Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1460 of 15 July 2025 extending the temporary protection introduced by Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1460 24.7.2025
(1) On 4 March 2022, the Council adopted Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382(2)establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 2001/55/EC with the effect of introducing temporary protection.
(2) In accordance with Article 4(1) of Directive 2001/55/EC, temporary protection first applied for an initial period of one year, until 4 March 2023, and was then automatically extended for one additional year until 4 March 2024.
(3) On 19 October 2023, the Council adopted Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/2409(3)extending the temporary protection as introduced by Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 until 4 March 2025. On 11 June 2024, the Council adopted Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1836(4)extending that temporary protection until 4 March 2026.
(4) Given that a person can benefit from the rights attached to temporary protection in only one Member State at a time, to ensure that this principle is respected, and to avoid multiple registrations for temporary protection, Member States should reject residence permit requests made on the basis of Article 8(1) of Directive 2001/55/EC when it is apparent that the person concerned has already obtained a residence permit on that basis in another Member State. This would be coherent with the judgment of the Court of Justice of 27 February 2025 in Case C-753/23(5)and in particular paragraph 30 thereof.
(5) In the context of the activation of temporary protection under Directive 2001/55/EC, in a statement made on 4 March 2022, Member States agreed unanimously not to apply Article 11 of that Directive in relation to persons who enjoy temporary protection in a given Member State in accordance with Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 and who move to another Member State without authorisation, unless Member States agree otherwise on a bilateral basis.
(6) In that overall context, nothing should be construed as implying an obligation for a Member State to issue a residence permit for temporary protection to a person who received a residence permit for temporary protection in another Member State.
(7) To ensure an up-to-date situational picture for operational purposes, coherent administration and oversight of the issuance of residence permits, Member States should regularly upload accurate and timely data to the Temporary Protection Registration Platform, including data on inactive registrations.
(8) Currently, there are almost 4,3 million displaced persons from Ukraine who benefit from temporary protection in the Union. The overall number of registrations of persons enjoying temporary protection has remained stable at around 4,3 million, with a constant slight upward trend and with few persons reporting going back home to Ukraine on a permanent basis. The situation in Ukraine does not allow for the majority of displaced people to return to Ukraine in safe and durable conditions. The International Organization for Migration estimates that, as of April 2025, 3 757 000 people are internally displaced within Ukraine, of which 66 % had been displaced for over two years, and 79 % had been displaced for over a year. The share of internally displaced persons who had been displaced for more than two years was highest among internally displaced persons who resided in the West of the country (78 %). The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that over 12,7 million people in Ukraine are in need of urgent humanitarian assistance in 2025.
(9) Moreover, further arrivals on a large scale cannot be excluded due to the difficult humanitarian conditions, broader volatility and the uncertainty of the situation in Ukraine as a result of Russia’s war of aggression, including intensified repeated air attacks across the country against civilians. The risk of escalation remains. At the same time, the risk to the efficient operation of the national asylum systems remains if temporary protection were to cease soon with all beneficiaries applying for international protection at the same time.
(10) Since the high number of displaced persons in the Union benefitting from temporary protection is not likely to decrease as long as the war against Ukraine continues, extending temporary protection is necessary to address the situation of persons currently benefitting from temporary protection in the Union or who will need such protection as from 5 March 2026, as it provides for immediate protection and access to a harmonised set of rights, while reducing formalities to a minimum in a situation of mass influx to the Union. Extending temporary protection should also help to ensure that the asylum systems of the Member States are not overwhelmed by a significant increase in the number of applications for international protection that could be lodged by persons benefitting from temporary protection in the period up to 4 March 2026, if temporary protection were to cease by then, or by persons fleeing the war in Ukraine and arriving in the Union in the period from 5 March 2026 to 4 March 2027.
(11) Therefore, considering that the reasons for temporary protection persist, temporary protection for the categories of displaced persons referred to in Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 should be extended until 4 March 2027.
(12) This Decision respects fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
(13) The Council reconfirms its commitment to providing support to Ukraine and its people as long as it takes and reiterates its support for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace, based on the principles of the UN Charter and international law and in the event of a sustainable ceasefire, the Council stands ready to act in accordance with Article 6(1)(b) of Directive 2001/55/EC.
(14) Ireland is bound by Directive 2001/55/EC and is therefore taking part in the adoption and application of this Implementing Decision.
(15) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 22 on the position of Denmark, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this Implementing Decision and is not bound by it or subject to its application,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof (1), and in particular Article 4(2) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Whereas:
(1) On 4 March 2022, the Council adopted Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 (2) establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 2001/55/EC with the effect of introducing temporary protection.
(2) In accordance with Article 4(1) of Directive 2001/55/EC, temporary protection first applied for an initial period of one year, until 4 March 2023, and was then automatically extended for one additional year until 4 March 2024.
(3) On 19 October 2023, the Council adopted Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/2409 (3) extending the temporary protection as introduced by Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 until 4 March 2025. On 11 June 2024, the Council adopted Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1836 (4) extending that temporary protection until 4 March 2026.
(4) Given that a person can benefit from the rights attached to temporary protection in only one Member State at a time, to ensure that this principle is respected, and to avoid multiple registrations for temporary protection, Member States should reject residence permit requests made on the basis of Article 8(1) of Directive 2001/55/EC when it is apparent that the person concerned has already obtained a residence permit on that basis in another Member State. This would be coherent with the judgment of the Court of Justice of 27 February 2025 in Case C-753/23 (5) and in particular paragraph 30 thereof.
(5) In the context of the activation of temporary protection under Directive 2001/55/EC, in a statement made on 4 March 2022, Member States agreed unanimously not to apply Article 11 of that Directive in relation to persons who enjoy temporary protection in a given Member State in accordance with Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 and who move to another Member State without authorisation, unless Member States agree otherwise on a bilateral basis.
(6) In that overall context, nothing should be construed as implying an obligation for a Member State to issue a residence permit for temporary protection to a person who received a residence permit for temporary protection in another Member State.
(7) To ensure an up-to-date situational picture for operational purposes, coherent administration and oversight of the issuance of residence permits, Member States should regularly upload accurate and timely data to the Temporary Protection Registration Platform, including data on inactive registrations.
(8) Currently, there are almost 4,3 million displaced persons from Ukraine who benefit from temporary protection in the Union. The overall number of registrations of persons enjoying temporary protection has remained stable at around 4,3 million, with a constant slight upward trend and with few persons reporting going back home to Ukraine on a permanent basis. The situation in Ukraine does not allow for the majority of displaced people to return to Ukraine in safe and durable conditions. The International Organization for Migration estimates that, as of April 2025, 3 757 000 people are internally displaced within Ukraine, of which 66 % had been displaced for over two years, and 79 % had been displaced for over a year. The share of internally displaced persons who had been displaced for more than two years was highest among internally displaced persons who resided in the West of the country (78 %). The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that over 12,7 million people in Ukraine are in need of urgent humanitarian assistance in 2025.
(9) Moreover, further arrivals on a large scale cannot be excluded due to the difficult humanitarian conditions, broader volatility and the uncertainty of the situation in Ukraine as a result of Russia’s war of aggression, including intensified repeated air attacks across the country against civilians. The risk of escalation remains. At the same time, the risk to the efficient operation of the national asylum systems remains if temporary protection were to cease soon with all beneficiaries applying for international protection at the same time.
(10) Since the high number of displaced persons in the Union benefitting from temporary protection is not likely to decrease as long as the war against Ukraine continues, extending temporary protection is necessary to address the situation of persons currently benefitting from temporary protection in the Union or who will need such protection as from 5 March 2026, as it provides for immediate protection and access to a harmonised set of rights, while reducing formalities to a minimum in a situation of mass influx to the Union. Extending temporary protection should also help to ensure that the asylum systems of the Member States are not overwhelmed by a significant increase in the number of applications for international protection that could be lodged by persons benefitting from temporary protection in the period up to 4 March 2026, if temporary protection were to cease by then, or by persons fleeing the war in Ukraine and arriving in the Union in the period from 5 March 2026 to 4 March 2027.
(11) Therefore, considering that the reasons for temporary protection persist, temporary protection for the categories of displaced persons referred to in Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 should be extended until 4 March 2027.
(12) This Decision respects fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
(13) The Council reconfirms its commitment to providing support to Ukraine and its people as long as it takes and reiterates its support for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace, based on the principles of the UN Charter and international law and in the event of a sustainable ceasefire, the Council stands ready to act in accordance with Article 6(1)(b) of Directive 2001/55/EC.
(14) Ireland is bound by Directive 2001/55/EC and is therefore taking part in the adoption and application of this Implementing Decision.
(15) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 22 on the position of Denmark, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this Implementing Decision and is not bound by it or subject to its application,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The temporary protection given to persons displaced from Ukraine referred to in Article 2 of Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382, and extended by Implementing Decisions (EU) 2023/2409, and (EU) 2024/1836 is extended for a further period of one year, until 4 March 2027.
This Decision shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1458 of 14 July 2025 authorising support from the EU Cybersecurity Reserve for Moldova (Text with EEA relevance)

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1458 18.7.2025
(1) On 23 June 2022, the European Council granted Moldova the status of candidate country. The decision was based on fulfilment by Moldova of the conditions specified in the Commission’s opinion of June 2022 on Moldova’s membership application. On 14 December 2023, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Moldova, following the recommendation issued by the Commission.
(2) In its conclusions of 15 December 2022, the European Council affirmed that the Union will continue to provide all relevant support to Moldova as it deals with the multifaceted impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
(3) Cybersecurity incidents continue to cause economic and societal impacts both across the Union and at global level. Cyber threats are evolving particularly rapidly in certain EU candidate countries where possible significant or large-scale incidents have the potential to disrupt and damage critical infrastructure, interfere with the proper functioning of the economy and institutions or pose serious public security and safety risks for entities and citizens. This is particularly the case in Moldova where Russia conducts hybrid campaigns and cyber-attacks to threaten critical infrastructure, democratic processes and election infrastructure.
(4) Taking into account the unpredictable nature of cybersecurity attacks, the fact that they are often not confined to a specific geographical area and that they pose a high risk of spill-over, the strengthening of the resilience of neighbouring countries and their capacity to respond effectively to significant and large-scale cybersecurity incidents contributes to the protection of the Union, in particular the internal market and industry, as a whole. Therefore, Regulation (EU) 2025/38 provides that third countries that are party to an association agreement with the Union allowing for their participation in the Digital Europe Programme (the ‘DEP’) (‘DEP-associated third countries’) may be supported from the EU Cybersecurity Reserve (the ‘Reserve’), in all or part of their territories, where this is provided for in the agreement associating the third country to DEP.
(5) In accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) 2025/38, DEP-associated third countries are able to request support from the Reserve when the entities targeted and for which they request such support are entities operating in sectors of high criticality or other critical sectors and when the incidents detected lead to significant operational disruptions or might have spillover effects in the Union. A third country is only eligible for such support where that is specifically provided for in the agreement associating that country to the DEP. In addition, such third countries should remain eligible only while three criteria set out in Article 19(3) of Regulation (EU) 2025/38 are fulfilled. First, the third country is to comply in full with relevant terms of that agreement. Second, given the complementary nature of the Reserve, the third country is to have taken adequate steps to prepare for significant or large-scale equivalent cybersecurity incidents. Third, the provision of support from the Reserve is to be consistent with the Union’s policy towards, and overall relations with, that country and with other Union policies in the field of security.
(6) The provision of support to DEP-associated third countries may affect relations with third countries and the Union’s security policy, including in the context of the common foreign and security policy and the common defence and security policy. The Council acts on the basis of a Commission proposal, taking due account of the Commission’s assessment of the three criteria referred to in Article 19(3) of Regulation (EU) 2025/38.
(7) Moldova has been heavily impacted by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, while being directly targeted by Russia’s hybrid activities seeking to destabilise the country and undermine its path to Union accession. Against this backdrop, the Union has provided comprehensive support to Moldova in addressing the challenges it faces as a consequence of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and to strengthen the country’s resilience, security and stability in the face of direct destabilising activities by Russia.
(8) On 24 April 2023, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/855(2)establishing a civilian European Union Partnership Mission in Moldova under the common security and defence policy in order to provide strategic advice and operational support in the areas of crisis management and hybrid threats. Since 2021, the Union has also provided consistent support though the European Peace Facility to strengthen Moldova’s capacities in the military and defence area. The signing of the EU-Moldova Security and Defence Partnership on 21 May 2024 streamlined the structure of Union’s cooperation with Moldova in key areas of peace, security, and defence. Furthermore, the Moldova Growth Plan, adopted by the Commission on 10 October 2024, aims to support Moldova’s socioeconomic reforms and enhance its access to the internal market, with specific reforms expected in the area of cybersecurity governance.
(9) The Commission has assessed in respect of Moldova the three criteria set out in Article 19(3) of Regulation (EU) 2025/38 and considers them to be fulfilled. It has also consulted the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy when conducting this assessment.
(10) In accordance with Article 19(6) of Regulation (EU) 2025/38, the Council’s assessment is that Moldova is complying with the relevant terms of the agreement associating that country to the DEP and has taken adequate steps to prepare for significant cybersecurity incidents and large-scale-equivalent cybersecurity incidents. Furthermore, the Council’s assessment is that the provision of support from the Reserve is consistent with the Union’s policy towards and overall relations with Moldova, and is consistent with other Union policies in the field of security, notably in light of the factors set out in recital 8.
(11) As the agreement associating Moldova to the DEP provides for support from the Reserve and as that country fulfils the criteria set out in Article 19(3) of Regulation (EU) 2025/38, support for Moldova from the Reserve should be authorised,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/38 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 laying down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cyber threats and incidents and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/694 (Cyber Solidarity Act) (1), and in particular Article 19(4) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Whereas:
(1) On 23 June 2022, the European Council granted Moldova the status of candidate country. The decision was based on fulfilment by Moldova of the conditions specified in the Commission’s opinion of June 2022 on Moldova’s membership application. On 14 December 2023, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Moldova, following the recommendation issued by the Commission.
(2) In its conclusions of 15 December 2022, the European Council affirmed that the Union will continue to provide all relevant support to Moldova as it deals with the multifaceted impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
(3) Cybersecurity incidents continue to cause economic and societal impacts both across the Union and at global level. Cyber threats are evolving particularly rapidly in certain EU candidate countries where possible significant or large-scale incidents have the potential to disrupt and damage critical infrastructure, interfere with the proper functioning of the economy and institutions or pose serious public security and safety risks for entities and citizens. This is particularly the case in Moldova where Russia conducts hybrid campaigns and cyber-attacks to threaten critical infrastructure, democratic processes and election infrastructure.
(4) Taking into account the unpredictable nature of cybersecurity attacks, the fact that they are often not confined to a specific geographical area and that they pose a high risk of spill-over, the strengthening of the resilience of neighbouring countries and their capacity to respond effectively to significant and large-scale cybersecurity incidents contributes to the protection of the Union, in particular the internal market and industry, as a whole. Therefore, Regulation (EU) 2025/38 provides that third countries that are party to an association agreement with the Union allowing for their participation in the Digital Europe Programme (the ‘DEP’) (‘DEP-associated third countries’) may be supported from the EU Cybersecurity Reserve (the ‘Reserve’), in all or part of their territories, where this is provided for in the agreement associating the third country to DEP.
(5) In accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) 2025/38, DEP-associated third countries are able to request support from the Reserve when the entities targeted and for which they request such support are entities operating in sectors of high criticality or other critical sectors and when the incidents detected lead to significant operational disruptions or might have spillover effects in the Union. A third country is only eligible for such support where that is specifically provided for in the agreement associating that country to the DEP. In addition, such third countries should remain eligible only while three criteria set out in Article 19(3) of Regulation (EU) 2025/38 are fulfilled. First, the third country is to comply in full with relevant terms of that agreement. Second, given the complementary nature of the Reserve, the third country is to have taken adequate steps to prepare for significant or large-scale equivalent cybersecurity incidents. Third, the provision of support from the Reserve is to be consistent with the Union’s policy towards, and overall relations with, that country and with other Union policies in the field of security.
(6) The provision of support to DEP-associated third countries may affect relations with third countries and the Union’s security policy, including in the context of the common foreign and security policy and the common defence and security policy. The Council acts on the basis of a Commission proposal, taking due account of the Commission’s assessment of the three criteria referred to in Article 19(3) of Regulation (EU) 2025/38.
(7) Moldova has been heavily impacted by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, while being directly targeted by Russia’s hybrid activities seeking to destabilise the country and undermine its path to Union accession. Against this backdrop, the Union has provided comprehensive support to Moldova in addressing the challenges it faces as a consequence of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and to strengthen the country’s resilience, security and stability in the face of direct destabilising activities by Russia.
(8) On 24 April 2023, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/855 (2) establishing a civilian European Union Partnership Mission in Moldova under the common security and defence policy in order to provide strategic advice and operational support in the areas of crisis management and hybrid threats. Since 2021, the Union has also provided consistent support though the European Peace Facility to strengthen Moldova’s capacities in the military and defence area. The signing of the EU-Moldova Security and Defence Partnership on 21 May 2024 streamlined the structure of Union’s cooperation with Moldova in key areas of peace, security, and defence. Furthermore, the Moldova Growth Plan, adopted by the Commission on 10 October 2024, aims to support Moldova’s socioeconomic reforms and enhance its access to the internal market, with specific reforms expected in the area of cybersecurity governance.
(9) The Commission has assessed in respect of Moldova the three criteria set out in Article 19(3) of Regulation (EU) 2025/38 and considers them to be fulfilled. It has also consulted the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy when conducting this assessment.
(10) In accordance with Article 19(6) of Regulation (EU) 2025/38, the Council’s assessment is that Moldova is complying with the relevant terms of the agreement associating that country to the DEP and has taken adequate steps to prepare for significant cybersecurity incidents and large-scale-equivalent cybersecurity incidents. Furthermore, the Council’s assessment is that the provision of support from the Reserve is consistent with the Union’s policy towards and overall relations with Moldova, and is consistent with other Union policies in the field of security, notably in light of the factors set out in recital 8.
(11) As the agreement associating Moldova to the DEP provides for support from the Reserve and as that country fulfils the criteria set out in Article 19(3) of Regulation (EU) 2025/38, support for Moldova from the Reserve should be authorised,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The provision of support from the EU Cybersecurity Reserve to the Republic of Moldova within the meaning of Article 19 of Regulation (EU) 2025/38 is hereby authorised.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption, and shall apply for 1 year.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1452 of 15 July 2025 extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for the Great Lakes region and amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2098

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1452 16.7.2025
(1) On 26 July 2024, the Council agreed to appoint a European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Great Lakes region.
(2) On 26 July 2024, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2024/2098(1), appointing Mr Johan BORGSTAM as the EUSR for the Great Lakes region. The EUSR’s mandate expires on 31 August 2025.
(3) The EUSR’s mandate should be extended for a further period of 24 months and the financial reference amount should be adjusted accordingly.
(4) The EUSR will implement the mandate in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union’s external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty,
(1) Article 1 is replaced by the following:‘Article 1European Union Special Representative1.   Mr Johan BORGSTAM is hereby appointed as the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Great Lakes region from 1 September 2024 to 31 August 2025.2.   The mandate of Mr Johan BORGSTAM as the EUSR for the Great Lakes region is extended until 31 August 2027.3.   The Council may decide to extend the mandate of the EUSR, or to terminate it earlier, on the basis of an assessment by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (“the High Representative”).’;
(2) in Article 5(1), the following subparagraph is added:‘The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the EUSR’s mandate for the period from 1 September 2025 to 31 August 2027 shall be EUR 3 385 100,49.’;
(3) in Article 13, the second sentence is replaced by the following:‘The EUSR shall present the Council, the High Representative and the Commission with regular progress reports and a final comprehensive mandate implementation report by 31 May 2027.’.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 33, in conjunction with Article 31(2) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 26 July 2024, the Council agreed to appoint a European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Great Lakes region.
(2) On 26 July 2024, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2024/2098 (1), appointing Mr Johan BORGSTAM as the EUSR for the Great Lakes region. The EUSR’s mandate expires on 31 August 2025.
(3) The EUSR’s mandate should be extended for a further period of 24 months and the financial reference amount should be adjusted accordingly.
(4) The EUSR will implement the mandate in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union’s external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Decision (CFSP) 2024/2098 is amended as follows:

(1) Article 1 is replaced by the following:
‘Article 1
European Union Special Representative 1. Mr Johan BORGSTAM is hereby appointed as the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Great Lakes region from 1 September 2024 to 31 August 2025. 2. The mandate of Mr Johan BORGSTAM as the EUSR for the Great Lakes region is extended until 31 August 2027. 3. The Council may decide to extend the mandate of the EUSR, or to terminate it earlier, on the basis of an assessment by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (“the High Representative”).’
;
(2) in Article 5(1), the following subparagraph is added:
‘The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the EUSR’s mandate for the period from 1 September 2025 to 31 August 2027 shall be EUR 3 385 100,49.’;
(3) in Article 13, the second sentence is replaced by the following:
‘The EUSR shall present the Council, the High Representative and the Commission with regular progress reports and a final comprehensive mandate implementation report by 31 May 2027.’.

Entry into force

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1457 of 16 July 2025 amending Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/2723 as regards the withdrawal of the reference to harmonised standard EN 60335-2-60:2003 on particular requirements for whirlpool baths and whirlpool spas, and as regards the publication with restriction of the reference to harmonised standards EN 60335-1:2012 on general requirements for household and similar electrical appliances, as well as EN 60335-2-27:2013 on particular requirements for appliances for skin exposure to ultraviolet and infrared radiation

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1457 18.7.2025
(1) In accordance with Article 12 of Directive 2014/35/EU of the European Parliament and the Council(2), electrical equipment manufactured in conformity with a harmonised standard, the reference to which has been published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union, is to be presumed to comply with the essential health and safety requirements covered by such harmonised standard.
(2) By letter M/511 of 8 November 2012, the Commission made a request to the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN), the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (Cenelec) and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) to provide the first full list of the titles of harmonised standards and for the drafting, revision and the completion of harmonised standards, for electrical equipment designed for use within certain voltage limits in support of Directive 2014/35/EU (‘the request’).
(3) On the basis of the request, CEN and Cenelec drafted harmonised standard EN 60335-2-60:2003, on whirlpool baths and whirlpool spas, as amended by EN 60335-2-60:2003/A1:2005, EN 60335-2-60:2003/A2:2008, EN 60335-2-60:2003/A12:2010 and EN 60335-2-60:2003/A11:2010; EN 60335-1:2012, on household and similar electrical appliances, as amended by EN 60335-1:2012/A11:2014, EN 60335-1:2012/A13:2017, EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019, EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019, EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019, EN 60335-1:2012/A15:2021 and corrected by EN 60335-1:2012/AC:2014; and EN 60335-2-27:2013, on appliances for skin exposure to ultraviolet and infrared radiation, as amended by EN 60335-2-27:2013/A1:2020 and EN 60335-2-27:2013/A2:2020 and corrected by EN 60335-2-27:2013/AC:2021-11. The references of those standards are published in theOfficial Journal of the European Unionby Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/2723(3).
(4) In December 2014, the Netherlands lodged a formal objection in accordance with Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 to harmonised standard EN 60335-2-60:2003, as amended by EN 60335-2-60:2003/A1:2005, EN 60335-2-60:2003/A2:2008, EN 60335-2-60:2003/A11:2010 and EN 60335-2-60:2003/A12:2010.
(5) The formal objection states that the harmonised standard EN 60335-2-60:2003, as amended, does not meet the safety objectives set out in point 1(c) of Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU, in conjunction with points 2(a), 2(b) and 2(d) of that Annex. The Netherlands argues that the standard takes insufficient account of the rules for installation as set out in the standards series IEC 60364 on low-voltage electrical installations. This results in products complying with the harmonised standard but still failing to comply with the safety objectives set out in Directive 2014/35/EU. The Netherlands adds that the conditions applicable to swimming pools and similar facilities, such as spas for outdoor use, must be considered. For such products, there is an increased risk of electric shock resulting from a reduction in body resistance and contact of the body with earth potential. Therefore, the Netherlands states that under harmonised standard EN 60335-2-60:2003, as amended, a fatal accident could occur the first time that a defect manifests.
(6) Since December 2014, the formal objection has been regularly discussed in the Low Voltage Directive Working Party and the Committee on Electrical Equipment. These discussions eventually led to an agreement between CEN-Cenelec and the Netherlands on a new draft of the standard in 2021. However, this new draft standard has still not been offered for publication to the Commission. The formal objection raised by the Netherlands was discussed again by the Committee on Electrical Equipment in its meeting on 25 June 2024.
(7) Having examined standard EN 60335-2-60:2003, as amended, together with Member States’ representatives on the Committee on Electrical Equipment, the Commission concluded that the harmonised standard fails to meet the safety objectives set out in point 1(c) of Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU, in conjunction with points 2(a), 2(b) and 2(d) of that Annex.
(8) On 25 May 2023, Germany raised a formal objection in accordance with Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 to harmonised standard EN 60335-1:2012, as amended by EN 60335-1:2012/A11:2014, EN 60335-1:2012/A13:2017, EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019, EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019, EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019 and EN 60335-1:2012/A15:2021 and corrected by EN 60335-1:2012/AC:2014.
(9) The formal objection raised by Germany states that the harmonised standard does not meet the safety objectives set out in point 2(c) of Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU. Germany argues that the standard provides for a test for the accessibility of moving parts with a test probe which is intended to replicate the human hand, however the referred test probe does not take into account the essential human body dimensions and does not realistically represent the human hand as it is only similar to the appropriate probe to be used for such type of test.
(10) The formal objection raised by Germany was discussed by the Committee on Electrical Equipment in its meeting on 25 June 2024.
(11) Having examined harmonised standard EN 60335-1:2012, as amended, together with Member States’ representatives on the Committee on Electrical Equipment, the Commission concluded that the harmonised standard fails to meet the safety objectives set out in point 2(c) of Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU.
(12) On 6 July 2023, France raised a formal objection in accordance with Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 to harmonised standard EN 60335-2-27:2013, as amended by EN 60335-2-27:2013/A1:2020 and EN 60335-2-27:2013/A2:2020 and corrected by EN 60335-2-27:2013/AC:2021-11.
(13) The formal objection of France states that the harmonised standard does not meet the safety objectives set out in point 1(a) of Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU. France argues that the conditions of use indicated in the text and in the normative annex of the harmonised standard through the classification of appliances based on use and user categories are not in line with the safety objectives set out in Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU.
(14) The formal objection raised by France was discussed by the Committee on Electrical Equipment in its meeting on 25 June 2024.
(15) Having examined harmonised standard EN 60335-2-27:2013, as amended, together with Member States’ representatives on the Committee on Electrical Equipment, the Commission concluded that the standard fails to meet the essential safety objectives set out in point 1(a) of Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU.
(16) Taking into consideration the need to improve safety aspects of harmonised standard EN 60335-2-60:2003, as amended, and pending a suitable revision of that standard, the reference of harmonised standard EN 60335-2-60:2003, together with the references of any amending standards thereto, does not provide a presumption of conformity with the basic health and safety requirements laid down in Directive 2014/35/EU. As a consequence, the reference of harmonised standard EN 60335-2-60:2003, together with the references of any amending standards thereto, should be withdrawn from theOfficial Journal of the European Union. In order to give manufacturers sufficient time to adapt their electrical equipment that is covered by harmonised standard EN 60335-2-60:2003 as amended, it is necessary to defer the withdrawal of the references to that standard.
(17) Harmonised standards EN 60335-1:2012, as amended by EN 60335-1:2012/A11:2014, EN 60335-1:2012/A13:2017, EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019, EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019, EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019 and EN 60335-1:2012/A15:2021 and corrected by EN 60335-1:2012/AC:2014; and EN 60335-2-27:2013 as amended by EN 60335-2-27:2013/A1:2020 and EN 60335-2-27:2013/A2:2020 and corrected by EN 60335-2-27:2013/AC:2021-11 should therefore be maintained in theOfficial Journal of the European Unionwith a restriction.
(18) Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/2723 should therefore be amended accordingly.
(19) Compliance with a harmonised standard confers a presumption of conformity with the corresponding essential requirements set out in Union harmonisation legislation from the date of publication of the reference of such standard in theOfficial Journal of the European Union. This Decision should therefore enter into force on the date of its publication.
(20) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the committee referred to in Article 22(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012,
(1) rows 155, 176 and 206 are deleted;
(2) the following rows are added in sequential order:NoReference of the standard‘155a.EN 60335-1:2012Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 1: General requirementsEN 60335-1:2012/AC:2014EN 60335-1:2012/A11:2014EN 60335-1:2012/A13:2017EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A15:2021Restriction: The application of the following parts of standard EN 60335-1:2012, as last amended by A15:2021, does not confer a presumption of conformity with the safety objectives laid down in point 2(c) of Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU:the part of clause 20.2 which refers to the test probe that is similar to test probe B.’‘176a.EN 60335-2-27:2013Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-27: Particular requirements for appliances for skin exposure to ultraviolet and infrared radiationEN 60335-2-27:2013/A1:2020EN 60335-2-27:2013/A2:2020EN 60335-2-27:2013/AC:2021-11Notice: In this harmonised standard, the application of the following notes does not relate to, nor confer presumption of conformity with, the safety objectives laid down in Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU:Note of clause 6.Z101 and Note 101 of clause BB.2 in Annex BB which provide a description on the locations where and by which user the different classifications of products within the scope of this harmonised standard can be used and, therefore, do not relate to the placing on the market.’ No Reference of the standard ‘155a. EN 60335-1:2012Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 1: General requirementsEN 60335-1:2012/AC:2014EN 60335-1:2012/A11:2014EN 60335-1:2012/A13:2017EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A15:2021Restriction: The application of the following parts of standard EN 60335-1:2012, as last amended by A15:2021, does not confer a presumption of conformity with the safety objectives laid down in point 2(c) of Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU:the part of clause 20.2 which refers to the test probe that is similar to test probe B.’ ‘176a. EN 60335-2-27:2013Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-27: Particular requirements for appliances for skin exposure to ultraviolet and infrared radiationEN 60335-2-27:2013/A1:2020EN 60335-2-27:2013/A2:2020EN 60335-2-27:2013/AC:2021-11Notice: In this harmonised standard, the application of the following notes does not relate to, nor confer presumption of conformity with, the safety objectives laid down in Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU:Note of clause 6.Z101 and Note 101 of clause BB.2 in Annex BB which provide a description on the locations where and by which user the different classifications of products within the scope of this harmonised standard can be used and, therefore, do not relate to the placing on the market.’
No Reference of the standard
‘155a. EN 60335-1:2012Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 1: General requirementsEN 60335-1:2012/AC:2014EN 60335-1:2012/A11:2014EN 60335-1:2012/A13:2017EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A15:2021Restriction: The application of the following parts of standard EN 60335-1:2012, as last amended by A15:2021, does not confer a presumption of conformity with the safety objectives laid down in point 2(c) of Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU:the part of clause 20.2 which refers to the test probe that is similar to test probe B.’
‘176a. EN 60335-2-27:2013Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-27: Particular requirements for appliances for skin exposure to ultraviolet and infrared radiationEN 60335-2-27:2013/A1:2020EN 60335-2-27:2013/A2:2020EN 60335-2-27:2013/AC:2021-11Notice: In this harmonised standard, the application of the following notes does not relate to, nor confer presumption of conformity with, the safety objectives laid down in Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU:Note of clause 6.Z101 and Note 101 of clause BB.2 in Annex BB which provide a description on the locations where and by which user the different classifications of products within the scope of this harmonised standard can be used and, therefore, do not relate to the placing on the market.’
No Reference of the standard
‘155a. EN 60335-1:2012Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 1: General requirementsEN 60335-1:2012/AC:2014EN 60335-1:2012/A11:2014EN 60335-1:2012/A13:2017EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019EN 60335-1:2012/A15:2021Restriction: The application of the following parts of standard EN 60335-1:2012, as last amended by A15:2021, does not confer a presumption of conformity with the safety objectives laid down in point 2(c) of Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU:the part of clause 20.2 which refers to the test probe that is similar to test probe B.’
‘176a. EN 60335-2-27:2013Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-27: Particular requirements for appliances for skin exposure to ultraviolet and infrared radiationEN 60335-2-27:2013/A1:2020EN 60335-2-27:2013/A2:2020EN 60335-2-27:2013/AC:2021-11Notice: In this harmonised standard, the application of the following notes does not relate to, nor confer presumption of conformity with, the safety objectives laid down in Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU:Note of clause 6.Z101 and Note 101 of clause BB.2 in Annex BB which provide a description on the locations where and by which user the different classifications of products within the scope of this harmonised standard can be used and, therefore, do not relate to the placing on the market.’
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on European standardisation, amending Council Directives 89/686/EEC and 93/15/EEC and Directives 94/9/EC, 94/25/EC, 95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 98/34/EC, 2004/22/EC, 2007/23/EC, 2009/23/EC and 2009/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Decision 87/95/EEC and Decision No 1673/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (1), and in particular Article 11(1), point (b), thereof,
Whereas:
(1) In accordance with Article 12 of Directive 2014/35/EU of the European Parliament and the Council (2), electrical equipment manufactured in conformity with a harmonised standard, the reference to which has been published in the Official Journal of the European Union, is to be presumed to comply with the essential health and safety requirements covered by such harmonised standard.
(2) By letter M/511 of 8 November 2012, the Commission made a request to the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN), the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (Cenelec) and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) to provide the first full list of the titles of harmonised standards and for the drafting, revision and the completion of harmonised standards, for electrical equipment designed for use within certain voltage limits in support of Directive 2014/35/EU (‘the request’).
(3) On the basis of the request, CEN and Cenelec drafted harmonised standard EN 60335-2-60:2003, on whirlpool baths and whirlpool spas, as amended by EN 60335-2-60:2003/A1:2005, EN 60335-2-60:2003/A2:2008, EN 60335-2-60:2003/A12:2010 and EN 60335-2-60:2003/A11:2010; EN 60335-1:2012, on household and similar electrical appliances, as amended by EN 60335-1:2012/A11:2014, EN 60335-1:2012/A13:2017, EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019, EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019, EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019, EN 60335-1:2012/A15:2021 and corrected by EN 60335-1:2012/AC:2014; and EN 60335-2-27:2013, on appliances for skin exposure to ultraviolet and infrared radiation, as amended by EN 60335-2-27:2013/A1:2020 and EN 60335-2-27:2013/A2:2020 and corrected by EN 60335-2-27:2013/AC:2021-11. The references of those standards are published in the Official Journal of the European Union by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/2723 (3).
(4) In December 2014, the Netherlands lodged a formal objection in accordance with Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 to harmonised standard EN 60335-2-60:2003, as amended by EN 60335-2-60:2003/A1:2005, EN 60335-2-60:2003/A2:2008, EN 60335-2-60:2003/A11:2010 and EN 60335-2-60:2003/A12:2010.
(5) The formal objection states that the harmonised standard EN 60335-2-60:2003, as amended, does not meet the safety objectives set out in point 1(c) of Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU, in conjunction with points 2(a), 2(b) and 2(d) of that Annex. The Netherlands argues that the standard takes insufficient account of the rules for installation as set out in the standards series IEC 60364 on low-voltage electrical installations. This results in products complying with the harmonised standard but still failing to comply with the safety objectives set out in Directive 2014/35/EU. The Netherlands adds that the conditions applicable to swimming pools and similar facilities, such as spas for outdoor use, must be considered. For such products, there is an increased risk of electric shock resulting from a reduction in body resistance and contact of the body with earth potential. Therefore, the Netherlands states that under harmonised standard EN 60335-2-60:2003, as amended, a fatal accident could occur the first time that a defect manifests.
(6) Since December 2014, the formal objection has been regularly discussed in the Low Voltage Directive Working Party and the Committee on Electrical Equipment. These discussions eventually led to an agreement between CEN-Cenelec and the Netherlands on a new draft of the standard in 2021. However, this new draft standard has still not been offered for publication to the Commission. The formal objection raised by the Netherlands was discussed again by the Committee on Electrical Equipment in its meeting on 25 June 2024.
(7) Having examined standard EN 60335-2-60:2003, as amended, together with Member States’ representatives on the Committee on Electrical Equipment, the Commission concluded that the harmonised standard fails to meet the safety objectives set out in point 1(c) of Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU, in conjunction with points 2(a), 2(b) and 2(d) of that Annex.
(8) On 25 May 2023, Germany raised a formal objection in accordance with Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 to harmonised standard EN 60335-1:2012, as amended by EN 60335-1:2012/A11:2014, EN 60335-1:2012/A13:2017, EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019, EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019, EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019 and EN 60335-1:2012/A15:2021 and corrected by EN 60335-1:2012/AC:2014.
(9) The formal objection raised by Germany states that the harmonised standard does not meet the safety objectives set out in point 2(c) of Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU. Germany argues that the standard provides for a test for the accessibility of moving parts with a test probe which is intended to replicate the human hand, however the referred test probe does not take into account the essential human body dimensions and does not realistically represent the human hand as it is only similar to the appropriate probe to be used for such type of test.
(10) The formal objection raised by Germany was discussed by the Committee on Electrical Equipment in its meeting on 25 June 2024.
(11) Having examined harmonised standard EN 60335-1:2012, as amended, together with Member States’ representatives on the Committee on Electrical Equipment, the Commission concluded that the harmonised standard fails to meet the safety objectives set out in point 2(c) of Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU.
(12) On 6 July 2023, France raised a formal objection in accordance with Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 to harmonised standard EN 60335-2-27:2013, as amended by EN 60335-2-27:2013/A1:2020 and EN 60335-2-27:2013/A2:2020 and corrected by EN 60335-2-27:2013/AC:2021-11.
(13) The formal objection of France states that the harmonised standard does not meet the safety objectives set out in point 1(a) of Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU. France argues that the conditions of use indicated in the text and in the normative annex of the harmonised standard through the classification of appliances based on use and user categories are not in line with the safety objectives set out in Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU.
(14) The formal objection raised by France was discussed by the Committee on Electrical Equipment in its meeting on 25 June 2024.
(15) Having examined harmonised standard EN 60335-2-27:2013, as amended, together with Member States’ representatives on the Committee on Electrical Equipment, the Commission concluded that the standard fails to meet the essential safety objectives set out in point 1(a) of Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU.
(16) Taking into consideration the need to improve safety aspects of harmonised standard EN 60335-2-60:2003, as amended, and pending a suitable revision of that standard, the reference of harmonised standard EN 60335-2-60:2003, together with the references of any amending standards thereto, does not provide a presumption of conformity with the basic health and safety requirements laid down in Directive 2014/35/EU. As a consequence, the reference of harmonised standard EN 60335-2-60:2003, together with the references of any amending standards thereto, should be withdrawn from the Official Journal of the European Union. In order to give manufacturers sufficient time to adapt their electrical equipment that is covered by harmonised standard EN 60335-2-60:2003 as amended, it is necessary to defer the withdrawal of the references to that standard.
(17) Harmonised standards EN 60335-1:2012, as amended by EN 60335-1:2012/A11:2014, EN 60335-1:2012/A13:2017, EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019, EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019, EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019 and EN 60335-1:2012/A15:2021 and corrected by EN 60335-1:2012/AC:2014; and EN 60335-2-27:2013 as amended by EN 60335-2-27:2013/A1:2020 and EN 60335-2-27:2013/A2:2020 and corrected by EN 60335-2-27:2013/AC:2021-11 should therefore be maintained in the Official Journal of the European Union with a restriction.
(18) Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/2723 should therefore be amended accordingly.
(19) Compliance with a harmonised standard confers a presumption of conformity with the corresponding essential requirements set out in Union harmonisation legislation from the date of publication of the reference of such standard in the Official Journal of the European Union. This Decision should therefore enter into force on the date of its publication.
(20) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the committee referred to in Article 22(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Annex I to Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/2723 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
However, point (1) of the Annex shall apply from 18 January 2027.

Annex I to Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/2723 is amended as follows:

(1) rows 155, 176 and 206 are deleted;

(2) the following rows are added in sequential order:
No
Reference of the standard
‘155a.
EN 60335-1:2012
Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 1: General requirements
EN 60335-1:2012/AC:2014
EN 60335-1:2012/A11:2014
EN 60335-1:2012/A13:2017
EN 60335-1:2012/A1:2019
EN 60335-1:2012/A14:2019
EN 60335-1:2012/A2:2019
EN 60335-1:2012/A15:2021
Restriction: The application of the following parts of standard EN 60335-1:2012, as last amended by A15:2021, does not confer a presumption of conformity with the safety objectives laid down in point 2(c) of Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU:
the part of clause 20.2 which refers to the test probe that is similar to test probe B.’
‘176a.
EN 60335-2-27:2013
Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-27: Particular requirements for appliances for skin exposure to ultraviolet and infrared radiation
EN 60335-2-27:2013/A1:2020
EN 60335-2-27:2013/A2:2020
EN 60335-2-27:2013/AC:2021-11
Notice: In this harmonised standard, the application of the following notes does not relate to, nor confer presumption of conformity with, the safety objectives laid down in Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU:
Note of clause 6.Z101 and Note 101 of clause BB.2 in Annex BB which provide a description on the locations where and by which user the different classifications of products within the scope of this harmonised standard can be used and, therefore, do not relate to the placing on the market.’

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1450 of 15 July 2025 extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia and amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2080

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1450 16.7.2025
(1) On 7 July 2003, the Council agreed to appoint a European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia.
(2) On 26 July 2024, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2024/2080(1), appointing Ms Magdalena GRONO as the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia. The EUSR’s mandate expires on 31 August 2025.
(3) The EUSR’s mandate should be extended for a period of 24 months and a new financial reference amount for the period from 1 September 2025 to 31 August 2027 should be established.
(4) The EUSR will implement the mandate in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union’s external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty,
(1) Article 1 is replaced by the following:‘Article 1European Union Special RepresentativeMs Magdalena GRONO is hereby appointed as the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia from 1 September 2024 to 31 August 2025.The mandate of Ms Magdalena GRONO as the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia is extended until 31 August 2027.The Council may decide that the mandate of the EUSR be terminated earlier, based on an assessment by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR).’;
(2) in Article 5(1), the following subparagraph is added:‘The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the EUSR’s mandate for the period from 1 September 2025 to 31 August 2027 shall be EUR 5 330 208.’;
(3) in Article 14, the second sentence is replaced by the following:‘The EUSR shall present the Council, the HR and the Commission with regular progress reports and a final comprehensive mandate implementation report by 31 May 2027.’.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 33, in conjunction with Article 31(2) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 7 July 2003, the Council agreed to appoint a European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia.
(2) On 26 July 2024, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2024/2080 (1), appointing Ms Magdalena GRONO as the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia. The EUSR’s mandate expires on 31 August 2025.
(3) The EUSR’s mandate should be extended for a period of 24 months and a new financial reference amount for the period from 1 September 2025 to 31 August 2027 should be established.
(4) The EUSR will implement the mandate in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union’s external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Decision (CFSP) 2024/2080 is amended as follows:

(1) Article 1 is replaced by the following:
‘Article 1
European Union Special Representative
Ms Magdalena GRONO is hereby appointed as the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia from 1 September 2024 to 31 August 2025. The mandate of Ms Magdalena GRONO as the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia is extended until 31 August 2027. The Council may decide that the mandate of the EUSR be terminated earlier, based on an assessment by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR).’
;
(2) in Article 5(1), the following subparagraph is added:
‘The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the EUSR’s mandate for the period from 1 September 2025 to 31 August 2027 shall be EUR 5 330 208.’;
(3) in Article 14, the second sentence is replaced by the following:
‘The EUSR shall present the Council, the HR and the Commission with regular progress reports and a final comprehensive mandate implementation report by 31 May 2027.’.

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1451 of 15 July 2025 in support of efforts to prevent and combat the illicit proliferation of and trafficking in small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition and their impact in the Americas – Phase III

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1451 16.7.2025
(1) The 2018 EU Strategy against illicit firearms, small arms & light weapons and their ammunition, entitled ‘Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens’ (the ‘EU SALW Strategy’) sets the guidelines for Union action in the field of small arms and light weapons (‘SALW’).
(2) At regional level, the EU SALW Strategy commits the Union and its Member States to providing assistance to other countries in order to improve the management and security of state-held stockpiles by strengthening national legislative and administrative frameworks and strengthening institutions that regulate the legitimate supply and stockpile management of SALW and ammunition for defence and security forces.
(3) The EU SALW Strategy notes that the Union will look for synergy with the relevant American states and regional organisations to reduce the illicit proliferation of and trafficking in SALW, with a view to reducing armed violence and criminal activity.
(4) The Organization of American States (OAS) is the Secretariat for the Inter-American Convention against Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials (CIFTA) and is coordinating and implementing regional initiatives combatting illicit SALW in the Americas.
(5) The Union previously supported the OAS by means of Council Decisions (CFSP) 2018/2010(1)and (CFSP) 2022/847(2)in support of activities countering the illicit proliferation of and trafficking in SALW and ammunition and their impact in Latin America and the Caribbean,
(a) to strengthen regulatory frameworks to address trafficking in firearms in the Americas;
(b) to increase the sharing of knowledge and information in respect of trafficking in firearms and the illicit proliferation of SALW in the Americas;
(c) to improve state capacities to manage the lifecycle of SALW and ammunition, reducing the risk of diversion to the illicit market;
(d) to strengthen national systems for systematic tracing of illicit SALW;
(e) to reduce risk factors associated with armed violence at the community level; and
(f) to strengthen sub-regional cooperation through the development and implementation of the Sub-Regional Firearms Roadmap.
— Legislative support to improve the firearms normative framework.
— Tailored, needs-driven, and sustainable technical assistance and capacity-building in various aspects of through-life management of firearms and ammunition.
— Promotion of preventive initiatives to strengthen community resilience against armed violence through the OASIS methodology and reduce unauthorized access to firearms.
— Development of the Central American Roadmap to Prevent the Illicit Proliferation and Trafficking of Firearms and Ammunition, adopted by Central American countries in February 2025.
— Legislative assistance to 7 countries to strengthen their firearms normative framework.
— Training of more than 3 400 national personnel from 28 countries on good practices and standards of Physical Security and Stockpile Management, Marking and Recordkeeping of Firearms, and Destruction of Firearms and Ammunition.
— Support to 16 countries in marking firearms, including through the donation of marking machines.
— Destruction of more than 219 tons of ammunition and 85 000 SALW seized, obsolete, or in excess in 6 countries.
— Security improvements to 16 depot areas of firearms and ammunition in 8 countries.
— Development of an inventory control software for firearms and ammunition of institutional stockpiles, used by 15 institutions in 9 countries.
— Development of a Regional Communication Mechanism on Licit Transfers of Firearms and Ammunition, including a national solution for countries that still use paper-based systems to manage their licensing processes.
— Strengthening of life skills for 2 600 at-risk youth from Honduras and Peru through afterschool orchestra and choir classes.
— Establishment of a Center of Reference for Victims of Gun Violence in Honduras, which provided psychosocial support to more than 160 people and organized outreach activities to raise awareness.
— Training of more than 300 community stakeholders from El Salvador, Honduras, and Peru in violence prevention and assistance to victims.
— Participation of more than 2 800 citizens from Honduras and Peru in outreach activities and violence prevention events to promote a culture of peace.
— Creation of a Monitoring and Evaluation framework for the Roadmap, including the designation of M&E focal points and the development of a web-based platform for States to report on the progress of the Roadmap;
— Assistance to States to collect the baseline assessments, including technical support to train States in the use of the M&E framework, and the support to gather the necessary data;
— Organization of annual meetings of States following the adoption of the Roadmap;
— Regular meetings of implementing partners, government authorities, and donors (separately and jointly);
— National workshops and technical assistance for countries to develop national action plans, considering the overall goals of the roadmap, including training, raising-awareness trainings, and one-on-one mentorship for countries.
— Technical assistance to countries to review legislation and normative framework considering international standards, and internal harmonization of mandates, as well as the integration of a gender-based perspective;
— Development of CIFTA Guidelines to develop, plan, implement, and evaluate voluntary weapons surrender programs;
— Development of CIFTA Guidelines with recommendations for safety and security standards that private security companies must maintain to avoid the diversion of SALW and ammunition to the illicit market;
— Dissemination of Hemispheric Knowledge Platform, including an optimized search tool to facilitate access to CIFTA standards and guidelines (developed during Phase II).
— Legislative assistance offered to improve national firearms normative framework, considering international standards and a gender perspective, to at least 3 countries of the region;
— Increased availability of regional tools to support countries in all aspects of firearms control (both at the supply and demand level) by developing and making available: (i) CIFTA Guidelines to Develop, Plan, Implement, and Evaluate voluntary weapons surrender programs; and (ii) CIFTA Guidelines on Safety and Security Practices for Private Security Companies that utilize firearms;
— Hemispheric Firearms Knowledge Platform expanded and disseminated for stakeholders in the region.
— Comprehensive assessment of state capacities to manage the lifecycle of SALW and ammunition (considering the Methodology of UNIDIR for Weapons and Ammunition Management Baseline Assessment);
— Implementation of the CIFTA questionnaire to identify state capacities to manage, prevent, control, and prosecute illicit trade of firearms;
— Training of national personnel to collect and systematize data regarding firearms trafficking and illicit proliferation of SALW, considering a gender perspective.
— UNIDIR WAM Baseline Assessment conducted in one country of the region;
— CIFTA Questionnaire deployed in the region, with at least 60 % of the CIFTA State Parties submitting their answers;
— Elaboration, publication and dissemination of report with key findings from the application of the CIFTA questionnaire;
— Three virtual sub-regional seminars (Mesoamerica, South America, and the Caribbean), with at least 20 participants in each, conducted to raise awareness of high-level national personnel on data collection tools regarding firearms trafficking and illicit proliferation, as well as techniques and strategies to improve data collection and systematization.
— Development and implementation of specialized training for national personnel in weapons and ammunition management, including on PSSM, marking and recordkeeping, voluntary weapons surrender campaigns, and destruction of SALW and ammunition, considering international standards and good practices;
— Provision of international certification in advanced explosive ordnance disposal (EOD-3) to national personnel, in partnership with the Ministry of Defense of Spain;
— Technical and material assistance, and certification of national destruction processes of confiscated, obsolete, or in-surplus SALW and ammunition;
— Technical and material assistance to assess and enhance the infrastructure of national depots of SALW and ammunition, according to CIFTA standards, MOSAIC, and IATG.
— Implementation of one workshop for users of the Inventory Control Software for Arms and Munition (SAM), developed during Phase I and expanded in Phase II, to identify challenges and requirements for upgrades;
— Provision of SAM to national institutions of OAS Member States that require it, including training and help-desk support of users;
— Pilot the initial concept of the electronic solution of the Regional Communication Mechanism on Licit Transfers of Arms and Ammunition (MCTA), developed during Phase II;
— Development of the optional modules of the Regional Communication Mechanism on Licit Transfers of Arms and Ammunition (MCTA), and the additional functionalities, considering feedback received by pilot countries;
— Support the deployment of the National Licensing System for Export/Import Control in countries, developed during Phase II, including adaptation to national standards and processes.
— At least 50 000 SALW and 100 tons of ammunition, in excess, obsolete, and/or seized, destroyed through the assistance and/or certification of the project;
— At least 400 national personnel, from 10 countries, trained and improved their knowledge regarding the application of good practices of WAM;
— At least 30 national personnel from 10 OAS Member States certified in EOD-3, in partnership with the Ministry of Defense of Spain;
— Security of institutional stockpiles improved in at least 5 national depots/warehouses of SALW and ammunition in the region;
— Enhanced capacity for the inventory and accountability of SALW and ammunition in stockpiles of national institutions through the improvement and dissemination of SAM;
— Increased capacity of at least 3 OAS Member States in controlling international transfers of SALW and ammunition through the installation of the National Licensing System;
— Regional Communication Mechanism on Licit Transfers of Arms and Ammunition (MCTA) fully developed and tested by OAS Member States.
— Implementation of subregional workshops for the exchange of information on good practices for tracing illicit SALW;
— Development of national firearms recovery protocols to enable systematic tracing and investigation of recovered firearms, in partnership with INTERPOL;
— Technical assistance to national authorities to identify and trace recovered firearms, and generate intelligence information to feed relevant investigative units;
— Assessment of main gaps in record-keeping systems and data collection that hinder domestic and international tracing of recovered firearms, and provision of technical assistance and resources to strengthen or establish these national systems/databases, considering identified gaps;
— Technical and material assistance on marking and recordkeeping, particularly to those Member States assisted in previous phases of the cooperation with the European Union.
— Increased capacities in one OAS Member State to trace recovered SALW through the development of firearms recovery protocol, the offer of technical assistance to trace firearms, and improvements of systems and equipment necessary for domestic and international tracing;
— One regional seminar, with at least 20 participants, carried out to disseminate tracing good practices, CIFTA tracing frameworks (including the designation of points of contacts s for tracing), and exchange of information;
— Five national institutions of OAS Member States assisted in improving their marking and recordkeeping capacities.
— Provision of daily extracurricular activities to strengthen the life skills of at-risk youth through the OASIS methodology in one OAS Member State;
— Establishment of a centre of reference for psychosocial support of victims of armed violence in at least one hotspot community of one OAS Member State;
— Training of local-level policymakers, government officials, service providers, educators, parents, and civil society on the prevention of violence with the use of firearms;
— Development and offer of a regional educational training program (through a massive open online course, and a train-the-trainer course) for educators, school officials, and other authorities on how to address and prevent the use of firearms in schools;
— Training of national public sector personnel (through a hybrid approach with in-person modules and a massive open online course) on the prevention of gender-based violence with the use of firearms;
— Implementation of workshops with journalists and digital influencers to raise awareness of risk factors of firearms-related violence and call for action on violence interruption and prevention;
— Technical and material assistance to one OAS Member State in the development and implementation of risk-awareness and voluntary weapons surrender programs in selected communities.
— At least 300 at-risk youth (including youth in conflict with the law) from benefitted communities improved their life skills through training and daily after-school activities;
— One Center of Reference for Psychosocial Support for Victims of Gun Violence established in one community, offering (i) individualized psychosocial support to at least 100 survivors of violence and/or persons at risk of engaging or experiencing armed violence; and (ii) thematic workshops on violence prevention, and outreach activities within the school community and local spaces of participation;
— At least 200 local-level policymakers, government officials, service providers, educators, parents, and civil society trained on the prevention of armed violence;
— At least 150 educators, school officials, and other related national authorities trained to address and prevent the use of firearms in schools;
— At least 150 government officials and civil society trained on the prevention of gender-based violence with the misuse of firearms, including 15 persons trained to be knowledge-multipliers through the train-the-trainers course;
— At least 25 journalists and digital influencers increased their awareness of risk factors associated with armed violence through their participation in the workshop on the prevention of firearms-related violence;
— Risk-awareness education and voluntary weapons surrender campaigns implemented in benefitted communities of one country, contributing to the reduction in the demand for and availability of firearms.
— Establishment of a Monitoring and Evaluation framework for the Central American Firearms Roadmap, including the development of electronic tools to support data collection and analysis;
— Technical assistance to Central American countries regarding the monitoring and evaluation of the Roadmap, including support to conduct baseline assessments, training of national personnel in the use of the M&E framework, and ongoing assistance to gather the necessary data;
— Implementation of one in-person annual meeting of States, donors, and implementing partners of the Central American Firearms Roadmap;
— Implementation of biannual virtual meetings of implementing partners, government authorities, and donors (separately and jointly);
— Implementation of national workshops and technical assistance for Central American countries to develop national action plans, considering the overall goals of the roadmap, including training, and one-on-one mentorship for countries.
— Monitoring and Evaluation framework for the Central American Firearms Roadmap developed and approved by participating countries;
— Baseline assessment carried out in at least 50 % of Central American participating countries;
— One in-person annual meeting of Central American Firearms Roadmap;
— Six virtual meetings of the Central American Firearms Roadmap implemented with implementing partners, government authorities, and donors;
— At least 40 % of participating countries of the Central American Firearms Roadmap with national actional plans developed and approved;
— Draft of the Andean Firearms Roadmap developed and agreed with Andean countries.
— Ratification of the CIFTA convention and other international instruments, such as the ATT and the Firearms Protocol;
— Active participation in voluntary frameworks, such as UN-PoA and the Global Framework on Through-Life Management of Conventional Ammunition;
— Adoption of the Caribbean and Central American Firearms Roadmap.
2.1. Strengthening the Normative Framework: The activities of Objective 1 of the Action seek to ensure countries harmonize their legislation to the international standards and have tools available to promote the implementation of the international treaties and conventions;
2.2.2 Controls on the export of firearms and their ammunition: The promotion of the national licensing system and the regional communication mechanism on licit transfers of firearms and ammunition, on Objective 3, addresses the importance of controlling the legal trade to avoid diversions to the illicit market;
2.2.3 Secure SALW and ammunition stockpile management: Objective 3 has a series of activities focusing on PSSM, including training of officials, and technical and material assistance for improvement of practices and facilities, following the international standards of MOSAICS and IATGs;
2.2.4 Responsible disposal of SALW and their ammunition: Objective 3 includes training, material assistance, supervision, and certification of the destruction processes of firearms and ammunition to countries that so require;
2.2.5 Cross-cutting issues: Throughout all objectives of the Action, we will promote solutions and strategies to address firearms trafficking through a comprehensive approach, including cross-cutting issues such as gender responsiveness and use of information technology.
— Priority 1: Safeguarding the licit market and limiting diversion
— Priority 2: Building a better intelligence picture
— Priority 3: Increasing pressure on criminal markets
— Priority 4: Stepping up international cooperation
Strengthening the Normative Framework:Objective 1 activities aim to ensure countries harmonize their legislation with international standards and have the necessary tools to implement international treaties and conventions.
Controls on the Export of Firearms and Ammunition:Objective 3 promotes national licensing systems and regional communication mechanisms on the licit transfers of firearms and ammunition, addressing the importance of controlling the legal trade to prevent diversions to the illicit market.
Secure SALW and Ammunition Stockpile Management:Objective 3 includes activities focusing on PSSM, including training officials, and providing technical and material assistance to improve practices and facilities, in line with international standards such as MOSAICS and IATGs.
Responsible Disposal of SALW and Ammunition:Objective 3 also includes training, material assistance, supervision, and certification of the destruction processes for firearms and ammunition in countries requiring such support.
Cross-Cutting Issues:Throughout all objectives, the Action promotes comprehensive solutions to address firearms trafficking, incorporating cross-cutting issues such as gender responsiveness and the use of information technology.
This Action is also aligned with the 2020-2025 EU Action Plan on Firearms Trafficking, which establishes four priorities:
Safeguarding the Licit Market and Limiting Diversion:Activities and expected results aim to reduce diversions from state and non-state authorized users through technical assistance on PSSM, marking, and destruction.
Building a Better Intelligence Picture:The comprehensive tracing strategy promoted in this Action will enhance the effectiveness of actions addressing firearms trafficking by law enforcement agencies.
Increasing Pressure on Criminal Markets: By addressing illicit SALW trafficking and enhancing cooperation with law enforcement, this Action contributes to increasing pressure on criminal markets.
Stepping Up International Cooperation:This Action enhances the support offered to the Americas and expands the EU’s international cooperation agenda. The Americas region is significantly impacted by firearms-related violence, jeopardizing security and having detrimental consequences globally, including cross-regional firearms trafficking routes and irregular migration due to regional instability.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 28(1) and Article 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) The 2018 EU Strategy against illicit firearms, small arms & light weapons and their ammunition, entitled ‘Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens’ (the ‘EU SALW Strategy’) sets the guidelines for Union action in the field of small arms and light weapons (‘SALW’).
(2) At regional level, the EU SALW Strategy commits the Union and its Member States to providing assistance to other countries in order to improve the management and security of state-held stockpiles by strengthening national legislative and administrative frameworks and strengthening institutions that regulate the legitimate supply and stockpile management of SALW and ammunition for defence and security forces.
(3) The EU SALW Strategy notes that the Union will look for synergy with the relevant American states and regional organisations to reduce the illicit proliferation of and trafficking in SALW, with a view to reducing armed violence and criminal activity.
(4) The Organization of American States (OAS) is the Secretariat for the Inter-American Convention against Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials (CIFTA) and is coordinating and implementing regional initiatives combatting illicit SALW in the Americas.
(5) The Union previously supported the OAS by means of Council Decisions (CFSP) 2018/2010 (1) and (CFSP) 2022/847 (2) in support of activities countering the illicit proliferation of and trafficking in SALW and ammunition and their impact in Latin America and the Caribbean,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
1. In the context of the implementation of the EU SALW Strategy, the purpose of this Decision is to address armed violence in the Americas. To that effect, the Union shall finance the project described in the Annex, the aim of which is to counter the illicit proliferation of and trafficking in firearms and ammunition, and to prevent engagement with firearms in highly impacted communities.

2. The objectives of this Decision are:
(a) to strengthen regulatory frameworks to address trafficking in firearms in the Americas;
(b) to increase the sharing of knowledge and information in respect of trafficking in firearms and the illicit proliferation of SALW in the Americas;
(c) to improve state capacities to manage the lifecycle of SALW and ammunition, reducing the risk of diversion to the illicit market;
(d) to strengthen national systems for systematic tracing of illicit SALW;
(e) to reduce risk factors associated with armed violence at the community level; and
(f) to strengthen sub-regional cooperation through the development and implementation of the Sub-Regional Firearms Roadmap.

3. A detailed description of the project is set out in the Annex to this Decision.

1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (‘HR’) shall be responsible for implementing this Decision.

2. The technical implementation of the project referred to in Article 1 shall be carried out by the OAS.

3. The OAS shall perform its tasks under the responsibility of the HR. For that purpose, the HR shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the OAS.

1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the project financed by the Union shall be EUR 4 055 956.
2. The expenditure financed by the reference amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.

3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure referred to in paragraph 2. For that purpose, it shall conclude the necessary financing agreement with the OAS. The financing agreement shall stipulate that the OAS has to ensure the visibility of the Union’s contribution, appropriate to its size.

4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.

1. The HR shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular narrative reports prepared by the OAS. Those reports shall form the basis of the evaluation to be carried out by the Council.

2. The Commission shall report on the financial aspects of the project referred to in Article 1.

1. This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

2. This Decision shall expire 36 months after the date of conclusion of the financing agreement referred to in Article 3(3). However, it shall expire six months after the date of its entry into force if no agreement has been concluded within that period.

1.   Background

The Americas continues to be the most violent region in the world, with high economic, social, and human costs, particularly affecting the most vulnerable populations. According to the latest Global Study on Homicides, in 2021, the region registered the highest regional rate of homicides, with 15 homicides per 100 000 inhabitants, compared to the global average of 5,8 per 100 000 inhabitants (1). Although there has been progress in reducing homicide rates—from 17,2 homicides per 100 000 inhabitants in 2017 (2)—one in every three homicides worldwide still occurs in the Americas. Moreover, almost 70 % of these homicides are committed with a firearm (3). Therefore, it is essential to strengthen the capacity of Latin American and Caribbean countries to address armed violence.
Several factors contribute to armed violence in the region. The illicit proliferation of arms and ammunition, especially in contexts of high inequality, social exclusion, and lack of access to public services and peaceful conflict resolution methods, jeopardizes community security. Additionally, organized criminal groups threaten the stability of Latin American and Caribbean countries by fueling the illicit arms market through illegal routes that exploit porous borders and insufficient oversight of the legal chain of firearms and ammunition. To effectively address armed violence in the Americas, comprehensive policies must prioritize controlling illicit flows of firearms and ammunition and addressing community-level risk factors through a bifold approach that targets both the supply and demand of illicit firearms and ammunition.
The region already has a framework for strengthening controls over the lifecycle of firearms and ammunition. The CIFTA Convention, signed in 1997 and ratified by 31 countries in the Americas, remains a key mechanism for regional cooperation in preventing, combating, and eradicating the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms, ammunition, and explosives. CIFTA establishes legally binding obligations related to the through-life management of firearms and ammunition, reducing diversion from legitimate users, and addressing firearms trafficking. However, it is necessary to intensify efforts to implement the convention’s provisions. Despite government efforts, the region still faces many challenges in implementing these policies to ensure only authorized users have access to firearms and ammunition.
The initial challenge is the lack of data to understand the nuances of the phenomenon in each country and identify gaps in institutional capacities. Countries also lack the legislation, human resources, and equipment to control the legal trade and legitimate use of firearms and ammunition. Although the marking of firearms has increased, the capacity of recordkeeping systems is limited. Most systems are still paper-based or fragmented, without data integration. In practice, once a civilian or a private security company obtains a license to possess a firearm, there is no assigned unit or personnel to verify compliance with licensing conditions. The oversight over state-owned arsenals is also loose. Military and security forces do not systematically implement stockpile management protocols, increasing the likelihood of diversion of firearms and ammunition to the illicit market, as well as the risk of unplanned explosions in storage facilities.
It is also relatively easy to divert firearms and ammunition during international transfers. Licensing authorities, customs, and border agencies do not have the channels to communicate in real time and to track the actual movement of goods. The absence of equipment, including x-rays, and lack of training of border personnel hinders the verification processes and interdiction of hidden firearms and ammunition.
The criminal justice response is also insufficient. Some countries still do not have specialized units to investigate and prosecute firearms trafficking. The absence of protocols and resources for investigating recovered firearms halts criminal investigations that could trace the origin of firearms, connect them to multiple crime scenes, and uncover networks of illicit trafficking.
Countries not only lack capacities to manage the supply of firearms and ammunition, in order to ensure that only authorized users have access to them. Institutional capacities are also limited to address the illicit demand for firearms and ammunition, and risk factors that hinder a culture of peace at the community level.
To address these challenges, since 2019, with funding from the European Union (Council Decision CFSP 2018/2010 and Council Decision CFSP 2022/847), the Department of Public Security of the Organization of American States (DPS/OAS), within the framework of the Program of Assistance on Control of Arms and Munition (PACAM), provides comprehensive technical assistance to Latin American and Caribbean states to strengthen their policies to address and prevent firearms and ammunition trafficking. PACAM is the operational mechanism of the OAS to support OAS Member States in addressing armed violence by strengthening their capacity to comply with and implement the provisions of international instruments, such as the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA), the UN Programme of Action (UN-PoA), and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). PACAM supports OAS Member States, at their request, through a multi-layered approach:

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Legislative support to improve the firearms normative framework.

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Tailored, needs-driven, and sustainable technical assistance and capacity-building in various aspects of through-life management of firearms and ammunition.

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Promotion of preventive initiatives to strengthen community resilience against armed violence through the OASIS methodology and reduce unauthorized access to firearms.

From January 2019 to July 2024, the implementation of the two CFSP Council Decisions has generated meaningful results in the region, benefiting 28 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean through various components:

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Development of the Central American Roadmap to Prevent the Illicit Proliferation and Trafficking of Firearms and Ammunition, adopted by Central American countries in February 2025.

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Legislative assistance to 7 countries to strengthen their firearms normative framework.

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Training of more than 3 400 national personnel from 28 countries on good practices and standards of Physical Security and Stockpile Management, Marking and Recordkeeping of Firearms, and Destruction of Firearms and Ammunition.

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Support to 16 countries in marking firearms, including through the donation of marking machines.

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Destruction of more than 219 tons of ammunition and 85 000 SALW seized, obsolete, or in excess in 6 countries.

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Security improvements to 16 depot areas of firearms and ammunition in 8 countries.

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Development of an inventory control software for firearms and ammunition of institutional stockpiles, used by 15 institutions in 9 countries.

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Development of a Regional Communication Mechanism on Licit Transfers of Firearms and Ammunition, including a national solution for countries that still use paper-based systems to manage their licensing processes.

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Strengthening of life skills for 2 600 at-risk youth from Honduras and Peru through afterschool orchestra and choir classes.

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Establishment of a Center of Reference for Victims of Gun Violence in Honduras, which provided psychosocial support to more than 160 people and organized outreach activities to raise awareness.

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Training of more than 300 community stakeholders from El Salvador, Honduras, and Peru in violence prevention and assistance to victims.

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Participation of more than 2 800 citizens from Honduras and Peru in outreach activities and violence prevention events to promote a culture of peace.

Through collaboration with the European Union, significant progress has been made in addressing firearms trafficking in the region. Some countries have participated in the regional components of the project, such as coordination mechanisms and workshops, while a core group of countries has been comprehensively impacted.
Despite these advances, it is still necessary to continue providing long-term assistance for countries to sustain good practices. DPS/OAS experience has shown that continuous, tailored, needs-driven technical and operational support, over the long term, is essential to achieve systematic implementation and national ownership of complex policies, such as firearms control. This new phase will consider the importance of long-term strategies to provide meaningful and sustainable change in security policies and conditions.
Phase III will incorporate new elements building on the progress of Phases I and II, such as targeted assistance to improve tracing practices and prevent firearms use and incidents in schools. During these five years, we created the conditions for introducing these new elements, which require a direct and close relationship with government authorities and an open dialogue about their challenges and needs. As such, Phase III will not only contribute to the sustainability of the assistance offered over the past five years but will also move the needle one step further to address armed violence in the Americas.
2. Technical Approach

During this phase, DPS/OAS will continue to invest in a holistic approach that combines strategies for the prevention of armed violence and firearms control to address both the unauthorized supply and demand for firearms and ammunition through five specific objectives:
1. Strengthen Regulatory Frameworks to Address Firearms Trafficking in the Americas

One component of the Action focuses on strengthening national legal frameworks to ensure they support the operational activities of firearms control and include all mandatory provisions of international regulations. This involves expanding the availability of standards and guidelines on key aspects of the prevention of armed violence and the through-life management of firearms and ammunition, as well as facilitating access for national authorities and technical personnel.
In the previous phase, DPS/OAS developed three new guidelines (Destruction of SALW, PSSM of SALW, and Prevention of Gender-Based Violence with the Misuse of Firearms) that were approved by the Consultative Committee of CIFTA and integrated into the body of complementary documentation to guide the application of the convention. In this phase, DPS/OAS will continue this effort by developing CIFTA Guidelines on Voluntary Weapons Surrender Programs and safety and security standards for private security companies. These topics are highly relevant to the region. Significant amounts of firearms circulate in highly impacted communities, necessitating awareness-raising about the risks they pose and encouraging their surrender to promote a culture of peace and peaceful conflict resolution. Additionally, private security companies continue to expand in Latin America and the Caribbean, with millions of armed guards providing various security services. It is crucial to regulate the use of firearms and ammunition by private security companies to reduce the diversion and misuse of firearms in their possession.
Moreover, we will expand and continue to disseminate the Hemispheric Firearms Knowledge Platform, developed during Phase II. This platform is a centralized repository of information and data regarding firearms trafficking in the Americas. It features a public area with a library of related publications and a search tool that allows users to filter standards by interest (such as area of application, level of recommendation, etc.). It also includes a private area for registered users from countries, featuring a forum to exchange information, a directory of authorities, and a tool to electronically submit their biennial reports on the implementation of CIFTA. This information is then available on dashboards to assess state capacities and gaps in the convention’s implementation.
2. Increase Knowledge and Information-Sharing on Firearms Trafficking and Illicit Proliferation of SALW in the Americas

Recognizing the need for continuous data generation to better understand the characteristics of firearms trafficking in the region and to identify the main gaps in institutional capacities, DPS/OAS aims to increase the availability of knowledge-generating tools within the CIFTA framework. We will offer training to national personnel on how to collect and systematize data on firearms trafficking through three sub-regional seminars. Individualized support will also be provided to countries to help them complete and submit the CIFTA implementation questionnaire, which includes specific variables to assess state capacities based on available benchmarks (including CIFTA, MOSAIC, IATG, and other standards).
In partnership with UNIDIR, we will conduct an in-depth analysis of state capacities to manage the lifecycle of SALW and ammunition using UNIDIR’s methodology. This analysis will enable countries to implement targeted strategies to address identified gaps.
3. Improve state capacities to manage the lifecycle of SALW and ammunition, reducing the risk of diversion to the illicit market

At the operational level, DPS/OAS will continue to enhance national capacities to manage institutional stockpiles and reduce the risk of loss, theft, and diversion of weapons and ammunition. This will include training and targeted assistance on physical security and stockpile management (PSSM), encompassing safety, security, accounting, storage, transportation, and handling of weapons and ammunition, as well as the destruction of seized, excess, or obsolete firearms and ammunition. On PSSM, we will continue applying the methodology developed during previous phases to train national operators to assess the conditions of depot areas. Based on assessed needs, we will implement minor improvements to the infrastructure and security of these depot areas. Additionally, we will continue providing comprehensive assistance for destruction processes, offering equipment, mentorship and training, and certification to ensure compliance with international standards. This technical assistance will be integrated with capacity-building activities (training, seminars, workshops) to build sustainability in through-life management of weapons and ammunition.
4. Strengthen national systems for systematic tracing of illicit SALW

Through the support offered in previous phases, particularly in marking and record-keeping, significant gaps have been identified in systematic tracing practices and information management systems. These gaps hinder law enforcement officials’ abilities to detect trafficking patterns, prevent diversions, and strengthen cooperation among countries. To address this issue, and leveraging the relationships established with authorities, DPS/OAS is introducing a new component in Phase III aimed at strengthening national systems for the systematic tracing of illicit SALW. This initiative will be implemented in partnership with INTERPOL, given their extensive experience on the topic with law enforcement agencies. This component includes a regional seminar to promote the exchange of information among Latin American and Caribbean countries on the topic of systematic tracing. We will also provide comprehensive technical assistance to a selected country, as a pilot initiative, including the development of a Firearms Recovery Protocol, with standard operating procedures, workflows, and processes to ensure recovered firearms are triaged (considering priority criteria for tracing and investigation), traced, and investigated, and the deployment of a taskforce to support national personnel in implementing the protocol and tracing firearms from a selected sample. This includes the development of intelligence reports to support police work.
5. Reduce risk factors associated with armed violence at the community level

DPS/OAS will continue to adopt a holistic approach to preventing gun violence at the community level, with focalized policies considering high-risk groups to be a victim and a perpetrator of armed violence. This includes the implementation of the OASIS methodology of the DPS/OAS in one country, which includes after-school music classes to develop life skills of at-risk youth; offer of psychosocial support, and promotion of community raising-awareness activities through a Center of Reference for Victims of Armed Violence; and training of community stakeholder in the prevention of armed violence. In addition, another focus of Phase III will be the prevention of firearms-related violence in schools by providing training for educators and school personnel on prevention strategies, intervention, and assistance for victims of firearms-related violence . This will be complemented by workshops focusing on journalists and influencers to improve reporting on firearms-related violence violence, aiming to prevent further engagement and replication of such cases. We will also continue building on the progress of Phase II by offering training-of-trainers to disseminate knowledge and good practices on preventing gender-based violence involving firearms. Finally, considering the initial work of Phase II, we will offer technical assistance for raising-awareness campaigns and voluntary weapons surrender programs to reduce illicit firearms circulation in highly impacted communities.
6. Strengthen sub-regional cooperation through the development and implementation of Sub-Regional Firearms Roadmap

In Phase II of the cooperation, DPS/OAS, in coordination with UNLIREC and the Central American Integration System (SICA), has successfully developed the Central American Roadmap to Prevent the Illicit Proliferation and Trafficking of Firearms and Ammunition. In Phase III, DPS/OAS will establish a follow-up mechanism to support the implementation of the Central American Firearms Roadmap, as mandated by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (4). The structure of the follow-up mechanism will be defined with the participating States considering lessons learned and good practices of the other Roadmaps, including the following:

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Creation of a Monitoring and Evaluation framework for the Roadmap, including the designation of M&E focal points and the development of a web-based platform for States to report on the progress of the Roadmap;

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Assistance to States to collect the baseline assessments, including technical support to train States in the use of the M&E framework, and the support to gather the necessary data;

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Organization of annual meetings of States following the adoption of the Roadmap;

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Regular meetings of implementing partners, government authorities, and donors (separately and jointly);

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National workshops and technical assistance for countries to develop national action plans, considering the overall goals of the roadmap, including training, raising-awareness trainings, and one-on-one mentorship for countries.

Through Phase III, DPS/OAS will advance key elements of the follow-up mechanism, such as organizing an annual meeting, creating the M&E framework, and supporting some countries with baseline assessments and national action plans. DPS/OAS will also seek additional donor contributions to strengthen the framework for implementing the Central American Firearms Roadmap.
In addition, considering the interest of Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) to address the issue of firearms trafficking in a more coherent and integrated approach, due to the specific needs of the sub-region (impacted by local dynamics of gangs, drug flows, and illegal mining), in Phase III, DPS/OAS will initiate the process to develop the Andean Firearms Roadmap. During this initial stage, we will map the needs and priorities of the countries and develop a draft of the Roadmap through national and regional workshops with government representatives. We will also strive to find other funding sources to complement the resources of the European Union and achieve the adoption of the Roadmap within Phase III.

Summary and Implementation Approach

By addressing these multiple areas, the Action aims to simultaneously meet the needs of the countries and promote long-term, sustainable changes. Activities to strengthen firearms control and reduce the supply of firearms will be complemented by preventive measures to reduce demand in communities heavily impacted by armed violence.
DPS/OAS, through PACAM, will coordinate and implement the Action in collaboration with other agencies and national authorities. Utilizing OAS political forums and communication channels, DPS/OAS will identify countries requiring support and work with them to create tailored assistance plans. This project will adopt a specific and customized approach to each country, acknowledging that needs and gaps vary. Not all countries will receive support in all project components; instead, DPS/OAS will continue using PACAM’s successful methodology: mapping needs, engaging authorities, creating assistance plans, and deploying missions. DPS/OAS will also participate in coordination mechanisms to avoid duplication of work, such as continuing to support Caribbean countries through the Caribbean Firearms Roadmap.

Gender and Human Rights Perspective

Considering the different impacts of armed conflict on vulnerable persons, Phase III will maintain a gender and human rights perspective. This includes incorporating women at all levels of project implementation and encouraging equal participation of women in project activities. Violence prevention activities will focus on the safety and security needs of women and girls within their communities and their participation in finding solutions to these challenges. Additionally, components will focus exclusively on addressing gender-based violence.
7. Overall Goal

To strengthen the capacity of Latin American and Caribbean countries to address armed violence in the region by controlling the proliferation and illicit trafficking in firearms and munitions, and preventing engagement with firearms in highly impacted communities.
8. Description of Projects’ Intervention Strategies

Objective 1: To strengthen regulatory frameworks to address firearms trafficking in the Americas

Activities

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Technical assistance to countries to review legislation and normative framework considering international standards, and internal harmonization of mandates, as well as the integration of a gender-based perspective;

—
Development of CIFTA Guidelines to develop, plan, implement, and evaluate voluntary weapons surrender programs;

—
Development of CIFTA Guidelines with recommendations for safety and security standards that private security companies must maintain to avoid the diversion of SALW and ammunition to the illicit market;

—
Dissemination of Hemispheric Knowledge Platform, including an optimized search tool to facilitate access to CIFTA standards and guidelines (developed during Phase II).

Outputs

—
Legislative assistance offered to improve national firearms normative framework, considering international standards and a gender perspective, to at least 3 countries of the region;

—
Increased availability of regional tools to support countries in all aspects of firearms control (both at the supply and demand level) by developing and making available: (i) CIFTA Guidelines to Develop, Plan, Implement, and Evaluate voluntary weapons surrender programs; and (ii) CIFTA Guidelines on Safety and Security Practices for Private Security Companies that utilize firearms;

—
Hemispheric Firearms Knowledge Platform expanded and disseminated for stakeholders in the region.

Objective 2: To increase knowledge and information-sharing on firearms trafficking and illicit proliferation of SALW in the Americas

Activities

—
Comprehensive assessment of state capacities to manage the lifecycle of SALW and ammunition (considering the Methodology of UNIDIR for Weapons and Ammunition Management Baseline Assessment);

—
Implementation of the CIFTA questionnaire to identify state capacities to manage, prevent, control, and prosecute illicit trade of firearms;

—
Training of national personnel to collect and systematize data regarding firearms trafficking and illicit proliferation of SALW, considering a gender perspective.

Outputs

—
UNIDIR WAM Baseline Assessment conducted in one country of the region;

—
CIFTA Questionnaire deployed in the region, with at least 60 % of the CIFTA State Parties submitting their answers;

—
Elaboration, publication and dissemination of report with key findings from the application of the CIFTA questionnaire;

—
Three virtual sub-regional seminars (Mesoamerica, South America, and the Caribbean), with at least 20 participants in each, conducted to raise awareness of high-level national personnel on data collection tools regarding firearms trafficking and illicit proliferation, as well as techniques and strategies to improve data collection and systematization.

Objective 3: To improve state capacities to manage the lifecycle of SALW and ammunition, reducing the risk of diversion to the illicit market

Activities

—
Development and implementation of specialized training for national personnel in weapons and ammunition management, including on PSSM, marking and recordkeeping, voluntary weapons surrender campaigns, and destruction of SALW and ammunition, considering international standards and good practices;

—
Provision of international certification in advanced explosive ordnance disposal (EOD-3) to national personnel, in partnership with the Ministry of Defense of Spain;

—
Technical and material assistance, and certification of national destruction processes of confiscated, obsolete, or in-surplus SALW and ammunition;

—
Technical and material assistance to assess and enhance the infrastructure of national depots of SALW and ammunition, according to CIFTA standards, MOSAIC, and IATG.

—
Implementation of one workshop for users of the Inventory Control Software for Arms and Munition (SAM), developed during Phase I and expanded in Phase II, to identify challenges and requirements for upgrades;

—
Provision of SAM to national institutions of OAS Member States that require it, including training and help-desk support of users;

—
Pilot the initial concept of the electronic solution of the Regional Communication Mechanism on Licit Transfers of Arms and Ammunition (MCTA), developed during Phase II;

—
Development of the optional modules of the Regional Communication Mechanism on Licit Transfers of Arms and Ammunition (MCTA), and the additional functionalities, considering feedback received by pilot countries;

—
Support the deployment of the National Licensing System for Export/Import Control in countries, developed during Phase II, including adaptation to national standards and processes.

Outputs

—
At least 50 000 SALW and 100 tons of ammunition, in excess, obsolete, and/or seized, destroyed through the assistance and/or certification of the project;

—
At least 400 national personnel, from 10 countries, trained and improved their knowledge regarding the application of good practices of WAM;

—
At least 30 national personnel from 10 OAS Member States certified in EOD-3, in partnership with the Ministry of Defense of Spain;

—
Security of institutional stockpiles improved in at least 5 national depots/warehouses of SALW and ammunition in the region;

—
Enhanced capacity for the inventory and accountability of SALW and ammunition in stockpiles of national institutions through the improvement and dissemination of SAM;

—
Increased capacity of at least 3 OAS Member States in controlling international transfers of SALW and ammunition through the installation of the National Licensing System;

—
Regional Communication Mechanism on Licit Transfers of Arms and Ammunition (MCTA) fully developed and tested by OAS Member States.

Objective 4: To establish or strengthen national systems for systematic tracing of illicit SALW

Activities

—
Implementation of subregional workshops for the exchange of information on good practices for tracing illicit SALW;

—
Development of national firearms recovery protocols to enable systematic tracing and investigation of recovered firearms, in partnership with INTERPOL;

—
Technical assistance to national authorities to identify and trace recovered firearms, and generate intelligence information to feed relevant investigative units;

—
Assessment of main gaps in record-keeping systems and data collection that hinder domestic and international tracing of recovered firearms, and provision of technical assistance and resources to strengthen or establish these national systems/databases, considering identified gaps;

—
Technical and material assistance on marking and recordkeeping, particularly to those Member States assisted in previous phases of the cooperation with the European Union.

Outputs

—
Increased capacities in one OAS Member State to trace recovered SALW through the development of firearms recovery protocol, the offer of technical assistance to trace firearms, and improvements of systems and equipment necessary for domestic and international tracing;

—
One regional seminar, with at least 20 participants, carried out to disseminate tracing good practices, CIFTA tracing frameworks (including the designation of points of contacts s for tracing), and exchange of information;

—
Five national institutions of OAS Member States assisted in improving their marking and recordkeeping capacities.

Objective 5: To reduce risk factors associated with armed violence at the community level

Activities

—
Provision of daily extracurricular activities to strengthen the life skills of at-risk youth through the OASIS methodology in one OAS Member State;

—
Establishment of a centre of reference for psychosocial support of victims of armed violence in at least one hotspot community of one OAS Member State;

—
Training of local-level policymakers, government officials, service providers, educators, parents, and civil society on the prevention of violence with the use of firearms;

—
Development and offer of a regional educational training program (through a massive open online course, and a train-the-trainer course) for educators, school officials, and other authorities on how to address and prevent the use of firearms in schools;

—
Training of national public sector personnel (through a hybrid approach with in-person modules and a massive open online course) on the prevention of gender-based violence with the use of firearms;

—
Implementation of workshops with journalists and digital influencers to raise awareness of risk factors of firearms-related violence and call for action on violence interruption and prevention;

—
Technical and material assistance to one OAS Member State in the development and implementation of risk-awareness and voluntary weapons surrender programs in selected communities.

Outputs

—
At least 300 at-risk youth (including youth in conflict with the law) from benefitted communities improved their life skills through training and daily after-school activities;

—
One Center of Reference for Psychosocial Support for Victims of Gun Violence established in one community, offering (i) individualized psychosocial support to at least 100 survivors of violence and/or persons at risk of engaging or experiencing armed violence; and (ii) thematic workshops on violence prevention, and outreach activities within the school community and local spaces of participation;

—
At least 200 local-level policymakers, government officials, service providers, educators, parents, and civil society trained on the prevention of armed violence;

—
At least 150 educators, school officials, and other related national authorities trained to address and prevent the use of firearms in schools;

—
At least 150 government officials and civil society trained on the prevention of gender-based violence with the misuse of firearms, including 15 persons trained to be knowledge-multipliers through the train-the-trainers course;

—
At least 25 journalists and digital influencers increased their awareness of risk factors associated with armed violence through their participation in the workshop on the prevention of firearms-related violence;

—
Risk-awareness education and voluntary weapons surrender campaigns implemented in benefitted communities of one country, contributing to the reduction in the demand for and availability of firearms.

Objective 6: To strengthen sub-regional cooperation through the development and implementation of Sub-Regional Firearms Roadmap

Activities

—
Establishment of a Monitoring and Evaluation framework for the Central American Firearms Roadmap, including the development of electronic tools to support data collection and analysis;

—
Technical assistance to Central American countries regarding the monitoring and evaluation of the Roadmap, including support to conduct baseline assessments, training of national personnel in the use of the M&E framework, and ongoing assistance to gather the necessary data;

—
Implementation of one in-person annual meeting of States, donors, and implementing partners of the Central American Firearms Roadmap;

—
Implementation of biannual virtual meetings of implementing partners, government authorities, and donors (separately and jointly);

—
Implementation of national workshops and technical assistance for Central American countries to develop national action plans, considering the overall goals of the roadmap, including training, and one-on-one mentorship for countries.

Outputs

—
Monitoring and Evaluation framework for the Central American Firearms Roadmap developed and approved by participating countries;

—
Baseline assessment carried out in at least 50 % of Central American participating countries;

—
One in-person annual meeting of Central American Firearms Roadmap;

—
Six virtual meetings of the Central American Firearms Roadmap implemented with implementing partners, government authorities, and donors;

—
At least 40 % of participating countries of the Central American Firearms Roadmap with national actional plans developed and approved;

—
Draft of the Andean Firearms Roadmap developed and agreed with Andean countries.

9. Duration

The total estimated duration of the comprehensive regional Phase III will be 36 months.
10. Technical implementing entity

The technical implementation of this program is entrusted to the Department of Public Security of the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States (DPS/OAS). The DPS/OAS is uniquely positioned to support the countries of the Americas, given its dual role as the Technical co-Secretariat of CIFTA and as the technical and operational body of the OAS in this area. In this capacity, the DPS/OAS has a track record of implementing projects and programs that assist OAS Member States in meeting their obligations to secure national firearms stockpiles, enact legislative measures to criminalize illicit firearms manufacturing and trafficking, require firearms marking, and share tracing information and patterns of illicit trafficking with other CIFTA signatories. No other regional or subregional organization covering all of the Americas possesses the political influence, technical expertise, or geographical reach necessary to support and assist all American states.
During Phase III, DPS/OAS will continue to coordinate and collaborate with other institutions and organizations. Since Phase I, strategic partnerships have been established with entities that support Latin American and Caribbean countries to avoid duplication of efforts and maximize the effectiveness of the Action. These partners include the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (CARICOM IMPACS), the Inter-American Defense Board, the Ammunition Management Advisory Team of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (AMAT-GICHD), and INTERPOL.
11. Relevance

— Regional Relevance

Despite significant progress in consolidating democracy and achieving socio-economic development, Latin American and Caribbean countries continue to face enormous challenges in promoting the safety of their citizens and communities. Public security, or the lack thereof, is a high priority for both citizens and government authorities in the region. The Americas remains one of the most violent areas in the world, with experts identifying the availability of firearms and unrestricted access to them as key risk factors contributing to high rates of lethal violence. Compounding this issue is the increasing sophistication and complexity of organized criminal groups, which have expanded their operations and now dominate the illicit arms trafficking market. These groups have transitioned from vertical structures to networked organizations, resulting in greater efficiency and profitability in their illicit activities and increasing the challenges of identifying and investigating offenders.
It is clear that firearms trafficking and the availability of firearms significantly impact the region, representing one of the main challenges to regional and global security. This is reflected in several political and legal commitments made by countries in the region, including:

—
Ratification of the CIFTA convention and other international instruments, such as the ATT and the Firearms Protocol;

—
Active participation in voluntary frameworks, such as UN-PoA and the Global Framework on Through-Life Management of Conventional Ammunition;

—
Adoption of the Caribbean and Central American Firearms Roadmap.

CIFTA establishes several obligations on State Parties, including the establishment of jurisdiction over criminal offenses, mandatory marking of firearms, maintenance of records for tracing, improvement of transfer controls, measures to prevent diversion, and cross-national cooperation. The Second Course of Action of CIFTA reinforces the aims of the CIFTA States Parties in these areas, in line with the UN-PoA and the Firearms Protocol. This project leverages this framework to provide technical assistance to countries in operationalizing the commitments and dispositions of these treaties, particularly the CIFTA Convention.
— Alignment with the Priorities of the European Union

The objectives, activities, and expected outcomes of this project are aligned with the goals and the approach of the EU Strategy ‘Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens’
(5), considering a multilateral perspective to foster engagement across regions of the world. By partnering with the OAS, this Action will continue to foster synergies between the EU and the OAS and, by extension, between Europe and the Americas to reduce armed violence and criminal activity. Particularly, this Action will promote the work of the European Union in the region through targeted support to countries that are seriously affected by the proliferation, excessive accumulation, and trafficking of SALW.
Specifically, Phase III reflects the following priorities of the Strategy:

2.1. Strengthening the Normative Framework: The activities of Objective 1 of the Action seek to ensure countries harmonize their legislation to the international standards and have tools available to promote the implementation of the international treaties and conventions;

2.2.2
Controls on the export of firearms and their ammunition: The promotion of the national licensing system and the regional communication mechanism on licit transfers of firearms and ammunition, on Objective 3, addresses the importance of controlling the legal trade to avoid diversions to the illicit market;

2.2.3
Secure SALW and ammunition stockpile management: Objective 3 has a series of activities focusing on PSSM, including training of officials, and technical and material assistance for improvement of practices and facilities, following the international standards of MOSAICS and IATGs;

2.2.4
Responsible disposal of SALW and their ammunition: Objective 3 includes training, material assistance, supervision, and certification of the destruction processes of firearms and ammunition to countries that so require;

2.2.5
Cross-cutting issues: Throughout all objectives of the Action, we will promote solutions and strategies to address firearms trafficking through a comprehensive approach, including cross-cutting issues such as gender responsiveness and use of information technology.

In addition, this Action is also aligned with the 2020-2025 EU action plan on firearms trafficking, considering its four established priorities:

—
Priority 1: Safeguarding the licit market and limiting diversion

—
Priority 2: Building a better intelligence picture

—
Priority 3: Increasing pressure on criminal markets

—
Priority 4: Stepping up international cooperation

Many of the activities and expected results of this Action will contribute to reducing diversion from state and non-state authorized users (such as the offer of technical assistance on PSSM, marking, and destruction), as well as to increase the effectiveness of actions to address firearms trafficking by promoting a comprehensive tracing strategy for law enforcement agencies. In addition, through the Action, the European Union is increasing the support offered to the Americas and the scope of its international cooperation agenda. As mentioned, the Americas is the region mostly affected by firearms-related violence, which jeopardizes security not only in the region, but has detrimental consequences in other parts of the globe, including Europe, such as cross-regional routes of firearms trafficking, and irregular migration due to the instability of the Americas.
The objectives, activities, and expected outcomes of this project align closely with the goals and approach of the EU Strategy ‘Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens’
(6), emphasizing a multilateral perspective to foster engagement across regions. By partnering with the OAS, this initiative will continue to create synergies between the EU and the OAS, and by extension, between Europe and the Americas, to reduce armed violence and criminal activity. Specifically, this project will highlight the work of the European Union in the region by providing targeted support to countries severely affected by the proliferation, excessive accumulation, and trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW).
Phase III reflects the following priorities of the EU Strategy:

Strengthening the Normative Framework: Objective 1 activities aim to ensure countries harmonize their legislation with international standards and have the necessary tools to implement international treaties and conventions.

Controls on the Export of Firearms and Ammunition: Objective 3 promotes national licensing systems and regional communication mechanisms on the licit transfers of firearms and ammunition, addressing the importance of controlling the legal trade to prevent diversions to the illicit market.

Secure SALW and Ammunition Stockpile Management: Objective 3 includes activities focusing on PSSM, including training officials, and providing technical and material assistance to improve practices and facilities, in line with international standards such as MOSAICS and IATGs.

Responsible Disposal of SALW and Ammunition: Objective 3 also includes training, material assistance, supervision, and certification of the destruction processes for firearms and ammunition in countries requiring such support.

Cross-Cutting Issues: Throughout all objectives, the Action promotes comprehensive solutions to address firearms trafficking, incorporating cross-cutting issues such as gender responsiveness and the use of information technology.

This Action is also aligned with the 2020-2025 EU Action Plan on Firearms Trafficking, which establishes four priorities:

Safeguarding the Licit Market and Limiting Diversion: Activities and expected results aim to reduce diversions from state and non-state authorized users through technical assistance on PSSM, marking, and destruction.

Building a Better Intelligence Picture: The comprehensive tracing strategy promoted in this Action will enhance the effectiveness of actions addressing firearms trafficking by law enforcement agencies.

Increasing Pressure on Criminal Markets: By addressing illicit SALW trafficking and enhancing cooperation with law enforcement, this Action contributes to increasing pressure on criminal markets.

Stepping Up International Cooperation: This Action enhances the support offered to the Americas and expands the EU’s international cooperation agenda. The Americas region is significantly impacted by firearms-related violence, jeopardizing security and having detrimental consequences globally, including cross-regional firearms trafficking routes and irregular migration due to regional instability.

By addressing these priorities, the project contributes to reducing firearms-related violence in the Americas and enhances regional and international security, demonstrating the EU’s commitment to fostering stability and safety across regions.
12. Reporting

The DPS/OAS will prepare regular reports, in line with the negotiated Delegation Agreement.

(1) UNODC, Global Study on Homicide. 2023. https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/2023/GSH23_ExSum.pdf

(2) UNODC, Global Study on Homicide. 2019. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/global-study-on-homicide.html

(3) UNODC, Global Study on Homicide. 2023. https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/2023/GSH23_ExSum.pdf

(4)
‘27. To request that the SMS, through the DPS and within the framework of the Program of Assistance for the Control of Arms and Munitions (PACAM), which is a voluntary program: a) support the development and implementation of the Central American Roadmap for the Prevention of Illicit Trafficking and Proliferation of Arms and Munitions in coordination with SICA and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC), including the creation of a follow-up mechanism to monitor progress and promote effective coordination among governments, implementing partners, and donors;’ (AG/RES. 3009 – LIII-O/23, adopted on June 23, 2023)

(5)
‘Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens’: EU Strategy against Illicit Firearms, Small Arms and Light Weapons, and their Ammunition, adopted by the Council on November 19th, 2018

(6)
‘Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens’: EU Strategy against Illicit Firearms, Small Arms and Light Weapons, and their Ammunition, adopted by the European Council on November 19th, 2018

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1445 of 8 July 2025 on the request for registration, pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/788 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of the European citizens’ initiative entitled Food is a Human Right for All! Guaranteeing healthy, just and sustainable food systems (notified under document C(2025) 4607)

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1445 1.8.2025
(1) A request for registration of a European citizens’ initiative entitled ‘Food is a Human Right for All! Guaranteeing healthy, just and sustainable food systems’ was submitted to the Commission on 13 June 2025.
(2) That request follows the request for registration of a European citizens’ initiative entitled ‘Food is a Human Right for All!’ which was submitted to the Commission on 31 March 2025.
(3) By letter of 29 April 2025 (C(2025) 2559 final), pursuant to Article 6(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/788, the Commission informed the group of organisers that as regards the request for registration submitted on 31 March 2025, the requirements for registration set out in Article 6(3), first subparagraph, points (a), (d) and (e), of that Regulation were fulfilled and that Article 6(3), first subparagraph, point (b), thereof was not applicable. However, the Commission also explained that the initiative did not fulfil the requirement set out in Article 6(3), first subparagraph, point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2019/788. In particular, the Commission explained that some of the proposals of the organisers did not call on the Commission to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties.
(4) The Commission therefore informed the organisers pursuant to Article 6(4), first subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) 2019/788 that they could either amend the initiative to take into account the Commission’s assessment, or maintain, or withdraw, the initial initiative in accordance with Article 6(4), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) 2019/788.
(5) On 13 June 2025, the group of organisers submitted an amended initiative.
(6) The aim of the amended initiative as expressed by the organisers is to call on the Union ‘to make the right to food a reality and integrate it into’ the Union legal framework that impacts ‘the right to food in the EU and abroad’. The organisers consider that the Union ‘must guarantee the right to food systemically and promote healthy, just, humane and sustainable food systems’. To achieve these goals, the organisers set out fourteen specific objectives calling for the proposal or amendment of Union legal acts in these areas: (i) ‘Fair food systems and democratic governance’; (ii) ‘Support to national social protection initiatives’; (iii) ‘Recognizing that agricultural products and foodstuff are not ordinary commodities’; (iv) ‘Support to peasant agroecology and territorial food systems’; (v) ‘Combating agricultural land’s concentration’; (vi) ‘Support to peasant seed systems’; (vii) ‘Strict regulation of GMOs, including those obtained with new genomic techniques’; (viii) ‘Sustainable water management’; (ix) ‘Strengthening of animal welfare’; (x) ‘Support to fruit and vegetable consumption and regulation of ultra-processed foodstuff’; (xi) ‘Sustainable food procurement’; (xii) ‘Meaningful food labelling’; (xiii) ‘Stopping food waste’; (xiv) ‘Strengthening of the right to food in third countries’.
(7) An annex to the amended initiative provides further details on its background, its subject matter and its objectives. It states that the right to food is ‘guaranteed when everyone has dignified access to adequate food on a sustainable basis’ and lists different measures that could be relevant to the objectives of the initiative. An additional document reproducing the initiative details has also been submitted by the organisers as part of their registration request.
(8) As regards the first, fourth, fifth and sixth objectives of the initiative, the Commission could adopt a proposal on sustainable and fair food systems; a proposal to support peasant agroecology and territorial food systems; propose actions relating to the improvement of gender equality in agricultural jobs and generational renewal; and propose a regulation to support the autonomy of peasant seed systems respectively, on the basis of Articles 38 to 44 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
(9) Concerning the second objective, at this stage it cannot be excluded that the Commission could adopt a proposal to support and complement the activities of the Member States for the social protection of workers and/or the combatting of social exclusion and/or the modernisation of social protection, on the basis of Article 153(1)(c), (j) or (k) TFEU, insofar as the risks of food security can be related to minimum income.
(10) Similarly, as regards the third objective, it cannot be excluded at this stage that the Commission could adopt a proposal for a legal act to recognise that agricultural products and foodstuffs are not ordinary commodities on the basis of Articles 38 to 44 TFEU.
(11) As regards the seventh objective, the Commission could adopt a proposal to regulate GMOs on the basis of Articles 43, 114 and 168(4)(b) TFEU.
(12) Concerning the eighth and thirteenth objectives, the Commission could adopt a proposal on sustainable water management and a proposal on food waste respectively, on the basis of Articles 191 and 192 TFEU.
(13) As regards the ninth objective, the Commission could adopt a proposal to strengthen animal welfare on the basis of Article 43(2) TFEU.
(14) Concerning the tenth objective, the Commission could propose incentive measures for actions that promote healthy and sustainable diets on the basis of Article 168(5) TFEU.
(15) As regards the eleventh objective, at this stage it cannot be excluded that the Commission could adopt a proposal on sustainable food procurement on the basis of Article 114 TFEU.
(16) Concerning the twelfth objective, the Commission could adopt a proposal on food labelling on the basis of Article 114 TFEU.
(17) Finally, concerning the fourteenth objective, at this stage it cannot be excluded that the Commission could adopt a proposal to strengthen the right to food in third countries on the basis of Articles 207, 208 and/or 212 TFEU.
(18) For those reasons, the Commission considers that none of the parts of the initiative manifestly falls outside the framework of the Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties.
(19) That conclusion does not affect the assessment of whether the concrete substantive conditions required for the Commission to act, including compliance with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity and compatibility with fundamental rights, would be met in this case.
(20) The group of organisers has provided appropriate evidence that it fulfils the requirements laid down in Article 5(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/788 and has designated the contact persons in accordance with Article 5(3), first subparagraph, of that Regulation.
(21) The initiative is not manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexatious, nor is it manifestly contrary to the values of the Union as set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union or to the rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
(22) The initiative entitled ‘Food is a Human Right for All! Guaranteeing healthy, just and sustainable food systems’ should therefore be registered.
(23) The conclusion that the conditions for registration under Article 6(3) of Regulation (EU) 2019/788 are fulfilled does not imply that the Commission in any way confirms the factual correctness of the content of the initiative, which is the sole responsibility of the group of organisers of the initiative. The content of the initiative only expresses the views of the group of organisers, and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Commission,
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/788 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on the European citizens’ initiative (1), and in particular Article 6(3) thereof,
Whereas:
(1) A request for registration of a European citizens’ initiative entitled ‘Food is a Human Right for All! Guaranteeing healthy, just and sustainable food systems’ was submitted to the Commission on 13 June 2025.
(2) That request follows the request for registration of a European citizens’ initiative entitled ‘Food is a Human Right for All!’ which was submitted to the Commission on 31 March 2025.
(3) By letter of 29 April 2025 (C(2025) 2559 final), pursuant to Article 6(4) of Regulation (EU) 2019/788, the Commission informed the group of organisers that as regards the request for registration submitted on 31 March 2025, the requirements for registration set out in Article 6(3), first subparagraph, points (a), (d) and (e), of that Regulation were fulfilled and that Article 6(3), first subparagraph, point (b), thereof was not applicable. However, the Commission also explained that the initiative did not fulfil the requirement set out in Article 6(3), first subparagraph, point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2019/788. In particular, the Commission explained that some of the proposals of the organisers did not call on the Commission to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties.
(4) The Commission therefore informed the organisers pursuant to Article 6(4), first subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) 2019/788 that they could either amend the initiative to take into account the Commission’s assessment, or maintain, or withdraw, the initial initiative in accordance with Article 6(4), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) 2019/788.
(5) On 13 June 2025, the group of organisers submitted an amended initiative.
(6) The aim of the amended initiative as expressed by the organisers is to call on the Union ‘to make the right to food a reality and integrate it into’ the Union legal framework that impacts ‘the right to food in the EU and abroad’. The organisers consider that the Union ‘must guarantee the right to food systemically and promote healthy, just, humane and sustainable food systems’. To achieve these goals, the organisers set out fourteen specific objectives calling for the proposal or amendment of Union legal acts in these areas: (i) ‘Fair food systems and democratic governance’; (ii) ‘Support to national social protection initiatives’; (iii) ‘Recognizing that agricultural products and foodstuff are not ordinary commodities’; (iv) ‘Support to peasant agroecology and territorial food systems’; (v) ‘Combating agricultural land’s concentration’; (vi) ‘Support to peasant seed systems’; (vii) ‘Strict regulation of GMOs, including those obtained with new genomic techniques’; (viii) ‘Sustainable water management’; (ix) ‘Strengthening of animal welfare’; (x) ‘Support to fruit and vegetable consumption and regulation of ultra-processed foodstuff’; (xi) ‘Sustainable food procurement’; (xii) ‘Meaningful food labelling’; (xiii) ‘Stopping food waste’; (xiv) ‘Strengthening of the right to food in third countries’.
(7) An annex to the amended initiative provides further details on its background, its subject matter and its objectives. It states that the right to food is ‘guaranteed when everyone has dignified access to adequate food on a sustainable basis’ and lists different measures that could be relevant to the objectives of the initiative. An additional document reproducing the initiative details has also been submitted by the organisers as part of their registration request.
(8) As regards the first, fourth, fifth and sixth objectives of the initiative, the Commission could adopt a proposal on sustainable and fair food systems; a proposal to support peasant agroecology and territorial food systems; propose actions relating to the improvement of gender equality in agricultural jobs and generational renewal; and propose a regulation to support the autonomy of peasant seed systems respectively, on the basis of Articles 38 to 44 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
(9) Concerning the second objective, at this stage it cannot be excluded that the Commission could adopt a proposal to support and complement the activities of the Member States for the social protection of workers and/or the combatting of social exclusion and/or the modernisation of social protection, on the basis of Article 153(1)(c), (j) or (k) TFEU, insofar as the risks of food security can be related to minimum income.
(10) Similarly, as regards the third objective, it cannot be excluded at this stage that the Commission could adopt a proposal for a legal act to recognise that agricultural products and foodstuffs are not ordinary commodities on the basis of Articles 38 to 44 TFEU.
(11) As regards the seventh objective, the Commission could adopt a proposal to regulate GMOs on the basis of Articles 43, 114 and 168(4)(b) TFEU.
(12) Concerning the eighth and thirteenth objectives, the Commission could adopt a proposal on sustainable water management and a proposal on food waste respectively, on the basis of Articles 191 and 192 TFEU.
(13) As regards the ninth objective, the Commission could adopt a proposal to strengthen animal welfare on the basis of Article 43(2) TFEU.
(14) Concerning the tenth objective, the Commission could propose incentive measures for actions that promote healthy and sustainable diets on the basis of Article 168(5) TFEU.
(15) As regards the eleventh objective, at this stage it cannot be excluded that the Commission could adopt a proposal on sustainable food procurement on the basis of Article 114 TFEU.
(16) Concerning the twelfth objective, the Commission could adopt a proposal on food labelling on the basis of Article 114 TFEU.
(17) Finally, concerning the fourteenth objective, at this stage it cannot be excluded that the Commission could adopt a proposal to strengthen the right to food in third countries on the basis of Articles 207, 208 and/or 212 TFEU.
(18) For those reasons, the Commission considers that none of the parts of the initiative manifestly falls outside the framework of the Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties.
(19) That conclusion does not affect the assessment of whether the concrete substantive conditions required for the Commission to act, including compliance with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity and compatibility with fundamental rights, would be met in this case.
(20) The group of organisers has provided appropriate evidence that it fulfils the requirements laid down in Article 5(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/788 and has designated the contact persons in accordance with Article 5(3), first subparagraph, of that Regulation.
(21) The initiative is not manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexatious, nor is it manifestly contrary to the values of the Union as set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union or to the rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
(22) The initiative entitled ‘Food is a Human Right for All! Guaranteeing healthy, just and sustainable food systems’ should therefore be registered.
(23) The conclusion that the conditions for registration under Article 6(3) of Regulation (EU) 2019/788 are fulfilled does not imply that the Commission in any way confirms the factual correctness of the content of the initiative, which is the sole responsibility of the group of organisers of the initiative. The content of the initiative only expresses the views of the group of organisers, and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Commission,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The European citizens’ initiative entitled ‘Food is a Human Right for All! Guaranteeing healthy, just and sustainable food systems’ shall be registered.
This Decision is addressed to the group of organisers of the citizens’ initiative entitled ‘Food is a Human Right for All! Guaranteeing healthy, just and sustainable food systems’, represented by Olga KIKOU and Almudena GARCÍA SASTRE acting as contact persons.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1443 of 15 July 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1443 15.7.2025
(1) On 8 October 2024, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643(1).
(2) The Union remains unwavering in its condemnation of Russia’s malign activities directed against the Union, its Member States, international organisations and third countries.
(3) On 26 June 2025 the European Council adopted conclusions, in which it condemned Russia’s continued hybrid campaign, including sabotage, disruption of critical infrastructure, cyber-attacks, information manipulation and interference, and attempts to undermine democracy, including in the electoral process. The European Council underlined that it would make full use of all means available, including the EU hybrid toolbox, to specifically prevent, deter and respond to Russia’s hybrid threats.
(4) In view of the gravity of the situation, the Council considers that 9 natural persons and 6 legal persons, entities or bodies should be added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in Annex I to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643.
(5) Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 should therefore be amended accordingly,
(1) the following entries are added under the heading ‘A. Natural persons’:NameIdentifying informationStatement of ReasonsDate of listing‘39.Andrey Yuryevich ROMANCHENKO(Russian: Андрей Юрьевич РОМАНЧЕНКО)Function: General Director of the Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS)DOB: 16.10.1960POB: Moscow, Russian SSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: maleRussian Tax ID (ИНН): 771515786260Andrey Yuryevich Romanchenko is the General Director of The Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS), a Russian federal unitary for-profit enterprise of strategic significance, operating terrestrial radio and television broadcasting infrastructure in Russia. Romanchenko, who was appointed as General Director by the Russian President, directs the RTRS, which plays a direct role in implementing policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation by providing the infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called “All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels” such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24 which disseminate Russian state propaganda.Under Romanchenko’s leadership, RTRS has played a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied territories is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the exclusive right to establish transmission infrastructure in the occupied territories. By overseeing and directing these operations, Romanchenko actively facilitates the obstruction of access to diverse and independent information, thereby assuming responsibility for the use of information manipulation.Therefore, Romanchenko, as the head of RTRS, benefits from and implements policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.15.7.202540.Vladimir NAIDENOV(Russian: Владимир НАЙДЕНОВ)Function: Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories of the Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS)Gender: maleNationality: RussianVladimir Naidenov is the Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories at the Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS), a Russian federal unitary for-profit enterprise of strategic significance operating terrestrial radio and television broadcasting infrastructure in Russia. Vladimir Naidenov, is subordinated to the RTRS General Director Andrey Yuryevich Romanchenko, who directs the RTRS and plays a direct role in implementing policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation. RTRS provides infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called “All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels” such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24 which disseminate Russian state propaganda.In his position within the RTRS, Vladimir Naidenov has played a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied regions is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the right to establish transmission infrastructure there.Therefore, Vladimir Naidenov, as the Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories at RTRS, facilitates the obstruction of access to diverse and independent information by coordinating the RTRS infrastructure development in the occupied Ukrainian territories and thus implements policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference15.7.202541.Dmitri BUIMISTRUFunction: TV presenter, actor; bloggerDOB: 26.11.1992POB: Chișinău, Republic of MoldovaNationality: MoldovanGender: maleDmitri Buimistru intentionally engages in coordinated information manipulation and interference by operating as a key propagandist on MD24, a Russia-based online TV channel created by Ilan Shor following license withdrawals from his previous stations for disseminating Russian disinformation. To that end, Buimistru deliberately spreads demonstrably false claims – systematically debunked by independent fact-checkers – regarding NATO drawing Moldova into conflict, imminent revocation of constitutional neutrality, “Romanization” of institutions, misrepresentation of the EU referendum’s constitutional implications, and fabricated trade statistics.Furthermore, his participation in synchronised cross-platform disinformation campaigns is evidenced by the July 2023 Russian embassy surveillance equipment scandal, where his messaging was perfectly coordinated with other pro-Kremlin outlets, demonstrating centralised orchestration. In addition, Buimistru’s “SOSEDI” project has been identified as a key tool in a broader external influence operation. His systematic promotion of other pro-Russian information sources and deployment of consistent messaging tactics specifically designed to undermine Moldova’s sovereignty, European integration, and democratic processes further confirms his deliberate engagement in coordinated information manipulation with a view to serving Russian destabilisation interests in Moldova.Therefore, Dmitri Buimistru is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability in a third country through engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.15.7.202542.Veaceslav VALICOFunction: ActivistDOB: 10.8.1977POB: Chișinău, Republic of MoldovaNationality: MoldovanGender: maleVeaceslav Valico participated, alongside Anatolii Prizenko, a natural person listed by the Union, in the Russian destabilisation operation concerning the painting of the Star of David on the streets of Paris following the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel in exchange for financial compensation and in order to create tensions in French society.Moreover, Veaceslav Valico is involved in the systematic dissemination of disinformation in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, as part of the Russian Federation’s malign hybrid activities.Furthermore, Veaceslav Valico is associated with Anatolii Prizenko, who is an individual listed by the Union. Their association predates their collaboration in the Paris incident.Therefore, Veaceslav Valico is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the stability in a Member State and therefore, in the Union, and in third countries, through planning, directing, and engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.15.7.202543.Simeon BOIKOVFunction: Pro-Russian bloggerDate of birth: 15.2.1990Place of birth: Sydney, AustraliaGender: maleNationality: Australian/RussianSimeon Boikov is an Australian pro-Russian activist known by the pseudonym “Aussie Cossack”. He is recognised for disseminating pro-Kremlin narratives and misinformation, particularly regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Boikov has also been implicated in spreading disinformation related to the 2024 U.S. presidential election, notably by paying an American influencer to post a Storm-1516 fabricated video falsely depicting voter fraud in Georgia.Therefore, Simeon Boikov is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.15.7.202544.Vitaly KULIKOV(Russian: Виталий КУЛИКОВ)Function: Lieutenant Colonel in the Russian military, heading the Electronic Warfare (EW) center of the Baltic FleetNationality: RussianGender: maleLieutenant Colonel Vitaly Kulikov is the commander of the Electronic Warfare (EW) center of the Baltic Fleet also known as the 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center. Vitaly Kulikov oversees exercises of his EW troops in the Kaliningrad region.GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and “spoofing” of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation.The EW center of the Baltic Fleet, under Kulikov’s commands, has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas, and is also involved in planning, supporting and executing coordinated information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States.Therefore, Vitaly Kulikov is responsible for planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States.15.7.202545.Yuri Illarionovich LASTOCHKIN(Russian: Юрий Илларионович ЛАСТОЧКИНUkrainian: Юрій Iлларіонович ЛАСТОЧКIН)Function: Official of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; Military Leader; General-Major/Lieutenant General; Chief of the Electronic Warfare Forces of the Russian Federation/head of Russian Defense Ministry’s Radio-Electronic Warfare (REB) forceDOB: 18.8.1967POB: Rzhavka, Mogilev region, Belarusian SSR (now Belarus)Nationality: RussianGender: maleLieutenant General Yuri Lastochkin is the chief of the Electronic Warfare (EW) Forces of the Russian Federation. Yuri Lastochkin oversees actions and exercises of Russia’s EW troops, including those of the 841st Separate EW center in the Kaliningrad region.Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and “spoofing” of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation.The 841st Separate EW center in the Kaliningrad region, under Lastochkin’s commands, has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas; it is also involved in planning, supporting and executing coordinated information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States.Therefore, Y. I. Lastochkin is responsible for planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States.15.7.202546.Yevgeny Shevchenko(Russian: Евгений ШЕВЧЕНКО)Function: Founder of TigerWebNationality: RussianGender: maleTax identification number: 910202780107Yevgeny Shevchenko is a web developer who has specialised in creating websites for many years. He is the founder of Tigerweb, the web-company that runs the informational manipulation set “Portal Kombat” which disseminates pro-Russian content and targets several Western countries, including France, on several so-called “informational portals”. Therefore, he is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten the stability and security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.15.7.202547Aleksey Nikolayevich SHAVROV(Russian: Алексей Николаевич ШАВРОВ)a.k.a. Andrey PETROV(Russian: Андрей ПЕТРОВ)Function: Military Intelligence Officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU)DOB: 12.12.1989Nationality: RussianGender: maleAleksey Shavrov is a GRU officer involved in Russian influence operations directed to destabilise the Union and its Member States. Aleksey Shavrov´s malign activities include information manipulation and disinformation campaigns in the Czech Republic and other Union Member States. Through his concealed associate, Natallia Sudliankova, Aleksey Shavrov conducts influence campaigns, including by organising the dissemination of tailor-made articles in various European media outlets. Misleading or outright false narratives aim to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and to spread its influence. Moreover, the content is designed to further undermine public trust in the Union values and processes, democracy and Union cohesion. Articles also contain specific manipulative anti-NATO, anti-Ukraine and anti-NGO narratives. Aleksey Shavrov instructed Natallia Sudliankova to spread and disseminate those divisive messages through media to amplify their polarising content. Aleksey Shavrov provided financial rewards for accomplishing tasks and for publication of those custom-made pro-Russian media campaigns.Therefore, Aleksey Shavrov is implementing actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.15.7.2025’ Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing ‘39. Andrey Yuryevich ROMANCHENKO(Russian: Андрей Юрьевич РОМАНЧЕНКО) Function: General Director of the Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS)DOB: 16.10.1960POB: Moscow, Russian SSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: maleRussian Tax ID (ИНН): 771515786260 Andrey Yuryevich Romanchenko is the General Director of The Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS), a Russian federal unitary for-profit enterprise of strategic significance, operating terrestrial radio and television broadcasting infrastructure in Russia. Romanchenko, who was appointed as General Director by the Russian President, directs the RTRS, which plays a direct role in implementing policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation by providing the infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called “All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels” such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24 which disseminate Russian state propaganda.Under Romanchenko’s leadership, RTRS has played a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied territories is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the exclusive right to establish transmission infrastructure in the occupied territories. By overseeing and directing these operations, Romanchenko actively facilitates the obstruction of access to diverse and independent information, thereby assuming responsibility for the use of information manipulation.Therefore, Romanchenko, as the head of RTRS, benefits from and implements policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025 40. Vladimir NAIDENOV(Russian: Владимир НАЙДЕНОВ) Function: Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories of the Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS)Gender: maleNationality: Russian Vladimir Naidenov is the Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories at the Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS), a Russian federal unitary for-profit enterprise of strategic significance operating terrestrial radio and television broadcasting infrastructure in Russia. Vladimir Naidenov, is subordinated to the RTRS General Director Andrey Yuryevich Romanchenko, who directs the RTRS and plays a direct role in implementing policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation. RTRS provides infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called “All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels” such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24 which disseminate Russian state propaganda.In his position within the RTRS, Vladimir Naidenov has played a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied regions is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the right to establish transmission infrastructure there.Therefore, Vladimir Naidenov, as the Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories at RTRS, facilitates the obstruction of access to diverse and independent information by coordinating the RTRS infrastructure development in the occupied Ukrainian territories and thus implements policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference 15.7.2025 41. Dmitri BUIMISTRU Function: TV presenter, actor; bloggerDOB: 26.11.1992POB: Chișinău, Republic of MoldovaNationality: MoldovanGender: male Dmitri Buimistru intentionally engages in coordinated information manipulation and interference by operating as a key propagandist on MD24, a Russia-based online TV channel created by Ilan Shor following license withdrawals from his previous stations for disseminating Russian disinformation. To that end, Buimistru deliberately spreads demonstrably false claims – systematically debunked by independent fact-checkers – regarding NATO drawing Moldova into conflict, imminent revocation of constitutional neutrality, “Romanization” of institutions, misrepresentation of the EU referendum’s constitutional implications, and fabricated trade statistics.Furthermore, his participation in synchronised cross-platform disinformation campaigns is evidenced by the July 2023 Russian embassy surveillance equipment scandal, where his messaging was perfectly coordinated with other pro-Kremlin outlets, demonstrating centralised orchestration. In addition, Buimistru’s “SOSEDI” project has been identified as a key tool in a broader external influence operation. His systematic promotion of other pro-Russian information sources and deployment of consistent messaging tactics specifically designed to undermine Moldova’s sovereignty, European integration, and democratic processes further confirms his deliberate engagement in coordinated information manipulation with a view to serving Russian destabilisation interests in Moldova.Therefore, Dmitri Buimistru is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability in a third country through engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025 42. Veaceslav VALICO Function: ActivistDOB: 10.8.1977POB: Chișinău, Republic of MoldovaNationality: MoldovanGender: male Veaceslav Valico participated, alongside Anatolii Prizenko, a natural person listed by the Union, in the Russian destabilisation operation concerning the painting of the Star of David on the streets of Paris following the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel in exchange for financial compensation and in order to create tensions in French society.Moreover, Veaceslav Valico is involved in the systematic dissemination of disinformation in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, as part of the Russian Federation’s malign hybrid activities.Furthermore, Veaceslav Valico is associated with Anatolii Prizenko, who is an individual listed by the Union. Their association predates their collaboration in the Paris incident.Therefore, Veaceslav Valico is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the stability in a Member State and therefore, in the Union, and in third countries, through planning, directing, and engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025 43. Simeon BOIKOV Function: Pro-Russian bloggerDate of birth: 15.2.1990Place of birth: Sydney, AustraliaGender: maleNationality: Australian/Russian Simeon Boikov is an Australian pro-Russian activist known by the pseudonym “Aussie Cossack”. He is recognised for disseminating pro-Kremlin narratives and misinformation, particularly regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Boikov has also been implicated in spreading disinformation related to the 2024 U.S. presidential election, notably by paying an American influencer to post a Storm-1516 fabricated video falsely depicting voter fraud in Georgia.Therefore, Simeon Boikov is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025 44. Vitaly KULIKOV(Russian: Виталий КУЛИКОВ) Function: Lieutenant Colonel in the Russian military, heading the Electronic Warfare (EW) center of the Baltic FleetNationality: RussianGender: male Lieutenant Colonel Vitaly Kulikov is the commander of the Electronic Warfare (EW) center of the Baltic Fleet also known as the 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center. Vitaly Kulikov oversees exercises of his EW troops in the Kaliningrad region.GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and “spoofing” of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation.The EW center of the Baltic Fleet, under Kulikov’s commands, has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas, and is also involved in planning, supporting and executing coordinated information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States.Therefore, Vitaly Kulikov is responsible for planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States. 15.7.2025 45. Yuri Illarionovich LASTOCHKIN(Russian: Юрий Илларионович ЛАСТОЧКИНUkrainian: Юрій Iлларіонович ЛАСТОЧКIН) Function: Official of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; Military Leader; General-Major/Lieutenant General; Chief of the Electronic Warfare Forces of the Russian Federation/head of Russian Defense Ministry’s Radio-Electronic Warfare (REB) forceDOB: 18.8.1967POB: Rzhavka, Mogilev region, Belarusian SSR (now Belarus)Nationality: RussianGender: male Lieutenant General Yuri Lastochkin is the chief of the Electronic Warfare (EW) Forces of the Russian Federation. Yuri Lastochkin oversees actions and exercises of Russia’s EW troops, including those of the 841st Separate EW center in the Kaliningrad region.Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and “spoofing” of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation.The 841st Separate EW center in the Kaliningrad region, under Lastochkin’s commands, has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas; it is also involved in planning, supporting and executing coordinated information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States.Therefore, Y. I. Lastochkin is responsible for planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States. 15.7.2025 46. Yevgeny Shevchenko(Russian: Евгений ШЕВЧЕНКО) Function: Founder of TigerWebNationality: RussianGender: maleTax identification number: 910202780107 Yevgeny Shevchenko is a web developer who has specialised in creating websites for many years. He is the founder of Tigerweb, the web-company that runs the informational manipulation set “Portal Kombat” which disseminates pro-Russian content and targets several Western countries, including France, on several so-called “informational portals”. Therefore, he is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten the stability and security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025 47 Aleksey Nikolayevich SHAVROV(Russian: Алексей Николаевич ШАВРОВ)a.k.a. Andrey PETROV(Russian: Андрей ПЕТРОВ) Function: Military Intelligence Officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU)DOB: 12.12.1989Nationality: RussianGender: male Aleksey Shavrov is a GRU officer involved in Russian influence operations directed to destabilise the Union and its Member States. Aleksey Shavrov´s malign activities include information manipulation and disinformation campaigns in the Czech Republic and other Union Member States. Through his concealed associate, Natallia Sudliankova, Aleksey Shavrov conducts influence campaigns, including by organising the dissemination of tailor-made articles in various European media outlets. Misleading or outright false narratives aim to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and to spread its influence. Moreover, the content is designed to further undermine public trust in the Union values and processes, democracy and Union cohesion. Articles also contain specific manipulative anti-NATO, anti-Ukraine and anti-NGO narratives. Aleksey Shavrov instructed Natallia Sudliankova to spread and disseminate those divisive messages through media to amplify their polarising content. Aleksey Shavrov provided financial rewards for accomplishing tasks and for publication of those custom-made pro-Russian media campaigns.Therefore, Aleksey Shavrov is implementing actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025’
Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing
‘39. Andrey Yuryevich ROMANCHENKO(Russian: Андрей Юрьевич РОМАНЧЕНКО) Function: General Director of the Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS)DOB: 16.10.1960POB: Moscow, Russian SSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: maleRussian Tax ID (ИНН): 771515786260 Andrey Yuryevich Romanchenko is the General Director of The Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS), a Russian federal unitary for-profit enterprise of strategic significance, operating terrestrial radio and television broadcasting infrastructure in Russia. Romanchenko, who was appointed as General Director by the Russian President, directs the RTRS, which plays a direct role in implementing policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation by providing the infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called “All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels” such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24 which disseminate Russian state propaganda.Under Romanchenko’s leadership, RTRS has played a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied territories is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the exclusive right to establish transmission infrastructure in the occupied territories. By overseeing and directing these operations, Romanchenko actively facilitates the obstruction of access to diverse and independent information, thereby assuming responsibility for the use of information manipulation.Therefore, Romanchenko, as the head of RTRS, benefits from and implements policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025
40. Vladimir NAIDENOV(Russian: Владимир НАЙДЕНОВ) Function: Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories of the Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS)Gender: maleNationality: Russian Vladimir Naidenov is the Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories at the Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS), a Russian federal unitary for-profit enterprise of strategic significance operating terrestrial radio and television broadcasting infrastructure in Russia. Vladimir Naidenov, is subordinated to the RTRS General Director Andrey Yuryevich Romanchenko, who directs the RTRS and plays a direct role in implementing policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation. RTRS provides infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called “All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels” such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24 which disseminate Russian state propaganda.In his position within the RTRS, Vladimir Naidenov has played a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied regions is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the right to establish transmission infrastructure there.Therefore, Vladimir Naidenov, as the Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories at RTRS, facilitates the obstruction of access to diverse and independent information by coordinating the RTRS infrastructure development in the occupied Ukrainian territories and thus implements policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference 15.7.2025
41. Dmitri BUIMISTRU Function: TV presenter, actor; bloggerDOB: 26.11.1992POB: Chișinău, Republic of MoldovaNationality: MoldovanGender: male Dmitri Buimistru intentionally engages in coordinated information manipulation and interference by operating as a key propagandist on MD24, a Russia-based online TV channel created by Ilan Shor following license withdrawals from his previous stations for disseminating Russian disinformation. To that end, Buimistru deliberately spreads demonstrably false claims – systematically debunked by independent fact-checkers – regarding NATO drawing Moldova into conflict, imminent revocation of constitutional neutrality, “Romanization” of institutions, misrepresentation of the EU referendum’s constitutional implications, and fabricated trade statistics.Furthermore, his participation in synchronised cross-platform disinformation campaigns is evidenced by the July 2023 Russian embassy surveillance equipment scandal, where his messaging was perfectly coordinated with other pro-Kremlin outlets, demonstrating centralised orchestration. In addition, Buimistru’s “SOSEDI” project has been identified as a key tool in a broader external influence operation. His systematic promotion of other pro-Russian information sources and deployment of consistent messaging tactics specifically designed to undermine Moldova’s sovereignty, European integration, and democratic processes further confirms his deliberate engagement in coordinated information manipulation with a view to serving Russian destabilisation interests in Moldova.Therefore, Dmitri Buimistru is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability in a third country through engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025
42. Veaceslav VALICO Function: ActivistDOB: 10.8.1977POB: Chișinău, Republic of MoldovaNationality: MoldovanGender: male Veaceslav Valico participated, alongside Anatolii Prizenko, a natural person listed by the Union, in the Russian destabilisation operation concerning the painting of the Star of David on the streets of Paris following the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel in exchange for financial compensation and in order to create tensions in French society.Moreover, Veaceslav Valico is involved in the systematic dissemination of disinformation in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, as part of the Russian Federation’s malign hybrid activities.Furthermore, Veaceslav Valico is associated with Anatolii Prizenko, who is an individual listed by the Union. Their association predates their collaboration in the Paris incident.Therefore, Veaceslav Valico is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the stability in a Member State and therefore, in the Union, and in third countries, through planning, directing, and engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025
43. Simeon BOIKOV Function: Pro-Russian bloggerDate of birth: 15.2.1990Place of birth: Sydney, AustraliaGender: maleNationality: Australian/Russian Simeon Boikov is an Australian pro-Russian activist known by the pseudonym “Aussie Cossack”. He is recognised for disseminating pro-Kremlin narratives and misinformation, particularly regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Boikov has also been implicated in spreading disinformation related to the 2024 U.S. presidential election, notably by paying an American influencer to post a Storm-1516 fabricated video falsely depicting voter fraud in Georgia.Therefore, Simeon Boikov is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025
44. Vitaly KULIKOV(Russian: Виталий КУЛИКОВ) Function: Lieutenant Colonel in the Russian military, heading the Electronic Warfare (EW) center of the Baltic FleetNationality: RussianGender: male Lieutenant Colonel Vitaly Kulikov is the commander of the Electronic Warfare (EW) center of the Baltic Fleet also known as the 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center. Vitaly Kulikov oversees exercises of his EW troops in the Kaliningrad region.GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and “spoofing” of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation.The EW center of the Baltic Fleet, under Kulikov’s commands, has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas, and is also involved in planning, supporting and executing coordinated information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States.Therefore, Vitaly Kulikov is responsible for planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States. 15.7.2025
45. Yuri Illarionovich LASTOCHKIN(Russian: Юрий Илларионович ЛАСТОЧКИНUkrainian: Юрій Iлларіонович ЛАСТОЧКIН) Function: Official of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; Military Leader; General-Major/Lieutenant General; Chief of the Electronic Warfare Forces of the Russian Federation/head of Russian Defense Ministry’s Radio-Electronic Warfare (REB) forceDOB: 18.8.1967POB: Rzhavka, Mogilev region, Belarusian SSR (now Belarus)Nationality: RussianGender: male Lieutenant General Yuri Lastochkin is the chief of the Electronic Warfare (EW) Forces of the Russian Federation. Yuri Lastochkin oversees actions and exercises of Russia’s EW troops, including those of the 841st Separate EW center in the Kaliningrad region.Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and “spoofing” of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation.The 841st Separate EW center in the Kaliningrad region, under Lastochkin’s commands, has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas; it is also involved in planning, supporting and executing coordinated information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States.Therefore, Y. I. Lastochkin is responsible for planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States. 15.7.2025
46. Yevgeny Shevchenko(Russian: Евгений ШЕВЧЕНКО) Function: Founder of TigerWebNationality: RussianGender: maleTax identification number: 910202780107 Yevgeny Shevchenko is a web developer who has specialised in creating websites for many years. He is the founder of Tigerweb, the web-company that runs the informational manipulation set “Portal Kombat” which disseminates pro-Russian content and targets several Western countries, including France, on several so-called “informational portals”. Therefore, he is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten the stability and security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025
47 Aleksey Nikolayevich SHAVROV(Russian: Алексей Николаевич ШАВРОВ)a.k.a. Andrey PETROV(Russian: Андрей ПЕТРОВ) Function: Military Intelligence Officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU)DOB: 12.12.1989Nationality: RussianGender: male Aleksey Shavrov is a GRU officer involved in Russian influence operations directed to destabilise the Union and its Member States. Aleksey Shavrov´s malign activities include information manipulation and disinformation campaigns in the Czech Republic and other Union Member States. Through his concealed associate, Natallia Sudliankova, Aleksey Shavrov conducts influence campaigns, including by organising the dissemination of tailor-made articles in various European media outlets. Misleading or outright false narratives aim to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and to spread its influence. Moreover, the content is designed to further undermine public trust in the Union values and processes, democracy and Union cohesion. Articles also contain specific manipulative anti-NATO, anti-Ukraine and anti-NGO narratives. Aleksey Shavrov instructed Natallia Sudliankova to spread and disseminate those divisive messages through media to amplify their polarising content. Aleksey Shavrov provided financial rewards for accomplishing tasks and for publication of those custom-made pro-Russian media campaigns.Therefore, Aleksey Shavrov is implementing actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025’
Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing
‘39. Andrey Yuryevich ROMANCHENKO(Russian: Андрей Юрьевич РОМАНЧЕНКО) Function: General Director of the Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS)DOB: 16.10.1960POB: Moscow, Russian SSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: maleRussian Tax ID (ИНН): 771515786260 Andrey Yuryevich Romanchenko is the General Director of The Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS), a Russian federal unitary for-profit enterprise of strategic significance, operating terrestrial radio and television broadcasting infrastructure in Russia. Romanchenko, who was appointed as General Director by the Russian President, directs the RTRS, which plays a direct role in implementing policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation by providing the infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called “All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels” such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24 which disseminate Russian state propaganda.Under Romanchenko’s leadership, RTRS has played a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied territories is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the exclusive right to establish transmission infrastructure in the occupied territories. By overseeing and directing these operations, Romanchenko actively facilitates the obstruction of access to diverse and independent information, thereby assuming responsibility for the use of information manipulation.Therefore, Romanchenko, as the head of RTRS, benefits from and implements policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025
40. Vladimir NAIDENOV(Russian: Владимир НАЙДЕНОВ) Function: Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories of the Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS)Gender: maleNationality: Russian Vladimir Naidenov is the Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories at the Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS), a Russian federal unitary for-profit enterprise of strategic significance operating terrestrial radio and television broadcasting infrastructure in Russia. Vladimir Naidenov, is subordinated to the RTRS General Director Andrey Yuryevich Romanchenko, who directs the RTRS and plays a direct role in implementing policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation. RTRS provides infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called “All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels” such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24 which disseminate Russian state propaganda.In his position within the RTRS, Vladimir Naidenov has played a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied regions is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the right to establish transmission infrastructure there.Therefore, Vladimir Naidenov, as the Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories at RTRS, facilitates the obstruction of access to diverse and independent information by coordinating the RTRS infrastructure development in the occupied Ukrainian territories and thus implements policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference 15.7.2025
41. Dmitri BUIMISTRU Function: TV presenter, actor; bloggerDOB: 26.11.1992POB: Chișinău, Republic of MoldovaNationality: MoldovanGender: male Dmitri Buimistru intentionally engages in coordinated information manipulation and interference by operating as a key propagandist on MD24, a Russia-based online TV channel created by Ilan Shor following license withdrawals from his previous stations for disseminating Russian disinformation. To that end, Buimistru deliberately spreads demonstrably false claims – systematically debunked by independent fact-checkers – regarding NATO drawing Moldova into conflict, imminent revocation of constitutional neutrality, “Romanization” of institutions, misrepresentation of the EU referendum’s constitutional implications, and fabricated trade statistics.Furthermore, his participation in synchronised cross-platform disinformation campaigns is evidenced by the July 2023 Russian embassy surveillance equipment scandal, where his messaging was perfectly coordinated with other pro-Kremlin outlets, demonstrating centralised orchestration. In addition, Buimistru’s “SOSEDI” project has been identified as a key tool in a broader external influence operation. His systematic promotion of other pro-Russian information sources and deployment of consistent messaging tactics specifically designed to undermine Moldova’s sovereignty, European integration, and democratic processes further confirms his deliberate engagement in coordinated information manipulation with a view to serving Russian destabilisation interests in Moldova.Therefore, Dmitri Buimistru is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability in a third country through engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025
42. Veaceslav VALICO Function: ActivistDOB: 10.8.1977POB: Chișinău, Republic of MoldovaNationality: MoldovanGender: male Veaceslav Valico participated, alongside Anatolii Prizenko, a natural person listed by the Union, in the Russian destabilisation operation concerning the painting of the Star of David on the streets of Paris following the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel in exchange for financial compensation and in order to create tensions in French society.Moreover, Veaceslav Valico is involved in the systematic dissemination of disinformation in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, as part of the Russian Federation’s malign hybrid activities.Furthermore, Veaceslav Valico is associated with Anatolii Prizenko, who is an individual listed by the Union. Their association predates their collaboration in the Paris incident.Therefore, Veaceslav Valico is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the stability in a Member State and therefore, in the Union, and in third countries, through planning, directing, and engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025
43. Simeon BOIKOV Function: Pro-Russian bloggerDate of birth: 15.2.1990Place of birth: Sydney, AustraliaGender: maleNationality: Australian/Russian Simeon Boikov is an Australian pro-Russian activist known by the pseudonym “Aussie Cossack”. He is recognised for disseminating pro-Kremlin narratives and misinformation, particularly regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Boikov has also been implicated in spreading disinformation related to the 2024 U.S. presidential election, notably by paying an American influencer to post a Storm-1516 fabricated video falsely depicting voter fraud in Georgia.Therefore, Simeon Boikov is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025
44. Vitaly KULIKOV(Russian: Виталий КУЛИКОВ) Function: Lieutenant Colonel in the Russian military, heading the Electronic Warfare (EW) center of the Baltic FleetNationality: RussianGender: male Lieutenant Colonel Vitaly Kulikov is the commander of the Electronic Warfare (EW) center of the Baltic Fleet also known as the 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center. Vitaly Kulikov oversees exercises of his EW troops in the Kaliningrad region.GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and “spoofing” of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation.The EW center of the Baltic Fleet, under Kulikov’s commands, has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas, and is also involved in planning, supporting and executing coordinated information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States.Therefore, Vitaly Kulikov is responsible for planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States. 15.7.2025
45. Yuri Illarionovich LASTOCHKIN(Russian: Юрий Илларионович ЛАСТОЧКИНUkrainian: Юрій Iлларіонович ЛАСТОЧКIН) Function: Official of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; Military Leader; General-Major/Lieutenant General; Chief of the Electronic Warfare Forces of the Russian Federation/head of Russian Defense Ministry’s Radio-Electronic Warfare (REB) forceDOB: 18.8.1967POB: Rzhavka, Mogilev region, Belarusian SSR (now Belarus)Nationality: RussianGender: male Lieutenant General Yuri Lastochkin is the chief of the Electronic Warfare (EW) Forces of the Russian Federation. Yuri Lastochkin oversees actions and exercises of Russia’s EW troops, including those of the 841st Separate EW center in the Kaliningrad region.Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and “spoofing” of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation.The 841st Separate EW center in the Kaliningrad region, under Lastochkin’s commands, has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas; it is also involved in planning, supporting and executing coordinated information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States.Therefore, Y. I. Lastochkin is responsible for planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States. 15.7.2025
46. Yevgeny Shevchenko(Russian: Евгений ШЕВЧЕНКО) Function: Founder of TigerWebNationality: RussianGender: maleTax identification number: 910202780107 Yevgeny Shevchenko is a web developer who has specialised in creating websites for many years. He is the founder of Tigerweb, the web-company that runs the informational manipulation set “Portal Kombat” which disseminates pro-Russian content and targets several Western countries, including France, on several so-called “informational portals”. Therefore, he is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten the stability and security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025
47 Aleksey Nikolayevich SHAVROV(Russian: Алексей Николаевич ШАВРОВ)a.k.a. Andrey PETROV(Russian: Андрей ПЕТРОВ) Function: Military Intelligence Officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU)DOB: 12.12.1989Nationality: RussianGender: male Aleksey Shavrov is a GRU officer involved in Russian influence operations directed to destabilise the Union and its Member States. Aleksey Shavrov´s malign activities include information manipulation and disinformation campaigns in the Czech Republic and other Union Member States. Through his concealed associate, Natallia Sudliankova, Aleksey Shavrov conducts influence campaigns, including by organising the dissemination of tailor-made articles in various European media outlets. Misleading or outright false narratives aim to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and to spread its influence. Moreover, the content is designed to further undermine public trust in the Union values and processes, democracy and Union cohesion. Articles also contain specific manipulative anti-NATO, anti-Ukraine and anti-NGO narratives. Aleksey Shavrov instructed Natallia Sudliankova to spread and disseminate those divisive messages through media to amplify their polarising content. Aleksey Shavrov provided financial rewards for accomplishing tasks and for publication of those custom-made pro-Russian media campaigns.Therefore, Aleksey Shavrov is implementing actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025’
(2) the following entries are added under the heading ‘B. Legal persons, entities and bodies’:NameIdentifying informationStatement of ReasonsDate of listing‘10.Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS);Федеральное государственное унитарное предприятие “Российская телевизионная и радиовещательная сеть”Address: 13, Korolyov street, Moscow, RussiaWebsite:https://moscow.rtrs.ru/Place of registration: 13, Korolyov street, Moscow, RussiaDate of registration: 30.11.2001Registration number: ИНН: 7717127211; ОГРН: 1027739456084The Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS) operatеs Russia’s terrestrial broadcasting infrastructure. It is directly subordinated to the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation and operates under the authority of a general director appointed by the Russian President. RTRS provides infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called “All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels” such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24. RTRS plays a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied regions is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the right to establish transmission infrastructure there.Therefore, RTRS is implementing and benefiting from policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.15.7.202511.841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center of the Baltic Fleet841-й центр радиоэлектронной борьбыAddress: 238580, Kaliningrad oblast, Yantarny settlement, Balebin street, 09643238580, Калининградская обл., пгт.Янтарный, ул.Балебина, в/ч 09643Type of entity: Military unitPlace of registration: Kalininingrad region, Russian FederationPhone number: 8(40153)37-244Military unit 09643The 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center is at the core of one of the strongest electronic warfare groups in Russia. The centre is responsible for using technology to disorganise any system of shortwave communication, conducting electronic warfare exercises (EW) to disrupt enemy navigation and radio communications as well as for the collection and analysis of intelligence information obtained by observing electromagnetic radiation in the short and ultrashort wave ranges.Several European countries have experienced GPS signal failures, which have been attributed to electronic warfare activities by Russia, specifically from Kaliningrad. This includes deliberate jamming and “spoofing” of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. Interference and manipulation of GPS signals has led to obstacles for landing civil planes.The 841st Separate EW Center in Kaliningrad has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas.Therefore, 841st Separate EW Center, as part of Russia’s military forces enabling the misuse of radio frequency sector, is responsible for engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States.15.7.202512.BRICS Journalist AssociationWebsite: bricspress.liveThe BRICS Journalists Association (BJA) is a Russian NGO linked to the Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI), created by Yevgeny Prigozhin, and headed by Oksana Vovk (Mira Terada). The BJA has been used as a vehicle to disseminate pro-Russian narratives and disinformation under the guise of independent journalism, including fake content originating from the Storm-1516 Information Manipulation Set (IMS).Therefore, the BJA is responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States or in a third country through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.15.7.202513.Center for Geopolitical ExpertiseЦентр геополитических экспертиз, CGEWebsite: cge.evrazia.ru, cge.suPlace of registration: Ul. Dinamovskaya D.1a, Office 409, Moscow, RUS, 109044Date of registration: 17.12.2002Registration number: 1027739806940The Center for Geopolitical Expertise (CGE) is a Moscow-based think tank founded by Aleksandr Dugin, and headed by Valery Korovin, accused of orchestrating disinformation campaigns aimed at targeting Ukrainian interests, discrediting Western political figures, and influencing electoral processes in Western countries. CGE and its director, Valery Mikhaylovich Korovin, are reportedly involved in creating and disseminating false information by utilising artificial intelligence tools to produce deepfake videos, and supporting a network of hundreds of fake news websites. CGE is alleged to have worked closely with Russia’s military intelligence agency (GRU), receiving financial support to carry out these operations.Therefore, the CGE is responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.15.7.202514.Foundation to Battle InjusticeDate of creation: 23.3.2021Website: fondfbr.ruThe Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI) is a fake human-rights defence NGO created in March 2021 by Wagner group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin. The R-FBI has been involved in numerous information operations targeting France and Ukraine, including a campaign accusing French soldiers of having kidnapped children from Niger just after the military coup d’état in 2023. Since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023, the R-FBI has been involved in the amplification of numerous Storm-1516’s information operations.Therefore, the R-FBI is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States, or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.15.7.202515.TigerwebWebsite: Tigerweb.ruPlace of registration: 295000, Krim Republic, Simferopol City, Oktyabirskaya Street, 3, Office 408Date of registration: 2019Registration number: 1199112018973Tigerweb is the Russian Crimea-based web-company that operates the informational manipulation project “Portal Kombat”, which disseminates pro-Russian content and targets several Western countries, including France, through various so-called “informational portals”.Therefore, Tigerweb is involved in the implementation of actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten the stability and security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States, or in third countries, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.15.7.2025’ Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing ‘10. Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS);Федеральное государственное унитарное предприятие “Российская телевизионная и радиовещательная сеть” Address: 13, Korolyov street, Moscow, RussiaWebsite:https://moscow.rtrs.ru/Place of registration: 13, Korolyov street, Moscow, RussiaDate of registration: 30.11.2001Registration number: ИНН: 7717127211; ОГРН: 1027739456084 The Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS) operatеs Russia’s terrestrial broadcasting infrastructure. It is directly subordinated to the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation and operates under the authority of a general director appointed by the Russian President. RTRS provides infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called “All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels” such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24. RTRS plays a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied regions is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the right to establish transmission infrastructure there.Therefore, RTRS is implementing and benefiting from policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025 11. 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center of the Baltic Fleet841-й центр радиоэлектронной борьбы Address: 238580, Kaliningrad oblast, Yantarny settlement, Balebin street, 09643238580, Калининградская обл., пгт.Янтарный, ул.Балебина, в/ч 09643Type of entity: Military unitPlace of registration: Kalininingrad region, Russian FederationPhone number: 8(40153)37-244Military unit 09643 The 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center is at the core of one of the strongest electronic warfare groups in Russia. The centre is responsible for using technology to disorganise any system of shortwave communication, conducting electronic warfare exercises (EW) to disrupt enemy navigation and radio communications as well as for the collection and analysis of intelligence information obtained by observing electromagnetic radiation in the short and ultrashort wave ranges.Several European countries have experienced GPS signal failures, which have been attributed to electronic warfare activities by Russia, specifically from Kaliningrad. This includes deliberate jamming and “spoofing” of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. Interference and manipulation of GPS signals has led to obstacles for landing civil planes.The 841st Separate EW Center in Kaliningrad has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas.Therefore, 841st Separate EW Center, as part of Russia’s military forces enabling the misuse of radio frequency sector, is responsible for engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States. 15.7.2025 12. BRICS Journalist Association Website: bricspress.live The BRICS Journalists Association (BJA) is a Russian NGO linked to the Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI), created by Yevgeny Prigozhin, and headed by Oksana Vovk (Mira Terada). The BJA has been used as a vehicle to disseminate pro-Russian narratives and disinformation under the guise of independent journalism, including fake content originating from the Storm-1516 Information Manipulation Set (IMS).Therefore, the BJA is responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States or in a third country through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025 13. Center for Geopolitical ExpertiseЦентр геополитических экспертиз, CGE Website: cge.evrazia.ru, cge.suPlace of registration: Ul. Dinamovskaya D.1a, Office 409, Moscow, RUS, 109044Date of registration: 17.12.2002Registration number: 1027739806940 The Center for Geopolitical Expertise (CGE) is a Moscow-based think tank founded by Aleksandr Dugin, and headed by Valery Korovin, accused of orchestrating disinformation campaigns aimed at targeting Ukrainian interests, discrediting Western political figures, and influencing electoral processes in Western countries. CGE and its director, Valery Mikhaylovich Korovin, are reportedly involved in creating and disseminating false information by utilising artificial intelligence tools to produce deepfake videos, and supporting a network of hundreds of fake news websites. CGE is alleged to have worked closely with Russia’s military intelligence agency (GRU), receiving financial support to carry out these operations.Therefore, the CGE is responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025 14. Foundation to Battle Injustice Date of creation: 23.3.2021Website: fondfbr.ru The Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI) is a fake human-rights defence NGO created in March 2021 by Wagner group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin. The R-FBI has been involved in numerous information operations targeting France and Ukraine, including a campaign accusing French soldiers of having kidnapped children from Niger just after the military coup d’état in 2023. Since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023, the R-FBI has been involved in the amplification of numerous Storm-1516’s information operations.Therefore, the R-FBI is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States, or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025 15. Tigerweb Website: Tigerweb.ruPlace of registration: 295000, Krim Republic, Simferopol City, Oktyabirskaya Street, 3, Office 408Date of registration: 2019Registration number: 1199112018973 Tigerweb is the Russian Crimea-based web-company that operates the informational manipulation project “Portal Kombat”, which disseminates pro-Russian content and targets several Western countries, including France, through various so-called “informational portals”.Therefore, Tigerweb is involved in the implementation of actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten the stability and security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States, or in third countries, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025’
Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing
‘10. Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS);Федеральное государственное унитарное предприятие “Российская телевизионная и радиовещательная сеть” Address: 13, Korolyov street, Moscow, RussiaWebsite:https://moscow.rtrs.ru/Place of registration: 13, Korolyov street, Moscow, RussiaDate of registration: 30.11.2001Registration number: ИНН: 7717127211; ОГРН: 1027739456084 The Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS) operatеs Russia’s terrestrial broadcasting infrastructure. It is directly subordinated to the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation and operates under the authority of a general director appointed by the Russian President. RTRS provides infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called “All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels” such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24. RTRS plays a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied regions is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the right to establish transmission infrastructure there.Therefore, RTRS is implementing and benefiting from policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025
11. 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center of the Baltic Fleet841-й центр радиоэлектронной борьбы Address: 238580, Kaliningrad oblast, Yantarny settlement, Balebin street, 09643238580, Калининградская обл., пгт.Янтарный, ул.Балебина, в/ч 09643Type of entity: Military unitPlace of registration: Kalininingrad region, Russian FederationPhone number: 8(40153)37-244Military unit 09643 The 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center is at the core of one of the strongest electronic warfare groups in Russia. The centre is responsible for using technology to disorganise any system of shortwave communication, conducting electronic warfare exercises (EW) to disrupt enemy navigation and radio communications as well as for the collection and analysis of intelligence information obtained by observing electromagnetic radiation in the short and ultrashort wave ranges.Several European countries have experienced GPS signal failures, which have been attributed to electronic warfare activities by Russia, specifically from Kaliningrad. This includes deliberate jamming and “spoofing” of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. Interference and manipulation of GPS signals has led to obstacles for landing civil planes.The 841st Separate EW Center in Kaliningrad has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas.Therefore, 841st Separate EW Center, as part of Russia’s military forces enabling the misuse of radio frequency sector, is responsible for engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States. 15.7.2025
12. BRICS Journalist Association Website: bricspress.live The BRICS Journalists Association (BJA) is a Russian NGO linked to the Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI), created by Yevgeny Prigozhin, and headed by Oksana Vovk (Mira Terada). The BJA has been used as a vehicle to disseminate pro-Russian narratives and disinformation under the guise of independent journalism, including fake content originating from the Storm-1516 Information Manipulation Set (IMS).Therefore, the BJA is responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States or in a third country through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025
13. Center for Geopolitical ExpertiseЦентр геополитических экспертиз, CGE Website: cge.evrazia.ru, cge.suPlace of registration: Ul. Dinamovskaya D.1a, Office 409, Moscow, RUS, 109044Date of registration: 17.12.2002Registration number: 1027739806940 The Center for Geopolitical Expertise (CGE) is a Moscow-based think tank founded by Aleksandr Dugin, and headed by Valery Korovin, accused of orchestrating disinformation campaigns aimed at targeting Ukrainian interests, discrediting Western political figures, and influencing electoral processes in Western countries. CGE and its director, Valery Mikhaylovich Korovin, are reportedly involved in creating and disseminating false information by utilising artificial intelligence tools to produce deepfake videos, and supporting a network of hundreds of fake news websites. CGE is alleged to have worked closely with Russia’s military intelligence agency (GRU), receiving financial support to carry out these operations.Therefore, the CGE is responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025
14. Foundation to Battle Injustice Date of creation: 23.3.2021Website: fondfbr.ru The Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI) is a fake human-rights defence NGO created in March 2021 by Wagner group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin. The R-FBI has been involved in numerous information operations targeting France and Ukraine, including a campaign accusing French soldiers of having kidnapped children from Niger just after the military coup d’état in 2023. Since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023, the R-FBI has been involved in the amplification of numerous Storm-1516’s information operations.Therefore, the R-FBI is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States, or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025
15. Tigerweb Website: Tigerweb.ruPlace of registration: 295000, Krim Republic, Simferopol City, Oktyabirskaya Street, 3, Office 408Date of registration: 2019Registration number: 1199112018973 Tigerweb is the Russian Crimea-based web-company that operates the informational manipulation project “Portal Kombat”, which disseminates pro-Russian content and targets several Western countries, including France, through various so-called “informational portals”.Therefore, Tigerweb is involved in the implementation of actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten the stability and security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States, or in third countries, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025’
Name Identifying information Statement of Reasons Date of listing
‘10. Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS);Федеральное государственное унитарное предприятие “Российская телевизионная и радиовещательная сеть” Address: 13, Korolyov street, Moscow, RussiaWebsite:https://moscow.rtrs.ru/Place of registration: 13, Korolyov street, Moscow, RussiaDate of registration: 30.11.2001Registration number: ИНН: 7717127211; ОГРН: 1027739456084 The Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS) operatеs Russia’s terrestrial broadcasting infrastructure. It is directly subordinated to the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation and operates under the authority of a general director appointed by the Russian President. RTRS provides infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called “All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels” such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24. RTRS plays a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied regions is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the right to establish transmission infrastructure there.Therefore, RTRS is implementing and benefiting from policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025
11. 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center of the Baltic Fleet841-й центр радиоэлектронной борьбы Address: 238580, Kaliningrad oblast, Yantarny settlement, Balebin street, 09643238580, Калининградская обл., пгт.Янтарный, ул.Балебина, в/ч 09643Type of entity: Military unitPlace of registration: Kalininingrad region, Russian FederationPhone number: 8(40153)37-244Military unit 09643 The 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center is at the core of one of the strongest electronic warfare groups in Russia. The centre is responsible for using technology to disorganise any system of shortwave communication, conducting electronic warfare exercises (EW) to disrupt enemy navigation and radio communications as well as for the collection and analysis of intelligence information obtained by observing electromagnetic radiation in the short and ultrashort wave ranges.Several European countries have experienced GPS signal failures, which have been attributed to electronic warfare activities by Russia, specifically from Kaliningrad. This includes deliberate jamming and “spoofing” of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. Interference and manipulation of GPS signals has led to obstacles for landing civil planes.The 841st Separate EW Center in Kaliningrad has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas.Therefore, 841st Separate EW Center, as part of Russia’s military forces enabling the misuse of radio frequency sector, is responsible for engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States. 15.7.2025
12. BRICS Journalist Association Website: bricspress.live The BRICS Journalists Association (BJA) is a Russian NGO linked to the Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI), created by Yevgeny Prigozhin, and headed by Oksana Vovk (Mira Terada). The BJA has been used as a vehicle to disseminate pro-Russian narratives and disinformation under the guise of independent journalism, including fake content originating from the Storm-1516 Information Manipulation Set (IMS).Therefore, the BJA is responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States or in a third country through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025
13. Center for Geopolitical ExpertiseЦентр геополитических экспертиз, CGE Website: cge.evrazia.ru, cge.suPlace of registration: Ul. Dinamovskaya D.1a, Office 409, Moscow, RUS, 109044Date of registration: 17.12.2002Registration number: 1027739806940 The Center for Geopolitical Expertise (CGE) is a Moscow-based think tank founded by Aleksandr Dugin, and headed by Valery Korovin, accused of orchestrating disinformation campaigns aimed at targeting Ukrainian interests, discrediting Western political figures, and influencing electoral processes in Western countries. CGE and its director, Valery Mikhaylovich Korovin, are reportedly involved in creating and disseminating false information by utilising artificial intelligence tools to produce deepfake videos, and supporting a network of hundreds of fake news websites. CGE is alleged to have worked closely with Russia’s military intelligence agency (GRU), receiving financial support to carry out these operations.Therefore, the CGE is responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025
14. Foundation to Battle Injustice Date of creation: 23.3.2021Website: fondfbr.ru The Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI) is a fake human-rights defence NGO created in March 2021 by Wagner group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin. The R-FBI has been involved in numerous information operations targeting France and Ukraine, including a campaign accusing French soldiers of having kidnapped children from Niger just after the military coup d’état in 2023. Since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023, the R-FBI has been involved in the amplification of numerous Storm-1516’s information operations.Therefore, the R-FBI is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States, or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025
15. Tigerweb Website: Tigerweb.ruPlace of registration: 295000, Krim Republic, Simferopol City, Oktyabirskaya Street, 3, Office 408Date of registration: 2019Registration number: 1199112018973 Tigerweb is the Russian Crimea-based web-company that operates the informational manipulation project “Portal Kombat”, which disseminates pro-Russian content and targets several Western countries, including France, through various so-called “informational portals”.Therefore, Tigerweb is involved in the implementation of actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten the stability and security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States, or in third countries, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. 15.7.2025’
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 8 October 2024, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 (1).
(2) The Union remains unwavering in its condemnation of Russia’s malign activities directed against the Union, its Member States, international organisations and third countries.
(3) On 26 June 2025 the European Council adopted conclusions, in which it condemned Russia’s continued hybrid campaign, including sabotage, disruption of critical infrastructure, cyber-attacks, information manipulation and interference, and attempts to undermine democracy, including in the electoral process. The European Council underlined that it would make full use of all means available, including the EU hybrid toolbox, to specifically prevent, deter and respond to Russia’s hybrid threats.
(4) In view of the gravity of the situation, the Council considers that 9 natural persons and 6 legal persons, entities or bodies should be added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in Annex I to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643.
(5) Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 should therefore be amended accordingly,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Annex I to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Annex I to Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 is amended as follows:

(1) the following entries are added under the heading ‘A. Natural persons’:

Name
Identifying information
Statement of Reasons
Date of listing
‘39. Andrey Yuryevich ROMANCHENKO
(Russian: Андрей Юрьевич РОМАНЧЕНКО)
Function: General Director of the Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS)
DOB: 16.10.1960
POB: Moscow, Russian SSR (now Russian Federation)
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
Russian Tax ID (ИНН): 771515786260
Andrey Yuryevich Romanchenko is the General Director of The Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS), a Russian federal unitary for-profit enterprise of strategic significance, operating terrestrial radio and television broadcasting infrastructure in Russia. Romanchenko, who was appointed as General Director by the Russian President, directs the RTRS, which plays a direct role in implementing policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation by providing the infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called “All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels” such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24 which disseminate Russian state propaganda.
Under Romanchenko’s leadership, RTRS has played a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied territories is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the exclusive right to establish transmission infrastructure in the occupied territories. By overseeing and directing these operations, Romanchenko actively facilitates the obstruction of access to diverse and independent information, thereby assuming responsibility for the use of information manipulation.
Therefore, Romanchenko, as the head of RTRS, benefits from and implements policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.
15.7.2025 40. Vladimir NAIDENOV
(Russian: Владимир НАЙДЕНОВ)
Function: Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories of the Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS)
Gender: male
Nationality: Russian
Vladimir Naidenov is the Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories at the Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS), a Russian federal unitary for-profit enterprise of strategic significance operating terrestrial radio and television broadcasting infrastructure in Russia. Vladimir Naidenov, is subordinated to the RTRS General Director Andrey Yuryevich Romanchenko, who directs the RTRS and plays a direct role in implementing policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation. RTRS provides infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called “All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels” such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24 which disseminate Russian state propaganda.
In his position within the RTRS, Vladimir Naidenov has played a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied regions is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the right to establish transmission infrastructure there.
Therefore, Vladimir Naidenov, as the Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories at RTRS, facilitates the obstruction of access to diverse and independent information by coordinating the RTRS infrastructure development in the occupied Ukrainian territories and thus implements policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference
15.7.2025 41. Dmitri BUIMISTRU
Function: TV presenter, actor; blogger
DOB: 26.11.1992
POB: Chișinău, Republic of Moldova
Nationality: Moldovan
Gender: male
Dmitri Buimistru intentionally engages in coordinated information manipulation and interference by operating as a key propagandist on MD24, a Russia-based online TV channel created by Ilan Shor following license withdrawals from his previous stations for disseminating Russian disinformation. To that end, Buimistru deliberately spreads demonstrably false claims – systematically debunked by independent fact-checkers – regarding NATO drawing Moldova into conflict, imminent revocation of constitutional neutrality, “Romanization” of institutions, misrepresentation of the EU referendum’s constitutional implications, and fabricated trade statistics.
Furthermore, his participation in synchronised cross-platform disinformation campaigns is evidenced by the July 2023 Russian embassy surveillance equipment scandal, where his messaging was perfectly coordinated with other pro-Kremlin outlets, demonstrating centralised orchestration. In addition, Buimistru’s “SOSEDI” project has been identified as a key tool in a broader external influence operation. His systematic promotion of other pro-Russian information sources and deployment of consistent messaging tactics specifically designed to undermine Moldova’s sovereignty, European integration, and democratic processes further confirms his deliberate engagement in coordinated information manipulation with a view to serving Russian destabilisation interests in Moldova.
Therefore, Dmitri Buimistru is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability in a third country through engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.
15.7.2025 42. Veaceslav VALICO
Function: Activist
DOB: 10.8.1977
POB: Chișinău, Republic of Moldova
Nationality: Moldovan
Gender: male
Veaceslav Valico participated, alongside Anatolii Prizenko, a natural person listed by the Union, in the Russian destabilisation operation concerning the painting of the Star of David on the streets of Paris following the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel in exchange for financial compensation and in order to create tensions in French society.
Moreover, Veaceslav Valico is involved in the systematic dissemination of disinformation in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, as part of the Russian Federation’s malign hybrid activities.
Furthermore, Veaceslav Valico is associated with Anatolii Prizenko, who is an individual listed by the Union. Their association predates their collaboration in the Paris incident.
Therefore, Veaceslav Valico is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the stability in a Member State and therefore, in the Union, and in third countries, through planning, directing, and engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.
15.7.2025 43. Simeon BOIKOV
Function: Pro-Russian blogger
Date of birth: 15.2.1990
Place of birth: Sydney, Australia
Gender: male
Nationality: Australian/Russian
Simeon Boikov is an Australian pro-Russian activist known by the pseudonym “Aussie Cossack”. He is recognised for disseminating pro-Kremlin narratives and misinformation, particularly regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Boikov has also been implicated in spreading disinformation related to the 2024 U.S. presidential election, notably by paying an American influencer to post a Storm-1516 fabricated video falsely depicting voter fraud in Georgia.
Therefore, Simeon Boikov is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.
15.7.2025 44. Vitaly KULIKOV
(Russian: Виталий КУЛИКОВ)
Function: Lieutenant Colonel in the Russian military, heading the Electronic Warfare (EW) center of the Baltic Fleet
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
Lieutenant Colonel Vitaly Kulikov is the commander of the Electronic Warfare (EW) center of the Baltic Fleet also known as the 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center. Vitaly Kulikov oversees exercises of his EW troops in the Kaliningrad region.
GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and “spoofing” of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation.
The EW center of the Baltic Fleet, under Kulikov’s commands, has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas, and is also involved in planning, supporting and executing coordinated information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States.
Therefore, Vitaly Kulikov is responsible for planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States.
15.7.2025 45. Yuri Illarionovich LASTOCHKIN
(Russian: Юрий Илларионович ЛАСТОЧКИН
Ukrainian: Юрій Iлларіонович ЛАСТОЧКIН)
Function: Official of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; Military Leader; General-Major/Lieutenant General; Chief of the Electronic Warfare Forces of the Russian Federation/head of Russian Defense Ministry’s Radio-Electronic Warfare (REB) force
DOB: 18.8.1967
POB: Rzhavka, Mogilev region, Belarusian SSR (now Belarus)
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
Lieutenant General Yuri Lastochkin is the chief of the Electronic Warfare (EW) Forces of the Russian Federation. Yuri Lastochkin oversees actions and exercises of Russia’s EW troops, including those of the 841st Separate EW center in the Kaliningrad region.
Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and “spoofing” of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation.
The 841st Separate EW center in the Kaliningrad region, under Lastochkin’s commands, has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas; it is also involved in planning, supporting and executing coordinated information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States.
Therefore, Y. I. Lastochkin is responsible for planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States.
15.7.2025 46. Yevgeny Shevchenko
(Russian: Евгений ШЕВЧЕНКО)
Function: Founder of TigerWeb
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
Tax identification number: 910202780107
Yevgeny Shevchenko is a web developer who has specialised in creating websites for many years. He is the founder of Tigerweb, the web-company that runs the informational manipulation set “Portal Kombat” which disseminates pro-Russian content and targets several Western countries, including France, on several so-called “informational portals”. Therefore, he is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten the stability and security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.
15.7.2025
47
Aleksey Nikolayevich SHAVROV
(Russian: Алексей Николаевич ШАВРОВ)
a.k.a. Andrey PETROV
(Russian: Андрей ПЕТРОВ)
Function: Military Intelligence Officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU)
DOB: 12.12.1989
Nationality: Russian
Gender: male
Aleksey Shavrov is a GRU officer involved in Russian influence operations directed to destabilise the Union and its Member States. Aleksey Shavrov´s malign activities include information manipulation and disinformation campaigns in the Czech Republic and other Union Member States. Through his concealed associate, Natallia Sudliankova, Aleksey Shavrov conducts influence campaigns, including by organising the dissemination of tailor-made articles in various European media outlets. Misleading or outright false narratives aim to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and to spread its influence. Moreover, the content is designed to further undermine public trust in the Union values and processes, democracy and Union cohesion. Articles also contain specific manipulative anti-NATO, anti-Ukraine and anti-NGO narratives. Aleksey Shavrov instructed Natallia Sudliankova to spread and disseminate those divisive messages through media to amplify their polarising content. Aleksey Shavrov provided financial rewards for accomplishing tasks and for publication of those custom-made pro-Russian media campaigns.
Therefore, Aleksey Shavrov is implementing actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.
15.7.2025’

(2) the following entries are added under the heading ‘B. Legal persons, entities and bodies’:

Name
Identifying information
Statement of Reasons
Date of listing
‘10. Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS);
Федеральное государственное унитарное предприятие “Российская телевизионная и радиовещательная сеть”
Address: 13, Korolyov street, Moscow, Russia
Website: https://moscow.rtrs.ru/
Place of registration: 13, Korolyov street, Moscow, Russia
Date of registration: 30.11.2001
Registration number: ИНН: 7717127211; ОГРН: 1027739456084
The Federal State-owned Enterprise “Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS) operatеs Russia’s terrestrial broadcasting infrastructure. It is directly subordinated to the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation and operates under the authority of a general director appointed by the Russian President. RTRS provides infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called “All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels” such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24. RTRS plays a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied regions is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the right to establish transmission infrastructure there.
Therefore, RTRS is implementing and benefiting from policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.
15.7.2025 11. 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center of the Baltic Fleet
841-й центр радиоэлектронной борьбы
Address: 238580, Kaliningrad oblast, Yantarny settlement, Balebin street, 09643
238580, Калининградская обл., пгт.Янтарный, ул.Балебина, в/ч 09643
Type of entity: Military unit
Place of registration: Kalininingrad region, Russian Federation
Phone number: 8(40153)37-244
Military unit 09643
The 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center is at the core of one of the strongest electronic warfare groups in Russia. The centre is responsible for using technology to disorganise any system of shortwave communication, conducting electronic warfare exercises (EW) to disrupt enemy navigation and radio communications as well as for the collection and analysis of intelligence information obtained by observing electromagnetic radiation in the short and ultrashort wave ranges.
Several European countries have experienced GPS signal failures, which have been attributed to electronic warfare activities by Russia, specifically from Kaliningrad. This includes deliberate jamming and “spoofing” of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. Interference and manipulation of GPS signals has led to obstacles for landing civil planes.
The 841st Separate EW Center in Kaliningrad has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas.
Therefore, 841st Separate EW Center, as part of Russia’s military forces enabling the misuse of radio frequency sector, is responsible for engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States.
15.7.2025 12. BRICS Journalist Association
Website: bricspress.live
The BRICS Journalists Association (BJA) is a Russian NGO linked to the Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI), created by Yevgeny Prigozhin, and headed by Oksana Vovk (Mira Terada). The BJA has been used as a vehicle to disseminate pro-Russian narratives and disinformation under the guise of independent journalism, including fake content originating from the Storm-1516 Information Manipulation Set (IMS).
Therefore, the BJA is responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States or in a third country through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.
15.7.2025 13. Center for Geopolitical Expertise
Центр геополитических экспертиз, CGE
Website: cge.evrazia.ru, cge.su
Place of registration: Ul. Dinamovskaya D.1a, Office 409, Moscow, RUS, 109044
Date of registration: 17.12.2002
Registration number: 1027739806940
The Center for Geopolitical Expertise (CGE) is a Moscow-based think tank founded by Aleksandr Dugin, and headed by Valery Korovin, accused of orchestrating disinformation campaigns aimed at targeting Ukrainian interests, discrediting Western political figures, and influencing electoral processes in Western countries. CGE and its director, Valery Mikhaylovich Korovin, are reportedly involved in creating and disseminating false information by utilising artificial intelligence tools to produce deepfake videos, and supporting a network of hundreds of fake news websites. CGE is alleged to have worked closely with Russia’s military intelligence agency (GRU), receiving financial support to carry out these operations.
Therefore, the CGE is responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.
15.7.2025 14. Foundation to Battle Injustice
Date of creation: 23.3.2021
Website: fondfbr.ru
The Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI) is a fake human-rights defence NGO created in March 2021 by Wagner group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin. The R-FBI has been involved in numerous information operations targeting France and Ukraine, including a campaign accusing French soldiers of having kidnapped children from Niger just after the military coup d’état in 2023. Since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023, the R-FBI has been involved in the amplification of numerous Storm-1516’s information operations.
Therefore, the R-FBI is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States, or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.
15.7.2025 15. Tigerweb
Website: Tigerweb.ru
Place of registration: 295000, Krim Republic, Simferopol City, Oktyabirskaya Street, 3, Office 408
Date of registration: 2019
Registration number: 1199112018973
Tigerweb is the Russian Crimea-based web-company that operates the informational manipulation project “Portal Kombat”, which disseminates pro-Russian content and targets several Western countries, including France, through various so-called “informational portals”.
Therefore, Tigerweb is involved in the implementation of actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten the stability and security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States, or in third countries, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.
15.7.2025’

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1439 of 15 July 2025 amending Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2319 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Haiti

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1439 16.7.2025
(1) On 25 November 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/2319(1).
(2) On 28 July 2023, in light of the further deteriorating political, economic, humanitarian and security situation in Haiti, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/1574(2), which amended Decision (CFSP) 2022/2319 and established a new framework of additional restrictive measures.
(3) On the basis of a review of the measures referred to in Article 2a(1) and Article 3a(1) and (2) of Decision (CFSP) 2022/2319, and in view of the gravity of the situation in Haiti, those measures should be renewed until 29 July 2026.
(4) Decision (CFSP) 2022/2319 should therefore be amended accordingly,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 25 November 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/2319 (1).
(2) On 28 July 2023, in light of the further deteriorating political, economic, humanitarian and security situation in Haiti, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/1574 (2), which amended Decision (CFSP) 2022/2319 and established a new framework of additional restrictive measures.
(3) On the basis of a review of the measures referred to in Article 2a(1) and Article 3a(1) and (2) of Decision (CFSP) 2022/2319, and in view of the gravity of the situation in Haiti, those measures should be renewed until 29 July 2026.
(4) Decision (CFSP) 2022/2319 should therefore be amended accordingly,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
In Article 8(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2022/2319, the date ‘29 July 2025’ is replaced by that of ‘29 July 2026’.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Council Decision (EU) 2025/1437 of 8 July 2025 establishing the position to be adopted on behalf of the European Union in the written procedure by the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits as regards the Common Line extending Ukraine’s eligibility for tied aid

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1437 17.7.2025
(1) The guidelines contained in the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits (the ‘Arrangement’), developed within the framework of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), have been transposed and thus been made legally binding in the Union by virtue of Regulation (EU) No 1233/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council(1).
(2) Article 32 of the Arrangement lays down the country eligibility conditions for tied aid. In accordance with paragraph (a) thereof, no tied aid may be provided to countries whose per capita gross national income (GNI), according to the World Bank data, is above the upper limit for lower middle income countries. A country is reclassified only after its World Bank category has remained unchanged for two consecutive years.
(3) In accordance with Article 35(e) of the Arrangement, a Participant to the Arrangement may, exceptionally and subject to the adoption of a Common Line, provide tied aid to a country that would otherwise not be eligible pursuant to Article 32 of the Arrangement.
(4) In July 2025, the World Bank classified Ukraine as an upper middle income country for the second time. This implies that Ukraine is no longer eligible to receive tied aid. However, in line with the Union’s unwavering commitment to provide support to Ukraine and its people for as long as it is needed, it is in the interests of the Union to continue to be able to grant tied aid to Ukraine.
(5) The Participants to the Arrangement (the ‘Participants’) are to decide, in a written procedure, on the European Union’s proposal for a Common Line in accordance with Chapter IV, Section 5 of the Arrangement to extend Ukraine’s eligibility for tied aid.
(6) In accordance with Article 59(a) of the Arrangement, Common Lines are valid for a period of two years. Common Lines which do not relate to a specific transaction may be extended in accordance with the procedures laid down in Articles 54 to 58 of the Arrangement. Since the Union may need to continue providing exceptional support to Ukraine for longer than two years, it is in the interests of the Union to be able to agree the extension of the proposed Common Line for up to a maximum of four years.
(7) It is appropriate to establish the position to be taken on the Union’s behalf regarding the proposed Common Line extending Ukraine’s eligibility for tied aid as well as the potential further extension thereof, as the proposed Common Line, once agreed, will be binding on the Union and will be capable of decisively influencing the content of Union law by virtue of Article 1 of Regulation (EU) No 1233/2011.
(8) The position of the Union in the written procedure by the Participants should therefore be to support the proposal based on the draft Common Line attached to this Decision, and to support a potential extension thereof,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 207(4), first subparagraph, in conjunction with Article 218(9) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Whereas:
(1) The guidelines contained in the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits (the ‘Arrangement’), developed within the framework of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), have been transposed and thus been made legally binding in the Union by virtue of Regulation (EU) No 1233/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1).
(2) Article 32 of the Arrangement lays down the country eligibility conditions for tied aid. In accordance with paragraph (a) thereof, no tied aid may be provided to countries whose per capita gross national income (GNI), according to the World Bank data, is above the upper limit for lower middle income countries. A country is reclassified only after its World Bank category has remained unchanged for two consecutive years.
(3) In accordance with Article 35(e) of the Arrangement, a Participant to the Arrangement may, exceptionally and subject to the adoption of a Common Line, provide tied aid to a country that would otherwise not be eligible pursuant to Article 32 of the Arrangement.
(4) In July 2025, the World Bank classified Ukraine as an upper middle income country for the second time. This implies that Ukraine is no longer eligible to receive tied aid. However, in line with the Union’s unwavering commitment to provide support to Ukraine and its people for as long as it is needed, it is in the interests of the Union to continue to be able to grant tied aid to Ukraine.
(5) The Participants to the Arrangement (the ‘Participants’) are to decide, in a written procedure, on the European Union’s proposal for a Common Line in accordance with Chapter IV, Section 5 of the Arrangement to extend Ukraine’s eligibility for tied aid.
(6) In accordance with Article 59(a) of the Arrangement, Common Lines are valid for a period of two years. Common Lines which do not relate to a specific transaction may be extended in accordance with the procedures laid down in Articles 54 to 58 of the Arrangement. Since the Union may need to continue providing exceptional support to Ukraine for longer than two years, it is in the interests of the Union to be able to agree the extension of the proposed Common Line for up to a maximum of four years.
(7) It is appropriate to establish the position to be taken on the Union’s behalf regarding the proposed Common Line extending Ukraine’s eligibility for tied aid as well as the potential further extension thereof, as the proposed Common Line, once agreed, will be binding on the Union and will be capable of decisively influencing the content of Union law by virtue of Article 1 of Regulation (EU) No 1233/2011.
(8) The position of the Union in the written procedure by the Participants should therefore be to support the proposal based on the draft Common Line attached to this Decision, and to support a potential extension thereof,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
1. The position to be adopted on the Union’s behalf in the written procedure by the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits (the ‘Participants’) as regards the Common Line extending Ukraine’s eligibility for tied aid shall be based on the draft Common Line attached to this Decision.

2. The position to be adopted on the Union’s behalf in the written procedure by the Participants as regards the extension of the Common Line referred to in paragraph 1 shall be to support the extension for up to a maximum of four years.

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.