Commission Decision (EU) 2025/1053 of 19 May 2025 on the consistency of the performance targets included in the draft performance plan submitted by the Czech Republic pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council with the Union-wide performance targets for the fourth reference period of the Single European Sky performance and charging scheme (notified under document C(2025) 2924)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1053 28.5.2025
(1) Pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 549/2004, Member States are to draw up plans, either at national level or at the level of functional airspace blocks (‘FABs’), including performance targets, for each reference period of the performance and charging scheme for air navigation services and network functions. Those plans are to include local performance targets which are consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for the reference period concerned.
(2) The Union-wide performance targets for the fourth reference period (‘RP4’, 2025-2029) were set out in Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688(4).
(3) All Member States have drawn up and adopted draft performance plans for RP4, which were submitted to the Commission for assessment by 1 October 2024. Following the verification of completeness of those draft performance plans, the Commission requested Member States to submit updated draft performance plans by 15 November 2024.
(4) The Commission’s assessment presented in this Decision is based on the updated draft performance plan for RP4 submitted by the Czech Republic (‘the draft performance plan’).
(5) The Performance Review Body (‘PRB’), assisting the Commission in the implementation of the performance scheme, has submitted to the Commission a report containing its advice on the assessment of the draft performance plans.
(6) In accordance with Article 14(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has assessed the consistency of the local performance targets included in the draft performance plan on the basis of the criteria laid down in point 1 of Annex IV to that Implementing Regulation, and taking account of local circumstances where relevant.
(7) The Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan with a review of the elements set out in point 2 of Annex IV to that Implementing Regulation. In respect of point 2.1(d)(vii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that it has not conducted, as part of that review, a detailed analysis of the methodology used by the Czech Republic for the allocation of costs betweenen routeand terminal services in RP4. Therefore, the Commission has not drawn any conclusions, at this stage, in respect of the compliance of that cost allocation methodology with points (e) and (f) of Article 15(2) Regulation (EC) No 550/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5)and Article 22(5) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(8) As regards the key performance area of safety, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan has been assessed in accordance with point 1.1 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(9) The performance targets in the key performance area of safety proposed by the Czech Republic in respect of the effectiveness of safety management, broken down per safety management objective and expressed as a level of implementation, are as follows:The Czech RepublicTargets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from EASA level A to DAir navigation service providerSafety management objective20252026202720282029ANS CRSafety policy and objectivesCCCCCSafety risk managementCCCCDSafety assuranceBCCCCSafety promotionCCCCCSafety cultureCCCCC The Czech Republic Targets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from EASA level A to D Air navigation service provider Safety management objective 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 ANS CR Safety policy and objectives C C C C C Safety risk management C C C C D Safety assurance B C C C C Safety promotion C C C C C Safety culture C C C C C
The Czech Republic Targets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from EASA level A to D
Air navigation service provider Safety management objective 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
ANS CR Safety policy and objectives C C C C C
Safety risk management C C C C D
Safety assurance B C C C C
Safety promotion C C C C C
Safety culture C C C C C
The Czech Republic Targets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from EASA level A to D
Air navigation service provider Safety management objective 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
ANS CR Safety policy and objectives C C C C C
Safety risk management C C C C D
Safety assurance B C C C C
Safety promotion C C C C C
Safety culture C C C C C
(10) The Commission has found that the safety performance targets proposed by the Czech Republic for the air navigation service provider ‘ANS CR’ are equal to the Union wide targets for each calendar year of RP4 for three of the ‘safety management objectives’, whilst the ‘safety assurance’ objective is planned to be achieved from 2026, and the ‘safety risk management’ objective is planned to be achieved in 2029.
(11) The Commission notes that the draft performance plan sets out measures for ANS CR for the achievement of the local safety targets, such as the implementation of redesigned emergency response processes, enhanced safety monitoring and training, and updated exercises within safety assurance.
(12) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (9), (10) and (11) and considering that the Union-wide safety performance targets set in Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688 must be achieved by the final year of RP4, that is, 2029, the local safety performance targets included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets.
(13) As regards the key performance area of environment, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan regarding the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory has been assessed based on the criterion laid down in point 1.2 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the proposed environment targets of the Czech Republic have been compared to the relevanten routehorizontal flight efficiency reference values set out in the European Route Network Improvement Plan (‘ERNIP’), drawn up in accordance with Annex I to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/123(6)and available at the time of adopting the Union-wide performance targets for RP4, that is on 2 July 2024.
(14) The environment performance targets proposed by the Czech Republic for RP4 and the corresponding national reference values from the ERNIP, expressed as the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory, are as follows:The Czech Republic20252026202720282029Targets in the key performance area of environment, expressed as the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory2,54  %2,52  %2,49  %2,45  %2,43  %Reference values2,54  %2,52  %2,49  %2,45  %2,43  % The Czech Republic 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Targets in the key performance area of environment, expressed as the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory 2,54  % 2,52  % 2,49  % 2,45  % 2,43  % Reference values 2,54  % 2,52  % 2,49  % 2,45  % 2,43  %
The Czech Republic 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of environment, expressed as the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory 2,54  % 2,52  % 2,49  % 2,45  % 2,43  %
Reference values 2,54  % 2,52  % 2,49  % 2,45  % 2,43  %
The Czech Republic 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of environment, expressed as the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory 2,54  % 2,52  % 2,49  % 2,45  % 2,43  %
Reference values 2,54  % 2,52  % 2,49  % 2,45  % 2,43  %
(15) The Commission observes that the environment targets proposed by the Czech Republic are equal to the corresponding national reference values for each calendar year of RP4.
(16) The Commission notes that the Czech Republic has presented in the draft performance plan measures for the achievement of the local environment targets which include the further expansion of cross-border operations and the implementation of an improved airspace sectorisation.
(17) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (14), (15) and (16), the targets in the key performance area of environment included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(18) Concerning the key performance area of capacity, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan regarding the averageen routeair traffic flow management (‘ATFM’) delay per flight has been assessed based on the criterion laid down in point 1.3 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the proposeden routecapacity targets of the Czech Republic have been compared to the relevant reference values set out in the Network Operations Plan drawn up in accordance with Article 9 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/123 and available at the time of adopting the Union-wide performance targets for RP4, that is on 2 July 2024.
(19) Theen routecapacity targets proposed by the Czech Republic for RP4, expressed in minutes of ATFM delay per flight, and the corresponding reference values from the Network Operations Plan, are as follows:The Czech Republic20252026202720282029Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes ofen routeATFM delay per flight0,190,140,110,100,10Reference values0,190,140,110,100,10 The Czech Republic 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes ofen routeATFM delay per flight 0,19 0,14 0,11 0,10 0,10 Reference values 0,19 0,14 0,11 0,10 0,10
The Czech Republic 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes ofen routeATFM delay per flight 0,19 0,14 0,11 0,10 0,10
Reference values 0,19 0,14 0,11 0,10 0,10
The Czech Republic 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes ofen routeATFM delay per flight 0,19 0,14 0,11 0,10 0,10
Reference values 0,19 0,14 0,11 0,10 0,10
(20) The Commission observes that theen routecapacity targets proposed by the Czech Republic are equal to the corresponding national reference values for each calendar year of RP4.
(21) The Commission notes that the Czech Republic has presented, in the draft performance plan, measures for the achievement of itsen routecapacity targets. Those measures include the recruitment and training of air traffic controllers, the optimisation of sector opening times, the implementation of an improved airspace sectorisation and the further development of the air traffic management system.
(22) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (19), (20) and (21), the targets in the key performance area of capacity included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(23) In accordance with point 2.1(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan by reviewing the capacity performance targets for terminal air navigation services set in respect of the airports referred to in Articles 1(3) and (4) of that Implementing Regulation. It was found that those targets give rise to concerns.
(24) The Commission notes that the proposed terminal capacity targets for RP4 lead to a significant deterioration of the average arrival ATFM delay per year compared to the third reference period (‘RP3’). Indeed, the proposed RP4 targets are set at 0,40 minute per flight, whereas the actual performance recorded during RP3 ranged from 0,01 to 0,15 minute per flight.
(25) Therefore, the Commission considers that, in connection with the adoption of its final performance plan in accordance with Article 16, point (a) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Czech Republic should further justify the terminal capacity targets for RP4 in light of the observations set out in recital (24) or should revise downwards those targets.
(26) As regards the key performance area of cost-efficiency, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan regarding the determined unit cost (‘DUC’) foren routeair navigation services has been assessed based on the criteria laid down in points 1.4(a), (b) and (c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Those criteria consist of the DUC trend over RP4, the long-term DUC trend over RP3 and RP4 (2020-2029), and the baseline value for the DUC at charging zone level compared with the average value of the charging zones where air navigation service providers have a similar operational and economic environment.
(27) Theen routecost-efficiency targets proposed by the Czech Republic for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:En routecharging zone of the Czech Republic2019 baseline value2024 baseline value20252026202720282029Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)CZK 1 315,2CZK 1 425,1CZK 1 426,6CZK 1 425,3CZK 1 393,9CZK 1 383,9CZK 1 336,2EUR 53,62EUR 58,10EUR 58,16EUR 58,11EUR 56,82EUR 56,42EUR 54,47 En routecharging zone of the Czech Republic 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) CZK 1 315,2 CZK 1 425,1 CZK 1 426,6 CZK 1 425,3 CZK 1 393,9 CZK 1 383,9 CZK 1 336,2 EUR 53,62 EUR 58,10 EUR 58,16 EUR 58,11 EUR 56,82 EUR 56,42 EUR 54,47
En routecharging zone of the Czech Republic 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) CZK 1 315,2 CZK 1 425,1 CZK 1 426,6 CZK 1 425,3 CZK 1 393,9 CZK 1 383,9 CZK 1 336,2
EUR 53,62 EUR 58,10 EUR 58,16 EUR 58,11 EUR 56,82 EUR 56,42 EUR 54,47
En routecharging zone of the Czech Republic 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) CZK 1 315,2 CZK 1 425,1 CZK 1 426,6 CZK 1 425,3 CZK 1 393,9 CZK 1 383,9 CZK 1 336,2
EUR 53,62 EUR 58,10 EUR 58,16 EUR 58,11 EUR 56,82 EUR 56,42 EUR 54,47
(28) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the Czech Republic’s DUC trend at charging zone level of -1,3 % over RP4 outperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(29) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the Czech Republic’s long-term DUC trend at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of +0,2 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(30) The Commission notes, however, that the Czech Republic has lost, as a consequence of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, a significant share of the overflights which it historically used to serve. That traffic reduction continues over RP4 to considerably impact the cost-efficiency performance of the air navigation service provider and has, in particular, a negative effect on the long-term DUC trend of the Czech Republic.
(31) It is therefore necessary and appropriate to examine, for the purpose of the assessment criterion referred to in recital (29), whether the Czech Republic would meet the Union-wide long-term DUC trend in the absence of the circumstances referred to in recital (30).
(32) To this end, the Commission has recalculated the long-term DUC trend in light of the estimated structural loss of traffic for the Czech Republic as a consequence of the war in Ukraine, measured inen routeservice units. That recalculation results in an adjusted long-term DUC trend for the Czech Republic of -2,3 %, which outperforms the long-term Union-wide DUC trend of -1,0 %. Therefore, it is concluded that the Czech Republic fulfils the assessment criterion referred to in recital (29) after taking into account the effect of the significant traffic reduction resulting from the war in Ukraine.
(33) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the Czech Republic’s baseline value for the DUC of EUR 58,10 in real terms at 2022 prices (‘EUR2022’) is 13,6 % higher than the average baseline value of EUR 51,14 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7 Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(34) When excluding the negative impact of the traffic changes resulting from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, it is clear that the Czech Republic meets both the Union-wide DUC trend and the Union-wide long-term DUC trend. Therefore, the Commission considers that the deviation from the average DUC baseline for 2024 referred to in recital (33) does not preclude the Czech Republic’s cost-efficiency performance targets from being consistent with the Union-wide cost-efficiency performance targets.
(35) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (27) to (34), the targets in the key performance area of cost-efficiency included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(36) In accordance with point 2.1(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan by reviewing the cost-efficiency performance targets for terminal air navigation services set in respect of the airports referred to in Articles 1(3) and (4) of that Implementing Regulation. It was found that those targets do not give rise to concerns.
(37) In accordance with point 2.1(f) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan by reviewing the incentive schemes supporting the achievement of capacity targets (‘capacity incentive schemes’) referred to in Article 11 of that Implementing Regulation. It was found that the capacity incentive schemes for RP4 established by the Czech Republic foren routeand terminal services in RP4 give rise to concerns.
(38) The Commission notes that both theen routecapacity incentive scheme and the terminal capacity incentive scheme included in the draft performance plan comprise a maximum financial disadvantage amounting to merely 0,75 % of the determined costs. Having regard to the expert advice provided by the PRB, the Commission considers that that the maximum financial disadvantages for the capacity incentive schemes set out by the Czech Republic do not comply with Article 11(3), point (a), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, which requires such incentive schemes to have ‘a material impact on the revenue at risk’.
(39) Therefore, the Czech Republic should revise, in connection with the adoption of its final performance plan pursuant to Article 16, point (a), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, its capacity incentive schemes in order for the maximum financial disadvantage stemming from those incentive schemes to be set at a level having a material impact on the revenue at risk, as required in Article 11(3), point (a) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. In the Commission’s view, that revision should lead to a maximum financial disadvantage equal to or higher than 1 % of the annual determined costs.
(40) In the light of the foregoing, the performance targets included in the draft performance plan of the Czech Republic should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4,
Czech Republic Targets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from European Aviation Safety Agency (‘EASA’) level A to D
Air navigation service provider Safety management objective 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
ANS CR Safety policy and objectives C C C C C
Safety risk management C C C C D
Safety assurance B C C C C
Safety promotion C C C C C
Safety culture C C C C C
Czech Republic 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of environment,expressed as the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory 2,54 % 2,52 % 2,49 % 2,45 % 2,43 %
Czech Republic 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes ofen routeATFM delay per flight 0,19 0,14 0,11 0,10 0,10
En routecharging zone of Czech Republic 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) CZK 1 315,2 CZK 1 425,1 CZK 1 426,6 CZK 1 425,3 CZK 1 393,9 CZK 1 383,9 CZK 1 336,2
EUR 53,62 EUR 58,10 EUR 58,16 EUR 58,11 EUR 56,82 EUR 56,42 EUR 54,47
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 laying down the framework for the creation of the single European sky (the framework Regulation) (1), and in particular Article 11(3) point (c) thereof,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/2803 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on the implementation of the Single European Sky (2), and in particular Article 58(3) thereof,
Having regard to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 of 11 February 2019 laying down a performance and charging scheme in the single European sky and repealing Implementing Regulations (EU) No 390/2013 and (EU) No 391/2013 (3), and in particular Article 14(2) thereof,
Whereas:
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
(1) Pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 549/2004, Member States are to draw up plans, either at national level or at the level of functional airspace blocks (‘FABs’), including performance targets, for each reference period of the performance and charging scheme for air navigation services and network functions. Those plans are to include local performance targets which are consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for the reference period concerned.
(2) The Union-wide performance targets for the fourth reference period (‘RP4’, 2025-2029) were set out in Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688 (4).
(3) All Member States have drawn up and adopted draft performance plans for RP4, which were submitted to the Commission for assessment by 1 October 2024. Following the verification of completeness of those draft performance plans, the Commission requested Member States to submit updated draft performance plans by 15 November 2024.
(4) The Commission’s assessment presented in this Decision is based on the updated draft performance plan for RP4 submitted by the Czech Republic (‘the draft performance plan’).
(5) The Performance Review Body (‘PRB’), assisting the Commission in the implementation of the performance scheme, has submitted to the Commission a report containing its advice on the assessment of the draft performance plans.
(6) In accordance with Article 14(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has assessed the consistency of the local performance targets included in the draft performance plan on the basis of the criteria laid down in point 1 of Annex IV to that Implementing Regulation, and taking account of local circumstances where relevant.
(7) The Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan with a review of the elements set out in point 2 of Annex IV to that Implementing Regulation. In respect of point 2.1(d)(vii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that it has not conducted, as part of that review, a detailed analysis of the methodology used by the Czech Republic for the allocation of costs between en route and terminal services in RP4. Therefore, the Commission has not drawn any conclusions, at this stage, in respect of the compliance of that cost allocation methodology with points (e) and (f) of Article 15(2) Regulation (EC) No 550/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5) and Article 22(5) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
COMMISSION ASSESSMENT
Assessment of the safety targets
(8) As regards the key performance area of safety, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan has been assessed in accordance with point 1.1 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(9) The performance targets in the key performance area of safety proposed by the Czech Republic in respect of the effectiveness of safety management, broken down per safety management objective and expressed as a level of implementation, are as follows:
The Czech Republic
Targets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from EASA level A to D
Air navigation service provider
Safety management objective
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
ANS CR
Safety policy and objectives
C
C
C
C
C
Safety risk management
C
C
C
C
D
Safety assurance
B
C
C
C
C
Safety promotion
C
C
C
C
C
Safety culture
C
C
C
C
C
(10) The Commission has found that the safety performance targets proposed by the Czech Republic for the air navigation service provider ‘ANS CR’ are equal to the Union wide targets for each calendar year of RP4 for three of the ‘safety management objectives’, whilst the ‘safety assurance’ objective is planned to be achieved from 2026, and the ‘safety risk management’ objective is planned to be achieved in 2029.
(11) The Commission notes that the draft performance plan sets out measures for ANS CR for the achievement of the local safety targets, such as the implementation of redesigned emergency response processes, enhanced safety monitoring and training, and updated exercises within safety assurance.
(12) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (9), (10) and (11) and considering that the Union-wide safety performance targets set in Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688 must be achieved by the final year of RP4, that is, 2029, the local safety performance targets included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets.
Assessment of the environment targets
(13) As regards the key performance area of environment, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan regarding the average horizontal en route flight efficiency of the actual trajectory has been assessed based on the criterion laid down in point 1.2 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the proposed environment targets of the Czech Republic have been compared to the relevant en route horizontal flight efficiency reference values set out in the European Route Network Improvement Plan (‘ERNIP’), drawn up in accordance with Annex I to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/123 (6) and available at the time of adopting the Union-wide performance targets for RP4, that is on 2 July 2024.
(14) The environment performance targets proposed by the Czech Republic for RP4 and the corresponding national reference values from the ERNIP, expressed as the average horizontal en route flight efficiency of the actual trajectory, are as follows:
The Czech Republic
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets in the key performance area of environment, expressed as the average horizontal en route flight efficiency of the actual trajectory
2,54 %
2,52 %
2,49 %
2,45 %
2,43 %
Reference values
2,54 %
2,52 %
2,49 %
2,45 %
2,43 %
(15) The Commission observes that the environment targets proposed by the Czech Republic are equal to the corresponding national reference values for each calendar year of RP4.
(16) The Commission notes that the Czech Republic has presented in the draft performance plan measures for the achievement of the local environment targets which include the further expansion of cross-border operations and the implementation of an improved airspace sectorisation.
(17) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (14), (15) and (16), the targets in the key performance area of environment included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
Assessment of the capacity targets
(18) Concerning the key performance area of capacity, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan regarding the average en route air traffic flow management (‘ATFM’) delay per flight has been assessed based on the criterion laid down in point 1.3 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the proposed en route capacity targets of the Czech Republic have been compared to the relevant reference values set out in the Network Operations Plan drawn up in accordance with Article 9 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/123 and available at the time of adopting the Union-wide performance targets for RP4, that is on 2 July 2024.
(19) The en route capacity targets proposed by the Czech Republic for RP4, expressed in minutes of ATFM delay per flight, and the corresponding reference values from the Network Operations Plan, are as follows:
The Czech Republic
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes of en route ATFM delay per flight
0,19
0,14
0,11
0,10
0,10
Reference values
0,19
0,14
0,11
0,10
0,10
(20) The Commission observes that the en route capacity targets proposed by the Czech Republic are equal to the corresponding national reference values for each calendar year of RP4.
(21) The Commission notes that the Czech Republic has presented, in the draft performance plan, measures for the achievement of its en route capacity targets. Those measures include the recruitment and training of air traffic controllers, the optimisation of sector opening times, the implementation of an improved airspace sectorisation and the further development of the air traffic management system.
(22) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (19), (20) and (21), the targets in the key performance area of capacity included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
Review of the capacity targets for terminal air navigation services
(23) In accordance with point 2.1(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan by reviewing the capacity performance targets for terminal air navigation services set in respect of the airports referred to in Articles 1(3) and (4) of that Implementing Regulation. It was found that those targets give rise to concerns.
(24) The Commission notes that the proposed terminal capacity targets for RP4 lead to a significant deterioration of the average arrival ATFM delay per year compared to the third reference period (‘RP3’). Indeed, the proposed RP4 targets are set at 0,40 minute per flight, whereas the actual performance recorded during RP3 ranged from 0,01 to 0,15 minute per flight.
(25) Therefore, the Commission considers that, in connection with the adoption of its final performance plan in accordance with Article 16, point (a) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Czech Republic should further justify the terminal capacity targets for RP4 in light of the observations set out in recital (24) or should revise downwards those targets.
Assessment of the cost-efficiency targets
(26) As regards the key performance area of cost-efficiency, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan regarding the determined unit cost (‘DUC’) for en route air navigation services has been assessed based on the criteria laid down in points 1.4(a), (b) and (c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Those criteria consist of the DUC trend over RP4, the long-term DUC trend over RP3 and RP4 (2020-2029), and the baseline value for the DUC at charging zone level compared with the average value of the charging zones where air navigation service providers have a similar operational and economic environment.
(27) The en route cost-efficiency targets proposed by the Czech Republic for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:
En route charging zone of the Czech Republic
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
CZK 1 315,2
CZK 1 425,1
CZK 1 426,6
CZK 1 425,3
CZK 1 393,9
CZK 1 383,9
CZK 1 336,2
EUR 53,62
EUR 58,10
EUR 58,16
EUR 58,11
EUR 56,82
EUR 56,42
EUR 54,47
(28) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the Czech Republic’s DUC trend at charging zone level of -1,3 % over RP4 outperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(29) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the Czech Republic’s long-term DUC trend at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of +0,2 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(30) The Commission notes, however, that the Czech Republic has lost, as a consequence of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, a significant share of the overflights which it historically used to serve. That traffic reduction continues over RP4 to considerably impact the cost-efficiency performance of the air navigation service provider and has, in particular, a negative effect on the long-term DUC trend of the Czech Republic.
(31) It is therefore necessary and appropriate to examine, for the purpose of the assessment criterion referred to in recital (29), whether the Czech Republic would meet the Union-wide long-term DUC trend in the absence of the circumstances referred to in recital (30).
(32) To this end, the Commission has recalculated the long-term DUC trend in light of the estimated structural loss of traffic for the Czech Republic as a consequence of the war in Ukraine, measured in en route service units. That recalculation results in an adjusted long-term DUC trend for the Czech Republic of -2,3 %, which outperforms the long-term Union-wide DUC trend of -1,0 %. Therefore, it is concluded that the Czech Republic fulfils the assessment criterion referred to in recital (29) after taking into account the effect of the significant traffic reduction resulting from the war in Ukraine.
(33) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the Czech Republic’s baseline value for the DUC of EUR 58,10 in real terms at 2022 prices (‘EUR2022’) is 13,6 % higher than the average baseline value of EUR 51,14 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7 Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(34) When excluding the negative impact of the traffic changes resulting from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, it is clear that the Czech Republic meets both the Union-wide DUC trend and the Union-wide long-term DUC trend. Therefore, the Commission considers that the deviation from the average DUC baseline for 2024 referred to in recital (33) does not preclude the Czech Republic’s cost-efficiency performance targets from being consistent with the Union-wide cost-efficiency performance targets.
(35) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (27) to (34), the targets in the key performance area of cost-efficiency included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
Review of the cost-efficiency targets for terminal air navigation services
(36) In accordance with point 2.1(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan by reviewing the cost-efficiency performance targets for terminal air navigation services set in respect of the airports referred to in Articles 1(3) and (4) of that Implementing Regulation. It was found that those targets do not give rise to concerns.
Review of the en route and terminal incentive schemes
(37) In accordance with point 2.1(f) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan by reviewing the incentive schemes supporting the achievement of capacity targets (‘capacity incentive schemes’) referred to in Article 11 of that Implementing Regulation. It was found that the capacity incentive schemes for RP4 established by the Czech Republic for en route and terminal services in RP4 give rise to concerns.
(38) The Commission notes that both the en route capacity incentive scheme and the terminal capacity incentive scheme included in the draft performance plan comprise a maximum financial disadvantage amounting to merely 0,75 % of the determined costs. Having regard to the expert advice provided by the PRB, the Commission considers that that the maximum financial disadvantages for the capacity incentive schemes set out by the Czech Republic do not comply with Article 11(3), point (a), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, which requires such incentive schemes to have ‘a material impact on the revenue at risk’.
(39) Therefore, the Czech Republic should revise, in connection with the adoption of its final performance plan pursuant to Article 16, point (a), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, its capacity incentive schemes in order for the maximum financial disadvantage stemming from those incentive schemes to be set at a level having a material impact on the revenue at risk, as required in Article 11(3), point (a) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. In the Commission’s view, that revision should lead to a maximum financial disadvantage equal to or higher than 1 % of the annual determined costs.
CONCLUSIONS
(40) In the light of the foregoing, the performance targets included in the draft performance plan of the Czech Republic should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The performance targets included in the draft performance plan submitted by the Czech Republic for the fourth reference period (‘RP4’), listed in the Annex to this Decision, are consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4 set out in Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
This Decision is addressed to the Czech Republic.

KEY PERFORMANCE AREA OF SAFETY

Czech Republic
Targets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from European Aviation Safety Agency (‘EASA’) level A to D
Air navigation service provider
Safety management objective
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
ANS CR
Safety policy and objectives
C
C
C
C
C
Safety risk management
C
C
C
C
D
Safety assurance
B
C
C
C
C
Safety promotion
C
C
C
C
C
Safety culture
C
C
C
C
C

KEY PERFORMANCE AREA OF ENVIRONMENT

Czech Republic
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets in the key performance area of environment, expressed as the average horizontal en route flight efficiency of the actual trajectory
2,54 %
2,52 %
2,49 %
2,45 %
2,43 %

KEY PERFORMANCE AREA OF CAPACITY

Czech Republic
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes of en route ATFM delay per flight
0,19
0,14
0,11
0,10
0,10

KEY PERFORMANCE AREA OF COST-EFFICIENCY

En route charging zone of Czech Republic
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
CZK 1 315,2
CZK 1 425,1
CZK 1 426,6
CZK 1 425,3
CZK 1 393,9
CZK 1 383,9
CZK 1 336,2
EUR 53,62
EUR 58,10
EUR 58,16
EUR 58,11
EUR 56,82
EUR 56,42
EUR 54,47

Commission Decision (EU) 2025/1051 of 19 May 2025 on the consistency of the performance targets included in the draft performance plan submitted by Poland pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council with the Union-wide performance targets for the fourth reference period of the Single European Sky performance and charging scheme (notified under document C(2025) 2921)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1051 28.5.2025
(1) Pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 549/2004, Member States are to draw up plans, either at national level or at the level of functional airspace blocks (‘FABs’), including performance targets, for each reference period of the performance and charging scheme for air navigation services and network functions. Those plans are to include local performance targets which are consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for the reference period concerned.
(2) The Union-wide performance targets for the fourth reference period (‘RP4’, 2025-2029) were set out in Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688(4).
(3) All Member States have drawn up and adopted draft performance plans for RP4, which were submitted to the Commission for assessment by 1 October 2024. Following the verification of completeness of those draft performance plans, the Commission requested Member States to submit updated draft performance plans by 15 November 2024.
(4) The Commission’s assessment presented in this Decision is based on the updated draft performance plan for RP4 submitted by Poland (‘the draft performance plan’).
(5) The Performance Review Body (‘PRB’), assisting the Commission in the implementation of the performance scheme, has submitted to the Commission a report containing its advice on the assessment of the draft performance plans.
(6) In accordance with Article 14(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has assessed the consistency of the local performance targets included in the draft performance plan on the basis of the criteria laid down in point 1 of Annex IV to that Implementing Regulation, and taking account of local circumstances where relevant.
(7) The Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan with a review of the elements set out in point 2 of Annex IV to that Implementing Regulation. In respect of point 2.1(d)(vii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that it has not conducted, as part of that review, a detailed analysis of the methodology used by Poland for the allocation of costs betweenen routeand terminal services in RP4. Therefore, the Commission has not drawn any conclusions, at this stage, in respect of the compliance of that cost allocation methodology with points (e) and (f) of Article 15(2) Regulation (EC) No 550/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5)and Article 22(5) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(8) As regards the key performance area of safety, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan has been assessed in accordance with point 1.1 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(9) The performance targets in the key performance area of safety proposed by Poland in respect of the effectiveness of safety management, broken down per safety management objective and expressed as a level of implementation, are as follows:PolandTargets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from EASA level A to DAir navigation service providerSafety management objective20252026202720282029PANSASafety policy and objectivesBCCCCSafety risk managementCCCCDSafety assuranceBCCCCSafety promotionCCCCCSafety cultureBBCCC Poland Targets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from EASA level A to D Air navigation service provider Safety management objective 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 PANSA Safety policy and objectives B C C C C Safety risk management C C C C D Safety assurance B C C C C Safety promotion C C C C C Safety culture B B C C C
Poland Targets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from EASA level A to D
Air navigation service provider Safety management objective 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
PANSA Safety policy and objectives B C C C C
Safety risk management C C C C D
Safety assurance B C C C C
Safety promotion C C C C C
Safety culture B B C C C
Poland Targets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from EASA level A to D
Air navigation service provider Safety management objective 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
PANSA Safety policy and objectives B C C C C
Safety risk management C C C C D
Safety assurance B C C C C
Safety promotion C C C C C
Safety culture B B C C C
(10) The Commission has found that the safety performance targets proposed by Poland for the air navigation service provider ‘PANSA’ are equal to the Union-wide safety targets for each calendar year from 2026 onwards in the areas of ‘safety policy and objectives’, ‘safety assurance’ and ‘safety promotion’. Furthermore, the Union-wide target level is planned to be reached from 2027 onwards for ‘safety culture’ and from 2029 for ‘safety risk management’.
(11) The Commission notes that the draft performance plan sets out measures for PANSA for the achievement of the local safety targets, such as a strengthened identification of safety hazards, enhanced risk management, training activities, and the implementation of improved safety performance indicators and tools.
(12) The safety targets proposed by Poland for the providers of terminal air navigation services in the scope of the draft performance plan, namely ‘Port Lotniczy Bydgoszcz S.A.’ and ‘Warmia i Mazury sp. z o.o.’, are also in line with the Union-wide performance targets. The Commission further notes that Poland has set out measures for the achievement of their safety performance targets.
(13) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (9) to (12) and considering that the Union-wide safety performance targets set in Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688 are to be achieved by the final year of RP4, that is, 2029, the local safety performance targets included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets.
(14) As regards the key performance area of environment, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan regarding the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory has been assessed based on the criterion laid down in point 1.2 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the proposed environment targets of Poland have been compared to the relevanten routehorizontal flight efficiency reference values set out in the European Route Network Improvement Plan (‘ERNIP’), drawn up in accordance with Annex I to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/123(6)and available at the time of adopting the Union-wide performance targets for RP4, that is on 2 July 2024.
(15) The environment performance targets proposed by Poland for RP4 and the corresponding national reference values from the ERNIP, expressed as the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory, are as follows:Poland20252026202720282029Targets in the key performance area of environment, expressed as the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory4,51 %4,49 %4,47 %4,45 %4,43 %Reference values4,51 %4,49 %4,47 %4,45 %4,43 % Poland 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Targets in the key performance area of environment, expressed as the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory 4,51 % 4,49 % 4,47 % 4,45 % 4,43 % Reference values 4,51 % 4,49 % 4,47 % 4,45 % 4,43 %
Poland 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of environment, expressed as the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory 4,51 % 4,49 % 4,47 % 4,45 % 4,43 %
Reference values 4,51 % 4,49 % 4,47 % 4,45 % 4,43 %
Poland 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of environment, expressed as the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory 4,51 % 4,49 % 4,47 % 4,45 % 4,43 %
Reference values 4,51 % 4,49 % 4,47 % 4,45 % 4,43 %
(16) The Commission observes that the environment targets proposed by Poland are equal to the corresponding national reference values for each calendar year of RP4.
(17) The Commission notes that Poland has presented, in the draft performance plan, measures for the achievement of the local environment targets, which include the expansion of cross-border free route airspace, the extension of free route airspace to terminal manoeuvring areas, and other operational measures to optimise airspace efficiency.
(18) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (15), (16) and (17), the targets in the key performance area of environment included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(19) As regards the key performance area of capacity, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan regarding the averageen routeair traffic flow management (‘ATFM’) delay per flight has been assessed based on the criterion laid down in point 1.3 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the proposeden routecapacity targets of Poland have been compared to the relevant reference values set out in the Network Operations Plan drawn up in accordance with Article 9 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/123 and available at the time of adopting the Union-wide performance targets for RP4, that is on 2 July 2024.
(20) Theen routecapacity targets proposed by Poland for RP4, expressed in minutes of ATFM delay per flight, and the corresponding reference values from the Network Operations Plan, are as follows:Poland20252026202720282029Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes ofen routeATFM delay per flight0,240,180,150,130,13Reference values0,240,180,150,130,13 Poland 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes ofen routeATFM delay per flight 0,24 0,18 0,15 0,13 0,13 Reference values 0,24 0,18 0,15 0,13 0,13
Poland 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes ofen routeATFM delay per flight 0,24 0,18 0,15 0,13 0,13
Reference values 0,24 0,18 0,15 0,13 0,13
Poland 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes ofen routeATFM delay per flight 0,24 0,18 0,15 0,13 0,13
Reference values 0,24 0,18 0,15 0,13 0,13
(21) The Commission observes that theen routecapacity targets proposed by Poland are equal to the corresponding national reference values for each calendar year of RP4.
(22) The Commission notes that Poland has presented, in the draft performance plan, measures for the achievement of the localen routecapacity targets, which include the expansion of cross-border free route airspace, and other operational measures to mitigate capacity constraints.
(23) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (20), (21) and (22), the targets in the key performance area of capacity included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(24) In accordance with point 2.1(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan by reviewing the capacity performance targets for terminal air navigation services set in respect of the airports referred to in Articles 1(3) and (4) of that Implementing Regulation. It was found that those targets do not give rise to concerns.
(25) As regards the key performance area of cost-efficiency, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan regarding the determined unit cost (‘DUC’) foren routeair navigation services has been assessed based on the criteria laid down in points 1.4(a), (b) and (c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Those criteria consist of the DUC trend over RP4, the long-term DUC trend over the third reference period (‘RP3’) and RP4 (2020-2029), and the baseline value for the DUC at charging zone level compared with the average value of the charging zones where air navigation service providers have a similar operational and economic environment.
(26) Theen routecost-efficiency targets proposed by Poland for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:En routecharging zone of Poland2019 baseline value2024 baseline value20252026202720282029Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)PLN211,01PLN 266,47PLN 255,95PLN 251,96PLN 247,50PLN 244,80PLN 239,46EUR 45,09EUR 56,94EUR 54,69EUR 53,84EUR 52,89EUR 52,31EUR 51,17 En routecharging zone of Poland 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) PLN211,01 PLN 266,47 PLN 255,95 PLN 251,96 PLN 247,50 PLN 244,80 PLN 239,46 EUR 45,09 EUR 56,94 EUR 54,69 EUR 53,84 EUR 52,89 EUR 52,31 EUR 51,17
En routecharging zone of Poland 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) PLN211,01 PLN 266,47 PLN 255,95 PLN 251,96 PLN 247,50 PLN 244,80 PLN 239,46
EUR 45,09 EUR 56,94 EUR 54,69 EUR 53,84 EUR 52,89 EUR 52,31 EUR 51,17
En routecharging zone of Poland 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) PLN211,01 PLN 266,47 PLN 255,95 PLN 251,96 PLN 247,50 PLN 244,80 PLN 239,46
EUR 45,09 EUR 56,94 EUR 54,69 EUR 53,84 EUR 52,89 EUR 52,31 EUR 51,17
(27) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that Poland’s DUC trend at charging zone level of -2,1 % over RP4 outperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(28) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that Poland’s long-term DUC trend over RP3 and RP4 at charging zone level of +1,4 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(29) The Commission notes, however, that Poland has lost, as a consequence of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, a significant share of the overflights which it historically used to serve. That traffic reduction continues over RP4 to considerably impact the cost-efficiency performance of the air navigation service provider and has, in particular, a negative effect on the long-term DUC trend of Poland.
(30) It is therefore necessary and appropriate to examine, for the purpose of the assessment criterion referred to in recital (28), whether Poland would meet the Union-wide long-term DUC trend in absence of the circumstances referred to in recital (29).
(31) To this end, the Commission has recalculated the long-term DUC trend in light of the estimated structural loss of traffic for Poland as a consequence of the war in Ukraine, measured inen routeservice units. That recalculation results in an adjusted long-term DUC trend for Poland of -1,6 %, which outperforms the long-term Union-wide DUC trend of -1,0 %. Therefore, it is concluded that Poland fulfils the assessment criterion referred to in recital (28) after taking into account the effect of the significant traffic reduction resulting from the war in Ukraine.
(32) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that Poland’s baseline value for the DUC of EUR 56,94 in real terms at 2022 prices (‘EUR2022’) is 10,7 % higher than the average baseline value of EUR 51,43 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7 Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(33) It is clear that Poland outperforms the RP4 Union-wide DUC trend and shows a steady reduction of the DUC over RP4. Furthermore, when excluding the negative impact of the traffic changes resulting from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Poland also meets the Union-wide long-term DUC trend. Therefore, the Commission considers that the deviation from the average 2024 baseline DUC of its comparator group referred to in recital (32) does not preclude Poland’s cost-efficiency performance targets from being consistent with the Union-wide cost-efficiency performance targets.
(34) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (26) to (33), the targets in the key performance area of cost-efficiency included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(35) In accordance with point 2.1(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan by reviewing the cost-efficiency performance targets for terminal air navigation services set in respect of the airports referred to in Articles 1(3) and (4) of that Implementing Regulation. It was found that those targets do not give rise to concerns.
(36) In the light of the foregoing, the performance targets included in the draft performance plan of Poland should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4,
Poland Targets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from European Aviation Safety Agency (‘EASA’) level A to D
Air navigation service providers Safety management objective 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
PANSA Safety policy and objectives B C C C C
Safety risk management C C C C D
Safety assurance B C C C C
Safety promotion C C C C C
Safety culture B B C C C
Port Lotniczy Bydgoszcz S.A.Warmia i Mazury Sp. z o.o. Safety policy and objectives B B B C C
Safety risk management C C C C D
Safety assurance B B B C C
Safety promotion B B B C C
Safety culture B B B C C
Poland 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of environment,expressed as the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory 4,51 % 4,49 % 4,47 % 4,45 % 4,43 %
Poland 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes ofen routeATFM delay per flight 0,24 0,18 0,15 0,13 0,13
En routecharging zone of Poland 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) PLN 211,01 PLN 266,47 PLN 255,95 PLN 251,96 PLN 247,50 PLN 244,80 PLN 239,46
EUR 45,09 EUR 56,94 EUR 54,69 EUR 53,84 EUR 52,89 EUR 52,31 EUR 51,17
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 laying down the framework for the creation of the single European sky (the framework Regulation) (1), and in particular Article 11(3) point (c) thereof,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/2803 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on the implementation of the Single European Sky (2), and in particular Article 58(3) thereof,
Having regard to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 of 11 February 2019 laying down a performance and charging scheme in the single European sky and repealing Implementing Regulations (EU) No 390/2013 and (EU) No 391/2013 (3), and in particular Article 14(2) thereof,
Whereas:
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
(1) Pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 549/2004, Member States are to draw up plans, either at national level or at the level of functional airspace blocks (‘FABs’), including performance targets, for each reference period of the performance and charging scheme for air navigation services and network functions. Those plans are to include local performance targets which are consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for the reference period concerned.
(2) The Union-wide performance targets for the fourth reference period (‘RP4’, 2025-2029) were set out in Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688 (4).
(3) All Member States have drawn up and adopted draft performance plans for RP4, which were submitted to the Commission for assessment by 1 October 2024. Following the verification of completeness of those draft performance plans, the Commission requested Member States to submit updated draft performance plans by 15 November 2024.
(4) The Commission’s assessment presented in this Decision is based on the updated draft performance plan for RP4 submitted by Poland (‘the draft performance plan’).
(5) The Performance Review Body (‘PRB’), assisting the Commission in the implementation of the performance scheme, has submitted to the Commission a report containing its advice on the assessment of the draft performance plans.
(6) In accordance with Article 14(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has assessed the consistency of the local performance targets included in the draft performance plan on the basis of the criteria laid down in point 1 of Annex IV to that Implementing Regulation, and taking account of local circumstances where relevant.
(7) The Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan with a review of the elements set out in point 2 of Annex IV to that Implementing Regulation. In respect of point 2.1(d)(vii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that it has not conducted, as part of that review, a detailed analysis of the methodology used by Poland for the allocation of costs between en route and terminal services in RP4. Therefore, the Commission has not drawn any conclusions, at this stage, in respect of the compliance of that cost allocation methodology with points (e) and (f) of Article 15(2) Regulation (EC) No 550/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5) and Article 22(5) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
COMMISSION ASSESSMENT
Assessment of the safety targets
(8) As regards the key performance area of safety, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan has been assessed in accordance with point 1.1 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(9) The performance targets in the key performance area of safety proposed by Poland in respect of the effectiveness of safety management, broken down per safety management objective and expressed as a level of implementation, are as follows:
Poland
Targets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from EASA level A to D
Air navigation service provider
Safety management objective
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
PANSA
Safety policy and objectives
B
C
C
C
C
Safety risk management
C
C
C
C
D
Safety assurance
B
C
C
C
C
Safety promotion
C
C
C
C
C
Safety culture
B
B
C
C
C
(10) The Commission has found that the safety performance targets proposed by Poland for the air navigation service provider ‘PANSA’ are equal to the Union-wide safety targets for each calendar year from 2026 onwards in the areas of ‘safety policy and objectives’, ‘safety assurance’ and ‘safety promotion’. Furthermore, the Union-wide target level is planned to be reached from 2027 onwards for ‘safety culture’ and from 2029 for ‘safety risk management’.
(11) The Commission notes that the draft performance plan sets out measures for PANSA for the achievement of the local safety targets, such as a strengthened identification of safety hazards, enhanced risk management, training activities, and the implementation of improved safety performance indicators and tools.
(12) The safety targets proposed by Poland for the providers of terminal air navigation services in the scope of the draft performance plan, namely ‘Port Lotniczy Bydgoszcz S.A.’ and ‘Warmia i Mazury sp. z o.o.’, are also in line with the Union-wide performance targets. The Commission further notes that Poland has set out measures for the achievement of their safety performance targets.
(13) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (9) to (12) and considering that the Union-wide safety performance targets set in Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688 are to be achieved by the final year of RP4, that is, 2029, the local safety performance targets included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets.
Assessment of the environment targets
(14) As regards the key performance area of environment, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan regarding the average horizontal en route flight efficiency of the actual trajectory has been assessed based on the criterion laid down in point 1.2 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the proposed environment targets of Poland have been compared to the relevant en route horizontal flight efficiency reference values set out in the European Route Network Improvement Plan (‘ERNIP’), drawn up in accordance with Annex I to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/123 (6) and available at the time of adopting the Union-wide performance targets for RP4, that is on 2 July 2024.
(15) The environment performance targets proposed by Poland for RP4 and the corresponding national reference values from the ERNIP, expressed as the average horizontal en route flight efficiency of the actual trajectory, are as follows:
Poland
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets in the key performance area of environment, expressed as the average horizontal en route flight efficiency of the actual trajectory
4,51 %
4,49 %
4,47 %
4,45 %
4,43 %
Reference values
4,51 %
4,49 %
4,47 %
4,45 %
4,43 %
(16) The Commission observes that the environment targets proposed by Poland are equal to the corresponding national reference values for each calendar year of RP4.
(17) The Commission notes that Poland has presented, in the draft performance plan, measures for the achievement of the local environment targets, which include the expansion of cross-border free route airspace, the extension of free route airspace to terminal manoeuvring areas, and other operational measures to optimise airspace efficiency.
(18) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (15), (16) and (17), the targets in the key performance area of environment included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
Assessment of the capacity targets
(19) As regards the key performance area of capacity, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan regarding the average en route air traffic flow management (‘ATFM’) delay per flight has been assessed based on the criterion laid down in point 1.3 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the proposed en route capacity targets of Poland have been compared to the relevant reference values set out in the Network Operations Plan drawn up in accordance with Article 9 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/123 and available at the time of adopting the Union-wide performance targets for RP4, that is on 2 July 2024.
(20) The en route capacity targets proposed by Poland for RP4, expressed in minutes of ATFM delay per flight, and the corresponding reference values from the Network Operations Plan, are as follows:
Poland
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes of en route ATFM delay per flight
0,24
0,18
0,15
0,13
0,13
Reference values
0,24
0,18
0,15
0,13
0,13
(21) The Commission observes that the en route capacity targets proposed by Poland are equal to the corresponding national reference values for each calendar year of RP4.
(22) The Commission notes that Poland has presented, in the draft performance plan, measures for the achievement of the local en route capacity targets, which include the expansion of cross-border free route airspace, and other operational measures to mitigate capacity constraints.
(23) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (20), (21) and (22), the targets in the key performance area of capacity included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
Review of the capacity targets for terminal air navigation services
(24) In accordance with point 2.1(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan by reviewing the capacity performance targets for terminal air navigation services set in respect of the airports referred to in Articles 1(3) and (4) of that Implementing Regulation. It was found that those targets do not give rise to concerns.
Assessment of the cost-efficiency targets
(25) As regards the key performance area of cost-efficiency, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan regarding the determined unit cost (‘DUC’) for en route air navigation services has been assessed based on the criteria laid down in points 1.4(a), (b) and (c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Those criteria consist of the DUC trend over RP4, the long-term DUC trend over the third reference period (‘RP3’) and RP4 (2020-2029), and the baseline value for the DUC at charging zone level compared with the average value of the charging zones where air navigation service providers have a similar operational and economic environment.
(26) The en route cost-efficiency targets proposed by Poland for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:
En route charging zone of Poland
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
PLN
211,01
PLN 266,47
PLN 255,95
PLN 251,96
PLN 247,50
PLN 244,80
PLN 239,46
EUR 45,09
EUR 56,94
EUR 54,69
EUR 53,84
EUR 52,89
EUR 52,31
EUR 51,17
(27) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that Poland’s DUC trend at charging zone level of -2,1 % over RP4 outperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(28) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that Poland’s long-term DUC trend over RP3 and RP4 at charging zone level of +1,4 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(29) The Commission notes, however, that Poland has lost, as a consequence of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, a significant share of the overflights which it historically used to serve. That traffic reduction continues over RP4 to considerably impact the cost-efficiency performance of the air navigation service provider and has, in particular, a negative effect on the long-term DUC trend of Poland.
(30) It is therefore necessary and appropriate to examine, for the purpose of the assessment criterion referred to in recital (28), whether Poland would meet the Union-wide long-term DUC trend in absence of the circumstances referred to in recital (29).
(31) To this end, the Commission has recalculated the long-term DUC trend in light of the estimated structural loss of traffic for Poland as a consequence of the war in Ukraine, measured in en route service units. That recalculation results in an adjusted long-term DUC trend for Poland of -1,6 %, which outperforms the long-term Union-wide DUC trend of -1,0 %. Therefore, it is concluded that Poland fulfils the assessment criterion referred to in recital (28) after taking into account the effect of the significant traffic reduction resulting from the war in Ukraine.
(32) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that Poland’s baseline value for the DUC of EUR 56,94 in real terms at 2022 prices (‘EUR2022’) is 10,7 % higher than the average baseline value of EUR 51,43 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7 Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(33) It is clear that Poland outperforms the RP4 Union-wide DUC trend and shows a steady reduction of the DUC over RP4. Furthermore, when excluding the negative impact of the traffic changes resulting from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Poland also meets the Union-wide long-term DUC trend. Therefore, the Commission considers that the deviation from the average 2024 baseline DUC of its comparator group referred to in recital (32) does not preclude Poland’s cost-efficiency performance targets from being consistent with the Union-wide cost-efficiency performance targets.
(34) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (26) to (33), the targets in the key performance area of cost-efficiency included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
Review of the cost-efficiency targets for terminal air navigation services
(35) In accordance with point 2.1(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan by reviewing the cost-efficiency performance targets for terminal air navigation services set in respect of the airports referred to in Articles 1(3) and (4) of that Implementing Regulation. It was found that those targets do not give rise to concerns.
CONCLUSIONS
(36) In the light of the foregoing, the performance targets included in the draft performance plan of Poland should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The performance targets included in the draft performance plan submitted by Poland for the fourth reference period (‘RP4’), listed in the Annex to this Decision, are consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4 set out in Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
This Decision is addressed to the Republic of Poland.

KEY PERFORMANCE AREA OF SAFETY

Poland
Targets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from European Aviation Safety Agency (‘EASA’) level A to D
Air navigation service providers
Safety management objective
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
PANSA
Safety policy and objectives
B
C
C
C
C
Safety risk management
C
C
C
C
D
Safety assurance
B
C
C
C
C
Safety promotion
C
C
C
C
C
Safety culture
B
B
C
C
C
Port Lotniczy Bydgoszcz S.A.
Warmia i Mazury Sp. z o.o.
Safety policy and objectives
B
B
B
C
C
Safety risk management
C
C
C
C
D
Safety assurance
B
B
B
C
C
Safety promotion
B
B
B
C
C
Safety culture
B
B
B
C
C

KEY PERFORMANCE AREA OF ENVIRONMENT

Poland
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets in the key performance area of environment, expressed as the average horizontal en route flight efficiency of the actual trajectory
4,51 %
4,49 %
4,47 %
4,45 %
4,43 %

KEY PERFORMANCE AREA OF CAPACITY

Poland
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes of en route ATFM delay per flight
0,24
0,18
0,15
0,13
0,13

KEY PERFORMANCE AREA OF COST-EFFICIENCY

En route charging zone of Poland
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
PLN 211,01
PLN 266,47
PLN 255,95
PLN 251,96
PLN 247,50
PLN 244,80
PLN 239,46
EUR 45,09
EUR 56,94
EUR 54,69
EUR 53,84
EUR 52,89
EUR 52,31
EUR 51,17

Commission Decision (EU) 2025/1050 of 19 May 2025 on the consistency of the performance targets included in the draft performance plan submitted by Hungary pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council with the Union-wide performance targets for the fourth reference period of the Single European Sky performance and charging scheme (notified under document C(2025) 2919)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1050 28.5.2025
(1) Pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 549/2004, Member States are to draw up plans, either at national level or at the level of functional airspace blocks (‘FABs’), including performance targets, for each reference period of the performance and charging scheme for air navigation services and network functions. Those plans are to include local performance targets which are consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for the reference period concerned.
(2) The Union-wide performance targets for the fourth reference period (‘RP4’, 2025-2029) were set out in Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688(4).
(3) All Member States have drawn up and adopted draft performance plans for RP4, which were submitted to the Commission for assessment by 1 October 2024. Following the verification of completeness of those draft performance plans, the Commission requested Member States to submit updated draft performance plans by 15 November 2024.
(4) The Commission’s assessment presented in this Decision is based on the updated draft performance plan for RP4 submitted by Hungary (‘the draft performance plan’).
(5) The Performance Review Body (‘PRB’), assisting the Commission in the implementation of the performance scheme, has submitted to the Commission a report containing its advice on the assessment of the draft performance plans.
(6) In accordance with Article 14(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has assessed the consistency of the local performance targets included in the draft performance plan on the basis of the criteria laid down in point 1 of Annex IV to that Implementing Regulation, and taking account of local circumstances where relevant.
(7) The Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan with a review of the elements set out in point 2 of Annex IV to that Implementing Regulation. In respect of point 2.1(d)(vii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that it has not conducted, as part of that review, a detailed analysis of the methodology used by Hungary for the allocation of costs betweenen routeand terminal services in RP4. Therefore, the Commission has not drawn any conclusions, at this stage, in respect of the compliance of that cost allocation methodology with points (e) and (f) of Article 15(2) Regulation (EC) No 550/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5)and Article 22(5) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(8) As regards the key performance area of safety, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan has been assessed in accordance with point 1.1 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(9) The performance targets in the key performance area of safety proposed by Hungary in respect of the effectiveness of safety management, broken down per safety management objective and expressed as a level of implementation, are as follows:HungaryTargets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from EASA level A to DAir navigation service providerSafety management objective20252026202720282029HungaroControlSafety policy and objectivesCCCCCSafety risk managementCCCDDSafety assuranceCCCCCSafety promotionCCCCCSafety cultureCCCCC Hungary Targets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from EASA level A to D Air navigation service provider Safety management objective 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 HungaroControl Safety policy and objectives C C C C C Safety risk management C C C D D Safety assurance C C C C C Safety promotion C C C C C Safety culture C C C C C
Hungary Targets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from EASA level A to D
Air navigation service provider Safety management objective 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
HungaroControl Safety policy and objectives C C C C C
Safety risk management C C C D D
Safety assurance C C C C C
Safety promotion C C C C C
Safety culture C C C C C
Hungary Targets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from EASA level A to D
Air navigation service provider Safety management objective 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
HungaroControl Safety policy and objectives C C C C C
Safety risk management C C C D D
Safety assurance C C C C C
Safety promotion C C C C C
Safety culture C C C C C
(10) The Commission has found that the safety performance targets proposed by Hungary for the air navigation service provider ‘HungaroControl’ are equal to the Union-wide safety targets from 2028 for the ‘safety risk management’ objective, while for the remaining four ‘safety management objectives’ the performance targets are equal to the Union-wide safety targets in respect of calendar years 2025 to 2029.
(11) The Commission notes that the draft performance plan sets out measures for HungaroControl for the achievement of the local safety targets, which relate to the implementation of its safety management system and to cybersecurity.
(12) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (9), (10) and (11), and considering that the Union-wide safety performance targets set in Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688 are to be achieved by the final year of RP4, that is, 2029, the local safety performance targets included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets.
(13) As regards the key performance area of environment, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan regarding the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory has been assessed based on the criterion laid down in point 1.2 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the environment targets of Hungary have been compared to the relevanten routehorizontal flight efficiency reference values set out in the European Route Network Improvement Plan (‘ERNIP’), drawn up in accordance with Annex I to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/123(6)and available at the time of adopting the Union-wide performance targets for RP4, that is on 2 July 2024.
(14) The environment performance targets proposed by Hungary for RP4 and the corresponding national reference values from the ERNIP, expressed as the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory, are as follows:Hungary20252026202720282029Targets in the key performance area of environment, expressed as the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory2,10  %2,09  %2,08  %2,07  %2,06  %Reference values2,10  %2,09  %2,08  %2,07  %2,06  % Hungary 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Targets in the key performance area of environment, expressed as the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory 2,10  % 2,09  % 2,08  % 2,07  % 2,06  % Reference values 2,10  % 2,09  % 2,08  % 2,07  % 2,06  %
Hungary 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of environment, expressed as the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory 2,10  % 2,09  % 2,08  % 2,07  % 2,06  %
Reference values 2,10  % 2,09  % 2,08  % 2,07  % 2,06  %
Hungary 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of environment, expressed as the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory 2,10  % 2,09  % 2,08  % 2,07  % 2,06  %
Reference values 2,10  % 2,09  % 2,08  % 2,07  % 2,06  %
(15) The Commission observes that the environment targets proposed by Hungary are equal to the corresponding national reference values for each calendar year of RP4.
(16) The Commission notes that Hungary has presented in the draft performance plan measures for the achievement of the local environment targets, which include the implementation and further expansion of cross-border free route airspace by the end of RP4. Having regard to the findings of the PRB, the Commission considers that Hungary should commit to the implementation of all the operational measures set out in the ERNIP of 2 July 2024 in order to support the achievement of its environment performance targets for RP4.
(17) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (14), (15) and (16), the targets in the key performance area of environment included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(18) As regards the key performance area of capacity, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan regarding the averageen routeair traffic flow management (‘ATFM’) delay per flight has been assessed based on the criterion laid down in point 1.3 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the proposeden routecapacity targets of Hungary have been compared to the relevant reference values set out in the Network Operations Plan drawn up in accordance with Article 9 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/123 and available at the time of adopting the Union-wide performance targets for RP4, that is on 2 July 2024.
(19) Theen routecapacity targets proposed by Hungary for RP4, expressed in minutes of ATFM delay per flight, and the corresponding reference values from the Network Operations Plan, are as follows:Hungary20252026202720282029Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes ofen routeATFM delay per flight0,850,550,200,200,14Reference values0,290,210,180,140,14 Hungary 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes ofen routeATFM delay per flight 0,85 0,55 0,20 0,20 0,14 Reference values 0,29 0,21 0,18 0,14 0,14
Hungary 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes ofen routeATFM delay per flight 0,85 0,55 0,20 0,20 0,14
Reference values 0,29 0,21 0,18 0,14 0,14
Hungary 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes ofen routeATFM delay per flight 0,85 0,55 0,20 0,20 0,14
Reference values 0,29 0,21 0,18 0,14 0,14
(20) The Commission observes that theen routecapacity targets proposed by Hungary are significantly higher than the corresponding national reference values for each year of RP4, except in 2029, where they are equal.
(21) Hungary justifies the observed difference of its capacity targets with the reference values referred to in recital (20) by invoking the significant increase in overflight traffic recorded as a consequence of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Hungary has provided detailed information, in its draft performance plan, demonstrating the resulting changes in air traffic volumes, density, and complexity. It is therefore necessary to take those circumstances into account when assessing the proposed capacity performance targets of Hungary for RP4 in respect of their consistency with the Union-wide capacity performance targets.
(22) Having regard to the detailed analysis made by the PRB, the Commission concludes that the gap between the national targets and the reference values is duly justified by the exceptional circumstances resulting from the war in Ukraine and referred to in recital (21). The Commission further notes that Hungary has put in place a range of measures for the achievements of its capacity targets, including a significant increase of the number of air traffic controllers (‘ATCOs’) in operations at the area control centre, improvements of the air traffic management system, and extended sector opening hours.
(23) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (19) to (22), the targets in the key performance area of capacity included in the draft performance plan of Hungary should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(24) In accordance with point 2.1(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan by reviewing the capacity performance targets for the terminal air navigation services set in respect of the airports referred to in Articles 1(3) and (4) of that Implementing Regulation. It was found that those targets give rise to concerns.
(25) The Commission notes that the proposed terminal capacity targets for RP4 lead to a significant deterioration of the average arrival ATFM delay per year compared to the third reference period (‘RP3’). Indeed, the proposed RP4 targets are set at 0,10 minute per flight, whereas the actual performance recorded in 2024 was 0,00 minute per flight.
(26) Therefore, the Commission considers that, in connection with the adoption of its final performance plan in accordance with Article 16, point (a) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, Hungary should further justify the terminal capacity targets for RP4 in light of the observations set out in recital (25), or should revise downwards those targets.
(27) As regards the key performance area of cost-efficiency, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan regarding the determined unit cost (‘DUC’) foren routeair navigation services has been assessed based on the criteria laid down in points 1.4(a), (b) and (c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Those criteria consist of the DUC trend over RP4, the long-term DUC trend over RP3 and RP4 (2020-2029), and the baseline value for the DUC at charging zone level compared with the average value of the charging zones where air navigation service providers have a similar operational and economic environment.
(28) Theen routecost-efficiency targets proposed by Hungary for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:En routecharging zone of the Hungary2019 baseline value2024 baseline value20252026202720282029Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)HUF 12 585HUF 11 373HUF 12 029HUF 11 984HUF 12 078HUF 12 002HUF 12 651EUR 32,24EUR 29,13EUR 30,81EUR 30,70EUR 30,94EUR 30,74EUR 32,41 En routecharging zone of the Hungary 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) HUF 12 585 HUF 11 373 HUF 12 029 HUF 11 984 HUF 12 078 HUF 12 002 HUF 12 651 EUR 32,24 EUR 29,13 EUR 30,81 EUR 30,70 EUR 30,94 EUR 30,74 EUR 32,41
En routecharging zone of the Hungary 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) HUF 12 585 HUF 11 373 HUF 12 029 HUF 11 984 HUF 12 078 HUF 12 002 HUF 12 651
EUR 32,24 EUR 29,13 EUR 30,81 EUR 30,70 EUR 30,94 EUR 30,74 EUR 32,41
En routecharging zone of the Hungary 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) HUF 12 585 HUF 11 373 HUF 12 029 HUF 11 984 HUF 12 078 HUF 12 002 HUF 12 651
EUR 32,24 EUR 29,13 EUR 30,81 EUR 30,70 EUR 30,94 EUR 30,74 EUR 32,41
(29) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that Hungary’s DUC trend at charging zone level of +2,2 % over RP4 underperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(30) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that Hungary’s long-term DUC trend at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of +0,1 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(31) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that Hungary’s baseline value for the DUC of EUR 29,13 in real terms at 2022 prices (‘EUR2022’) is 28,1 % lower than the average baseline value of EUR 40,51 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7 Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(32) The Commission has further examined whether the deviations observed in recitals (29) and (30) could be deemed necessary and proportionate under point 1.4(d) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, provided that the observed deviations from the Union-wide DUC trend over RP4 and from the long-term Union-wide DUC trend are exclusively due to additional determined costs related to measures necessary to achieve the performance targets in the key performance area of capacity or to restructuring measures within the meaning of Article 2(18) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(33) In respect of the criterion specified under point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that Hungary refers in the draft performance plan to the additional determined costs incurred over RP4 by the air navigation service provider Hungarocontrol in relation to measures needed for the achievement of the local capacity targets (‘capacity measures’). The presented capacity measures comprise the following main elements:—The training and employment of additional ATCOs in operations in order to handle the expected traffic increase during RP4. This is planned to result over RP4 into an overall increase of over 30 % of the number of ATCOs in operations at the area control centre of Budapest.—The upgrade of the air traffic management (‘ATM’) system.—Other investments in infrastructure, equipment, and radars. — The training and employment of additional ATCOs in operations in order to handle the expected traffic increase during RP4. This is planned to result over RP4 into an overall increase of over 30 % of the number of ATCOs in operations at the area control centre of Budapest. — The upgrade of the air traffic management (‘ATM’) system. — Other investments in infrastructure, equipment, and radars.
— The training and employment of additional ATCOs in operations in order to handle the expected traffic increase during RP4. This is planned to result over RP4 into an overall increase of over 30 % of the number of ATCOs in operations at the area control centre of Budapest.
— The upgrade of the air traffic management (‘ATM’) system.
— Other investments in infrastructure, equipment, and radars.
— The training and employment of additional ATCOs in operations in order to handle the expected traffic increase during RP4. This is planned to result over RP4 into an overall increase of over 30 % of the number of ATCOs in operations at the area control centre of Budapest.
— The upgrade of the air traffic management (‘ATM’) system.
— Other investments in infrastructure, equipment, and radars.
(34) The PRB has analysed in detail the capacity measures invoked by Hungary. Based on its analysis, the PRB considered that the capacity measures related to the increase of the number of ATCOs in operations and the upgrade of the ATM system are necessary and proportionate for the achievement of Hungary’s capacity targets. Those capacity measures were found by the PRB to result in a structural increase of the available capacity in Hungary’s airspace for RP4. Furthermore, the PRB concluded that the additional costs of those capacity measures are larger than the deviation from the long-term Union-wide DUC trend referred to in recital (30).
(35) In light of the considerations in recitals (33) and (34), the Commission therefore finds that the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) is fulfilled in respect of Hungary with regard to the deviation from the long-term Union-wide DUC trend referred to in recital (30).
(36) Hungary has not presented in the draft performance plan any restructuring measures pursuant to the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(ii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 which would justify the remaining deviation from the Union-wide DUC trend observed in recital (29).
(37) The Commission notes, however, that Hungary has demonstrated a good level of cost-efficiency in relative terms, given that the baseline value for 2024 is significantly below the average of the relevant comparator group, as outlined in recital (31). The Commission further observes that Hungary’s DUC remains stable over time, when comparing the baseline value for 2019 with the planned DUC for 2029. Furthermore, Hungary’s deviation from the long-term Union-wide DUC trend was found to be justified by the additional costs induced by capacity measures, as concluded in recital (35). Therefore, the Commission considers, on balance, that the remaining deviation from the Union-wide DUC trend observed in recital (29) does not preclude Hungary’s cost-efficiency performance targets from being consistent with the Union-wide cost-efficiency performance targets.
(38) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (28) to (37), the targets in the key performance area of cost-efficiency included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(39) In accordance with point 2.1(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan by reviewing the cost-efficiency performance targets for terminal air navigation services set in respect of the airports referred to in Articles 1(3) and (4) of that Implementing Regulation. It was found that those targets do not give rise to concerns.
(40) In the light of the foregoing, the performance targets included in the draft performance plan of Hungary should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4,
Hungary Targets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from European Aviation Safety Agency (‘EASA’) level A to D
Air navigation service provider Safety management objective 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
HungaroControl Safety policy and objectives C C C C C
Safety risk management C C C D D
Safety assurance C C C C C
Safety promotion C C C C C
Safety culture C C C C C
Hungary 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of environment,expressed as the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory 2,10 % 2,09 % 2,08 % 2,07 % 2,06 %
Hungary 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes ofen routeATFM delay per flight 0,85 0,55 0,20 0,20 0,14
En routecharging zone of Hungary 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) HUF 12 585 HUF 11 373 HUF 12 029 HUF 11 984 HUF 12 078 HUF 12 002 HUF 12 651
EUR 32,24 EUR 29,13 EUR 30,81 EUR 30,70 EUR 30,94 EUR 30,74 EUR 32,41
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 laying down the framework for the creation of the single European sky (the framework Regulation) (1), and in particular Article 11(3) point (c) thereof,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/2803 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on the implementation of the Single European Sky (2), and in particular Article 58(3) thereof,
Having regard to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 of 11 February 2019 laying down a performance and charging scheme in the single European sky and repealing Implementing Regulations (EU) No 390/2013 and (EU) No 391/2013 (3), and in particular Article 14(2) thereof,
Whereas:
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
(1) Pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 549/2004, Member States are to draw up plans, either at national level or at the level of functional airspace blocks (‘FABs’), including performance targets, for each reference period of the performance and charging scheme for air navigation services and network functions. Those plans are to include local performance targets which are consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for the reference period concerned.
(2) The Union-wide performance targets for the fourth reference period (‘RP4’, 2025-2029) were set out in Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688 (4).
(3) All Member States have drawn up and adopted draft performance plans for RP4, which were submitted to the Commission for assessment by 1 October 2024. Following the verification of completeness of those draft performance plans, the Commission requested Member States to submit updated draft performance plans by 15 November 2024.
(4) The Commission’s assessment presented in this Decision is based on the updated draft performance plan for RP4 submitted by Hungary (‘the draft performance plan’).
(5) The Performance Review Body (‘PRB’), assisting the Commission in the implementation of the performance scheme, has submitted to the Commission a report containing its advice on the assessment of the draft performance plans.
(6) In accordance with Article 14(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has assessed the consistency of the local performance targets included in the draft performance plan on the basis of the criteria laid down in point 1 of Annex IV to that Implementing Regulation, and taking account of local circumstances where relevant.
(7) The Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan with a review of the elements set out in point 2 of Annex IV to that Implementing Regulation. In respect of point 2.1(d)(vii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that it has not conducted, as part of that review, a detailed analysis of the methodology used by Hungary for the allocation of costs between en route and terminal services in RP4. Therefore, the Commission has not drawn any conclusions, at this stage, in respect of the compliance of that cost allocation methodology with points (e) and (f) of Article 15(2) Regulation (EC) No 550/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5) and Article 22(5) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
COMMISSION ASSESSMENT
Assessment of the safety targets
(8) As regards the key performance area of safety, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan has been assessed in accordance with point 1.1 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(9) The performance targets in the key performance area of safety proposed by Hungary in respect of the effectiveness of safety management, broken down per safety management objective and expressed as a level of implementation, are as follows:
Hungary
Targets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from EASA level A to D
Air navigation service provider
Safety management objective
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
HungaroControl
Safety policy and objectives
C
C
C
C
C
Safety risk management
C
C
C
D
D
Safety assurance
C
C
C
C
C
Safety promotion
C
C
C
C
C
Safety culture
C
C
C
C
C
(10) The Commission has found that the safety performance targets proposed by Hungary for the air navigation service provider ‘HungaroControl’ are equal to the Union-wide safety targets from 2028 for the ‘safety risk management’ objective, while for the remaining four ‘safety management objectives’ the performance targets are equal to the Union-wide safety targets in respect of calendar years 2025 to 2029.
(11) The Commission notes that the draft performance plan sets out measures for HungaroControl for the achievement of the local safety targets, which relate to the implementation of its safety management system and to cybersecurity.
(12) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (9), (10) and (11), and considering that the Union-wide safety performance targets set in Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688 are to be achieved by the final year of RP4, that is, 2029, the local safety performance targets included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets.
Assessment of the environment targets
(13) As regards the key performance area of environment, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan regarding the average horizontal en route flight efficiency of the actual trajectory has been assessed based on the criterion laid down in point 1.2 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the environment targets of Hungary have been compared to the relevant en route horizontal flight efficiency reference values set out in the European Route Network Improvement Plan (‘ERNIP’), drawn up in accordance with Annex I to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/123 (6) and available at the time of adopting the Union-wide performance targets for RP4, that is on 2 July 2024.
(14) The environment performance targets proposed by Hungary for RP4 and the corresponding national reference values from the ERNIP, expressed as the average horizontal en route flight efficiency of the actual trajectory, are as follows:
Hungary
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets in the key performance area of environment, expressed as the average horizontal en route flight efficiency of the actual trajectory
2,10 %
2,09 %
2,08 %
2,07 %
2,06 %
Reference values
2,10 %
2,09 %
2,08 %
2,07 %
2,06 %
(15) The Commission observes that the environment targets proposed by Hungary are equal to the corresponding national reference values for each calendar year of RP4.
(16) The Commission notes that Hungary has presented in the draft performance plan measures for the achievement of the local environment targets, which include the implementation and further expansion of cross-border free route airspace by the end of RP4. Having regard to the findings of the PRB, the Commission considers that Hungary should commit to the implementation of all the operational measures set out in the ERNIP of 2 July 2024 in order to support the achievement of its environment performance targets for RP4.
(17) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (14), (15) and (16), the targets in the key performance area of environment included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
Assessment of the capacity targets
(18) As regards the key performance area of capacity, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan regarding the average en route air traffic flow management (‘ATFM’) delay per flight has been assessed based on the criterion laid down in point 1.3 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the proposed en route capacity targets of Hungary have been compared to the relevant reference values set out in the Network Operations Plan drawn up in accordance with Article 9 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/123 and available at the time of adopting the Union-wide performance targets for RP4, that is on 2 July 2024.
(19) The en route capacity targets proposed by Hungary for RP4, expressed in minutes of ATFM delay per flight, and the corresponding reference values from the Network Operations Plan, are as follows:
Hungary
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes of en route ATFM delay per flight
0,85
0,55
0,20
0,20
0,14
Reference values
0,29
0,21
0,18
0,14
0,14
(20) The Commission observes that the en route capacity targets proposed by Hungary are significantly higher than the corresponding national reference values for each year of RP4, except in 2029, where they are equal.
(21) Hungary justifies the observed difference of its capacity targets with the reference values referred to in recital (20) by invoking the significant increase in overflight traffic recorded as a consequence of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Hungary has provided detailed information, in its draft performance plan, demonstrating the resulting changes in air traffic volumes, density, and complexity. It is therefore necessary to take those circumstances into account when assessing the proposed capacity performance targets of Hungary for RP4 in respect of their consistency with the Union-wide capacity performance targets.
(22) Having regard to the detailed analysis made by the PRB, the Commission concludes that the gap between the national targets and the reference values is duly justified by the exceptional circumstances resulting from the war in Ukraine and referred to in recital (21). The Commission further notes that Hungary has put in place a range of measures for the achievements of its capacity targets, including a significant increase of the number of air traffic controllers (‘ATCOs’) in operations at the area control centre, improvements of the air traffic management system, and extended sector opening hours.
(23) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (19) to (22), the targets in the key performance area of capacity included in the draft performance plan of Hungary should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
Review of the capacity targets for terminal air navigation services
(24) In accordance with point 2.1(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan by reviewing the capacity performance targets for the terminal air navigation services set in respect of the airports referred to in Articles 1(3) and (4) of that Implementing Regulation. It was found that those targets give rise to concerns.
(25) The Commission notes that the proposed terminal capacity targets for RP4 lead to a significant deterioration of the average arrival ATFM delay per year compared to the third reference period (‘RP3’). Indeed, the proposed RP4 targets are set at 0,10 minute per flight, whereas the actual performance recorded in 2024 was 0,00 minute per flight.
(26) Therefore, the Commission considers that, in connection with the adoption of its final performance plan in accordance with Article 16, point (a) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, Hungary should further justify the terminal capacity targets for RP4 in light of the observations set out in recital (25), or should revise downwards those targets.
Assessment of the cost-efficiency targets
(27) As regards the key performance area of cost-efficiency, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan regarding the determined unit cost (‘DUC’) for en route air navigation services has been assessed based on the criteria laid down in points 1.4(a), (b) and (c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Those criteria consist of the DUC trend over RP4, the long-term DUC trend over RP3 and RP4 (2020-2029), and the baseline value for the DUC at charging zone level compared with the average value of the charging zones where air navigation service providers have a similar operational and economic environment.
(28) The en route cost-efficiency targets proposed by Hungary for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:
En route charging zone of the Hungary
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
HUF 12 585
HUF 11 373
HUF 12 029
HUF 11 984
HUF 12 078
HUF 12 002
HUF 12 651
EUR 32,24
EUR 29,13
EUR 30,81
EUR 30,70
EUR 30,94
EUR 30,74
EUR 32,41
(29) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that Hungary’s DUC trend at charging zone level of +2,2 % over RP4 underperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(30) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that Hungary’s long-term DUC trend at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of +0,1 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(31) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that Hungary’s baseline value for the DUC of EUR 29,13 in real terms at 2022 prices (‘EUR2022’) is 28,1 % lower than the average baseline value of EUR 40,51 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7 Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(32) The Commission has further examined whether the deviations observed in recitals (29) and (30) could be deemed necessary and proportionate under point 1.4(d) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, provided that the observed deviations from the Union-wide DUC trend over RP4 and from the long-term Union-wide DUC trend are exclusively due to additional determined costs related to measures necessary to achieve the performance targets in the key performance area of capacity or to restructuring measures within the meaning of Article 2(18) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(33) In respect of the criterion specified under point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that Hungary refers in the draft performance plan to the additional determined costs incurred over RP4 by the air navigation service provider Hungarocontrol in relation to measures needed for the achievement of the local capacity targets (‘capacity measures’). The presented capacity measures comprise the following main elements:
—
The training and employment of additional ATCOs in operations in order to handle the expected traffic increase during RP4. This is planned to result over RP4 into an overall increase of over 30 % of the number of ATCOs in operations at the area control centre of Budapest.
—
The upgrade of the air traffic management (‘ATM’) system.
—
Other investments in infrastructure, equipment, and radars.
(34) The PRB has analysed in detail the capacity measures invoked by Hungary. Based on its analysis, the PRB considered that the capacity measures related to the increase of the number of ATCOs in operations and the upgrade of the ATM system are necessary and proportionate for the achievement of Hungary’s capacity targets. Those capacity measures were found by the PRB to result in a structural increase of the available capacity in Hungary’s airspace for RP4. Furthermore, the PRB concluded that the additional costs of those capacity measures are larger than the deviation from the long-term Union-wide DUC trend referred to in recital (30).
(35) In light of the considerations in recitals (33) and (34), the Commission therefore finds that the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) is fulfilled in respect of Hungary with regard to the deviation from the long-term Union-wide DUC trend referred to in recital (30).
(36) Hungary has not presented in the draft performance plan any restructuring measures pursuant to the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(ii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 which would justify the remaining deviation from the Union-wide DUC trend observed in recital (29).
(37) The Commission notes, however, that Hungary has demonstrated a good level of cost-efficiency in relative terms, given that the baseline value for 2024 is significantly below the average of the relevant comparator group, as outlined in recital (31). The Commission further observes that Hungary’s DUC remains stable over time, when comparing the baseline value for 2019 with the planned DUC for 2029. Furthermore, Hungary’s deviation from the long-term Union-wide DUC trend was found to be justified by the additional costs induced by capacity measures, as concluded in recital (35). Therefore, the Commission considers, on balance, that the remaining deviation from the Union-wide DUC trend observed in recital (29) does not preclude Hungary’s cost-efficiency performance targets from being consistent with the Union-wide cost-efficiency performance targets.
(38) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (28) to (37), the targets in the key performance area of cost-efficiency included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
Review of the cost-efficiency targets for terminal air navigation services
(39) In accordance with point 2.1(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan by reviewing the cost-efficiency performance targets for terminal air navigation services set in respect of the airports referred to in Articles 1(3) and (4) of that Implementing Regulation. It was found that those targets do not give rise to concerns.
CONCLUSIONS
(40) In the light of the foregoing, the performance targets included in the draft performance plan of Hungary should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The performance targets included in the draft performance plan submitted by Hungary for the fourth reference period (‘RP4’), listed in the Annex to this Decision, are consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4 set out in Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
This Decision is addressed to Hungary.

Performance targets included in the draft performance plan of Hungary, found to be consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for the fourth reference period

KEY PERFORMANCE AREA OF SAFETY

Hungary
Targets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from European Aviation Safety Agency (‘EASA’) level A to D
Air navigation service provider
Safety management objective
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
HungaroControl
Safety policy and objectives
C
C
C
C
C
Safety risk management
C
C
C
D
D
Safety assurance
C
C
C
C
C
Safety promotion
C
C
C
C
C
Safety culture
C
C
C
C
C

KEY PERFORMANCE AREA OF ENVIRONMENT

Hungary
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets in the key performance area of environment, expressed as the average horizontal en route flight efficiency of the actual trajectory
2,10 %
2,09 %
2,08 %
2,07 %
2,06 %

KEY PERFORMANCE AREA OF CAPACITY

Hungary
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes of en route ATFM delay per flight
0,85
0,55
0,20
0,20
0,14

KEY PERFORMANCE AREA OF COST-EFFICIENCY

En route charging zone of Hungary
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
HUF 12 585
HUF 11 373
HUF 12 029
HUF 11 984
HUF 12 078
HUF 12 002
HUF 12 651
EUR 32,24
EUR 29,13
EUR 30,81
EUR 30,70
EUR 30,94
EUR 30,74
EUR 32,41

Commission Decision (EU) 2025/1049 of 19 May 2025 on the consistency of the performance targets included in the draft performance plan submitted by Romania pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council with the Union-wide performance targets for the fourth reference period of the Single European Sky performance and charging scheme (notified under document C(2025) 2931)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1049 28.5.2025
(1) Pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 549/2004, Member States are to draw up plans, either at national level or at the level of functional airspace blocks (‘FABs’), including performance targets, for each reference period of the performance and charging scheme for air navigation services and network functions. Those plans are to include local performance targets which are consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for the reference period concerned.
(2) The Union-wide performance targets for the fourth reference period (‘RP4’, 2025-2029) were set out in Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688(4).
(3) All Member States have drawn up and adopted draft performance plans for RP4, which were submitted to the Commission for assessment by 1 October 2024. Following the verification of completeness of those draft performance plans, the Commission requested Member States to submit updated draft performance plans by 15 November 2024.
(4) The Commission’s assessment presented in this Decision is based on the updated draft performance plan for RP4 submitted by Romania (‘the draft performance plan’).
(5) The Performance Review Body (‘PRB’), assisting the Commission in the implementation of the performance scheme, has submitted to the Commission a report containing its advice on the assessment of the draft performance plans.
(6) In accordance with Article 14(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has assessed the consistency of the local performance targets included in the draft performance plan on the basis of the criteria laid down in point 1 of Annex IV to that Implementing Regulation, and taking account of local circumstances where relevant.
(7) The Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan with a review of the elements set out in point 2 of Annex IV to that Implementing Regulation. In respect of point 2.1(d)(vii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that it has not conducted, as part of that review, a detailed analysis of the methodology used by Romania for the allocation of costs betweenen routeand terminal services in RP4. Therefore, the Commission has not drawn any conclusions, at this stage, in respect of the compliance of that cost allocation methodology with points (e) and (f) of Article 15(2) Regulation (EC) No 550/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5)and Article 22(5) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(8) As regards the key performance area of safety, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan has been assessed in accordance with point 1.1 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(9) The performance targets in the key performance area of safety proposed by Romania in respect of the effectiveness of safety management, broken down per safety management objective and expressed as a level of implementation, are as follows:RomaniaTargets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from EASA level A to DAir navigationservice providerSafety management objective20252026202720282029ROMATSASafety policy and objectivesCCCCCSafety risk managementCCCCDSafety assuranceCCCCCSafety promotionCCCCCSafety cultureCCCCC Romania Targets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from EASA level A to D Air navigationservice provider Safety management objective 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 ROMATSA Safety policy and objectives C C C C C Safety risk management C C C C D Safety assurance C C C C C Safety promotion C C C C C Safety culture C C C C C
Romania Targets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from EASA level A to D
Air navigationservice provider Safety management objective 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
ROMATSA Safety policy and objectives C C C C C
Safety risk management C C C C D
Safety assurance C C C C C
Safety promotion C C C C C
Safety culture C C C C C
Romania Targets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from EASA level A to D
Air navigationservice provider Safety management objective 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
ROMATSA Safety policy and objectives C C C C C
Safety risk management C C C C D
Safety assurance C C C C C
Safety promotion C C C C C
Safety culture C C C C C
(10) The Commission observes that the safety performance targets proposed by Romania for the air navigation service provider ‘ROMATSA’ are equal to the Union-wide safety targets for each calendar year from 2025 to 2029, except for the ‘safety risk management’ objective for which the level of the Union-wide target is planned to be reached in year 2029.
(11) The Commission notes that the draft performance plan sets out measures for ROMATSA for the achievement of the local safety targets, including enhancing the safety management system, monitoring change management, and investing in safety training and technology.
(12) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (9), (10) and (11) and considering that the Union-wide safety performance targets set in Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688 are to be achieved by the final year of RP4, that is, 2029, the local safety performance targets included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets.
(13) As regards the key performance area of environment, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan regarding the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory has been assessed based on the criterion laid down in point 1.2 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the environment targets of Romania have been compared to the relevanten routehorizontal flight efficiency reference values set out in the European Route Network Improvement Plan (‘ERNIP’), drawn up in accordance with Annex I to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/123(6)and available at the time of adopting the Union-wide performance targets for RP4, that is on 2 July 2024.
(14) The environment performance targets proposed by Romania for RP4 and the corresponding national reference values from the ERNIP, expressed as the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory, are as follows:Romania20252026202720282029Targets in the key performance area of environment, expressed as the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory3,54 %3,52 %3,50 %3,48 %3,46 %Reference values3,54 %3,52 %3,50 %3,48 %3,46 % Romania 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Targets in the key performance area of environment, expressed as the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory 3,54 % 3,52 % 3,50 % 3,48 % 3,46 % Reference values 3,54 % 3,52 % 3,50 % 3,48 % 3,46 %
Romania 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of environment, expressed as the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory 3,54 % 3,52 % 3,50 % 3,48 % 3,46 %
Reference values 3,54 % 3,52 % 3,50 % 3,48 % 3,46 %
Romania 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of environment, expressed as the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory 3,54 % 3,52 % 3,50 % 3,48 % 3,46 %
Reference values 3,54 % 3,52 % 3,50 % 3,48 % 3,46 %
(15) The Commission observes that the environment targets proposed by Romania are equal to the corresponding national reference values for each calendar year of RP4.
(16) The Commission notes that Romania has presented, in the draft performance plan, measures for the achievement of its environment targets. Those measures include the implementation of enhanced cross-border free route airspace, the roll-out of advanced flexible use of airspace, and the deployment of a sector optimisation tool by the end of 2025. Having regard to the findings of the PRB, the Commission considers that Romania should commit to the implementation of all the operational measures set out in the ERNIP, in order to support the achievement of its environment performance targets for RP4.
(17) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (14), (15) and (16), the targets in the key performance area of environment included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(18) As regards the key performance area of capacity, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan regarding the averageen routeair traffic flow management (‘ATFM’) delay per flight has been assessed based on the criterion laid down in point 1.3 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the proposeden routecapacity targets of Romania have been compared to the relevant reference values set out in the Network Operations Plan drawn up in accordance with Article 9 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/123 and available at the time of adopting the Union-wide performance targets for RP4, that is on 2 July 2024.
(19) Theen routecapacity targets proposed by Romania for RP4, expressed in minutes of ATFM delay per flight, and the corresponding reference values from the Network Operations Plan, are as follows:Romania20252026202720282029Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes ofen routeATFM delay per flight0,240,170,140,110,11Reference values0,240,170,140,110,11 Romania 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes ofen routeATFM delay per flight 0,24 0,17 0,14 0,11 0,11 Reference values 0,24 0,17 0,14 0,11 0,11
Romania 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes ofen routeATFM delay per flight 0,24 0,17 0,14 0,11 0,11
Reference values 0,24 0,17 0,14 0,11 0,11
Romania 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes ofen routeATFM delay per flight 0,24 0,17 0,14 0,11 0,11
Reference values 0,24 0,17 0,14 0,11 0,11
(20) The Commission observes that theen routecapacity targets proposed by Romania are equal to the corresponding national reference values for each calendar year of RP4.
(21) The Commission notes that Romania has presented, in the draft performance plan, measures for the achievement of itsen routecapacity targets. Those measures include the deployment of a new air traffic management system, improvements in airspace configuration, developments related to human resource policy, and the use of a new traffic load and complexity tool.
(22) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (19), (20) and (21), the targets in the key performance area of capacity included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(23) In accordance with point 2.1(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan by reviewing the capacity performance targets for terminal air navigation services set in respect of the airports referred to in Articles 1(3) and (4) of that Implementing Regulation. It was found that those targets give rise to concerns.
(24) The Commission notes that the proposed terminal capacity targets for RP4 lead to a significant deterioration of the average arrival ATFM delay per year compared to the third reference period (‘RP3’). Indeed, the proposed RP4 targets range from 0,32 to 0,40 minute per flight, whereas the measured actual performance did not exceed 0,12 minute per flight in any year of RP3.
(25) Therefore, the Commission considers that, in connection with the adoption of its final performance plan in accordance with Article 16, point (a) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, Romania should further justify the terminal capacity targets for RP4 in light of the observations set out in recital (24), or should revise downwards those targets.
(26) As regards the key performance area of cost-efficiency, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan regarding the determined unit cost (‘DUC’) foren routeair navigation services has been assessed based on the criteria laid down in points 1.4(a), (b) and (c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Those criteria consist of the DUC trend over RP4, the long-term DUC trend over RP3 and RP4 (2020-2029), and the baseline value for the DUC at charging zone level compared with the average value of the charging zones where air navigation service providers have a similar operational and economic environment.
(27) Theen routecost-efficiency targets proposed by Romania for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:En routecharging zone of Romania2019 baseline value2024 baseline value20252026202720282029Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)RON 193,74RON 190,26RON 188,70RON 190,59RON 190,14RON 187,75RON 178,08EUR 39,32EUR 38,61EUR 38,29EUR 38,68EUR 38,58EUR 38,10EUR 36,14 En routecharging zone of Romania 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) RON 193,74 RON 190,26 RON 188,70 RON 190,59 RON 190,14 RON 187,75 RON 178,08 EUR 39,32 EUR 38,61 EUR 38,29 EUR 38,68 EUR 38,58 EUR 38,10 EUR 36,14
En routecharging zone of Romania 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) RON 193,74 RON 190,26 RON 188,70 RON 190,59 RON 190,14 RON 187,75 RON 178,08
EUR 39,32 EUR 38,61 EUR 38,29 EUR 38,68 EUR 38,58 EUR 38,10 EUR 36,14
En routecharging zone of Romania 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) RON 193,74 RON 190,26 RON 188,70 RON 190,59 RON 190,14 RON 187,75 RON 178,08
EUR 39,32 EUR 38,61 EUR 38,29 EUR 38,68 EUR 38,58 EUR 38,10 EUR 36,14
(28) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that Romania’s DUC trend at charging zone level of -1,3 % over RP4 outperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(29) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that Romania’s long-term DUC trend at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of -0,9 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(30) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that Romania’s baseline value for the DUC of EUR 38,61 in real terms at 2022 prices (‘EUR2022’) is 0,8 % lower than the average baseline value of EUR 38,93 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7 Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(31) It is clear that Romania’s DUC trend over RP4 outperforms the corresponding Union-wide trend and that Romania’s baseline value for 2024 is below the comparator group average. Therefore, the Commission considers that the limited deviation from the Union-wide long-term DUC trend referred to in recital (29) does not preclude Romania’s cost-efficiency performance targets from being consistent with the Union-wide cost-efficiency performance targets.
(32) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (27) to (31), the targets in the key performance area of cost-efficiency included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(33) In accordance with point 2.1(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan by reviewing the cost-efficiency performance targets for terminal air navigation services set in respect of the airports referred to in Article 1(3) and (4) of that Implementing Regulation. It was found that those targets do not give rise to concerns.
(34) In the light of the foregoing, the performance targets included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4,
Romania Targets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from European Aviation Safety Agency (‘EASA’) level A to D
Air navigation service provider Safety management objective 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
ROMATSA Safety policy and objectives C C C C C
Safety risk management C C C C D
Safety assurance C C C C C
Safety promotion C C C C C
Safety culture C C C C C
Romania 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of environment,expressed as the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory 3,54 % 3,52 % 3,50 % 3,48 % 3,46 %
Romania 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes ofen routeATFM delay per flight 0,24 0,17 0,14 0,11 0,11
En routecharging zone of Romania 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) RON 193,74 RON 190,26 RON 188,70 RON 190,59 RON 190,14 RON 187,75 RON 178,08
EUR 39,32 EUR 38,61 EUR 38,29 EUR 38,68 EUR 38,58 EUR 38,10 EUR 36,14
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 laying down the framework for the creation of the single European sky (the framework Regulation) (1), and in particular Article 11(3), point (c) thereof,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/2803 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on the implementation of the Single European Sky (2), and in particular Article 58(3) thereof,
Having regard to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 of 11 February 2019 laying down a performance and charging scheme in the single European sky and repealing Implementing Regulations (EU) No 390/2013 and (EU) No 391/2013 (3), and in particular Article 14(2) thereof,
Whereas:
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
(1) Pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 549/2004, Member States are to draw up plans, either at national level or at the level of functional airspace blocks (‘FABs’), including performance targets, for each reference period of the performance and charging scheme for air navigation services and network functions. Those plans are to include local performance targets which are consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for the reference period concerned.
(2) The Union-wide performance targets for the fourth reference period (‘RP4’, 2025-2029) were set out in Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688 (4).
(3) All Member States have drawn up and adopted draft performance plans for RP4, which were submitted to the Commission for assessment by 1 October 2024. Following the verification of completeness of those draft performance plans, the Commission requested Member States to submit updated draft performance plans by 15 November 2024.
(4) The Commission’s assessment presented in this Decision is based on the updated draft performance plan for RP4 submitted by Romania (‘the draft performance plan’).
(5) The Performance Review Body (‘PRB’), assisting the Commission in the implementation of the performance scheme, has submitted to the Commission a report containing its advice on the assessment of the draft performance plans.
(6) In accordance with Article 14(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has assessed the consistency of the local performance targets included in the draft performance plan on the basis of the criteria laid down in point 1 of Annex IV to that Implementing Regulation, and taking account of local circumstances where relevant.
(7) The Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan with a review of the elements set out in point 2 of Annex IV to that Implementing Regulation. In respect of point 2.1(d)(vii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that it has not conducted, as part of that review, a detailed analysis of the methodology used by Romania for the allocation of costs between en route and terminal services in RP4. Therefore, the Commission has not drawn any conclusions, at this stage, in respect of the compliance of that cost allocation methodology with points (e) and (f) of Article 15(2) Regulation (EC) No 550/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5) and Article 22(5) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
COMMISSION ASSESSMENT
Assessment of the safety targets
(8) As regards the key performance area of safety, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan has been assessed in accordance with point 1.1 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(9) The performance targets in the key performance area of safety proposed by Romania in respect of the effectiveness of safety management, broken down per safety management objective and expressed as a level of implementation, are as follows:
Romania
Targets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from EASA level A to D
Air navigation
service provider
Safety management objective
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
ROMATSA
Safety policy and objectives
C
C
C
C
C
Safety risk management
C
C
C
C
D
Safety assurance
C
C
C
C
C
Safety promotion
C
C
C
C
C
Safety culture
C
C
C
C
C
(10) The Commission observes that the safety performance targets proposed by Romania for the air navigation service provider ‘ROMATSA’ are equal to the Union-wide safety targets for each calendar year from 2025 to 2029, except for the ‘safety risk management’ objective for which the level of the Union-wide target is planned to be reached in year 2029.
(11) The Commission notes that the draft performance plan sets out measures for ROMATSA for the achievement of the local safety targets, including enhancing the safety management system, monitoring change management, and investing in safety training and technology.
(12) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (9), (10) and (11) and considering that the Union-wide safety performance targets set in Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688 are to be achieved by the final year of RP4, that is, 2029, the local safety performance targets included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets.
Assessment of the environment targets
(13) As regards the key performance area of environment, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan regarding the average horizontal en route flight efficiency of the actual trajectory has been assessed based on the criterion laid down in point 1.2 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the environment targets of Romania have been compared to the relevant en route horizontal flight efficiency reference values set out in the European Route Network Improvement Plan (‘ERNIP’), drawn up in accordance with Annex I to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/123 (6) and available at the time of adopting the Union-wide performance targets for RP4, that is on 2 July 2024.
(14) The environment performance targets proposed by Romania for RP4 and the corresponding national reference values from the ERNIP, expressed as the average horizontal en route flight efficiency of the actual trajectory, are as follows:
Romania
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets in the key performance area of environment, expressed as the average horizontal en route flight efficiency of the actual trajectory
3,54 %
3,52 %
3,50 %
3,48 %
3,46 %
Reference values
3,54 %
3,52 %
3,50 %
3,48 %
3,46 %
(15) The Commission observes that the environment targets proposed by Romania are equal to the corresponding national reference values for each calendar year of RP4.
(16) The Commission notes that Romania has presented, in the draft performance plan, measures for the achievement of its environment targets. Those measures include the implementation of enhanced cross-border free route airspace, the roll-out of advanced flexible use of airspace, and the deployment of a sector optimisation tool by the end of 2025. Having regard to the findings of the PRB, the Commission considers that Romania should commit to the implementation of all the operational measures set out in the ERNIP, in order to support the achievement of its environment performance targets for RP4.
(17) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (14), (15) and (16), the targets in the key performance area of environment included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
Assessment of the capacity targets
(18) As regards the key performance area of capacity, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan regarding the average en route air traffic flow management (‘ATFM’) delay per flight has been assessed based on the criterion laid down in point 1.3 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the proposed en route capacity targets of Romania have been compared to the relevant reference values set out in the Network Operations Plan drawn up in accordance with Article 9 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/123 and available at the time of adopting the Union-wide performance targets for RP4, that is on 2 July 2024.
(19) The en route capacity targets proposed by Romania for RP4, expressed in minutes of ATFM delay per flight, and the corresponding reference values from the Network Operations Plan, are as follows:
Romania
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes of en route ATFM delay per flight
0,24
0,17
0,14
0,11
0,11
Reference values
0,24
0,17
0,14
0,11
0,11
(20) The Commission observes that the en route capacity targets proposed by Romania are equal to the corresponding national reference values for each calendar year of RP4.
(21) The Commission notes that Romania has presented, in the draft performance plan, measures for the achievement of its en route capacity targets. Those measures include the deployment of a new air traffic management system, improvements in airspace configuration, developments related to human resource policy, and the use of a new traffic load and complexity tool.
(22) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (19), (20) and (21), the targets in the key performance area of capacity included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
Review of the capacity targets for terminal air navigation services
(23) In accordance with point 2.1(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan by reviewing the capacity performance targets for terminal air navigation services set in respect of the airports referred to in Articles 1(3) and (4) of that Implementing Regulation. It was found that those targets give rise to concerns.
(24) The Commission notes that the proposed terminal capacity targets for RP4 lead to a significant deterioration of the average arrival ATFM delay per year compared to the third reference period (‘RP3’). Indeed, the proposed RP4 targets range from 0,32 to 0,40 minute per flight, whereas the measured actual performance did not exceed 0,12 minute per flight in any year of RP3.
(25) Therefore, the Commission considers that, in connection with the adoption of its final performance plan in accordance with Article 16, point (a) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, Romania should further justify the terminal capacity targets for RP4 in light of the observations set out in recital (24), or should revise downwards those targets.
Assessment of the cost-efficiency targets
(26) As regards the key performance area of cost-efficiency, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plan regarding the determined unit cost (‘DUC’) for en route air navigation services has been assessed based on the criteria laid down in points 1.4(a), (b) and (c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Those criteria consist of the DUC trend over RP4, the long-term DUC trend over RP3 and RP4 (2020-2029), and the baseline value for the DUC at charging zone level compared with the average value of the charging zones where air navigation service providers have a similar operational and economic environment.
(27) The en route cost-efficiency targets proposed by Romania for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:
En route charging zone of Romania
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
RON 193,74
RON 190,26
RON 188,70
RON 190,59
RON 190,14
RON 187,75
RON 178,08
EUR 39,32
EUR 38,61
EUR 38,29
EUR 38,68
EUR 38,58
EUR 38,10
EUR 36,14
(28) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that Romania’s DUC trend at charging zone level of -1,3 % over RP4 outperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(29) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that Romania’s long-term DUC trend at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of -0,9 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(30) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that Romania’s baseline value for the DUC of EUR 38,61 in real terms at 2022 prices (‘EUR2022’) is 0,8 % lower than the average baseline value of EUR 38,93 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7 Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(31) It is clear that Romania’s DUC trend over RP4 outperforms the corresponding Union-wide trend and that Romania’s baseline value for 2024 is below the comparator group average. Therefore, the Commission considers that the limited deviation from the Union-wide long-term DUC trend referred to in recital (29) does not preclude Romania’s cost-efficiency performance targets from being consistent with the Union-wide cost-efficiency performance targets.
(32) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (27) to (31), the targets in the key performance area of cost-efficiency included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
Review of the cost-efficiency targets for terminal air navigation services
(33) In accordance with point 2.1(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan by reviewing the cost-efficiency performance targets for terminal air navigation services set in respect of the airports referred to in Article 1(3) and (4) of that Implementing Regulation. It was found that those targets do not give rise to concerns.
CONCLUSIONS
(34) In the light of the foregoing, the performance targets included in the draft performance plan should be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The performance targets included in the draft performance plan submitted by Romania for the fourth reference period (‘RP4’), listed in the Annex to this Decision, are consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4 set out in Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
This Decision is addressed to Romania.

Performance targets included in the draft performance plan of Romania, found to be consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for the fourth reference period

KEY PERFORMANCE AREA OF SAFETY

Romania
Targets on the effectiveness of safety management, expressed as a level of implementation, ranging from European Aviation Safety Agency (‘EASA’) level A to D
Air navigation service provider
Safety management objective
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
ROMATSA
Safety policy and objectives
C
C
C
C
C
Safety risk management
C
C
C
C
D
Safety assurance
C
C
C
C
C
Safety promotion
C
C
C
C
C
Safety culture
C
C
C
C
C

KEY PERFORMANCE AREA OF ENVIRONMENT

Romania
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets in the key performance area of environment, expressed as the average horizontal en route flight efficiency of the actual trajectory
3,54 %
3,52 %
3,50 %
3,48 %
3,46 %

KEY PERFORMANCE AREA OF CAPACITY

Romania
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes of en route ATFM delay per flight
0,24
0,17
0,14
0,11
0,11

KEY PERFORMANCE AREA OF COST-EFFICIENCY

En route charging zone of Romania
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
RON 193,74
RON 190,26
RON 188,70
RON 190,59
RON 190,14
RON 187,75
RON 178,08
EUR 39,32
EUR 38,61
EUR 38,29
EUR 38,68
EUR 38,58
EUR 38,10
EUR 36,14

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1046 of 26 May 2025 recognising that the report submitted by Sweden under Article 31(2) of Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council contains accurate data for the purposes of measuring the greenhouse gas emissions associated with the cultivation of barley, faba bean, rapeseed, rye, triticale, wheat and yellow pea in that Member State

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1046 28.5.2025
(1) Directive (EU) 2018/2001 requires biofuels, bioliquids, and biomass fuels to save significant greenhouse gas emissions compared to fossil fuels so that they can be counted towards the targets set in that Directive. For that purpose, Article 29(10) of that Directive sets specific emission savings thresholds for those fuels, and Article 31 regulates how to calculate the greenhouse gas emission savings from their use. When making those calculations, it is possible to use the default values set out in Annexes V and VI to Directive (EU) 2018/2001. Instead of the default values of greenhouse gas emissions from the cultivation of agricultural raw materials, it is possible to use typical values under some conditions. Those typical values, representing the average value in a specific area, may be reported to the Commission by Member States or third countries. The typical values may only be used if the Commission recognises them to be accurate.
(2) On 23 January 2025, the Sweden submitted to the Commission the final report with data for the purposes of measuring the greenhouse gas emissions associated with the cultivation of barley, faba bean, rapeseed, rye, triticale, wheat and yellow pea typically produced in areas on its territory classified as level 2 in the nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS), in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(2). The Kingdom of Sweden asked for the data to be recognised as accurate in accordance with Article 31(4) of Directive (EU) 2018/2001.
(3) The Commission assessed the report and found that it contained accurate data for the purposes of measuring the greenhouse gas emissions associated with the cultivation of barley, faba bean, rapeseed, rye, triticale, wheat and yellow pea typically produced in NUTS 2 regions in Sweden.
(4) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee on the Sustainability of Biofuels, Bioliquids and Biomass Fuels,
NUTS-2 region according to Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 Soil N2O Embedded Fuel use Seed Total
Direct Indirect Fertilizer Neutralisation Pesticide
SE11 Stockholm 164 20 84 17 0(*1) 50 14 349
SE12 Östra Mellansverige 174 18 79 7 0(*1) 43 12 332
SE21 Småland med öarna 173 24 42 7 0(*1) 38 12 296
SE22 Sydsverige 151 17 71 3 0(*1) 28 9 277
SE23 Västsverige 175 22 73 11 0(*1) 34 10 325
SE31 Norra Mellansverige 201 31 60 12 0(*1) 47 15 367
SE32 Mellersta Norrland – – – – – – – –
SE33 Övre Norrland 262 45 43 8 0(*1) 58 20 434
NUTS-2 region according to Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 Soil N2O Embedded Fuel use Seed Total
Direct Indirect Fertilizer Neutralisation Pesticide
SE11 Stockholm – – – – – – – –
SE12 Östra Mellansverige 99 6 1 9 0(*2) 49 21 184
SE21 Småland med öarna 158 21 11 4 0(*2) 35 18 247
SE22 Sydsverige 91 8 7 4 0(*2) 32 17 160
SE23 Västsverige 94 7 5 20 0 38 19 183
SE31 Norra Mellansverige 72 8 6 11 0(*2) 48 23 168
SE32 Mellersta Norrland – – – – – – – –
SE33 Övre Norrland – – – – – – – –
NUTS-2 region according to Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 Soil N2O Embedded Fuel use Seed Total
Direct Indirect Fertilizer Neutralisation Pesticide
SE11 Stockholm 290 33 171 36 0(*3) 58 1 588
SE12 Östra Mellansverige 295 38 147 14 0(*3) 52 1 546
SE21 Småland med öarna 320 43 155 20 0(*3) 41 1 580
SE22 Sydsverige 325 41 179 5 0(*3) 40 1 590
SE23 Västsverige 335 42 192 39 0(*3) 43 1 652
SE31 Norra Mellansverige – – – – – – – –
SE32 Mellersta Norrland – – – – – – – –
SE33 Övre Norrland – – – – – – – –
NUTS-2 region according to Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 Soil N2O Embedded Fuel use Seed Total
Direct Indirect Fertilizer Neutralisation Pesticide
SE11 Stockholm 111 19 18 2 0(*4) 38 8 197
SE12 Östra Mellansverige 107 14 49 1 0(*4) 32 7 210
SE21 Småland med öarna 129 19 50 7 0(*4) 30 8 242
SE22 Sydsverige 110 13 59 2 0(*4) 24 6 214
SE23 Västsverige 132 18 67 15 0(*4) 29 7 267
SE31 Norra Mellansverige 157 20 89 19 0(*4) 34 8 328
SE32 Mellersta Norrland – – – – – – – –
SE33 Övre Norrland – – – – – – – –
NUTS-2 region according to Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 Soil N2O Embedded Fuel use Seed Total
Direct Indirect Fertilizer Neutralisation Pesticide
SE11 Stockholm – – – – – – – –
SE12 Östra Mellansverige 156 21 76 2 0(*5) 34 10 298
SE21 Småland med öarna 166 26 61 5 0(*5) 31 10 299
SE22 Sydsverige 175 25 80 4 0(*5) 28 10 322
SE23 Västsverige 150 22 63 10 0(*5) 26 9 280
SE31 Norra Mellansverige – – – – – – – –
SE32 Mellersta Norrland – – – – – – – –
SE33 Övre Norrland – – – – – – – –
NUTS-2 region according to Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 Soil N2O Embedded Fuel use Seed Total
Direct Indirect Fertilizer Neutralisation Pesticide
SE11 Stockholm 169 21 112 24 0(*6) 33 10 368
SE12 Östra Mellansverige 150 19 92 9 0(*6) 30 9 309
SE21 Småland med öarna 138 19 73 8 0(*6) 26 9 272
SE22 Sydsverige 141 17 91 2 0(*6) 22 7 281
SE23 Västsverige 166 22 105 22 0(*6) 26 8 348
SE31 Norra Mellansverige 159 22 90 19 0(*6) 31 10 330
SE32 Mellersta Norrland – – – – – – – –
SE33 Övre Norrland – – – – – – – –
NUTS-2 region according to Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 Soil N2O Embedded Fuel use Seed Total
Direct Indirect Fertilizer Neutralisation Pesticide
SE11 Stockholm 72 6 10 9 0(*7) 52 23 172
SE12 Östra Mellansverige 101 7 3 8 0(*7) 46 20 185
SE21 Småland med öarna 113 11 9 2 0(*7) 31 17 182
SE22 Sydsverige 97 10 7 4 0(*7) 30 16 165
SE23 Västsverige 102 9 6 20 0(*7) 38 20 194
SE31 Norra Mellansverige 68 6 9 12 0(*7) 53 27 174
SE32 Mellersta Norrland – – – – – – – –
SE33 Övre Norrland – – – – – – – –
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (1), and in particular Article 31(4) thereof,
Whereas:
(1) Directive (EU) 2018/2001 requires biofuels, bioliquids, and biomass fuels to save significant greenhouse gas emissions compared to fossil fuels so that they can be counted towards the targets set in that Directive. For that purpose, Article 29(10) of that Directive sets specific emission savings thresholds for those fuels, and Article 31 regulates how to calculate the greenhouse gas emission savings from their use. When making those calculations, it is possible to use the default values set out in Annexes V and VI to Directive (EU) 2018/2001. Instead of the default values of greenhouse gas emissions from the cultivation of agricultural raw materials, it is possible to use typical values under some conditions. Those typical values, representing the average value in a specific area, may be reported to the Commission by Member States or third countries. The typical values may only be used if the Commission recognises them to be accurate.
(2) On 23 January 2025, the Sweden submitted to the Commission the final report with data for the purposes of measuring the greenhouse gas emissions associated with the cultivation of barley, faba bean, rapeseed, rye, triticale, wheat and yellow pea typically produced in areas on its territory classified as level 2 in the nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS), in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2). The Kingdom of Sweden asked for the data to be recognised as accurate in accordance with Article 31(4) of Directive (EU) 2018/2001.
(3) The Commission assessed the report and found that it contained accurate data for the purposes of measuring the greenhouse gas emissions associated with the cultivation of barley, faba bean, rapeseed, rye, triticale, wheat and yellow pea typically produced in NUTS 2 regions in Sweden.
(4) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee on the Sustainability of Biofuels, Bioliquids and Biomass Fuels,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The report submitted for recognition to the Commission by Sweden on 23 January 2025 contains accurate data for the purposes of measuring the greenhouse gas emissions associated with the cultivation of barley, faba bean, rapeseed, rye, triticale, wheat and yellow pea typically produced in NUTS 2 regions in Sweden. The summary of the report’s data is set out in the Annex.
If the data contained in the report, as submitted for recognition to the Commission on 23 January 2025, changes in a way that might affect the accuracy of the data and thereby the basis for this Decision, Sweden shall notify the Commission of such changes immediately. The Commission shall assess the notified changes to determine whether the report still provides the accurate data for which it is recognised.
This Decision shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
It shall cease to apply on 17 June 2030.

Greenhouse gas emissions from cultivation of barley in Sweden for NUTS-2 regions (kg CO2eq/tonne barley harvested on dry matter basis)

NUTS-2 region according to Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003
Soil N2O
Embedded
Fuel use
Seed
Total
Direct
Indirect
Fertilizer
Neutralisation
Pesticide

SE11
Stockholm
164
20
84
17
0 (*1)
50
14
349
SE12
Östra Mellansverige
174
18
79
7
0 (*1)
43
12
332
SE21
Småland med öarna
173
24
42
7
0 (*1)
38
12
296
SE22
Sydsverige
151
17
71
3
0 (*1)
28
9
277
SE23
Västsverige
175
22
73
11
0 (*1)
34
10
325
SE31
Norra Mellansverige
201
31
60
12
0 (*1)
47
15
367
SE32
Mellersta Norrland
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
SE33
Övre Norrland
262
45
43
8
0 (*1)
58
20
434

Greenhouse gas emissions from cultivation of faba bean in Sweden for NUTS-2 regions (kg CO2eq/tonne faba bean harvested on dry matter basis)

NUTS-2 region according to Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003
Soil N2O
Embedded
Fuel use
Seed
Total
Direct
Indirect
Fertilizer
Neutralisation
Pesticide

SE11
Stockholm
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
SE12
Östra Mellansverige
99
6
1
9
0 (*2)
49
21
184
SE21
Småland med öarna
158
21
11
4
0 (*2)
35
18
247
SE22
Sydsverige
91
8
7
4
0 (*2)
32
17
160
SE23
Västsverige
94
7
5
20
0
38
19
183
SE31
Norra Mellansverige
72
8
6
11
0 (*2)
48
23
168
SE32
Mellersta Norrland
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
SE33
Övre Norrland
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

Greenhouse gas emissions from cultivation of rapeseed in Sweden for NUTS-2 regions (kg CO2eq/tonne rapeseed harvested on dry matter basis)

NUTS-2 region according to Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003
Soil N2O
Embedded
Fuel use
Seed
Total
Direct
Indirect
Fertilizer
Neutralisation
Pesticide

SE11
Stockholm
290
33
171
36
0 (*3)
58
1
588
SE12
Östra Mellansverige
295
38
147
14
0 (*3)
52
1
546
SE21
Småland med öarna
320
43
155
20
0 (*3)
41
1
580
SE22
Sydsverige
325
41
179
5
0 (*3)
40
1
590
SE23
Västsverige
335
42
192
39
0 (*3)
43
1
652
SE31
Norra Mellansverige
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
SE32
Mellersta Norrland
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
SE33
Övre Norrland
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

Greenhouse gas emissions from cultivation of rye in Sweden for NUTS-2 regions (kg CO2eq/tonne rye harvested on dry matter basis)

NUTS-2 region according to Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003
Soil N2O
Embedded
Fuel use
Seed
Total
Direct
Indirect
Fertilizer
Neutralisation
Pesticide

SE11
Stockholm
111
19
18
2
0 (*4)
38
8
197
SE12
Östra Mellansverige
107
14
49
1
0 (*4)
32
7
210
SE21
Småland med öarna
129
19
50
7
0 (*4)
30
8
242
SE22
Sydsverige
110
13
59
2
0 (*4)
24
6
214
SE23
Västsverige
132
18
67
15
0 (*4)
29
7
267
SE31
Norra Mellansverige
157
20
89
19
0 (*4)
34
8
328
SE32
Mellersta Norrland
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
SE33
Övre Norrland
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

Greenhouse gas emissions from cultivation of triticale in Sweden for NUTS-2 regions (kg CO2eq/tonne triticale harvested on dry matter basis)

NUTS-2 region according to Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003
Soil N2O
Embedded
Fuel use
Seed
Total
Direct
Indirect
Fertilizer
Neutralisation
Pesticide

SE11
Stockholm
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
SE12
Östra Mellansverige
156
21
76
2
0 (*5)
34
10
298
SE21
Småland med öarna
166
26
61
5
0 (*5)
31
10
299
SE22
Sydsverige
175
25
80
4
0 (*5)
28
10
322
SE23
Västsverige
150
22
63
10
0 (*5)
26
9
280
SE31
Norra Mellansverige
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
SE32
Mellersta Norrland
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
SE33
Övre Norrland
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

Greenhouse gas emissions from cultivation of wheat in Sweden for NUTS-2 regions (kg CO2eq/tonne wheat harvested on dry matter basis)

NUTS-2 region according to Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003
Soil N2O
Embedded
Fuel use
Seed
Total
Direct
Indirect
Fertilizer
Neutralisation
Pesticide

SE11
Stockholm
169
21
112
24
0 (*6)
33
10
368
SE12
Östra Mellansverige
150
19
92
9
0 (*6)
30
9
309
SE21
Småland med öarna
138
19
73
8
0 (*6)
26
9
272
SE22
Sydsverige
141
17
91
2
0 (*6)
22
7
281
SE23
Västsverige
166
22
105
22
0 (*6)
26
8
348
SE31
Norra Mellansverige
159
22
90
19
0 (*6)
31
10
330
SE32
Mellersta Norrland
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
SE33
Övre Norrland
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

Greenhouse gas emissions from cultivation of yellow pea in Sweden for NUTS-2 regions (kg CO2eq/tonne yellow pea harvested on dry matter basis)

NUTS-2 region according to Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003
Soil N2O
Embedded
Fuel use
Seed
Total
Direct
Indirect
Fertilizer
Neutralisation
Pesticide

SE11
Stockholm
72
6
10
9
0 (*7)
52
23
172
SE12
Östra Mellansverige
101
7
3
8
0 (*7)
46
20
185
SE21
Småland med öarna
113
11
9
2
0 (*7)
31
17
182
SE22
Sydsverige
97
10
7
4
0 (*7)
30
16
165
SE23
Västsverige
102
9
6
20
0 (*7)
38
20
194
SE31
Norra Mellansverige
68
6
9
12
0 (*7)
53
27
174
SE32
Mellersta Norrland
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
SE33
Övre Norrland
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

(*1) Pesticide emissions are embedded in fertilizer emissions.

(*2) Pesticide emissions are embedded in fertilizer emissions.

(*3) Pesticide emissions are embedded in fertilizer emissions.

(*4) Pesticide emissions are embedded in fertilizer emissions.

(*5) Pesticide emissions are embedded in fertilizer emissions.

(*6) Pesticide emissions are embedded in fertilizer emissions.

(*7) Pesticide emissions are embedded in fertilizer emissions.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1040 of 16 May 2025 on the inconsistency of certain performance targets included in the draft national and functional airspace block performance plans submitted by Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, France, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Slovakia pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council with the Union-wide performance targets for the fourth reference period of the Single European Sky performance and charging scheme (notified under document C(2025) 2930)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1040 23.5.2025
(1) Pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 549/2004, Member States are to draw up plans, either at national level or at the level of functional airspace blocks (‘FABs’), including performance targets, for each reference period of the performance and charging scheme for air navigation services and network functions. Those plans are to include local performance targets which are consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for the reference period concerned.
(2) The Union-wide performance targets for the fourth reference period (‘RP4’, 2025-2029) were set out in Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688(3).
(3) All Member States have drawn up and adopted draft performance plans for RP4, which were submitted to the Commission for assessment by 1 October 2024. Following the verification of completeness of those draft performance plans, the Commission requested Member States to submit updated draft performance plans by 15 November 2024.
(4) The Commission’s assessment presented in this Decision is based on the updated draft performance plans for RP4 submitted by Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, France, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Slovakia (‘draft performance plans’).
(5) The Performance Review Body (‘PRB’), assisting the Commission in the implementation of the performance scheme, has submitted to the Commission a report containing its advice on the assessment of the draft performance plans.
(6) In accordance with Article 14(1) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317(4), the Commission has assessed the consistency of the local performance targets included in the draft performance plans on the basis of the criteria laid down in point 1 of Annex IV to that Implementing Regulation, and taking account of local circumstances where relevant.
(7) As regards the key performance area of safety, the Commission has assessed the consistency of the targets submitted by the Member States concerned regarding the effectiveness of safety management of air navigation service providers based on the criterion laid down in point 1.1 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the Commission has examined whether the proposed targets included in the draft performance plans provide for a level of effectiveness of safety management equal to, or higher than, the level of the Union-wide performance targets.
(8) As regards the key performance area of environment, the consistency of the targets submitted by the Member States concerned regarding the average horizontalen routeflight efficiency of the actual trajectory has been assessed on the basis of the criterion laid down in point 1.2 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the proposed targets included in the draft performance plans have been compared to the relevanten routehorizontal flight efficiency reference values set out in the European Route Network Improvement Plan of 2 July 2024, drawn up in accordance with Annex I to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/123(5)(‘ERNIP’). That assessment was conducted taking account of local circumstances.
(9) As regards the key performance area of capacity, the consistency of the targets submitted by the Member States concerned regarding the averageen routeair traffic flow management (‘ATFM’) delay per flight has been assessed on the basis of the criterion laid down in point 1.3 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the proposed targets included in the draft performance plans have been compared to the relevant reference values set out in the Network Operations Plan of 2 July 2024, drawn up in accordance with Article 9 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/123. That assessment was conducted taking account of local circumstances.
(10) As regards the key performance area of cost-efficiency, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plans regarding the determined unit cost (‘DUC’) foren routeair navigation services has been assessed on the basis of the criteria laid down in points 1.4(a), (b) and (c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Those criteria consist of the DUC trend over RP4, the long-term DUC trend over the third reference period (2020-2024) (‘RP3’) and RP4 (2020-2029), and the baseline value for the DUC at charging zone level compared with the average value of the charging zones where air navigation service providers have a similar operational and economic environment.
(11) Where theen routecost-efficiency targets were found to be inconsistent with the criteria laid down in points 1.4(a), 1.4(b) and 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has further examined, in light of the justifications and evidence provided in the draft performance plans, whether a deviation could be deemed necessary and proportionate on the grounds of point 1.4(d) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(12) The Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plans with a review of the elements set out in point 2 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. In respect of point 2.1(d)(vii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that it has not conducted, as part of that review, a detailed analysis of the methodologies used by Member States for the allocation of costs betweenen routeand terminal services in RP4. Therefore, the Commission has not drawn any conclusions, at this stage, in respect of the compliance of those cost allocation methodologies with points (e) and (f) of Article 15(2) Regulation (EC) No 550/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6)and Article 22(5) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(13) Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland have jointly drawn up and adopted a draft performance plan at the level of the Functional Airspace Block Europe Central (‘FABEC’).
(14) This Decision sets out the Commission’s assessment of the draft performance plan of FABEC (‘the draft FABEC performance plan’) with regard to Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. As a third country subject to the performance and charging scheme pursuant to the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air Transport(7), Switzerland has been notified separately by the Commission of the findings resulting from the assessment of the draft FABEC performance plan(8).
(15) Theen routecost-efficiency targets proposed for theen routecharging zone of Belgium and Luxembourg for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:En routecharging zone of Belgium-Luxembourg2019 baseline value2024 baseline value20252026202720282029Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)EUR 94,14EUR 104,26EUR 104,94EUR 106,08EUR 106,14EUR 104,43EUR 103,83 En routecharging zone of Belgium-Luxembourg 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 94,14 EUR 104,26 EUR 104,94 EUR 106,08 EUR 106,14 EUR 104,43 EUR 103,83
En routecharging zone of Belgium-Luxembourg 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 94,14 EUR 104,26 EUR 104,94 EUR 106,08 EUR 106,14 EUR 104,43 EUR 103,83
En routecharging zone of Belgium-Luxembourg 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 94,14 EUR 104,26 EUR 104,94 EUR 106,08 EUR 106,14 EUR 104,43 EUR 103,83
(16) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the DUC trend of Belgium and Luxembourg at charging zone level of -0,1 % over RP4 underperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(17) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the long-term DUC trend of Belgium and Luxembourg at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of +1,1 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(18) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the baseline value for the DUC of EUR 104,26 of Belgium and Luxembourg, expressed in real terms at 2022 prices (‘EUR2022’), is 10,8 % higher than the average baseline value of EUR 94,13 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7, point (e), of Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(19) It is necessary to examine whether the deviations referred to in recitals (16), (17) and (18) may be deemed necessary and proportionate in accordance with point 1.4(d) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the Commission has assessed whether the observed deviations from the Union-wide DUC trend and from the long-term Union-wide DUC trend referred to in recitals (16) and (17) are exclusively due to additional determined costs related to measures necessary to achieve the performance targets in the key performance area of capacity or to restructuring costs within the meaning of Article 2, point (18), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(20) In respect of the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that Belgium and Luxembourg refer in the draft FABEC performance plan to the additional determined costs incurred over RP4 by the air navigation service providers (‘ANSPs’) skeyes and the Maastricht Upper Area Control Centre (‘MUAC’) in relation to measures needed for the achievement of the local capacity targets (‘capacity measures’). The presented capacity measures comprise the following main elements:(a)the training and recruitment by skeyes and MUAC of new air traffic controllers (‘ATCOs’), mainly to replace the ATCOs expected to retire during RP4, but also to accommodate the forecasted the traffic growth and support system modernisation;(b)the acquisition and deployment by skeyes of a new air traffic management (‘ATM’) system in 2028, which will provide significant functional and technical improvements; the new ATM will replace the current ATM system of skeyes, which has been in use since 2009;(c)the roll-out by skeyes of a new planning tool which will enable an automated rostering of ATCOs, resulting in optimised workforce management and associated operational gains;(d)the development and implementation by MUAC of new tools and functions to support operations;(e)the implementation by MUAC of structural improvements in airspace design and use;(f)the construction by MUAC of a new building for the purpose of hosting a new operations room (OPS room) with supporting offices and facilities. (a) the training and recruitment by skeyes and MUAC of new air traffic controllers (‘ATCOs’), mainly to replace the ATCOs expected to retire during RP4, but also to accommodate the forecasted the traffic growth and support system modernisation; (b) the acquisition and deployment by skeyes of a new air traffic management (‘ATM’) system in 2028, which will provide significant functional and technical improvements; the new ATM will replace the current ATM system of skeyes, which has been in use since 2009; (c) the roll-out by skeyes of a new planning tool which will enable an automated rostering of ATCOs, resulting in optimised workforce management and associated operational gains; (d) the development and implementation by MUAC of new tools and functions to support operations; (e) the implementation by MUAC of structural improvements in airspace design and use; (f) the construction by MUAC of a new building for the purpose of hosting a new operations room (OPS room) with supporting offices and facilities.
(a) the training and recruitment by skeyes and MUAC of new air traffic controllers (‘ATCOs’), mainly to replace the ATCOs expected to retire during RP4, but also to accommodate the forecasted the traffic growth and support system modernisation;
(b) the acquisition and deployment by skeyes of a new air traffic management (‘ATM’) system in 2028, which will provide significant functional and technical improvements; the new ATM will replace the current ATM system of skeyes, which has been in use since 2009;
(c) the roll-out by skeyes of a new planning tool which will enable an automated rostering of ATCOs, resulting in optimised workforce management and associated operational gains;
(d) the development and implementation by MUAC of new tools and functions to support operations;
(e) the implementation by MUAC of structural improvements in airspace design and use;
(f) the construction by MUAC of a new building for the purpose of hosting a new operations room (OPS room) with supporting offices and facilities.
(a) the training and recruitment by skeyes and MUAC of new air traffic controllers (‘ATCOs’), mainly to replace the ATCOs expected to retire during RP4, but also to accommodate the forecasted the traffic growth and support system modernisation;
(b) the acquisition and deployment by skeyes of a new air traffic management (‘ATM’) system in 2028, which will provide significant functional and technical improvements; the new ATM will replace the current ATM system of skeyes, which has been in use since 2009;
(c) the roll-out by skeyes of a new planning tool which will enable an automated rostering of ATCOs, resulting in optimised workforce management and associated operational gains;
(d) the development and implementation by MUAC of new tools and functions to support operations;
(e) the implementation by MUAC of structural improvements in airspace design and use;
(f) the construction by MUAC of a new building for the purpose of hosting a new operations room (OPS room) with supporting offices and facilities.
(21) Having regard to the evaluation made by the PRB, the additional costs reported by Belgium and Luxembourg for the capacity measures referred to in recital (20) are significantly lower in monetary terms than the observed deviations from the Union-wide cost-efficiency trends calculated by the PRB. Furthermore, the Commission observes that certain capacity measures invoked by Belgium and Luxembourg could be considered to be part of the normal operations of the ANSPs concerned or may not directly contribute to enhancing airspace capacity. Hence, it is not possible to conclude, without further detailed information and analysis, on whether the capacity measures presented by Belgium and Luxembourg can be, in their entirety, deemed necessary and proportionate for the achievement of the local capacity performance targets for RP4. Therefore, the Commission notes that the observed deviations from the Union-wide cost-efficiency trends referred to in recitals (16) and (17) cannot be exclusively attributed to the additional costs deriving from the presented capacity measures.
(22) Therefore, the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 should not be considered fulfilled in respect of Belgium and Luxembourg.
(23) Furthermore, the Commission notes that Belgium and Luxembourg have not presented in the draft FABEC performance plan any restructuring measures which would justify a deviation from the Union-wide DUC trend or from the Union-wide long-term DUC trend pursuant to the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(ii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(24) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (15) to (23), the cost-efficiency performance targets for theen routecharging zone of Belgium-Luxembourg should be considered inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(25) Theen routecost-efficiency targets proposed for theen routecharging zone of Germany for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:En routecharging zone of Germany2019 baseline value2024 baseline value20252026202720282029Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)EUR 71,71EUR 74,90EUR 73,16EUR 73,06EUR 73,10EUR 71,87EUR 70,54 En routecharging zone of Germany 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 71,71 EUR 74,90 EUR 73,16 EUR 73,06 EUR 73,10 EUR 71,87 EUR 70,54
En routecharging zone of Germany 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 71,71 EUR 74,90 EUR 73,16 EUR 73,06 EUR 73,10 EUR 71,87 EUR 70,54
En routecharging zone of Germany 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 71,71 EUR 74,90 EUR 73,16 EUR 73,06 EUR 73,10 EUR 71,87 EUR 70,54
(26) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the DUC trend of Germany at charging zone level of -1,2 % over RP4 is in line with the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(27) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the long-term DUC trend of Germany at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of -0,2 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(28) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the baseline value for the DUC of EUR 74,90 of Germany in EUR2022 is 29,9 % higher than the average baseline value of EUR 57,66 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7, point (a), of Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(29) It is necessary to examine whether the deviations referred to in recitals (27) and (28) may be deemed necessary and proportionate in accordance with point 1.4(d) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the Commission has assessed whether the observed deviation from the long-term Union-wide DUC trend referred to in recital (27) is exclusively due to additional determined costs related to measures necessary to achieve the performance targets in the key performance area of capacity or to restructuring costs within the meaning of Article 2, point (18), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(30) In respect of the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that Germany refers in the draft FABEC performance plan to the additional determined costs incurred over RP4 by the ANSPs DFS and MUAC in relation to measures needed for the achievement of the local capacity targets (‘capacity measures’). The presented capacity measures comprise the following main elements:(a)the training and recruitment by DFS and MUAC of new ATCOs: in the case of DFS, that measure is planned to result over RP4 into an overall increase of over 10 % of the number of ATCOs in operations at the area control centres (‘ACCs’) of Bremen, Karlsruhe, Langen and Munich, in order to address the capacity shortages faced by those ACCs; for MUAC, the number of ATCOs in operations is planned to only slightly increase over RP4 but the intake of new ATCOs will remain significant in order to make up for the expected high number of ATCO retirements over that reference period;(b)the acquisition and deployment by DFS of new ATM system functionalities for the ACC of Bremen and Munich; those functionalities are expected to result in operational improvements in the provision of ANS, including enhanced airspace capacity;(c)the initiative by MUAC and DFS, in respect of the ACC of Karlsruhe, to set up two geo-redundant data centres capable of supporting and replacing each other, with the objective of strengthening the service quality of air navigation services;(d)the participation of DFS, together with six other ANSPs, in a cooperation programme aiming at the development of a common future ATM system for the ANSPs concerned; DFS considers that the resulting new ATM system could be deployed at the ACC of Langen, not earlier than 2031, thus not within the timeframe of RP4;(e)the deployment by DFS of the technical systems and software necessary to comply with the sub-functionality ‘AF6 – Initial Trajectory Information Sharing’ required under Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/116(10);(f)the implementation by DFS of changes in its surveillance system and of a new tool supporting a more efficient and dynamic sectorisation of airspace;(g)the development and implementation by MUAC of new tools and functions to support operations;(h)the implementation by MUAC of structural improvements in airspace design and use;(i)the construction by MUAC of a new building for the purpose of hosting a new operations room (OPS room) with supporting offices and facilities. (a) the training and recruitment by DFS and MUAC of new ATCOs: in the case of DFS, that measure is planned to result over RP4 into an overall increase of over 10 % of the number of ATCOs in operations at the area control centres (‘ACCs’) of Bremen, Karlsruhe, Langen and Munich, in order to address the capacity shortages faced by those ACCs; for MUAC, the number of ATCOs in operations is planned to only slightly increase over RP4 but the intake of new ATCOs will remain significant in order to make up for the expected high number of ATCO retirements over that reference period; (b) the acquisition and deployment by DFS of new ATM system functionalities for the ACC of Bremen and Munich; those functionalities are expected to result in operational improvements in the provision of ANS, including enhanced airspace capacity; (c) the initiative by MUAC and DFS, in respect of the ACC of Karlsruhe, to set up two geo-redundant data centres capable of supporting and replacing each other, with the objective of strengthening the service quality of air navigation services; (d) the participation of DFS, together with six other ANSPs, in a cooperation programme aiming at the development of a common future ATM system for the ANSPs concerned; DFS considers that the resulting new ATM system could be deployed at the ACC of Langen, not earlier than 2031, thus not within the timeframe of RP4; (e) the deployment by DFS of the technical systems and software necessary to comply with the sub-functionality ‘AF6 – Initial Trajectory Information Sharing’ required under Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/116(10); (f) the implementation by DFS of changes in its surveillance system and of a new tool supporting a more efficient and dynamic sectorisation of airspace; (g) the development and implementation by MUAC of new tools and functions to support operations; (h) the implementation by MUAC of structural improvements in airspace design and use; (i) the construction by MUAC of a new building for the purpose of hosting a new operations room (OPS room) with supporting offices and facilities.
(a) the training and recruitment by DFS and MUAC of new ATCOs: in the case of DFS, that measure is planned to result over RP4 into an overall increase of over 10 % of the number of ATCOs in operations at the area control centres (‘ACCs’) of Bremen, Karlsruhe, Langen and Munich, in order to address the capacity shortages faced by those ACCs; for MUAC, the number of ATCOs in operations is planned to only slightly increase over RP4 but the intake of new ATCOs will remain significant in order to make up for the expected high number of ATCO retirements over that reference period;
(b) the acquisition and deployment by DFS of new ATM system functionalities for the ACC of Bremen and Munich; those functionalities are expected to result in operational improvements in the provision of ANS, including enhanced airspace capacity;
(c) the initiative by MUAC and DFS, in respect of the ACC of Karlsruhe, to set up two geo-redundant data centres capable of supporting and replacing each other, with the objective of strengthening the service quality of air navigation services;
(d) the participation of DFS, together with six other ANSPs, in a cooperation programme aiming at the development of a common future ATM system for the ANSPs concerned; DFS considers that the resulting new ATM system could be deployed at the ACC of Langen, not earlier than 2031, thus not within the timeframe of RP4;
(e) the deployment by DFS of the technical systems and software necessary to comply with the sub-functionality ‘AF6 – Initial Trajectory Information Sharing’ required under Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/116(10);
(f) the implementation by DFS of changes in its surveillance system and of a new tool supporting a more efficient and dynamic sectorisation of airspace;
(g) the development and implementation by MUAC of new tools and functions to support operations;
(h) the implementation by MUAC of structural improvements in airspace design and use;
(i) the construction by MUAC of a new building for the purpose of hosting a new operations room (OPS room) with supporting offices and facilities.
(a) the training and recruitment by DFS and MUAC of new ATCOs: in the case of DFS, that measure is planned to result over RP4 into an overall increase of over 10 % of the number of ATCOs in operations at the area control centres (‘ACCs’) of Bremen, Karlsruhe, Langen and Munich, in order to address the capacity shortages faced by those ACCs; for MUAC, the number of ATCOs in operations is planned to only slightly increase over RP4 but the intake of new ATCOs will remain significant in order to make up for the expected high number of ATCO retirements over that reference period;
(b) the acquisition and deployment by DFS of new ATM system functionalities for the ACC of Bremen and Munich; those functionalities are expected to result in operational improvements in the provision of ANS, including enhanced airspace capacity;
(c) the initiative by MUAC and DFS, in respect of the ACC of Karlsruhe, to set up two geo-redundant data centres capable of supporting and replacing each other, with the objective of strengthening the service quality of air navigation services;
(d) the participation of DFS, together with six other ANSPs, in a cooperation programme aiming at the development of a common future ATM system for the ANSPs concerned; DFS considers that the resulting new ATM system could be deployed at the ACC of Langen, not earlier than 2031, thus not within the timeframe of RP4;
(e) the deployment by DFS of the technical systems and software necessary to comply with the sub-functionality ‘AF6 – Initial Trajectory Information Sharing’ required under Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/116(10);
(f) the implementation by DFS of changes in its surveillance system and of a new tool supporting a more efficient and dynamic sectorisation of airspace;
(g) the development and implementation by MUAC of new tools and functions to support operations;
(h) the implementation by MUAC of structural improvements in airspace design and use;
(i) the construction by MUAC of a new building for the purpose of hosting a new operations room (OPS room) with supporting offices and facilities.
(31) Having regard to the evaluation made by the PRB, the additional costs reported by Germany for the capacity measures referred to in recital (30) are significantly lower in monetary terms than the observed deviation from the Union-wide long-term cost-efficiency trend calculated by the PRB.
(32) Furthermore, the Commission observes that certain capacity measures invoked by Germany could be considered to be part of the normal operations of the ANSPs concerned or may not directly contribute to enhancing airspace capacity. Hence, it is not possible to conclude, without further detailed information and analysis, on whether the capacity measures presented by Germany can be, in their entirety, deemed necessary and proportionate for the achievement of the local capacity performance targets for RP4. Therefore, the Commission notes that the observed deviations from the long-term Union-wide DUC trend referred to in recital (27) cannot be exclusively attributed to the additional costs deriving from the presented capacity measures.
(33) Therefore, the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 should not be considered fulfilled in respect of Germany.
(34) Furthermore, the Commission notes that Germany has not presented in the draft FABEC performance plan any restructuring measures which would justify a deviation from the Union-wide DUC trend or from the Union-wide long-term DUC trend pursuant to the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(ii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(35) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (25) to (34), the cost-efficiency performance targets for theen routecharging zone of Germany should be considered inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(36) Theen routecost-efficiency targets proposed for theen routecharging zone of the Netherlands for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:En routecharging zone of the Netherlands2019 baseline value2024 baseline value20252026202720282029Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)EUR 86,52EUR 104,60EUR 103,51EUR 103,61EUR 106,50EUR 106,28EUR 105,95 En routecharging zone of the Netherlands 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 86,52 EUR 104,60 EUR 103,51 EUR 103,61 EUR 106,50 EUR 106,28 EUR 105,95
En routecharging zone of the Netherlands 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 86,52 EUR 104,60 EUR 103,51 EUR 103,61 EUR 106,50 EUR 106,28 EUR 105,95
En routecharging zone of the Netherlands 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 86,52 EUR 104,60 EUR 103,51 EUR 103,61 EUR 106,50 EUR 106,28 EUR 105,95
(37) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the DUC trend of the Netherlands at charging zone level of +0,3 % over RP4 underperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(38) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the long-term DUC trend of the Netherlands at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of +2,3 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(39) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the baseline value for the DUC of EUR 104,60 of the Netherlands in EUR2022 is 11,3 % higher than the average baseline value of EUR 94,01 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7, point (e), of Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(40) It is necessary to examine whether the deviations referred to in recitals (37) to (39) may be deemed necessary and proportionate in accordance with point 1.4(d) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the Commission has assessed whether the observed deviations from the Union-wide DUC trend and from the long-term Union-wide DUC trend referred to in recitals (37) and (38) are exclusively due to additional determined costs related to measures necessary to achieve the performance targets in the key performance area of capacity or to restructuring costs within the meaning of Article 2, point (18), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(41) In respect of the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that the Netherlands refers in the draft FABEC performance plan to the additional determined costs incurred over RP4 by the ANSPs LVNL and MUAC in relation to measures needed for the achievement of the local capacity targets (‘capacity measures’). The presented capacity measures comprise the following main elements:(a)the training and recruitment by LVNL and MUAC of new ATCOs, mainly to replace the ATCOs expected to retire during RP4, but also to accommodate the forecasted the traffic growth and support system modernisation;(b)the improvement by LVNL of its ATCO training facilities and simulators, in order to increase training capacity and output;(c)the upgrade by LVNL of its ATM system, which is foreseen to enable future improvements in airspace capacity;(d)the development and implementation by MUAC of new tools and functions to support operations;(e)the implementation by MUAC of structural improvements in airspace design and use;(f)the construction by MUAC of a new building for the purpose of hosting a new operations room (OPS room) with supporting offices and facilities. (a) the training and recruitment by LVNL and MUAC of new ATCOs, mainly to replace the ATCOs expected to retire during RP4, but also to accommodate the forecasted the traffic growth and support system modernisation; (b) the improvement by LVNL of its ATCO training facilities and simulators, in order to increase training capacity and output; (c) the upgrade by LVNL of its ATM system, which is foreseen to enable future improvements in airspace capacity; (d) the development and implementation by MUAC of new tools and functions to support operations; (e) the implementation by MUAC of structural improvements in airspace design and use; (f) the construction by MUAC of a new building for the purpose of hosting a new operations room (OPS room) with supporting offices and facilities.
(a) the training and recruitment by LVNL and MUAC of new ATCOs, mainly to replace the ATCOs expected to retire during RP4, but also to accommodate the forecasted the traffic growth and support system modernisation;
(b) the improvement by LVNL of its ATCO training facilities and simulators, in order to increase training capacity and output;
(c) the upgrade by LVNL of its ATM system, which is foreseen to enable future improvements in airspace capacity;
(d) the development and implementation by MUAC of new tools and functions to support operations;
(e) the implementation by MUAC of structural improvements in airspace design and use;
(f) the construction by MUAC of a new building for the purpose of hosting a new operations room (OPS room) with supporting offices and facilities.
(a) the training and recruitment by LVNL and MUAC of new ATCOs, mainly to replace the ATCOs expected to retire during RP4, but also to accommodate the forecasted the traffic growth and support system modernisation;
(b) the improvement by LVNL of its ATCO training facilities and simulators, in order to increase training capacity and output;
(c) the upgrade by LVNL of its ATM system, which is foreseen to enable future improvements in airspace capacity;
(d) the development and implementation by MUAC of new tools and functions to support operations;
(e) the implementation by MUAC of structural improvements in airspace design and use;
(f) the construction by MUAC of a new building for the purpose of hosting a new operations room (OPS room) with supporting offices and facilities.
(42) Having regard to the evaluation made by the PRB, the additional costs reported by the Netherlands for the capacity measures referred to in recital (41) are significantly lower in monetary terms than the observed deviations from the Union-wide cost-efficiency trends calculated by the PRB. Furthermore, the Commission observes that certain capacity measures invoked by the Netherlands could be considered part of the normal operations of the ANSPs concerned or may not directly contribute to enhancing airspace capacity. Hence, it is not possible to conclude, without further detailed information and analysis, on whether the capacity measures presented by the Netherlands can be, in their entirety, deemed necessary and proportionate for the achievement of the local capacity performance targets for RP4. Therefore, the Commission notes that the observed deviations from the Union-wide cost-efficiency trends referred to in recitals (37) and (38) cannot be exclusively attributed to the additional costs deriving from the presented capacity measures.
(43) Therefore, the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 should not be considered fulfilled in respect of the Netherlands.
(44) Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Netherlands have not presented in the draft FABEC performance plan any restructuring measures which would justify a deviation from the Union-wide DUC trend or from the Union-wide long-term DUC trend pursuant to the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(ii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(45) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (36) to (44), the cost-efficiency performance targets for theen routecharging zone of the Netherlands should be considered inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(46) In accordance with point 2.1(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft FABEC performance plan by reviewing the measures for the achievement of the safety targets included in that plan.
(47) On the basis of the review referred to in recital (46), the Commission notes that the draft FABEC performance plan includes measures for the achievement of the safety performance targets with a view to meeting the Union-wide targets in 2029. However, the Commission notes that, despite those measures, the intermediate targets for years 2025 to 2028 presented by Luxembourg and the Netherlands for the ANSPs ANALUX and LVNL respectively, are abnormally low. Such low intermediate targets are not justified in light of the actual performance of those ANSPs in RP3 and the measures presented for achievement of those safety targets for RP4.
(48) Therefore, the Commission considers that Luxembourg and the Netherlands should address the findings set out in recital (47) by improving the targeted safety management levels for years 2025 to 2028 for the ANSPs ANALUX and LVNL respectively, including by putting in place additional measures if necessary.
(49) In accordance with point 2.1(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft FABEC performance plan by reviewing the measures for the achievement of the environment targets included in that plan.
(50) On the basis of the review referred to in recital (49), the Commission has strong doubts as to whether the measures presented by Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands for the achievement of the environment performance targets of FABEC are adequate to enable those targets to be effectively reached. Having regard to the PRB’s findings, the Commission observes, in particular, that the measures presented by France in respect of the ANSP ‘DSNA’ are insufficient to enable the targeted flight efficiency improvements in RP4.
(51) Therefore, the Commission considers that FABEC should put in place additional measures for the achievement of its environment targets for RP4, for example, through the effective implementation of free route airspace and the implementation of cross-border free route airspace with additional neighbouring Member States.
(52) In accordance with point 2.1(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft FABEC performance plan by reviewing the measures for the achievement of theen routecapacity targets included in that plan.
(53) On the basis of the review referred to in recital (52), the Commission has strong doubts as to whether the measures presented by Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands for the achievement of theen routecapacity performance targets of FABEC are adequate to enable those targets to be effectively reached. Having regard to the PRB’s findings, the Commission observes, in particular, that the measures presented by Germany in respect of the ANSP ‘DFS’ are insufficient to effectively meet the traffic demand expected in RP4.
(54) Therefore, the Commission considers that FABEC should put in place additional measures for the achievement of itsen routecapacity targets for RP4, for example, in respect of the training and recruitment of additional ATCOs, a more efficient use of resources, and cooperation arrangements between air navigation service providers.
(55) In accordance with point 2.1(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft FABEC performance plan by reviewing the capacity performance targets for terminal air navigation services set in respect of the airports referred to in Articles 1(3) and (4) of that Implementing Regulation. It was found that those targets give rise to concerns.
(56) In respect of Belgium, the Commission notes that the proposed terminal capacity targets for RP4 lead to a significant deterioration of the average arrival ATFM delay per year compared to RP3. Indeed, the proposed RP4 targets are set at 0,94 minute per flight, except for year 2027 for which a target of 2,00 minutes per flight is proposed, whereas the actual performance recorded in 2024 was 0,28 minute per flight. Furthermore, it was found that those terminal capacity targets result in a significantly worse level of average arrival ATFM delay per flight for Brussels airport than the level of performance of similar airports identified by the PRB.
(57) In respect of the Netherlands, the Commission notes that the average arrival ATFM delay recorded in the last three years of RP3 were at a high level, reaching 3,50 minutes per flight in 2024. The proposed terminal capacity targets for RP4, although an improvement compared to RP3, result in a significantly worse level of average arrival ATFM delay per flight for Amsterdam Schiphol airport than the level of performance of similar airports identified by the PRB.
(58) Therefore, the Commission considers that Belgium and the Netherlands should further justify the terminal capacity targets for RP4 in light of the observations set out in recitals (56) and (57), or should revise downwards those targets.
(59) In accordance with point 2.1(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft FABEC performance plan by reviewing the cost-efficiency performance targets for terminal air navigation services set in respect of the airports referred to in Articles 1(3) and (4) of that Implementing Regulation. It was found that those targets give rise to concerns.
(60) In respect of the terminal charging zone of Belgium, the Commission notes that the proposed cost-efficiency targets lead to a DUC trend of -0,8 % over RP4. However, it was found that the average DUC for RP4 for the terminal air navigation services at Brussels airport is estimated to be higher, by a significant margin, than the median DUC of the similar airports identified by the PRB.
(61) In respect of the terminal charging zone of Germany, the Commission notes that the proposed cost-efficiency targets lead to a DUC trend of -0,8 % over RP4. However, it was found that the average DUC for RP4 for the terminal air navigation services at the airports of Munich, Hamburg, Dusseldorf and Cologne-Bonn is estimated to be higher, by a significant margin, than the median DUC of the relevant group of similar airports.
(62) In respect of the terminal charging zone of the Netherlands, the Commission notes that the proposed cost-efficiency targets lead to a deteriorating DUC trend of +0,4 % over RP4. Furthermore, it was found that the average DUC for RP4 of terminal air navigation services at Amsterdam-Schiphol airport is estimated to be higher, by a significant margin, than the median DUC of the relevant group of similar airports.
(63) Therefore, the Commission considers that Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands should further justify their terminal cost-efficiency targets for RP4 in light of the observations set out in recitals (60), (61) and (62), or should revise downwards those targets.
(64) In accordance with point 2.1(f) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has reviewed the incentive schemes included in the draft FABEC performance plan for the purpose of supporting the achievement of capacity targets (‘capacity incentive schemes’). It was found that the capacity incentive schemes for RP4 established by Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands foren routeand terminal services give rise to concerns.
(65) The Commission notes that theen routecapacity incentive scheme of FABEC and the terminal capacity incentive schemes of Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands, as established in the draft FABEC performance plan, comprise a maximum financial disadvantage amounting to merely 0,50 % of determined costs. Having regard to the expert advice provided by the PRB, the Commission considers that that the maximum financial disadvantages for those incentive schemes do not comply with Article 11(3), point (a), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, which requires such incentive schemes to have ‘material impact on revenue at risk’.
(66) Therefore, Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands should revise the capacity incentive schemes referred to in recital (65) so that the maximum financial disadvantages stemming from those incentive schemes are set at a level having a material impact on the revenue at risk, as required by Article 11(3), point (a), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. In the Commission’s view, that revision should lead to a maximum financial disadvantage equal to or higher than 1 % of the annual determined costs.
(67) Theen routecost-efficiency targets proposed by Denmark for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:En routecharging zone of Denmark2019 baseline value2024 baseline value20252026202720282029Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)DKK 466,58DKK 543,10DKK 529,76DKK 521,41DKK 515,34DKK 506,93DKK 500,26EUR 62,74EUR 73,02EUR 71,23EUR 70,11EUR 69,29EUR 68,16EUR 67,26 En routecharging zone of Denmark 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) DKK 466,58 DKK 543,10 DKK 529,76 DKK 521,41 DKK 515,34 DKK 506,93 DKK 500,26 EUR 62,74 EUR 73,02 EUR 71,23 EUR 70,11 EUR 69,29 EUR 68,16 EUR 67,26
En routecharging zone of Denmark 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) DKK 466,58 DKK 543,10 DKK 529,76 DKK 521,41 DKK 515,34 DKK 506,93 DKK 500,26
EUR 62,74 EUR 73,02 EUR 71,23 EUR 70,11 EUR 69,29 EUR 68,16 EUR 67,26
En routecharging zone of Denmark 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) DKK 466,58 DKK 543,10 DKK 529,76 DKK 521,41 DKK 515,34 DKK 506,93 DKK 500,26
EUR 62,74 EUR 73,02 EUR 71,23 EUR 70,11 EUR 69,29 EUR 68,16 EUR 67,26
(68) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the DUC trend of Denmark at charging zone level of -1,6 % over RP4 outperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(69) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the long-term DUC trend of Denmark at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of +0,8 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(70) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the baseline value for the DUC of EUR 73,02 of Denmark in EUR2022 is 19,9 % higher than the average baseline value of EUR 60,91 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7, point (f), of Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(71) Furthermore, the Commission notes that Denmark has not presented any justifications for the deviations referred to in recitals (69) and (70) on the grounds of additional determined costs related to measures necessary for the achievement of capacity targets or restructuring costs within the meaning of Article 2, point (18), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Therefore, the assessment criteria set out in points 1.4(d)(i) and (ii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 should not be considered fulfilled in respect of Denmark.
(72) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (67) to (71), the cost-efficiency performance targets for theen routecharging zone of Denmark should be considered inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(73) Theen routecost-efficiency targets proposed by Estonia for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:En routecharging zone of Estonia2019 baseline value2024 baseline value20252026202720282029Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)EUR 38,12EUR 54,69EUR 50,46EUR 52,95EUR 54,37EUR 54,54EUR 55,69 En routecharging zone of Estonia 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 38,12 EUR 54,69 EUR 50,46 EUR 52,95 EUR 54,37 EUR 54,54 EUR 55,69
En routecharging zone of Estonia 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 38,12 EUR 54,69 EUR 50,46 EUR 52,95 EUR 54,37 EUR 54,54 EUR 55,69
En routecharging zone of Estonia 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 38,12 EUR 54,69 EUR 50,46 EUR 52,95 EUR 54,37 EUR 54,54 EUR 55,69
(74) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the DUC trend of Estonia at charging zone level of +0,4 % over RP4 underperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(75) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the long-term DUC trend of Estonia at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of +4,3 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(76) The Commission notes, however, that Estonia has lost, as a consequence of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, a significant share of the overflights which it historically used to serve. That traffic reduction continues over RP4 to considerably impact the cost-efficiency performance of the ANSP of Estonia and has, in particular, a negative effect on the long-term DUC trend of Estonia calculated over RP3 and RP4 combined.
(77) It is therefore necessary and appropriate to examine, for the purpose of the assessment criterion referred to in recital (75), whether Estonia would meet the Union-wide long-term DUC trend in the absence of the circumstances referred to in recital (76).
(78) To that end, the Commission has recalculated Estonia’s long-term DUC trend over RP3 and RP4 in light of the estimated structural loss of traffic for Estonia as a consequence of the war in Ukraine, measured inen routeservice units. That recalculation results in an adjusted long-term DUC trend for Estonia of -2,4 %, which outperforms the long-term Union-wide DUC trend of -1,0 %. Therefore, it is concluded that Estonia fulfils the assessment criterion referred to in recital (75) after taking into account the effect of the significant traffic reduction resulting from the war in Ukraine.
(79) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the baseline value for the DUC of EUR 54,69 of Estonia in EUR2022 is 5,2 % higher than the average baseline value of EUR 52,00 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7, point (d), of Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(80) Furthermore, the Commission notes that Estonia has not presented any justifications for the deviations referred to in recitals (74) and (79) on the grounds of additional determined costs related to measures necessary for achievement of capacity targets or restructuring costs within the meaning of Article 2, point (18), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Therefore, the assessment criteria set out in points 1.4(d)(i) and (ii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 should not be considered fulfilled in respect of Estonia.
(81) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (73) to (80), the cost-efficiency performance targets for theen routecharging zone of Estonia should be considered inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(82) Theen routecapacity targets proposed by Greece for RP4, expressed in minutes of ATFM delay per flight, and the corresponding reference values from the Network Operations Plan of 2 July 2024, are as follows:Greece20252026202720282029Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes ofen routeATFM delay per flight0,690,500,190,160,16Reference values0,340,250,190,160,16 Greece 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes ofen routeATFM delay per flight 0,69 0,50 0,19 0,16 0,16 Reference values 0,34 0,25 0,19 0,16 0,16
Greece 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes ofen routeATFM delay per flight 0,69 0,50 0,19 0,16 0,16
Reference values 0,34 0,25 0,19 0,16 0,16
Greece 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes ofen routeATFM delay per flight 0,69 0,50 0,19 0,16 0,16
Reference values 0,34 0,25 0,19 0,16 0,16
(83) The Commission observes that the capacity targets proposed by Greece for the years 2027, 2028 and 2029 are equal to the corresponding national reference values. However, the proposed capacity targets are significantly higher than the reference values in respect of years 2025 and 2026.
(84) The measures for the achievement of capacity targets presented by Greece include the training and recruitment by the ANSP of a high number of new ATCOs, amounting over RP4 to an overall increase of 35 % of the number of full-time equivalent ATCOs in operations at the ACC. Furthermore, the ANSP plans to deploy a new ATM system, upgrade its radar network, implement airspace reorganisation measures and improve its air traffic flow and capacity management procedures.
(85) Based on the evaluation made by the PRB, the Commission notes that certain relevant capacity enhancement measures outlined in the Network Operations Plan of 2 July 2024 are not included in the draft performance plan of Greece. This may result in a capacity gap during RP4, including in years 2025 and 2026 for which the proposed capacity targets are higher than the corresponding reference values.
(86) Greece states in its draft performance plan that the capacity targets for calendar years 2025 and 2026 could not be set in line with the reference values included in the Network Operations Plan of 2 July 2024 because of the more optimistic growth of air traffic predicted in the October 2024 STATFOR traffic forecast. Greece explains that the ANSP incurred delays in RP3 in the implementation of its RP3 investment plan and in the recruitment of ATCOs, which has resulted in operational constraints at local level. Greece invokes, in particular, the technical limitations related to the legacy systems currently in use by the ANSP, which are planned to be replaced or modernised only later in the course of RP4.
(87) However, in the light of the assessment criteria set out in point 1.3 to Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission considers that the information and evidence provided by Greece in its draft performance plan, including in respect of relevant local circumstances, do not justify the proposed significant deviations of the capacity targets for years 2025 and 2026 from the corresponding reference values. The Commission takes the view that it would be possible for Greece to put in place additional measures to improve its capacity targets for those years in order to mitigate the negative effects of the delayed recruitment of ATCOs and the non-realisation of planned investments in RP3.
(88) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (82) to (87), the capacity targets of Greece should be considered inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(89) Theen routecost-efficiency targets proposed by Greece for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:En routecharging zone of Greece2019 baseline value2024 baseline value20252026202720282029Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)EUR 28,84EUR 25,04EUR 24,67EUR 24,01EUR 24,95EUR 26,40EUR 25,72 En routecharging zone of Greece 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 28,84 EUR 25,04 EUR 24,67 EUR 24,01 EUR 24,95 EUR 26,40 EUR 25,72
En routecharging zone of Greece 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 28,84 EUR 25,04 EUR 24,67 EUR 24,01 EUR 24,95 EUR 26,40 EUR 25,72
En routecharging zone of Greece 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 28,84 EUR 25,04 EUR 24,67 EUR 24,01 EUR 24,95 EUR 26,40 EUR 25,72
(90) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the DUC trend of Greece at charging zone level of +0,5 % over RP4 underperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(91) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the long-term DUC trend of Greece at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of -1,3 % outperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(92) The Commission notes that the baseline value for year 2019 presented by Greece in its draft performance plan includes cost adjustments amounting to EUR 19,5 M of additional costs expressed in EUR 2022. According to the PRB’s analysis, those adjustments were not part of the 2019 baseline value set in Greece’s performance plan for RP3 and have not been adequately justified by Greece in its draft RP4 performance plan.
(93) It is therefore necessary to examine, for the purpose of the assessment criterion referred to in recital (91), whether Greece would meet the Union-wide long-term DUC trend in the absence of the adjustments in respect of the 2019 baseline value, referred to in recital (92).
(94) To that end, the Commission has recalculated Greece’s long DUC trend over RP3 and RP4 by using the baseline value for 2019 included in Greece’s RP3 performance plan, instead of the adjusted baseline value included in Greece draft performance plan for RP4. That recalculation results in an adjusted long-term DUC trend for Greece of +0,1 %, which underperforms the long-term Union-wide DUC trend of -1,0 %. Therefore, it is concluded that Greece does not fulfil the assessment criterion referred to in recital (91).
(95) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the 2024 baseline value for the DUC of EUR 25,04 of Greece in EUR2022 is 39,2 % lower than the average baseline value of EUR 41,19 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7, point (c), of Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(96) Furthermore, the Commission notes that Greece has not presented any justifications for the deviations referred to in recitals (90) and (91) on the grounds of measures for the achievement of capacity targets or restructuring measures within the meaning of Article 2, point (18), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Therefore, the assessment criteria set out in points 1.4(d)(i) and (ii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 should not be considered fulfilled in respect of Greece.
(97) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (89) to (96), the cost-efficiency performance targets for theen routecharging zone of Greece should be considered inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(98) In accordance with point 2.1(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan of Greece by reviewing the measures for the achievement of the environment targets included in that plan.
(99) On the basis of the review referred to in recital (98), the Commission has doubts as to whether the measures presented by Greece for the achievement of its environment performance targets are adequate to enable those targets to be effectively reached. Having regard to the PRB’s findings, the Commission observes, in particular, that Greece has not committed, in the draft performance plan, to the implementation of several relevant measures set out in the ERNIP.
(100) Therefore, the Commission considers that Greece should improve the measures for the achievement of its environment targets for RP4 presented in the draft performance plan, including by committing to all the operational measures set out in the ERNIP and expediting the implementation of cross-border free route airspace.
(101) Theen routecost-efficiency targets proposed by Ireland for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:En routecharging zone of Ireland2019 baseline value2024 baseline value20252026202720282029Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)EUR 27,59EUR 27,29EUR 28,61EUR 29,72EUR 29,75EUR 29,84EUR 30,14 En routecharging zone of Ireland 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 27,59 EUR 27,29 EUR 28,61 EUR 29,72 EUR 29,75 EUR 29,84 EUR 30,14
En routecharging zone of Ireland 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 27,59 EUR 27,29 EUR 28,61 EUR 29,72 EUR 29,75 EUR 29,84 EUR 30,14
En routecharging zone of Ireland 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 27,59 EUR 27,29 EUR 28,61 EUR 29,72 EUR 29,75 EUR 29,84 EUR 30,14
(102) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the DUC trend of Ireland at charging zone level of +2,0 % over RP4 underperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(103) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the long-term DUC trend of Ireland at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of +1,0 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(104) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the baseline value for the DUC of EUR 27,29 of Ireland in EUR2022 is 4,0 % lower than the average baseline value of EUR 28,43 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7, point (b), of Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(105) It is necessary to examine whether the deviations referred to in recitals (102) and (103) may be deemed necessary and proportionate in accordance with point 1.4(d) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the Commission has assessed whether the observed deviations from the Union-wide DUC trend and from the long-term Union-wide DUC trend referred to in recitals (102) and (103) are exclusively due to additional determined costs related to measures necessary to achieve the performance targets in the key performance area of capacity or to restructuring costs within the meaning of Article 2, point (18), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(106) In respect of the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that Ireland refers in the draft performance plan to the additional determined costs incurred over RP4 by the ANSP AirNav Ireland in relation to measures needed for the achievement of the local capacity targets (‘capacity measures’). The presented capacity measures comprise the following main elements:(a)the training and employment of additional ATCOs in operations in order to handle the expected traffic increase during RP4;(b)the employment of additional air traffic safety electronics personnel in order to support the delivery of capital investment projects, in particularly the planned implementation of a new ATM system during RP4;(c)the employment of additional overhead support staff in order to release ATCOs from non-operational tasks and increase ATCO productivity;(d)the acquisition and deployment of a new ATM system, which will provide significant functional and technical improvements; the new ATM will replace the current ATM system of AirNav Ireland, which has been in use for 17 years; in connection with the new ATM system, AirNav Ireland also plans to implement a new contingency ATM system and to extend its ACC buildings for the purpose of proving and testing facilities of the new ATM system;(e)the upgrade of radar infrastructure in use, in particular by replacing technical components which have reached their end of life;(f)the acquisition of equipment and tools to support the resilience of operations. (a) the training and employment of additional ATCOs in operations in order to handle the expected traffic increase during RP4; (b) the employment of additional air traffic safety electronics personnel in order to support the delivery of capital investment projects, in particularly the planned implementation of a new ATM system during RP4; (c) the employment of additional overhead support staff in order to release ATCOs from non-operational tasks and increase ATCO productivity; (d) the acquisition and deployment of a new ATM system, which will provide significant functional and technical improvements; the new ATM will replace the current ATM system of AirNav Ireland, which has been in use for 17 years; in connection with the new ATM system, AirNav Ireland also plans to implement a new contingency ATM system and to extend its ACC buildings for the purpose of proving and testing facilities of the new ATM system; (e) the upgrade of radar infrastructure in use, in particular by replacing technical components which have reached their end of life; (f) the acquisition of equipment and tools to support the resilience of operations.
(a) the training and employment of additional ATCOs in operations in order to handle the expected traffic increase during RP4;
(b) the employment of additional air traffic safety electronics personnel in order to support the delivery of capital investment projects, in particularly the planned implementation of a new ATM system during RP4;
(c) the employment of additional overhead support staff in order to release ATCOs from non-operational tasks and increase ATCO productivity;
(d) the acquisition and deployment of a new ATM system, which will provide significant functional and technical improvements; the new ATM will replace the current ATM system of AirNav Ireland, which has been in use for 17 years; in connection with the new ATM system, AirNav Ireland also plans to implement a new contingency ATM system and to extend its ACC buildings for the purpose of proving and testing facilities of the new ATM system;
(e) the upgrade of radar infrastructure in use, in particular by replacing technical components which have reached their end of life;
(f) the acquisition of equipment and tools to support the resilience of operations.
(a) the training and employment of additional ATCOs in operations in order to handle the expected traffic increase during RP4;
(b) the employment of additional air traffic safety electronics personnel in order to support the delivery of capital investment projects, in particularly the planned implementation of a new ATM system during RP4;
(c) the employment of additional overhead support staff in order to release ATCOs from non-operational tasks and increase ATCO productivity;
(d) the acquisition and deployment of a new ATM system, which will provide significant functional and technical improvements; the new ATM will replace the current ATM system of AirNav Ireland, which has been in use for 17 years; in connection with the new ATM system, AirNav Ireland also plans to implement a new contingency ATM system and to extend its ACC buildings for the purpose of proving and testing facilities of the new ATM system;
(e) the upgrade of radar infrastructure in use, in particular by replacing technical components which have reached their end of life;
(f) the acquisition of equipment and tools to support the resilience of operations.
(107) Having regard to the evaluation made by the PRB, the additional costs reported by Ireland for the capacity measures referred to in recital (106) would cover in monetary terms the observed deviations from the Union-wide cost-efficiency trends calculated by the PRB. However, according to the PRB, Ireland does not face major capacity-related issues, the resolution of which would require significant additional costs in RP4.
(108) Furthermore, the Commission observes that certain capacity measures invoked by Ireland could be considered to be part of the normal operations of the ANSP concerned or may not directly contribute to enhancing airspace capacity. Therefore, it is not possible to conclude, without further detailed information and analysis, on whether the capacity measures presented by Ireland can be, in their entirety, deemed necessary and proportionate for the achievement of the local capacity performance targets for RP4.
(109) Therefore, the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 should not be considered fulfilled in respect of Ireland.
(110) Furthermore, the Commission notes that Ireland has not presented in the draft performance plan any restructuring measures which would justify a deviation from the Union-wide DUC trend or from the Union-wide long-term DUC trend pursuant to the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(ii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(111) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (101) to (110), the cost-efficiency performance targets for theen routecharging zone of Ireland should be considered inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(112) Theen routecost-efficiency targets proposed by Latvia for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:En routecharging zone of Latvia2019 baseline value2024 baseline value20252026202720282029Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)EUR 28,57EUR 37,97EUR 48,73EUR 53,56EUR 57,79EUR 61,14EUR 63,75 En routecharging zone of Latvia 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 28,57 EUR 37,97 EUR 48,73 EUR 53,56 EUR 57,79 EUR 61,14 EUR 63,75
En routecharging zone of Latvia 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 28,57 EUR 37,97 EUR 48,73 EUR 53,56 EUR 57,79 EUR 61,14 EUR 63,75
En routecharging zone of Latvia 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 28,57 EUR 37,97 EUR 48,73 EUR 53,56 EUR 57,79 EUR 61,14 EUR 63,75
(113) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the DUC trend of Latvia at charging zone level of +10,9 % over RP4 underperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(114) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the long-term DUC trend of Latvia at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of +9,3 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(115) The Commission notes, however, that Latvia has lost, as a consequence of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, a significant share of the overflights which it historically used to serve. That traffic reduction continues over RP4 to considerably impact the cost-efficiency performance of the ANSP of Latvia and has, in particular, a negative effect on the long-term DUC trend of Latvia calculated over RP3 and RP4 combined.
(116) It is therefore necessary and appropriate to examine, for the purpose of the assessment criterion referred to in recital (114), whether Latvia would meet the Union-wide long-term DUC trend in the absence of the circumstances referred to in recital (115).
(117) To that end, the Commission has recalculated Latvia’s long-term DUC trend over RP3 and RP4 in light of the estimated structural loss of traffic for Latvia as a consequence of the war in Ukraine, measured inen routeservice units. That recalculation results in an adjusted long-term DUC trend for Latvia of +1,3 %, which remains above the long-term Union-wide DUC trend of -1,0 %. Therefore, it is concluded that Latvia does not fulfil the assessment criterion referred to in recital (114), even after taking into account the effect of the significant traffic reduction resulting from the war in Ukraine.
(118) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the baseline value for the DUC of EUR 37,97 of Latvia in EUR2022 is 32,4 % lower than the average baseline value of EUR 56,17 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7, point (d), of Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(119) Furthermore, the Commission notes that Latvia has not presented any justifications for the deviations referred to in recitals (113) to (117) on the grounds of additional determined costs related to measures necessary for the achievement of capacity targets or restructuring costs within the meaning of Article 2, point (18), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Therefore, the assessment criteria set out in points 1.4(d)(i) and (ii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 should not be considered fulfilled in respect of Latvia.
(120) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (112) to (119), the cost-efficiency performance targets for theen routecharging zone of Latvia should be considered inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(121) Theen routecost-efficiency targets proposed by Slovakia for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:En routecharging zone of Slovakia2019 baseline value2024 baseline value20252026202720282029Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)EUR 56,20EUR 60,11EUR 62,58EUR 61,85EUR 61,12EUR 59,71EUR 58,34 En routecharging zone of Slovakia 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 56,20 EUR 60,11 EUR 62,58 EUR 61,85 EUR 61,12 EUR 59,71 EUR 58,34
En routecharging zone of Slovakia 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 56,20 EUR 60,11 EUR 62,58 EUR 61,85 EUR 61,12 EUR 59,71 EUR 58,34
En routecharging zone of Slovakia 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 56,20 EUR 60,11 EUR 62,58 EUR 61,85 EUR 61,12 EUR 59,71 EUR 58,34
(122) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the DUC trend of Slovakia at charging zone level of -0,6 % over RP4 underperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(123) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the long-term DUC trend of Slovakia at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of +0,4 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(124) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the baseline value for the DUC of EUR 60,11 of Slovakia in EUR2022 is 70,0 % higher than the average baseline value of EUR 35,35 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7, point (c), of Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(125) It is necessary to examine whether the deviations referred to in recitals (122) to (124) may be deemed necessary and proportionate in accordance with point 1.4(d) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the Commission has assessed whether the observed deviations from the Union-wide DUC trend and from the long-term Union-wide DUC trend referred to in recitals (122) and (123) are exclusively due to additional determined costs related to measures necessary to achieve the performance targets in the key performance area of capacity or to restructuring costs within the meaning of Article 2, point (18), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(126) In respect of the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that Slovakia refers in the draft performance plan to the additional determined costs incurred over RP4 by the ANSP LPS in relation to measures needed for the achievement of the local capacity targets (‘capacity measures’). The presented capacity measures comprise the following main elements:(a)the training and employment of additional ATCOs in operations in order to handle the expected traffic increase during RP4; this is planned to result over RP4 into an overall increase of over 10 % of the number of ATCOs in operations at the ACC of Bratislava;(b)the implementation of a new ATM system, which is foreseen to enable future improvements in airspace capacity,(c)infrastructure and buildings modernisation with a view of enhancing operational resilience. (a) the training and employment of additional ATCOs in operations in order to handle the expected traffic increase during RP4; this is planned to result over RP4 into an overall increase of over 10 % of the number of ATCOs in operations at the ACC of Bratislava; (b) the implementation of a new ATM system, which is foreseen to enable future improvements in airspace capacity, (c) infrastructure and buildings modernisation with a view of enhancing operational resilience.
(a) the training and employment of additional ATCOs in operations in order to handle the expected traffic increase during RP4; this is planned to result over RP4 into an overall increase of over 10 % of the number of ATCOs in operations at the ACC of Bratislava;
(b) the implementation of a new ATM system, which is foreseen to enable future improvements in airspace capacity,
(c) infrastructure and buildings modernisation with a view of enhancing operational resilience.
(a) the training and employment of additional ATCOs in operations in order to handle the expected traffic increase during RP4; this is planned to result over RP4 into an overall increase of over 10 % of the number of ATCOs in operations at the ACC of Bratislava;
(b) the implementation of a new ATM system, which is foreseen to enable future improvements in airspace capacity,
(c) infrastructure and buildings modernisation with a view of enhancing operational resilience.
(127) Having regard to the evaluation made by the PRB, the additional costs reported by Slovakia for the capacity measures referred to in recital (126) are significantly lower in monetary terms than the observed deviations from the Union-wide cost-efficiency trends calculated by the PRB. Furthermore, the Commission observes that certain capacity measures invoked by Slovakia could be considered to be part of the normal operations of the ANSP concerned or may not directly contribute to enhancing airspace capacity. Hence, it is not possible to conclude, without further detailed information and analysis, on whether the capacity measures presented by Slovakia can be, in their entirety, deemed necessary and proportionate for the achievement of the local capacity performance targets for RP4. Therefore, the Commission notes that the observed deviations from the Union-wide cost-efficiency trends referred to in recitals (122) and (123) cannot be exclusively attributed to the additional costs deriving from the presented capacity measures.
(128) Therefore, the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 should not be considered fulfilled in respect of Slovakia.
(129) Furthermore, the Commission notes that Slovakia has not presented in the draft performance plan any restructuring measures which would justify a deviation from the Union-wide DUC trend or from the Union-wide long-term DUC trend pursuant to the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(ii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(130) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (121) to (129), the cost-efficiency performance targets for theen routecharging zone of Slovakia should be considered inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(131) In light of the foregoing, certain performance targets included in the draft FABEC performance plan submitted by Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and certain performance targets included in the draft performance plans submitted by Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Latvia and Slovakia, should not be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(132) In accordance with Article 14(3), second subparagraph, of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Member States concerned are to submit their revised draft performance plans to the Commission within three months from the date of the adoption of this Decision, taking account of the recommendations put forward by the Commission,
(a) ensure that the revised cost-efficiency targets are consistent both with the Union-wide DUC trend and with the Union-wide long-term DUC trend, referred to, respectively, in point 1.4(a) and (b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317;
(b) reduce the level of determined costs accordingly, in particular in respect of calendar year 2029;
(c) use the latest traffic forecasts, expressed in service units, in accordance with Article 10(2) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
En routecharging zone of Belgium-Luxembourg 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 94,14 EUR 104,26 EUR 104,94 EUR 106,08 EUR 106,14 EUR 104,43 EUR 103,83
En routecharging zone of Germany 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 71,71 EUR 74,90 EUR 73,16 EUR 73,06 EUR 73,10 EUR 71,87 EUR 70,54
En routecharging zone of the Netherlands 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 86,52 EUR 104,60 EUR 103,51 EUR 103,61 EUR 106,50 EUR 106,28 EUR 105,95
En routecharging zone of Denmark 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) DKK 466,58 DKK 543,10 DKK 529,76 DKK 521,41 DKK 515,34 DKK 506,93 DKK 500,26
EUR 62,74 EUR 73,02 EUR 71,23 EUR 70,11 EUR 69,29 EUR 68,16 EUR 67,26
En routecharging zone of Estonia 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 38,12 EUR 54,69 EUR 50,46 EUR 52,95 EUR 54,37 EUR 54,54 EUR 55,69
Greece 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes ofen routeATFM delay per flight 0,69 0,50 0,19 0,16 0,16
En routecharging zone of Greece 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 28,84 EUR 25,04 EUR 24,67 EUR 24,01 EUR 24,95 EUR 26,40 EUR 25,72
En routecharging zone of Ireland 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 27,59 EUR 27,29 EUR 28,61 EUR 29,72 EUR 29,75 EUR 29,84 EUR 30,14
En routecharging zone of Latvia 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 28,57 EUR 37,97 EUR 48,73 EUR 53,56 EUR 57,79 EUR 61,14 EUR 63,75
En routecharging zone of Slovakia 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) EUR 56,20 EUR 60,11 EUR 62,58 EUR 61,85 EUR 61,12 EUR 59,71 EUR 58,34
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 laying down the framework for the creation of the single European sky (the framework Regulation) (1), and in particular Article 11(3), point (c), second subparagraph, thereof,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/2803 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on the implementation of the Single European Sky (2), and in particular Article 58(3) thereof,
After consulting the Single Sky Committee,
Whereas:
1. BACKGROUND
(1) Pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 549/2004, Member States are to draw up plans, either at national level or at the level of functional airspace blocks (‘FABs’), including performance targets, for each reference period of the performance and charging scheme for air navigation services and network functions. Those plans are to include local performance targets which are consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for the reference period concerned.
(2) The Union-wide performance targets for the fourth reference period (‘RP4’, 2025-2029) were set out in Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688 (3).
(3) All Member States have drawn up and adopted draft performance plans for RP4, which were submitted to the Commission for assessment by 1 October 2024. Following the verification of completeness of those draft performance plans, the Commission requested Member States to submit updated draft performance plans by 15 November 2024.
(4) The Commission’s assessment presented in this Decision is based on the updated draft performance plans for RP4 submitted by Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, France, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Slovakia (‘draft performance plans’).
(5) The Performance Review Body (‘PRB’), assisting the Commission in the implementation of the performance scheme, has submitted to the Commission a report containing its advice on the assessment of the draft performance plans.
(6) In accordance with Article 14(1) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 (4), the Commission has assessed the consistency of the local performance targets included in the draft performance plans on the basis of the criteria laid down in point 1 of Annex IV to that Implementing Regulation, and taking account of local circumstances where relevant.
(7) As regards the key performance area of safety, the Commission has assessed the consistency of the targets submitted by the Member States concerned regarding the effectiveness of safety management of air navigation service providers based on the criterion laid down in point 1.1 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the Commission has examined whether the proposed targets included in the draft performance plans provide for a level of effectiveness of safety management equal to, or higher than, the level of the Union-wide performance targets.
(8) As regards the key performance area of environment, the consistency of the targets submitted by the Member States concerned regarding the average horizontal en route flight efficiency of the actual trajectory has been assessed on the basis of the criterion laid down in point 1.2 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the proposed targets included in the draft performance plans have been compared to the relevant en route horizontal flight efficiency reference values set out in the European Route Network Improvement Plan of 2 July 2024, drawn up in accordance with Annex I to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/123 (5) (‘ERNIP’). That assessment was conducted taking account of local circumstances.
(9) As regards the key performance area of capacity, the consistency of the targets submitted by the Member States concerned regarding the average en route air traffic flow management (‘ATFM’) delay per flight has been assessed on the basis of the criterion laid down in point 1.3 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the proposed targets included in the draft performance plans have been compared to the relevant reference values set out in the Network Operations Plan of 2 July 2024, drawn up in accordance with Article 9 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/123. That assessment was conducted taking account of local circumstances.
(10) As regards the key performance area of cost-efficiency, the consistency of the targets included in the draft performance plans regarding the determined unit cost (‘DUC’) for en route air navigation services has been assessed on the basis of the criteria laid down in points 1.4(a), (b) and (c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Those criteria consist of the DUC trend over RP4, the long-term DUC trend over the third reference period (2020-2024) (‘RP3’) and RP4 (2020-2029), and the baseline value for the DUC at charging zone level compared with the average value of the charging zones where air navigation service providers have a similar operational and economic environment.
(11) Where the en route cost-efficiency targets were found to be inconsistent with the criteria laid down in points 1.4(a), 1.4(b) and 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has further examined, in light of the justifications and evidence provided in the draft performance plans, whether a deviation could be deemed necessary and proportionate on the grounds of point 1.4(d) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(12) The Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plans with a review of the elements set out in point 2 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. In respect of point 2.1(d)(vii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that it has not conducted, as part of that review, a detailed analysis of the methodologies used by Member States for the allocation of costs between en route and terminal services in RP4. Therefore, the Commission has not drawn any conclusions, at this stage, in respect of the compliance of those cost allocation methodologies with points (e) and (f) of Article 15(2) Regulation (EC) No 550/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (6) and Article 22(5) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
2. FINDINGS CONCERNING BELGIUM, FRANCE, GERMANY, LUXEMBOURG AND THE NETHERLANDS
(13) Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland have jointly drawn up and adopted a draft performance plan at the level of the Functional Airspace Block Europe Central (‘FABEC’).
(14) This Decision sets out the Commission’s assessment of the draft performance plan of FABEC (‘the draft FABEC performance plan’) with regard to Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. As a third country subject to the performance and charging scheme pursuant to the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air Transport (7), Switzerland has been notified separately by the Commission of the findings resulting from the assessment of the draft FABEC performance plan (8).
Assessment of the cost-efficiency targets
(9) En route charging zone of Belgium-Luxembourg
(15) The en route cost-efficiency targets proposed for the en route charging zone of Belgium and Luxembourg for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:
En route charging zone of Belgium-Luxembourg
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
EUR 94,14
EUR 104,26
EUR 104,94
EUR 106,08
EUR 106,14
EUR 104,43
EUR 103,83
(16) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the DUC trend of Belgium and Luxembourg at charging zone level of -0,1 % over RP4 underperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(17) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the long-term DUC trend of Belgium and Luxembourg at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of +1,1 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(18) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the baseline value for the DUC of EUR 104,26 of Belgium and Luxembourg, expressed in real terms at 2022 prices (‘EUR2022’), is 10,8 % higher than the average baseline value of EUR 94,13 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7, point (e), of Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(19) It is necessary to examine whether the deviations referred to in recitals (16), (17) and (18) may be deemed necessary and proportionate in accordance with point 1.4(d) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the Commission has assessed whether the observed deviations from the Union-wide DUC trend and from the long-term Union-wide DUC trend referred to in recitals (16) and (17) are exclusively due to additional determined costs related to measures necessary to achieve the performance targets in the key performance area of capacity or to restructuring costs within the meaning of Article 2, point (18), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(20) In respect of the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that Belgium and Luxembourg refer in the draft FABEC performance plan to the additional determined costs incurred over RP4 by the air navigation service providers (‘ANSPs’) skeyes and the Maastricht Upper Area Control Centre (‘MUAC’) in relation to measures needed for the achievement of the local capacity targets (‘capacity measures’). The presented capacity measures comprise the following main elements:
(a)
the training and recruitment by skeyes and MUAC of new air traffic controllers (‘ATCOs’), mainly to replace the ATCOs expected to retire during RP4, but also to accommodate the forecasted the traffic growth and support system modernisation;
(b)
the acquisition and deployment by skeyes of a new air traffic management (‘ATM’) system in 2028, which will provide significant functional and technical improvements; the new ATM will replace the current ATM system of skeyes, which has been in use since 2009;
(c)
the roll-out by skeyes of a new planning tool which will enable an automated rostering of ATCOs, resulting in optimised workforce management and associated operational gains;
(d)
the development and implementation by MUAC of new tools and functions to support operations;
(e)
the implementation by MUAC of structural improvements in airspace design and use;
(f)
the construction by MUAC of a new building for the purpose of hosting a new operations room (OPS room) with supporting offices and facilities.
(21) Having regard to the evaluation made by the PRB, the additional costs reported by Belgium and Luxembourg for the capacity measures referred to in recital (20) are significantly lower in monetary terms than the observed deviations from the Union-wide cost-efficiency trends calculated by the PRB. Furthermore, the Commission observes that certain capacity measures invoked by Belgium and Luxembourg could be considered to be part of the normal operations of the ANSPs concerned or may not directly contribute to enhancing airspace capacity. Hence, it is not possible to conclude, without further detailed information and analysis, on whether the capacity measures presented by Belgium and Luxembourg can be, in their entirety, deemed necessary and proportionate for the achievement of the local capacity performance targets for RP4. Therefore, the Commission notes that the observed deviations from the Union-wide cost-efficiency trends referred to in recitals (16) and (17) cannot be exclusively attributed to the additional costs deriving from the presented capacity measures.
(22) Therefore, the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 should not be considered fulfilled in respect of Belgium and Luxembourg.
(23) Furthermore, the Commission notes that Belgium and Luxembourg have not presented in the draft FABEC performance plan any restructuring measures which would justify a deviation from the Union-wide DUC trend or from the Union-wide long-term DUC trend pursuant to the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(ii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(24) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (15) to (23), the cost-efficiency performance targets for the en route charging zone of Belgium-Luxembourg should be considered inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
En route charging zone of Germany
(25) The en route cost-efficiency targets proposed for the en route charging zone of Germany for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:
En route charging zone of Germany
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
EUR 71,71
EUR 74,90
EUR 73,16
EUR 73,06
EUR 73,10
EUR 71,87
EUR 70,54
(26) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the DUC trend of Germany at charging zone level of -1,2 % over RP4 is in line with the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(27) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the long-term DUC trend of Germany at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of -0,2 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(28) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the baseline value for the DUC of EUR 74,90 of Germany in EUR2022 is 29,9 % higher than the average baseline value of EUR 57,66 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7, point (a), of Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(29) It is necessary to examine whether the deviations referred to in recitals (27) and (28) may be deemed necessary and proportionate in accordance with point 1.4(d) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the Commission has assessed whether the observed deviation from the long-term Union-wide DUC trend referred to in recital (27) is exclusively due to additional determined costs related to measures necessary to achieve the performance targets in the key performance area of capacity or to restructuring costs within the meaning of Article 2, point (18), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(30) In respect of the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that Germany refers in the draft FABEC performance plan to the additional determined costs incurred over RP4 by the ANSPs DFS and MUAC in relation to measures needed for the achievement of the local capacity targets (‘capacity measures’). The presented capacity measures comprise the following main elements:
(a)
the training and recruitment by DFS and MUAC of new ATCOs: in the case of DFS, that measure is planned to result over RP4 into an overall increase of over 10 % of the number of ATCOs in operations at the area control centres (‘ACCs’) of Bremen, Karlsruhe, Langen and Munich, in order to address the capacity shortages faced by those ACCs; for MUAC, the number of ATCOs in operations is planned to only slightly increase over RP4 but the intake of new ATCOs will remain significant in order to make up for the expected high number of ATCO retirements over that reference period;
(b)
the acquisition and deployment by DFS of new ATM system functionalities for the ACC of Bremen and Munich; those functionalities are expected to result in operational improvements in the provision of ANS, including enhanced airspace capacity;
(c)
the initiative by MUAC and DFS, in respect of the ACC of Karlsruhe, to set up two geo-redundant data centres capable of supporting and replacing each other, with the objective of strengthening the service quality of air navigation services;
(d)
the participation of DFS, together with six other ANSPs, in a cooperation programme aiming at the development of a common future ATM system for the ANSPs concerned; DFS considers that the resulting new ATM system could be deployed at the ACC of Langen, not earlier than 2031, thus not within the timeframe of RP4;
(e)
the deployment by DFS of the technical systems and software necessary to comply with the sub-functionality ‘AF6 – Initial Trajectory Information Sharing’ required under Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/116 (10);
(f)
the implementation by DFS of changes in its surveillance system and of a new tool supporting a more efficient and dynamic sectorisation of airspace;
(g)
the development and implementation by MUAC of new tools and functions to support operations;
(h)
the implementation by MUAC of structural improvements in airspace design and use;
(i)
the construction by MUAC of a new building for the purpose of hosting a new operations room (OPS room) with supporting offices and facilities.
(31) Having regard to the evaluation made by the PRB, the additional costs reported by Germany for the capacity measures referred to in recital (30) are significantly lower in monetary terms than the observed deviation from the Union-wide long-term cost-efficiency trend calculated by the PRB.
(32) Furthermore, the Commission observes that certain capacity measures invoked by Germany could be considered to be part of the normal operations of the ANSPs concerned or may not directly contribute to enhancing airspace capacity. Hence, it is not possible to conclude, without further detailed information and analysis, on whether the capacity measures presented by Germany can be, in their entirety, deemed necessary and proportionate for the achievement of the local capacity performance targets for RP4. Therefore, the Commission notes that the observed deviations from the long-term Union-wide DUC trend referred to in recital (27) cannot be exclusively attributed to the additional costs deriving from the presented capacity measures.
(33) Therefore, the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 should not be considered fulfilled in respect of Germany.
(34) Furthermore, the Commission notes that Germany has not presented in the draft FABEC performance plan any restructuring measures which would justify a deviation from the Union-wide DUC trend or from the Union-wide long-term DUC trend pursuant to the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(ii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(35) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (25) to (34), the cost-efficiency performance targets for the en route charging zone of Germany should be considered inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
En route charging zone of the Netherlands
(36) The en route cost-efficiency targets proposed for the en route charging zone of the Netherlands for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:
En route charging zone of the Netherlands
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
EUR 86,52
EUR 104,60
EUR 103,51
EUR 103,61
EUR 106,50
EUR 106,28
EUR 105,95
(37) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the DUC trend of the Netherlands at charging zone level of +0,3 % over RP4 underperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(38) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the long-term DUC trend of the Netherlands at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of +2,3 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(39) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the baseline value for the DUC of EUR 104,60 of the Netherlands in EUR2022 is 11,3 % higher than the average baseline value of EUR 94,01 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7, point (e), of Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(40) It is necessary to examine whether the deviations referred to in recitals (37) to (39) may be deemed necessary and proportionate in accordance with point 1.4(d) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the Commission has assessed whether the observed deviations from the Union-wide DUC trend and from the long-term Union-wide DUC trend referred to in recitals (37) and (38) are exclusively due to additional determined costs related to measures necessary to achieve the performance targets in the key performance area of capacity or to restructuring costs within the meaning of Article 2, point (18), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(41) In respect of the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that the Netherlands refers in the draft FABEC performance plan to the additional determined costs incurred over RP4 by the ANSPs LVNL and MUAC in relation to measures needed for the achievement of the local capacity targets (‘capacity measures’). The presented capacity measures comprise the following main elements:
(a)
the training and recruitment by LVNL and MUAC of new ATCOs, mainly to replace the ATCOs expected to retire during RP4, but also to accommodate the forecasted the traffic growth and support system modernisation;
(b)
the improvement by LVNL of its ATCO training facilities and simulators, in order to increase training capacity and output;
(c)
the upgrade by LVNL of its ATM system, which is foreseen to enable future improvements in airspace capacity;
(d)
the development and implementation by MUAC of new tools and functions to support operations;
(e)
the implementation by MUAC of structural improvements in airspace design and use;
(f)
the construction by MUAC of a new building for the purpose of hosting a new operations room (OPS room) with supporting offices and facilities.
(42) Having regard to the evaluation made by the PRB, the additional costs reported by the Netherlands for the capacity measures referred to in recital (41) are significantly lower in monetary terms than the observed deviations from the Union-wide cost-efficiency trends calculated by the PRB. Furthermore, the Commission observes that certain capacity measures invoked by the Netherlands could be considered part of the normal operations of the ANSPs concerned or may not directly contribute to enhancing airspace capacity. Hence, it is not possible to conclude, without further detailed information and analysis, on whether the capacity measures presented by the Netherlands can be, in their entirety, deemed necessary and proportionate for the achievement of the local capacity performance targets for RP4. Therefore, the Commission notes that the observed deviations from the Union-wide cost-efficiency trends referred to in recitals (37) and (38) cannot be exclusively attributed to the additional costs deriving from the presented capacity measures.
(43) Therefore, the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 should not be considered fulfilled in respect of the Netherlands.
(44) Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Netherlands have not presented in the draft FABEC performance plan any restructuring measures which would justify a deviation from the Union-wide DUC trend or from the Union-wide long-term DUC trend pursuant to the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(ii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(45) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (36) to (44), the cost-efficiency performance targets for the en route charging zone of the Netherlands should be considered inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
Review of the measures for the achievement of safety targets
(46) In accordance with point 2.1(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft FABEC performance plan by reviewing the measures for the achievement of the safety targets included in that plan.
(47) On the basis of the review referred to in recital (46), the Commission notes that the draft FABEC performance plan includes measures for the achievement of the safety performance targets with a view to meeting the Union-wide targets in 2029. However, the Commission notes that, despite those measures, the intermediate targets for years 2025 to 2028 presented by Luxembourg and the Netherlands for the ANSPs ANALUX and LVNL respectively, are abnormally low. Such low intermediate targets are not justified in light of the actual performance of those ANSPs in RP3 and the measures presented for achievement of those safety targets for RP4.
(48) Therefore, the Commission considers that Luxembourg and the Netherlands should address the findings set out in recital (47) by improving the targeted safety management levels for years 2025 to 2028 for the ANSPs ANALUX and LVNL respectively, including by putting in place additional measures if necessary.
Review of the measures for the achievement of environment targets
(49) In accordance with point 2.1(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft FABEC performance plan by reviewing the measures for the achievement of the environment targets included in that plan.
(50) On the basis of the review referred to in recital (49), the Commission has strong doubts as to whether the measures presented by Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands for the achievement of the environment performance targets of FABEC are adequate to enable those targets to be effectively reached. Having regard to the PRB’s findings, the Commission observes, in particular, that the measures presented by France in respect of the ANSP ‘DSNA’ are insufficient to enable the targeted flight efficiency improvements in RP4.
(51) Therefore, the Commission considers that FABEC should put in place additional measures for the achievement of its environment targets for RP4, for example, through the effective implementation of free route airspace and the implementation of cross-border free route airspace with additional neighbouring Member States.
Review of the measures for the achievement of capacity targets
(52) In accordance with point 2.1(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft FABEC performance plan by reviewing the measures for the achievement of the en route capacity targets included in that plan.
(53) On the basis of the review referred to in recital (52), the Commission has strong doubts as to whether the measures presented by Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands for the achievement of the en route capacity performance targets of FABEC are adequate to enable those targets to be effectively reached. Having regard to the PRB’s findings, the Commission observes, in particular, that the measures presented by Germany in respect of the ANSP ‘DFS’ are insufficient to effectively meet the traffic demand expected in RP4.
(54) Therefore, the Commission considers that FABEC should put in place additional measures for the achievement of its en route capacity targets for RP4, for example, in respect of the training and recruitment of additional ATCOs, a more efficient use of resources, and cooperation arrangements between air navigation service providers.
Review of the capacity targets for terminal air navigation services
(55) In accordance with point 2.1(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft FABEC performance plan by reviewing the capacity performance targets for terminal air navigation services set in respect of the airports referred to in Articles 1(3) and (4) of that Implementing Regulation. It was found that those targets give rise to concerns.
(56) In respect of Belgium, the Commission notes that the proposed terminal capacity targets for RP4 lead to a significant deterioration of the average arrival ATFM delay per year compared to RP3. Indeed, the proposed RP4 targets are set at 0,94 minute per flight, except for year 2027 for which a target of 2,00 minutes per flight is proposed, whereas the actual performance recorded in 2024 was 0,28 minute per flight. Furthermore, it was found that those terminal capacity targets result in a significantly worse level of average arrival ATFM delay per flight for Brussels airport than the level of performance of similar airports identified by the PRB.
(57) In respect of the Netherlands, the Commission notes that the average arrival ATFM delay recorded in the last three years of RP3 were at a high level, reaching 3,50 minutes per flight in 2024. The proposed terminal capacity targets for RP4, although an improvement compared to RP3, result in a significantly worse level of average arrival ATFM delay per flight for Amsterdam Schiphol airport than the level of performance of similar airports identified by the PRB.
(58) Therefore, the Commission considers that Belgium and the Netherlands should further justify the terminal capacity targets for RP4 in light of the observations set out in recitals (56) and (57), or should revise downwards those targets.
Review of the cost-efficiency targets for terminal air navigation services
(59) In accordance with point 2.1(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft FABEC performance plan by reviewing the cost-efficiency performance targets for terminal air navigation services set in respect of the airports referred to in Articles 1(3) and (4) of that Implementing Regulation. It was found that those targets give rise to concerns.
(60) In respect of the terminal charging zone of Belgium, the Commission notes that the proposed cost-efficiency targets lead to a DUC trend of -0,8 % over RP4. However, it was found that the average DUC for RP4 for the terminal air navigation services at Brussels airport is estimated to be higher, by a significant margin, than the median DUC of the similar airports identified by the PRB.
(61) In respect of the terminal charging zone of Germany, the Commission notes that the proposed cost-efficiency targets lead to a DUC trend of -0,8 % over RP4. However, it was found that the average DUC for RP4 for the terminal air navigation services at the airports of Munich, Hamburg, Dusseldorf and Cologne-Bonn is estimated to be higher, by a significant margin, than the median DUC of the relevant group of similar airports.
(62) In respect of the terminal charging zone of the Netherlands, the Commission notes that the proposed cost-efficiency targets lead to a deteriorating DUC trend of +0,4 % over RP4. Furthermore, it was found that the average DUC for RP4 of terminal air navigation services at Amsterdam-Schiphol airport is estimated to be higher, by a significant margin, than the median DUC of the relevant group of similar airports.
(63) Therefore, the Commission considers that Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands should further justify their terminal cost-efficiency targets for RP4 in light of the observations set out in recitals (60), (61) and (62), or should revise downwards those targets.
Review of the en route and terminal capacity incentive schemes
(64) In accordance with point 2.1(f) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has reviewed the incentive schemes included in the draft FABEC performance plan for the purpose of supporting the achievement of capacity targets (‘capacity incentive schemes’). It was found that the capacity incentive schemes for RP4 established by Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands for en route and terminal services give rise to concerns.
(65) The Commission notes that the en route capacity incentive scheme of FABEC and the terminal capacity incentive schemes of Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands, as established in the draft FABEC performance plan, comprise a maximum financial disadvantage amounting to merely 0,50 % of determined costs. Having regard to the expert advice provided by the PRB, the Commission considers that that the maximum financial disadvantages for those incentive schemes do not comply with Article 11(3), point (a), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, which requires such incentive schemes to have ‘material impact on revenue at risk’.
(66) Therefore, Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands should revise the capacity incentive schemes referred to in recital (65) so that the maximum financial disadvantages stemming from those incentive schemes are set at a level having a material impact on the revenue at risk, as required by Article 11(3), point (a), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. In the Commission’s view, that revision should lead to a maximum financial disadvantage equal to or higher than 1 % of the annual determined costs.
3. FINDINGS CONCERNING DENMARK
Assessment of the cost-efficiency targets
(67) The en route cost-efficiency targets proposed by Denmark for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:
En route charging zone of Denmark
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
DKK 466,58
DKK 543,10
DKK 529,76
DKK 521,41
DKK 515,34
DKK 506,93
DKK 500,26
EUR 62,74
EUR 73,02
EUR 71,23
EUR 70,11
EUR 69,29
EUR 68,16
EUR 67,26
(68) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the DUC trend of Denmark at charging zone level of -1,6 % over RP4 outperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(69) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the long-term DUC trend of Denmark at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of +0,8 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(70) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the baseline value for the DUC of EUR 73,02 of Denmark in EUR2022 is 19,9 % higher than the average baseline value of EUR 60,91 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7, point (f), of Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(71) Furthermore, the Commission notes that Denmark has not presented any justifications for the deviations referred to in recitals (69) and (70) on the grounds of additional determined costs related to measures necessary for the achievement of capacity targets or restructuring costs within the meaning of Article 2, point (18), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Therefore, the assessment criteria set out in points 1.4(d)(i) and (ii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 should not be considered fulfilled in respect of Denmark.
(72) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (67) to (71), the cost-efficiency performance targets for the en route charging zone of Denmark should be considered inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
4. FINDINGS CONCERNING ESTONIA
Assessment of the cost-efficiency targets
(73) The en route cost-efficiency targets proposed by Estonia for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:
En route charging zone of Estonia
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
EUR 38,12
EUR 54,69
EUR 50,46
EUR 52,95
EUR 54,37
EUR 54,54
EUR 55,69
(74) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the DUC trend of Estonia at charging zone level of +0,4 % over RP4 underperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(75) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the long-term DUC trend of Estonia at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of +4,3 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(76) The Commission notes, however, that Estonia has lost, as a consequence of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, a significant share of the overflights which it historically used to serve. That traffic reduction continues over RP4 to considerably impact the cost-efficiency performance of the ANSP of Estonia and has, in particular, a negative effect on the long-term DUC trend of Estonia calculated over RP3 and RP4 combined.
(77) It is therefore necessary and appropriate to examine, for the purpose of the assessment criterion referred to in recital (75), whether Estonia would meet the Union-wide long-term DUC trend in the absence of the circumstances referred to in recital (76).
(78) To that end, the Commission has recalculated Estonia’s long-term DUC trend over RP3 and RP4 in light of the estimated structural loss of traffic for Estonia as a consequence of the war in Ukraine, measured in en route service units. That recalculation results in an adjusted long-term DUC trend for Estonia of -2,4 %, which outperforms the long-term Union-wide DUC trend of -1,0 %. Therefore, it is concluded that Estonia fulfils the assessment criterion referred to in recital (75) after taking into account the effect of the significant traffic reduction resulting from the war in Ukraine.
(79) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the baseline value for the DUC of EUR 54,69 of Estonia in EUR2022 is 5,2 % higher than the average baseline value of EUR 52,00 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7, point (d), of Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(80) Furthermore, the Commission notes that Estonia has not presented any justifications for the deviations referred to in recitals (74) and (79) on the grounds of additional determined costs related to measures necessary for achievement of capacity targets or restructuring costs within the meaning of Article 2, point (18), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Therefore, the assessment criteria set out in points 1.4(d)(i) and (ii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 should not be considered fulfilled in respect of Estonia.
(81) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (73) to (80), the cost-efficiency performance targets for the en route charging zone of Estonia should be considered inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
5. FINDINGS CONCERNING GREECE
Assessment of the capacity targets
(82) The en route capacity targets proposed by Greece for RP4, expressed in minutes of ATFM delay per flight, and the corresponding reference values from the Network Operations Plan of 2 July 2024, are as follows:
Greece
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes of en route ATFM delay per flight
0,69
0,50
0,19
0,16
0,16
Reference values
0,34
0,25
0,19
0,16
0,16
(83) The Commission observes that the capacity targets proposed by Greece for the years 2027, 2028 and 2029 are equal to the corresponding national reference values. However, the proposed capacity targets are significantly higher than the reference values in respect of years 2025 and 2026.
(84) The measures for the achievement of capacity targets presented by Greece include the training and recruitment by the ANSP of a high number of new ATCOs, amounting over RP4 to an overall increase of 35 % of the number of full-time equivalent ATCOs in operations at the ACC. Furthermore, the ANSP plans to deploy a new ATM system, upgrade its radar network, implement airspace reorganisation measures and improve its air traffic flow and capacity management procedures.
(85) Based on the evaluation made by the PRB, the Commission notes that certain relevant capacity enhancement measures outlined in the Network Operations Plan of 2 July 2024 are not included in the draft performance plan of Greece. This may result in a capacity gap during RP4, including in years 2025 and 2026 for which the proposed capacity targets are higher than the corresponding reference values.
(86) Greece states in its draft performance plan that the capacity targets for calendar years 2025 and 2026 could not be set in line with the reference values included in the Network Operations Plan of 2 July 2024 because of the more optimistic growth of air traffic predicted in the October 2024 STATFOR traffic forecast. Greece explains that the ANSP incurred delays in RP3 in the implementation of its RP3 investment plan and in the recruitment of ATCOs, which has resulted in operational constraints at local level. Greece invokes, in particular, the technical limitations related to the legacy systems currently in use by the ANSP, which are planned to be replaced or modernised only later in the course of RP4.
(87) However, in the light of the assessment criteria set out in point 1.3 to Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission considers that the information and evidence provided by Greece in its draft performance plan, including in respect of relevant local circumstances, do not justify the proposed significant deviations of the capacity targets for years 2025 and 2026 from the corresponding reference values. The Commission takes the view that it would be possible for Greece to put in place additional measures to improve its capacity targets for those years in order to mitigate the negative effects of the delayed recruitment of ATCOs and the non-realisation of planned investments in RP3.
(88) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (82) to (87), the capacity targets of Greece should be considered inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
Assessment of the cost-efficiency targets
(89) The en route cost-efficiency targets proposed by Greece for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:
En route charging zone of Greece
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
EUR 28,84
EUR 25,04
EUR 24,67
EUR 24,01
EUR 24,95
EUR 26,40
EUR 25,72
(90) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the DUC trend of Greece at charging zone level of +0,5 % over RP4 underperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(91) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the long-term DUC trend of Greece at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of -1,3 % outperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(92) The Commission notes that the baseline value for year 2019 presented by Greece in its draft performance plan includes cost adjustments amounting to EUR 19,5 M of additional costs expressed in EUR 2022. According to the PRB’s analysis, those adjustments were not part of the 2019 baseline value set in Greece’s performance plan for RP3 and have not been adequately justified by Greece in its draft RP4 performance plan.
(93) It is therefore necessary to examine, for the purpose of the assessment criterion referred to in recital (91), whether Greece would meet the Union-wide long-term DUC trend in the absence of the adjustments in respect of the 2019 baseline value, referred to in recital (92).
(94) To that end, the Commission has recalculated Greece’s long DUC trend over RP3 and RP4 by using the baseline value for 2019 included in Greece’s RP3 performance plan, instead of the adjusted baseline value included in Greece draft performance plan for RP4. That recalculation results in an adjusted long-term DUC trend for Greece of +0,1 %, which underperforms the long-term Union-wide DUC trend of -1,0 %. Therefore, it is concluded that Greece does not fulfil the assessment criterion referred to in recital (91).
(95) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the 2024 baseline value for the DUC of EUR 25,04 of Greece in EUR2022 is 39,2 % lower than the average baseline value of EUR 41,19 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7, point (c), of Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(96) Furthermore, the Commission notes that Greece has not presented any justifications for the deviations referred to in recitals (90) and (91) on the grounds of measures for the achievement of capacity targets or restructuring measures within the meaning of Article 2, point (18), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Therefore, the assessment criteria set out in points 1.4(d)(i) and (ii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 should not be considered fulfilled in respect of Greece.
(97) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (89) to (96), the cost-efficiency performance targets for the en route charging zone of Greece should be considered inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
Review of the measures for the achievement of environment targets
(98) In accordance with point 2.1(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft performance plan of Greece by reviewing the measures for the achievement of the environment targets included in that plan.
(99) On the basis of the review referred to in recital (98), the Commission has doubts as to whether the measures presented by Greece for the achievement of its environment performance targets are adequate to enable those targets to be effectively reached. Having regard to the PRB’s findings, the Commission observes, in particular, that Greece has not committed, in the draft performance plan, to the implementation of several relevant measures set out in the ERNIP.
(100) Therefore, the Commission considers that Greece should improve the measures for the achievement of its environment targets for RP4 presented in the draft performance plan, including by committing to all the operational measures set out in the ERNIP and expediting the implementation of cross-border free route airspace.
6. FINDINGS CONCERNING IRELAND
Assessment of the cost-efficiency targets
(101) The en route cost-efficiency targets proposed by Ireland for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:
En route charging zone of Ireland
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
EUR 27,59
EUR 27,29
EUR 28,61
EUR 29,72
EUR 29,75
EUR 29,84
EUR 30,14
(102) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the DUC trend of Ireland at charging zone level of +2,0 % over RP4 underperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(103) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the long-term DUC trend of Ireland at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of +1,0 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(104) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the baseline value for the DUC of EUR 27,29 of Ireland in EUR2022 is 4,0 % lower than the average baseline value of EUR 28,43 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7, point (b), of Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(105) It is necessary to examine whether the deviations referred to in recitals (102) and (103) may be deemed necessary and proportionate in accordance with point 1.4(d) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the Commission has assessed whether the observed deviations from the Union-wide DUC trend and from the long-term Union-wide DUC trend referred to in recitals (102) and (103) are exclusively due to additional determined costs related to measures necessary to achieve the performance targets in the key performance area of capacity or to restructuring costs within the meaning of Article 2, point (18), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(106) In respect of the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that Ireland refers in the draft performance plan to the additional determined costs incurred over RP4 by the ANSP AirNav Ireland in relation to measures needed for the achievement of the local capacity targets (‘capacity measures’). The presented capacity measures comprise the following main elements:
(a)
the training and employment of additional ATCOs in operations in order to handle the expected traffic increase during RP4;
(b)
the employment of additional air traffic safety electronics personnel in order to support the delivery of capital investment projects, in particularly the planned implementation of a new ATM system during RP4;
(c)
the employment of additional overhead support staff in order to release ATCOs from non-operational tasks and increase ATCO productivity;
(d)
the acquisition and deployment of a new ATM system, which will provide significant functional and technical improvements; the new ATM will replace the current ATM system of AirNav Ireland, which has been in use for 17 years; in connection with the new ATM system, AirNav Ireland also plans to implement a new contingency ATM system and to extend its ACC buildings for the purpose of proving and testing facilities of the new ATM system;
(e)
the upgrade of radar infrastructure in use, in particular by replacing technical components which have reached their end of life;
(f)
the acquisition of equipment and tools to support the resilience of operations.
(107) Having regard to the evaluation made by the PRB, the additional costs reported by Ireland for the capacity measures referred to in recital (106) would cover in monetary terms the observed deviations from the Union-wide cost-efficiency trends calculated by the PRB. However, according to the PRB, Ireland does not face major capacity-related issues, the resolution of which would require significant additional costs in RP4.
(108) Furthermore, the Commission observes that certain capacity measures invoked by Ireland could be considered to be part of the normal operations of the ANSP concerned or may not directly contribute to enhancing airspace capacity. Therefore, it is not possible to conclude, without further detailed information and analysis, on whether the capacity measures presented by Ireland can be, in their entirety, deemed necessary and proportionate for the achievement of the local capacity performance targets for RP4.
(109) Therefore, the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 should not be considered fulfilled in respect of Ireland.
(110) Furthermore, the Commission notes that Ireland has not presented in the draft performance plan any restructuring measures which would justify a deviation from the Union-wide DUC trend or from the Union-wide long-term DUC trend pursuant to the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(ii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(111) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (101) to (110), the cost-efficiency performance targets for the en route charging zone of Ireland should be considered inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
7. FINDINGS CONCERNING LATVIA
Assessment of the cost-efficiency targets
(112) The en route cost-efficiency targets proposed by Latvia for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:
En route charging zone of Latvia
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
EUR 28,57
EUR 37,97
EUR 48,73
EUR 53,56
EUR 57,79
EUR 61,14
EUR 63,75
(113) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the DUC trend of Latvia at charging zone level of +10,9 % over RP4 underperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(114) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the long-term DUC trend of Latvia at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of +9,3 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(115) The Commission notes, however, that Latvia has lost, as a consequence of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, a significant share of the overflights which it historically used to serve. That traffic reduction continues over RP4 to considerably impact the cost-efficiency performance of the ANSP of Latvia and has, in particular, a negative effect on the long-term DUC trend of Latvia calculated over RP3 and RP4 combined.
(116) It is therefore necessary and appropriate to examine, for the purpose of the assessment criterion referred to in recital (114), whether Latvia would meet the Union-wide long-term DUC trend in the absence of the circumstances referred to in recital (115).
(117) To that end, the Commission has recalculated Latvia’s long-term DUC trend over RP3 and RP4 in light of the estimated structural loss of traffic for Latvia as a consequence of the war in Ukraine, measured in en route service units. That recalculation results in an adjusted long-term DUC trend for Latvia of +1,3 %, which remains above the long-term Union-wide DUC trend of -1,0 %. Therefore, it is concluded that Latvia does not fulfil the assessment criterion referred to in recital (114), even after taking into account the effect of the significant traffic reduction resulting from the war in Ukraine.
(118) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the baseline value for the DUC of EUR 37,97 of Latvia in EUR2022 is 32,4 % lower than the average baseline value of EUR 56,17 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7, point (d), of Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(119) Furthermore, the Commission notes that Latvia has not presented any justifications for the deviations referred to in recitals (113) to (117) on the grounds of additional determined costs related to measures necessary for the achievement of capacity targets or restructuring costs within the meaning of Article 2, point (18), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Therefore, the assessment criteria set out in points 1.4(d)(i) and (ii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 should not be considered fulfilled in respect of Latvia.
(120) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (112) to (119), the cost-efficiency performance targets for the en route charging zone of Latvia should be considered inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
8. FINDINGS CONCERNING SLOVAKIA
Assessment of the cost-efficiency targets
(121) The en route cost-efficiency targets proposed by Slovakia for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:
En route charging zone of Slovakia
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
EUR 56,20
EUR 60,11
EUR 62,58
EUR 61,85
EUR 61,12
EUR 59,71
EUR 58,34
(122) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the DUC trend of Slovakia at charging zone level of -0,6 % over RP4 underperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(123) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the long-term DUC trend of Slovakia at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of +0,4 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(124) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the baseline value for the DUC of EUR 60,11 of Slovakia in EUR2022 is 70,0 % higher than the average baseline value of EUR 35,35 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7, point (c), of Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(125) It is necessary to examine whether the deviations referred to in recitals (122) to (124) may be deemed necessary and proportionate in accordance with point 1.4(d) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the Commission has assessed whether the observed deviations from the Union-wide DUC trend and from the long-term Union-wide DUC trend referred to in recitals (122) and (123) are exclusively due to additional determined costs related to measures necessary to achieve the performance targets in the key performance area of capacity or to restructuring costs within the meaning of Article 2, point (18), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(126) In respect of the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that Slovakia refers in the draft performance plan to the additional determined costs incurred over RP4 by the ANSP LPS in relation to measures needed for the achievement of the local capacity targets (‘capacity measures’). The presented capacity measures comprise the following main elements:
(a)
the training and employment of additional ATCOs in operations in order to handle the expected traffic increase during RP4; this is planned to result over RP4 into an overall increase of over 10 % of the number of ATCOs in operations at the ACC of Bratislava;
(b)
the implementation of a new ATM system, which is foreseen to enable future improvements in airspace capacity,
(c)
infrastructure and buildings modernisation with a view of enhancing operational resilience.
(127) Having regard to the evaluation made by the PRB, the additional costs reported by Slovakia for the capacity measures referred to in recital (126) are significantly lower in monetary terms than the observed deviations from the Union-wide cost-efficiency trends calculated by the PRB. Furthermore, the Commission observes that certain capacity measures invoked by Slovakia could be considered to be part of the normal operations of the ANSP concerned or may not directly contribute to enhancing airspace capacity. Hence, it is not possible to conclude, without further detailed information and analysis, on whether the capacity measures presented by Slovakia can be, in their entirety, deemed necessary and proportionate for the achievement of the local capacity performance targets for RP4. Therefore, the Commission notes that the observed deviations from the Union-wide cost-efficiency trends referred to in recitals (122) and (123) cannot be exclusively attributed to the additional costs deriving from the presented capacity measures.
(128) Therefore, the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 should not be considered fulfilled in respect of Slovakia.
(129) Furthermore, the Commission notes that Slovakia has not presented in the draft performance plan any restructuring measures which would justify a deviation from the Union-wide DUC trend or from the Union-wide long-term DUC trend pursuant to the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(ii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(130) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (121) to (129), the cost-efficiency performance targets for the en route charging zone of Slovakia should be considered inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
9. CONCLUSIONS
(131) In light of the foregoing, certain performance targets included in the draft FABEC performance plan submitted by Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and certain performance targets included in the draft performance plans submitted by Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Latvia and Slovakia, should not be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(132) In accordance with Article 14(3), second subparagraph, of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Member States concerned are to submit their revised draft performance plans to the Commission within three months from the date of the adoption of this Decision, taking account of the recommendations put forward by the Commission,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The performance targets listed in the Annex to this Decision, which are included in the draft functional airspace block performance plan submitted by Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and in the draft national performance plans submitted by Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Latvia and Slovakia, are inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for the fourth reference period (‘RP4’) set out in Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
Greece shall revise its en route capacity targets for 2025 and 2026, expressed as the average minutes of en route air traffic flow management delay per flight, to make them consistent with the Union-wide performance targets in the key performance area of capacity set out in Article 4 of Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
Where the Network Operations Plan of 2 July 2024 drawn up in accordance with Article 9 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/123 recommends specific additional measures to improve capacity performance, account shall be taken of those measures when revising the capacity performance targets referred to in the first paragraph.
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Slovakia shall revise downwards the cost-efficiency targets set for their en route charging zones, expressed as determined unit cost (DUC).
When revising their cost-efficiency targets, those Member States shall:

(a) ensure that the revised cost-efficiency targets are consistent both with the Union-wide DUC trend and with the Union-wide long-term DUC trend, referred to, respectively, in point 1.4(a) and (b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317;
(b) reduce the level of determined costs accordingly, in particular in respect of calendar year 2029;
(c) use the latest traffic forecasts, expressed in service units, in accordance with Article 10(2) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
By way of derogation from the first paragraph, point (a), where the baseline value of the relevant en route charging zone fulfils the criterion laid down in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Member State concerned shall ensure that the revised cost-efficiency targets are consistent at least with the Union-wide DUC trend or with the Union-wide long-term DUC trend.
Where a Member State invokes, in its revised draft performance plan to be submitted in accordance with Article 14(3), second subparagraph, of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, a deviation under point 1.4(d) of Annex IV to that Implementing Regulation, it shall ensure that such a deviation is substantiated with adequate information and justifications. In particular, the Member State concerned shall demonstrate that any measures invoked to justify a deviation from Union-wide cost-efficiency targets relate solely to additional operational resources or technical capabilities necessary to meet the capacity targets.

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Estonia, Ireland, the Hellenic Republic, the French Republic, the Republic of Latvia, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Slovak Republic.

Performance targets found to be inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for the fourth reference period

1. TARGETS INCLUDED IN THE DRAFT FABEC PERFORMANCE PLAN SUBMITTED BY BELGIUM, GERMANY, FRANCE, LUXEMBOURG AND THE NETHERLANDS

KEY PERFORMANCE AREA OF COST-EFFICIENCY

En route charging zone of Belgium-Luxembourg
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
EUR 94,14
EUR 104,26
EUR 104,94
EUR 106,08
EUR 106,14
EUR 104,43
EUR 103,83

En route charging zone of Germany
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
EUR 71,71
EUR 74,90
EUR 73,16
EUR 73,06
EUR 73,10
EUR 71,87
EUR 70,54

En route charging zone of the Netherlands
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
EUR 86,52
EUR 104,60
EUR 103,51
EUR 103,61
EUR 106,50
EUR 106,28
EUR 105,95

2. TARGETS INCLUDED IN THE DRAFT PERFORMANCE PLAN OF DENMARK

KEY PERFORMANCE AREA OF COST-EFFICIENCY

En route charging zone of Denmark
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
DKK 466,58
DKK 543,10
DKK 529,76
DKK 521,41
DKK 515,34
DKK 506,93
DKK 500,26
EUR 62,74
EUR 73,02
EUR 71,23
EUR 70,11
EUR 69,29
EUR 68,16
EUR 67,26

3. TARGETS INCLUDED IN THE DRAFT PERFORMANCE PLAN OF ESTONIA

KEY PERFORMANCE AREA OF COST-EFFICIENCY

En route charging zone of Estonia
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
EUR 38,12
EUR 54,69
EUR 50,46
EUR 52,95
EUR 54,37
EUR 54,54
EUR 55,69

4. TARGETS INCLUDED IN THE DRAFT PERFORMANCE PLAN OF GREECE

KEY PERFORMANCE AREA OF CAPACITY

Greece
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets in the key performance area of capacity, expressed in minutes of en route ATFM delay per flight
0,69
0,50
0,19
0,16
0,16

KEY PERFORMANCE AREA OF COST-EFFICIENCY

En route charging zone of Greece
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
EUR 28,84
EUR 25,04
EUR 24,67
EUR 24,01
EUR 24,95
EUR 26,40
EUR 25,72

5. TARGETS INCLUDED IN THE DRAFT PERFORMANCE PLAN OF IRELAND

KEY PERFORMANCE AREA OF COST-EFFICIENCY

En route charging zone of Ireland
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
EUR 27,59
EUR 27,29
EUR 28,61
EUR 29,72
EUR 29,75
EUR 29,84
EUR 30,14

6. TARGETS INCLUDED IN THE DRAFT PERFORMANCE PLAN OF LATVIA

KEY PERFORMANCE AREA OF COST-EFFICIENCY

En route charging zone of Latvia
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
EUR 28,57
EUR 37,97
EUR 48,73
EUR 53,56
EUR 57,79
EUR 61,14
EUR 63,75

7. TARGETS INCLUDED IN THE DRAFT PERFORMANCE PLAN OF SLOVAKIA

KEY PERFORMANCE AREA OF COST-EFFICIENCY

En route charging zone of Slovakia
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
EUR 56,20
EUR 60,11
EUR 62,58
EUR 61,85
EUR 61,12
EUR 59,71
EUR 58,34

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1039 of 16 May 2025 on the inconsistency of certain performance targets included in the draft performance plan submitted by Switzerland pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council with the Union-wide performance targets for the fourth reference period of the Single European Sky performance and charging scheme (notified under document C(2025) 2923)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1039 23.5.2025
(1) Pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 549/2004, Member States are to draw up plans, either at national level or at the level of functional airspace blocks (‘FABs’), including performance targets, for each reference period of the performance scheme for air navigation services and network functions. Those plans are to include local performance targets which are consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for the reference period concerned.
(2) The Union-wide performance targets for the fourth reference period (‘RP4’, 2025-2029) were set out in Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688(4).
(3) All Member States and Switzerland have drawn up and adopted draft performance plans for RP4, which were submitted to the Commission for assessment by 1 October 2024. Switzerland submitted to the Commission a draft performance plan adopted jointly with Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (‘the EU Member States part of FABEC’) at the level of Functional Airspace Block Europe Central (‘FABEC’). Following the verification of completeness of FABEC’s draft performance plan, the Commission requested FABEC to submit an updated draft performance plan by 15 November 2024.
(4) The Commission’s assessment included in this Decision is based on the updated draft performance plan of FABEC (‘draft FABEC performance plan’) submitted by Switzerland and the Member States comprised in FABEC.
(5) The Performance Review Body (‘PRB’), assisting the Commission in the implementation of the performance scheme, has submitted to the Commission a report setting out its advice on the assessment of the FABEC’s draft performance plan.
(6) In accordance with Article 14(1) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317(5), the Commission has assessed the consistency of the local performance targets included in the draft FABEC performance plan on the basis of the criteria laid down in point 1 of Annex IV to that Implementing Regulation, and taking account of local circumstances.
(7) The Commission has complemented its assessment with the review of the draft FABEC performance plan in respect of the elements set out in point 2 of Annex IV to that Implementing Regulation. In respect of point 2.1(d)(vii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that it has not conducted, as part of that review, a detailed analysis of the methodology used by Switzerland for the allocation of costs betweenen routeand terminal services in RP4. Therefore, the Commission has not drawn any conclusions, at this stage, in respect of the compliance of that cost allocation methodology with points (e) and (f) of Article 15(2) Regulation (EC) No 550/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6)and Article 22(5) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(8) This Decision covers solely the performance targets and the elements set out in point 2 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 which directly apply to the air navigation service provider designated to provide services in the airspace of Switzerland.
(9) The consistency of the cost-efficiency performance targets included in the draft FABEC performance plan regarding the determined unit cost (‘DUC’) foren routeair navigation services has been assessed based on the criteria laid down in points 1.4(a), (b) and (c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Those criteria consist of the DUC trend over RP4, the long-term DUC trend over the third reference period (2020-2024) (RP3) and RP4 (2025-2029), and the baseline value for the DUC at charging zone level compared with the average value of the charging zones where air navigation service providers have a similar operational and economic environment.
(10) Theen routecost-efficiency targets proposed for theen routecharging zone of Switzerland for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:En routecharging zone of Switzerland2019 baseline value2024 baseline value20252026202720282029Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)CHF 110,08CHF 124,74CHF 131,82CHF 133,17CHF 131,03CHF 128,63CHF 129,42EUR 109,54EUR 124,13EUR 131,17EUR 132,51EUR 130,39EUR 128,00EUR 128,79 En routecharging zone of Switzerland 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) CHF 110,08 CHF 124,74 CHF 131,82 CHF 133,17 CHF 131,03 CHF 128,63 CHF 129,42 EUR 109,54 EUR 124,13 EUR 131,17 EUR 132,51 EUR 130,39 EUR 128,00 EUR 128,79
En routecharging zone of Switzerland 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) CHF 110,08 CHF 124,74 CHF 131,82 CHF 133,17 CHF 131,03 CHF 128,63 CHF 129,42
EUR 109,54 EUR 124,13 EUR 131,17 EUR 132,51 EUR 130,39 EUR 128,00 EUR 128,79
En routecharging zone of Switzerland 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) CHF 110,08 CHF 124,74 CHF 131,82 CHF 133,17 CHF 131,03 CHF 128,63 CHF 129,42
EUR 109,54 EUR 124,13 EUR 131,17 EUR 132,51 EUR 130,39 EUR 128,00 EUR 128,79
(11) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the DUC trend of Switzerland at charging zone level of +0,7 % over RP4 underperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(12) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the long-term DUC trend of Switzerland at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of +1,8 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(13) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the baseline value for the DUC of EUR 124,13 of Switzerland, expressed in real terms at 2022 prices (‘EUR2022’), is 41,8 % higher than the average baseline value of EUR 87,51 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7, point (e), of Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(14) It is necessary to examine whether the deviations referred to in recitals (11), (12) and (13) may be deemed necessary and proportionate in accordance with point 1.4(d) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the Commission has assessed whether the observed deviations from the Union-wide DUC trend and from the long-term Union-wide DUC trend referred to in recitals (11) and (12) are exclusively due to additional determined costs related to measures necessary to achieve the performance targets in the key performance area of capacity or to restructuring costs within the meaning of Article 2, point (18), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(15) In respect of the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that Switzerland refers in the draft FABEC performance plan to the additional determined costs incurred over RP4 by the air navigation service provider Skyguide in relation to measures needed for the achievement of the capacity targets (‘capacity measures’). The presented capacity measures comprise the following main elements:(a)the training and recruitment by Skyguide of new air traffic controllers (‘ATCOs’) to replace the ATCOs expected to retire during RP4 and to accommodate the forecasted traffic growth. This is planned to result over RP4 into an overall increase of approximately 10 % of the number of ATCOs in operations at the area control centres (‘ACCs’) of Geneva and Zurich;.(b)investments in infrastructure and systems to support the resilience of operations, including additional contingency and fall-back solutions;(c)technical enhancements of the air traffic management system enabling increased capacity and efficiency. These enhancements will support the location-independent operations at the ACCs of Geneva and Zurich, which means that the whole Swiss airspace can be controlled from either one of these ACCs;(d)deployment of tools for the optimisation of air traffic flow management. (a) the training and recruitment by Skyguide of new air traffic controllers (‘ATCOs’) to replace the ATCOs expected to retire during RP4 and to accommodate the forecasted traffic growth. This is planned to result over RP4 into an overall increase of approximately 10 % of the number of ATCOs in operations at the area control centres (‘ACCs’) of Geneva and Zurich;. (b) investments in infrastructure and systems to support the resilience of operations, including additional contingency and fall-back solutions; (c) technical enhancements of the air traffic management system enabling increased capacity and efficiency. These enhancements will support the location-independent operations at the ACCs of Geneva and Zurich, which means that the whole Swiss airspace can be controlled from either one of these ACCs; (d) deployment of tools for the optimisation of air traffic flow management.
(a) the training and recruitment by Skyguide of new air traffic controllers (‘ATCOs’) to replace the ATCOs expected to retire during RP4 and to accommodate the forecasted traffic growth. This is planned to result over RP4 into an overall increase of approximately 10 % of the number of ATCOs in operations at the area control centres (‘ACCs’) of Geneva and Zurich;.
(b) investments in infrastructure and systems to support the resilience of operations, including additional contingency and fall-back solutions;
(c) technical enhancements of the air traffic management system enabling increased capacity and efficiency. These enhancements will support the location-independent operations at the ACCs of Geneva and Zurich, which means that the whole Swiss airspace can be controlled from either one of these ACCs;
(d) deployment of tools for the optimisation of air traffic flow management.
(a) the training and recruitment by Skyguide of new air traffic controllers (‘ATCOs’) to replace the ATCOs expected to retire during RP4 and to accommodate the forecasted traffic growth. This is planned to result over RP4 into an overall increase of approximately 10 % of the number of ATCOs in operations at the area control centres (‘ACCs’) of Geneva and Zurich;.
(b) investments in infrastructure and systems to support the resilience of operations, including additional contingency and fall-back solutions;
(c) technical enhancements of the air traffic management system enabling increased capacity and efficiency. These enhancements will support the location-independent operations at the ACCs of Geneva and Zurich, which means that the whole Swiss airspace can be controlled from either one of these ACCs;
(d) deployment of tools for the optimisation of air traffic flow management.
(16) Having regard to the evaluation made by the PRB, the additional costs reported by Switzerland for the capacity measures referred to in recital (15) are significantly lower in monetary terms than the observed deviations from the Union-wide cost-efficiency trends calculated by the PRB. Furthermore, the Commission observes that certain capacity measures invoked by Switzerland could be considered to be part of the normal operations of the air navigation service provider concerned or may not directly contribute to enhancing airspace capacity. Hence, it is not possible to conclude, without further detailed information and analysis, on whether the capacity measures presented by Switzerland can be, in their entirety, deemed necessary and proportionate for the achievement of the local capacity performance targets for RP4. Therefore, the Commission notes that the observed deviations from the Union-wide cost-efficiency trends referred to in recitals (11) and (12) cannot be exclusively attributed to the additional costs deriving from the presented capacity measures.
(17) Therefore, the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 should not be considered fulfilled in respect of Switzerland.
(18) Furthermore, the Commission notes that Switzerland has not presented in the draft FABEC performance plan any restructuring measures which would justify a deviation from the Union-wide DUC trend or from the Union-wide long-term DUC trend pursuant to the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(ii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(19) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (10) to (18), the cost-efficiency performance targets for theen routecharging zone of Switzerland should be considered inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(20) In accordance with point 2.1(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft FABEC performance plan by reviewing the measures for the achievement of the environment targets included in that plan.
(21) On the basis of the review referred to in recital (20), the Commission has strong doubts whether the measures presented by Switzerland and the EU Member States part of FABEC for the achievement of the FABEC environment performance targets are adequate to enable those targets to be effectively reached. Having regard to the PRB’s findings, the Commission observes, in particular, that the measures presented by France in respect of the air navigation service provider DSNA are insufficient to enable the targeted flight efficiency improvements in RP4.
(22) Therefore, the Commission considers that FABEC should put in place additional measures for the achievement of its environment targets for RP4, for example through the effective implementation of free route airspace and the implementation of cross-border free route airspace with additional neighbouring Member States.
(23) In accordance with point 2.1(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft FABEC performance plan by reviewing the measures for the achievement of theen routecapacity targets included in that plan.
(24) On the basis of the review referred to in recital (23), the Commission has strong doubts as to whether the measures presented by Switzerland and the EU Member States part of FABEC for the achievement of the FABECen routecapacity performance targets are adequate to enable those targets to be effectively reached. Having regard to the PRB’s findings, the Commission observes, in particular, that the measures presented by Germany in respect of the air navigation service provider ‘DFS’ are insufficient to effectively meet the traffic demand expected in RP4.
(25) Therefore, the Commission considers that Switzerland and the EU Member States part of FABEC should put in place additional measures for the achievement of its capacity targets for RP4, for example in respect of the training and recruitment of additional ATCOs, a more efficient use of resources, and cooperation arrangements between air navigation service providers.
(26) In accordance with point 2.1(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft FABEC performance plan by reviewing the capacity performance targets for terminal air navigation services set by Switzerland in respect of the airports referred to in Articles 1(3) and (4) of that Implementing Regulation. It was found that those targets give rise to concerns.
(27) Firstly, the Commission notes that the proposed terminal capacity targets of Switzerland for RP4 lead to a deterioration of the average arrival ATFM delay per year compared to RP3. Indeed, the proposed RP4 targets are set at 1,60 minutes per flight, whereas the actual performance recorded in RP3 ranged from 0,37 to 1,50 minutes per flight.
(28) Secondly, when breaking down the terminal capacity targets at airport level, it was found that those terminal capacity targets result in a significantly worse level of ATFM delay per flight for Zurich and Geneva airports than the level of performance of similar airports identified by the PRB.
(29) Therefore, the Commission considers that Switzerland should further justify the terminal capacity targets for RP4 in light of the observations set out in recitals (27) and (28), or should revise downwards those targets.
(30) In accordance with point 2.1(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft FABEC performance plan by reviewing the cost-efficiency performance targets for terminal air navigation services set by Switzerland in respect of the airports referred to in Articles 1(3) and (4) of that Implementing Regulation.
(31) The Commission notes that the cost-efficiency targets for the terminal charging zone of Switzerland lead to a deteriorating DUC trend of +1,0 % over RP4. Furthermore, it was found that the average DUC for RP4 of terminal air navigation services at the airports of Zurich and Geneva is estimated to be higher, by a significant margin, than the median DUC of the similar airports identified by the PRB.
(32) Therefore, the Commission considers that Switzerland should further justify its terminal cost-efficiency targets for RP4 in light of the observations set out in recital (31), or should revise downwards those targets.
(33) In accordance with point 2.1(f) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has reviewed the incentive schemes included in the draft FABEC performance plan for the purpose of supporting the achievement of capacity targets (‘capacity incentive schemes’). It was found that the capacity incentive schemes for RP4 established by Switzerland foren routeand terminal services give rise to concerns.
(34) The Commission notes that theen routecapacity incentive scheme of FABEC and the terminal capacity incentive scheme of Switzerland, as established in the draft FABEC performance plan, comprise a maximum financial disadvantage amounting to merely 0,50 % of determined costs. Having regard to the expert advice provided by the PRB, the Commission considers that the maximum financial disadvantages for those incentive schemes do not comply with Article 11(3), point (a), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, which requires such incentive schemes to have ‘material impact on revenue at risk’.
(35) Therefore, Switzerland should, in respect of the draft FABEC performance plan, revise its capacity incentive schemes referred to in recital (34) so that the maximum financial disadvantages stemming from those incentive schemes are set at a level having a material impact on the revenue at risk, as required by Article 11(3), point (a), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. In the Commission’s view, that revision should lead to a maximum financial disadvantage equal to or higher than 1 % of the annual determined costs.
(36) In the light of the foregoing, certain performance targets included in the draft FABEC performance plan in respect of Switzerland should not be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(37) Therefore, in accordance with Article 14(3), second subparagraph, of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, Switzerland and the FABEC Member States, are to submit their revised draft performance plan to the Commission within three months from the date of the adoption of this Decision, taking account of the recommendations put forward by the Commission.
(38) The Commission has consulted Switzerland on the recommendations set out in this Decision, in accordance with Article 19(2) of the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air Transport,
(a) ensure that the revised cost-efficiency targets are consistent both with the Union-wide DUC trend and with the Union-wide long-term DUC trend, referred to, respectively, in point 1.4(a) and (b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317;
(b) reduce the level of determined costs accordingly, in particular in respect of calendar year 2029;
(c) use the latest traffic forecasts, expressed in service units, in accordance with Article 10(2) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
En routecharging zone of Switzerland 2019 baseline value 2024 baseline value 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency,expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices) CHF 110,08 CHF 124,74 CHF 131,82 CHF 133,17 CHF 131,03 CHF 128,63 CHF 129,42
EUR 109,54 EUR 124,13 EUR 131,17 EUR 132,51 EUR 130,39 EUR 128,00 EUR 128,79
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air Transport (1),
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 laying down the framework for the creation of the single European sky (the framework Regulation) (2), and in particular Article 11(3), point (c), second subparagraph, thereof,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/2803 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on the implementation of the Single European Sky (3), and in particular Article 58(3) thereof,
After consulting the Single Sky Committee,
Whereas:
1. BACKGROUND
(1) Pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 549/2004, Member States are to draw up plans, either at national level or at the level of functional airspace blocks (‘FABs’), including performance targets, for each reference period of the performance scheme for air navigation services and network functions. Those plans are to include local performance targets which are consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for the reference period concerned.
(2) The Union-wide performance targets for the fourth reference period (‘RP4’, 2025-2029) were set out in Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688 (4).
(3) All Member States and Switzerland have drawn up and adopted draft performance plans for RP4, which were submitted to the Commission for assessment by 1 October 2024. Switzerland submitted to the Commission a draft performance plan adopted jointly with Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (‘the EU Member States part of FABEC’) at the level of Functional Airspace Block Europe Central (‘FABEC’). Following the verification of completeness of FABEC’s draft performance plan, the Commission requested FABEC to submit an updated draft performance plan by 15 November 2024.
(4) The Commission’s assessment included in this Decision is based on the updated draft performance plan of FABEC (‘draft FABEC performance plan’) submitted by Switzerland and the Member States comprised in FABEC.
(5) The Performance Review Body (‘PRB’), assisting the Commission in the implementation of the performance scheme, has submitted to the Commission a report setting out its advice on the assessment of the FABEC’s draft performance plan.
(6) In accordance with Article 14(1) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 (5), the Commission has assessed the consistency of the local performance targets included in the draft FABEC performance plan on the basis of the criteria laid down in point 1 of Annex IV to that Implementing Regulation, and taking account of local circumstances.
(7) The Commission has complemented its assessment with the review of the draft FABEC performance plan in respect of the elements set out in point 2 of Annex IV to that Implementing Regulation. In respect of point 2.1(d)(vii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that it has not conducted, as part of that review, a detailed analysis of the methodology used by Switzerland for the allocation of costs between en route and terminal services in RP4. Therefore, the Commission has not drawn any conclusions, at this stage, in respect of the compliance of that cost allocation methodology with points (e) and (f) of Article 15(2) Regulation (EC) No 550/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (6) and Article 22(5) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(8) This Decision covers solely the performance targets and the elements set out in point 2 of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 which directly apply to the air navigation service provider designated to provide services in the airspace of Switzerland.
2. FINDINGS FROM THE ASSESSMENT
Assessment of the cost-efficiency targets for the en route charging zone of Switzerland
(9) The consistency of the cost-efficiency performance targets included in the draft FABEC performance plan regarding the determined unit cost (‘DUC’) for en route air navigation services has been assessed based on the criteria laid down in points 1.4(a), (b) and (c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Those criteria consist of the DUC trend over RP4, the long-term DUC trend over the third reference period (2020-2024) (RP3) and RP4 (2025-2029), and the baseline value for the DUC at charging zone level compared with the average value of the charging zones where air navigation service providers have a similar operational and economic environment.
(10) The en route cost-efficiency targets proposed for the en route charging zone of Switzerland for RP4, and the related baseline values, are as follows:
En route charging zone of Switzerland
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
CHF 110,08
CHF 124,74
CHF 131,82
CHF 133,17
CHF 131,03
CHF 128,63
CHF 129,42
EUR 109,54
EUR 124,13
EUR 131,17
EUR 132,51
EUR 130,39
EUR 128,00
EUR 128,79
(11) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the DUC trend of Switzerland at charging zone level of +0,7 % over RP4 underperforms the Union-wide trend of -1,2 % over the same period.
(12) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the long-term DUC trend of Switzerland at charging zone level over RP3 and RP4 of +1,8 % underperforms the long-term Union-wide trend of -1,0 % over the same period.
(13) Concerning the assessment criterion set out in point 1.4(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission observes that the baseline value for the DUC of EUR 124,13 of Switzerland, expressed in real terms at 2022 prices (‘EUR2022’), is 41,8 % higher than the average baseline value of EUR 87,51 in EUR2022 of the relevant comparator group set out in Article 7, point (e), of Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
(14) It is necessary to examine whether the deviations referred to in recitals (11), (12) and (13) may be deemed necessary and proportionate in accordance with point 1.4(d) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. Accordingly, the Commission has assessed whether the observed deviations from the Union-wide DUC trend and from the long-term Union-wide DUC trend referred to in recitals (11) and (12) are exclusively due to additional determined costs related to measures necessary to achieve the performance targets in the key performance area of capacity or to restructuring costs within the meaning of Article 2, point (18), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(15) In respect of the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission notes that Switzerland refers in the draft FABEC performance plan to the additional determined costs incurred over RP4 by the air navigation service provider Skyguide in relation to measures needed for the achievement of the capacity targets (‘capacity measures’). The presented capacity measures comprise the following main elements:
(a)
the training and recruitment by Skyguide of new air traffic controllers (‘ATCOs’) to replace the ATCOs expected to retire during RP4 and to accommodate the forecasted traffic growth. This is planned to result over RP4 into an overall increase of approximately 10 % of the number of ATCOs in operations at the area control centres (‘ACCs’) of Geneva and Zurich;.
(b)
investments in infrastructure and systems to support the resilience of operations, including additional contingency and fall-back solutions;
(c)
technical enhancements of the air traffic management system enabling increased capacity and efficiency. These enhancements will support the location-independent operations at the ACCs of Geneva and Zurich, which means that the whole Swiss airspace can be controlled from either one of these ACCs;
(d)
deployment of tools for the optimisation of air traffic flow management.
(16) Having regard to the evaluation made by the PRB, the additional costs reported by Switzerland for the capacity measures referred to in recital (15) are significantly lower in monetary terms than the observed deviations from the Union-wide cost-efficiency trends calculated by the PRB. Furthermore, the Commission observes that certain capacity measures invoked by Switzerland could be considered to be part of the normal operations of the air navigation service provider concerned or may not directly contribute to enhancing airspace capacity. Hence, it is not possible to conclude, without further detailed information and analysis, on whether the capacity measures presented by Switzerland can be, in their entirety, deemed necessary and proportionate for the achievement of the local capacity performance targets for RP4. Therefore, the Commission notes that the observed deviations from the Union-wide cost-efficiency trends referred to in recitals (11) and (12) cannot be exclusively attributed to the additional costs deriving from the presented capacity measures.
(17) Therefore, the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(i) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 should not be considered fulfilled in respect of Switzerland.
(18) Furthermore, the Commission notes that Switzerland has not presented in the draft FABEC performance plan any restructuring measures which would justify a deviation from the Union-wide DUC trend or from the Union-wide long-term DUC trend pursuant to the criterion set out in point 1.4(d)(ii) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
(19) On the basis of the findings set out in recitals (10) to (18), the cost-efficiency performance targets for the en route charging zone of Switzerland should be considered inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
Review of the measures for the achievement of environment targets
(20) In accordance with point 2.1(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft FABEC performance plan by reviewing the measures for the achievement of the environment targets included in that plan.
(21) On the basis of the review referred to in recital (20), the Commission has strong doubts whether the measures presented by Switzerland and the EU Member States part of FABEC for the achievement of the FABEC environment performance targets are adequate to enable those targets to be effectively reached. Having regard to the PRB’s findings, the Commission observes, in particular, that the measures presented by France in respect of the air navigation service provider DSNA are insufficient to enable the targeted flight efficiency improvements in RP4.
(22) Therefore, the Commission considers that FABEC should put in place additional measures for the achievement of its environment targets for RP4, for example through the effective implementation of free route airspace and the implementation of cross-border free route airspace with additional neighbouring Member States.
Review of the measures for the achievement of capacity targets
(23) In accordance with point 2.1(a) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft FABEC performance plan by reviewing the measures for the achievement of the en route capacity targets included in that plan.
(24) On the basis of the review referred to in recital (23), the Commission has strong doubts as to whether the measures presented by Switzerland and the EU Member States part of FABEC for the achievement of the FABEC en route capacity performance targets are adequate to enable those targets to be effectively reached. Having regard to the PRB’s findings, the Commission observes, in particular, that the measures presented by Germany in respect of the air navigation service provider ‘DFS’ are insufficient to effectively meet the traffic demand expected in RP4.
(25) Therefore, the Commission considers that Switzerland and the EU Member States part of FABEC should put in place additional measures for the achievement of its capacity targets for RP4, for example in respect of the training and recruitment of additional ATCOs, a more efficient use of resources, and cooperation arrangements between air navigation service providers.
Review of the capacity targets for terminal air navigation services
(26) In accordance with point 2.1(b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft FABEC performance plan by reviewing the capacity performance targets for terminal air navigation services set by Switzerland in respect of the airports referred to in Articles 1(3) and (4) of that Implementing Regulation. It was found that those targets give rise to concerns.
(27) Firstly, the Commission notes that the proposed terminal capacity targets of Switzerland for RP4 lead to a deterioration of the average arrival ATFM delay per year compared to RP3. Indeed, the proposed RP4 targets are set at 1,60 minutes per flight, whereas the actual performance recorded in RP3 ranged from 0,37 to 1,50 minutes per flight.
(28) Secondly, when breaking down the terminal capacity targets at airport level, it was found that those terminal capacity targets result in a significantly worse level of ATFM delay per flight for Zurich and Geneva airports than the level of performance of similar airports identified by the PRB.
(29) Therefore, the Commission considers that Switzerland should further justify the terminal capacity targets for RP4 in light of the observations set out in recitals (27) and (28), or should revise downwards those targets.
Review of the cost-efficiency targets for terminal air navigation services
(30) In accordance with point 2.1(c) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has complemented its assessment of the draft FABEC performance plan by reviewing the cost-efficiency performance targets for terminal air navigation services set by Switzerland in respect of the airports referred to in Articles 1(3) and (4) of that Implementing Regulation.
(31) The Commission notes that the cost-efficiency targets for the terminal charging zone of Switzerland lead to a deteriorating DUC trend of +1,0 % over RP4. Furthermore, it was found that the average DUC for RP4 of terminal air navigation services at the airports of Zurich and Geneva is estimated to be higher, by a significant margin, than the median DUC of the similar airports identified by the PRB.
(32) Therefore, the Commission considers that Switzerland should further justify its terminal cost-efficiency targets for RP4 in light of the observations set out in recital (31), or should revise downwards those targets.
Review of the en route and terminal capacity incentive schemes
(33) In accordance with point 2.1(f) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, the Commission has reviewed the incentive schemes included in the draft FABEC performance plan for the purpose of supporting the achievement of capacity targets (‘capacity incentive schemes’). It was found that the capacity incentive schemes for RP4 established by Switzerland for en route and terminal services give rise to concerns.
(34) The Commission notes that the en route capacity incentive scheme of FABEC and the terminal capacity incentive scheme of Switzerland, as established in the draft FABEC performance plan, comprise a maximum financial disadvantage amounting to merely 0,50 % of determined costs. Having regard to the expert advice provided by the PRB, the Commission considers that the maximum financial disadvantages for those incentive schemes do not comply with Article 11(3), point (a), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, which requires such incentive schemes to have ‘material impact on revenue at risk’.
(35) Therefore, Switzerland should, in respect of the draft FABEC performance plan, revise its capacity incentive schemes referred to in recital (34) so that the maximum financial disadvantages stemming from those incentive schemes are set at a level having a material impact on the revenue at risk, as required by Article 11(3), point (a), of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317. In the Commission’s view, that revision should lead to a maximum financial disadvantage equal to or higher than 1 % of the annual determined costs.
3. CONCLUSIONS
(36) In the light of the foregoing, certain performance targets included in the draft FABEC performance plan in respect of Switzerland should not be considered consistent with the Union-wide performance targets for RP4.
(37) Therefore, in accordance with Article 14(3), second subparagraph, of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317, Switzerland and the FABEC Member States, are to submit their revised draft performance plan to the Commission within three months from the date of the adoption of this Decision, taking account of the recommendations put forward by the Commission.
(38) The Commission has consulted Switzerland on the recommendations set out in this Decision, in accordance with Article 19(2) of the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air Transport,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The performance targets in respect of Switzerland listed in the Annex to this Decision, which are included in the draft performance plan of the Functional Airspace Block Europe Central are inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for the fourth reference period set out in Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1688.
Switzerland shall revise downwards the cost-efficiency targets set for its en route charging zone, expressed as determined unit cost (DUC).
When revising its cost-efficiency targets, Switzerland shall:

(a) ensure that the revised cost-efficiency targets are consistent both with the Union-wide DUC trend and with the Union-wide long-term DUC trend, referred to, respectively, in point 1.4(a) and (b) of Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317;
(b) reduce the level of determined costs accordingly, in particular in respect of calendar year 2029;
(c) use the latest traffic forecasts, expressed in service units, in accordance with Article 10(2) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317.
If Switzerland invokes in the revised draft performance plan to be submitted in accordance with Article 14(3), second subparagraph, of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/317 a deviation under point 1.4(d) of Annex IV to that Implementing Regulation, it shall ensure that such a deviation is substantiated with adequate information and justifications. In particular, Switzerland shall demonstrate that any measures invoked to justify a deviation from Union-wide cost-efficiency targets relate solely to additional operational resources or technical capabilities necessary to meet the capacity targets.

This Decision is addressed to the Swiss Confederation.

Performance targets found to be inconsistent with the Union-wide performance targets for the fourth reference period

KEY PERFORMANCE AREA OF COST-EFFICIENCY

En route charging zone of Switzerland
2019 baseline value
2024 baseline value
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
Targets and baseline values in the key performance area of cost-efficiency, expressed as determined unit cost (in real terms at 2022 prices)
CHF 110,08
CHF 124,74
CHF 131,82
CHF 133,17
CHF 131,03
CHF 128,63
CHF 129,42
EUR 109,54
EUR 124,13
EUR 131,17
EUR 132,51
EUR 130,39
EUR 128,00
EUR 128,79

Decision (EU) 2025/1018 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 May 2025 on the mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers following an application from Belgium – EGF/2024/003 BE/Van Hool

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1018 22.5.2025
(1) The European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers (EGF) aims to demonstrate solidarity and promote decent and sustainable employment in the Union by providing support for workers made redundant and self-employed persons whose activity has ceased in the case of major restructuring events and assisting them in returning to decent and sustainable employment as soon as possible.
(2) The EGF is not to exceed a maximum annual amount of EUR 30 million (in 2018 prices), as laid down in Article 8 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093(3), amended by Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765(4), and Article 16 of Regulation (EU) 2021/691.
(3) On 29 October 2024, Belgium submitted an application to mobilise the EGF in accordance with Article 8(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/691, in respect of workers’ displacements in Van Hool NV in Belgium. It was supplemented by additional information provided in accordance with Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2021/691. That application is considered to comply with the conditions for providing a financial contribution from the EGF as laid down in Article 13 of Regulation (EU) 2021/691, on the basis of the assessment made by the Commission in the Proposal for a mobilisation decision of the European Parliament and of the Council(5).
(4) The EGF should, therefore, be mobilised in order to provide a financial contribution of EUR 7 999 015 in respect of the application submitted by Belgium.
(5) In order to minimise the time taken to mobilise the EGF, this Decision should apply from the date of its adoption,
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/691 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 on the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers (EGF) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013 (1), and in particular Article 15(1), first subparagraph, thereof,
Having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources (2), and in particular point 9 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Whereas:
(1) The European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers (EGF) aims to demonstrate solidarity and promote decent and sustainable employment in the Union by providing support for workers made redundant and self-employed persons whose activity has ceased in the case of major restructuring events and assisting them in returning to decent and sustainable employment as soon as possible.
(2) The EGF is not to exceed a maximum annual amount of EUR 30 million (in 2018 prices), as laid down in Article 8 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 (3), amended by Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 (4), and Article 16 of Regulation (EU) 2021/691.
(3) On 29 October 2024, Belgium submitted an application to mobilise the EGF in accordance with Article 8(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/691, in respect of workers’ displacements in Van Hool NV in Belgium. It was supplemented by additional information provided in accordance with Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2021/691. That application is considered to comply with the conditions for providing a financial contribution from the EGF as laid down in Article 13 of Regulation (EU) 2021/691, on the basis of the assessment made by the Commission in the Proposal for a mobilisation decision of the European Parliament and of the Council (5).
(4) The EGF should, therefore, be mobilised in order to provide a financial contribution of EUR 7 999 015 in respect of the application submitted by Belgium.
(5) In order to minimise the time taken to mobilise the EGF, this Decision should apply from the date of its adoption,
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
For the general budget of the Union for the financial year 2025, the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers shall be mobilised to provide the amount of EUR 7 999 015 in commitment and payment appropriations.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
It shall apply from 7 May 2025.

Commission Decision (EU) 2025/1016 of 16 May 2025 granting the Kingdom of Spain a derogation from certain provisions of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council and of Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards Melilla (notified under document C(2025) 3175)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1016 23.5.2025
(1) On 23 November 2020, the Kingdom of Spain (‘Spain’) submitted to the Commission a request for derogation (the ‘Application’) for the non-peninsular territories of the Canary Islands, the Balearic Islands, Ceuta and Melilla (jointly, ‘NPT’) in accordance with Article 64 Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Article 66 of Directive (EU) 2019/944.
(2) The Application initially asked for derogations from Article 8 and Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 and from Articles 3, 6, 7(1); 8(1) and (4), 9, 10, 11, Articles 14 to 17, Articles 19 to 27 and Articles 35 to 47 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943. That Application did not specify the duration of the requested derogation.
(3) On 18 March 2021, the Commission published the Application on its website and invited Member States and stakeholders to provide comments by 30 April 2021.
(4) The Commission requested from Spain additional information on the derogation request on 17 August 2021 and 16 December 2021. Spain replied on 4 October 2021 and 17 January 2022. In the latter submission, Spain modified the scope of its request for derogation as follows:—the request for derogation from Article 8 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 was withdrawn for all NPT,—the request for derogation from Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 was withdrawn for the Balearic Islands and Ceuta,—Spain included a new request for derogation from Article 40(4) to (7) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 for all NPT,—the request for derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (d), (f), (g), (h), (i), (l), (m) and (q) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 was withdrawn for all NPT,—Spain also withdrew the request for derogation for all NPT from Article 16(1) and (2), Article 20(1) and (2); Article 21(1) to (6); Article 22(1), except for points (f) and (h); Article 22(4); and Articles 35 to 47 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943,—Spain set out a limited duration for the requested derogation for the Balearic Islands and Ceuta until the effective integration of these territories with the mainland (not expected before 2030). — the request for derogation from Article 8 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 was withdrawn for all NPT, — the request for derogation from Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 was withdrawn for the Balearic Islands and Ceuta, — Spain included a new request for derogation from Article 40(4) to (7) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 for all NPT, — the request for derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (d), (f), (g), (h), (i), (l), (m) and (q) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 was withdrawn for all NPT, — Spain also withdrew the request for derogation for all NPT from Article 16(1) and (2), Article 20(1) and (2); Article 21(1) to (6); Article 22(1), except for points (f) and (h); Article 22(4); and Articles 35 to 47 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, — Spain set out a limited duration for the requested derogation for the Balearic Islands and Ceuta until the effective integration of these territories with the mainland (not expected before 2030).
— the request for derogation from Article 8 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 was withdrawn for all NPT,
— the request for derogation from Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 was withdrawn for the Balearic Islands and Ceuta,
— Spain included a new request for derogation from Article 40(4) to (7) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 for all NPT,
— the request for derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (d), (f), (g), (h), (i), (l), (m) and (q) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 was withdrawn for all NPT,
— Spain also withdrew the request for derogation for all NPT from Article 16(1) and (2), Article 20(1) and (2); Article 21(1) to (6); Article 22(1), except for points (f) and (h); Article 22(4); and Articles 35 to 47 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943,
— Spain set out a limited duration for the requested derogation for the Balearic Islands and Ceuta until the effective integration of these territories with the mainland (not expected before 2030).
— the request for derogation from Article 8 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 was withdrawn for all NPT,
— the request for derogation from Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 was withdrawn for the Balearic Islands and Ceuta,
— Spain included a new request for derogation from Article 40(4) to (7) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 for all NPT,
— the request for derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (d), (f), (g), (h), (i), (l), (m) and (q) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 was withdrawn for all NPT,
— Spain also withdrew the request for derogation for all NPT from Article 16(1) and (2), Article 20(1) and (2); Article 21(1) to (6); Article 22(1), except for points (f) and (h); Article 22(4); and Articles 35 to 47 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943,
— Spain set out a limited duration for the requested derogation for the Balearic Islands and Ceuta until the effective integration of these territories with the mainland (not expected before 2030).
(5) This Decision should cover only the Autonomous City of Melilla, as the Commission decision on the derogation request submitted by Spain concerning the NPT of the Canary Islands was adopted on 8 December 2023(3)and the derogation requests submitted by Spain concerning the NPT of the Balearic Islands and the Autonomous City of Ceuta will be addressed in separate decisions.
(6) Spain explains that the city of Melilla is not connected with the mainland electricity system of Spain. In this regard, Spain submits that the distance to the Iberian Peninsula makes the cost of interconnection very high and technically very difficult. Thus, currently there are no plans to connect the mainland with Melilla, a condition which Spain considers a prerequisite for the effective integration of Melilla in the Iberian electricity market.
(7) Spain submits that Melilla’s annual consumption was less than 3 000 GWh in 1996 (97,5 GWh). According to Spain, almost all demand in Melilla is covered mainly by thermal power generation units. In 2023, annual consumption in Melilla was 202 GWh, out of which 97,5 % is served by fossil-fuel based generation (mostly diesel generators), and 2,5 % by renewable generation(4).
(8) In this context, Spain explains that the lower rate of renewables in the NPT, compared to Spain’s mainland, is mainly due to the limited geographic space available for new generation capacity, the higher needs for dispatchable generation and the limited availability of energy storage facilities.
(9) Spain notes that NPTs, including Melilla, are characterised by their small market size, which prevents them from reaping the benefits of the economies of scale present in the mainland electricity system, and by higher fuel costs. Their historical isolation also results in a greater need for installed reserve capacity.
(10) According to Spain, those market specificities entail higher electricity production costs compared to the mainland and a lack of attractiveness for new undertakings to enter the market. As a result, no effective competition has developed in Melilla.
(11) The Endesa group(5)have historically generated almost 100 % of the energy produced in Melilla. This is the case still today.
(12) In view of the problems associated with the lack of effective competition and high costs, and despite the national measures adopted to promote competition and introduce economic incentives to encourage operational efficiency of installations and reduce generating costs, Spain submits that it has not been possible to establish a market mechanism which is identical to the one in place on the mainland.
(13) Spain further explains that electricity generated in all the NPT, including Melilla, is excluded from the bidding system on the mainland market. NPT electricity systems use a mechanism of economic precedence for dispatch(6):—the system operator ranks the generation plants in order of economic merit based on variable costs until demand is covered, taking into account the technical constraints and the reserves necessary to guarantee electricity supply,—the demand side (direct consumers and suppliers) notifies the system operator of the hourly demand in the electricity systems of each NPT,—following the daily dispatch, the demand side purchases the energy at a price equivalent to that of the bidding system on the mainland. — the system operator ranks the generation plants in order of economic merit based on variable costs until demand is covered, taking into account the technical constraints and the reserves necessary to guarantee electricity supply, — the demand side (direct consumers and suppliers) notifies the system operator of the hourly demand in the electricity systems of each NPT, — following the daily dispatch, the demand side purchases the energy at a price equivalent to that of the bidding system on the mainland.
— the system operator ranks the generation plants in order of economic merit based on variable costs until demand is covered, taking into account the technical constraints and the reserves necessary to guarantee electricity supply,
— the demand side (direct consumers and suppliers) notifies the system operator of the hourly demand in the electricity systems of each NPT,
— following the daily dispatch, the demand side purchases the energy at a price equivalent to that of the bidding system on the mainland.
— the system operator ranks the generation plants in order of economic merit based on variable costs until demand is covered, taking into account the technical constraints and the reserves necessary to guarantee electricity supply,
— the demand side (direct consumers and suppliers) notifies the system operator of the hourly demand in the electricity systems of each NPT,
— following the daily dispatch, the demand side purchases the energy at a price equivalent to that of the bidding system on the mainland.
(14) According to Spain, this mechanism takes account of the high electricity generation costs and specificities of the NPT and aims to ensure that consumers and suppliers in those territories are not exposed to the higher cost of producing electricity in the NPT compared to mainland Spain, this being based on inter-regional solidarity principles.
(15) Spain further explains that electricity generation in the NPT constitutes a system of regulated remuneration instead of a market remuneration system and is applied in conditions where a wholesale market could not function and where costs, for geographical and territorial reasons, are higher than electricity generation costs in mainland Spain.
(16) Spain notes that the mechanism ensures that the electricity system and the public budget cover the extra cost resulting from the difference between the higher generating costs in the NPT, and the electricity price equivalent to that on the mainland, so that all consumers pay the same for electricity, irrespective of the system in which they consume it.
(17) According to Spain, the regulation of the activities of transmission and distribution of electricity in the NPT is similar to that in mainland Spain.
(18) In relation to the retail market, Spain explains that final customers in the NPT have a right to choose their supplier on the same terms as final customers in mainland Spain. Similarly, the concept of vulnerable consumers is defined for the whole of Spain and, in general, supply is organised uniformly throughout the country. In this respect, Spain notes that there are no differences between the mainland and non-mainland retail markets.
(19) Spain explains that Law 24/2013 sets out that the supply of electricity in the NPT is subject to a specific regulation. It also sets out that this activity can receive an additional remuneration to cover the difference between the costs to generate electricity in the NPT and the revenues from the sales of electricity in these territories. Law 24/2013 provides for the conditions that must be met for an isolated system not to be considered as such anymore, namely that the capacity of the connection of the NPT with the mainland allows them to enter the mainland production market and that there are market mechanisms in place to integrate their electricity.
(20) Spain notes that Law 17/2013 sets out the general provisions for the guarantee of supply and increase of competition in the electricity systems in the NPT(7). In particular, Article 5 of Law 17/2013 provides that the pumped hydropower storage facilities in the NPT whose main purposes are to guarantee supply, ensure system security and integrate non-dispatchable renewable energy sources, are to be owned by the system operator.
(21) Spain indicates that Royal Decree 738/2015 regulates in detail the activity of producing electricity and the dispatching procedure in the electricity systems in the NPT as well as the remuneration scheme of this activity. The remuneration scheme is based on two remuneration components: one for the investment made and other fixed costs, and one for the variable costs incurred during operation. The objective of this remuneration is to cover the extra costs of electricity generation in the NPT. The Royal Decree 738/2015 defines the extra cost as the difference between all the costs of generation and the price paid in the electricity dispatch run by the system operator.
(22) Additionally, the Royal Decree 738/2015 introduces a competitive procedure for the selection of new capacity and capacity to be refurbished.
(23) The Commission notes, in this regard, that the remuneration mechanism set out in Royal Decree 738/2015 received State aid approval by the Commission in its Decision SA.42270 ‘Spain Electricity production in Spanish non-peninsular territories’(8).
(24) The request for derogation submitted for Melilla is based on its qualification as a small isolated system pursuant to Article 2(42) of Directive (EU) 2019/944.
(25) Spain requests a derogation from Article 40(4) to (7) and from Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 as regards the procurement of ancillary services by the transmission system operator (‘TSO’) and the prohibition of transmission system operators to own, develop, manage or operate energy storage facilities.
(26) Spain requests a derogation for Melilla from the following provisions of Regulation (EU) 2019/943:—the market principles in Article 3(1), points (a), (b), (c), (e), (j), (k), (n), (o) and (p),—electricity trading rules pursuant to Article 6, Articles 7(1), 8(1) and 8(4), Articles 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16 and 17,—the rules on congestion income set out in Article 19,—Articles 14, 15, Article 16(3) to 16(13), Articles 17, 19, Articles 20(3) to 20(8), 21(7) and 21(8), 22(1), points (f) and (h), 22(2), 22(3) and 22(5), and 25(2) to 25(4) for any new support capacity mechanisms that might be established in the future,—Articles 14 to 17, 19 to 27, 35 to 47 for the existing mechanism defined in Royal Decree 738/2015. — the market principles in Article 3(1), points (a), (b), (c), (e), (j), (k), (n), (o) and (p), — electricity trading rules pursuant to Article 6, Articles 7(1), 8(1) and 8(4), Articles 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16 and 17, — the rules on congestion income set out in Article 19, — Articles 14, 15, Article 16(3) to 16(13), Articles 17, 19, Articles 20(3) to 20(8), 21(7) and 21(8), 22(1), points (f) and (h), 22(2), 22(3) and 22(5), and 25(2) to 25(4) for any new support capacity mechanisms that might be established in the future, — Articles 14 to 17, 19 to 27, 35 to 47 for the existing mechanism defined in Royal Decree 738/2015.
— the market principles in Article 3(1), points (a), (b), (c), (e), (j), (k), (n), (o) and (p),
— electricity trading rules pursuant to Article 6, Articles 7(1), 8(1) and 8(4), Articles 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16 and 17,
— the rules on congestion income set out in Article 19,
— Articles 14, 15, Article 16(3) to 16(13), Articles 17, 19, Articles 20(3) to 20(8), 21(7) and 21(8), 22(1), points (f) and (h), 22(2), 22(3) and 22(5), and 25(2) to 25(4) for any new support capacity mechanisms that might be established in the future,
— Articles 14 to 17, 19 to 27, 35 to 47 for the existing mechanism defined in Royal Decree 738/2015.
— the market principles in Article 3(1), points (a), (b), (c), (e), (j), (k), (n), (o) and (p),
— electricity trading rules pursuant to Article 6, Articles 7(1), 8(1) and 8(4), Articles 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16 and 17,
— the rules on congestion income set out in Article 19,
— Articles 14, 15, Article 16(3) to 16(13), Articles 17, 19, Articles 20(3) to 20(8), 21(7) and 21(8), 22(1), points (f) and (h), 22(2), 22(3) and 22(5), and 25(2) to 25(4) for any new support capacity mechanisms that might be established in the future,
— Articles 14 to 17, 19 to 27, 35 to 47 for the existing mechanism defined in Royal Decree 738/2015.
(27) Spain considers that the effective integration of the NPT in the Iberian electricity market depends on the existence of interconnection with the Spanish mainland.
(28) Regarding Melilla, Spain requests that derogations be exempt from any time limits.
(29) As described in recital 3, throughout March and April 2021, the Commission carried out a public consultation.
(30) All the comments submitted in response to the public consultation concerned the derogation requested by Spain from Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 regarding ownership, management and operation of storage facilities by the TSO.
(31) Respondents to the public consultation were against granting such derogation, as it would legitimise a project according to which Red Eléctrica de España S.A.U. (‘REE’), the Spanish TSO, has been allowed to develop the Chira-Soria Project in the Canary Islands without tendering procedure (‘the Chira-Soria Project‘)(9), as required by Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944. Respondents noted that the fact that the derogation also covers the other NPT is not relevant because the orography of the Balearic Islands and the small size of Ceuta and Melilla would not allow for pumped hydropower storage in those territories(10).
(32) Respondents indicated that mere insularity is not a sufficient justification to derogate from the tendering requirement set out in Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944, given that private parties had reportedly shown an interest in the Chira-Soria Project. They claimed that this interest was not considered in view of Law 17/2013.
(33) Respondents further highlighted that the Spanish regulatory authority, the Comisión Nacional de Mercados y Competencia (CNMC), and the Spanish Council of State have expressed concerns about the Royal Decree 738/2015 and the role of REE in owning pumped hydropower storage facilities and, at the same time, being the entity on which, in first instance, the administrative process of authorizing pumped hydropower storage facilities depends.
(34) Specifically, in relation to the Chira-Soria Project, respondents also raised arguments alleging that it is not economically justified that the project does not contribute to the integration of renewable energy and that the project raises environmental and social concerns(11).
(35) In accordance with Article 64 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, a derogation from the relevant provisions of Articles 3 and 6, Article 7(1), Article 8(1) and (4), Articles 9 to 11, Articles 14 to 17, Articles 19 to 27, Articles 35 to 47 and Article 51 of that Regulation may be granted in two cases:(a)for small isolated systems and small connected systems, if the Member State(s) can demonstrate that there are substantial problems for the operation of those systems. In such a case, the derogation is to be subject to conditions that aim to increase competition and integration with the internal market for electricity;(b)for outermost regions with the meaning of Article 349 TFEU, if they cannot be interconnected with the Union’s energy market for evident physical reasons. (a) for small isolated systems and small connected systems, if the Member State(s) can demonstrate that there are substantial problems for the operation of those systems. In such a case, the derogation is to be subject to conditions that aim to increase competition and integration with the internal market for electricity; (b) for outermost regions with the meaning of Article 349 TFEU, if they cannot be interconnected with the Union’s energy market for evident physical reasons.
(a) for small isolated systems and small connected systems, if the Member State(s) can demonstrate that there are substantial problems for the operation of those systems. In such a case, the derogation is to be subject to conditions that aim to increase competition and integration with the internal market for electricity;
(b) for outermost regions with the meaning of Article 349 TFEU, if they cannot be interconnected with the Union’s energy market for evident physical reasons.
(a) for small isolated systems and small connected systems, if the Member State(s) can demonstrate that there are substantial problems for the operation of those systems. In such a case, the derogation is to be subject to conditions that aim to increase competition and integration with the internal market for electricity;
(b) for outermost regions with the meaning of Article 349 TFEU, if they cannot be interconnected with the Union’s energy market for evident physical reasons.
(36) In accordance with Article 66(1), first subparagraph, of Directive (EU) 2019/944, a derogation from the relevant provisions of Articles 7 and 8 and of Chapters IV, V and VI may be granted for small isolated systems and small connected systems, if the Member State(s) can demonstrate that there are substantial problems for the operation of those systems. Article 66(2), second subparagraph, of Directive (EU) 2019/944 sets out that for outermost regions within the meaning of Article 349 TFEU that cannot be interconnected with the Union electricity markets, the derogation is to be subject to conditions aimed to ensure that the derogation does not hamper the transition towards renewable energy.
(37) Both under Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Directive (EU) 2019/944, in the case of small isolated systems, the derogation is to be limited in time and subject to conditions aiming to increase competition and integration with the internal market for electricity. In addition, the derogation is to ensure that it does not obstruct or hamper the transition towards renewable energy, increased flexibility, energy storage, electromobility and demand response.
(38) Article 2(42) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 defines ‘small isolated system’ as ‘any system that had consumption of less than 3 000 GWh in the year 1996, where less than 5 % of annual consumption is obtained through interconnection with other systems’.
(39) In its submission, Spain explains that Melilla is currently not connected to Spain’s mainland (recital 6). In addition, Spain submits that Melilla’s annual consumption amounted to less than 3 000 GWh in 1996 (recital 7).
(40) Based on the information provided by Spain, and in line with the Commission’s decision SA.42270 ‘Spain Electricity production in Spanish non-peninsular territories’, the city of Melilla qualifies as a small isolated system within the meaning of Article 2(42) of Directive (EU) 2019/944.
(41) The term ‘substantial problems’ referred to in Article 64(1), point (a) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Article 66(1) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 has not been defined by the legislator. The open formulation allows the Commission to consider all potential problems related to the particular situation of small systems, provided they are substantial and not only marginal. Such problems can vary significantly depending on the geographical particularities, production and consumption of the system in question, but also on technical developments (such as electricity storage and small generation).
(42) In past Commission decisions, the problems to be resolved related to maintaining social coherence and/or equal competitive conditions between the mainland and islands in a situation where system security on the island required additional measures or implied significantly higher costs on an island compared to the mainland. ‘Operation’ can thus not be understood narrowly, such as requiring that without the derogation, secure system operation would not be possible. Instead, ‘problems’ have always been considered to also include socioeconomic problems for the users of the system at hand(12).
(43) Furthermore, those substantial problems need to occur for the operation of the small isolated systems or the small connected systems. It thus appears difficult to imagine a justification which would be based exclusively on impact occurring outside of the system, e.g., impact on national subsidy schemes. This does not exclude the relevance of ‘indirect’ impact on the secure operation of the system.
(44) Spain highlights several challenges and problems for the operation of the electricity markets and systems in the NPT, including Melilla:—the small market size of the NPT, which prevents them from reaping the benefits of the economies of scale present in the mainland electricity system,—the higher costs associated with the fuel mix, which result in higher electricity costs, since most of the generation in the NPT is fuelled by gas, coal or diesel,—the high investment and operation costs derived from the geographical isolation and small size of the systems,—the greater need for installed reserve capacity as a result of the geographical isolation of the systems. In particular, Spain explains that NPT need a higher level of spinning reserve to cover the security of supply standards. Such supply standard is 40-70 % higher than the installed capacity, compared to the 10 % of the mainland. This results in the power plants being idle a significant amount of time, which leads to a low interest to invest in new capacity,—The environmental restrictions for the localisation of new generation capacity, both for conventional and renewable generation facilities,—the cost associated with and the investments needed to build new interconnections with the mainland, due to their geographic location. — the small market size of the NPT, which prevents them from reaping the benefits of the economies of scale present in the mainland electricity system, — the higher costs associated with the fuel mix, which result in higher electricity costs, since most of the generation in the NPT is fuelled by gas, coal or diesel, — the high investment and operation costs derived from the geographical isolation and small size of the systems, — the greater need for installed reserve capacity as a result of the geographical isolation of the systems. In particular, Spain explains that NPT need a higher level of spinning reserve to cover the security of supply standards. Such supply standard is 40-70 % higher than the installed capacity, compared to the 10 % of the mainland. This results in the power plants being idle a significant amount of time, which leads to a low interest to invest in new capacity, — The environmental restrictions for the localisation of new generation capacity, both for conventional and renewable generation facilities, — the cost associated with and the investments needed to build new interconnections with the mainland, due to their geographic location.
— the small market size of the NPT, which prevents them from reaping the benefits of the economies of scale present in the mainland electricity system,
— the higher costs associated with the fuel mix, which result in higher electricity costs, since most of the generation in the NPT is fuelled by gas, coal or diesel,
— the high investment and operation costs derived from the geographical isolation and small size of the systems,
— the greater need for installed reserve capacity as a result of the geographical isolation of the systems. In particular, Spain explains that NPT need a higher level of spinning reserve to cover the security of supply standards. Such supply standard is 40-70 % higher than the installed capacity, compared to the 10 % of the mainland. This results in the power plants being idle a significant amount of time, which leads to a low interest to invest in new capacity,
— The environmental restrictions for the localisation of new generation capacity, both for conventional and renewable generation facilities,
— the cost associated with and the investments needed to build new interconnections with the mainland, due to their geographic location.
— the small market size of the NPT, which prevents them from reaping the benefits of the economies of scale present in the mainland electricity system,
— the higher costs associated with the fuel mix, which result in higher electricity costs, since most of the generation in the NPT is fuelled by gas, coal or diesel,
— the high investment and operation costs derived from the geographical isolation and small size of the systems,
— the greater need for installed reserve capacity as a result of the geographical isolation of the systems. In particular, Spain explains that NPT need a higher level of spinning reserve to cover the security of supply standards. Such supply standard is 40-70 % higher than the installed capacity, compared to the 10 % of the mainland. This results in the power plants being idle a significant amount of time, which leads to a low interest to invest in new capacity,
— The environmental restrictions for the localisation of new generation capacity, both for conventional and renewable generation facilities,
— the cost associated with and the investments needed to build new interconnections with the mainland, due to their geographic location.
(45) According to Spain, these challenges and problems result in two major features which characterise the NPT: a higher cost of electricity and a lack of competition in electricity generation.
(46) Regarding the high cost of producing electricity in the NPT, Spain explains that due to the challenges and problems listed above, the dispatchable generation costs often double the dispatchable generation costs in mainland Spain. Spain argues that the NPT need to be excluded from the mainland market system in order for its consumers to pay prices that are similar to those of the mainland.
(47) Regarding the lack of competition in electricity generation, Spain explains that due to the historical development of the NPT and the lack of attractiveness of the power sector in these regions, a single business group traditionally performed all energy supply functions. As a result, according to Spain, Melilla still does not count with an effective competition at generation level, and this despite the efforts to promote competition.
(48) In addition, Spain points out to the challenges linked to the deployment of renewable energies in the NPT, including Melilla.
(49) The Commission acknowledges Spain’s arguments that, due to the challenges linked to the operation of the small isolated systems, the very low levels of competition in the generation segment in the NPT, and the inexistent levels of interconnection with Spain’s mainland market, the conditions for the implementation of a fully liberalised wholesale electricity market in Melilla are not yet present.
(50) It thus seems plausible to assume that it is not possible to deploy a functioning wholesale market in Melilla without public intervention, and that, as consequence, a number of provisions regarding the forward, day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets cannot be implemented in this territory for the time being.
(51) The Commission can conclude that the full application of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Directive (EU) 2019/944 to the territories subject to this derogation request would create substantial problems for the operation of the electricity system in Melilla.
(52) Article 54(1) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 prohibits transmission system operators from owning, developing, managing or operating energy storage facilities.
(53) Article 54(2) of that Directive provides for a possibility for Member States to derogate from this rule where the facilities are fully integrated network components and the regulatory authority has granted its approval or where all the conditions set out in points (a) to (c) of that paragraph are fulfilled.
(54) As stated in recital 36 above, pursuant to Article 66(1), first subparagraph of Directive (EU) 2019/944, Member States can request a derogation from the rules in Chapter VI (including Article 54) for small isolated systems, provided they can demonstrate that there are substantial problems for their operation.
(55) Hence, in addition to applying the derogation possibility in Article 54(2) of Directive (EU) 2019/944, Spain may request a derogation to the Commission from Article 54 of that Directive, as regards Melilla, by reference to Article 66.
(56) As described in recital 20, Article 5 of Law 17/2013 provides that the pumped hydropower storage facilities in the NPT whose main purposes are to guarantee supply, ensure system security and integrate non-dispatchable renewable energy sources, are to be owned by the system operator.
(57) In the Application, Spain points out that the small size of Melilla does not make very likely the installation of hydropower storage facilities but that other types of storage could be considered instead. In this regard, Spain refers to studies carried out by the TSO pointing out that in view of the decarbonisation commitments applicable to isolated territories and as generation from renewable sources and demand-side response increase, storage facilities will be needed to ensure energy supply in compliance with established quality and safety requirements.
(58) Spain thus requests the derogation from Article 54 of the Directive (EU) 2019/944 for Melilla in accordance with Article 66 of the Directive.
(59) As stated in recital 53, the Commission notes that Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 already includes, in its paragraph 2, a possibility for Member States to derogate from the rule in paragraph 1 of that Article, namely that transmission system operators are not to own, develop, manage or operate energy storage facilities.
(60) In view of the possibility set out in Article 54(2) of Directive (EU) 2019/944, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 54(1) pursuant to Article 66 of the Directive, for all types of energy storage technologies, is not justified, as it would prevent the market-based development of energy storage projects.
(61) The Commission further highlights that the obligation of TSOs to own and operate energy storage facilities in non-peninsular territories set out in Law 17/2013 appears to be based on criteria that differ from those set out in Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944. The present Decision merely assesses whether the requirements for a derogation pursuant to Article 66(1) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 are met and does not pre-empt the Commission’s assessment of the compatibility of Law 17/2013 with the requirements set out in Directive (EU) 2019/944.
(62) According to Spain, the lack of effective competition in the generation segment prevents the establishment of undistorted electricity markets in the NPT. In particular, it prevents the transmission system operator from establishing and operating a balancing market in Melilla, including procuring market based non-frequency ancillary services.
(63) The Commission considers that the reasons in recitals 9 to 12 currently prevent the establishment of a balancing market and of a market-based procurement of non-frequency ancillary services in Melilla. Hence, the Commission considers that derogations from the obligations in Article 40(4) to (7) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 in accordance with Article 66 of the Directive are justified.
(64) According to Spain, the lack of effective competition between generators prevents the establishment of non-regulated electricity markets. The dispatch decisions in NPT, including Melilla, are based on technical and economic criteria for which it is not always possible to apply market rules. Additionally, Spain explains that price formation in the NPT is not based on the offer and demand in those territories, but on that of mainland Spain, to prevent that consumers in NPTs pay the extra costs of electricity production in those territories.
(65) Spain therefore requests a derogation from the following provisions of Article 3, first paragraph, of Regulation (EU) 2019/943:—points (a), (b), (o), (p), since according to Spain prices in the markets at stake cannot be freely formed based on offer and demand, and there are no forward markets operating in these territories,—point (c), since Spain considers that the market rules that facilitate the development of flexible generation and demand might not be applicable in the territories,—points (e) and (k), since according to Spain generators are not responsible for selling the electricity they produce (it is instead the task of the system operator to decide which power plants should be dispatched) and cannot submit aggregated offers,—point (j), since Spain considers that the storage strategy in these territories might require that energy storage has priority and is not on equal footing with other generation facilities,—point (n), for which Spain notes that in principle the entry and exit of electricity generation could be based on the undertakings’ assessment of the economic and financial viability of their operations, but that in practical terms it is not possible for generation companies to participate in the system without being granted a regulated payment regime by which the generation costs can be covered. — points (a), (b), (o), (p), since according to Spain prices in the markets at stake cannot be freely formed based on offer and demand, and there are no forward markets operating in these territories, — point (c), since Spain considers that the market rules that facilitate the development of flexible generation and demand might not be applicable in the territories, — points (e) and (k), since according to Spain generators are not responsible for selling the electricity they produce (it is instead the task of the system operator to decide which power plants should be dispatched) and cannot submit aggregated offers, — point (j), since Spain considers that the storage strategy in these territories might require that energy storage has priority and is not on equal footing with other generation facilities, — point (n), for which Spain notes that in principle the entry and exit of electricity generation could be based on the undertakings’ assessment of the economic and financial viability of their operations, but that in practical terms it is not possible for generation companies to participate in the system without being granted a regulated payment regime by which the generation costs can be covered.
— points (a), (b), (o), (p), since according to Spain prices in the markets at stake cannot be freely formed based on offer and demand, and there are no forward markets operating in these territories,
— point (c), since Spain considers that the market rules that facilitate the development of flexible generation and demand might not be applicable in the territories,
— points (e) and (k), since according to Spain generators are not responsible for selling the electricity they produce (it is instead the task of the system operator to decide which power plants should be dispatched) and cannot submit aggregated offers,
— point (j), since Spain considers that the storage strategy in these territories might require that energy storage has priority and is not on equal footing with other generation facilities,
— point (n), for which Spain notes that in principle the entry and exit of electricity generation could be based on the undertakings’ assessment of the economic and financial viability of their operations, but that in practical terms it is not possible for generation companies to participate in the system without being granted a regulated payment regime by which the generation costs can be covered.
— points (a), (b), (o), (p), since according to Spain prices in the markets at stake cannot be freely formed based on offer and demand, and there are no forward markets operating in these territories,
— point (c), since Spain considers that the market rules that facilitate the development of flexible generation and demand might not be applicable in the territories,
— points (e) and (k), since according to Spain generators are not responsible for selling the electricity they produce (it is instead the task of the system operator to decide which power plants should be dispatched) and cannot submit aggregated offers,
— point (j), since Spain considers that the storage strategy in these territories might require that energy storage has priority and is not on equal footing with other generation facilities,
— point (n), for which Spain notes that in principle the entry and exit of electricity generation could be based on the undertakings’ assessment of the economic and financial viability of their operations, but that in practical terms it is not possible for generation companies to participate in the system without being granted a regulated payment regime by which the generation costs can be covered.
(66) Regarding Article 6, Articles 7(1), 8(1) and (4), Articles 9, 10 and 11, Spain highlights that although the electricity system in the NPT is governed by a dispatch system that operates in a way similar to the Union electricity markets, for example with daily and intraday dispatches, it constitutes a regulated system. The purchase price is based on the mainland price and not on the recognised costs incurred by generators in carrying out their electricity generation activities, including the balancing services. On this basis, Spain requests a derogation from Article 6, Articles 7(1), 8(1) and (4), and Articles 9, 10 and 11 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, since there is no balancing market in the NPT, including Melilla, and neither is there the possibility of integration with the Union day-ahead and intraday markets due to the lack of connection with mainland Spain.
(67) With regard to Article 7(1) and Article 8(1) and (4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, Spain notes that due to the isolated nature of the NPT, dispatches are operated independently of the mainland and Union markets – aside from the reference price for the purchase of energy being based on the mainland price – with the dispatches being based on hourly schedules.
(68) Likewise, in accordance with the above, the integration of forward markets, technical bidding limits and the value of lost load referred to in Articles 9 to 11 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 are considered by Spain as not applying to dispatches in the NPT.
(69) Concerning the request for derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the Commission considers that:—the reasons set out in recitals 9 to 12 currently entail that electricity prices in Melilla are not formed following a market-based approach but via a special regulated mechanism whereby the system operator carries out the generation dispatch for each of the NPT, and a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (a), (b), (e), (k), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is justified.—the reasons set out in recitals 9 to 12 currently entail that there is no forward market in Melilla and the system operator’s dispatch involves weekly, daily, intraday forecasting as well as deviations in real time, and a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (o) and (p), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is also justified.—while acknowledging that the current regulated system and particular characteristics of Melilla might render more difficult the development of more flexible generation, low carbon generation and more flexible demand, the application of the market rules is still required to incentivise their development to the extent possible. Thus, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified,—Article 3, first paragraph, point (j), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 does not prevent that priority is given to energy storage projects in Melilla, if for example, those projects are considered as the best option to ensure security of supply. Thus, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (j), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified.—in relation to Article 3, first paragraph, point (n), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the entry or exit of an undertaking in the market for electricity generation should depend on that undertaking’s assessment of economic and financial viability, taking into account the possibility to receive the regulated remuneration mentioned in recitals (15) and (16). Hence, a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (n), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified for Melilla. — the reasons set out in recitals 9 to 12 currently entail that electricity prices in Melilla are not formed following a market-based approach but via a special regulated mechanism whereby the system operator carries out the generation dispatch for each of the NPT, and a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (a), (b), (e), (k), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is justified. — the reasons set out in recitals 9 to 12 currently entail that there is no forward market in Melilla and the system operator’s dispatch involves weekly, daily, intraday forecasting as well as deviations in real time, and a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (o) and (p), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is also justified. — while acknowledging that the current regulated system and particular characteristics of Melilla might render more difficult the development of more flexible generation, low carbon generation and more flexible demand, the application of the market rules is still required to incentivise their development to the extent possible. Thus, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified, — Article 3, first paragraph, point (j), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 does not prevent that priority is given to energy storage projects in Melilla, if for example, those projects are considered as the best option to ensure security of supply. Thus, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (j), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified. — in relation to Article 3, first paragraph, point (n), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the entry or exit of an undertaking in the market for electricity generation should depend on that undertaking’s assessment of economic and financial viability, taking into account the possibility to receive the regulated remuneration mentioned in recitals (15) and (16). Hence, a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (n), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified for Melilla.
— the reasons set out in recitals 9 to 12 currently entail that electricity prices in Melilla are not formed following a market-based approach but via a special regulated mechanism whereby the system operator carries out the generation dispatch for each of the NPT, and a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (a), (b), (e), (k), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is justified.
— the reasons set out in recitals 9 to 12 currently entail that there is no forward market in Melilla and the system operator’s dispatch involves weekly, daily, intraday forecasting as well as deviations in real time, and a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (o) and (p), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is also justified.
— while acknowledging that the current regulated system and particular characteristics of Melilla might render more difficult the development of more flexible generation, low carbon generation and more flexible demand, the application of the market rules is still required to incentivise their development to the extent possible. Thus, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified,
— Article 3, first paragraph, point (j), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 does not prevent that priority is given to energy storage projects in Melilla, if for example, those projects are considered as the best option to ensure security of supply. Thus, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (j), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified.
— in relation to Article 3, first paragraph, point (n), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the entry or exit of an undertaking in the market for electricity generation should depend on that undertaking’s assessment of economic and financial viability, taking into account the possibility to receive the regulated remuneration mentioned in recitals (15) and (16). Hence, a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (n), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified for Melilla.
— the reasons set out in recitals 9 to 12 currently entail that electricity prices in Melilla are not formed following a market-based approach but via a special regulated mechanism whereby the system operator carries out the generation dispatch for each of the NPT, and a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (a), (b), (e), (k), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is justified.
— the reasons set out in recitals 9 to 12 currently entail that there is no forward market in Melilla and the system operator’s dispatch involves weekly, daily, intraday forecasting as well as deviations in real time, and a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (o) and (p), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is also justified.
— while acknowledging that the current regulated system and particular characteristics of Melilla might render more difficult the development of more flexible generation, low carbon generation and more flexible demand, the application of the market rules is still required to incentivise their development to the extent possible. Thus, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified,
— Article 3, first paragraph, point (j), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 does not prevent that priority is given to energy storage projects in Melilla, if for example, those projects are considered as the best option to ensure security of supply. Thus, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (j), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified.
— in relation to Article 3, first paragraph, point (n), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the entry or exit of an undertaking in the market for electricity generation should depend on that undertaking’s assessment of economic and financial viability, taking into account the possibility to receive the regulated remuneration mentioned in recitals (15) and (16). Hence, a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (n), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified for Melilla.
(70) With respect to the requested derogation from Article 6, Articles 7(1) and 8(1) and (4), Articles 9, 10, 11 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, those provisions refer to requirements regarding the forward, day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets. Based on the information submitted by Spain, those markets cannot be implemented effectively in Melilla (recitals 9 to 12). Hence, the Commission considers that a derogation from those provisions is justified.
(71) Spain explains that the requirements set out in Articles 14 to 16 and Article 19 cannot be applied in the NPTs, because the TSO carries out the generation dispatch for each of the electricity systems in these territories and those systems do not constitute separate interconnected bidding zones. Spain also explains that since the NPT do not constitute separate bidding zones, there is not an associated cross-zonal capacity market and thus no congestion income is generated.
(72) The derogations from Articles 7(1) and 8(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 have the effect of not including Melilla in the integrated day-ahead and intraday markets. Therefore, some provisions relating to the functioning of those markets will necessarily not apply to Melilla.
(73) Articles 14 to 17 and Article 19 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 relate to bidding zones and the management of the capacity and congestions between bidding zones. In this context, the Commission notes that Melilla does not constitute a separate bidding zone and that Spain currently does not plan to build an interconnection linking Melilla with the mainland. As Articles 14 and 15 aim to optimise market-based dispatch between bidding zones, the Commission considers that a derogation from these provisions is justified. Conversely, the provisions in Article 16(3) to (13) and Articles 17 and 19 de facto do not apply to Melilla as it does not constitute a separate bidding zone. It follows that a derogation from the requirements in Article 16(3) to (13) and Articles 17 and 19 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified.
(74) Regarding Article 16(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, which contain general principles regarding congestion management, the Commission considers that, in view of the isolation and small size of the system in Melilla and the substantial problems this presents for its operation, a derogation is justified.
(75) Spain explains that, due to the geographical isolation of the NPT resulting from the low degree or lack of connection to the mainland, the resource adequacy assessments carried out by the system operator for each of the NPT are independent, and they are not integrated into the European resource adequacy assessment or into the Spanish mainland resource adequacy assessment. Therefore, Spain considers that some of the provisions in Chapter IV are not applicable to the NPT. Spain underlines nevertheless that the current national rules aim, in so far as possible, to provide for an equal treatment between the non-peninsular territories and the mainland market, for example, as regards the levels of security of supply or the methodology for carrying out resource adequacy assessments.
(76) Spain argues that adequacy in the NPT is ensured by the specific mechanism for allocating new capacity set out in Royal Decree 738/2015 as described in recitals 21 to 23. Spain considers that this mechanism should be maintained given the unique nature of the NPT, and thus requests for a derogation from Articles 20(3) to (8), Article 21(7) and (8), Article 22(1), points (f) and (h), Article 22(2), (3) and (5), and Article 25(2) to (4).
(77) Spain argues that the resource adequacy assessments in the NPT comply with the principles included in Article 20(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943. Spain further explains that where adequacy concerns are identified, those are tackled with a call for a competitive bidding procedure (as set out in Royal Decree 738/2015) combined with the assessment of auctions of capacity of renewable origin. These are procedures for which, according to Spain, the requirements in Article 20(3) to (8) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 cannot be applied.
(78) Spain explains that the provisions included in Article 21(7) and (8) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 are not compatible with the mechanism set out in Royal Decree 738/2015. It states, however, that for any future new capacity mechanisms the requirements in Article 21(7) and (8) of the Regulation will apply.
(79) Spain notes that the mechanism set out in Royal Decree 738/2015 is also incompatible with the following provisions of Regulation (EU) 2019/943:—Article 22(1), point (f), which sets that the remuneration is to be determined through a competitive process, because according to Spain the remuneration in the existing mechanism is not based on a competitive process, but on a benchmark installation to incentivise efficiency,—Article 22(1), point (h), which sets that capacity mechanisms must be open to the participation of all resources that can provide the required technical performance, because according to Spain the mechanism is applied only to dispatchable installations,—Article 22(2), which sets a list of design features that strategic reserves must comply with, since according to Spain it makes reference to balancing markets that do not exist in the NPT,—Article 22(3), which sets additional requirements to capacity mechanisms other than strategic reserves, since according to Spain the existing mechanism does not comply with those requirements: the retribution does not tend to zero when the capacity level supplied is adequate, the retribution is not only linked to the capacity and the capacity obligations are not transferable,—Article 22(4), which incorporates CO2emission limit requirements on capacity mechanisms, since according to Spain the current mechanism does not include any requisite of this nature, but it does allow to set technical limitations,—Article 22(5), which requires the adaptation of capacity mechanisms that apply on 4 July 2019. — Article 22(1), point (f), which sets that the remuneration is to be determined through a competitive process, because according to Spain the remuneration in the existing mechanism is not based on a competitive process, but on a benchmark installation to incentivise efficiency, — Article 22(1), point (h), which sets that capacity mechanisms must be open to the participation of all resources that can provide the required technical performance, because according to Spain the mechanism is applied only to dispatchable installations, — Article 22(2), which sets a list of design features that strategic reserves must comply with, since according to Spain it makes reference to balancing markets that do not exist in the NPT, — Article 22(3), which sets additional requirements to capacity mechanisms other than strategic reserves, since according to Spain the existing mechanism does not comply with those requirements: the retribution does not tend to zero when the capacity level supplied is adequate, the retribution is not only linked to the capacity and the capacity obligations are not transferable, — Article 22(4), which incorporates CO2emission limit requirements on capacity mechanisms, since according to Spain the current mechanism does not include any requisite of this nature, but it does allow to set technical limitations, — Article 22(5), which requires the adaptation of capacity mechanisms that apply on 4 July 2019.
— Article 22(1), point (f), which sets that the remuneration is to be determined through a competitive process, because according to Spain the remuneration in the existing mechanism is not based on a competitive process, but on a benchmark installation to incentivise efficiency,
— Article 22(1), point (h), which sets that capacity mechanisms must be open to the participation of all resources that can provide the required technical performance, because according to Spain the mechanism is applied only to dispatchable installations,
— Article 22(2), which sets a list of design features that strategic reserves must comply with, since according to Spain it makes reference to balancing markets that do not exist in the NPT,
— Article 22(3), which sets additional requirements to capacity mechanisms other than strategic reserves, since according to Spain the existing mechanism does not comply with those requirements: the retribution does not tend to zero when the capacity level supplied is adequate, the retribution is not only linked to the capacity and the capacity obligations are not transferable,
— Article 22(4), which incorporates CO2emission limit requirements on capacity mechanisms, since according to Spain the current mechanism does not include any requisite of this nature, but it does allow to set technical limitations,
— Article 22(5), which requires the adaptation of capacity mechanisms that apply on 4 July 2019.
— Article 22(1), point (f), which sets that the remuneration is to be determined through a competitive process, because according to Spain the remuneration in the existing mechanism is not based on a competitive process, but on a benchmark installation to incentivise efficiency,
— Article 22(1), point (h), which sets that capacity mechanisms must be open to the participation of all resources that can provide the required technical performance, because according to Spain the mechanism is applied only to dispatchable installations,
— Article 22(2), which sets a list of design features that strategic reserves must comply with, since according to Spain it makes reference to balancing markets that do not exist in the NPT,
— Article 22(3), which sets additional requirements to capacity mechanisms other than strategic reserves, since according to Spain the existing mechanism does not comply with those requirements: the retribution does not tend to zero when the capacity level supplied is adequate, the retribution is not only linked to the capacity and the capacity obligations are not transferable,
— Article 22(4), which incorporates CO2emission limit requirements on capacity mechanisms, since according to Spain the current mechanism does not include any requisite of this nature, but it does allow to set technical limitations,
— Article 22(5), which requires the adaptation of capacity mechanisms that apply on 4 July 2019.
(80) Spain explains that the reliability standards for the non-peninsular territories are not aligned with the requirements in Article 25(3) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, since they do not take into account the cost of new entry. Spain adds that even if the standards were the same, they might evolve to stricter values at a different pace, based on which they request a derogation from Article 25(2) to (4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943.
(81) Article 20 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 addresses resource adequacy in the internal market for electricity and sets out obligations for Member States on how to monitor resource adequacy and how to act when resource adequacy concerns are identified, namely by developing an implementation plan with the aim of removing regulatory distortions, ensuring market-based balancing procurement, or removing regulated prices, among others. The Commission notes that, as part of the State aid process, Spain has already developed and submitted to the Commission an implementation plan in accordance with Article 20(3) and (4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943. In accordance with Article 20(5) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the Commission has issued an opinion on the Spanish implementation plan on 13 March 2024(13). Therefore, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 20(3) to (8) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified.
(82) Article 21(7) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 was repealed by Regulation (EU) 2024/1747 of the European Parliament and of the Council(14). Therefore, it no longer applies to the NPT. With regard to the request to derogate from Article 21(8)(15)of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 the Commission notes that while this provision no longer specifies that capacity mechanisms are to be temporary, it sets out that capacity mechanisms are to be approved by the Commission for no longer than 10 years. Moreover, it is not possible to predict the evolution of the electricity system of Melilla over time. Accordingly, the duration of the regulated remuneration mechanism set out in Royal Decree 738/2015 should be limited to the period up to 31 December 2029 as approved under State aid decision in case SA. 42270 in the case of Melilla.
(83) Article 22 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 sets out the design principles applicable to capacity mechanisms. The Commission considers that a derogation from Article 22(1), points (f) and (h), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 applicable after the expiration date of the regulated remuneration mechanism set out under the State aid decision in case SA. 42270 could hinder the transition towards renewable energy, increased flexibility, energy storage, electromobility and demand response as these provisions aim to allow the participation by all technologies on a competitive basis. Therefore, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 22(1), points (f) and (h) is not justified. This should be without prejudice to commitments and contracts concluded with regards to Melilla under the remuneration mechanism in Royal Decree 738/2015 as approved under the State aid decision in case SA. 42270.
(84) Based on the information provided by Spain (recital 79), the Commission considers that a derogation from the requirements in Article 22(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is justified because the specific design requirements for strategic reserves are intrinsically linked to the establishment of a well-functioning balancing market. Conversely, a derogation from Article 22(3) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified because the specific design requirements for capacity mechanisms are intended to apply independently of a sufficiently developed balancing market.
(85) With regards to the request for derogation from Article 22(5) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the Commission considers that a derogation is not justified given that Article 22(5) of that Regulation is not applicable to capacity mechanisms approved after 4 July 2019.
(86) Regarding Article 22(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 which sets out the CO2emission limit requirements on capacity mechanisms, the Commission considers that the CO2emission limit requirements are not applicable to the current regulated remuneration mechanism approved under State aid decision in case SA. 42270, in light of the small size of the electricity system of Melilla, the constraints linked to obtaining the necessary environmental permits for new generation capacity and of the higher need for dispatchable generation to ensure the integration of renewables in Melilla and guarantee security of supply. The Commission considers that a derogation from Article 22(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 applicable after the expiration date of the regulated remuneration mechanism set out under the State aid decision in case SA. 42270 could hinder the transition towards renewable energy, increased flexibility, energy storage, electromobility and demand response as these provisions aim to allow the participation by all technologies on a competitive basis. Therefore, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 22(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified. This should be without prejudice to commitments and contracts concluded with regards to Melilla under the remuneration mechanism in Royal Decree 738/2015 as approved under the State aid decision in case SA. 42270.
(87) In the Commission’s view, based on the explanations provided by Spain (see recital 80) a derogation from Article 25(2) to 25(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 for the operation of the electricity systems in Melilla is justified, for the period up to 31 December 2029 as set out in the case of Melilla under State aid decision in case SA. 42270.
(88) In its Application, as amended by the second set of clarifications sent by Spain on 17 January 2022, Spain stated that for the existing mechanism in Royal Decree 738/2015 a derogation from Articles 14 to 17, 19 to 27, 35 to 47 of the Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is needed. The Commission deems that such an ample derogation is not necessary to ensure its application. The Commission’s view is that only the derogations stated in the sections above are justified.
(89) Pursuant to Article 64(1), fifth subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Article 66(2) of Directive (EU) 2019/944, a derogation decision is to ensure that it does not obstruct the transition towards renewable energy, increased flexibility, energy storage, electro-mobility and demand response.
(90) As regards the transition towards renewable energy and increased flexibility (including demand response) and energy storage, it is important to note that well-functioning forward, day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets, in line with the requirements set in Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Directive (EU) 2019/944, should provide the necessary dispatch and investment signals to maximise the potential development of those technologies. By way of example, the development of demand response that can be activated in periods when the electricity system of Melilla is under stress in principle would be achieved more easily in a system where the demand prices reflect the hourly situation of generation in Melilla, instead of that of the mainland generation. This does not automatically prevent developments of demand response or other forms of flexibility in the current regulatory setting. However, it cannot be excluded that the derogation decision may have a negative impact on such potential developments.
(91) On the other hand, Article 64 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 does not require that derogation decisions maximise the potential for flexibility or energy storage. A derogation under Article 64 of that Regulation only aims to ensure that it ‘does not obstruct’ such transition. In other words, the derogation must not prevent developments which, without the derogation, would occur naturally. It is highly unlikely that, absent the derogation, well-functioning forward, day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets would develop in the electricity system in Melilla. This is due to the challenges linked to the operation of NPT, the very low levels of competition in the generation segment, and the lack of connection to the mainland market described in Section 2. It is however necessary to ensure that once the conditions for the development of functioning wholesale markets are present, the derogations are phased-out. This is why the Commission is setting out in this decision a limited derogation period and strict conditions for a prolongation of the derogation, as set out in Section 5.5 below.
(92) The derogation does not appear to have noticeable impact on electromobility.
(93) Article 64 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Article 66 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 expressly set out, as regards small isolated systems, that the derogation is to be limited in time and that it is to be subject to conditions aiming to increase competition and integration with the internal market for electricity.
(94) As regards small isolated and small interconnected systems, Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Directive (EU) 2019/944 provide for a mandatory limitation for several purposes. First and foremost, they assume that the general regulatory framework can be applied to all situations in the internal market, and that such a general application is beneficial for society. While Article 64 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 recognises that derogations may be required for specific situations, these derogations are susceptible to increase complexity of the overall system and can constitute barriers to market integration also in neighbouring areas. Furthermore, the justification of the derogation is generally based on the technical and regulatory framework at the time, and on a given network topology. All these situations are bound to change. Finally, it is important for market participants to be able to predict regulatory changes sufficiently in advance. Thus, all derogations need to be limited in time.
(95) Spain requests the derogations for Melilla to be exempted from any time limits, since the interconnection of Melilla with the Spanish mainland (and this with the Union continental electricity system) is unlikely to happen. While acknowledging Spain’s reasons, the Commission notes that Melilla does not constitute one of the outermost regions recognised under Article 349 TFEU and the derogation must be limited in time.
(96) Given the uncertainty regarding a future interconnection between Melilla and the Spanish mainland and the substantial problems for the operation of this territory, the Commission considers proportionate to grant the derogations for Melilla for a duration which is dependent on the connection of the autonomous city with Spain’s mainland, except for the derogation from Article 25(2) to 25(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, which is to apply for the period up to 31 December 2029 as set out in the State aid decision in case SA. 42270,
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity (1), and in particular Article 64 thereof,
Having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU (2), and in particular Article 66 thereof,
Whereas:
1. PROCEDURE AND THE SCOPE OF THE DECISION
(1) On 23 November 2020, the Kingdom of Spain (‘Spain’) submitted to the Commission a request for derogation (the ‘Application’) for the non-peninsular territories of the Canary Islands, the Balearic Islands, Ceuta and Melilla (jointly, ‘NPT’) in accordance with Article 64 Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Article 66 of Directive (EU) 2019/944.
(2) The Application initially asked for derogations from Article 8 and Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 and from Articles 3, 6, 7(1); 8(1) and (4), 9, 10, 11, Articles 14 to 17, Articles 19 to 27 and Articles 35 to 47 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943. That Application did not specify the duration of the requested derogation.
(3) On 18 March 2021, the Commission published the Application on its website and invited Member States and stakeholders to provide comments by 30 April 2021.
(4) The Commission requested from Spain additional information on the derogation request on 17 August 2021 and 16 December 2021. Spain replied on 4 October 2021 and 17 January 2022. In the latter submission, Spain modified the scope of its request for derogation as follows:
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the request for derogation from Article 8 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 was withdrawn for all NPT,
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the request for derogation from Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 was withdrawn for the Balearic Islands and Ceuta,
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Spain included a new request for derogation from Article 40(4) to (7) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 for all NPT,
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the request for derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (d), (f), (g), (h), (i), (l), (m) and (q) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 was withdrawn for all NPT,
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Spain also withdrew the request for derogation for all NPT from Article 16(1) and (2), Article 20(1) and (2); Article 21(1) to (6); Article 22(1), except for points (f) and (h); Article 22(4); and Articles 35 to 47 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943,
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Spain set out a limited duration for the requested derogation for the Balearic Islands and Ceuta until the effective integration of these territories with the mainland (not expected before 2030).
(5) This Decision should cover only the Autonomous City of Melilla, as the Commission decision on the derogation request submitted by Spain concerning the NPT of the Canary Islands was adopted on 8 December 2023 (3) and the derogation requests submitted by Spain concerning the NPT of the Balearic Islands and the Autonomous City of Ceuta will be addressed in separate decisions.
2. MELILLA
The electricity system and electricity market in Melilla
(6) Spain explains that the city of Melilla is not connected with the mainland electricity system of Spain. In this regard, Spain submits that the distance to the Iberian Peninsula makes the cost of interconnection very high and technically very difficult. Thus, currently there are no plans to connect the mainland with Melilla, a condition which Spain considers a prerequisite for the effective integration of Melilla in the Iberian electricity market.
(7) Spain submits that Melilla’s annual consumption was less than 3 000 GWh in 1996 (97,5 GWh). According to Spain, almost all demand in Melilla is covered mainly by thermal power generation units. In 2023, annual consumption in Melilla was 202 GWh, out of which 97,5 % is served by fossil-fuel based generation (mostly diesel generators), and 2,5 % by renewable generation (4).
(8) In this context, Spain explains that the lower rate of renewables in the NPT, compared to Spain’s mainland, is mainly due to the limited geographic space available for new generation capacity, the higher needs for dispatchable generation and the limited availability of energy storage facilities.
(9) Spain notes that NPTs, including Melilla, are characterised by their small market size, which prevents them from reaping the benefits of the economies of scale present in the mainland electricity system, and by higher fuel costs. Their historical isolation also results in a greater need for installed reserve capacity.
(10) According to Spain, those market specificities entail higher electricity production costs compared to the mainland and a lack of attractiveness for new undertakings to enter the market. As a result, no effective competition has developed in Melilla.
(11) The Endesa group (5) have historically generated almost 100 % of the energy produced in Melilla. This is the case still today.
(12) In view of the problems associated with the lack of effective competition and high costs, and despite the national measures adopted to promote competition and introduce economic incentives to encourage operational efficiency of installations and reduce generating costs, Spain submits that it has not been possible to establish a market mechanism which is identical to the one in place on the mainland.
(13) Spain further explains that electricity generated in all the NPT, including Melilla, is excluded from the bidding system on the mainland market. NPT electricity systems use a mechanism of economic precedence for dispatch (6):
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the system operator ranks the generation plants in order of economic merit based on variable costs until demand is covered, taking into account the technical constraints and the reserves necessary to guarantee electricity supply,
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the demand side (direct consumers and suppliers) notifies the system operator of the hourly demand in the electricity systems of each NPT,
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following the daily dispatch, the demand side purchases the energy at a price equivalent to that of the bidding system on the mainland.
(14) According to Spain, this mechanism takes account of the high electricity generation costs and specificities of the NPT and aims to ensure that consumers and suppliers in those territories are not exposed to the higher cost of producing electricity in the NPT compared to mainland Spain, this being based on inter-regional solidarity principles.
(15) Spain further explains that electricity generation in the NPT constitutes a system of regulated remuneration instead of a market remuneration system and is applied in conditions where a wholesale market could not function and where costs, for geographical and territorial reasons, are higher than electricity generation costs in mainland Spain.
(16) Spain notes that the mechanism ensures that the electricity system and the public budget cover the extra cost resulting from the difference between the higher generating costs in the NPT, and the electricity price equivalent to that on the mainland, so that all consumers pay the same for electricity, irrespective of the system in which they consume it.
(17) According to Spain, the regulation of the activities of transmission and distribution of electricity in the NPT is similar to that in mainland Spain.
(18) In relation to the retail market, Spain explains that final customers in the NPT have a right to choose their supplier on the same terms as final customers in mainland Spain. Similarly, the concept of vulnerable consumers is defined for the whole of Spain and, in general, supply is organised uniformly throughout the country. In this respect, Spain notes that there are no differences between the mainland and non-mainland retail markets.
Overview of the legal framework for the NPT
(19) Spain explains that Law 24/2013 sets out that the supply of electricity in the NPT is subject to a specific regulation. It also sets out that this activity can receive an additional remuneration to cover the difference between the costs to generate electricity in the NPT and the revenues from the sales of electricity in these territories. Law 24/2013 provides for the conditions that must be met for an isolated system not to be considered as such anymore, namely that the capacity of the connection of the NPT with the mainland allows them to enter the mainland production market and that there are market mechanisms in place to integrate their electricity.
(20) Spain notes that Law 17/2013 sets out the general provisions for the guarantee of supply and increase of competition in the electricity systems in the NPT (7). In particular, Article 5 of Law 17/2013 provides that the pumped hydropower storage facilities in the NPT whose main purposes are to guarantee supply, ensure system security and integrate non-dispatchable renewable energy sources, are to be owned by the system operator.
(21) Spain indicates that Royal Decree 738/2015 regulates in detail the activity of producing electricity and the dispatching procedure in the electricity systems in the NPT as well as the remuneration scheme of this activity. The remuneration scheme is based on two remuneration components: one for the investment made and other fixed costs, and one for the variable costs incurred during operation. The objective of this remuneration is to cover the extra costs of electricity generation in the NPT. The Royal Decree 738/2015 defines the extra cost as the difference between all the costs of generation and the price paid in the electricity dispatch run by the system operator.
(22) Additionally, the Royal Decree 738/2015 introduces a competitive procedure for the selection of new capacity and capacity to be refurbished.
(23) The Commission notes, in this regard, that the remuneration mechanism set out in Royal Decree 738/2015 received State aid approval by the Commission in its Decision SA.42270 ‘Spain Electricity production in Spanish non-peninsular territories’ (8).
3. THE REQUESTED DEROGATIONS CONCERNING MELILLA
(24) The request for derogation submitted for Melilla is based on its qualification as a small isolated system pursuant to Article 2(42) of Directive (EU) 2019/944.
3.1. Derogation pursuant to Article 66 of Directive (EU) 2019/944
(25) Spain requests a derogation from Article 40(4) to (7) and from Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 as regards the procurement of ancillary services by the transmission system operator (‘TSO’) and the prohibition of transmission system operators to own, develop, manage or operate energy storage facilities.
Derogation pursuant to Article 64 of the Regulation (EU) 2019/943
(26) Spain requests a derogation for Melilla from the following provisions of Regulation (EU) 2019/943:
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the market principles in Article 3(1), points (a), (b), (c), (e), (j), (k), (n), (o) and (p),
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electricity trading rules pursuant to Article 6, Articles 7(1), 8(1) and 8(4), Articles 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16 and 17,
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the rules on congestion income set out in Article 19,
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Articles 14, 15, Article 16(3) to 16(13), Articles 17, 19, Articles 20(3) to 20(8), 21(7) and 21(8), 22(1), points (f) and (h), 22(2), 22(3) and 22(5), and 25(2) to 25(4) for any new support capacity mechanisms that might be established in the future,
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Articles 14 to 17, 19 to 27, 35 to 47 for the existing mechanism defined in Royal Decree 738/2015.
3.2. Duration of the requested derogations
(27) Spain considers that the effective integration of the NPT in the Iberian electricity market depends on the existence of interconnection with the Spanish mainland.
(28) Regarding Melilla, Spain requests that derogations be exempt from any time limits.
4. COMMENTS RECEIVED DURING THE CONSULTATION PERIOD
(29) As described in recital 3, throughout March and April 2021, the Commission carried out a public consultation.
(30) All the comments submitted in response to the public consultation concerned the derogation requested by Spain from Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 regarding ownership, management and operation of storage facilities by the TSO.
(31) Respondents to the public consultation were against granting such derogation, as it would legitimise a project according to which Red Eléctrica de España S.A.U. (‘REE’), the Spanish TSO, has been allowed to develop the Chira-Soria Project in the Canary Islands without tendering procedure (‘the Chira-Soria Project‘) (9), as required by Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944. Respondents noted that the fact that the derogation also covers the other NPT is not relevant because the orography of the Balearic Islands and the small size of Ceuta and Melilla would not allow for pumped hydropower storage in those territories (10).
(32) Respondents indicated that mere insularity is not a sufficient justification to derogate from the tendering requirement set out in Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944, given that private parties had reportedly shown an interest in the Chira-Soria Project. They claimed that this interest was not considered in view of Law 17/2013.
(33) Respondents further highlighted that the Spanish regulatory authority, the Comisión Nacional de Mercados y Competencia (CNMC), and the Spanish Council of State have expressed concerns about the Royal Decree 738/2015 and the role of REE in owning pumped hydropower storage facilities and, at the same time, being the entity on which, in first instance, the administrative process of authorizing pumped hydropower storage facilities depends.
(34) Specifically, in relation to the Chira-Soria Project, respondents also raised arguments alleging that it is not economically justified that the project does not contribute to the integration of renewable energy and that the project raises environmental and social concerns (11).
5. ASSESSMENT OF THE DEROGATION REQUEST CONCERNING MELILLA
5.1. Small isolated system
(35) In accordance with Article 64 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, a derogation from the relevant provisions of Articles 3 and 6, Article 7(1), Article 8(1) and (4), Articles 9 to 11, Articles 14 to 17, Articles 19 to 27, Articles 35 to 47 and Article 51 of that Regulation may be granted in two cases:
(a)
for small isolated systems and small connected systems, if the Member State(s) can demonstrate that there are substantial problems for the operation of those systems. In such a case, the derogation is to be subject to conditions that aim to increase competition and integration with the internal market for electricity;
(b)
for outermost regions with the meaning of Article 349 TFEU, if they cannot be interconnected with the Union’s energy market for evident physical reasons.
(36) In accordance with Article 66(1), first subparagraph, of Directive (EU) 2019/944, a derogation from the relevant provisions of Articles 7 and 8 and of Chapters IV, V and VI may be granted for small isolated systems and small connected systems, if the Member State(s) can demonstrate that there are substantial problems for the operation of those systems. Article 66(2), second subparagraph, of Directive (EU) 2019/944 sets out that for outermost regions within the meaning of Article 349 TFEU that cannot be interconnected with the Union electricity markets, the derogation is to be subject to conditions aimed to ensure that the derogation does not hamper the transition towards renewable energy.
(37) Both under Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Directive (EU) 2019/944, in the case of small isolated systems, the derogation is to be limited in time and subject to conditions aiming to increase competition and integration with the internal market for electricity. In addition, the derogation is to ensure that it does not obstruct or hamper the transition towards renewable energy, increased flexibility, energy storage, electromobility and demand response.
(38) Article 2(42) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 defines ‘small isolated system’ as ‘any system that had consumption of less than 3 000 GWh in the year 1996, where less than 5 % of annual consumption is obtained through interconnection with other systems’.
(39) In its submission, Spain explains that Melilla is currently not connected to Spain’s mainland (recital 6). In addition, Spain submits that Melilla’s annual consumption amounted to less than 3 000 GWh in 1996 (recital 7).
(40) Based on the information provided by Spain, and in line with the Commission’s decision SA.42270 ‘Spain Electricity production in Spanish non-peninsular territories’, the city of Melilla qualifies as a small isolated system within the meaning of Article 2(42) of Directive (EU) 2019/944.
5.2. Substantial problems for the operation of the system
5.2.1. The meaning of ‘substantial problems for the operation’ of the system
(41) The term ‘substantial problems’ referred to in Article 64(1), point (a) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Article 66(1) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 has not been defined by the legislator. The open formulation allows the Commission to consider all potential problems related to the particular situation of small systems, provided they are substantial and not only marginal. Such problems can vary significantly depending on the geographical particularities, production and consumption of the system in question, but also on technical developments (such as electricity storage and small generation).
(42) In past Commission decisions, the problems to be resolved related to maintaining social coherence and/or equal competitive conditions between the mainland and islands in a situation where system security on the island required additional measures or implied significantly higher costs on an island compared to the mainland. ‘Operation’ can thus not be understood narrowly, such as requiring that without the derogation, secure system operation would not be possible. Instead, ‘problems’ have always been considered to also include socioeconomic problems for the users of the system at hand (12).
(43) Furthermore, those substantial problems need to occur for the operation of the small isolated systems or the small connected systems. It thus appears difficult to imagine a justification which would be based exclusively on impact occurring outside of the system, e.g., impact on national subsidy schemes. This does not exclude the relevance of ‘indirect’ impact on the secure operation of the system.
5.2.2. Substantial problems presented by Spain in the Application
(44) Spain highlights several challenges and problems for the operation of the electricity markets and systems in the NPT, including Melilla:
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the small market size of the NPT, which prevents them from reaping the benefits of the economies of scale present in the mainland electricity system,
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the higher costs associated with the fuel mix, which result in higher electricity costs, since most of the generation in the NPT is fuelled by gas, coal or diesel,
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the high investment and operation costs derived from the geographical isolation and small size of the systems,
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the greater need for installed reserve capacity as a result of the geographical isolation of the systems. In particular, Spain explains that NPT need a higher level of spinning reserve to cover the security of supply standards. Such supply standard is 40-70 % higher than the installed capacity, compared to the 10 % of the mainland. This results in the power plants being idle a significant amount of time, which leads to a low interest to invest in new capacity,
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The environmental restrictions for the localisation of new generation capacity, both for conventional and renewable generation facilities,
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the cost associated with and the investments needed to build new interconnections with the mainland, due to their geographic location.
(45) According to Spain, these challenges and problems result in two major features which characterise the NPT: a higher cost of electricity and a lack of competition in electricity generation.
(46) Regarding the high cost of producing electricity in the NPT, Spain explains that due to the challenges and problems listed above, the dispatchable generation costs often double the dispatchable generation costs in mainland Spain. Spain argues that the NPT need to be excluded from the mainland market system in order for its consumers to pay prices that are similar to those of the mainland.
(47) Regarding the lack of competition in electricity generation, Spain explains that due to the historical development of the NPT and the lack of attractiveness of the power sector in these regions, a single business group traditionally performed all energy supply functions. As a result, according to Spain, Melilla still does not count with an effective competition at generation level, and this despite the efforts to promote competition.
(48) In addition, Spain points out to the challenges linked to the deployment of renewable energies in the NPT, including Melilla.
5.2.3. Assessment
(49) The Commission acknowledges Spain’s arguments that, due to the challenges linked to the operation of the small isolated systems, the very low levels of competition in the generation segment in the NPT, and the inexistent levels of interconnection with Spain’s mainland market, the conditions for the implementation of a fully liberalised wholesale electricity market in Melilla are not yet present.
(50) It thus seems plausible to assume that it is not possible to deploy a functioning wholesale market in Melilla without public intervention, and that, as consequence, a number of provisions regarding the forward, day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets cannot be implemented in this territory for the time being.
(51) The Commission can conclude that the full application of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Directive (EU) 2019/944 to the territories subject to this derogation request would create substantial problems for the operation of the electricity system in Melilla.
5.3. Scope of the derogation
5.3.1. Articles 54 and 66 of Directive (EU) 2019/944
(52) Article 54(1) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 prohibits transmission system operators from owning, developing, managing or operating energy storage facilities.
(53) Article 54(2) of that Directive provides for a possibility for Member States to derogate from this rule where the facilities are fully integrated network components and the regulatory authority has granted its approval or where all the conditions set out in points (a) to (c) of that paragraph are fulfilled.
(54) As stated in recital 36 above, pursuant to Article 66(1), first subparagraph of Directive (EU) 2019/944, Member States can request a derogation from the rules in Chapter VI (including Article 54) for small isolated systems, provided they can demonstrate that there are substantial problems for their operation.
(55) Hence, in addition to applying the derogation possibility in Article 54(2) of Directive (EU) 2019/944, Spain may request a derogation to the Commission from Article 54 of that Directive, as regards Melilla, by reference to Article 66.
5.3.1.1. The Application
(56) As described in recital 20, Article 5 of Law 17/2013 provides that the pumped hydropower storage facilities in the NPT whose main purposes are to guarantee supply, ensure system security and integrate non-dispatchable renewable energy sources, are to be owned by the system operator.
(57) In the Application, Spain points out that the small size of Melilla does not make very likely the installation of hydropower storage facilities but that other types of storage could be considered instead. In this regard, Spain refers to studies carried out by the TSO pointing out that in view of the decarbonisation commitments applicable to isolated territories and as generation from renewable sources and demand-side response increase, storage facilities will be needed to ensure energy supply in compliance with established quality and safety requirements.
(58) Spain thus requests the derogation from Article 54 of the Directive (EU) 2019/944 for Melilla in accordance with Article 66 of the Directive.
5.3.1.2. Assessment
(59) As stated in recital 53, the Commission notes that Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 already includes, in its paragraph 2, a possibility for Member States to derogate from the rule in paragraph 1 of that Article, namely that transmission system operators are not to own, develop, manage or operate energy storage facilities.
(60) In view of the possibility set out in Article 54(2) of Directive (EU) 2019/944, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 54(1) pursuant to Article 66 of the Directive, for all types of energy storage technologies, is not justified, as it would prevent the market-based development of energy storage projects.
(61) The Commission further highlights that the obligation of TSOs to own and operate energy storage facilities in non-peninsular territories set out in Law 17/2013 appears to be based on criteria that differ from those set out in Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944. The present Decision merely assesses whether the requirements for a derogation pursuant to Article 66(1) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 are met and does not pre-empt the Commission’s assessment of the compatibility of Law 17/2013 with the requirements set out in Directive (EU) 2019/944.
5.3.2. Article 40(4) to (7) of Directive (EU) 2019/944
(62) According to Spain, the lack of effective competition in the generation segment prevents the establishment of undistorted electricity markets in the NPT. In particular, it prevents the transmission system operator from establishing and operating a balancing market in Melilla, including procuring market based non-frequency ancillary services.
(63) The Commission considers that the reasons in recitals 9 to 12 currently prevent the establishment of a balancing market and of a market-based procurement of non-frequency ancillary services in Melilla. Hence, the Commission considers that derogations from the obligations in Article 40(4) to (7) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 in accordance with Article 66 of the Directive are justified.
5.3.3. Chapter II of Regulation (EU) 2019/943: General rules for the electricity market – Articles 3 and 6, Articles 7(1), 8(1) and (4), Articles 9, 10 and 11
5.3.3.1. The Application
(64) According to Spain, the lack of effective competition between generators prevents the establishment of non-regulated electricity markets. The dispatch decisions in NPT, including Melilla, are based on technical and economic criteria for which it is not always possible to apply market rules. Additionally, Spain explains that price formation in the NPT is not based on the offer and demand in those territories, but on that of mainland Spain, to prevent that consumers in NPTs pay the extra costs of electricity production in those territories.
(65) Spain therefore requests a derogation from the following provisions of Article 3, first paragraph, of Regulation (EU) 2019/943:
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points (a), (b), (o), (p), since according to Spain prices in the markets at stake cannot be freely formed based on offer and demand, and there are no forward markets operating in these territories,
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point (c), since Spain considers that the market rules that facilitate the development of flexible generation and demand might not be applicable in the territories,
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points (e) and (k), since according to Spain generators are not responsible for selling the electricity they produce (it is instead the task of the system operator to decide which power plants should be dispatched) and cannot submit aggregated offers,
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point (j), since Spain considers that the storage strategy in these territories might require that energy storage has priority and is not on equal footing with other generation facilities,
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point (n), for which Spain notes that in principle the entry and exit of electricity generation could be based on the undertakings’ assessment of the economic and financial viability of their operations, but that in practical terms it is not possible for generation companies to participate in the system without being granted a regulated payment regime by which the generation costs can be covered.
(66) Regarding Article 6, Articles 7(1), 8(1) and (4), Articles 9, 10 and 11, Spain highlights that although the electricity system in the NPT is governed by a dispatch system that operates in a way similar to the Union electricity markets, for example with daily and intraday dispatches, it constitutes a regulated system. The purchase price is based on the mainland price and not on the recognised costs incurred by generators in carrying out their electricity generation activities, including the balancing services. On this basis, Spain requests a derogation from Article 6, Articles 7(1), 8(1) and (4), and Articles 9, 10 and 11 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, since there is no balancing market in the NPT, including Melilla, and neither is there the possibility of integration with the Union day-ahead and intraday markets due to the lack of connection with mainland Spain.
(67) With regard to Article 7(1) and Article 8(1) and (4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, Spain notes that due to the isolated nature of the NPT, dispatches are operated independently of the mainland and Union markets – aside from the reference price for the purchase of energy being based on the mainland price – with the dispatches being based on hourly schedules.
(68) Likewise, in accordance with the above, the integration of forward markets, technical bidding limits and the value of lost load referred to in Articles 9 to 11 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 are considered by Spain as not applying to dispatches in the NPT.
5.3.3.2. Assessment
(69) Concerning the request for derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the Commission considers that:
—
the reasons set out in recitals 9 to 12 currently entail that electricity prices in Melilla are not formed following a market-based approach but via a special regulated mechanism whereby the system operator carries out the generation dispatch for each of the NPT, and a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (a), (b), (e), (k), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is justified.
—
the reasons set out in recitals 9 to 12 currently entail that there is no forward market in Melilla and the system operator’s dispatch involves weekly, daily, intraday forecasting as well as deviations in real time, and a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (o) and (p), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is also justified.
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while acknowledging that the current regulated system and particular characteristics of Melilla might render more difficult the development of more flexible generation, low carbon generation and more flexible demand, the application of the market rules is still required to incentivise their development to the extent possible. Thus, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified,
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Article 3, first paragraph, point (j), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 does not prevent that priority is given to energy storage projects in Melilla, if for example, those projects are considered as the best option to ensure security of supply. Thus, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (j), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified.
—
in relation to Article 3, first paragraph, point (n), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the entry or exit of an undertaking in the market for electricity generation should depend on that undertaking’s assessment of economic and financial viability, taking into account the possibility to receive the regulated remuneration mentioned in recitals (15) and (16). Hence, a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (n), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified for Melilla.
(70) With respect to the requested derogation from Article 6, Articles 7(1) and 8(1) and (4), Articles 9, 10, 11 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, those provisions refer to requirements regarding the forward, day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets. Based on the information submitted by Spain, those markets cannot be implemented effectively in Melilla (recitals 9 to 12). Hence, the Commission considers that a derogation from those provisions is justified.
5.3.4. Chapter III of Regulation (EU) 2019/943: Network access and congestion management – Articles 14 to 17 and Article 19
5.3.4.1. The Application
(71) Spain explains that the requirements set out in Articles 14 to 16 and Article 19 cannot be applied in the NPTs, because the TSO carries out the generation dispatch for each of the electricity systems in these territories and those systems do not constitute separate interconnected bidding zones. Spain also explains that since the NPT do not constitute separate bidding zones, there is not an associated cross-zonal capacity market and thus no congestion income is generated.
5.3.4.2. Assessment
(72) The derogations from Articles 7(1) and 8(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 have the effect of not including Melilla in the integrated day-ahead and intraday markets. Therefore, some provisions relating to the functioning of those markets will necessarily not apply to Melilla.
(73) Articles 14 to 17 and Article 19 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 relate to bidding zones and the management of the capacity and congestions between bidding zones. In this context, the Commission notes that Melilla does not constitute a separate bidding zone and that Spain currently does not plan to build an interconnection linking Melilla with the mainland. As Articles 14 and 15 aim to optimise market-based dispatch between bidding zones, the Commission considers that a derogation from these provisions is justified. Conversely, the provisions in Article 16(3) to (13) and Articles 17 and 19 de facto do not apply to Melilla as it does not constitute a separate bidding zone. It follows that a derogation from the requirements in Article 16(3) to (13) and Articles 17 and 19 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified.
(74) Regarding Article 16(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, which contain general principles regarding congestion management, the Commission considers that, in view of the isolation and small size of the system in Melilla and the substantial problems this presents for its operation, a derogation is justified.
5.3.5. Chapter IV of Regulation (EU) 2019/943: Resource adequacy – Articles 20(3) to (8), Article 21(7) and (8), Article 22(1), points (f) and (h), Article 22(2), (3) and (5), and Article 25(2) to (4) 5.3.5.1. The Application
(75) Spain explains that, due to the geographical isolation of the NPT resulting from the low degree or lack of connection to the mainland, the resource adequacy assessments carried out by the system operator for each of the NPT are independent, and they are not integrated into the European resource adequacy assessment or into the Spanish mainland resource adequacy assessment. Therefore, Spain considers that some of the provisions in Chapter IV are not applicable to the NPT. Spain underlines nevertheless that the current national rules aim, in so far as possible, to provide for an equal treatment between the non-peninsular territories and the mainland market, for example, as regards the levels of security of supply or the methodology for carrying out resource adequacy assessments.
(76) Spain argues that adequacy in the NPT is ensured by the specific mechanism for allocating new capacity set out in Royal Decree 738/2015 as described in recitals 21 to 23. Spain considers that this mechanism should be maintained given the unique nature of the NPT, and thus requests for a derogation from Articles 20(3) to (8), Article 21(7) and (8), Article 22(1), points (f) and (h), Article 22(2), (3) and (5), and Article 25(2) to (4).
(77) Spain argues that the resource adequacy assessments in the NPT comply with the principles included in Article 20(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943. Spain further explains that where adequacy concerns are identified, those are tackled with a call for a competitive bidding procedure (as set out in Royal Decree 738/2015) combined with the assessment of auctions of capacity of renewable origin. These are procedures for which, according to Spain, the requirements in Article 20(3) to (8) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 cannot be applied.
(78) Spain explains that the provisions included in Article 21(7) and (8) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 are not compatible with the mechanism set out in Royal Decree 738/2015. It states, however, that for any future new capacity mechanisms the requirements in Article 21(7) and (8) of the Regulation will apply.
(79) Spain notes that the mechanism set out in Royal Decree 738/2015 is also incompatible with the following provisions of Regulation (EU) 2019/943:
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Article 22(1), point (f), which sets that the remuneration is to be determined through a competitive process, because according to Spain the remuneration in the existing mechanism is not based on a competitive process, but on a benchmark installation to incentivise efficiency,
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Article 22(1), point (h), which sets that capacity mechanisms must be open to the participation of all resources that can provide the required technical performance, because according to Spain the mechanism is applied only to dispatchable installations,
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Article 22(2), which sets a list of design features that strategic reserves must comply with, since according to Spain it makes reference to balancing markets that do not exist in the NPT,
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Article 22(3), which sets additional requirements to capacity mechanisms other than strategic reserves, since according to Spain the existing mechanism does not comply with those requirements: the retribution does not tend to zero when the capacity level supplied is adequate, the retribution is not only linked to the capacity and the capacity obligations are not transferable,
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Article 22(4), which incorporates CO2 emission limit requirements on capacity mechanisms, since according to Spain the current mechanism does not include any requisite of this nature, but it does allow to set technical limitations,
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Article 22(5), which requires the adaptation of capacity mechanisms that apply on 4 July 2019.
(80) Spain explains that the reliability standards for the non-peninsular territories are not aligned with the requirements in Article 25(3) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, since they do not take into account the cost of new entry. Spain adds that even if the standards were the same, they might evolve to stricter values at a different pace, based on which they request a derogation from Article 25(2) to (4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943.
5.3.5.2. Assessment
(81) Article 20 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 addresses resource adequacy in the internal market for electricity and sets out obligations for Member States on how to monitor resource adequacy and how to act when resource adequacy concerns are identified, namely by developing an implementation plan with the aim of removing regulatory distortions, ensuring market-based balancing procurement, or removing regulated prices, among others. The Commission notes that, as part of the State aid process, Spain has already developed and submitted to the Commission an implementation plan in accordance with Article 20(3) and (4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943. In accordance with Article 20(5) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the Commission has issued an opinion on the Spanish implementation plan on 13 March 2024 (13). Therefore, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 20(3) to (8) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified.
(82) Article 21(7) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 was repealed by Regulation (EU) 2024/1747 of the European Parliament and of the Council (14). Therefore, it no longer applies to the NPT. With regard to the request to derogate from Article 21(8) (15) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 the Commission notes that while this provision no longer specifies that capacity mechanisms are to be temporary, it sets out that capacity mechanisms are to be approved by the Commission for no longer than 10 years. Moreover, it is not possible to predict the evolution of the electricity system of Melilla over time. Accordingly, the duration of the regulated remuneration mechanism set out in Royal Decree 738/2015 should be limited to the period up to 31 December 2029 as approved under State aid decision in case SA. 42270 in the case of Melilla.
(83) Article 22 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 sets out the design principles applicable to capacity mechanisms. The Commission considers that a derogation from Article 22(1), points (f) and (h), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 applicable after the expiration date of the regulated remuneration mechanism set out under the State aid decision in case SA. 42270 could hinder the transition towards renewable energy, increased flexibility, energy storage, electromobility and demand response as these provisions aim to allow the participation by all technologies on a competitive basis. Therefore, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 22(1), points (f) and (h) is not justified. This should be without prejudice to commitments and contracts concluded with regards to Melilla under the remuneration mechanism in Royal Decree 738/2015 as approved under the State aid decision in case SA. 42270.
(84) Based on the information provided by Spain (recital 79), the Commission considers that a derogation from the requirements in Article 22(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is justified because the specific design requirements for strategic reserves are intrinsically linked to the establishment of a well-functioning balancing market. Conversely, a derogation from Article 22(3) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified because the specific design requirements for capacity mechanisms are intended to apply independently of a sufficiently developed balancing market.
(85) With regards to the request for derogation from Article 22(5) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the Commission considers that a derogation is not justified given that Article 22(5) of that Regulation is not applicable to capacity mechanisms approved after 4 July 2019.
(86) Regarding Article 22(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 which sets out the CO2 emission limit requirements on capacity mechanisms, the Commission considers that the CO2 emission limit requirements are not applicable to the current regulated remuneration mechanism approved under State aid decision in case SA. 42270, in light of the small size of the electricity system of Melilla, the constraints linked to obtaining the necessary environmental permits for new generation capacity and of the higher need for dispatchable generation to ensure the integration of renewables in Melilla and guarantee security of supply. The Commission considers that a derogation from Article 22(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 applicable after the expiration date of the regulated remuneration mechanism set out under the State aid decision in case SA. 42270 could hinder the transition towards renewable energy, increased flexibility, energy storage, electromobility and demand response as these provisions aim to allow the participation by all technologies on a competitive basis. Therefore, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 22(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified. This should be without prejudice to commitments and contracts concluded with regards to Melilla under the remuneration mechanism in Royal Decree 738/2015 as approved under the State aid decision in case SA. 42270.
(87) In the Commission’s view, based on the explanations provided by Spain (see recital 80) a derogation from Article 25(2) to 25(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 for the operation of the electricity systems in Melilla is justified, for the period up to 31 December 2029 as set out in the case of Melilla under State aid decision in case SA. 42270.
5.3.6. Derogation from Articles 14 to 17, 19 to 27, 35 to 47 of the Regulation (EU) 2019/943 for the mechanism in Royal Decree 738/2015
(88) In its Application, as amended by the second set of clarifications sent by Spain on 17 January 2022, Spain stated that for the existing mechanism in Royal Decree 738/2015 a derogation from Articles 14 to 17, 19 to 27, 35 to 47 of the Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is needed. The Commission deems that such an ample derogation is not necessary to ensure its application. The Commission’s view is that only the derogations stated in the sections above are justified.
5.4. No obstruction to the transition towards renewable energy, increased flexibility, energy storage, electro-mobility and demand response
(89) Pursuant to Article 64(1), fifth subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Article 66(2) of Directive (EU) 2019/944, a derogation decision is to ensure that it does not obstruct the transition towards renewable energy, increased flexibility, energy storage, electro-mobility and demand response.
(90) As regards the transition towards renewable energy and increased flexibility (including demand response) and energy storage, it is important to note that well-functioning forward, day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets, in line with the requirements set in Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Directive (EU) 2019/944, should provide the necessary dispatch and investment signals to maximise the potential development of those technologies. By way of example, the development of demand response that can be activated in periods when the electricity system of Melilla is under stress in principle would be achieved more easily in a system where the demand prices reflect the hourly situation of generation in Melilla, instead of that of the mainland generation. This does not automatically prevent developments of demand response or other forms of flexibility in the current regulatory setting. However, it cannot be excluded that the derogation decision may have a negative impact on such potential developments.
(91) On the other hand, Article 64 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 does not require that derogation decisions maximise the potential for flexibility or energy storage. A derogation under Article 64 of that Regulation only aims to ensure that it ‘does not obstruct’ such transition. In other words, the derogation must not prevent developments which, without the derogation, would occur naturally. It is highly unlikely that, absent the derogation, well-functioning forward, day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets would develop in the electricity system in Melilla. This is due to the challenges linked to the operation of NPT, the very low levels of competition in the generation segment, and the lack of connection to the mainland market described in Section 2. It is however necessary to ensure that once the conditions for the development of functioning wholesale markets are present, the derogations are phased-out. This is why the Commission is setting out in this decision a limited derogation period and strict conditions for a prolongation of the derogation, as set out in Section 5.5 below.
(92) The derogation does not appear to have noticeable impact on electromobility.
5.5. Duration of the derogation and conditions aiming to increase competition and integration with the internal market for electricity
(93) Article 64 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Article 66 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 expressly set out, as regards small isolated systems, that the derogation is to be limited in time and that it is to be subject to conditions aiming to increase competition and integration with the internal market for electricity.
(94) As regards small isolated and small interconnected systems, Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Directive (EU) 2019/944 provide for a mandatory limitation for several purposes. First and foremost, they assume that the general regulatory framework can be applied to all situations in the internal market, and that such a general application is beneficial for society. While Article 64 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 recognises that derogations may be required for specific situations, these derogations are susceptible to increase complexity of the overall system and can constitute barriers to market integration also in neighbouring areas. Furthermore, the justification of the derogation is generally based on the technical and regulatory framework at the time, and on a given network topology. All these situations are bound to change. Finally, it is important for market participants to be able to predict regulatory changes sufficiently in advance. Thus, all derogations need to be limited in time.
(95) Spain requests the derogations for Melilla to be exempted from any time limits, since the interconnection of Melilla with the Spanish mainland (and this with the Union continental electricity system) is unlikely to happen. While acknowledging Spain’s reasons, the Commission notes that Melilla does not constitute one of the outermost regions recognised under Article 349 TFEU and the derogation must be limited in time.
(96) Given the uncertainty regarding a future interconnection between Melilla and the Spanish mainland and the substantial problems for the operation of this territory, the Commission considers proportionate to grant the derogations for Melilla for a duration which is dependent on the connection of the autonomous city with Spain’s mainland, except for the derogation from Article 25(2) to 25(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, which is to apply for the period up to 31 December 2029 as set out in the State aid decision in case SA. 42270,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
A derogation is granted to the Kingdom of Spain from the provisions of Article 3, first paragraph, points (a), (b), (e), (k), (o) and (p), Article 6, Articles 7(1) and 8(1) and (4), Articles 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, Article 16(1) and (2), Articles 22(2) and 25(2) to (4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and of Article 40(4) to (7) of the Directive (EU) 2019/944 as regards Melilla.
The derogation granted under Article 1 for all the Articles of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and the Directive (EU) 2019/944 listed therein shall apply until Melilla is connected with mainland Spain, except for derogation from Article 25(2) to 25(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, which shall apply for the period up to 31 December 2029.
This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Spain.

Commission Decision (EU) 2025/1014 of 16 May 2025 granting the Kingdom of Spain a derogation from certain provisions of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council and of Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the Balearic Islands (notified under document C(2025) 3174)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1014 26.5.2025
(1) On 23 November 2020, the Kingdom of Spain (‘Spain’) submitted to the Commission a request for derogation (the ‘Application’) for the non-peninsular territories of the Canary Islands, the Balearic Islands, Ceuta and Melilla (jointly, ‘NPT’) in accordance with Article 64 Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Article 66 of Directive (EU) 2019/944.
(2) The Application initially asked for derogations from Article 8 and Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 and from Articles 3, 6, 7(1),8(1) and (4), 9, 10, 11, Articles 14 to 17, Articles 19 to 27 and Articles 35 to 47 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943. That Application did not specify the duration of the requested derogation.
(3) On 18 March 2021, the Commission published the Application on its website and invited Member States and stakeholders to provide comments by 30 April 2021.
(4) The Commission requested from Spain additional information on the Application on 17 August 2021 and 16 December 2021. Spain replied on 4 October 2021 and 17 January 2022. In the latter submission, Spain modified the scope of its Application as follows:—the request for derogation from Article 8 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 was withdrawn for all NPT;—the request for derogation from Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 was withdrawn for the Balearic Islands and Ceuta;—Spain included a new request for derogation from Article 40(4) to (7) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 for all NPT;—the request for derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (d), (f), (g), (h), (i), (l), (m) and (q) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 was withdrawn for all NPT;—Spain also withdrew the request for derogation for all NPT from Article 16(1) and (2), Article 20(1) and (2); Article 21(1) to (6); Article 22(1), except for points (f) and (h); Article 22(4); and Articles 35 to 47 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943;—Spain set out a limited duration for the requested derogation for the Balearic Islands and Ceuta until the effective integration of these territories with the mainland (not expected before 2030). — the request for derogation from Article 8 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 was withdrawn for all NPT; — the request for derogation from Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 was withdrawn for the Balearic Islands and Ceuta; — Spain included a new request for derogation from Article 40(4) to (7) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 for all NPT; — the request for derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (d), (f), (g), (h), (i), (l), (m) and (q) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 was withdrawn for all NPT; — Spain also withdrew the request for derogation for all NPT from Article 16(1) and (2), Article 20(1) and (2); Article 21(1) to (6); Article 22(1), except for points (f) and (h); Article 22(4); and Articles 35 to 47 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943; — Spain set out a limited duration for the requested derogation for the Balearic Islands and Ceuta until the effective integration of these territories with the mainland (not expected before 2030).
— the request for derogation from Article 8 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 was withdrawn for all NPT;
— the request for derogation from Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 was withdrawn for the Balearic Islands and Ceuta;
— Spain included a new request for derogation from Article 40(4) to (7) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 for all NPT;
— the request for derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (d), (f), (g), (h), (i), (l), (m) and (q) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 was withdrawn for all NPT;
— Spain also withdrew the request for derogation for all NPT from Article 16(1) and (2), Article 20(1) and (2); Article 21(1) to (6); Article 22(1), except for points (f) and (h); Article 22(4); and Articles 35 to 47 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943;
— Spain set out a limited duration for the requested derogation for the Balearic Islands and Ceuta until the effective integration of these territories with the mainland (not expected before 2030).
— the request for derogation from Article 8 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 was withdrawn for all NPT;
— the request for derogation from Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 was withdrawn for the Balearic Islands and Ceuta;
— Spain included a new request for derogation from Article 40(4) to (7) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 for all NPT;
— the request for derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (d), (f), (g), (h), (i), (l), (m) and (q) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 was withdrawn for all NPT;
— Spain also withdrew the request for derogation for all NPT from Article 16(1) and (2), Article 20(1) and (2); Article 21(1) to (6); Article 22(1), except for points (f) and (h); Article 22(4); and Articles 35 to 47 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943;
— Spain set out a limited duration for the requested derogation for the Balearic Islands and Ceuta until the effective integration of these territories with the mainland (not expected before 2030).
(5) This Decision should cover only the Balearic Islands, as the Commission decision on the derogation request submitted by Spain concerning the NPT of the Canary Islands was adopted on 8 December 2023(3)and the derogation requests submitted by Spain concerning the NPT of Ceuta and Melilla will be addressed in separate decisions.
(6) The Balearic Islands jointly form a single interconnected system (Mallorca, Menorca, Ibiza and Formentera). According to Spain, the Balearic Islands had a consumption of less than 3 000 GWh in 1996 (2 856 GWh, measured in customer metering)(4). In 2023, annual consumption in the Balearic Islands was 6 047 GWh, out of which 8,7 % (i.e., 526 GWh) was covered through renewable energy sources(5).
(7) The Balearic Islands were isolated from Spain’s mainland electricity system until 2012. Historically, the Balearic Islands comprised two electric systems (‘Mallorca-Menorca’ and ‘Ibiza-Formentera’) with capacities of 1,9 GW and 0,3 GW respectively. At the end of year 2012, a cable connected the ‘Mallorca-Menorca’ electricity system with Spain’s mainland system through a 400 MW interconnector, whereas the ‘Ibiza-Formentera’ electricity system remained isolated. Since December 2018, following the entry into operation of a cable connecting Mallorca with Ibiza, the cable has connected the now integrated Mallorca-Menorca-Ibiza-Formentera electricity system to the mainland system(6). In 2023, the cable covered approximately 24 % of the Balearic Islands’ electricity demand(7).
(8) Based on the Ministerial Order TEC/212/2019 of 25 February 2019, the 2021-2026 electricity transmission network plan provides for a second cable linking the Balearic Islands’ electricity system with mainland Spain. The cable is expected to be operational by 2030 (best estimation provided by Spain, 2029) and to cover up to 65 % of the Balearic Islands’ electricity supply(8).
(9) According to Spain, in June 2021 the Balearic Islands had an installed generation capacity of 1 999,4 MW, out of which 91 % (1 819 MW) constitutes thermal generation (mainly combined-cycle gas turbines, following the closure of two coal-fired power plants) and the remaining 9 % (180,4 MW) are renewable generation. In this context, Spain explains that the lower rate of renewables in the NPT, compared to Spain’s mainland, is mainly due to the limited geographic space available for new generation capacity, the higher needs for dispatchable generation and the limited availability of energy storage facilities.
(10) Spain notes that the Balearic Islands are characterised by their small market size, which prevents them from reaping the benefits of the economies of scale present in the mainland electricity system. Spain also submits that the Balearic Islands’ system faces higher fuel costs. Their historical isolation also results in a greater need for installed reserve capacity.
(11) Spain further notes that almost all thermal generation in the Balearic Islands is directly or indirectly owned by Endesa S.A. As a result, even if the increasing roll out of renewables is facilitating the entry in the Balearic Islands of competing undertakings, Endesa S.A. will still produce most of the electricity in this non-peninsular territory.
(12) According to Spain, those market specificities entail higher electricity production costs compared to the mainland and a lack of attractiveness for new undertakings to enter the market. As a result, no effective competition has developed in the Balearic Islands.
(13) In view of the problems associated with the lack of effective competition and high costs, and despite the national measures adopted to promote competition and introduce economic incentives to encourage operational efficiency of installations and reduce generating costs, Spain submits that it has not been possible to establish a market mechanism which is identical to the one in place on the mainland.
(14) Spain further explains that electricity generated in all the NPT, including the Balearic Islands, is excluded from the bidding system on the mainland market. NPT electricity systems use a mechanism of economic precedence for dispatch(9):—the system operator ranks the generation plants in order of economic merit based on variable costs until demand is covered, taking into account the technical constraints and the reserves necessary to guarantee electricity supply;—the dispatch involves weekly, daily, intraday forecasting as well as deviations in real time. In the Balearic system, the dispatch also takes into account the maximum exchange of electricity available through the interconnection with the mainland;—the demand side (direct consumers and suppliers) notifies the system operator of the hourly demand in the electricity systems of each NPT;—following the daily dispatch, the demand side purchases the energy at a price equivalent to that of the bidding system on the mainland. — the system operator ranks the generation plants in order of economic merit based on variable costs until demand is covered, taking into account the technical constraints and the reserves necessary to guarantee electricity supply; — the dispatch involves weekly, daily, intraday forecasting as well as deviations in real time. In the Balearic system, the dispatch also takes into account the maximum exchange of electricity available through the interconnection with the mainland; — the demand side (direct consumers and suppliers) notifies the system operator of the hourly demand in the electricity systems of each NPT; — following the daily dispatch, the demand side purchases the energy at a price equivalent to that of the bidding system on the mainland.
— the system operator ranks the generation plants in order of economic merit based on variable costs until demand is covered, taking into account the technical constraints and the reserves necessary to guarantee electricity supply;
— the dispatch involves weekly, daily, intraday forecasting as well as deviations in real time. In the Balearic system, the dispatch also takes into account the maximum exchange of electricity available through the interconnection with the mainland;
— the demand side (direct consumers and suppliers) notifies the system operator of the hourly demand in the electricity systems of each NPT;
— following the daily dispatch, the demand side purchases the energy at a price equivalent to that of the bidding system on the mainland.
— the system operator ranks the generation plants in order of economic merit based on variable costs until demand is covered, taking into account the technical constraints and the reserves necessary to guarantee electricity supply;
— the dispatch involves weekly, daily, intraday forecasting as well as deviations in real time. In the Balearic system, the dispatch also takes into account the maximum exchange of electricity available through the interconnection with the mainland;
— the demand side (direct consumers and suppliers) notifies the system operator of the hourly demand in the electricity systems of each NPT;
— following the daily dispatch, the demand side purchases the energy at a price equivalent to that of the bidding system on the mainland.
(15) According to Spain, this mechanism takes account of the high electricity generation costs and specificities of the NPT and aims to ensure that consumers and suppliers in those territories are not exposed to the higher cost of producing electricity in the NPT compared to mainland Spain, this being based on inter-regional solidarity principles.
(16) Spain further explains that electricity generation in the NPT constitutes a system of regulated remuneration instead of a market remuneration system and is applied in conditions where a wholesale market could not function and where costs, for geographical and territorial reasons, are higher than electricity generation costs in mainland Spain.
(17) Spain notes that the mechanism ensures that the electricity system and the public budget cover the extra cost resulting from the difference between the higher generating costs in the NPT, and the electricity price equivalent to that on the mainland, so that all consumers pay the same for electricity, irrespective of the system in which they consume it.
(18) According to Spain, the regulation of the activities of transmission and distribution of electricity in the NPT is similar to that on mainland Spain.
(19) In relation to the retail market, Spain explains that final customers in the NPT have a right to choose their supplier on the same terms as final customers in mainland Spain. Similarly, the concept of vulnerable consumers is defined for the whole of Spain and, in general, supply is organised uniformly throughout the country. In this respect, Spain notes that there are no differences between the mainland and non-mainland retail markets.
(20) Spain explains that Law 24/2013 sets out that the supply of electricity in the NPT is subject to a specific regulation. It also sets out that this activity can receive an additional remuneration to cover the difference between the costs to generate electricity in the NPT and the revenues from the sales of electricity in these territories. Law 24/2013 provides for the conditions that must be met for an isolated system not to be considered as such anymore, namely that the capacity of the connection of the NPT with the mainland allows them to enter the mainland production market and that there are market mechanisms in place to integrate their electricity.
(21) Spain notes that Law 17/2013 sets out the general provisions for the guarantee of supply and increase of competition in the electricity systems in the NPT(10).
(22) Spain indicates that Royal Decree 738/2015 regulates in detail the activity of producing electricity and the dispatching procedure in the electricity systems in the NPT as well as the remuneration scheme of this activity. The remuneration scheme is based on two remuneration components: one for the investment made and other fixed costs, and one for the variable costs incurred during operation. The objective of this remuneration is to cover the extra costs of electricity generation in the NPT. The Royal Decree 738/2015 defines the extra cost as the difference between all the costs of generation and the price paid in the electricity dispatch run by the system operator.
(23) Additionally, the Royal Decree 738/2015 introduces a competitive procedure for the selection of new capacity and capacity to be refurbished.
(24) The Commission notes, in this regard, that the remuneration mechanism set out in Royal Decree 738/2015 received State aid approval by the Commission in its Decision ‘SA.42270 ‘Spain Electricity production in Spanish non-peninsular territories’(11).
(25) The request for derogation submitted for the Balearic Islands is based on its qualification as a small connected system pursuant to Article 2(43) of Directive (EU) 2019/944.
(26) Spain requests a derogation from Article 40(4) to (7) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 as regards the procurement of ancillary services by the transmission system operator (‘TSO’).
(27) Spain requests a derogation for the Balearic Islands from the following provisions of Regulation (EU) 2019/943:—the market principles in Article 3(1), points (a), (b), (c), (e), (j), (k), (n), (o) and (p);—electricity trading rules pursuant to Article 6, Articles 7(1), 8(1) and 8(4), Articles 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16 and 17;—the rules on congestion income set out in Article 19;—Articles 14, 15, Article 16(3) to 16(13), Articles 17, 19, Articles 20(3) to 20(8), 21(7) and 21(8), 22(1), points (f) and (h), 22(2), 22(3) and 22(5), and 25(2) to 25(4) for any new support capacity mechanisms that might be established in the future;—Articles 14 to 17, 19 to 27, 35 to 47 for the existing mechanism defined in Royal Decree 738/2015. — the market principles in Article 3(1), points (a), (b), (c), (e), (j), (k), (n), (o) and (p); — electricity trading rules pursuant to Article 6, Articles 7(1), 8(1) and 8(4), Articles 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16 and 17; — the rules on congestion income set out in Article 19; — Articles 14, 15, Article 16(3) to 16(13), Articles 17, 19, Articles 20(3) to 20(8), 21(7) and 21(8), 22(1), points (f) and (h), 22(2), 22(3) and 22(5), and 25(2) to 25(4) for any new support capacity mechanisms that might be established in the future; — Articles 14 to 17, 19 to 27, 35 to 47 for the existing mechanism defined in Royal Decree 738/2015.
— the market principles in Article 3(1), points (a), (b), (c), (e), (j), (k), (n), (o) and (p);
— electricity trading rules pursuant to Article 6, Articles 7(1), 8(1) and 8(4), Articles 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16 and 17;
— the rules on congestion income set out in Article 19;
— Articles 14, 15, Article 16(3) to 16(13), Articles 17, 19, Articles 20(3) to 20(8), 21(7) and 21(8), 22(1), points (f) and (h), 22(2), 22(3) and 22(5), and 25(2) to 25(4) for any new support capacity mechanisms that might be established in the future;
— Articles 14 to 17, 19 to 27, 35 to 47 for the existing mechanism defined in Royal Decree 738/2015.
— the market principles in Article 3(1), points (a), (b), (c), (e), (j), (k), (n), (o) and (p);
— electricity trading rules pursuant to Article 6, Articles 7(1), 8(1) and 8(4), Articles 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16 and 17;
— the rules on congestion income set out in Article 19;
— Articles 14, 15, Article 16(3) to 16(13), Articles 17, 19, Articles 20(3) to 20(8), 21(7) and 21(8), 22(1), points (f) and (h), 22(2), 22(3) and 22(5), and 25(2) to 25(4) for any new support capacity mechanisms that might be established in the future;
— Articles 14 to 17, 19 to 27, 35 to 47 for the existing mechanism defined in Royal Decree 738/2015.
(28) Spain considers that the effective integration of the NPT in the Iberian electricity market depends on the existence of interconnection with the Spanish mainland.
(29) Regarding the Balearic Islands, Spain explains that the derogations should last until the effective integration of this territory in the mainland electricity market. According to Spain, the effective integration does not only comprise the commission of the new interconnectors, but also testing time and the necessary regulatory developments. Based on this, the Spain requests a derogation at least until 2030.
(30) As described in recital 3, throughout March and April 2021, the Commission carried out a public consultation.
(31) All the comments submitted in response to the public consultation concerned the derogation requested by Spain from Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 regarding ownership, management and operation of storage facilities by the TSO. As described in recital 4, Spain withdrew the request for derogation from Article 54 of Directive for the Balearic Islands.
(32) In accordance with Article 64 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, a derogation from the relevant provisions of Articles 3 and 6, Article 7(1), Article 8(1) and (4), Articles 9 to 11, Articles 14 to 17, Articles 19 to 27, Articles 35 to 47 and Article 51 of that Regulation may be granted in two cases:(a)for small isolated systems and small connected systems, if the Member State(s) can demonstrate that there are substantial problems for the operation of those systems. In such a case, the derogation is to be subject to conditions that aim to increase competition and integration with the internal market for electricity;(b)for outermost regions with the meaning of Article 349 TFEU, if they cannot be interconnected with the Union’s energy market for evident physical reasons. (a) for small isolated systems and small connected systems, if the Member State(s) can demonstrate that there are substantial problems for the operation of those systems. In such a case, the derogation is to be subject to conditions that aim to increase competition and integration with the internal market for electricity; (b) for outermost regions with the meaning of Article 349 TFEU, if they cannot be interconnected with the Union’s energy market for evident physical reasons.
(a) for small isolated systems and small connected systems, if the Member State(s) can demonstrate that there are substantial problems for the operation of those systems. In such a case, the derogation is to be subject to conditions that aim to increase competition and integration with the internal market for electricity;
(b) for outermost regions with the meaning of Article 349 TFEU, if they cannot be interconnected with the Union’s energy market for evident physical reasons.
(a) for small isolated systems and small connected systems, if the Member State(s) can demonstrate that there are substantial problems for the operation of those systems. In such a case, the derogation is to be subject to conditions that aim to increase competition and integration with the internal market for electricity;
(b) for outermost regions with the meaning of Article 349 TFEU, if they cannot be interconnected with the Union’s energy market for evident physical reasons.
(33) In accordance with Article 66(1), first subparagraph, of Directive (EU) 2019/944, a derogation from the relevant provisions of Articles 7 and 8 and of Chapters IV, V and VI may be granted for small isolated systems and small connected systems, if the Member State(s) can demonstrate that there are substantial problems for the operation of those systems. Article 66(2), second subparagraph, of Directive (EU) 2019/944 sets out that for outermost regions within the meaning of Article 349 TFEU that cannot be interconnected with the Union electricity markets, the derogation is to be subject to conditions aimed to ensure that the derogation does not hamper the transition towards renewable energy.
(34) Both under Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Directive (EU) 2019/944, in the case of small connected systems, the derogation is to be limited in time and subject to conditions aiming to increase competition and integration with the internal market for electricity. In addition, the derogation is to ensure that it does not obstruct or hamper the transition towards renewable energy, increased flexibility, energy storage, electromobility and demand response.
(35) Article 2(43) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 defines ‘small connected system’ as ‘any system that had consumption of less than 3 000 GWh in the year 1996, where more than 5 % of annual consumption is obtained through interconnection with other systems’.
(36) In its submission, Spain explains that the Balearic Islands (Mallorca, Menorca, Ibiza and Formentera) conform a single, interconnected system with a consumption of less than 3 000 GWh in 1996 (recital 6). Approximately 25 % of the electricity demand in the Balearic Islands is covered through the interconnector with mainland Spain.
(37) Based on the information provided by Spain, and in line with the Commission decision in case SA.42270 ‘Spain Electricity production in Spanish non-peninsular territories’, the Balearic Islands qualify as a small connected system within the meaning of Article 2(43) of Directive (EU) 2019/944.
(38) The term ‘substantial problems’ referred to in Article 64(1), point (a) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Article 66(1) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 has not been defined by the legislator. The open formulation allows the Commission to consider all potential problems related to the particular situation of small systems, provided they are substantial and not only marginal. Such problems can vary significantly depending on the geographical particularities, production and consumption of the system in question, but also on technical developments (such as electricity storage and small generation).
(39) In past Commission decisions, the problems to be resolved related to maintaining social coherence and/or equal competitive conditions between the mainland and islands in a situation where system security on the island required additional measures or implied significantly higher costs on an island compared to the mainland. ‘Operation’ can thus not be understood narrowly, such as requiring that without the derogation, secure system operation would not be possible. Instead, ‘problems’ have always been considered to also include socioeconomic problems for the users of the system at hand(12).
(40) Furthermore, those substantial problems need to occur for the operation of the small isolated systems or the small connected systems. It thus appears difficult to imagine a justification which would be based exclusively on impacts occurring outside of the system, e.g., impacts on national subsidy schemes. This does not exclude the relevance of ‘indirect’ impacts on the secure operation of the system.
(41) Spain highlights several challenges and problems for the operation of the electricity markets and systems in the NPT, including the Balearic Islands:—the small market size of the NPT, which prevents them from reaping the benefits of the economies of scale present in the mainland electricity system;—the higher costs associated with the fuel mix, which result in higher electricity costs, since most of the generation in the NPT is fuelled by gas, coal or diesel;—the high investment and operation costs linked to power plants, derived from the geographical isolation resulting from the low degree of connection to the mainland and small size of the systems;—the greater need for installed reserve capacity as a result of the geographical isolation resulting from the low degree of connection of the systems. In particular, Spain explains that NPT need a higher level of spinning reserve to cover the security of supply standards. Such supply standard is 40-70 % higher than the installed capacity, compared to the 10 % of the mainland. This results in the power plants being idle a significant amount of time, which leads to a low interest to invest in new capacity;—The environmental restrictions for the localisation of new generation capacity, both for conventional and renewable generation facilities;—the high seasonality of demand, which is strongly linked to the tourism sector in the Balearic Islands;—the cost associated and the investments needed to build new interconnections with the mainland, due to their geographic location. — the small market size of the NPT, which prevents them from reaping the benefits of the economies of scale present in the mainland electricity system; — the higher costs associated with the fuel mix, which result in higher electricity costs, since most of the generation in the NPT is fuelled by gas, coal or diesel; — the high investment and operation costs linked to power plants, derived from the geographical isolation resulting from the low degree of connection to the mainland and small size of the systems; — the greater need for installed reserve capacity as a result of the geographical isolation resulting from the low degree of connection of the systems. In particular, Spain explains that NPT need a higher level of spinning reserve to cover the security of supply standards. Such supply standard is 40-70 % higher than the installed capacity, compared to the 10 % of the mainland. This results in the power plants being idle a significant amount of time, which leads to a low interest to invest in new capacity; — The environmental restrictions for the localisation of new generation capacity, both for conventional and renewable generation facilities; — the high seasonality of demand, which is strongly linked to the tourism sector in the Balearic Islands; — the cost associated and the investments needed to build new interconnections with the mainland, due to their geographic location.
— the small market size of the NPT, which prevents them from reaping the benefits of the economies of scale present in the mainland electricity system;
— the higher costs associated with the fuel mix, which result in higher electricity costs, since most of the generation in the NPT is fuelled by gas, coal or diesel;
— the high investment and operation costs linked to power plants, derived from the geographical isolation resulting from the low degree of connection to the mainland and small size of the systems;
— the greater need for installed reserve capacity as a result of the geographical isolation resulting from the low degree of connection of the systems. In particular, Spain explains that NPT need a higher level of spinning reserve to cover the security of supply standards. Such supply standard is 40-70 % higher than the installed capacity, compared to the 10 % of the mainland. This results in the power plants being idle a significant amount of time, which leads to a low interest to invest in new capacity;
— The environmental restrictions for the localisation of new generation capacity, both for conventional and renewable generation facilities;
— the high seasonality of demand, which is strongly linked to the tourism sector in the Balearic Islands;
— the cost associated and the investments needed to build new interconnections with the mainland, due to their geographic location.
— the small market size of the NPT, which prevents them from reaping the benefits of the economies of scale present in the mainland electricity system;
— the higher costs associated with the fuel mix, which result in higher electricity costs, since most of the generation in the NPT is fuelled by gas, coal or diesel;
— the high investment and operation costs linked to power plants, derived from the geographical isolation resulting from the low degree of connection to the mainland and small size of the systems;
— the greater need for installed reserve capacity as a result of the geographical isolation resulting from the low degree of connection of the systems. In particular, Spain explains that NPT need a higher level of spinning reserve to cover the security of supply standards. Such supply standard is 40-70 % higher than the installed capacity, compared to the 10 % of the mainland. This results in the power plants being idle a significant amount of time, which leads to a low interest to invest in new capacity;
— The environmental restrictions for the localisation of new generation capacity, both for conventional and renewable generation facilities;
— the high seasonality of demand, which is strongly linked to the tourism sector in the Balearic Islands;
— the cost associated and the investments needed to build new interconnections with the mainland, due to their geographic location.
(42) According to Spain, these challenges and problems result in two major features which characterise the NPT: a higher cost of electricity and a lack of competition in electricity generation.
(43) Regarding the high cost of producing electricity in the NPT, Spain explains that due to the challenges and problems listed above, the dispatchable generation costs often double the dispatchable generation costs in mainland Spain. Spain argues that the NPT, including the Balearic Islands, need to be excluded from the mainland market system in order for its consumers to pay prices that are similar to those of the mainland. Spain adds that an assessment would be needed before the integration of the NPT in the mainland electricity market, to ensure that the high generation costs in these territories do not distort marginal electricity prices in the mainland electricity market.
(44) Regarding the lack of competition in electricity generation, Spain explains that due to the historical development of the NPT and the lack of attractiveness of the power sector in these regions, a single business group traditionally performed all energy supply functions. In relation to the Balearic Islands, Spain notes that Endesa S.A. continues to own almost 100 % of the fossil fuel generation plants, which are the main generation source in the territories at stake. As a result, according to Spain, the Balearic Islands still do not count with an effective competition at generation level, and this despite the efforts to promote competition, which have resulted in alternative renewable generators entering this territory.
(45) Spain underlines that, due to the higher costs of producing electricity and the lack of effective competition, the integration of the NPT, including the Balearic Islands in the mainland (and European) electricity market would result in market distortions, and that this will be the case as long as the interconnections with mainland Spain do not suffice to cover the totality of the local demand.
(46) In addition, Spain points out to the challenges linked to the deployment of renewable energies in the NPT, including the Balearic Islands. Spain explains that most of the variable renewable power plants in an island produce under the same meteorological conditions, a phenomenon known as ‘correlation’. As a result, the more renewable generation is deployed in the island systems, the more difficult it is to comply with security of supply standards. According to Spain, this situation could limit the amount of variable renewable energy deployed in the NPT.
(47) The Commission acknowledges Spain’s arguments that, due to the challenges linked to the operation of small connected systems, the very low levels of competition in the generation segment in the NPT, and the low levels of connection to Spain’s mainland market, the conditions for the implementation of a fully liberalised wholesale electricity market in the Balearic Islands are not yet present.
(48) It thus seems plausible to assume that it is not possible to deploy a functioning wholesale market in the Balearic Islands without public intervention, and that, as consequence, a number of provisions regarding the forward, day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets cannot be implemented in the Balearic Islands for the time being.
(49) The Commission can conclude that the full application of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Directive (EU) 2019/944 to the territories subject to this derogation request would create substantial problems for the operation of the systems of the Balearic Islands.
(50) The Commission notes, however, that the situation of the Balearic Islands will change as soon as more interconnections with mainland Spain are built and become operational.
(51) According to Spain, the lack of effective competition in the generation segment prevents the establishment of undistorted electricity markets in the NPT. In particular, it prevents the transmission system operator from establishing and operating a balancing market in the Balearic Islands, including procuring market based non-frequency ancillary services.
(52) The Commission considers that the reasons in recitals 10 to 13 currently prevent the establishment of a balancing market and of a market-based procurement of non-frequency ancillary services in the Balearic Islands. Hence, the Commission considers that derogations from the obligations in Article 40(4) to (7) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 in accordance with Article 66 of the Directive are justified.
(53) According to Spain, the lack of effective competition between generators prevents the establishment of non-regulated electricity markets. The dispatch decisions in NPT including the Balearic Islands are based on technical and economic criteria for which it is not always possible to apply market rules. Additionally, Spain explains that price formation in the NPT is not based on the offer and demand in those territories, but on that of mainland Spain, to prevent that consumers in NPTs pay the extra costs of electricity production in those territories.
(54) Spain therefore requests a derogation from the following provisions of Article 3, first paragraph, of Regulation (EU) 2019/943:—points (a), (b), (o), (p), since according to Spain prices in the markets at stake cannot be freely formed based on offer and demand, and there are no forward markets operating in these territories. Spain further notes that the limited interconnection capacity between the Balearic Islands and the mainland does not change this situation;—point (c), since Spain considers that the market rules that facilitate the development of flexible generation and demand might not be applicable in the territories;—points (e) and (k), since according to Spain generators are not responsible for selling the electricity they produce (it is instead the task of the system operator to decide which power plants should be dispatched) and cannot submit aggregated offers;—point (j), since Spain considers that the storage strategy in these territories might require that energy storage has priority and is not on equal footing with other generation facilities;—point (n), for which Spain notes that in principle the entry and exit of electricity generation could be based on the undertakings’ assessment of the economic and financial viability of their operations, but that in practical terms it is not possible for generation companies to participate in the system without being granted a regulated payment regime by which the generation costs can be covered. — points (a), (b), (o), (p), since according to Spain prices in the markets at stake cannot be freely formed based on offer and demand, and there are no forward markets operating in these territories. Spain further notes that the limited interconnection capacity between the Balearic Islands and the mainland does not change this situation; — point (c), since Spain considers that the market rules that facilitate the development of flexible generation and demand might not be applicable in the territories; — points (e) and (k), since according to Spain generators are not responsible for selling the electricity they produce (it is instead the task of the system operator to decide which power plants should be dispatched) and cannot submit aggregated offers; — point (j), since Spain considers that the storage strategy in these territories might require that energy storage has priority and is not on equal footing with other generation facilities; — point (n), for which Spain notes that in principle the entry and exit of electricity generation could be based on the undertakings’ assessment of the economic and financial viability of their operations, but that in practical terms it is not possible for generation companies to participate in the system without being granted a regulated payment regime by which the generation costs can be covered.
— points (a), (b), (o), (p), since according to Spain prices in the markets at stake cannot be freely formed based on offer and demand, and there are no forward markets operating in these territories. Spain further notes that the limited interconnection capacity between the Balearic Islands and the mainland does not change this situation;
— point (c), since Spain considers that the market rules that facilitate the development of flexible generation and demand might not be applicable in the territories;
— points (e) and (k), since according to Spain generators are not responsible for selling the electricity they produce (it is instead the task of the system operator to decide which power plants should be dispatched) and cannot submit aggregated offers;
— point (j), since Spain considers that the storage strategy in these territories might require that energy storage has priority and is not on equal footing with other generation facilities;
— point (n), for which Spain notes that in principle the entry and exit of electricity generation could be based on the undertakings’ assessment of the economic and financial viability of their operations, but that in practical terms it is not possible for generation companies to participate in the system without being granted a regulated payment regime by which the generation costs can be covered.
— points (a), (b), (o), (p), since according to Spain prices in the markets at stake cannot be freely formed based on offer and demand, and there are no forward markets operating in these territories. Spain further notes that the limited interconnection capacity between the Balearic Islands and the mainland does not change this situation;
— point (c), since Spain considers that the market rules that facilitate the development of flexible generation and demand might not be applicable in the territories;
— points (e) and (k), since according to Spain generators are not responsible for selling the electricity they produce (it is instead the task of the system operator to decide which power plants should be dispatched) and cannot submit aggregated offers;
— point (j), since Spain considers that the storage strategy in these territories might require that energy storage has priority and is not on equal footing with other generation facilities;
— point (n), for which Spain notes that in principle the entry and exit of electricity generation could be based on the undertakings’ assessment of the economic and financial viability of their operations, but that in practical terms it is not possible for generation companies to participate in the system without being granted a regulated payment regime by which the generation costs can be covered.
(55) Regarding Article 6, Articles 7(1), 8(1) and (4), Articles 9, 10 and 11, Spain highlights that although the electricity system in the NPT is governed by a dispatch system that operates in a way similar to the Union electricity markets, for example with daily and intraday dispatches, it constitutes a regulated system. The purchase price is based on the mainland price and not on the recognised costs incurred by generators in carrying out their electricity generation activities, including the balancing services. On this basis, Spain requests a derogation from Article 6, Articles 7(1), 8(1) and (4), and Articles 9, 10 and 11 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, since there is no balancing market in the NPT, including the Balearic Islands, and neither is there the possibility of integration with the Union day-ahead and intraday markets due to their limited connection with mainland Spain.
(56) With regard to Article 7(1) and Article 8(1) and (4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, Spain notes that due to the isolated nature of the NPT, dispatches are operated independently of the mainland and Union markets – aside from the reference price for the purchase of energy being based on the mainland price – with the dispatches being based on hourly schedules.
(57) Likewise, in accordance with the above, the integration of forward markets, technical bidding limits and the value of lost load referred to in Articles 9 to 11 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 are considered by Spain as not applying to dispatches in the NPT.
(58) Concerning the request for derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the Commission considers that:—the reasons set out in recitals 10 to 13 currently entail that electricity prices in the Balearic Islands are not formed following a market-based approach but via a special regulated mechanism whereby the system operator carries out the generation dispatch for each of the NPT, and a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (a), (b), (e), (k), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is justified;—the reasons set out in recitals 10 to 13 currently entail that there is no forward market in the Balearic Islands and the system operator’s dispatch involves weekly, daily, intraday forecasting as well as deviations in real time, and a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (o) and (p), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is also justified;—while acknowledging that the current regulated system and particular characteristics of the Balearic Islands might render more difficult the development of more flexible generation, low carbon generation and more flexible demand, the application of the market rules is still required to incentivise their development to the extent possible. Thus, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified;—Article 3, first paragraph, point (j), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 does not prevent that priority is given to energy storage projects in the Balearic Islands, if for example, those projects are considered as the best option to ensure security of supply in the Balearic Islands. Thus, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (j), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified;—in relation to Article 3, first paragraph, point (n), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the entry or exit of an undertaking in the market for electricity generation should depend on that undertaking’s assessment of economic and financial viability, taking into account the possibility to receive the regulated remuneration mentioned in recitals 16 and 17. Hence, a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (n), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified for the Balearic Islands. — the reasons set out in recitals 10 to 13 currently entail that electricity prices in the Balearic Islands are not formed following a market-based approach but via a special regulated mechanism whereby the system operator carries out the generation dispatch for each of the NPT, and a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (a), (b), (e), (k), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is justified; — the reasons set out in recitals 10 to 13 currently entail that there is no forward market in the Balearic Islands and the system operator’s dispatch involves weekly, daily, intraday forecasting as well as deviations in real time, and a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (o) and (p), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is also justified; — while acknowledging that the current regulated system and particular characteristics of the Balearic Islands might render more difficult the development of more flexible generation, low carbon generation and more flexible demand, the application of the market rules is still required to incentivise their development to the extent possible. Thus, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified; — Article 3, first paragraph, point (j), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 does not prevent that priority is given to energy storage projects in the Balearic Islands, if for example, those projects are considered as the best option to ensure security of supply in the Balearic Islands. Thus, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (j), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified; — in relation to Article 3, first paragraph, point (n), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the entry or exit of an undertaking in the market for electricity generation should depend on that undertaking’s assessment of economic and financial viability, taking into account the possibility to receive the regulated remuneration mentioned in recitals 16 and 17. Hence, a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (n), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified for the Balearic Islands.
— the reasons set out in recitals 10 to 13 currently entail that electricity prices in the Balearic Islands are not formed following a market-based approach but via a special regulated mechanism whereby the system operator carries out the generation dispatch for each of the NPT, and a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (a), (b), (e), (k), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is justified;
— the reasons set out in recitals 10 to 13 currently entail that there is no forward market in the Balearic Islands and the system operator’s dispatch involves weekly, daily, intraday forecasting as well as deviations in real time, and a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (o) and (p), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is also justified;
— while acknowledging that the current regulated system and particular characteristics of the Balearic Islands might render more difficult the development of more flexible generation, low carbon generation and more flexible demand, the application of the market rules is still required to incentivise their development to the extent possible. Thus, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified;
— Article 3, first paragraph, point (j), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 does not prevent that priority is given to energy storage projects in the Balearic Islands, if for example, those projects are considered as the best option to ensure security of supply in the Balearic Islands. Thus, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (j), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified;
— in relation to Article 3, first paragraph, point (n), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the entry or exit of an undertaking in the market for electricity generation should depend on that undertaking’s assessment of economic and financial viability, taking into account the possibility to receive the regulated remuneration mentioned in recitals 16 and 17. Hence, a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (n), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified for the Balearic Islands.
— the reasons set out in recitals 10 to 13 currently entail that electricity prices in the Balearic Islands are not formed following a market-based approach but via a special regulated mechanism whereby the system operator carries out the generation dispatch for each of the NPT, and a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (a), (b), (e), (k), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is justified;
— the reasons set out in recitals 10 to 13 currently entail that there is no forward market in the Balearic Islands and the system operator’s dispatch involves weekly, daily, intraday forecasting as well as deviations in real time, and a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (o) and (p), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is also justified;
— while acknowledging that the current regulated system and particular characteristics of the Balearic Islands might render more difficult the development of more flexible generation, low carbon generation and more flexible demand, the application of the market rules is still required to incentivise their development to the extent possible. Thus, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified;
— Article 3, first paragraph, point (j), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 does not prevent that priority is given to energy storage projects in the Balearic Islands, if for example, those projects are considered as the best option to ensure security of supply in the Balearic Islands. Thus, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (j), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified;
— in relation to Article 3, first paragraph, point (n), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the entry or exit of an undertaking in the market for electricity generation should depend on that undertaking’s assessment of economic and financial viability, taking into account the possibility to receive the regulated remuneration mentioned in recitals 16 and 17. Hence, a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (n), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified for the Balearic Islands.
(59) With respect to the requested derogation from Article 6, Articles 7(1) and 8(1) and (4), Articles 9, 10, 11 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, those provisions refer to requirements regarding the forward, day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets. Based on the information submitted by Spain, it appears that those markets cannot be implemented effectively in the Balearic Islands (recitals 10 to 13), considering the particularities of the electricity system in this territory. Hence, the Commission considers that a derogation from those provisions is justified.
(60) Spain explains that the requirements set out in Articles 14 to 16 and Article 19 cannot be applied in the NPTs, because the TSO carries out the generation dispatch for each of the electricity systems in these territories and those systems do not constitute separate interconnected bidding zones. Those dispatches take into consideration the energy transferred via links between mainland Spain and the Balearic Islands. In the event of congestion in those links, the TSO reorganises the dispatch of the available generating capacity, taking into account mainly technical criteria, to ensure supply. Spain also explains that since the NPT do not constitute separate bidding zones, there is not an associated cross-zonal capacity market and thus no congestion income is generated.
(61) The derogations from Articles 7(1) and 8(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 have the effect of not including the electricity systems in the Balearic Islands in the integrated day-ahead and intraday markets. Therefore, some provisions relating to the functioning of those markets will necessarily not apply to the Balearic Islands.
(62) Articles 14 to 17 and Article 19 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 relate to bidding zones and the management of the capacity and congestions between bidding zones. In this context, the Commission notes that even though currently the Balearic Islands constitute a single bidding zone together with mainland Spain and the other NPTs, in the future, by application of Articles 14 and 15, the situation could change. Conversely, the provisions in Article 16(3) to (13) and Articles 17 and 19 de facto do not apply to the Balearic Islands as long as this territory does not constitute a separate bidding zone. It follows that a derogation from the requirements in Articles 14 and 15, Article 16(3) to (13), Articles 17 and 19 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified.
(63) Article 16(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, which contain general principles regarding congestion management, apply to the Balearic Islands because those principles provide guarantees to market participants that the TSO is to address congestion problems with non-discriminatory market-based solutions and use transaction curtailment procedures only in emergency situations. Hence, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 16(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified.
(64) Spain explains that, due to the geographical isolation of the NPT resulting from the low degree or lack of connection to the mainland, the resource adequacy assessments carried out by the system operator for each of the NPT are independent, and they are not integrated into the European resource adequacy assessment or into the Spanish mainland resource adequacy assessment. Therefore, Spain considers that some of the provisions in Chapter IV are not applicable to the NPT. Spain underlines nevertheless that the current national rules aim, in so far as possible, to provide for an equal treatment between the NPT and the mainland market, for example, as regards the levels of security of supply or the methodology for carrying out resource adequacy assessments.
(65) Spain argues that adequacy in the NPT is ensured by the specific mechanism for allocating new capacity set out in Royal Decree 738/2015 as described in recitals 22 to 24. Spain considers that this mechanism should be maintained given the unique nature of the NPT, and thus requests for a derogation from Articles 20(3) to (8), Article 21(7) and (8), Article 22(1), points (f) and (h), Article 22(2), (3) and (5), and Article 25(2) to (4).
(66) Spain argues that the resource adequacy assessments in the NPT comply with the principles included in Article 20(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943. Spain further explains that where adequacy concerns are identified, those are tackled with a call for a competitive bidding procedure (as set out in Royal Decree 738/2015) combined with the assessment of auctions of capacity of renewable origin. These are procedures for which, according to Spain, the requirements in Article 20(3) to (8) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 cannot be applied.
(67) Spain explains that the provisions included in Article 21(7) and (8) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 are not compatible with the mechanism set out in Royal Decree 738/2015. It states, however, that for any future new capacity mechanisms the requirements in Article 21(7) and (8) of the Regulation will apply.
(68) Spain notes that the mechanism set out in Royal Decree 738/2015 is also incompatible with the following provisions of Regulation (EU) 2019/943:—Article 22(1), point (f), which sets that the remuneration is to be determined through a competitive process, because according to Spain the remuneration in the existing mechanism is not based on a competitive process, but on a benchmark installation to incentivise efficiency;—Article 22(1), point (h), which sets that capacity mechanisms must be open to the participation of all resources that can provide the required technical performance, because according to Spain the mechanism is applied only to dispatchable installations;—Article 22(2), which sets a list of design features that strategic reserves must comply with, since according to Spain it makes reference to balancing markets that do not exist in the NPT;—Article 22(3), which sets additional requirements to capacity mechanisms other than strategic reserves, since according to Spain the existing mechanism does not comply with those requirements: the retribution does not tend to zero when the capacity level supplied is adequate, the retribution is not only linked to the capacity and the capacity obligations are not transferable;—Article 22(4), which incorporates CO2emission limit requirements on capacity mechanisms, since according to Spain the current mechanism does not include any requisite of this nature, but it does allow to set technical limitations;—Article 22(5), which requires the adaptation of capacity mechanisms that apply on 4 July 2019. — Article 22(1), point (f), which sets that the remuneration is to be determined through a competitive process, because according to Spain the remuneration in the existing mechanism is not based on a competitive process, but on a benchmark installation to incentivise efficiency; — Article 22(1), point (h), which sets that capacity mechanisms must be open to the participation of all resources that can provide the required technical performance, because according to Spain the mechanism is applied only to dispatchable installations; — Article 22(2), which sets a list of design features that strategic reserves must comply with, since according to Spain it makes reference to balancing markets that do not exist in the NPT; — Article 22(3), which sets additional requirements to capacity mechanisms other than strategic reserves, since according to Spain the existing mechanism does not comply with those requirements: the retribution does not tend to zero when the capacity level supplied is adequate, the retribution is not only linked to the capacity and the capacity obligations are not transferable; — Article 22(4), which incorporates CO2emission limit requirements on capacity mechanisms, since according to Spain the current mechanism does not include any requisite of this nature, but it does allow to set technical limitations; — Article 22(5), which requires the adaptation of capacity mechanisms that apply on 4 July 2019.
— Article 22(1), point (f), which sets that the remuneration is to be determined through a competitive process, because according to Spain the remuneration in the existing mechanism is not based on a competitive process, but on a benchmark installation to incentivise efficiency;
— Article 22(1), point (h), which sets that capacity mechanisms must be open to the participation of all resources that can provide the required technical performance, because according to Spain the mechanism is applied only to dispatchable installations;
— Article 22(2), which sets a list of design features that strategic reserves must comply with, since according to Spain it makes reference to balancing markets that do not exist in the NPT;
— Article 22(3), which sets additional requirements to capacity mechanisms other than strategic reserves, since according to Spain the existing mechanism does not comply with those requirements: the retribution does not tend to zero when the capacity level supplied is adequate, the retribution is not only linked to the capacity and the capacity obligations are not transferable;
— Article 22(4), which incorporates CO2emission limit requirements on capacity mechanisms, since according to Spain the current mechanism does not include any requisite of this nature, but it does allow to set technical limitations;
— Article 22(5), which requires the adaptation of capacity mechanisms that apply on 4 July 2019.
— Article 22(1), point (f), which sets that the remuneration is to be determined through a competitive process, because according to Spain the remuneration in the existing mechanism is not based on a competitive process, but on a benchmark installation to incentivise efficiency;
— Article 22(1), point (h), which sets that capacity mechanisms must be open to the participation of all resources that can provide the required technical performance, because according to Spain the mechanism is applied only to dispatchable installations;
— Article 22(2), which sets a list of design features that strategic reserves must comply with, since according to Spain it makes reference to balancing markets that do not exist in the NPT;
— Article 22(3), which sets additional requirements to capacity mechanisms other than strategic reserves, since according to Spain the existing mechanism does not comply with those requirements: the retribution does not tend to zero when the capacity level supplied is adequate, the retribution is not only linked to the capacity and the capacity obligations are not transferable;
— Article 22(4), which incorporates CO2emission limit requirements on capacity mechanisms, since according to Spain the current mechanism does not include any requisite of this nature, but it does allow to set technical limitations;
— Article 22(5), which requires the adaptation of capacity mechanisms that apply on 4 July 2019.
(69) Spain explains that the reliability standards for the non-peninsular territories are not aligned with the requirements in Article 25(3) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, since they do not take into account the cost of new entry. Spain adds that even if the standards were the same, they might evolve to stricter values at a different pace, based on which they request a derogation from Article 25(2) to (4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943.
(70) Article 20 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 addresses resource adequacy in the internal market for electricity and sets out obligations for Member States on how to monitor resource adequacy and how to act when resource adequacy concerns are identified, namely by developing an implementation plan with the aim of removing regulatory distortions, ensuring market-based balancing procurement, or removing regulated prices, among others. The Commission notes that, as part of the State aid process, Spain has already developed and submitted to the Commission an implementation plan in accordance with Article 20(3) and (4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943. In accordance with Article 20(5) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the Commission has issued an opinion on the Spanish implementation plan on 13 March 2024. Therefore, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 20(3) to (8) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified.
(71) Article 21(7) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 was repealed by Regulation (EU) 2024/1747 of the European Parliament and of the Council(13). Therefore, it no longer applies to the NPT. With regards to the request to derogate from Article 21(8)(14)of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the Commission notes that while this provision no longer specifies that capacity mechanisms are to be temporary, it sets out that capacity mechanisms are to be approved by the Commission for no longer than 10 years. Moreover, it is not possible to predict the evolution of the electricity system of the Balearic Islands over time. Accordingly, the duration of the regulated remuneration mechanism set out in Royal Decree 738/2015 should be limited to the period up to 31 December 2025 as approved in the case of the Balearic Islands under State aid decision in case SA.42270.
(72) Article 22 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 sets out the design principles applicable to capacity mechanisms. The Commission considers that a derogation from Article 22(1), points (f) and (h), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 applicable after the expiration date of the regulated remuneration mechanism set out under the State aid decision in case SA.42270 would hinder the transition towards renewable energy, increased flexibility, energy storage, electromobility and demand response as these provisions aim to allow the participation by all technologies on a competitive basis. Therefore, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 22(1), points (f) and (h) is not justified. This should be without prejudice to commitments and contracts concluded with regards to the Balearic Islands under the remuneration mechanism in Royal Decree 738/2015 as approved under the State aid decision in case SA.42270.
(73) Based on the information provided by Spain (recital 68), the Commission considers that a derogation from the requirements in Article 22(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is justified because the specific design requirements for strategic reserves are intrinsically linked to the establishment of a well-functioning balancing market. Conversely, a derogation from Article 22(3) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified because the specific design requirements for capacity mechanisms are intended to apply independently of a sufficiently developed balancing market.
(74) With regards to the request for derogation from Article 22(5) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the Commission considers that a derogation is not justified given that Article 22(5) of that Regulation is not applicable to capacity mechanisms approved after 4 July 2019.
(75) Regarding Article 22(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 which sets out the CO2emission limit requirements on capacity mechanisms, the Commission considers that the CO2emission limit requirements are not applicable to the current regulated remuneration mechanism approved under State aid decision in case SA.42270, in light of the small size of the electricity system of the Balearic Islands, the constraints linked to obtaining the necessary environmental permits for new generation capacity and of the higher need for dispatchable generation to ensure the integration of renewables in the Balearic Islands and guarantee security of supply. The Commission considers that a derogation from Article 22(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 applicable after the expiration date of the regulated remuneration mechanism set out under the State aid decision in case SA.42270 would hinder the transition towards renewable energy, increased flexibility, energy storage, electromobility and demand response as these provisions aim to allow the participation by all technologies on a competitive basis. Therefore, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 22(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified. This should be without prejudice to commitments and contracts concluded with regards to the Balearic Islands under the remuneration mechanism in Royal Decree 738/2015 as approved under the State aid decision in case SA.42270.
(76) In the Commission’s view, based on the explanations provided by Spain (see recital 69) a derogation from Article 25(2) to 25(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 for the operation of the electricity systems in the Balearic Islands is not justified. This should be without prejudice to commitments and contracts concluded with regards to the Balearic Islands under the remuneration mechanism in Royal Decree 738/2015 as approved under the State aid decision in case SA.42270.
(77) In its Application, as amended by the second set of clarifications sent by Spain on 17 January 2022, Spain stated that for the existing mechanism in Royal Decree 738/2015 a derogation from Articles 14 to 17, 19 to 27, 35 to 47 of the Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is needed. The Commission deems that such an ample derogation is not necessary to ensure its application. The Commission view is that only the derogations stated in the sections above are justified.
(78) Pursuant to Article 64(1), fifth subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Article 66(2) of Directive (EU) 2019/944, a derogation decision is to ensure that it does not obstruct the transition towards renewable energy, increased flexibility, energy storage, electro-mobility and demand response.
(79) As regards the transition towards renewable energy and increased flexibility (including demand response) and energy storage, it is important to note that well-functioning forward, day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets, in line with the requirements set in Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Directive (EU) 2019/944, should provide the necessary dispatch and investment signals to maximise the potential development of those technologies. By way of example, the development of demand response that can be activated in periods when the electricity system of the Balearic Islands is under stress in principle would be achieved more easily in a system where the demand prices reflect the hourly situation of generation in the Balearic Islands, instead of that of the mainland generation. This does not automatically prevent developments of demand response or other forms of flexibility in the current regulatory setting. However, it cannot be excluded that the derogation decision may have a negative impact on such potential developments.
(80) On the other hand, Article 64 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 does not require that derogation decisions maximise the potential for flexibility or energy storage. A derogation under Article 64 of that Regulation only aims to ensure that it ‘does not obstruct’ such transition. In other words, the derogation must not prevent developments which, without the derogation, would occur naturally. It is unlikely that, absent the derogation, well-functioning forward, day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets would develop in each of the electricity systems in the Balearic Islands. This is due to the challenges linked to the operation of NPT, the very low levels of competition in the generation segment, and the low degree of connection to the mainland market described in section 2. It is however necessary to ensure that once the conditions for the development of functioning wholesale markets are present, the derogations are phased-out. This is why the Commission is setting out in this decision a limited derogation period and strict conditions for a prolongation of the derogation, as set out in section 5.5 below.
(81) The derogation does not appear to have noticeable impact on electromobility.
(82) Article 64 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Article 66 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 expressly set out, as regards small connected systems, that the derogation is to be limited in time and that it is to be subject to conditions aiming to increase competition and integration with the internal market for electricity.
(83) Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Directive (EU) 2019/944 provide for a mandatory limitation for several purposes. First and foremost, they assume that the general regulatory framework can be applied to all situations in the internal market, and that such a general application is beneficial for society. While Article 64 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 recognises that derogations may be required for specific situations, these derogations are susceptible to increase complexity of the overall system and can constitute barriers to market integration also in neighbouring areas. Furthermore, the justification of the derogation is generally based on the technical and regulatory framework at the time, and on a given network topology. All these situations are bound to change. Finally, it is important for market participants to be able to predict regulatory changes sufficiently in advance. Thus, all derogations need to be limited in time.
(84) The new cables increasing the connection between the Balearic Islands and the Spain’s mainland are expected to become operational by the end of 2030. Once these cables start to operate, the regulatory framework applicable to this territory should be amended, this territory should be incorporated to the mainland electricity market and the requested derogations should be phased out. Spain argues that once that the cables are commissioned, additional time will be needed in order to incorporate these territories to mainland market rules, and to make the necessary regulatory changes and testing. Following this, Spain requests the derogations for the Balearic Islands at least until 2030.
(85) In light of the reasons put forward by Spain, the Commission considers proportionate to grant the derogations for the Balearic Islands until 12 months after the day the new cable becomes operational.
(86) To ensure the timely phase out of the requested derogations, by six months after the day the new cables between the Balearic Islands and Spain’s mainland are commissioned, Spain is to provide to the Commission a clear plan detailing all the regulatory and system changes needed in order to incorporate the Balearic Islands to the mainland electricity market. The plan is to clearly identify the different actions required and include a timeline identifying the most notable milestones.
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity (1), and in particular Article 64 thereof,
Having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU (2), and in particular Article 66 thereof,
Whereas:
1. PROCEDURE AND THE SCOPE OF THE DECISION
(1) On 23 November 2020, the Kingdom of Spain (‘Spain’) submitted to the Commission a request for derogation (the ‘Application’) for the non-peninsular territories of the Canary Islands, the Balearic Islands, Ceuta and Melilla (jointly, ‘NPT’) in accordance with Article 64 Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Article 66 of Directive (EU) 2019/944.
(2) The Application initially asked for derogations from Article 8 and Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 and from Articles 3, 6, 7(1),8(1) and (4), 9, 10, 11, Articles 14 to 17, Articles 19 to 27 and Articles 35 to 47 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943. That Application did not specify the duration of the requested derogation.
(3) On 18 March 2021, the Commission published the Application on its website and invited Member States and stakeholders to provide comments by 30 April 2021.
(4) The Commission requested from Spain additional information on the Application on 17 August 2021 and 16 December 2021. Spain replied on 4 October 2021 and 17 January 2022. In the latter submission, Spain modified the scope of its Application as follows:
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the request for derogation from Article 8 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 was withdrawn for all NPT;
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the request for derogation from Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 was withdrawn for the Balearic Islands and Ceuta;
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Spain included a new request for derogation from Article 40(4) to (7) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 for all NPT;
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the request for derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (d), (f), (g), (h), (i), (l), (m) and (q) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 was withdrawn for all NPT;
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Spain also withdrew the request for derogation for all NPT from Article 16(1) and (2), Article 20(1) and (2); Article 21(1) to (6); Article 22(1), except for points (f) and (h); Article 22(4); and Articles 35 to 47 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943;
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Spain set out a limited duration for the requested derogation for the Balearic Islands and Ceuta until the effective integration of these territories with the mainland (not expected before 2030).
(5) This Decision should cover only the Balearic Islands, as the Commission decision on the derogation request submitted by Spain concerning the NPT of the Canary Islands was adopted on 8 December 2023 (3) and the derogation requests submitted by Spain concerning the NPT of Ceuta and Melilla will be addressed in separate decisions.
2. THE BALEARIC ISLANDS
The electricity system and electricity market in the Balearic Islands
(6) The Balearic Islands jointly form a single interconnected system (Mallorca, Menorca, Ibiza and Formentera). According to Spain, the Balearic Islands had a consumption of less than 3 000 GWh in 1996 (2 856 GWh, measured in customer metering) (4). In 2023, annual consumption in the Balearic Islands was 6 047 GWh, out of which 8,7 % (i.e., 526 GWh) was covered through renewable energy sources (5).
(7) The Balearic Islands were isolated from Spain’s mainland electricity system until 2012. Historically, the Balearic Islands comprised two electric systems (‘Mallorca-Menorca’ and ‘Ibiza-Formentera’) with capacities of 1,9 GW and 0,3 GW respectively. At the end of year 2012, a cable connected the ‘Mallorca-Menorca’ electricity system with Spain’s mainland system through a 400 MW interconnector, whereas the ‘Ibiza-Formentera’ electricity system remained isolated. Since December 2018, following the entry into operation of a cable connecting Mallorca with Ibiza, the cable has connected the now integrated Mallorca-Menorca-Ibiza-Formentera electricity system to the mainland system (6). In 2023, the cable covered approximately 24 % of the Balearic Islands’ electricity demand (7).
(8) Based on the Ministerial Order TEC/212/2019 of 25 February 2019, the 2021-2026 electricity transmission network plan provides for a second cable linking the Balearic Islands’ electricity system with mainland Spain. The cable is expected to be operational by 2030 (best estimation provided by Spain, 2029) and to cover up to 65 % of the Balearic Islands’ electricity supply (8).
(9) According to Spain, in June 2021 the Balearic Islands had an installed generation capacity of 1 999,4 MW, out of which 91 % (1 819 MW) constitutes thermal generation (mainly combined-cycle gas turbines, following the closure of two coal-fired power plants) and the remaining 9 % (180,4 MW) are renewable generation. In this context, Spain explains that the lower rate of renewables in the NPT, compared to Spain’s mainland, is mainly due to the limited geographic space available for new generation capacity, the higher needs for dispatchable generation and the limited availability of energy storage facilities.
(10) Spain notes that the Balearic Islands are characterised by their small market size, which prevents them from reaping the benefits of the economies of scale present in the mainland electricity system. Spain also submits that the Balearic Islands’ system faces higher fuel costs. Their historical isolation also results in a greater need for installed reserve capacity.
(11) Spain further notes that almost all thermal generation in the Balearic Islands is directly or indirectly owned by Endesa S.A. As a result, even if the increasing roll out of renewables is facilitating the entry in the Balearic Islands of competing undertakings, Endesa S.A. will still produce most of the electricity in this non-peninsular territory.
(12) According to Spain, those market specificities entail higher electricity production costs compared to the mainland and a lack of attractiveness for new undertakings to enter the market. As a result, no effective competition has developed in the Balearic Islands.
(13) In view of the problems associated with the lack of effective competition and high costs, and despite the national measures adopted to promote competition and introduce economic incentives to encourage operational efficiency of installations and reduce generating costs, Spain submits that it has not been possible to establish a market mechanism which is identical to the one in place on the mainland.
(14) Spain further explains that electricity generated in all the NPT, including the Balearic Islands, is excluded from the bidding system on the mainland market. NPT electricity systems use a mechanism of economic precedence for dispatch (9):
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the system operator ranks the generation plants in order of economic merit based on variable costs until demand is covered, taking into account the technical constraints and the reserves necessary to guarantee electricity supply;
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the dispatch involves weekly, daily, intraday forecasting as well as deviations in real time. In the Balearic system, the dispatch also takes into account the maximum exchange of electricity available through the interconnection with the mainland;
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the demand side (direct consumers and suppliers) notifies the system operator of the hourly demand in the electricity systems of each NPT;
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following the daily dispatch, the demand side purchases the energy at a price equivalent to that of the bidding system on the mainland.
(15) According to Spain, this mechanism takes account of the high electricity generation costs and specificities of the NPT and aims to ensure that consumers and suppliers in those territories are not exposed to the higher cost of producing electricity in the NPT compared to mainland Spain, this being based on inter-regional solidarity principles.
(16) Spain further explains that electricity generation in the NPT constitutes a system of regulated remuneration instead of a market remuneration system and is applied in conditions where a wholesale market could not function and where costs, for geographical and territorial reasons, are higher than electricity generation costs in mainland Spain.
(17) Spain notes that the mechanism ensures that the electricity system and the public budget cover the extra cost resulting from the difference between the higher generating costs in the NPT, and the electricity price equivalent to that on the mainland, so that all consumers pay the same for electricity, irrespective of the system in which they consume it.
(18) According to Spain, the regulation of the activities of transmission and distribution of electricity in the NPT is similar to that on mainland Spain.
(19) In relation to the retail market, Spain explains that final customers in the NPT have a right to choose their supplier on the same terms as final customers in mainland Spain. Similarly, the concept of vulnerable consumers is defined for the whole of Spain and, in general, supply is organised uniformly throughout the country. In this respect, Spain notes that there are no differences between the mainland and non-mainland retail markets.
Overview of the legal framework for the NPT
(20) Spain explains that Law 24/2013 sets out that the supply of electricity in the NPT is subject to a specific regulation. It also sets out that this activity can receive an additional remuneration to cover the difference between the costs to generate electricity in the NPT and the revenues from the sales of electricity in these territories. Law 24/2013 provides for the conditions that must be met for an isolated system not to be considered as such anymore, namely that the capacity of the connection of the NPT with the mainland allows them to enter the mainland production market and that there are market mechanisms in place to integrate their electricity.
(21) Spain notes that Law 17/2013 sets out the general provisions for the guarantee of supply and increase of competition in the electricity systems in the NPT (10).
(22) Spain indicates that Royal Decree 738/2015 regulates in detail the activity of producing electricity and the dispatching procedure in the electricity systems in the NPT as well as the remuneration scheme of this activity. The remuneration scheme is based on two remuneration components: one for the investment made and other fixed costs, and one for the variable costs incurred during operation. The objective of this remuneration is to cover the extra costs of electricity generation in the NPT. The Royal Decree 738/2015 defines the extra cost as the difference between all the costs of generation and the price paid in the electricity dispatch run by the system operator.
(23) Additionally, the Royal Decree 738/2015 introduces a competitive procedure for the selection of new capacity and capacity to be refurbished.
(24) The Commission notes, in this regard, that the remuneration mechanism set out in Royal Decree 738/2015 received State aid approval by the Commission in its Decision ‘SA.42270 ‘Spain Electricity production in Spanish non-peninsular territories’ (11).
3. THE REQUESTED DEROGATIONS CONCERNING THE BALEARIC ISLANDS
(25) The request for derogation submitted for the Balearic Islands is based on its qualification as a small connected system pursuant to Article 2(43) of Directive (EU) 2019/944.
3.1. Derogation pursuant to Article 66 of Directive (EU) 2019/944
(26) Spain requests a derogation from Article 40(4) to (7) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 as regards the procurement of ancillary services by the transmission system operator (‘TSO’).
3.2. Derogation pursuant to Article 64 of the Regulation (EU) 2019/943
(27) Spain requests a derogation for the Balearic Islands from the following provisions of Regulation (EU) 2019/943:
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the market principles in Article 3(1), points (a), (b), (c), (e), (j), (k), (n), (o) and (p);
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electricity trading rules pursuant to Article 6, Articles 7(1), 8(1) and 8(4), Articles 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16 and 17;
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the rules on congestion income set out in Article 19;
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Articles 14, 15, Article 16(3) to 16(13), Articles 17, 19, Articles 20(3) to 20(8), 21(7) and 21(8), 22(1), points (f) and (h), 22(2), 22(3) and 22(5), and 25(2) to 25(4) for any new support capacity mechanisms that might be established in the future;
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Articles 14 to 17, 19 to 27, 35 to 47 for the existing mechanism defined in Royal Decree 738/2015.
3.3. Duration of the requested derogations
(28) Spain considers that the effective integration of the NPT in the Iberian electricity market depends on the existence of interconnection with the Spanish mainland.
(29) Regarding the Balearic Islands, Spain explains that the derogations should last until the effective integration of this territory in the mainland electricity market. According to Spain, the effective integration does not only comprise the commission of the new interconnectors, but also testing time and the necessary regulatory developments. Based on this, the Spain requests a derogation at least until 2030.
4. COMMENTS RECEIVED DURING THE CONSULTATION PERIOD
(30) As described in recital 3, throughout March and April 2021, the Commission carried out a public consultation.
(31) All the comments submitted in response to the public consultation concerned the derogation requested by Spain from Article 54 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 regarding ownership, management and operation of storage facilities by the TSO. As described in recital 4, Spain withdrew the request for derogation from Article 54 of Directive for the Balearic Islands.
5. ASSESSMENT OF THE DEROGATION REQUEST CONCERNING THE BALEARIC ISLANDS
5.1. Small connected system
(32) In accordance with Article 64 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, a derogation from the relevant provisions of Articles 3 and 6, Article 7(1), Article 8(1) and (4), Articles 9 to 11, Articles 14 to 17, Articles 19 to 27, Articles 35 to 47 and Article 51 of that Regulation may be granted in two cases:
(a)
for small isolated systems and small connected systems, if the Member State(s) can demonstrate that there are substantial problems for the operation of those systems. In such a case, the derogation is to be subject to conditions that aim to increase competition and integration with the internal market for electricity;
(b)
for outermost regions with the meaning of Article 349 TFEU, if they cannot be interconnected with the Union’s energy market for evident physical reasons.
(33) In accordance with Article 66(1), first subparagraph, of Directive (EU) 2019/944, a derogation from the relevant provisions of Articles 7 and 8 and of Chapters IV, V and VI may be granted for small isolated systems and small connected systems, if the Member State(s) can demonstrate that there are substantial problems for the operation of those systems. Article 66(2), second subparagraph, of Directive (EU) 2019/944 sets out that for outermost regions within the meaning of Article 349 TFEU that cannot be interconnected with the Union electricity markets, the derogation is to be subject to conditions aimed to ensure that the derogation does not hamper the transition towards renewable energy.
(34) Both under Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Directive (EU) 2019/944, in the case of small connected systems, the derogation is to be limited in time and subject to conditions aiming to increase competition and integration with the internal market for electricity. In addition, the derogation is to ensure that it does not obstruct or hamper the transition towards renewable energy, increased flexibility, energy storage, electromobility and demand response.
(35) Article 2(43) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 defines ‘small connected system’ as ‘any system that had consumption of less than 3 000 GWh in the year 1996, where more than 5 % of annual consumption is obtained through interconnection with other systems’.
(36) In its submission, Spain explains that the Balearic Islands (Mallorca, Menorca, Ibiza and Formentera) conform a single, interconnected system with a consumption of less than 3 000 GWh in 1996 (recital 6). Approximately 25 % of the electricity demand in the Balearic Islands is covered through the interconnector with mainland Spain.
(37) Based on the information provided by Spain, and in line with the Commission decision in case SA.42270 ‘Spain Electricity production in Spanish non-peninsular territories’, the Balearic Islands qualify as a small connected system within the meaning of Article 2(43) of Directive (EU) 2019/944.
5.2. Substantial problems for the operation of the system
5.2.1. The meaning of ‘substantial problems for the operation’ of the system
(38) The term ‘substantial problems’ referred to in Article 64(1), point (a) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Article 66(1) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 has not been defined by the legislator. The open formulation allows the Commission to consider all potential problems related to the particular situation of small systems, provided they are substantial and not only marginal. Such problems can vary significantly depending on the geographical particularities, production and consumption of the system in question, but also on technical developments (such as electricity storage and small generation).
(39) In past Commission decisions, the problems to be resolved related to maintaining social coherence and/or equal competitive conditions between the mainland and islands in a situation where system security on the island required additional measures or implied significantly higher costs on an island compared to the mainland. ‘Operation’ can thus not be understood narrowly, such as requiring that without the derogation, secure system operation would not be possible. Instead, ‘problems’ have always been considered to also include socioeconomic problems for the users of the system at hand (12).
(40) Furthermore, those substantial problems need to occur for the operation of the small isolated systems or the small connected systems. It thus appears difficult to imagine a justification which would be based exclusively on impacts occurring outside of the system, e.g., impacts on national subsidy schemes. This does not exclude the relevance of ‘indirect’ impacts on the secure operation of the system.
5.2.2. Substantial problems presented by Spain in the Application
(41) Spain highlights several challenges and problems for the operation of the electricity markets and systems in the NPT, including the Balearic Islands:
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the small market size of the NPT, which prevents them from reaping the benefits of the economies of scale present in the mainland electricity system;
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the higher costs associated with the fuel mix, which result in higher electricity costs, since most of the generation in the NPT is fuelled by gas, coal or diesel;
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the high investment and operation costs linked to power plants, derived from the geographical isolation resulting from the low degree of connection to the mainland and small size of the systems;
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the greater need for installed reserve capacity as a result of the geographical isolation resulting from the low degree of connection of the systems. In particular, Spain explains that NPT need a higher level of spinning reserve to cover the security of supply standards. Such supply standard is 40-70 % higher than the installed capacity, compared to the 10 % of the mainland. This results in the power plants being idle a significant amount of time, which leads to a low interest to invest in new capacity;
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The environmental restrictions for the localisation of new generation capacity, both for conventional and renewable generation facilities;
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the high seasonality of demand, which is strongly linked to the tourism sector in the Balearic Islands;
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the cost associated and the investments needed to build new interconnections with the mainland, due to their geographic location.
(42) According to Spain, these challenges and problems result in two major features which characterise the NPT: a higher cost of electricity and a lack of competition in electricity generation.
(43) Regarding the high cost of producing electricity in the NPT, Spain explains that due to the challenges and problems listed above, the dispatchable generation costs often double the dispatchable generation costs in mainland Spain. Spain argues that the NPT, including the Balearic Islands, need to be excluded from the mainland market system in order for its consumers to pay prices that are similar to those of the mainland. Spain adds that an assessment would be needed before the integration of the NPT in the mainland electricity market, to ensure that the high generation costs in these territories do not distort marginal electricity prices in the mainland electricity market.
(44) Regarding the lack of competition in electricity generation, Spain explains that due to the historical development of the NPT and the lack of attractiveness of the power sector in these regions, a single business group traditionally performed all energy supply functions. In relation to the Balearic Islands, Spain notes that Endesa S.A. continues to own almost 100 % of the fossil fuel generation plants, which are the main generation source in the territories at stake. As a result, according to Spain, the Balearic Islands still do not count with an effective competition at generation level, and this despite the efforts to promote competition, which have resulted in alternative renewable generators entering this territory.
(45) Spain underlines that, due to the higher costs of producing electricity and the lack of effective competition, the integration of the NPT, including the Balearic Islands in the mainland (and European) electricity market would result in market distortions, and that this will be the case as long as the interconnections with mainland Spain do not suffice to cover the totality of the local demand.
(46) In addition, Spain points out to the challenges linked to the deployment of renewable energies in the NPT, including the Balearic Islands. Spain explains that most of the variable renewable power plants in an island produce under the same meteorological conditions, a phenomenon known as ‘correlation’. As a result, the more renewable generation is deployed in the island systems, the more difficult it is to comply with security of supply standards. According to Spain, this situation could limit the amount of variable renewable energy deployed in the NPT.
5.2.3. Assessment
(47) The Commission acknowledges Spain’s arguments that, due to the challenges linked to the operation of small connected systems, the very low levels of competition in the generation segment in the NPT, and the low levels of connection to Spain’s mainland market, the conditions for the implementation of a fully liberalised wholesale electricity market in the Balearic Islands are not yet present.
(48) It thus seems plausible to assume that it is not possible to deploy a functioning wholesale market in the Balearic Islands without public intervention, and that, as consequence, a number of provisions regarding the forward, day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets cannot be implemented in the Balearic Islands for the time being.
(49) The Commission can conclude that the full application of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Directive (EU) 2019/944 to the territories subject to this derogation request would create substantial problems for the operation of the systems of the Balearic Islands.
(50) The Commission notes, however, that the situation of the Balearic Islands will change as soon as more interconnections with mainland Spain are built and become operational.
5.3. Scope of the derogation
5.3.1. Article 40(4) to (7) of Directive (EU) 2019/944
(51) According to Spain, the lack of effective competition in the generation segment prevents the establishment of undistorted electricity markets in the NPT. In particular, it prevents the transmission system operator from establishing and operating a balancing market in the Balearic Islands, including procuring market based non-frequency ancillary services.
(52) The Commission considers that the reasons in recitals 10 to 13 currently prevent the establishment of a balancing market and of a market-based procurement of non-frequency ancillary services in the Balearic Islands. Hence, the Commission considers that derogations from the obligations in Article 40(4) to (7) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 in accordance with Article 66 of the Directive are justified.
5.3.2. Chapter II of Regulation (EU) 2019/943: General rules for the electricity market – Articles 3 and 6, Articles 7(1), 8(1) and (4), Articles 9, 10 and 11
5.3.2.1. The Application
(53) According to Spain, the lack of effective competition between generators prevents the establishment of non-regulated electricity markets. The dispatch decisions in NPT including the Balearic Islands are based on technical and economic criteria for which it is not always possible to apply market rules. Additionally, Spain explains that price formation in the NPT is not based on the offer and demand in those territories, but on that of mainland Spain, to prevent that consumers in NPTs pay the extra costs of electricity production in those territories.
(54) Spain therefore requests a derogation from the following provisions of Article 3, first paragraph, of Regulation (EU) 2019/943:
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points (a), (b), (o), (p), since according to Spain prices in the markets at stake cannot be freely formed based on offer and demand, and there are no forward markets operating in these territories. Spain further notes that the limited interconnection capacity between the Balearic Islands and the mainland does not change this situation;
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point (c), since Spain considers that the market rules that facilitate the development of flexible generation and demand might not be applicable in the territories;
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points (e) and (k), since according to Spain generators are not responsible for selling the electricity they produce (it is instead the task of the system operator to decide which power plants should be dispatched) and cannot submit aggregated offers;
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point (j), since Spain considers that the storage strategy in these territories might require that energy storage has priority and is not on equal footing with other generation facilities;
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point (n), for which Spain notes that in principle the entry and exit of electricity generation could be based on the undertakings’ assessment of the economic and financial viability of their operations, but that in practical terms it is not possible for generation companies to participate in the system without being granted a regulated payment regime by which the generation costs can be covered.
(55) Regarding Article 6, Articles 7(1), 8(1) and (4), Articles 9, 10 and 11, Spain highlights that although the electricity system in the NPT is governed by a dispatch system that operates in a way similar to the Union electricity markets, for example with daily and intraday dispatches, it constitutes a regulated system. The purchase price is based on the mainland price and not on the recognised costs incurred by generators in carrying out their electricity generation activities, including the balancing services. On this basis, Spain requests a derogation from Article 6, Articles 7(1), 8(1) and (4), and Articles 9, 10 and 11 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, since there is no balancing market in the NPT, including the Balearic Islands, and neither is there the possibility of integration with the Union day-ahead and intraday markets due to their limited connection with mainland Spain.
(56) With regard to Article 7(1) and Article 8(1) and (4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, Spain notes that due to the isolated nature of the NPT, dispatches are operated independently of the mainland and Union markets – aside from the reference price for the purchase of energy being based on the mainland price – with the dispatches being based on hourly schedules.
(57) Likewise, in accordance with the above, the integration of forward markets, technical bidding limits and the value of lost load referred to in Articles 9 to 11 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 are considered by Spain as not applying to dispatches in the NPT.
5.3.2.2. Assessment
(58) Concerning the request for derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the Commission considers that:
—
the reasons set out in recitals 10 to 13 currently entail that electricity prices in the Balearic Islands are not formed following a market-based approach but via a special regulated mechanism whereby the system operator carries out the generation dispatch for each of the NPT, and a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (a), (b), (e), (k), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is justified;
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the reasons set out in recitals 10 to 13 currently entail that there is no forward market in the Balearic Islands and the system operator’s dispatch involves weekly, daily, intraday forecasting as well as deviations in real time, and a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, points (o) and (p), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is also justified;
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while acknowledging that the current regulated system and particular characteristics of the Balearic Islands might render more difficult the development of more flexible generation, low carbon generation and more flexible demand, the application of the market rules is still required to incentivise their development to the extent possible. Thus, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified;
—
Article 3, first paragraph, point (j), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 does not prevent that priority is given to energy storage projects in the Balearic Islands, if for example, those projects are considered as the best option to ensure security of supply in the Balearic Islands. Thus, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (j), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified;
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in relation to Article 3, first paragraph, point (n), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the entry or exit of an undertaking in the market for electricity generation should depend on that undertaking’s assessment of economic and financial viability, taking into account the possibility to receive the regulated remuneration mentioned in recitals 16 and 17. Hence, a derogation from Article 3, first paragraph, point (n), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified for the Balearic Islands.
(59) With respect to the requested derogation from Article 6, Articles 7(1) and 8(1) and (4), Articles 9, 10, 11 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, those provisions refer to requirements regarding the forward, day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets. Based on the information submitted by Spain, it appears that those markets cannot be implemented effectively in the Balearic Islands (recitals 10 to 13), considering the particularities of the electricity system in this territory. Hence, the Commission considers that a derogation from those provisions is justified.
5.3.3. Chapter III of Regulation (EU) 2019/943: Network access and congestion management – Articles 14 to 17 and Article 19
5.3.3.1. The Application
(60) Spain explains that the requirements set out in Articles 14 to 16 and Article 19 cannot be applied in the NPTs, because the TSO carries out the generation dispatch for each of the electricity systems in these territories and those systems do not constitute separate interconnected bidding zones. Those dispatches take into consideration the energy transferred via links between mainland Spain and the Balearic Islands. In the event of congestion in those links, the TSO reorganises the dispatch of the available generating capacity, taking into account mainly technical criteria, to ensure supply. Spain also explains that since the NPT do not constitute separate bidding zones, there is not an associated cross-zonal capacity market and thus no congestion income is generated.
5.3.3.2. Assessment
(61) The derogations from Articles 7(1) and 8(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 have the effect of not including the electricity systems in the Balearic Islands in the integrated day-ahead and intraday markets. Therefore, some provisions relating to the functioning of those markets will necessarily not apply to the Balearic Islands.
(62) Articles 14 to 17 and Article 19 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 relate to bidding zones and the management of the capacity and congestions between bidding zones. In this context, the Commission notes that even though currently the Balearic Islands constitute a single bidding zone together with mainland Spain and the other NPTs, in the future, by application of Articles 14 and 15, the situation could change. Conversely, the provisions in Article 16(3) to (13) and Articles 17 and 19 de facto do not apply to the Balearic Islands as long as this territory does not constitute a separate bidding zone. It follows that a derogation from the requirements in Articles 14 and 15, Article 16(3) to (13), Articles 17 and 19 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified.
(63) Article 16(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, which contain general principles regarding congestion management, apply to the Balearic Islands because those principles provide guarantees to market participants that the TSO is to address congestion problems with non-discriminatory market-based solutions and use transaction curtailment procedures only in emergency situations. Hence, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 16(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified.
5.3.4. Chapter IV of Regulation (EU) 2019/943: Resource adequacy – Articles 20(3) to (8), Article 21(7) and (8), Article 22(1), points (f) and (h), Article 22(2), (3) and (5), and Article 25(2) to (4) 5.3.4.1. The Application
(64) Spain explains that, due to the geographical isolation of the NPT resulting from the low degree or lack of connection to the mainland, the resource adequacy assessments carried out by the system operator for each of the NPT are independent, and they are not integrated into the European resource adequacy assessment or into the Spanish mainland resource adequacy assessment. Therefore, Spain considers that some of the provisions in Chapter IV are not applicable to the NPT. Spain underlines nevertheless that the current national rules aim, in so far as possible, to provide for an equal treatment between the NPT and the mainland market, for example, as regards the levels of security of supply or the methodology for carrying out resource adequacy assessments.
(65) Spain argues that adequacy in the NPT is ensured by the specific mechanism for allocating new capacity set out in Royal Decree 738/2015 as described in recitals 22 to 24. Spain considers that this mechanism should be maintained given the unique nature of the NPT, and thus requests for a derogation from Articles 20(3) to (8), Article 21(7) and (8), Article 22(1), points (f) and (h), Article 22(2), (3) and (5), and Article 25(2) to (4).
(66) Spain argues that the resource adequacy assessments in the NPT comply with the principles included in Article 20(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943. Spain further explains that where adequacy concerns are identified, those are tackled with a call for a competitive bidding procedure (as set out in Royal Decree 738/2015) combined with the assessment of auctions of capacity of renewable origin. These are procedures for which, according to Spain, the requirements in Article 20(3) to (8) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 cannot be applied.
(67) Spain explains that the provisions included in Article 21(7) and (8) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 are not compatible with the mechanism set out in Royal Decree 738/2015. It states, however, that for any future new capacity mechanisms the requirements in Article 21(7) and (8) of the Regulation will apply.
(68) Spain notes that the mechanism set out in Royal Decree 738/2015 is also incompatible with the following provisions of Regulation (EU) 2019/943:
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Article 22(1), point (f), which sets that the remuneration is to be determined through a competitive process, because according to Spain the remuneration in the existing mechanism is not based on a competitive process, but on a benchmark installation to incentivise efficiency;
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Article 22(1), point (h), which sets that capacity mechanisms must be open to the participation of all resources that can provide the required technical performance, because according to Spain the mechanism is applied only to dispatchable installations;
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Article 22(2), which sets a list of design features that strategic reserves must comply with, since according to Spain it makes reference to balancing markets that do not exist in the NPT;
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Article 22(3), which sets additional requirements to capacity mechanisms other than strategic reserves, since according to Spain the existing mechanism does not comply with those requirements: the retribution does not tend to zero when the capacity level supplied is adequate, the retribution is not only linked to the capacity and the capacity obligations are not transferable;
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Article 22(4), which incorporates CO2 emission limit requirements on capacity mechanisms, since according to Spain the current mechanism does not include any requisite of this nature, but it does allow to set technical limitations;
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Article 22(5), which requires the adaptation of capacity mechanisms that apply on 4 July 2019.
(69) Spain explains that the reliability standards for the non-peninsular territories are not aligned with the requirements in Article 25(3) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, since they do not take into account the cost of new entry. Spain adds that even if the standards were the same, they might evolve to stricter values at a different pace, based on which they request a derogation from Article 25(2) to (4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943.
5.3.4.2. Assessment
(70) Article 20 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 addresses resource adequacy in the internal market for electricity and sets out obligations for Member States on how to monitor resource adequacy and how to act when resource adequacy concerns are identified, namely by developing an implementation plan with the aim of removing regulatory distortions, ensuring market-based balancing procurement, or removing regulated prices, among others. The Commission notes that, as part of the State aid process, Spain has already developed and submitted to the Commission an implementation plan in accordance with Article 20(3) and (4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943. In accordance with Article 20(5) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the Commission has issued an opinion on the Spanish implementation plan on 13 March 2024. Therefore, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 20(3) to (8) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified.
(71) Article 21(7) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 was repealed by Regulation (EU) 2024/1747 of the European Parliament and of the Council (13). Therefore, it no longer applies to the NPT. With regards to the request to derogate from Article 21(8) (14) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the Commission notes that while this provision no longer specifies that capacity mechanisms are to be temporary, it sets out that capacity mechanisms are to be approved by the Commission for no longer than 10 years. Moreover, it is not possible to predict the evolution of the electricity system of the Balearic Islands over time. Accordingly, the duration of the regulated remuneration mechanism set out in Royal Decree 738/2015 should be limited to the period up to 31 December 2025 as approved in the case of the Balearic Islands under State aid decision in case SA.42270.
(72) Article 22 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 sets out the design principles applicable to capacity mechanisms. The Commission considers that a derogation from Article 22(1), points (f) and (h), of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 applicable after the expiration date of the regulated remuneration mechanism set out under the State aid decision in case SA.42270 would hinder the transition towards renewable energy, increased flexibility, energy storage, electromobility and demand response as these provisions aim to allow the participation by all technologies on a competitive basis. Therefore, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 22(1), points (f) and (h) is not justified. This should be without prejudice to commitments and contracts concluded with regards to the Balearic Islands under the remuneration mechanism in Royal Decree 738/2015 as approved under the State aid decision in case SA.42270.
(73) Based on the information provided by Spain (recital 68), the Commission considers that a derogation from the requirements in Article 22(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is justified because the specific design requirements for strategic reserves are intrinsically linked to the establishment of a well-functioning balancing market. Conversely, a derogation from Article 22(3) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified because the specific design requirements for capacity mechanisms are intended to apply independently of a sufficiently developed balancing market.
(74) With regards to the request for derogation from Article 22(5) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943, the Commission considers that a derogation is not justified given that Article 22(5) of that Regulation is not applicable to capacity mechanisms approved after 4 July 2019.
(75) Regarding Article 22(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 which sets out the CO2 emission limit requirements on capacity mechanisms, the Commission considers that the CO2 emission limit requirements are not applicable to the current regulated remuneration mechanism approved under State aid decision in case SA.42270, in light of the small size of the electricity system of the Balearic Islands, the constraints linked to obtaining the necessary environmental permits for new generation capacity and of the higher need for dispatchable generation to ensure the integration of renewables in the Balearic Islands and guarantee security of supply. The Commission considers that a derogation from Article 22(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 applicable after the expiration date of the regulated remuneration mechanism set out under the State aid decision in case SA.42270 would hinder the transition towards renewable energy, increased flexibility, energy storage, electromobility and demand response as these provisions aim to allow the participation by all technologies on a competitive basis. Therefore, the Commission considers that a derogation from Article 22(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is not justified. This should be without prejudice to commitments and contracts concluded with regards to the Balearic Islands under the remuneration mechanism in Royal Decree 738/2015 as approved under the State aid decision in case SA.42270.
(76) In the Commission’s view, based on the explanations provided by Spain (see recital 69) a derogation from Article 25(2) to 25(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 for the operation of the electricity systems in the Balearic Islands is not justified. This should be without prejudice to commitments and contracts concluded with regards to the Balearic Islands under the remuneration mechanism in Royal Decree 738/2015 as approved under the State aid decision in case SA.42270.
5.3.5. Derogation from Articles 14 to 17, 19 to 27, 35 to 47 of the Regulation (EU) 2019/943 for the mechanism in Royal Decree 738/2015
(77) In its Application, as amended by the second set of clarifications sent by Spain on 17 January 2022, Spain stated that for the existing mechanism in Royal Decree 738/2015 a derogation from Articles 14 to 17, 19 to 27, 35 to 47 of the Regulation (EU) 2019/943 is needed. The Commission deems that such an ample derogation is not necessary to ensure its application. The Commission view is that only the derogations stated in the sections above are justified.
5.4. No obstruction to the transition towards renewable energy, increased flexibility, energy storage, electro-mobility and demand response
(78) Pursuant to Article 64(1), fifth subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Article 66(2) of Directive (EU) 2019/944, a derogation decision is to ensure that it does not obstruct the transition towards renewable energy, increased flexibility, energy storage, electro-mobility and demand response.
(79) As regards the transition towards renewable energy and increased flexibility (including demand response) and energy storage, it is important to note that well-functioning forward, day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets, in line with the requirements set in Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Directive (EU) 2019/944, should provide the necessary dispatch and investment signals to maximise the potential development of those technologies. By way of example, the development of demand response that can be activated in periods when the electricity system of the Balearic Islands is under stress in principle would be achieved more easily in a system where the demand prices reflect the hourly situation of generation in the Balearic Islands, instead of that of the mainland generation. This does not automatically prevent developments of demand response or other forms of flexibility in the current regulatory setting. However, it cannot be excluded that the derogation decision may have a negative impact on such potential developments.
(80) On the other hand, Article 64 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 does not require that derogation decisions maximise the potential for flexibility or energy storage. A derogation under Article 64 of that Regulation only aims to ensure that it ‘does not obstruct’ such transition. In other words, the derogation must not prevent developments which, without the derogation, would occur naturally. It is unlikely that, absent the derogation, well-functioning forward, day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets would develop in each of the electricity systems in the Balearic Islands. This is due to the challenges linked to the operation of NPT, the very low levels of competition in the generation segment, and the low degree of connection to the mainland market described in section 2. It is however necessary to ensure that once the conditions for the development of functioning wholesale markets are present, the derogations are phased-out. This is why the Commission is setting out in this decision a limited derogation period and strict conditions for a prolongation of the derogation, as set out in section 5.5 below.
(81) The derogation does not appear to have noticeable impact on electromobility.
5.5. Duration of the derogation and conditions aiming to increase competition and integration with the internal market for electricity
(82) Article 64 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Article 66 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 expressly set out, as regards small connected systems, that the derogation is to be limited in time and that it is to be subject to conditions aiming to increase competition and integration with the internal market for electricity.
(83) Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Directive (EU) 2019/944 provide for a mandatory limitation for several purposes. First and foremost, they assume that the general regulatory framework can be applied to all situations in the internal market, and that such a general application is beneficial for society. While Article 64 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 recognises that derogations may be required for specific situations, these derogations are susceptible to increase complexity of the overall system and can constitute barriers to market integration also in neighbouring areas. Furthermore, the justification of the derogation is generally based on the technical and regulatory framework at the time, and on a given network topology. All these situations are bound to change. Finally, it is important for market participants to be able to predict regulatory changes sufficiently in advance. Thus, all derogations need to be limited in time.
(84) The new cables increasing the connection between the Balearic Islands and the Spain’s mainland are expected to become operational by the end of 2030. Once these cables start to operate, the regulatory framework applicable to this territory should be amended, this territory should be incorporated to the mainland electricity market and the requested derogations should be phased out. Spain argues that once that the cables are commissioned, additional time will be needed in order to incorporate these territories to mainland market rules, and to make the necessary regulatory changes and testing. Following this, Spain requests the derogations for the Balearic Islands at least until 2030.
(85) In light of the reasons put forward by Spain, the Commission considers proportionate to grant the derogations for the Balearic Islands until 12 months after the day the new cable becomes operational.
(86) To ensure the timely phase out of the requested derogations, by six months after the day the new cables between the Balearic Islands and Spain’s mainland are commissioned, Spain is to provide to the Commission a clear plan detailing all the regulatory and system changes needed in order to incorporate the Balearic Islands to the mainland electricity market. The plan is to clearly identify the different actions required and include a timeline identifying the most notable milestones.
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
A derogation is granted to the Kingdom of Spain from the provisions of Article 3, first paragraph, points (a), (b), (e), (k), (o) and (p), Article 6, Articles 7(1) and 8(1) and (4), Articles 9, 10, 11, Article 22(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and of Article 40(4) to (7) of the Directive (EU) 2019/944 as regards the Balearic Islands.
The derogation granted under Article 1 shall apply until 12 months after the day the new electricity cable interconnecting the Balearic Islands with mainland Spain becomes operational.
This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Spain.