms and principles referred to in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union, including those in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and in the constitutions of the Member States, within their respective fields of application.
(11) Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 should therefore be amended accordingly,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 is amended as follows:

(1) in Article 1, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:
‘1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of natural persons, as listed in Annex I, who are:
(a) responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:
(i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process or public order and safety, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order;
(ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations;
(iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating acts of physical or non-physical violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation;
(iv) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;
(v) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure;
(vi) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359;
(vii) exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation of, or trade in, natural resources and wildlife in a third country;
(viii) instigating, supporting or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict in a third country;
(b) associated with the natural persons listed under point (a);
(c) supporting the natural persons engaged in activities referred to in point (a).’
;
(2) in Article 2, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:
‘1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by natural or legal persons, entities or bodies that are:
(a) responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:
(i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process or public order and safety, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order;
(ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating violent demonstrations;
(iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating acts of physical or non-physical violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation;
(iv) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;
(v) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure;
(vi) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the instrumentalisation of migrants as referred to in Article 1(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359;
(vii) exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation of, or trade in, natural resources and wildlife in a third country;
(viii) instigating, supporting or otherwise facilitating a violent conflict in a third country;
(b) associated with the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed under point (a);
(c) supporting the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in point (a), as listed in Annex I, shall be frozen.’
;
(3) the following articles are inserted:
‘Article 2a 1. It shall be prohibited to engage, directly or indirectly, in any transaction relating to or involving any tangible asset, such as vessels, aircraft, real estate, ports, airports, and physical elements of digital and communication networks, as listed in Annex II. 2. The list in Annex II shall include tangible assets which are:
(a) used in activities of a destabilising character that endanger or damage critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure, and that are attributable to or benefitting the Government of the Russian Federation;
(b) used in the context of activities of a destabilising character that violate Union, national, or international air, marine or land traffic regulations, and that are attributable to or benefitting the Government of the Russian Federation;
(c) used in activities of a destabilising character, including espionage and surveillance, the transport of weapons or military equipment and personnel, information manipulation and interference, and that are attributable to or benefitting the Government of the Russian Federation;
(d) owned, chartered or operated by natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I, or is otherwise used in the name of, on behalf of, in relation with, or for the benefit of, such persons. 3. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to transactions for reasons of maritime or aviation safety, or necessary for humanitarian purposes, or for the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or on the environment, or as a response to natural disasters. 4. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to transactions resulting from the recognition or enforcement of a judgment or an arbitral award rendered in a Member State, or to transactions carried out for the purposes of an investigation into infringements of this Decision or of an investigation into other illicit activity. 5. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities of a Member State may authorise transactions relating to or involving tangible assets listed in Annex II, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined, on a case by case basis, that the transaction is necessary for any purpose consistent with the objectives of this Decision.
The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any such authorisation granted within two weeks thereof.
Article 2b 1. It shall be prohibited to engage, directly or indirectly, in any transaction with:
(a) a legal person, entity or body established outside the Union that is a credit or financial institution or an entity providing crypto assets services, involved in transactions that facilitate, directly or indirectly, activities referred to in Article 1(1) or Article 2(1) or otherwise supporting persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in Article 1(1) or Article 2(1); or;
(b) a legal person, entity or body providing technical or operational assistance to natural or legal persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to Article 1(1) or Article 2(1), as listed in Annex III to this Decision. 2. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to transactions that are:
(a) necessary for the export, sale, supply, transfer or transport of pharmaceutical, medical, or agricultural and food products, including wheat and fertilisers;
(b) strictly necessary to ensure access to judicial, administrative or arbitral proceedings in a Member State, as well as for the recognition or enforcement of a judgment or an arbitration award rendered in a Member State, provided that such transactions are consistent with the objectives of this Decision and those of Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 (*1); or
(c) necessary for humanitarian purposes, such as delivering, or facilitating the delivery of, assistance, including medical supplies, food, or the transfer of humanitarian workers and related assistance, or for evacuations.
Article 2c 1. It shall be prohibited for operators to broadcast or to enable, facilitate or otherwise contribute to broadcasting, any content by the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex IV, including through transmission or distribution by any means, such as cable, satellite, IP-TV, internet service providers, internet video-sharing platforms or applications, whether new or pre-installed. 2. Any broadcasting licence or authorisation, transmission or distribution arrangement with the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex IV shall be suspended. 3. It shall be prohibited to advertise products or services in any content produced or broadcast by the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex IV, including through transmission or distribution by any of the means referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.
(*1) Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 of 8 October 2024 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities (OJ L, 2024/2642, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2642/oj).’;”

(4) the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.

This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

The Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 is amended as follows:

(1) the Annex is renamed ‘Annex I’;

(2) the following Annexes are added:
‘ANNEX II
List of tangible assets referred to in Article 2a
[…]
ANNEX III
List of legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 2b
[…]
ANNEX IV
List of legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 2c
[…]’.