Council Decision (EU) 2025/1487 of 14 July 2025 on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union within the Association Committee in Trade configuration established by the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, on the European Union and Ukraine granting each other internal market treatment with respect to the sector of roaming on public mobile communications networks

                                January 13, 2026                            

Official Journalof the European Union
ENL series

2025/1487
22.7.2025

(1)
The Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part(1)(the ‘Agreement’) entered into force on 1 September 2017.

(2)
Pursuant to Article 4(3) of Annex XVII to the Agreement, the Association Committee in Trade configuration (the ‘Trade Committee’) may decide that the Parties grant each other internal market treatment with respect to the services sectors concerned by regulatory approximation.

(3)
In the course of 2025, the Trade Committee should adopt a draft Decision on the European Union and Ukraine granting each other internal market treatment with respect to the sector of roaming on public mobile communications networks.

(4)
As stated in the preamble to the Agreement and in accordance with Article 124(1) of the Agreement, the Parties recognise the importance of the approximation of Ukraine’s existing legislation to that of the Union, and that Ukraine is to ensure that existing laws and future legislation will be gradually made compatible with the Unionacquis.

(5)
Ukraine has requested further integration with regard to the roaming sector in the Union, in particular through internal market treatment for the purpose of roaming services.

(6)
Decision No 1/2023 of the EU-Ukraine Association Committee in Trade configuration(2)complemented Appendix XVII-3 (Rules applicable to telecommunication services) of Annex XVII to the Agreement with the relevant Union acts relating to roaming on public mobile communications networks.

(7)
Pursuant to Article 4(2) of Annex XVII to the Agreement, on 7 November 2024, Ukraine notified the Union that it considered that the conditions for enacting and implementing the Unionacquisin the sector of roaming on public mobile communications networks were met, and requested the Union to carry out a comprehensive assessment.

(8)
On 6 June 2025, Ukraine supplemented its initial notification after adopting its last remaining transposition measure.

(9)
Decision No 1/2025 of the EU-Ukraine Association Committee in Trade configuration(3)introduced certain additional specific adaptations to Part A of Appendix XVII-3 of Annex XVII to the Agreement.

(10)
Pursuant to Article 4(2) of Annex XVII to the Agreement, a comprehensive assessment was carried out and, on the basis thereof, it was determined that Ukraine fulfils the conditions for enacting and implementing the Unionacquisin the sector of roaming on public mobile communications networks.

(11)
Pursuant to Article 4(3) of Annex XVII to the Agreement, the Union will inform the Trade Committee about the positive result of its comprehensive assessment.

(12)
Against that background, in accordance with Article 4(3) of Annex XVII to the Agreement, the Union and Ukraine should grant each other internal market treatment with respect to the sector of roaming on public mobile communications networks.

(13)
It is therefore appropriate to establish the position to be taken on the Union’s behalf within the Trade Committee, as the Decision on the European Union and Ukraine granting each other internal market treatment with respect to the sector of roaming on public mobile communications networks will be binding upon the Union,

(1)
The Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part(1)(the ‘Agreement’) entered into force on 1 September 2017.

(2)
The preamble to the Agreement recognises Ukraine’s commitment to gradually approximate its legislation with that of the Union, along the lines set out in the Agreement, and to effectively implement it, thus contributing to the gradual economic integration and deepening of political association of Ukraine with the Union.

(3)
Article 1(2)(d) of the Agreement provides that the aims of the Agreement include supporting Ukraine’s efforts to complete the transition into a functioning market economy by means of, inter alia, the progressive approximation of its legislation to that of the Union.

(4)
Pursuant to Article 124 of the Agreement, the Parties recognise the importance of the approximating Ukraine’s existing legislation to that of the Union in the telecommunication services sector. Ukraine committed to ensure that its existing laws and future legislation are made compatible with the Unionacquis. Ukraine is expected to gradually extend its legislation approximation to all elements of the Unionacquisreferred to in Appendices XVII-2 to XVII-5 of Annex XVII to the Agreement. Once the conditions for it have been fulfilled, it should lead to Ukraine’s gradual integration into the internal market of the Union, notably through the reciprocal granting of internal market treatment in accordance with Article 4(3) of Annex XVII to the Agreement.

(5)
Ukraine has requested further integration with regard to roaming on public mobile communications networks in the Union. In particular, Ukraine requested internal market treatment for the purpose of roaming on public mobile communications networks.

(6)
In order to enable Ukraine’s gradual transition to full enactment and complete and full implementation of the applicable provisions for the telecommunications sector, in particular those on roaming on public mobile communications networks, Decision No 1/2023 of the EU-Ukraine Association Committee in Trade configuration(2)complemented Appendix XVII-3 (Rules applicable to telecommunication services) of Annex XVII to the Agreement with the relevant Union acts relating to roaming on public mobile communications networks.

(7)
Pursuant to Article 4(2) of Annex XVII to the Agreement, on 7 November 2024, Ukraine notified the Union that it considered that the conditions for enacting and implementing the Unionacquisin the sector of roaming on public mobile communications networks were met and requested the Union to carry out a comprehensive assessment. On 6 June 2025, Ukraine supplemented its initial notification after signing into law its last remaining transposition measure.

(8)
Based on the regular assessments and monitoring pursuant to Appendix XVII-6 of Annex XVII to the Agreement and Article 4(2) of Annex XVII to the Agreement and taking into account the impact of Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, Decision 1/2025 of the EU-Ukraine Association Committee in Trade configuration(3)introduced certain additional specific adaptations to Part A of Appendix XVII-3 of Annex XVII to the Agreement. In particular, that Decision granted Ukraine additional time to fully implement certain provisions of Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council(4), part of the Unionacquisin the sector of roaming on public mobile communications networks, without postponing a possible decision by the Trade Committee to grant internal market treatment for roaming pursuant to Article 4(3) of Annex XVII to the Agreement.

(9)
Pursuant to Article 4(2) of Annex XVII to the Agreement, the European Union carried out a comprehensive assessment, determined on its basis that the conditions are fulfilled, informed the Trade Committee accordingly and proposed that the Trade Committee decides that the Parties grant each other internal market treatment with respect to the sector of roaming on public mobile communications networks.

(10)
Once this decision becomes applicable, the roamingacquisconcerned, as specified in Appendix XVII-3 of Annex XVII to the Agreement, will need to be applied in accordance with points 1 to 6 of Appendix XVII-1 of Annex XVII to the Agreement, unless otherwise provided in Appendix XVII-3 of Annex XVII to the Agreement. This implies that the Union roamingacquisas defined in Appendix XVII-3 of Annex XVII to the Agreement should be read in line with the adaptations contained in Appendix XVII-1 of Annex XVII to the Agreement and hence all rights and obligations roaming service providers and operators in the Union are bound to apply between each other, will have to be extended in relation to roaming service providers and operators in Ukraine. Likewise, roaming service providers and operators in Ukraine will be bound to apply the same rights and obligations in relation to roaming service providers and operators in the Union. End users of Ukraine and the Union will also henceforth benefit, subject to certain exceptional limitations, from regulated roaming services at their domestic retail prices.

(11)
To allow undertakings providing roaming on public communications networks in the Union and in Ukraine the necessary time to implement all technical and legal requirements resulting from the Trade Committee’s decision, an application date is set,

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 207(4), first subparagraph, in conjunction with Article 218(9) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

Whereas:

(1) The Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part (1) (the ‘Agreement’) entered into force on 1 September 2017.

(2) Pursuant to Article 4(3) of Annex XVII to the Agreement, the Association Committee in Trade configuration (the ‘Trade Committee’) may decide that the Parties grant each other internal market treatment with respect to the services sectors concerned by regulatory approximation.

(3) In the course of 2025, the Trade Committee should adopt a draft Decision on the European Union and Ukraine granting each other internal market treatment with respect to the sector of roaming on public mobile communications networks.

(4) As stated in the preamble to the Agreement and in accordance with Article 124(1) of the Agreement, the Parties recognise the importance of the approximation of Ukraine’s existing legislation to that of the Union, and that Ukraine is to ensure that existing laws and future legislation will be gradually made compatible with the Union acquis.

(5) Ukraine has requested further integration with regard to the roaming sector in the Union, in particular through internal market treatment for the purpose of roaming services.

(6) Decision No 1/2023 of the EU-Ukraine Association Committee in Trade configuration (2) complemented Appendix XVII-3 (Rules applicable to telecommunication services) of Annex XVII to the Agreement with the relevant Union acts relating to roaming on public mobile communications networks.

(7) Pursuant to Article 4(2) of Annex XVII to the Agreement, on 7 November 2024, Ukraine notified the Union that it considered that the conditions for enacting and implementing the Union acquis in the sector of roaming on public mobile communications networks were met, and requested the Union to carry out a comprehensive assessment.

(8) On 6 June 2025, Ukraine supplemented its initial notification after adopting its last remaining transposition measure.

(9) Decision No 1/2025 of the EU-Ukraine Association Committee in Trade configuration (3) introduced certain additional specific adaptations to Part A of Appendix XVII-3 of Annex XVII to the Agreement.

(10) Pursuant to Article 4(2) of Annex XVII to the Agreement, a comprehensive assessment was carried out and, on the basis thereof, it was determined that Ukraine fulfils the conditions for enacting and implementing the Union acquis in the sector of roaming on public mobile communications networks.

(11) Pursuant to Article 4(3) of Annex XVII to the Agreement, the Union will inform the Trade Committee about the positive result of its comprehensive assessment.

(12) Against that background, in accordance with Article 4(3) of Annex XVII to the Agreement, the Union and Ukraine should grant each other internal market treatment with respect to the sector of roaming on public mobile communications networks.

(13) It is therefore appropriate to establish the position to be taken on the Union’s behalf within the Trade Committee, as the Decision on the European Union and Ukraine granting each other internal market treatment with respect to the sector of roaming on public mobile communications networks will be binding upon the Union,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The position to be taken on the Union’s behalf in the course of 2025 in the Association Committee in Trade configuration (the ‘Trade Committee’) established by the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, on the European Union and Ukraine granting each other internal market treatment with respect to the sector of roaming on public mobile communications networks shall be based on the draft Decision of the Trade Committee attached to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
The European Union and Ukraine grant each other internal market treatment with respect to the sector of roaming on public mobile communications networks.
This Decision has been drawn up in the Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish, Swedish and Ukrainian languages, each text being equally authentic.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption. It shall apply from 1 January 2026.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1486 of 22 July 2025 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the temporary exclusion of offers of hydrogen supplies originating in the Russian Federation or Belarus from being collected through the mechanism to support the market development of hydrogen

                                January 13, 2026                            

Official Journalof the European Union
ENL series

2025/1486
23.7.2025

(1)
The Commission established the Hydrogen Mechanism (‘the mechanism’) to support the market development of hydrogen referred to in Article 52 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 which is to be implemented under the activities of the European Hydrogen Bank(2). The mechanism was launched in July 2025. The mechanism aims to increase the transparency of hydrogen demand, supply, flows and prices and play a coordination role, connecting, processing, and giving access to information on demand and supply for renewable and low-carbon hydrogen and hydrogen derivatives submitted by off-takers established in the Union and in the Energy Community Contracting Parties and both domestic and international suppliers. The Hydrogen mechanism will be implemented and will operate in accordance with the EU competition rules, in particular Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.

(2)
Hydrogen supply refer to the sale, including resale, of hydrogen, including in the form of liquid organic hydrogen carriers or liquid hydrogen and hydrogen derivatives including ammonia or methanol to customers(3).

(3)
Russia and Belarus produce significant volumes of fossil fuel-based hydrogen and derivatives (such as ammonia). Also, there is potential for substantial sales and supplies of renewable and low-carbon hydrogen and hydrogen derivatives production originating from Russia and Belarus. It is not excluded that some of those hydrogen and hydrogen derivatives volumes would be exported, also to the Union.

(4)
Experience with energy supplies from Russia and Belarus has shown that Russia exploited the Union’s dependence on its energy exports to the Union as a means of exerting coercion and manipulations(4). Russia has systematically abused dependencies to the detriment of the Union’s economy and economic security and used energy supply relationships with partners in the Union to manipulate markets and to weaken the Union’s security of supply(5).

(5)
There is a risk that Russia and Belarus would try to establish similar business relationships and dependencies with regard to exports of renewable and low-carbon hydrogen and hydrogen derivatives to the Union which could be used to manipulate markets.

(6)
Allowing supplies originating in Russia or Belarus to be offered through the mechanism could permit Russia and Belarus to gain a significant foothold in the Union market, thereby facilitating attempts to manipulate the nascent hydrogen market.

(7)
As hydrogen is often used by large industrial customers, and as the hydrogen market is much less liquid than the market for natural gas, establishing new supply dependencies with Russia or Belarus could enable those countries to continue their strategy towards the Union to endanger security of supply by manipulating markets, by interrupting supplies, or by using other form of weaponisation of energy supplies.

(8)
Although these risks are present even in the case of smaller shares in the overall volumes, collecting Russian and Belarusian hydrogen supply offers via the mechanism to support the market development of hydrogen could significantly increase the role and visibility of Russia and Belarus on the Union hydrogen market. This would run counter the Union’s efforts to phase out its dependency on Russian energy imports(6)and avoid new dependencies on energy supplies from those countries(7).

(9)
In view of that geopolitical situation and taking account of the risks resulting from energy deliveries from Russia and Belarus, it is necessary to temporarily exclude offers of hydrogen supplies originating in Russia or Belarus from being collected through the mechanism in order to protect the Union’s essential security interests and security of supply. Pursuant to Article 54(2) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1789, the decision shall be valid for a period of up to one year and may be renewed if justified.

(10)
The temporary exclusion will not unduly disrupt the proper functioning of the internal market for hydrogen and will not undermine the security of supply of the Union or of a Member State, notably because the Union hydrogen market is still nascent with very limited supplies from Russia and Belarus. Furthermore, the temporary exclusion respects the principle of energy solidarity(8), because it is taken in the interest of the Union with regard to the mechanism, without undue impacts on the rights of Member States or their economic operators to trade hydrogen, including renewable and low-carbon, and its derivatives with third countries outside the voluntary mechanism. Moreover, this Decision is taken in accordance with the rights and obligations of the Union or of the Member States with respect to third countries.

(11)
In accordance with Article 54(2) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1789, the Commission has duly informed the European Parliament and the Council about its assessment, and may propose to renew the decision, if justified, also with a view to aligning the measure with other EU policies, such as the RePowerEU Roadmap(9), which aims to further advance the EU’s independence from Russian energy by measures to support the phase out of imports of gas, nuclear, and oil to reduce risks of weaponisation of energy supplies,

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen, amending Regulations (EU) No 1227/2011, (EU) 2017/1938, (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2022/869 and Decision (EU) 2017/684 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 (1), and in particular Article 54(1) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) The Commission established the Hydrogen Mechanism (‘the mechanism’) to support the market development of hydrogen referred to in Article 52 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 which is to be implemented under the activities of the European Hydrogen Bank (2). The mechanism was launched in July 2025. The mechanism aims to increase the transparency of hydrogen demand, supply, flows and prices and play a coordination role, connecting, processing, and giving access to information on demand and supply for renewable and low-carbon hydrogen and hydrogen derivatives submitted by off-takers established in the Union and in the Energy Community Contracting Parties and both domestic and international suppliers. The Hydrogen mechanism will be implemented and will operate in accordance with the EU competition rules, in particular Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.

(2) Hydrogen supply refer to the sale, including resale, of hydrogen, including in the form of liquid organic hydrogen carriers or liquid hydrogen and hydrogen derivatives including ammonia or methanol to customers (3).

(3) Russia and Belarus produce significant volumes of fossil fuel-based hydrogen and derivatives (such as ammonia). Also, there is potential for substantial sales and supplies of renewable and low-carbon hydrogen and hydrogen derivatives production originating from Russia and Belarus. It is not excluded that some of those hydrogen and hydrogen derivatives volumes would be exported, also to the Union.

(4) Experience with energy supplies from Russia and Belarus has shown that Russia exploited the Union’s dependence on its energy exports to the Union as a means of exerting coercion and manipulations (4). Russia has systematically abused dependencies to the detriment of the Union’s economy and economic security and used energy supply relationships with partners in the Union to manipulate markets and to weaken the Union’s security of supply (5).

(5) There is a risk that Russia and Belarus would try to establish similar business relationships and dependencies with regard to exports of renewable and low-carbon hydrogen and hydrogen derivatives to the Union which could be used to manipulate markets.

(6) Allowing supplies originating in Russia or Belarus to be offered through the mechanism could permit Russia and Belarus to gain a significant foothold in the Union market, thereby facilitating attempts to manipulate the nascent hydrogen market.

(7) As hydrogen is often used by large industrial customers, and as the hydrogen market is much less liquid than the market for natural gas, establishing new supply dependencies with Russia or Belarus could enable those countries to continue their strategy towards the Union to endanger security of supply by manipulating markets, by interrupting supplies, or by using other form of weaponisation of energy supplies.

(8) Although these risks are present even in the case of smaller shares in the overall volumes, collecting Russian and Belarusian hydrogen supply offers via the mechanism to support the market development of hydrogen could significantly increase the role and visibility of Russia and Belarus on the Union hydrogen market. This would run counter the Union’s efforts to phase out its dependency on Russian energy imports (6) and avoid new dependencies on energy supplies from those countries (7).

(9) In view of that geopolitical situation and taking account of the risks resulting from energy deliveries from Russia and Belarus, it is necessary to temporarily exclude offers of hydrogen supplies originating in Russia or Belarus from being collected through the mechanism in order to protect the Union’s essential security interests and security of supply. Pursuant to Article 54(2) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1789, the decision shall be valid for a period of up to one year and may be renewed if justified.

(10) The temporary exclusion will not unduly disrupt the proper functioning of the internal market for hydrogen and will not undermine the security of supply of the Union or of a Member State, notably because the Union hydrogen market is still nascent with very limited supplies from Russia and Belarus. Furthermore, the temporary exclusion respects the principle of energy solidarity (8), because it is taken in the interest of the Union with regard to the mechanism, without undue impacts on the rights of Member States or their economic operators to trade hydrogen, including renewable and low-carbon, and its derivatives with third countries outside the voluntary mechanism. Moreover, this Decision is taken in accordance with the rights and obligations of the Union or of the Member States with respect to third countries.

(11) In accordance with Article 54(2) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1789, the Commission has duly informed the European Parliament and the Council about its assessment, and may propose to renew the decision, if justified, also with a view to aligning the measure with other EU policies, such as the RePowerEU Roadmap (9), which aims to further advance the EU’s independence from Russian energy by measures to support the phase out of imports of gas, nuclear, and oil to reduce risks of weaponisation of energy supplies,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Offers of hydrogen supplies originating in the Russian Federation or Belarus shall be excluded from being collected through the Hydrogen Mechanism to support the market development of hydrogen for a period of one year.
This Decision shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1481 of 18 July 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2023/2135 concerning restrictive measures in view of activities undermining the stability and political transition of Sudan

                                January 13, 2026                            

Official Journalof the European Union
ENL series




2025/1481
18.7.2025



(1)
On 9 October 2023, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/2135(1).



(2)
On 27 November 2023, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy issued a statement on behalf of the Union, in which the Union and its Member States reiterated their strong condemnation of the continuous fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their respective affiliated militias. The statement also deplored the dramatic escalation of violence and the irreparable cost to human life in Darfur and throughout the country, as well as violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law.



(3)
In view of the gravity of the situation, two individuals and two entities should be included in the list of natural and legal persons, entities or bodies set out in the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2023/2135.



(4)
Decision (CFSP) 2023/2135 should therefore be amended accordingly,



(1)
under heading ‘A. List of natural persons referred to in Article 1(1) and in Article 2(1)’, the following entries are added:NameIdentifying informationReasonsDate of listing‘11.Abu Aqla Mohamed Ahmed KAIKALNationality: SudaneseGender: maleFunction: Commander of a SAF-affiliated militiaAssociated entities: SAFAbu Aqla Mohamed Ahmed Kaikal is a Sudanese Military Commander who served in the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the Jazira state in Sudan until he defected to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in October 2024. In December 2023, he was appointed by the RSF as Governor of the Jazira state, after the RSF violently took over that area. The RSF is responsible for attacking cities and humanitarian hubs in the Jazira state, leading to massive displacement of civilians, hunger, shortage of medicines and impediment of humanitarian aid. Jazira state specifically has been a centre of violence committed by the RSF during Kaikal’s governorship. Therefore, Abu Aqla Mohamed Ahmed Kaikal is responsible for actions and policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. In addition, he is responsible for directing acts in Sudan that constitute serious human rights violations, and for obstructing the delivery of, access to and distribution of humanitarian assistance in Sudan.18.7.202512.Hussein BARSHAMNationality: SudaneseGender: maleFunction: Military Field Commander of the RSFAssociated entities: RSF; Misseria tribeHussein Barsham is a Military Field Commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), an organisation that has been accused by international non-governmental organisations of ethnic cleansing and even genocide against the Masalit tribe and other non-Arab groups in Darfur.As a Commander, Hussein Barsham has led RSF soldiers in the capture of the Baleela airport from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and the capture of localities in the West Kordofan state, such as Meiram. He has played a leading role in RSF operations that have resulted in mass atrocities, including targeted killings, ethnic violence, forced displacement and violence against civilians, particularly in Darfur and other conflict-affected regions of Sudan. Under his command, RSF forces have been involved in mass killings and atrocities. Barsham has been engaged in the fighting in the Kordofan region. He has led attacks on several localities and has been present at the sites of atrocities and mass executions committed by soldiers under his command. Such acts constitute war crimes.Hussein Barsham is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. He is also responsible for undermining efforts to resume the political transition in Sudan and for directing or committing acts in Sudan that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses or violations of international humanitarian law.18.7.2025’

Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing
‘11.
Abu Aqla Mohamed Ahmed KAIKAL
Nationality: SudaneseGender: maleFunction: Commander of a SAF-affiliated militiaAssociated entities: SAF
Abu Aqla Mohamed Ahmed Kaikal is a Sudanese Military Commander who served in the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the Jazira state in Sudan until he defected to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in October 2024. In December 2023, he was appointed by the RSF as Governor of the Jazira state, after the RSF violently took over that area. The RSF is responsible for attacking cities and humanitarian hubs in the Jazira state, leading to massive displacement of civilians, hunger, shortage of medicines and impediment of humanitarian aid. Jazira state specifically has been a centre of violence committed by the RSF during Kaikal’s governorship. Therefore, Abu Aqla Mohamed Ahmed Kaikal is responsible for actions and policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. In addition, he is responsible for directing acts in Sudan that constitute serious human rights violations, and for obstructing the delivery of, access to and distribution of humanitarian assistance in Sudan.
18.7.2025
12.
Hussein BARSHAM
Nationality: SudaneseGender: maleFunction: Military Field Commander of the RSFAssociated entities: RSF; Misseria tribe
Hussein Barsham is a Military Field Commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), an organisation that has been accused by international non-governmental organisations of ethnic cleansing and even genocide against the Masalit tribe and other non-Arab groups in Darfur.As a Commander, Hussein Barsham has led RSF soldiers in the capture of the Baleela airport from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and the capture of localities in the West Kordofan state, such as Meiram. He has played a leading role in RSF operations that have resulted in mass atrocities, including targeted killings, ethnic violence, forced displacement and violence against civilians, particularly in Darfur and other conflict-affected regions of Sudan. Under his command, RSF forces have been involved in mass killings and atrocities. Barsham has been engaged in the fighting in the Kordofan region. He has led attacks on several localities and has been present at the sites of atrocities and mass executions committed by soldiers under his command. Such acts constitute war crimes.Hussein Barsham is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. He is also responsible for undermining efforts to resume the political transition in Sudan and for directing or committing acts in Sudan that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses or violations of international humanitarian law.
18.7.2025’


Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing

‘11.
Abu Aqla Mohamed Ahmed KAIKAL
Nationality: SudaneseGender: maleFunction: Commander of a SAF-affiliated militiaAssociated entities: SAF
Abu Aqla Mohamed Ahmed Kaikal is a Sudanese Military Commander who served in the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the Jazira state in Sudan until he defected to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in October 2024. In December 2023, he was appointed by the RSF as Governor of the Jazira state, after the RSF violently took over that area. The RSF is responsible for attacking cities and humanitarian hubs in the Jazira state, leading to massive displacement of civilians, hunger, shortage of medicines and impediment of humanitarian aid. Jazira state specifically has been a centre of violence committed by the RSF during Kaikal’s governorship. Therefore, Abu Aqla Mohamed Ahmed Kaikal is responsible for actions and policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. In addition, he is responsible for directing acts in Sudan that constitute serious human rights violations, and for obstructing the delivery of, access to and distribution of humanitarian assistance in Sudan.
18.7.2025

12.
Hussein BARSHAM
Nationality: SudaneseGender: maleFunction: Military Field Commander of the RSFAssociated entities: RSF; Misseria tribe
Hussein Barsham is a Military Field Commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), an organisation that has been accused by international non-governmental organisations of ethnic cleansing and even genocide against the Masalit tribe and other non-Arab groups in Darfur.As a Commander, Hussein Barsham has led RSF soldiers in the capture of the Baleela airport from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and the capture of localities in the West Kordofan state, such as Meiram. He has played a leading role in RSF operations that have resulted in mass atrocities, including targeted killings, ethnic violence, forced displacement and violence against civilians, particularly in Darfur and other conflict-affected regions of Sudan. Under his command, RSF forces have been involved in mass killings and atrocities. Barsham has been engaged in the fighting in the Kordofan region. He has led attacks on several localities and has been present at the sites of atrocities and mass executions committed by soldiers under his command. Such acts constitute war crimes.Hussein Barsham is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. He is also responsible for undermining efforts to resume the political transition in Sudan and for directing or committing acts in Sudan that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses or violations of international humanitarian law.
18.7.2025’




Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing

‘11.
Abu Aqla Mohamed Ahmed KAIKAL
Nationality: SudaneseGender: maleFunction: Commander of a SAF-affiliated militiaAssociated entities: SAF
Abu Aqla Mohamed Ahmed Kaikal is a Sudanese Military Commander who served in the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the Jazira state in Sudan until he defected to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in October 2024. In December 2023, he was appointed by the RSF as Governor of the Jazira state, after the RSF violently took over that area. The RSF is responsible for attacking cities and humanitarian hubs in the Jazira state, leading to massive displacement of civilians, hunger, shortage of medicines and impediment of humanitarian aid. Jazira state specifically has been a centre of violence committed by the RSF during Kaikal’s governorship. Therefore, Abu Aqla Mohamed Ahmed Kaikal is responsible for actions and policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. In addition, he is responsible for directing acts in Sudan that constitute serious human rights violations, and for obstructing the delivery of, access to and distribution of humanitarian assistance in Sudan.
18.7.2025

12.
Hussein BARSHAM
Nationality: SudaneseGender: maleFunction: Military Field Commander of the RSFAssociated entities: RSF; Misseria tribe
Hussein Barsham is a Military Field Commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), an organisation that has been accused by international non-governmental organisations of ethnic cleansing and even genocide against the Masalit tribe and other non-Arab groups in Darfur.As a Commander, Hussein Barsham has led RSF soldiers in the capture of the Baleela airport from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and the capture of localities in the West Kordofan state, such as Meiram. He has played a leading role in RSF operations that have resulted in mass atrocities, including targeted killings, ethnic violence, forced displacement and violence against civilians, particularly in Darfur and other conflict-affected regions of Sudan. Under his command, RSF forces have been involved in mass killings and atrocities. Barsham has been engaged in the fighting in the Kordofan region. He has led attacks on several localities and has been present at the sites of atrocities and mass executions committed by soldiers under his command. Such acts constitute war crimes.Hussein Barsham is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. He is also responsible for undermining efforts to resume the political transition in Sudan and for directing or committing acts in Sudan that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses or violations of international humanitarian law.
18.7.2025’



(2)
under heading ‘B. List of legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in Article 2(1)’, the following entries are added:NameIdentifying informationReasonsDate of listing‘7.Alkhaleej Bank Co Ltda.k.a.:Khaleej Bank;Al Rowad Bank For Development & Investment;Al Rowad Bank For Development And Investment;Al-Khaleej Bank;بنك الخليجAddress: Albaraka Tower, 6th Floor, 1 Al Qasr, Khartoum, SudanWebsite:https://al-khaleejbank.com/alkhaleej/Type of entity: Financial institutionRegistration number: SUDAN-EO14098Principal place of business: Khartoum, SudanAssociated individuals or entities: Mustafa Ibrahim Abdel Nabi Mohamed, designated by the Union on 24.6.2024; Musa Hamdan Dagalo Musa, brother of RSF Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo; Shield Protective Solutions Co. Ltd. (Sudan)Alkhaleej Bank Co Ltd (“Alkhaleej”) plays an essential role in the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) efforts to finance its own operations, complicating efforts to stop the fighting in Sudan. Alkhaleej is largely owned by companies linked to family members of RSF Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) and is therefore considered to be controlled by the RSF.Before and during the war, the RSF has established complex financial networks using profits from its gold business to fund weapons, salaries and media campaigns, and to gain political support. It controls a network of up to 50 companies, including Alkhaleej, which became a key financier and received USD 50 million from Sudan’s Central Bank in March 2023. Furthermore, Alkhaleej has international banking ties that allow the RSF to operate within the global financial system. Hemedti’s network reportedly owns a significant portion of Alkhaleej, with some estimates suggesting majority control.The RSF’s business activities span multiple sectors, including transport, construction, agriculture and banking, making Hemedti one of Sudan’s wealthiest and most powerful figures. Alkhaleej plays a crucial role in those operations, offering a direct or indirect financial lifeline to the RSF.As a key financier and facilitator of the RSF and its armed attacks and actions, Alkhaleej Bank Co Ltd is therefore engaging directly or indirectly in providing support to, or benefitting from, actions or policies that threaten the peace, stability or security of Sudan.18.7.20258.Red Rock Mining Companya.k.a. Red Rock LtdAddress: Blok 9, Kafory, Khartoum, SudanTelephone: + 249 1203 47711Website:https://redrockmining.co/contact-us/#Email: [email protected]@redrocksd.comType of entity: mining companyDate of registration: 1960sRegistration number: Group ID: 16463Principal place of business: United Arab EmiratesAddress: Office 320, Emarat Atrium Building, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab EmiratesAssociated individuals or entities: SMT EngineeringRed Rock Mining Company is a mining and exploration company. Its parent company is SMT Engineering (SMT), which is subject to restrictive measures by the Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. SMT is a major joint shareholder, along with the Defense Industries System (DIS), in three companies involved in the production of weapons and vehicles for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).The mining sector is of particular importance for the fuelling of conflict. Mining areas are often linked to war zones and represent strategically important sites to conquer for the conflict parties, increasing competition and tensions. Red Rock Mining Company is present and active in Sudan. It further holds a concession near al Damazin, which was taken over by the SAF in 2012.Red Rock Mining Company provides funding to the armed groups behind the Sudanese conflict, most prominently to the SAF. Red Rock Mining Company has a 99 % shareholding in Advanced Mining Works, which is part of the multi-sectoral network of corporations and shareholdings headed by the parent company GIAD. GIAD is involved, among others, in the production of weapons and vehicles for SAF, as well as in the provision of services. The GIAD conglomerate is controlled by the SAF via the DIS.Red Rock Mining Company is therefore an entity providing support to actions or policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. It is also associated with designated individuals and entities.18.7.2025’

Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing
‘7.
Alkhaleej Bank Co Ltda.k.a.:Khaleej Bank;Al Rowad Bank For Development & Investment;Al Rowad Bank For Development And Investment;Al-Khaleej Bank;بنك الخليج
Address: Albaraka Tower, 6th Floor, 1 Al Qasr, Khartoum, SudanWebsite:https://al-khaleejbank.com/alkhaleej/Type of entity: Financial institutionRegistration number: SUDAN-EO14098Principal place of business: Khartoum, SudanAssociated individuals or entities: Mustafa Ibrahim Abdel Nabi Mohamed, designated by the Union on 24.6.2024; Musa Hamdan Dagalo Musa, brother of RSF Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo; Shield Protective Solutions Co. Ltd. (Sudan)
Alkhaleej Bank Co Ltd (“Alkhaleej”) plays an essential role in the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) efforts to finance its own operations, complicating efforts to stop the fighting in Sudan. Alkhaleej is largely owned by companies linked to family members of RSF Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) and is therefore considered to be controlled by the RSF.Before and during the war, the RSF has established complex financial networks using profits from its gold business to fund weapons, salaries and media campaigns, and to gain political support. It controls a network of up to 50 companies, including Alkhaleej, which became a key financier and received USD 50 million from Sudan’s Central Bank in March 2023. Furthermore, Alkhaleej has international banking ties that allow the RSF to operate within the global financial system. Hemedti’s network reportedly owns a significant portion of Alkhaleej, with some estimates suggesting majority control.The RSF’s business activities span multiple sectors, including transport, construction, agriculture and banking, making Hemedti one of Sudan’s wealthiest and most powerful figures. Alkhaleej plays a crucial role in those operations, offering a direct or indirect financial lifeline to the RSF.As a key financier and facilitator of the RSF and its armed attacks and actions, Alkhaleej Bank Co Ltd is therefore engaging directly or indirectly in providing support to, or benefitting from, actions or policies that threaten the peace, stability or security of Sudan.
18.7.2025
8.
Red Rock Mining Companya.k.a. Red Rock Ltd
Address: Blok 9, Kafory, Khartoum, SudanTelephone: + 249 1203 47711Website:https://redrockmining.co/contact-us/#Email: [email protected]@redrocksd.comType of entity: mining companyDate of registration: 1960sRegistration number: Group ID: 16463Principal place of business: United Arab EmiratesAddress: Office 320, Emarat Atrium Building, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab EmiratesAssociated individuals or entities: SMT Engineering
Red Rock Mining Company is a mining and exploration company. Its parent company is SMT Engineering (SMT), which is subject to restrictive measures by the Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. SMT is a major joint shareholder, along with the Defense Industries System (DIS), in three companies involved in the production of weapons and vehicles for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).The mining sector is of particular importance for the fuelling of conflict. Mining areas are often linked to war zones and represent strategically important sites to conquer for the conflict parties, increasing competition and tensions. Red Rock Mining Company is present and active in Sudan. It further holds a concession near al Damazin, which was taken over by the SAF in 2012.Red Rock Mining Company provides funding to the armed groups behind the Sudanese conflict, most prominently to the SAF. Red Rock Mining Company has a 99 % shareholding in Advanced Mining Works, which is part of the multi-sectoral network of corporations and shareholdings headed by the parent company GIAD. GIAD is involved, among others, in the production of weapons and vehicles for SAF, as well as in the provision of services. The GIAD conglomerate is controlled by the SAF via the DIS.Red Rock Mining Company is therefore an entity providing support to actions or policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. It is also associated with designated individuals and entities.
18.7.2025’


Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing

‘7.
Alkhaleej Bank Co Ltda.k.a.:Khaleej Bank;Al Rowad Bank For Development & Investment;Al Rowad Bank For Development And Investment;Al-Khaleej Bank;بنك الخليج
Address: Albaraka Tower, 6th Floor, 1 Al Qasr, Khartoum, SudanWebsite:https://al-khaleejbank.com/alkhaleej/Type of entity: Financial institutionRegistration number: SUDAN-EO14098Principal place of business: Khartoum, SudanAssociated individuals or entities: Mustafa Ibrahim Abdel Nabi Mohamed, designated by the Union on 24.6.2024; Musa Hamdan Dagalo Musa, brother of RSF Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo; Shield Protective Solutions Co. Ltd. (Sudan)
Alkhaleej Bank Co Ltd (“Alkhaleej”) plays an essential role in the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) efforts to finance its own operations, complicating efforts to stop the fighting in Sudan. Alkhaleej is largely owned by companies linked to family members of RSF Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) and is therefore considered to be controlled by the RSF.Before and during the war, the RSF has established complex financial networks using profits from its gold business to fund weapons, salaries and media campaigns, and to gain political support. It controls a network of up to 50 companies, including Alkhaleej, which became a key financier and received USD 50 million from Sudan’s Central Bank in March 2023. Furthermore, Alkhaleej has international banking ties that allow the RSF to operate within the global financial system. Hemedti’s network reportedly owns a significant portion of Alkhaleej, with some estimates suggesting majority control.The RSF’s business activities span multiple sectors, including transport, construction, agriculture and banking, making Hemedti one of Sudan’s wealthiest and most powerful figures. Alkhaleej plays a crucial role in those operations, offering a direct or indirect financial lifeline to the RSF.As a key financier and facilitator of the RSF and its armed attacks and actions, Alkhaleej Bank Co Ltd is therefore engaging directly or indirectly in providing support to, or benefitting from, actions or policies that threaten the peace, stability or security of Sudan.
18.7.2025

8.
Red Rock Mining Companya.k.a. Red Rock Ltd
Address: Blok 9, Kafory, Khartoum, SudanTelephone: + 249 1203 47711Website:https://redrockmining.co/contact-us/#Email: [email protected]@redrocksd.comType of entity: mining companyDate of registration: 1960sRegistration number: Group ID: 16463Principal place of business: United Arab EmiratesAddress: Office 320, Emarat Atrium Building, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab EmiratesAssociated individuals or entities: SMT Engineering
Red Rock Mining Company is a mining and exploration company. Its parent company is SMT Engineering (SMT), which is subject to restrictive measures by the Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. SMT is a major joint shareholder, along with the Defense Industries System (DIS), in three companies involved in the production of weapons and vehicles for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).The mining sector is of particular importance for the fuelling of conflict. Mining areas are often linked to war zones and represent strategically important sites to conquer for the conflict parties, increasing competition and tensions. Red Rock Mining Company is present and active in Sudan. It further holds a concession near al Damazin, which was taken over by the SAF in 2012.Red Rock Mining Company provides funding to the armed groups behind the Sudanese conflict, most prominently to the SAF. Red Rock Mining Company has a 99 % shareholding in Advanced Mining Works, which is part of the multi-sectoral network of corporations and shareholdings headed by the parent company GIAD. GIAD is involved, among others, in the production of weapons and vehicles for SAF, as well as in the provision of services. The GIAD conglomerate is controlled by the SAF via the DIS.Red Rock Mining Company is therefore an entity providing support to actions or policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. It is also associated with designated individuals and entities.
18.7.2025’




Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing

‘7.
Alkhaleej Bank Co Ltda.k.a.:Khaleej Bank;Al Rowad Bank For Development & Investment;Al Rowad Bank For Development And Investment;Al-Khaleej Bank;بنك الخليج
Address: Albaraka Tower, 6th Floor, 1 Al Qasr, Khartoum, SudanWebsite:https://al-khaleejbank.com/alkhaleej/Type of entity: Financial institutionRegistration number: SUDAN-EO14098Principal place of business: Khartoum, SudanAssociated individuals or entities: Mustafa Ibrahim Abdel Nabi Mohamed, designated by the Union on 24.6.2024; Musa Hamdan Dagalo Musa, brother of RSF Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo; Shield Protective Solutions Co. Ltd. (Sudan)
Alkhaleej Bank Co Ltd (“Alkhaleej”) plays an essential role in the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) efforts to finance its own operations, complicating efforts to stop the fighting in Sudan. Alkhaleej is largely owned by companies linked to family members of RSF Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) and is therefore considered to be controlled by the RSF.Before and during the war, the RSF has established complex financial networks using profits from its gold business to fund weapons, salaries and media campaigns, and to gain political support. It controls a network of up to 50 companies, including Alkhaleej, which became a key financier and received USD 50 million from Sudan’s Central Bank in March 2023. Furthermore, Alkhaleej has international banking ties that allow the RSF to operate within the global financial system. Hemedti’s network reportedly owns a significant portion of Alkhaleej, with some estimates suggesting majority control.The RSF’s business activities span multiple sectors, including transport, construction, agriculture and banking, making Hemedti one of Sudan’s wealthiest and most powerful figures. Alkhaleej plays a crucial role in those operations, offering a direct or indirect financial lifeline to the RSF.As a key financier and facilitator of the RSF and its armed attacks and actions, Alkhaleej Bank Co Ltd is therefore engaging directly or indirectly in providing support to, or benefitting from, actions or policies that threaten the peace, stability or security of Sudan.
18.7.2025

8.
Red Rock Mining Companya.k.a. Red Rock Ltd
Address: Blok 9, Kafory, Khartoum, SudanTelephone: + 249 1203 47711Website:https://redrockmining.co/contact-us/#Email: [email protected]@redrocksd.comType of entity: mining companyDate of registration: 1960sRegistration number: Group ID: 16463Principal place of business: United Arab EmiratesAddress: Office 320, Emarat Atrium Building, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab EmiratesAssociated individuals or entities: SMT Engineering
Red Rock Mining Company is a mining and exploration company. Its parent company is SMT Engineering (SMT), which is subject to restrictive measures by the Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. SMT is a major joint shareholder, along with the Defense Industries System (DIS), in three companies involved in the production of weapons and vehicles for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).The mining sector is of particular importance for the fuelling of conflict. Mining areas are often linked to war zones and represent strategically important sites to conquer for the conflict parties, increasing competition and tensions. Red Rock Mining Company is present and active in Sudan. It further holds a concession near al Damazin, which was taken over by the SAF in 2012.Red Rock Mining Company provides funding to the armed groups behind the Sudanese conflict, most prominently to the SAF. Red Rock Mining Company has a 99 % shareholding in Advanced Mining Works, which is part of the multi-sectoral network of corporations and shareholdings headed by the parent company GIAD. GIAD is involved, among others, in the production of weapons and vehicles for SAF, as well as in the provision of services. The GIAD conglomerate is controlled by the SAF via the DIS.Red Rock Mining Company is therefore an entity providing support to actions or policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. It is also associated with designated individuals and entities.
18.7.2025’

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union and in particular Article 29 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

(1) On 9 October 2023, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/2135 (1).

(2) On 27 November 2023, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy issued a statement on behalf of the Union, in which the Union and its Member States reiterated their strong condemnation of the continuous fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their respective affiliated militias. The statement also deplored the dramatic escalation of violence and the irreparable cost to human life in Darfur and throughout the country, as well as violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

(3) In view of the gravity of the situation, two individuals and two entities should be included in the list of natural and legal persons, entities or bodies set out in the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2023/2135.

(4) Decision (CFSP) 2023/2135 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2023/2135 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
The Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2023/2135 is amended as follows:
(1) under heading ‘A. List of natural persons referred to in Article 1(1) and in Article 2(1)’, the following entries are added:
Name

Identifying information

Reasons

Date of listing

‘11. Abu Aqla Mohamed Ahmed KAIKAL

Nationality: Sudanese

Gender: male

Function: Commander of a SAF-affiliated militia

Associated entities: SAF

Abu Aqla Mohamed Ahmed Kaikal is a Sudanese Military Commander who served in the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the Jazira state in Sudan until he defected to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in October 2024. In December 2023, he was appointed by the RSF as Governor of the Jazira state, after the RSF violently took over that area. The RSF is responsible for attacking cities and humanitarian hubs in the Jazira state, leading to massive displacement of civilians, hunger, shortage of medicines and impediment of humanitarian aid. Jazira state specifically has been a centre of violence committed by the RSF during Kaikal’s governorship. Therefore, Abu Aqla Mohamed Ahmed Kaikal is responsible for actions and policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. In addition, he is responsible for directing acts in Sudan that constitute serious human rights violations, and for obstructing the delivery of, access to and distribution of humanitarian assistance in Sudan.

18.7.2025 12. Hussein BARSHAM

Nationality: Sudanese

Gender: male

Function: Military Field Commander of the RSF

Associated entities: RSF; Misseria tribe

Hussein Barsham is a Military Field Commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), an organisation that has been accused by international non-governmental organisations of ethnic cleansing and even genocide against the Masalit tribe and other non-Arab groups in Darfur.

As a Commander, Hussein Barsham has led RSF soldiers in the capture of the Baleela airport from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and the capture of localities in the West Kordofan state, such as Meiram. He has played a leading role in RSF operations that have resulted in mass atrocities, including targeted killings, ethnic violence, forced displacement and violence against civilians, particularly in Darfur and other conflict-affected regions of Sudan. Under his command, RSF forces have been involved in mass killings and atrocities. Barsham has been engaged in the fighting in the Kordofan region. He has led attacks on several localities and has been present at the sites of atrocities and mass executions committed by soldiers under his command. Such acts constitute war crimes.

Hussein Barsham is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. He is also responsible for undermining efforts to resume the political transition in Sudan and for directing or committing acts in Sudan that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses or violations of international humanitarian law.

18.7.2025’

(2) under heading ‘B. List of legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in Article 2(1)’, the following entries are added:
Name

Identifying information

Reasons

Date of listing

‘7. Alkhaleej Bank Co Ltd

a.k.a.:

Khaleej Bank;

Al Rowad Bank For Development & Investment;

Al Rowad Bank For Development And Investment;

Al-Khaleej Bank;

بنك الخليج

Address: Albaraka Tower, 6th Floor, 1 Al Qasr, Khartoum, Sudan

Website: https://al-khaleejbank.com/alkhaleej/

Type of entity: Financial institution

Registration number: SUDAN-EO14098

Principal place of business: Khartoum, Sudan

Associated individuals or entities: Mustafa Ibrahim Abdel Nabi Mohamed, designated by the Union on 24.6.2024; Musa Hamdan Dagalo Musa, brother of RSF Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo; Shield Protective Solutions Co. Ltd. (Sudan)

Alkhaleej Bank Co Ltd (“Alkhaleej”) plays an essential role in the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) efforts to finance its own operations, complicating efforts to stop the fighting in Sudan. Alkhaleej is largely owned by companies linked to family members of RSF Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) and is therefore considered to be controlled by the RSF.

Before and during the war, the RSF has established complex financial networks using profits from its gold business to fund weapons, salaries and media campaigns, and to gain political support. It controls a network of up to 50 companies, including Alkhaleej, which became a key financier and received USD 50 million from Sudan’s Central Bank in March 2023. Furthermore, Alkhaleej has international banking ties that allow the RSF to operate within the global financial system. Hemedti’s network reportedly owns a significant portion of Alkhaleej, with some estimates suggesting majority control.

The RSF’s business activities span multiple sectors, including transport, construction, agriculture and banking, making Hemedti one of Sudan’s wealthiest and most powerful figures. Alkhaleej plays a crucial role in those operations, offering a direct or indirect financial lifeline to the RSF.

As a key financier and facilitator of the RSF and its armed attacks and actions, Alkhaleej Bank Co Ltd is therefore engaging directly or indirectly in providing support to, or benefitting from, actions or policies that threaten the peace, stability or security of Sudan.

18.7.2025 8. Red Rock Mining Company

a.k.a. Red Rock Ltd

Address: Blok 9, Kafory, Khartoum, Sudan

Telephone: + 249 1203 47711

Website: https://redrockmining.co/contact-us/#

Email: [email protected]

[email protected]

Type of entity: mining company

Date of registration: 1960s

Registration number: Group ID: 16463

Principal place of business: United Arab Emirates

Address: Office 320, Emarat Atrium Building, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Associated individuals or entities: SMT Engineering

Red Rock Mining Company is a mining and exploration company. Its parent company is SMT Engineering (SMT), which is subject to restrictive measures by the Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. SMT is a major joint shareholder, along with the Defense Industries System (DIS), in three companies involved in the production of weapons and vehicles for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

The mining sector is of particular importance for the fuelling of conflict. Mining areas are often linked to war zones and represent strategically important sites to conquer for the conflict parties, increasing competition and tensions. Red Rock Mining Company is present and active in Sudan. It further holds a concession near al Damazin, which was taken over by the SAF in 2012. Red Rock Mining Company provides funding to the armed groups behind the Sudanese conflict, most prominently to the SAF. Red Rock Mining Company has a 99 % shareholding in Advanced Mining Works, which is part of the multi-sectoral network of corporations and shareholdings headed by the parent company GIAD. GIAD is involved, among others, in the production of weapons and vehicles for SAF, as well as in the provision of services. The GIAD conglomerate is controlled by the SAF via the DIS.

Red Rock Mining Company is therefore an entity providing support to actions or policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. It is also associated with designated individuals and entities.

18.7.2025’
			

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1483 of 31 July 2025 amending Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1160 concerning certain emergency measures relating to sheep pox and goat pox in Bulgaria (notified under document C(2025) 5466)

                                January 13, 2026                            

Official Journalof the European Union
ENL series

2025/1483
5.8.2025

(1)
Sheep pox and goat pox is an infectious viral disease affecting caprine and ovine animals and can have a severe impact on the concerned animal population and the profitability of farming causing disturbance to movements of consignments of those animals and products thereof within the Union and exports to third countries.

(2)
In the event of an outbreak of sheep pox and goat pox in caprine or ovine animals, there is a serious risk of the spread of that disease to other establishments of caprine or ovine animals.

(3)
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687(2)supplements the rules for the control of the listed diseases referred to in Article 9(1), points (a), (b) and (c), of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, and defined as category A, B and C diseases in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1882(3). In particular, Articles 21 and 22 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 provide for the establishment of a restricted zone in the event of an outbreak of a category A disease, including sheep pox and goat pox, and for certain measures to be applied therein. In addition, Article 21(1) of that Delegated Regulation provides that the restricted zone is to comprise a protection zone, a surveillance zone, and, if necessary, a further restricted zone around or adjacent to the protection and surveillance zones.

(4)
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1160(4)was adopted, on 5 June 2025, within the framework of Regulation (EU) 2016/429. It specifies certain emergency measures relating to sheep pox and goat pox in Bulgaria.

(5)
More particularly, Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1160 provides that the protection and surveillance zones to be established by that Member State, following an outbreak of sheep pox and goat pox, in accordance with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, are to comprise at least the areas listed in the Annex to that Implementing Decision.

(6)
On 20 June 2025, Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1160 was amended in order to adjust, both spatially and temporally, the areas where emergency measures must be taken, as well as the duration thereof, in Bulgaria to prevent the further spread of sheep pox and goat pox in Bulgaria or to the rest of the Union. Since then, Bulgaria has notified the Commission of sixty eight additional outbreaks of sheep pox and goat pox in establishments where ovine and caprine animals are kept, sixty five located in the region of Plovdiv, approximately one hundred kilometres away from the nearest outbreak previously recorded in the region of Haskovo, two in the region of Stara Zagora, about sixty kilometres north east of Plovdiv and one in the region of Haskovo, all outside the protection and surveillance zones listed in the Annex to this Implementing Decision.

(7)
In the current epidemiological situation, there is a high risk of further spread of the disease, in particular due to the fact that, according to the information provided by the competent authority of Bulgaria, the new outbreaks are located outside the established surveillance zones currently set out in the Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1160, suggesting that the disease moved outside the restricted areas and already circulates in the newly affected region of Plovdiv.

(8)
Therefore, the restricted zone, comprising protection and surveillance zones in Bulgaria, set out in the Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1160 should be adjusted, spatially and temporally in order to prevent the further spread of the disease in the territory of Bulgaria and to the rest of the Union. In addition, it is necessary to establish a further restricted zone in Bulgaria.

(9)
The size of the protection, surveillance and further restricted zones, and the duration of the measures to be applied therein, is based on the criteria set out in Article 64(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, as well as on the rules laid down in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687. The criteria applied for the choice of the size of the protection, surveillance, and further restricted zones, as well as of the duration of the measures to be applied therein, include a consideration of not only the epidemiological situation as regards sheep pox and goat pox in the areas affected by that disease, but also of the overall epidemiological situation of sheep pox and goat pox in the entire territory of Bulgaria, and of the level of risk for the further spread of the disease. The duration of the measures also takes the international standards of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code of the World Organisation for Animal Health(5)into account. In light of these considerations, when applied to the current epidemiological situation concerning sheep pox and goat pox in Bulgaria, it is necessary to establish protection, surveillance and further restricted zones around the outbreaks in the regions of Plovdiv, Stara Zagora and Haskovo, to prevent further spread of the disease.

(10)
In addition, in view of the occurrence of numerous new outbreaks of sheep pox and goat pox in Bulgaria during the past three weeks, over long distances, and the lack of sufficiently effective measures tackling this increased spread, it is necessary to adopt additional emergency measures in order to avoid the spread of the disease in Bulgaria, to the rest of the Union or to third countries, as well as to prevent unjustified trade barriers. It is therefore necessary to prohibit movements of sheep and goats from the protection and surveillance zones to any destinations located outside the external perimeter of the immediately surrounding further restricted zones, and to prohibit movements of sheep and goats from any other further restricted zone to a destination located outside the external perimeter of those further restricted zones, including to destinations located in different further restricted zones, as set out in Part B of the Annex. Furthermore, it is also necessary to prohibit movements of animals originating from those areas of Bulgaria that are not subject to restrictions due to sheep pox and goat pox to any of the areas set out as further restricted zones, until a specific date, since such movements may also contribute to indirect disease spread.

(11)
In view of the epidemiological situation, it also necessary to identify the areas in the territory of Bulgaria where further measures like those applicable to further restricted zones, as provided for in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, should apply, and where movements of ovine and caprine animals outside the external perimeters of those areas should be prohibited until a specific date.

(12)
In addition, in order to minimise the risk of further disease spread, it is also necessary to prohibit movements of ovine and caprine animals from the entire territory of Bulgaria to any destination located to other Member States or third countries, until a specific date.

(13)
Given the urgency of the epidemiological situation in the Union as regards the spread of sheep pox and goat pox, and the need to prevent the disease from spreading from the affected establishments in Bulgaria to other parts of that Member State or to other Member State or third countries the emergency measures laid down in this Implementing Decision should apply as soon as possible.

(14)
The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,

(1)
Articles 1, 2 and 3 are replaced by the following:‘Article 1Bulgaria shall ensure that:(a)a restricted zone, which comprises protection zones, surveillance zones, and further restricted zones, is established, in accordance with Article 21 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, immediately by the competent authorities of Bulgaria;(b)the protection, surveillance, and further restricted zones, referred to in point (a), comprise at least the areas listed in Parts A and B of Annex I;(c)the measures required to be applied in the protection, surveillance, and further restricted zones, referred to in point (a), are applied at least until the dates listed in Parts A and B of Annex I.Article 2Bulgaria shall ensure that:(a)movements of sheep and goats from the protection and surveillance zones to a destination located outside the external perimeter of the immediately surrounding further restricted zone and from a further restricted zone to a destination located outside the external perimeter of this further restricted zone, including destinations located in a different further restricted zone as set out in Part B of the Annex, are prohibited until the dates listed for each such protection, surveillance and further restricted zone in the Annex;(b)movements of sheep and goats from those parts of the territory of Bulgaria that are not listed in the Annex, to a destination located within the external perimeter of a further restricted zone shall be prohibited until all protection zones within this external perimeter have been lifted in accordance with the dates set out in that Annex;(c)movements of sheep and goats from the territory of Bulgaria to a destination located outside Bulgaria are prohibited until 31 October 2025.Article 3Bulgaria shall apply the measures which are applicable to further restricted zones, as provided for in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, in the areas listed in Annex II to this Decision until the dates set out therein.Movements of sheep and goats from the areas listed in Annex II to this Decision to a destination located outside the external perimeter of those areas shall be prohibited until the dates set out in that Annex.Article 4This Decision is addressed to the Republic of Bulgaria.’;
(a)
a restricted zone, which comprises protection zones, surveillance zones, and further restricted zones, is established, in accordance with Article 21 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, immediately by the competent authorities of Bulgaria;
(b)
the protection, surveillance, and further restricted zones, referred to in point (a), comprise at least the areas listed in Parts A and B of Annex I;
(c)
the measures required to be applied in the protection, surveillance, and further restricted zones, referred to in point (a), are applied at least until the dates listed in Parts A and B of Annex I.
(a)
movements of sheep and goats from the protection and surveillance zones to a destination located outside the external perimeter of the immediately surrounding further restricted zone and from a further restricted zone to a destination located outside the external perimeter of this further restricted zone, including destinations located in a different further restricted zone as set out in Part B of the Annex, are prohibited until the dates listed for each such protection, surveillance and further restricted zone in the Annex;
(b)
movements of sheep and goats from those parts of the territory of Bulgaria that are not listed in the Annex, to a destination located within the external perimeter of a further restricted zone shall be prohibited until all protection zones within this external perimeter have been lifted in accordance with the dates set out in that Annex;
(c)
movements of sheep and goats from the territory of Bulgaria to a destination located outside Bulgaria are prohibited until 31 October 2025.

(a)
a restricted zone, which comprises protection zones, surveillance zones, and further restricted zones, is established, in accordance with Article 21 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, immediately by the competent authorities of Bulgaria;

(b)
the protection, surveillance, and further restricted zones, referred to in point (a), comprise at least the areas listed in Parts A and B of Annex I;

(c)
the measures required to be applied in the protection, surveillance, and further restricted zones, referred to in point (a), are applied at least until the dates listed in Parts A and B of Annex I.

(a)
movements of sheep and goats from the protection and surveillance zones to a destination located outside the external perimeter of the immediately surrounding further restricted zone and from a further restricted zone to a destination located outside the external perimeter of this further restricted zone, including destinations located in a different further restricted zone as set out in Part B of the Annex, are prohibited until the dates listed for each such protection, surveillance and further restricted zone in the Annex;

(b)
movements of sheep and goats from those parts of the territory of Bulgaria that are not listed in the Annex, to a destination located within the external perimeter of a further restricted zone shall be prohibited until all protection zones within this external perimeter have been lifted in accordance with the dates set out in that Annex;

(c)
movements of sheep and goats from the territory of Bulgaria to a destination located outside Bulgaria are prohibited until 31 October 2025.

(a)
a restricted zone, which comprises protection zones, surveillance zones, and further restricted zones, is established, in accordance with Article 21 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, immediately by the competent authorities of Bulgaria;

(b)
the protection, surveillance, and further restricted zones, referred to in point (a), comprise at least the areas listed in Parts A and B of Annex I;

(c)
the measures required to be applied in the protection, surveillance, and further restricted zones, referred to in point (a), are applied at least until the dates listed in Parts A and B of Annex I.

(a)
movements of sheep and goats from the protection and surveillance zones to a destination located outside the external perimeter of the immediately surrounding further restricted zone and from a further restricted zone to a destination located outside the external perimeter of this further restricted zone, including destinations located in a different further restricted zone as set out in Part B of the Annex, are prohibited until the dates listed for each such protection, surveillance and further restricted zone in the Annex;

(b)
movements of sheep and goats from those parts of the territory of Bulgaria that are not listed in the Annex, to a destination located within the external perimeter of a further restricted zone shall be prohibited until all protection zones within this external perimeter have been lifted in accordance with the dates set out in that Annex;

(c)
movements of sheep and goats from the territory of Bulgaria to a destination located outside Bulgaria are prohibited until 31 October 2025.

(2)
the Annex is replaced by the text set out in the Annex to this Decision.

Region and ADIS reference number of the outbreak
Areas established as protection and surveillance zones, part of the restricted zone in Bulgaria referred to in Article 1
Date until applicable

Region of BurgasBG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00007
Surveillance zone:Those parts of the region of Burgas, contained within a circle of a radius of 15 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.3872, Long. 27.2608 (2025/7), excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.
29.7.2025

Surveillance zone:Those parts of the region of Burgas, contained within a circle of a radius of 5 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.3872, Long. 27.2608 (2025/7).
15.7.2025 -29.7.2025

Region of PlovdivBG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00008BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00009BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00010BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00011BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00012BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00013BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00014BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00015BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00016BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00017BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00018BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00021BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00022BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00023BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00024BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00025BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00026BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00027BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00028BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00029BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00030BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00031BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00032BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00033BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00034BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00035BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00036BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00039BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00040BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00041BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00042BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00043BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00044BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00045BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00046BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00047BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00048BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00049BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00050BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00051BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00052BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00053BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00054BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00055BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00056BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00057BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00058BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00059BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00060BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00061BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00062BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00063BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00064BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00065BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00067BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00068BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00069BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00070BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00071BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00072BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00073BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00074BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00075BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00076BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00077
Protection zone:Those parts of the regions of Plovdiv and Stara Zagora contained within a circle of a radius of 5 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat.42.1944, Long. 24.8528 (2025/8), Lat. 42.1823, Long. 24.8337 (2025/9), Lat. 42.1889, Long. 24.8137 (2025/10), Lat. 42.1862, Long. 24.8316 (2025/11), Lat. 42.1856, Long. 24.8456 (2025/12), Lat. 42.2312, Long. 24.9357 (2025/13), Lat. 42.2308, Long. 24.9368 (2025/14), Lat. 42.18222, Long. 24.86694 (2025/15), Lat. 42.1873, Long. 24.8456 (2025/16), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/17), Lat. 42.06, Long. 25.1658 (2025/18) Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/17), Lat. 42.23, Long. 24.9391 (2025/21), Lat. 42.231703, Long. 24.938912 (2025/22), Lat. 42.2306, Long. 24.9369 (2025/23), Lat. 42.2319, Long. 24.9362 (2025/24), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/25), Lat. 42.2051, Long. 24.87314 (2025/26), Lat. 42.2069, Long. 24.78666 (2025/27), Lat. 42.233, Long. 24.9405 (2025/28), Lat. 42.2316, Long. 24.94214 (2025/29), Lat. 42.2602, Long. 24.8751 (2025/30), Lat. 42.20922, Long. 24.95578 (2025/31), Lat. 42.2089, Long. 24.9508 (2025/32), Lat. 42.2092, Long. 24.9525 (2025/33), Lat. 42.1886, Long. 24.9265 (2025/34), Lat. 42.1886, Long. 24.9265 (2025/35), Lat. 42.1925, Long. 24.9329 (2025/36), Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/37), Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/38), Lat. 42.200845, Long. 24.790453 (2025/39), Lat. 42.2463, Long. 24.7957 (2025/40), Lat. 42.202878, Long 24.690226 (2025/41), Lat. 42.2829, Long. 24.9637 (2025/42), Lat. 42.2363, Long. 24.8297 (2025/43), Lat. 42.1872, Long. 24.9242 (2025/44), Lat. 42.2308, Long 25.0438 (2025/45), Lat. 42.2401, Long. 25.0556 (2025/46), Lat. 42.2037, Long. 25.0513 (2025/47), Lat. 42.1959, Long. 25.0566 (2025/48), Lat. 42.2977, Long. 24.9179 (2025/49), Lat. 42.1369, Long. 24.9082 (2025/50), Lat. 42.1481, Long. 24.9055 (2025/51), Lat. 42.2333, Long. 24.8135 (2025/52), Lat. 42.3188, Long. 24.8888 (2025/53), Lat. 42.1903, Long. 25.034 (2025/54), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/55), Lat. 42.2828, Long. 24.7528 (2025/56), Lat. 42.1061, Long. 24.8812 (2025/57), Lat. 42.2116, Long. 24.9584 (2025/58), Lat. 42.2559, Long. 24.6802 (2025/59), Lat. 41.9946, Long. 25.2278 (2025/60), Lat. 42.0248, Long. 25.096 (2025/61), Lat. 42.0341, Long. 25.1186 (2025/62), Lat. 42.0973, Long. 24.8738 (2025/63), Lat. 42.2008, Long. 25.049 (2025/64), Lat. 42.21546, Long. 24.62801 (2025/65), Lat. 42.3695, Long. 24.7158 (2025/67), Lat. 42.2753, Long. 25.1217 (2025/68), Lat. 42.2883, Long. 24.6303 (2025/69), Lat. 42.3705, Long. 24.725 (2025/70), Lat. 42.371, Long. 24.7229 (2025/71), Lat. 42.3288, Long. 24.6784 (2025/72), Lat. 42.3263, Long. 24.6724 (2025/73), Lat. 42.1929, Long. 24.635 (2025/74), Lat. 42.0567, Long. 24.7664 (2025/75), Lat. 42.1295, Long. 25.04 (2025/76), Lat. 42.3826, Long. 24.7806 (2025/77).
24.8.2025

Surveillance zone:Those parts of the regions of Plovdiv, Stara Zagora, Haskovo and Pazardzhik contained within a circle of a radius of 15 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.1944, Long. 24.8528 (2025/8), Lat. 42.1823, Long. 24.8337 (2025/9), Lat. 42.1889, Long. 24.8137 (2025/10), Lat. 42.1862, Long. 24.8316 (2025/11), Lat. 42.1856, Long. 24.8456 (2025/12), Lat. 42.2312, Long. 24.9357 (2025/13), Lat. 42.2308, Long. 24.9368 (2025/14), Lat. 42.18222, Long. 24.86694 (2025/15), Lat. 42.1873, Long. 24.8456 (2025/16), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/17), Lat. 42.06, Long. 25.1658 (2025/18), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/17), Lat. 42.23, Long. 24.9391 (2025/21), Lat. 42.231703, Long. 24.938912 (2025/22), Lat. 42.2306, Long. 24.9369 (2025/23), Lat. 42.2319, Long. 24.9362 (2025/24), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/25), Lat. 42.2051, Long. 24.87314 (2025/26), Lat. 42.2069, Long. 24.78666 (2025/27), Lat. 42.233, Long. 24.9405 (2025/28), Lat. 42.2316, Long. 24.94214 (2025/29), Lat. 42.2602, Long. 24.8751 (2025/30), Lat. 42.20922, Long. 24.95578 (2025/31), Lat. 42.2089, Long. 24.9508 (2025/32), Lat. 42.2092, Long. 24.9525 (2025/33), Lat. 42.1886, Long. 24.9265 (2025/34), Lat. 42.1886, Long. 24.9265 (2025/35), Lat. 42.1925, Long. 24.9329 (2025/36), Lat. 42.200845, Long. 24.790453 (2025/39), Lat. 42.2463, Long. 24.7957 (2025/40), Lat. 42.202878, Long. 24.690226 (2025/41), Lat. 42.2829, Long. 24.9637 (2025/42), Lat. 42.2363, Long. 24.8297 (2025/43), Lat. 42.1872, Long. 24.9242 (2025/44), Lat. 42.2308, Long 25.0438 (2025/45), Lat. 42.2401, Long. 25.0556 (2025/46), Lat. 42.2037, Long. 25.0513 (2025/47), Lat. 42.1959, Long. 25.0566 (2025/48), Lat. 42.2977, Long 24.9179 (2025/49), Lat. 42.1369, Long. 24.9082 (2025/50), Lat. 42.1481, Long. 24.9055 (2025/51), Lat. 42.2333, Long. 24.8135 (2025/52), Lat. 42.3188, Long 24.8888 (2025/53), Lat. 42.1903, Long. 25.034 (2025/54), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/55), Lat. 42.2828, Long. 24.7528 (2025/56), Lat. 42.1061, Long. 24.8812 (2025/57), Lat. 42.2116, Long. 24.9584 (2025/58), Lat. 42.2559, Long. 24.6802 (2025/59), Lat. 41.9946, Long. 25.2278 (2025/60), Lat. 42.0248, Long. 25.096 (2025/61), Lat. 42.0341, Long. 25.1186 (2025/62), Lat. 42.0973, Long. 24.8738 (2025/63), Lat. 42.2008, Long. 25.049 (2025/64), Lat. 42.21546, Long. 24.62801 (2025/65), Lat. 42.3695, Long. 24.7158 (2025/67), Lat. 42.2753, Long. 25.1217 (2025/68), Lat. 42.2883, Long. 24.6303 (2025/69), Lat. 42.3705, Long. 24.725 (2025/70), Lat. 42.371, Long. 24.7229 (2025/71), Lat. 42.3288, Long. 24.6784 (2025/72), Lat. 42.3263, Long. 24.6724 (2025/73), Lat. 42.1929, Long. 24.635 (2025/74), Lat. 42.0567, Long. 24.7664 (2025/75), Lat. 42.1295, Long. 25.04 (2025/76), Lat. 42.3826, Long. 24.7806 (2025/77). excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.
8.9.2025

Surveillance zone:Those parts of the regions of Plovdiv and Stara Zagora, contained within a circle of a radius of 5 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.1944, Long. 24.8528 (2025/8), Lat. 42.1823, Long. 24.8337 (2025/9), Lat.42.1889, Long. 24.8137(2025/10), Lat. 42.1862, Long. 24.8316 (2025/11), Lat. 42.1856, Long. 24.8456 (2025/12), Lat. 42.2312, Long. 24.9357 (2025/13), Lat. 42.2308, Long. 24.9368 (2025/14), Lat. 42.18222, Long. 24.86694 (2025/15), Lat. 42.1873, Long. 24.8456 (2025/16), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/17), Lat. 42.06, Long. 25.1658 (2025/18), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/17), Lat. 42.23, Long. 24.9391 (2025/21), Lat. 42.231703, Long. 24.938912 (2025/22), Lat. 42.2306, Long. 24.9369 (2025/23), Lat. 42.2319, Long. 24.9362 (2025/24), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/25), Lat. 42.2051, Long. 24.87314 (2025/26), Lat. 42.2069, Long. 24.78666 (2025/27), Lat. 42.233, Long. 24.9405 (2025/28), Lat. 42.2316, Long. 24.94214 (2025/29), Lat. 42.2602, Long. 24.8751 (2025/30), Lat. 42.20922, Long. 24.95578 (2025/31), Lat. 42.2089, Long. 24.9508 (2025/32), Lat. 42.2092, Long. 24.9525 (2025/33), Lat. 42.1886, Long. 24.9265 (2025/34), Lat. 42.1886, Long. 24.9265 (2025/35), Lat. 42.1925, Long. 24.9329 (2025/36), Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/37), Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/38), Lat. 42.200845, Long. 24.790453 (2025/39), Lat. 42.2463, Long. 24.7957 (2025/40), Lat. 42.202878, Long 24.690226 (2025/41), Lat. 42.2829, Long. 24.9637 (2025/42), Lat. 42.2363, Long. 24.8297 (2025/43), Lat. 42.1872, Long. 24.9242 (2025/44), Lat. 42.2308, Long 25.0438 (2025/45), Lat. 42.2401, Long. 25.0556 (2025/46), Lat. 42.2037, Long. 25.0513 (2025/47), Lat. 42.1959, Long. 25.0566 (2025/48), Lat. 42.2977, Long 24.9179 (2025/49), Lat. 42.1369, Long. 24.9082 (2025/50), Lat. 42.1481, Long. 24.9055 (2025/51), Lat. 42.2333, Long. 24.8135 (2025/52), Lat. 42.3188, Long 24.8888 (2025/53), Lat. 42.1903, Long. 25.034 (2025/54), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/55), Lat. 42.2828, Long. 24.7528 (2025/56), Lat. 42.1061, Long. 24.8812 (2025/57), Lat. 42.2116, Long. 24.9584 (2025/58), Lat. 42.2559, Long. 24.6802 (2025/59), Lat. 41.9946, Long. 25.2278 (2025/60), Lat. 42.0248, Long. 25.096 (2025/61), Lat. 42.0341, Long. 25.1186 (2025/62), Lat. 42.0973, Long. 24.8738 (2025/63), Lat. 42.2008, Long. 25.049 (2025/64), Lat. 42.21546, Long. 24.62801 (2025/65), Lat. 42.3695, Long. 24.7158 (2025/67), Lat. 42.2753, Long. 25.1217 (2025/68), Lat. 42.2883, Long. 24.6303 (2025/69), Lat. 42.3705, Long. 24.725 (2025/70), Lat. 42.371, Long. 24.7229 (2025/71), Lat. 42.3288, Long. 24.6784 (2025/72), Lat. 42.3263, Long. 24.6724 (2025/73), Lat. 42.1929, Long. 24.635 (2025/74), Lat. 42.0567, Long. 24.7664 (2025/75), Lat. 42.1295, Long. 25.04 (2025/76), Lat. 42.3826, Long. 24.7806 (2025/77).
25.8.2025 – 8.9.2025

Region of Stara ZagoraBG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00037BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00038
Protection zone:Those parts of the region of Stara Zagora, contained within a circle of a radius of 5 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/37), Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/38).
17.8.2025

Surveillance zone:Those parts of the regions of Stara Zagora and Gabrovo contained within a circle of a radius of 15 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/37), Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/38), excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.
1.9.2025

Surveillance zone:Those parts of the region of Stara Zagora, contained within a circle of a radius of 5 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/37), Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/38).
18.8.2025-1.9.2025

Region of HaskovoBG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00066
Protection zone:Those parts of the region of Haskovo, contained within a circle of a radius of 5 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 41.7227, Long. 26.325 (2025/66).
24.8.2025

Surveillance zone:Those parts of the region of Haskovo, contained within a circle of a radius of 15 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 41.7227, Long. 26.325 (2025/66), excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.
8.9.2025

Surveillance zone:Those parts of the region of Haskovo, contained within a circle of a radius of 5 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 41.7227, Long. 26.325 (2025/66).
25.8.2025 -8.9.2025

Further restricted zone
Region
Areas included in the further restricted zones established in Bulgaria as referred to in Article 2
Date until applicable

Further restricted zone No 1
Region of Plovdiv
The entire region of Plovdiv excluding the areas included in any protection or surveillance zone.
8.9.2025

Region of Haskovo
The municipalities of Dimitrovgrad, and Mineralni Bani, excluding the areas included in any protection or surveillance zone.

Further restricted zone No 2
Region of Stara Zagora
The municipalities of Pavel Bajna, Kazanlak, Bratja Daskalovi and Cirpan, excluding the areas included in any protection or surveillance zone.
1.9.2025

Region of Gabrovo
The entire region of Gabrovo, excluding the areas included in any protection or surveillance zone

Area
Region
Areas, referred to in Article 3
Date until applicable

Area No 1
Region of Plovdiv
The entire region of Plovdiv.
9.9.2025-8.10.2025

Region of Haskovo
The municipalities of Dimitrovgrad, and Mineralni Bani.

Area No 2
Region of Stara Zagora
The municipalities of Pavel Bajna, Kazanlak, Bratja Daskalovi and Cirpan.
2.9.2025-1.10.2025

Region of Gabrovo
The entire region of Gabrovo.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on transmissible animal diseases and amending and repealing certain acts in the area of animal health (‘Animal Health Law’) (1), and in particular Article 259(1) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Sheep pox and goat pox is an infectious viral disease affecting caprine and ovine animals and can have a severe impact on the concerned animal population and the profitability of farming causing disturbance to movements of consignments of those animals and products thereof within the Union and exports to third countries.

(2) In the event of an outbreak of sheep pox and goat pox in caprine or ovine animals, there is a serious risk of the spread of that disease to other establishments of caprine or ovine animals.

(3) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 (2) supplements the rules for the control of the listed diseases referred to in Article 9(1), points (a), (b) and (c), of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, and defined as category A, B and C diseases in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1882 (3). In particular, Articles 21 and 22 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 provide for the establishment of a restricted zone in the event of an outbreak of a category A disease, including sheep pox and goat pox, and for certain measures to be applied therein. In addition, Article 21(1) of that Delegated Regulation provides that the restricted zone is to comprise a protection zone, a surveillance zone, and, if necessary, a further restricted zone around or adjacent to the protection and surveillance zones.

(4) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1160 (4) was adopted, on 5 June 2025, within the framework of Regulation (EU) 2016/429. It specifies certain emergency measures relating to sheep pox and goat pox in Bulgaria.

(5) More particularly, Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1160 provides that the protection and surveillance zones to be established by that Member State, following an outbreak of sheep pox and goat pox, in accordance with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, are to comprise at least the areas listed in the Annex to that Implementing Decision.

(6) On 20 June 2025, Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1160 was amended in order to adjust, both spatially and temporally, the areas where emergency measures must be taken, as well as the duration thereof, in Bulgaria to prevent the further spread of sheep pox and goat pox in Bulgaria or to the rest of the Union. Since then, Bulgaria has notified the Commission of sixty eight additional outbreaks of sheep pox and goat pox in establishments where ovine and caprine animals are kept, sixty five located in the region of Plovdiv, approximately one hundred kilometres away from the nearest outbreak previously recorded in the region of Haskovo, two in the region of Stara Zagora, about sixty kilometres north east of Plovdiv and one in the region of Haskovo, all outside the protection and surveillance zones listed in the Annex to this Implementing Decision.

(7) In the current epidemiological situation, there is a high risk of further spread of the disease, in particular due to the fact that, according to the information provided by the competent authority of Bulgaria, the new outbreaks are located outside the established surveillance zones currently set out in the Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1160, suggesting that the disease moved outside the restricted areas and already circulates in the newly affected region of Plovdiv.

(8) Therefore, the restricted zone, comprising protection and surveillance zones in Bulgaria, set out in the Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1160 should be adjusted, spatially and temporally in order to prevent the further spread of the disease in the territory of Bulgaria and to the rest of the Union. In addition, it is necessary to establish a further restricted zone in Bulgaria.

(9) The size of the protection, surveillance and further restricted zones, and the duration of the measures to be applied therein, is based on the criteria set out in Article 64(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, as well as on the rules laid down in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687. The criteria applied for the choice of the size of the protection, surveillance, and further restricted zones, as well as of the duration of the measures to be applied therein, include a consideration of not only the epidemiological situation as regards sheep pox and goat pox in the areas affected by that disease, but also of the overall epidemiological situation of sheep pox and goat pox in the entire territory of Bulgaria, and of the level of risk for the further spread of the disease. The duration of the measures also takes the international standards of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code of the World Organisation for Animal Health (5) into account. In light of these considerations, when applied to the current epidemiological situation concerning sheep pox and goat pox in Bulgaria, it is necessary to establish protection, surveillance and further restricted zones around the outbreaks in the regions of Plovdiv, Stara Zagora and Haskovo, to prevent further spread of the disease.

(10) In addition, in view of the occurrence of numerous new outbreaks of sheep pox and goat pox in Bulgaria during the past three weeks, over long distances, and the lack of sufficiently effective measures tackling this increased spread, it is necessary to adopt additional emergency measures in order to avoid the spread of the disease in Bulgaria, to the rest of the Union or to third countries, as well as to prevent unjustified trade barriers. It is therefore necessary to prohibit movements of sheep and goats from the protection and surveillance zones to any destinations located outside the external perimeter of the immediately surrounding further restricted zones, and to prohibit movements of sheep and goats from any other further restricted zone to a destination located outside the external perimeter of those further restricted zones, including to destinations located in different further restricted zones, as set out in Part B of the Annex. Furthermore, it is also necessary to prohibit movements of animals originating from those areas of Bulgaria that are not subject to restrictions due to sheep pox and goat pox to any of the areas set out as further restricted zones, until a specific date, since such movements may also contribute to indirect disease spread.

(11) In view of the epidemiological situation, it also necessary to identify the areas in the territory of Bulgaria where further measures like those applicable to further restricted zones, as provided for in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, should apply, and where movements of ovine and caprine animals outside the external perimeters of those areas should be prohibited until a specific date.

(12) In addition, in order to minimise the risk of further disease spread, it is also necessary to prohibit movements of ovine and caprine animals from the entire territory of Bulgaria to any destination located to other Member States or third countries, until a specific date.

(13) Given the urgency of the epidemiological situation in the Union as regards the spread of sheep pox and goat pox, and the need to prevent the disease from spreading from the affected establishments in Bulgaria to other parts of that Member State or to other Member State or third countries the emergency measures laid down in this Implementing Decision should apply as soon as possible.

(14) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1160 is amended as follows:
(1) Articles 1, 2 and 3 are replaced by the following:

‘Article 1

Bulgaria shall ensure that:

(a) a restricted zone, which comprises protection zones, surveillance zones, and further restricted zones, is established, in accordance with Article 21 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, immediately by the competent authorities of Bulgaria;

(b) the protection, surveillance, and further restricted zones, referred to in point (a), comprise at least the areas listed in Parts A and B of Annex I;

(c) the measures required to be applied in the protection, surveillance, and further restricted zones, referred to in point (a), are applied at least until the dates listed in Parts A and B of Annex I.

Article 2

Bulgaria shall ensure that:

(a) movements of sheep and goats from the protection and surveillance zones to a destination located outside the external perimeter of the immediately surrounding further restricted zone and from a further restricted zone to a destination located outside the external perimeter of this further restricted zone, including destinations located in a different further restricted zone as set out in Part B of the Annex, are prohibited until the dates listed for each such protection, surveillance and further restricted zone in the Annex;

(b) movements of sheep and goats from those parts of the territory of Bulgaria that are not listed in the Annex, to a destination located within the external perimeter of a further restricted zone shall be prohibited until all protection zones within this external perimeter have been lifted in accordance with the dates set out in that Annex;

(c) movements of sheep and goats from the territory of Bulgaria to a destination located outside Bulgaria are prohibited until 31 October 2025. Article 3

Bulgaria shall apply the measures which are applicable to further restricted zones, as provided for in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, in the areas listed in Annex II to this Decision until the dates set out therein.

Movements of sheep and goats from the areas listed in Annex II to this Decision to a destination located outside the external perimeter of those areas shall be prohibited until the dates set out in that Annex.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to the Republic of Bulgaria.’

;

(2) the Annex is replaced by the text set out in the Annex to this Decision.
This Decision is addressed to the Republic of Bulgaria.

‘ANNEX I

Part A: Protection and surveillance zones established around the confirmed outbreaks

Region and ADIS reference number of the outbreak

Areas established as protection and surveillance zones, part of the restricted zone in Bulgaria referred to in Article 1

Date until applicable

Region of Burgas

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00007

Surveillance zone:

Those parts of the region of Burgas, contained within a circle of a radius of 15 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.3872, Long. 27.2608 (2025/7), excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.

29.7.2025

Surveillance zone:

Those parts of the region of Burgas, contained within a circle of a radius of 5 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.3872, Long. 27.2608 (2025/7).

15.7.2025 -29.7.2025

Region of Plovdiv

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00008

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00009

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00010

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00011

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00012

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00013

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00014

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00015

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00016

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00017

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00018

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00021

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00022

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00023

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00024

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00025

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00026

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00027

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00028

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00029

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00030

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00031

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00032

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00033

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00034

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00035

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00036

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00039

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00040

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00041

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00042

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00043

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00044

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00045

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00046

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00047

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00048

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00049

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00050

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00051

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00052

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00053

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00054

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00055

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00056

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00057

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00058

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00059

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00060

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00061

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00062

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00063

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00064

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00065

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00067

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00068

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00069

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00070

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00071

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00072

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00073

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00074

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00075

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00076

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00077

Protection zone:

Those parts of the regions of Plovdiv and Stara Zagora contained within a circle of a radius of 5 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat.42.1944, Long. 24.8528 (2025/8), Lat. 42.1823, Long. 24.8337 (2025/9), Lat. 42.1889, Long. 24.8137 (2025/10), Lat. 42.1862, Long. 24.8316 (2025/11), Lat. 42.1856, Long. 24.8456 (2025/12), Lat. 42.2312, Long. 24.9357 (2025/13), Lat. 42.2308, Long. 24.9368 (2025/14), Lat. 42.18222, Long. 24.86694 (2025/15), Lat. 42.1873, Long. 24.8456 (2025/16), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/17), Lat. 42.06, Long. 25.1658 (2025/18) Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/17), Lat. 42.23, Long. 24.9391 (2025/21), Lat. 42.231703, Long. 24.938912 (2025/22), Lat. 42.2306, Long. 24.9369 (2025/23), Lat. 42.2319, Long. 24.9362 (2025/24), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/25), Lat. 42.2051, Long. 24.87314 (2025/26), Lat. 42.2069, Long. 24.78666 (2025/27), Lat. 42.233, Long. 24.9405 (2025/28), Lat. 42.2316, Long. 24.94214 (2025/29), Lat. 42.2602, Long. 24.8751 (2025/30), Lat. 42.20922, Long. 24.95578 (2025/31), Lat. 42.2089, Long. 24.9508 (2025/32), Lat. 42.2092, Long. 24.9525 (2025/33), Lat. 42.1886, Long. 24.9265 (2025/34), Lat. 42.1886, Long. 24.9265 (2025/35), Lat. 42.1925, Long. 24.9329 (2025/36), Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/37), Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/38), Lat. 42.200845, Long. 24.790453 (2025/39), Lat. 42.2463, Long. 24.7957 (2025/40), Lat. 42.202878, Long 24.690226 (2025/41), Lat. 42.2829, Long. 24.9637 (2025/42), Lat. 42.2363, Long. 24.8297 (2025/43), Lat. 42.1872, Long. 24.9242 (2025/44), Lat. 42.2308, Long 25.0438 (2025/45), Lat. 42.2401, Long. 25.0556 (2025/46), Lat. 42.2037, Long. 25.0513 (2025/47), Lat. 42.1959, Long. 25.0566 (2025/48), Lat. 42.2977, Long. 24.9179 (2025/49), Lat. 42.1369, Long. 24.9082 (2025/50), Lat. 42.1481, Long. 24.9055 (2025/51), Lat. 42.2333, Long. 24.8135 (2025/52), Lat. 42.3188, Long. 24.8888 (2025/53), Lat. 42.1903, Long. 25.034 (2025/54), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/55), Lat. 42.2828, Long. 24.7528 (2025/56), Lat. 42.1061, Long. 24.8812 (2025/57), Lat. 42.2116, Long. 24.9584 (2025/58), Lat. 42.2559, Long. 24.6802 (2025/59), Lat. 41.9946, Long. 25.2278 (2025/60), Lat. 42.0248, Long. 25.096 (2025/61), Lat. 42.0341, Long. 25.1186 (2025/62), Lat. 42.0973, Long. 24.8738 (2025/63), Lat. 42.2008, Long. 25.049 (2025/64), Lat. 42.21546, Long. 24.62801 (2025/65), Lat. 42.3695, Long. 24.7158 (2025/67), Lat. 42.2753, Long. 25.1217 (2025/68), Lat. 42.2883, Long. 24.6303 (2025/69), Lat. 42.3705, Long. 24.725 (2025/70), Lat. 42.371, Long. 24.7229 (2025/71), Lat. 42.3288, Long. 24.6784 (2025/72), Lat. 42.3263, Long. 24.6724 (2025/73), Lat. 42.1929, Long. 24.635 (2025/74), Lat. 42.0567, Long. 24.7664 (2025/75), Lat. 42.1295, Long. 25.04 (2025/76), Lat. 42.3826, Long. 24.7806 (2025/77).

24.8.2025

Surveillance zone:

Those parts of the regions of Plovdiv, Stara Zagora, Haskovo and Pazardzhik contained within a circle of a radius of 15 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.1944, Long. 24.8528 (2025/8), Lat. 42.1823, Long. 24.8337 (2025/9), Lat. 42.1889, Long. 24.8137 (2025/10), Lat. 42.1862, Long. 24.8316 (2025/11), Lat. 42.1856, Long. 24.8456 (2025/12), Lat. 42.2312, Long. 24.9357 (2025/13), Lat. 42.2308, Long. 24.9368 (2025/14), Lat. 42.18222, Long. 24.86694 (2025/15), Lat. 42.1873, Long. 24.8456 (2025/16), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/17), Lat. 42.06, Long. 25.1658 (2025/18), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/17), Lat. 42.23, Long. 24.9391 (2025/21), Lat. 42.231703, Long. 24.938912 (2025/22), Lat. 42.2306, Long. 24.9369 (2025/23), Lat. 42.2319, Long. 24.9362 (2025/24), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/25), Lat. 42.2051, Long. 24.87314 (2025/26), Lat. 42.2069, Long. 24.78666 (2025/27), Lat. 42.233, Long. 24.9405 (2025/28), Lat. 42.2316, Long. 24.94214 (2025/29), Lat. 42.2602, Long. 24.8751 (2025/30), Lat. 42.20922, Long. 24.95578 (2025/31), Lat. 42.2089, Long. 24.9508 (2025/32), Lat. 42.2092, Long. 24.9525 (2025/33), Lat. 42.1886, Long. 24.9265 (2025/34), Lat. 42.1886, Long. 24.9265 (2025/35), Lat. 42.1925, Long. 24.9329 (2025/36), Lat. 42.200845, Long. 24.790453 (2025/39), Lat. 42.2463, Long. 24.7957 (2025/40), Lat. 42.202878, Long. 24.690226 (2025/41), Lat. 42.2829, Long. 24.9637 (2025/42), Lat. 42.2363, Long. 24.8297 (2025/43), Lat. 42.1872, Long. 24.9242 (2025/44), Lat. 42.2308, Long 25.0438 (2025/45), Lat. 42.2401, Long. 25.0556 (2025/46), Lat. 42.2037, Long. 25.0513 (2025/47), Lat. 42.1959, Long. 25.0566 (2025/48), Lat. 42.2977, Long 24.9179 (2025/49), Lat. 42.1369, Long. 24.9082 (2025/50), Lat. 42.1481, Long. 24.9055 (2025/51), Lat. 42.2333, Long. 24.8135 (2025/52), Lat. 42.3188, Long 24.8888 (2025/53), Lat. 42.1903, Long. 25.034 (2025/54), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/55), Lat. 42.2828, Long. 24.7528 (2025/56), Lat. 42.1061, Long. 24.8812 (2025/57), Lat. 42.2116, Long. 24.9584 (2025/58), Lat. 42.2559, Long. 24.6802 (2025/59), Lat. 41.9946, Long. 25.2278 (2025/60), Lat. 42.0248, Long. 25.096 (2025/61), Lat. 42.0341, Long. 25.1186 (2025/62), Lat. 42.0973, Long. 24.8738 (2025/63), Lat. 42.2008, Long. 25.049 (2025/64), Lat. 42.21546, Long. 24.62801 (2025/65), Lat. 42.3695, Long. 24.7158 (2025/67), Lat. 42.2753, Long. 25.1217 (2025/68), Lat. 42.2883, Long. 24.6303 (2025/69), Lat. 42.3705, Long. 24.725 (2025/70), Lat. 42.371, Long. 24.7229 (2025/71), Lat. 42.3288, Long. 24.6784 (2025/72), Lat. 42.3263, Long. 24.6724 (2025/73), Lat. 42.1929, Long. 24.635 (2025/74), Lat. 42.0567, Long. 24.7664 (2025/75), Lat. 42.1295, Long. 25.04 (2025/76), Lat. 42.3826, Long. 24.7806 (2025/77). excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.

8.9.2025

Surveillance zone:

Those parts of the regions of Plovdiv and Stara Zagora, contained within a circle of a radius of 5 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.1944, Long. 24.8528 (2025/8), Lat. 42.1823, Long. 24.8337 (2025/9), Lat.42.1889, Long. 24.8137(2025/10), Lat. 42.1862, Long. 24.8316 (2025/11), Lat. 42.1856, Long. 24.8456 (2025/12), Lat. 42.2312, Long. 24.9357 (2025/13), Lat. 42.2308, Long. 24.9368 (2025/14), Lat. 42.18222, Long. 24.86694 (2025/15), Lat. 42.1873, Long. 24.8456 (2025/16), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/17), Lat. 42.06, Long. 25.1658 (2025/18), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/17), Lat. 42.23, Long. 24.9391 (2025/21), Lat. 42.231703, Long. 24.938912 (2025/22), Lat. 42.2306, Long. 24.9369 (2025/23), Lat. 42.2319, Long. 24.9362 (2025/24), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/25), Lat. 42.2051, Long. 24.87314 (2025/26), Lat. 42.2069, Long. 24.78666 (2025/27), Lat. 42.233, Long. 24.9405 (2025/28), Lat. 42.2316, Long. 24.94214 (2025/29), Lat. 42.2602, Long. 24.8751 (2025/30), Lat. 42.20922, Long. 24.95578 (2025/31), Lat. 42.2089, Long. 24.9508 (2025/32), Lat. 42.2092, Long. 24.9525 (2025/33), Lat. 42.1886, Long. 24.9265 (2025/34), Lat. 42.1886, Long. 24.9265 (2025/35), Lat. 42.1925, Long. 24.9329 (2025/36), Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/37), Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/38), Lat. 42.200845, Long. 24.790453 (2025/39), Lat. 42.2463, Long. 24.7957 (2025/40), Lat. 42.202878, Long 24.690226 (2025/41), Lat. 42.2829, Long. 24.9637 (2025/42), Lat. 42.2363, Long. 24.8297 (2025/43), Lat. 42.1872, Long. 24.9242 (2025/44), Lat. 42.2308, Long 25.0438 (2025/45), Lat. 42.2401, Long. 25.0556 (2025/46), Lat. 42.2037, Long. 25.0513 (2025/47), Lat. 42.1959, Long. 25.0566 (2025/48), Lat. 42.2977, Long 24.9179 (2025/49), Lat. 42.1369, Long. 24.9082 (2025/50), Lat. 42.1481, Long. 24.9055 (2025/51), Lat. 42.2333, Long. 24.8135 (2025/52), Lat. 42.3188, Long 24.8888 (2025/53), Lat. 42.1903, Long. 25.034 (2025/54), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/55), Lat. 42.2828, Long. 24.7528 (2025/56), Lat. 42.1061, Long. 24.8812 (2025/57), Lat. 42.2116, Long. 24.9584 (2025/58), Lat. 42.2559, Long. 24.6802 (2025/59), Lat. 41.9946, Long. 25.2278 (2025/60), Lat. 42.0248, Long. 25.096 (2025/61), Lat. 42.0341, Long. 25.1186 (2025/62), Lat. 42.0973, Long. 24.8738 (2025/63), Lat. 42.2008, Long. 25.049 (2025/64), Lat. 42.21546, Long. 24.62801 (2025/65), Lat. 42.3695, Long. 24.7158 (2025/67), Lat. 42.2753, Long. 25.1217 (2025/68), Lat. 42.2883, Long. 24.6303 (2025/69), Lat. 42.3705, Long. 24.725 (2025/70), Lat. 42.371, Long. 24.7229 (2025/71), Lat. 42.3288, Long. 24.6784 (2025/72), Lat. 42.3263, Long. 24.6724 (2025/73), Lat. 42.1929, Long. 24.635 (2025/74), Lat. 42.0567, Long. 24.7664 (2025/75), Lat. 42.1295, Long. 25.04 (2025/76), Lat. 42.3826, Long. 24.7806 (2025/77).

25.8.2025 – 8.9.2025

Region of Stara Zagora

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00037

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00038

Protection zone:

Those parts of the region of Stara Zagora, contained within a circle of a radius of 5 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/37), Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/38).

17.8.2025

Surveillance zone:

Those parts of the regions of Stara Zagora and Gabrovo contained within a circle of a radius of 15 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/37), Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/38), excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.

1.9.2025

Surveillance zone:

Those parts of the region of Stara Zagora, contained within a circle of a radius of 5 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/37), Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/38).

18.8.2025-1.9.2025

Region of Haskovo

BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00066

Protection zone:

Those parts of the region of Haskovo, contained within a circle of a radius of 5 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 41.7227, Long. 26.325 (2025/66).

24.8.2025

Surveillance zone:

Those parts of the region of Haskovo, contained within a circle of a radius of 15 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 41.7227, Long. 26.325 (2025/66), excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.

8.9.2025

Surveillance zone:

Those parts of the region of Haskovo, contained within a circle of a radius of 5 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 41.7227, Long. 26.325 (2025/66).

25.8.2025 -8.9.2025

Part B: Further restricted zones

Further restricted zone

Region

Areas included in the further restricted zones established in Bulgaria as referred to in Article 2

Date until applicable

Further restricted zone No 1

Region of Plovdiv

The entire region of Plovdiv excluding the areas included in any protection or surveillance zone.

8.9.2025

Region of Haskovo

The municipalities of Dimitrovgrad, and Mineralni Bani, excluding the areas included in any protection or surveillance zone.

Further restricted zone No 2

Region of Stara Zagora

The municipalities of Pavel Bajna, Kazanlak, Bratja Daskalovi and Cirpan, excluding the areas included in any protection or surveillance zone.

1.9.2025

Region of Gabrovo

The entire region of Gabrovo, excluding the areas included in any protection or surveillance zone

ANNEX II

Area

Region

Areas, referred to in Article 3

Date until applicable

Area No 1

Region of Plovdiv

The entire region of Plovdiv.

9.9.2025-8.10.2025

Region of Haskovo

The municipalities of Dimitrovgrad, and Mineralni Bani.

Area No 2

Region of Stara Zagora

The municipalities of Pavel Bajna, Kazanlak, Bratja Daskalovi and Cirpan.

2.9.2025-1.10.2025

Region of Gabrovo

The entire region of Gabrovo.

            ’

Commission Decision (EU) 2025/1479 of 22 May 2025 specifying the pro rata contributions to the Union CO2 injection capacity objective by 2030 from entities holding an authorisation as defined in Article 1, point 3, of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council

                                January 13, 2026                            

Official Journalof the European Union
ENL series

2025/1479
25.7.2025

(1)
Articles 20(1) and Article 23(1) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 provide that entities which produced natural gas and crude oil on the territory of the Union between 1 January 2020 and 31 December 2023 are to contribute to the Union-wide target of 50 million tonnes of CO2injection capacity by 2030.

(2)
Member States were required, pursuant to Article 23(2) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1735, to report to the Commission by 30 September 2024 the entities to which they had granted authorisations for the production of natural gas and crude oil, and the production volumes of those entities between 1 January 2020 and 31 December 2023.

(3)
All Member States reported information on every individual authorisation as defined in Article 1, point 3, of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(2)on their territory, such as which entity or entities held the authorisation, the production volume of those entities for the period from 1 January 2020 to 31 December 2023, and the split of the production volumes between those entities in the event that more than one entity held the authorisation. The information on authorisations was communicated using a standardised form, and Member States sent one form per authorisation. In addition, several Member States also sent the aggregated production volume for the period from 1 January 2020 to 31 December 2023 for all entities holding at least one authorisation on the respective Member State’s territory.

(4)
The Commission has verified the completeness of the reports, and the comparability of the data provided. Where necessary, it requested the Member States to provide any missing information and to clarify the data supplied. Where Member States sent both the standardised forms per authorisation and the aggregated production per entity, the Commission relied on the latter. Where Member States were not able to calculate the production per authorisation, the Commission agreed to only rely on the aggregated production per entity. After obtaining the relevant production data from all Member States, the Commission cross-referenced it with external sources, to determine the Union’s total crude oil and natural gas production in the period from 1 January 2020 to 31 December 2023.

(5)
Following the receipt of the reports referred to in Article 23(2) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1735, and in accordance with the rules set out in Article 4 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1477(3), the Commission is to specify the amount of the contributions of obligated entities.

(6)
It is therefore necessary for the Commission to specify the amount of the contributions to the Union CO2injection capacity objective by 2030 from the entities referred to in Article 23(1) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1735.

(7)
In accordance with Article 23(4) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1735, by 30 June 2025, the authorisation holders are to submit to the Commission a plan specifying in detail how they intend to meet their contribution to the Union CO2injection capacity objective by 2030. In order to allow authorisation holders time to prepare and submit that plan by 30 June 2025, this Decision should enter into force as a matter of urgency,

No
Obligated entities
Local tax registration number
Operational CO2injection capacity contribution obligation by 2030 (in thousand tonnes per annum)

1
Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij B.V.
NL003014861B01
6 350

2
OMV PETROM SA
RO 1590082
5 880

3
S.N.G.N ROMGAZ S.A.
RO 14056826
4 120

4
ORLEN S.A. (poprzednio Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo S.A.)
7740001454
4 100

5
Eni S.A.
00484960588
3 230

6
Wintershall Dea Deutschland GmbH
DE 814756974
1 980

7
TotalEnergies EP Nederland B.V.
NL001766971B01
1 590

8
MOL Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Nyrt.
10625790-4-44
1 560

9
SHELL ITALIA E&P
05160421003
1 550

10
BlueNord Energy Denmark A/S
78342714
1 340

11
Oldenburgische Erdölgesellschaft mbH
DE 204823786
1 270

12
NAM Offshore B.V.
NL863955058B01
1 220

13
INA-INDUSTRIJA NAFTE, d.d
OIB-27759560625
1 150

14
TotalEnergies EP Danmark A/S concessionaire
22757318
1 130

15
OMV Austria
ATU57544036
960

16
Eni Energy Netherlands B.V.
NL001649103B01
880

17
TOTALENERGIES EP ITALIA
10569621005
830

18
Neptune Energy Deutschland GmbH
DE 811127999
770

19
Nordsøfonden
29435065
730

20
BEB Erdgas und Erdöl GmbH & Co. KG
DE 282430970
630

21
Petrogas E&P Netherlands B.V.
NL007409825B01
580

22
Nephin Energy Limited
3514113IH
550

23
ENI MEDITERRANEA IDROCARBURI
12300000150
510

24
Vermilion Energy Corrib Ireland Limited
8249996O
470

25
Rockrose (NL) CS1 B.V.
NL001799782B01
450

26
Vermilion Energy Netherlands B.V.
NL812927254B01
450

27
TotalEnergies Denmark ASW, Filial af TotalEnergies Denmark ASW, INC., USA
53592716
440

28
MITSUI E&P ITALIA B
11835991008
420

29
ENERGEAN ITALY
10245700967
410

30
Mobil Erdgas und Erdöl GmbH
DE 811140133
400

31
VERMILION REP
79410964837
390

32
Lakocsa Koncessziós Kft.
25500002-2-44
390

33
Kistos NL2 B.V.
NL855336717B01
370

34
Exxonmobil Producing Netherlands B.V.
NL814970175B01
330

35
ONE-Dyas B.V.
NL008848087B01
330

36
Vermilion Energy Germany GmbH & Co. KG
DE 292 126 532
320

37
Wintershall Noordzee B.V.
NL005614260B01
310

38
TAQA Offshore B.V.
NL814079386B01
290

39
INEOS Energy (Syd Arne) ApS
73589118
250

40
Black Sea Oil & Gas S.A.
RO 21288144
250

41
INEOS E&P A/S
73349613
250

42
Vermilion Energy Ireland Limited
6602191R
240

43
Dana Petroleum Netherlands B.V.
NL005658214B01
170

44
B8 Sp. z o.o. BALTIC Sp. k. a.
5833163579
160

Excluded entities

AB „LOTOS Geonafta“

ADX VIE GmbH

AIMAG

ALPHA METAL OIL AND GAS SRL

AMROMCO ENERGY S.R.L.

APENNINE ENERGY

ARMAX GAZ SA

Bendra Lietuvos–Švedijos įmonė uždaroji akcinė bendrovė „Genčių nafta“

BRENT EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION S.R.L.

BRIDGE ENERGIES

CANOEL ITALIA

CEPSA E.P. ESPAÑA, S.L.

CH4LIZZANO

CNWL Oil España, S.A.U.

Csanád Szénhidrogén Koncessziós Kft.

DACIAN PETROLEUM S.A.

Danoil Exploration A/S

Darany Energy Kft.

DNO North Sea (U.K.) Limited

EAST WEST PETROLEUM CORPORATION

EDISON STOCCAGGIO

EMSZ Első Magyar Szénhidrogén Koncessziós Kft.

ENERGEAN OIL & GAS S.A

ENERGEAN SICILIA

ENGAS s.r.o.

Eni Energy Participation Netherlands B.V.

Folyópart Energia Kft.

FORA OIL AND GAS SRL

FORAJ SONDE SA – CRAIOVA

GAS PLUS DACIA SRL

GAS PLUS ITALIANA

GAZKOP-1 Sp. z o. o.

GAZKOP-WILCHWY Sp. z o.o.

GAZONOR BENELUX

Gazprom International UK Ltd

GEOENERGO d.o.o.

GÉOPÉTROL

Green Gas DPB, a.s.

HEXUM Földgáz Zrt.

HEYCO ENERGY IBERIA SLU

HHE DrávaP Koncessziós Kft.

HHE Gyulavari Kft.

HHE Sarkad Kft.

INEOS E&P Siri (UK) Limited

IPC PETROLEUM

IRMINIO

KARBONIA S.A.

KMSZ Kelet-Magyarországi Szénhidrogén Koncessziós Kft.

LAMA GAS & OIL s.r.o.

LAZZI GAS

LFDE

Lietuvos ir Danijos uždaroji akcinė bendrovė „MINIJOS NAFTA“

LOTOS Petrobaltic S.A.

Magyar Földgáztároló Zrt.

Magyar Horizont Energia Kft.

Mazarine Energy Romania S.R.L.

Mercuria Hydrocarbons B.V.

MND a.s.

Mogyoród Koncessziós Kft.

MOL Dráva Szénhidrogén Koncessziós Kft.

NAFTA a.s.

NAFTA Speicher GmbH & Co. KG

O&GD Central Kft.

OELWEG

OGD Berettyóújfalu Koncessziós Kft.

OGD Újléta Koncessziós Kft.

Oil and Gas Exploration and Production Plc.

OIL AND GAS SKILLS S.A.

OILFIELD EXPLORATION BUSINESS SOLUTIONS S.A.

ONEO GmbH & Co. KG

ORLEN Upstream Sp. z o.o.

Parkmead (E&P) Ltd.

PETRO VENTURES RESOURCES SRL

Petroceltic Bulgaria EOOD

PETROLEUM OIL & GAS ESPAÑA, SA

PETROREP ITALIANA S.R.L. IN LIQUIDAZIONE

Production North Sea Netherlands Ltd.

PSE Kinsale Energy Ltd

PSE Seven Heads Ltd

PSP d.o.o.

PXOG Massey Limited

RAFFLES ENERGY SRL

RAG Austria AG

REP GmbH

REPSOL INVESTIGACIONES PETROLÍFERAS, S.A

Rhein Petroleum GmbH

Rockrose (NL) CS5 B.V.

Römermann Insolvenzverwalter Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft mbH

S.C. BRENT OIL S.R.L.

S.C. FORAJ SONDE S.A. – VIDELE

S.C. HUNT OIL COMPANY OF ROMANIA S.R.L.

S.C. Lotus Petrol S.R.L.

S.C. MIHOC OIL S.R.L.

S.C. NIS PETROL S.R.L.

S.C. SERINUS ENERGY S.A.

SIM

Sociedad de Hidrocarburos de Euskadi, S.A. (SHESA)

SOCIETÀ DI SALSOMAGGIORE S.R.L. IN LIQUIDAZIONE

SOCIETÀ PADANA ENERGIA

SOCOPLUS

SPPE

Stratum Energy Romania LLC

Tápió Szénhidrogén Koncessziós Kft.

TARBA ENERGIA, SL

Tenaz Energy Netherlands Offshore B.V.

Tenaz Energy Netherlands Offshore II B.V.

TÉT-3 GÁZKÚT Kft.

TXM Olaj- és Gázkutató Kft.

UAB „LL investicijos“

UAB „Manifoldas“

UNION FENOSA GAS EXPLORACION Y PRODUCCION, SA

Vermilion Exploration and Production Ireland Limited

Vermilion Hungary Battonya-dél Koncessziós Kft.

Wintershall Dea International GmbH

Wintershall Nordzee B.V.

ZENITH RESOURCES SRL

ZOK Sp. z o.o.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology manufacturing ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724 (1), and in particular Article 23(3) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Articles 20(1) and Article 23(1) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 provide that entities which produced natural gas and crude oil on the territory of the Union between 1 January 2020 and 31 December 2023 are to contribute to the Union-wide target of 50 million tonnes of CO2 injection capacity by 2030.

(2) Member States were required, pursuant to Article 23(2) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1735, to report to the Commission by 30 September 2024 the entities to which they had granted authorisations for the production of natural gas and crude oil, and the production volumes of those entities between 1 January 2020 and 31 December 2023.

(3) All Member States reported information on every individual authorisation as defined in Article 1, point 3, of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) on their territory, such as which entity or entities held the authorisation, the production volume of those entities for the period from 1 January 2020 to 31 December 2023, and the split of the production volumes between those entities in the event that more than one entity held the authorisation. The information on authorisations was communicated using a standardised form, and Member States sent one form per authorisation. In addition, several Member States also sent the aggregated production volume for the period from 1 January 2020 to 31 December 2023 for all entities holding at least one authorisation on the respective Member State’s territory.

(4) The Commission has verified the completeness of the reports, and the comparability of the data provided. Where necessary, it requested the Member States to provide any missing information and to clarify the data supplied. Where Member States sent both the standardised forms per authorisation and the aggregated production per entity, the Commission relied on the latter. Where Member States were not able to calculate the production per authorisation, the Commission agreed to only rely on the aggregated production per entity. After obtaining the relevant production data from all Member States, the Commission cross-referenced it with external sources, to determine the Union’s total crude oil and natural gas production in the period from 1 January 2020 to 31 December 2023.

(5) Following the receipt of the reports referred to in Article 23(2) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1735, and in accordance with the rules set out in Article 4 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1477 (3), the Commission is to specify the amount of the contributions of obligated entities.

(6) It is therefore necessary for the Commission to specify the amount of the contributions to the Union CO2 injection capacity objective by 2030 from the entities referred to in Article 23(1) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1735.

(7) In accordance with Article 23(4) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1735, by 30 June 2025, the authorisation holders are to submit to the Commission a plan specifying in detail how they intend to meet their contribution to the Union CO2 injection capacity objective by 2030. In order to allow authorisation holders time to prepare and submit that plan by 30 June 2025, this Decision should enter into force as a matter of urgency,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Authorisation holders whose combined production of crude oil and natural gas in the Union amounted to 95 % of the volume of crude oil and natural gas produced in the Union in the period from 1 January 2020 to 31 December 2023 shall be considered obligated entities. Those obligated entities shall be subject to the contribution obligations as set out in Annex 1.
Authorisation holders with production volumes of crude oil and natural gas that made up 5 % of the cumulative Union production volumes of crude oil and natural gas in the period from 1 January 2020 to 31 December 2023 shall be considered excluded entities. Those excluded entities are listed in Annex 2.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
No

Obligated entities

Local tax registration number

Operational CO2 injection capacity contribution obligation by 2030 (in thousand tonnes per annum)

1

Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij B.V.

NL003014861B01

6 350 

2

OMV PETROM SA

RO 1590082

5 880 

3

S.N.G.N ROMGAZ S.A.

RO 14056826

4 120 

4

ORLEN S.A. (poprzednio Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo S.A.)

7740001454

4 100 

5

Eni S.A.

00484960588

3 230 

6

Wintershall Dea Deutschland GmbH

DE 814756974

1 980 

7

TotalEnergies EP Nederland B.V.

NL001766971B01

1 590 

8

MOL Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Nyrt.

10625790-4-44

1 560 

9

SHELL ITALIA E&P

05160421003

1 550 

10

BlueNord Energy Denmark A/S

78342714

1 340 

11

Oldenburgische Erdölgesellschaft mbH

DE 204823786

1 270 

12

NAM Offshore B.V.

NL863955058B01

1 220 

13

INA-INDUSTRIJA NAFTE, d.d

OIB-27759560625

1 150 

14

TotalEnergies EP Danmark A/S concessionaire

22757318

1 130 

15

OMV Austria

ATU57544036

960 

16

Eni Energy Netherlands B.V.

NL001649103B01

880 

17

TOTALENERGIES EP ITALIA

10569621005

830 

18

Neptune Energy Deutschland GmbH

DE 811127999

770 

19

Nordsøfonden

29435065

730 

20

BEB Erdgas und Erdöl GmbH & Co. KG

DE 282430970

630 

21

Petrogas E&P Netherlands B.V.

NL007409825B01

580 

22

Nephin Energy Limited

3514113IH

550 

23

ENI MEDITERRANEA IDROCARBURI

12300000150

510 

24

Vermilion Energy Corrib Ireland Limited

8249996O

470 

25

Rockrose (NL) CS1 B.V.

NL001799782B01

450 

26

Vermilion Energy Netherlands B.V.

NL812927254B01

450 

27

TotalEnergies Denmark ASW, Filial af TotalEnergies Denmark ASW, INC., USA

53592716

440 

28

MITSUI E&P ITALIA B

11835991008

420 

29

ENERGEAN ITALY

10245700967

410 

30

Mobil Erdgas und Erdöl GmbH

DE 811140133

400 

31

VERMILION REP

79410964837

390 

32

Lakocsa Koncessziós Kft.

25500002-2-44

390 

33

Kistos NL2 B.V.

NL855336717B01

370 

34

Exxonmobil Producing Netherlands B.V.

NL814970175B01

330 

35

ONE-Dyas B.V.

NL008848087B01

330 

36

Vermilion Energy Germany GmbH & Co. KG

DE 292 126 532 

320 

37

Wintershall Noordzee B.V.

NL005614260B01

310 

38

TAQA Offshore B.V.

NL814079386B01

290 

39

INEOS Energy (Syd Arne) ApS

73589118

250 

40

Black Sea Oil & Gas S.A.

RO 21288144

250 

41

INEOS E&P A/S

73349613

250 

42

Vermilion Energy Ireland Limited

6602191R

240 

43

Dana Petroleum Netherlands B.V.

NL005658214B01

170 

44

B8 Sp. z o.o. BALTIC Sp. k. a.

5833163579

160 
Excluded entities

AB „LOTOS Geonafta“

ADX VIE GmbH

AIMAG

ALPHA METAL OIL AND GAS SRL

AMROMCO ENERGY S.R.L.

APENNINE ENERGY

ARMAX GAZ SA

Bendra Lietuvos–Švedijos įmonė uždaroji akcinė bendrovė „Genčių nafta“

BRENT EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION S.R.L.

BRIDGE ENERGIES

CANOEL ITALIA

CEPSA E.P. ESPAÑA, S.L.

CH4 LIZZANO

CNWL Oil España, S.A.U.

Csanád Szénhidrogén Koncessziós Kft.

DACIAN PETROLEUM S.A.

Danoil Exploration A/S

Darany Energy Kft.

DNO North Sea (U.K.) Limited

EAST WEST PETROLEUM CORPORATION

EDISON STOCCAGGIO

EMSZ Első Magyar Szénhidrogén Koncessziós Kft.

ENERGEAN OIL & GAS S.A

ENERGEAN SICILIA

ENGAS s.r.o.

Eni Energy Participation Netherlands B.V.

Folyópart Energia Kft.

FORA OIL AND GAS SRL

FORAJ SONDE SA – CRAIOVA

GAS PLUS DACIA SRL

GAS PLUS ITALIANA

GAZKOP-1 Sp. z o. o.

GAZKOP-WILCHWY Sp. z o.o.

GAZONOR BENELUX

Gazprom International UK Ltd

GEOENERGO d.o.o.

GÉOPÉTROL

Green Gas DPB, a.s.

HEXUM Földgáz Zrt.

HEYCO ENERGY IBERIA SLU

HHE DrávaP Koncessziós Kft.

HHE Gyulavari Kft.

HHE Sarkad Kft.

INEOS E&P Siri (UK) Limited

IPC PETROLEUM

IRMINIO

KARBONIA S.A.

KMSZ Kelet-Magyarországi Szénhidrogén Koncessziós Kft.

LAMA GAS & OIL s.r.o.

LAZZI GAS

LFDE

Lietuvos ir Danijos uždaroji akcinė bendrovė „MINIJOS NAFTA“

LOTOS Petrobaltic S.A.

Magyar Földgáztároló Zrt.

Magyar Horizont Energia Kft.

Mazarine Energy Romania S.R.L.

Mercuria Hydrocarbons B.V.

MND a.s.

Mogyoród Koncessziós Kft.

MOL Dráva Szénhidrogén Koncessziós Kft.

NAFTA a.s.

NAFTA Speicher GmbH & Co. KG

O&GD Central Kft.

OELWEG

OGD Berettyóújfalu Koncessziós Kft.

OGD Újléta Koncessziós Kft.

Oil and Gas Exploration and Production Plc.

OIL AND GAS SKILLS S.A.

OILFIELD EXPLORATION BUSINESS SOLUTIONS S.A.

ONEO GmbH & Co. KG

ORLEN Upstream Sp. z o.o.

Parkmead (E&P) Ltd.

PETRO VENTURES RESOURCES SRL

Petroceltic Bulgaria EOOD

PETROLEUM OIL & GAS ESPAÑA, SA

PETROREP ITALIANA S.R.L. IN LIQUIDAZIONE

Production North Sea Netherlands Ltd.

PSE Kinsale Energy Ltd

PSE Seven Heads Ltd

PSP d.o.o.

PXOG Massey Limited

RAFFLES ENERGY SRL

RAG Austria AG

REP GmbH

REPSOL INVESTIGACIONES PETROLÍFERAS, S.A

Rhein Petroleum GmbH

Rockrose (NL) CS5 B.V.

Römermann Insolvenzverwalter Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft mbH

S.C. BRENT OIL S.R.L.

S.C. FORAJ SONDE S.A. – VIDELE

S.C. HUNT OIL COMPANY OF ROMANIA S.R.L.

S.C. Lotus Petrol S.R.L.

S.C. MIHOC OIL S.R.L.

S.C. NIS PETROL S.R.L.

S.C. SERINUS ENERGY S.A.

SIM

Sociedad de Hidrocarburos de Euskadi, S.A. (SHESA)

SOCIETÀ DI SALSOMAGGIORE S.R.L. IN LIQUIDAZIONE

SOCIETÀ PADANA ENERGIA

SOCOPLUS

SPPE

Stratum Energy Romania LLC

Tápió Szénhidrogén Koncessziós Kft.

TARBA ENERGIA, SL

Tenaz Energy Netherlands Offshore B.V.

Tenaz Energy Netherlands Offshore II B.V.

TÉT-3 GÁZKÚT Kft.

TXM Olaj- és Gázkutató Kft.

UAB „LL investicijos“

UAB „Manifoldas“

UNION FENOSA GAS EXPLORACION Y PRODUCCION, SA

Vermilion Exploration and Production Ireland Limited

Vermilion Hungary Battonya-dél Koncessziós Kft.

Wintershall Dea International GmbH

Wintershall Nordzee B.V.

ZENITH RESOURCES SRL

ZOK Sp. z o.o.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1478 of 18 July 2025 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine

                                January 13, 2026                            

Official Journalof the European Union
ENL series

2025/1478
19.7.2025

(1)
On 17 March 2014, the Council adopted Decision 2014/145/CFSP(1).

(2)
In its conclusions of 19 December 2024, the European Council reiterated its resolute condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations, and reaffirmed its continued support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. The European Council stated that efforts to further limit Russia’s ability to wage war must continue. It also expressed the Union’s readiness to step up pressure on Russia, including by adopting further sanctions.

(3)
In view of the gravity of the situation, it is appropriate to adopt further restrictive measures.

(4)
In particular, the Council considers that 14 persons and 41 entities responsible for actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine should be added to the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in the Annex to Decision 2014/145/CFSP.

(5)
Decision 2014/145/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,

Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing

‘1945.
Svetlana Ivanovna NIKOLAYEVARussian: Светлана Ивановна НИКОЛАЕВА
Function: BusinesspersonDOB: 15.11.1964Nationality: RussianGender: femaleTax Identification Number: 503219217814
Svetlana Nikolayeva is a Russian businessperson holding managing positions and business interests in the Russian military and industrial complex. She is the wife of Konstantin Yuryevich Nikolayev.In particular, Svetlana Nikolayeva is the Chief Executive Officer of the Russian defence company Promtekhnologiya LLC, which owns the trademark “ORSIS” and which supplies rifles for the Russian military and security services that are used in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Svetlana Nikolayeva’s position as Chief Executive Officer of Promtekhnologiya LLC contributes to concealing her husband’s controlling influence over the company. In addition, Svetlana Nikolayeva holds interests in the Russian companies ScanEx and LLC Resource. Those companies cooperate with the Russian military and security services, supplying them with military hardware which has been used in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.Svetlana Nikolayeva is therefore supporting and benefitting from the Government of the Russian Federation and supporting actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine. She is also supporting Russia’s military and industrial complex, including by being involved in the development, production or supply of military technology and equipment.Furthermore, Svetlana Nikolayeva is associated with Konstantin Yuryevich Nikolayev.
19.7.2025

1946.
Lin ZHONGHENGChinese: 林仲恒
Function: Owner of Shenzhen Biguang Trading Co. LtdNationality: ChineseGender: male
Lin Zhongheng is a Chinese businessperson. He controls and represents Shenzhen Biguang Trading Co. Ltd, a provider of technological hardware based in the People’s Republic of China.Shenzhen Biguang Trading Co. Ltd repeatedly transferred goods of Union origin to Russia while those goods were subject to Union export restrictions under Regulation (EU) No 833/2014.Lin Zhongheng therefore facilitated infringements of the prohibition against circumvention of the Union restrictive measures regime imposed on the Russian Federation and thus additionally significantly frustrated existing provisions of Union restrictive measures.
19.7.2025

1947.
Aleksandr Sergeyevich USHKORussian: Александр Сергеевич УШКО
Function: Lead Marketing Manager of LLC “Open Systems Development Technology” (LLC TROS)DOB: 15.1.1991Nationality: RussianGender: malePassport number: 550403152
Aleksandr Ushko is the Lead Marketing Manager of LLC “Open Systems Development Technology” (LLC TROS), a Russia-based entity that manufactures metalworking equipment and is a wholesaler of machine tools. He is the son of Sergey Ushko, the CEO of LLC TROS, who is subject to Union restrictive measures. Since the imposition of Union restrictive measures prohibiting the export of lathes to Russia, LLC TROS is actively involved in circumventing such restrictive measures by acting as the Russia-based recipient of illegally exported lathes. Aleksandr Ushko helped his father to participate in an import scheme in order to provide machine tools and other dual-use equipment to Russia.Therefore, Aleksandr Ushko is facilitating infringements of the prohibition against circumvention of Union restrictive measures.
19.7.2025

1948.
Felix Feliksovych PLESKACHEVSKYRussian: Феликс Феликсович ПЛЕСКАЧЕВСЬКИЙ
Function: General Director of JSC Scientific and Production Association “POISK”DOB: 11.5.1967Nationality: RussianGender: male
Felix Pleskachevsky is the General Director of JSC Scientific and Production Association “POISK”, a leading Russian manufacturer of weapons and ammunition as well as a leading entity for the development of mechanical, electromechanical and electronic multifunctional fuses for ammunition. The company has well-established cooperation with some of the major Russian defence companies, such as Tekhmash, Air Defence Concern Almaz-Antey and Tactical Missile Weapons Corporation. In recent years, JSC Scientific and Production Association “POISK” has developed over 20 different types of fuse for all types of ammunition used by the Russian army in its war of aggression against Ukraine. Moreover, the company is the developer of the 9E133M safety and actuating mechanism for the 9M723 Iskander-M ballistic missiles.Moreover, JSC Scientific and Production Association “POISK” is part of JSC Technodinamika, an entity listed by the Union, which is in turn part of the State Corporation Rostec.Therefore, Felix Pleskachevsky is supporting materially actions which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.Felix Pleskachevsky is also supporting Russia’s military and industrial complex and the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.
19.7.2025

1949.
Abhinav KAMAL
Function: Captain of crude oil tanker ARGENT (formerly JAGUAR, IMO: 9293002)Date of birth: 6.7.1984Nationality: IndianGender: male
Abhinav Kamal is the captain of crude oil tanker ARGENT (formerly JAGUAR, IMO: 9293002). ARGENT is not registered with the International Group of Protection and Indemity Clubs and therefore is sailing without a trusted liability cover. It is also the only vessel managed by Sapang Shipping Inc (registered owner and ship manager) and Zhu Jiang Shipmanagement Co (technical manager), which indicates that it operates under a non-transparent corporate governance policy. ARGENT has changed management companies and flag state multiple times in the last few years and has also sailed without a flag. It has also not verified its Automatic Identification Systems on multiple occasions. ARGENT is a vessel that has transported crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33). As captain of the ARGENT, Abhinav Kamal therefore provides material, technical or financial support to the operations of a vessel that transports crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly Resolution A.1192(33). As captain of the ARGENT, he is moreover associated with Sapang Shipping Inc, which is managing and operating a vessel that transports crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33).
19.7.2025

1950.
Nikita Aleksandrovich ZAKHAROVRussian: Никита Александрович ЗАХАРОВ
Function: Owner of LLC AeroscanNationality: RussianGender: maleTax Identification Number: 184101937739
Nikita Zakharov is a Russian businessperson, and founder and owner of LLC Aeroscan. LLC Aeroscan is a Russian commercial operator that provides services in the areas of aerial photography, video and thermal imaging monitoring and laser scanning for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). It is also part of the ZALA Aero group of companies which specialises in the development and production of UAVs, in particular Lancet loitering munitions and reconnaissance UAVs. Lancet loitering munitions and the Z-16 UAVs are actively used by the Russian army in its war of aggression against Ukraine. LLC Aeroscan also manufactures, in cooperation with Zala Aero Group, the new military reconnaissance, artillery fire and battlefield surveillance Zala Z-20 UAVs which are also used by the Russian army in its war of aggression against Ukraine.Therefore, Nikita Zakharov is supporting materially actions which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Moreover, he is supporting materially Russia’s military and industrial complex and the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.
19.7.2025

1951.
Hossein SHAMKHANIFarsi: شمخانی حسینa.k.a. Mohammad Hossein SHAMKHANI
Function: Director of Admiral ShippingDOB: 1984 or 1985POB: Tehran, IranNationality: IranianGender: maleID number: 0070293384
Hossein Shamkhani is a businessperson active in the Russian oil trade and a central player in Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet”. He uses the company Milavous Group Ltd to blend crude oil with various petroleum products from Russia and to rebrand for exporting purposes, thereby concealing their origin. Additionally, as Director of the company Admiral Shipping, he is involved in transporting and selling Russian crude oil. Therefore, Hossein Shamkhani is involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.
19.7.2025

1952.
Viktor Sergeevich FOFANOVRussian: Виктор Сергеевич ФОФАНОВ
Function: General Director of LLC VolgotransNationality: RussianGender: maleTax Identification Number: 631630065950
Viktor Fofanov is the General Director of LLC Volgotrans, a Russian company operating a fleet of several tankers and carrying out transportation of crude oil and oil products by sea, including for export purposes. The energy sector, especially oil, provides substantial revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. Therefore, as the General Director of LLC Volgotrans, Viktor Fofanov is a businessperson involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine. As the General Director of LLC Volgotrans, Viktor Fofanov is associated with LLC Volgotrans.
19.7.2025

1953.
Olga Vasilyevna BUROVARussian: Ольга Васильевна БУРОВАUkrainian: Ольга Василівна БУРОВА
Function: so-called “First Deputy Minister of Culture of the Republic of Crimea”DOB: 29.8.1972POB: Zelenchukskaya, USSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: female
Olga Burova has been the so-called “First Deputy Minister of Culture of the Republic of Crimea” since 15 May 2023. In that role, she has promoted Crimea as a centre of Russian culture and as a part of Russian history, and supported its illegal annexation by Russia in 2014.In taking on and acting in this capacity, Olga Burova is supporting and implementing actions or policies which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
19.7.2025

1954.
Ilshat Ilgizovich SHAGIAKHMETOVRussian: Ильшат Ильгизович ШАГИАХМЕТОВ
Function: General Director of the Territorial Development FundDOB: 4.6.1985POB: Kazan, USSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: male
Ilshat Shagiakhmetov is the General Director of the Territorial Development Fund, a public law company operating under the Ministry of Construction of the Russian Federation and founded by the Government of the Russian Federation. In particular, the Territorial Development Fund manages the so-called free economic zone in the illegally occupied territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, which was created by the Government of the Russian Federation to grant benefits and privileges to companies that operate in those illegally occupied territories.In acting in this capacity, Ilshat Shagiakhmetov is supporting and implementing actions or policies which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
19.7.2025

1955.
Vladimir Olegovich KURYANOVRussian: Владимир Олегович КУРЬЯНОВ
Function: Acting Rector of the V.I. Vernadsky Crimean Federal UniversityDOB: 23.1.1960POB: Simferopol, USSR (now Ukraine)Nationality: RussianGender: male
Since 22 June 2023, Vladimir Kuryanov has been the acting Rector of the V.I. Vernadsky Crimean Federal University. He is supporting policies which contribute to the militarised education of Ukrainian children and young people and which undermine Ukrainian history and language. He has committed the University to supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including by allowing military training in the University of students who are to be sent to the frontline.In taking on and acting in this capacity, Vladimir Kuryanov is supporting and implementing actions or policies which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
19.7.2025

1956.
Karen Georgievich SHAKHNAZAROVRussian: Карен Георгиевич ШАХНАЗАРОВ
Function: General Director of MosfilmDOB: 8.7.1952POB: Krasnodar, USSR (now Russian Federation)Nationality: RussianGender: maleTax Identification Number: 771002632970
Karen Shakhnazarov is the General Director of Mosfilm, a Russian State-owned film studio. He maintains a close relationship with President Vladimir Putin, and they share a mutual admiration for each other’s work and actions.Karen Shakhnazarov received various orders, merits, medals and State prizes from the Government of the Russian Federation for his work and engagement. In his function as the General Director of Mosfilm, Karen Shakhnazarov supported Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine verbally and ideologically in his public speeches and interviews. Furthermore, Mosfilm delivered humanitarian, technical, financial and material support to the Russian military, including providing it with military equipment that was previously used for staging purposes in Mosfilm’s film production.Therefore, Karen Shakhnazarov is responsible for actions undermining and threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. He is supporting and benefitting from the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.
19.7.2025

1957.
Tatyana Petrovna LITVINENKORussian: Татьяна Петровна ЛИТВИНЕНКО
Function: BusinesspersonDOB: 2.5.1958Nationality: RussianGender: femaleTax Individual Number: 780158958115
Tatyana Litvinenko is a major shareholder of PhosAgro, a globally leading producer of phosphate fertilisers. Russia is the world’s leading exporter of fertilisers, a sector which provides substantial revenue to the Russian Government. Tatyana Litvinenko is therefore a businessperson involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.
19.7.2025

1958.
Ahmed KERIMOV
Function: shareholder of the 2Rivers GroupNationality: AzerbaijaniGender: male
Ahmed Kerimov is a shareholder of the 2Rivers Group, a UAE-based oil-trading group previously known as Coral Energy, which enables shipments and export of Russian oil, notably from Rosneft, by concealing the actual origin of the oil. In particular, the 2 Rivers Group controls a large proportion of the vessels in Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet”. The 2Rivers Group continues to operate the same network as Coral Energy, which includes associated entities such as Nord Axis and Bellatrix Energy, regardless of its change in name and ownership, as demonstrated by the connection between the previous owner and the new management. Furthermore, the energy sector, in particular the oil sector, is a sector providing substantial revenue to the Russian Government.Therefore, Ahmed Kerimov is significantly frustrating the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, in particular Article 3m. He is also involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.
19.7.2025’

Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing

‘601.
Joint Stock Company “Research Institute of Measuring Instruments – Novosibirsk Plant Named After Komintern”Russian: Акционерное Общество “Нии Измерительных Приборов – Новосибирский Завод Имени Коминтерна”a.k.a. AO “NPO NIIIP-NZIK”a.k.a. JSC “Research Institute of Measuring Instruments – Novosibirsk Plant Named After Komintern”
Address: Novosibirsk, Planetnaya Street 32, Russian FederationType of entity: Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: Russian FederationDate of registration: 20.9.2002Registration Number: 1025400510827Tax Identification Number: 5401199015KPP: 540101001
JSC “Research Institute of Measuring Instruments – Novosibirsk Plant Named After Komintern” is a Russian entity responsible for the production of radar, radio navigation equipment and radio remote control equipment.The company is involved in the upgrading of the “Listva” remote demining machine, which is used by the Russian military in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.Therefore, JSC “Research Institute of Measuring Instruments – Novosibirsk Plant Named After Komintern” is supporting Russia’s military and industrial complex, including by being involved in the development, production or supply of military technology and equipment.
19.7.2025

602.
Joint Stock Company “Research Institute of Semiconductor Devices”Russian: Акционерное Общество “Научно Исследовательский Институт Полупроводниковых Приборов”a.k.a. AO “NIIPP”a.k.a. JSC “Research Institute of Semiconductor Devices”
Address: Tomsk, krasnoarmeyskaya street 99A, Russian FederationType of entity: Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: Russian FederationDate of registration: 19.12.2003Registration Number: 1037000170690Tax Identification Number: 7017084932KPP: 701701001
JSC “Research Institute of Semiconductor Devices” is a military industrial company. It develops technologies and produces electronic components, primarily for the military industry. For instance, the company creates miniature LEDs that can be used as part of special-purpose equipment, including to enable operations in extreme conditions.Therefore, JSC “Research Institute of Semiconductor Devices” is supporting Russia’s military and industrial complex, including by being involved in the development, production or supply of military technology and equipment.
19.7.2025

603.
Closed Joint Stock Company “Moscow Mechanical Plant of Special Equipment”Russian: Закрытое Акционерное Общество “Московский Механический Завод Специального Оборудования”a.k.a. CJSC “Moscow Mechanical Plant of Special Equipment”a.k.a. ZAO “MMZSO”
Address: 121357, Moscow, Municipal District Mozhaisky, Vereiskaya Street, D. 29a, building 1, floor 2, room 1, Russian FederationType of entity: Closed Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: Russian FederationDate of registration: 20.2.2007Registration Number: 1075032002682Tax Identification Number: 5032164385KPP: 773101001
CJSC “Moscow Mechanical Plant of Special Equipment” is a Russian company that develops military equipment, including technical equipment for ships of the Russian fleet, supporting the country’s defence capabilities. The company is licenced by the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation to manufacture, sell, repair, maintain, install and test weapons and military equipment.Therefore, CJSC “Moscow Mechanical Plant of Special Equipment” is supporting Russia’s military and industrial complex, including by being involved in the development, production or supply of military technology and equipment.
19.7.2025

604.
Joint Stock Company “Polymer”Russian: Акционерное Общество “Полимер”a.k.a. JSC “Polymer”a.k.a. АО “Полимер”
Address: 4 Proizvodstvennaya Street, Chapeavsk, 446100, Samara region, Russian FederationType of entity: Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: Russian FederationDate of registration: 8.12.2002Registration number: 1026303177119Tax Identification Number: 6335005315
JSC Polymer is a Russia-based company integrated into the structure of NPK Tekhmash JSC, part of the State Corporation Rostec, which is responsible for executing the State armament programme and fulfilling the State defence orders. It is specialised in the manufacture of weapons, ammunition and explosives, and supplies its products to the Russian Armed Forces and companies of the Russian military and industrial complex. As explained by the General Director of JSC Polymer, the company’s military production has increased since 2022 with a view to responding to the needs of the Russian Armed Forces in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.Therefore, JSC Polymer is forming part of Russia’s military and industrial complex and is supporting materially actions which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
19.7.2025

605.
Joint Stock Company “Scientific Production Enterprise ‘Rubin’”Russian: Акционерное Общество “Научно-Производственное Предприятие ‘Рубин’”a.k.a. JSC “Scientific Production Enterprise ‘Rubin’”a.k.a. JSC NPP Rubina.k.a. АО НПП Рубин
Address: 440015 Penzenskaya Oblast, city of Penza, Baydukova Street, bldg. 2, Russian FederationType of entity: Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: Russian FederationDate of registration: 5.12.2003Registration number: 1035802518531Tax Identification Number: 5835049453
JSC “Scientific Production Enterprise ‘Rubin’” is a leading company of the Russian defence industry which manufactures mobile automated control and communication systems designed for military applications. The company holds an active State licence in Russia for the maintenance and servicing of weapons and military equipment. It plays a significant role in the supply chain of the Russian Armed Forces, supplying them with specialised military equipment. Among the various systems produced for the Russian army is the air defence control system “Magistr-SV”, which has been deployed in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.Therefore, JSC “Scientific Production Enterprise ‘Rubin’” is forming part of Russia’s military and industrial complex and is supporting materially actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
19.7.2025

606.
Joint Stock Company “Aleksinsky Experimental Mechanical Plant”Russian: Акционерное Общество “Алексинский опытный механический завод”a.k.a. JSC “Aleksinsky Experimental Mechanical Plant”a.k.a. JSC “AEMP”a.k.a. АО “АОМЗ”
Address: 10, Metallistov Str., 301365, Aleksin, Tula Region, Russian FederationType of entity: Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registation: Russian FederationRegistration number: 1127154040122Tax Identification Number: 7111504768Telephone: + 7 (48753) 5-94-05Fax: + 7 (48753) 5-60-37Email: [email protected]:http://www.aleksinomz.ru
JSC “Aleksinsky Experimental Mechanical Plant” produces weapons in Tula in the Russian Federation. It was added to the list of strategic organisations of the Russian Government in 2022. The company is part of the Russian military and industrial complex and supports it materially, including by being involved in the development, production and supply of military technology and equipment. The Deputy Head of the Security Council of the Russian Federation visited JSC “Aleksinsky Experimental Mechanical Plant” to inspect weapons production, and the company hosted a meeting of the working group of the Military-Industrial Commission of the Russian Federation. The recognition of JSC “Aleksinsky Experimental Mechanical Plant” and the involvement of the Russian Government demonstrate its strategic importance in the Russian defence sector.Therefore, JSC “Aleksinsky Experimental Mechanical Plant” is supporting materially actions which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. In addition, JSC “Aleksinsky Experimental Mechanical Plant” is forming part of Russia’s military and industrial complex.
19.7.2025

607.
Joint Stock Company “State Ryazan Instrument Plant”Russian: Акционерное Общество “Государственный Рязанский приборный завод”a.k.a. JSC “State Ryazan Instrument Plant”a.k.a. JSC “GRPZ”a.k.a. АО “ГРПЗ”
Address: 32 Seminarskaya Str., 390000, Ryazan, Russian FederationType of entity: Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: Russian FederationRegistration number: 1116234013598Date of registration: 20.12.2011Tax Identification Number: 6234098539
JSC “State Ryazan Instrument Plant” is the largest Russian enterprise for serial production and support of radar systems and communications equipment.The company’s main sphere of activity is the manufacture of radar, radio navigation equipment and remote-control radio equipment, which is used in fighter jets such as MiG-29, Su-27, Su-30, Su-35 and fifth-generation fighter jet Su-57 (T-50) and in helicopters such as Mi 8, Mi 17, Mi-35 and Mi-28N. JSC “State Ryazan Instrument Plant” also has an active State licence that allows it to provide maintenance and servicing of weapons and military equipment.Therefore, JSC “State Ryazan Instrument Plant” is supporting materially actions which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Moreover, as a military equipment supplier to armed forces of the Russian Federation, JSC “State Ryazan Instrument Plant” is supporting Russia’s military and industrial complex.
19.7.2025

608.
Joint Stock Company “NPO Stekloplastik named after N.N. Trofimov”Russian: Акционерное Общество “НПО Стеклопластик имени Н.Н. Трофимова”a.k.a. JSC “NPO Stekloplastik named after N.N. Trofimov”a.k.a. NPO Stekloplastik
Address: 141551, Moscow region, Solnechnogorsk urban district, Andreevka urban settlement, building 3A/4, Russian FederationType of entity: Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: Russian FederationDate of registration: 30.12.1992Registration number: 1035008852097Tax Identification Number: 5044000039KPP: 504401001
JSC “NPO Stekloplastik named after N.N. Trofimov” is the largest scientific and production centre in Russia dedicated to creating glass fibre materials and their composites.In the first three quarters of 2024, JSC “NPO Stekloplastik named after N.N. Trofimov” supplied its products directly to the Iskander production facilities, including to plants assembling the Iskander missiles, to the developer of the Iskander missile, and to a plant that manufactures solid rocket engines. In addition, the company supplied products to multiple other enterprises of the military and industrial complex of the Russian Federation that are subject to restrictive measures.Since 2021, the company has had a steady increase in total revenue, indicating that it is actively involved in Russia’s war-time economy.Therefore, JSC “NPO Stekloplastik named after N.N. Trofimov” is supporting materially actions which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
19.7.2025

609.
Limited Liability Company “Open Systems Development Technology”Russian: Общество с ограниченной ответственностью “Технология Pазвития Открытых Систем”a.k.a. LLC “Open Systems Development Technology”a.k.a. LLC “TROS”a.k.a. OOO “T.P.O.C.”a.k.a. LLC “T.R.O.S”
Address: 105082, Russian Federation, Moscow, Bolshaya Pochtovaya Street., 26 “B”, bldg. 1, room 401Type of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: Russian FederationDate of registration: 6.12.2014Registration number: 5147746464256Principal place of business: Russian FederationTax Identification Number: 7706818288KPP: 770101001
LLC “Open Systems Development Technology” is a Russia-based entity that supplies metalworking equipment. Since the imposition of Union restrictive measures prohibiting the export of lathes to Russia, LLC “Open Systems Development Technology” is actively involved in circumventing such restrictive measures by acting as the Russia-based recipient of illegally exported lathes. An import scheme organised by Sergey Ushko, Director of LLC “Open Systems Development Technology”, supplies machine tools (including lathes) of Union origin to Russia. Therefore, LLC “Open Systems Development Technology” is an entity circumventing Union restrictive measures by activities which have the aim or result of frustrating the provisions of Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Regulation (EU) No 833/2014.
19.7.2025

610.
Limited Liability Company “Inroel”Russian: Общество с ограниченной ответственностью “Инроел”a.k.a. LLC “INROEL”
Address: St. Petersburg, Arsenalnaya st., building 4, Russian FederationType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: Russian FederationDate of registration: 5.8.2021Registration number: 1217800120724Tax Identification Number: 7811763398
LLC “Inroel” provides metal processing services to companies in the Russian defence sector, including several companies who have been subject to Union restrictive measures for manufacturing weapons systems used by the Russian Armed Forces in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Customers of LLC “Inroel” include JSC Concern VKO Almaz-Antey, JSC “Equality”, LLC “Special Technology Center”, JSC “Radio Engineering Equipment Plant”, JSC Concern “Granit-Electron” and JSC “Plant named after A.A. Kulakov”. The main website of LLC “Inroel” also identifies the defence industry complex as one of the sectors placing orders with the company.Therefore, LLC “Inroel” is supporting materially Russia’s military and industrial complex.
19.7.2025

611.
Public Joint Stock Company “Yakutsk Fuel and Energy Company”Russian: Публичное Акционерное Общество “Якутская Топливно-Энергетическая Компания”a.k.a. PJSC “Yakutsk Fuel and Energy Company”
Address: 678214, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Vilyuysky U., P. Kysyl-SYR, Lenin Str. 4, Russian FederationType of entity: Public Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: Russian FederationDate of registration: 20.11.2002 / 16.5.1964Registration number: 1021401062187Tax Identificiation Number: 1435032049KPP: 141001001
PJSC “Yakutsk Fuel and Energy Company” is a Russian company active in the field of energy production and exploration with a particular focus on natural gas (LNG). It operates the future Yaktuia LNG Project. PJSC “Yakutsk Fuel and Energy Company” is also included in the list of strategically important enterprises of the Russian Federation in the fuel and energy complex.PJSC “Yakutsk Fuel and Energy Company” is therefore involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.
19.7.2025

612.
Shandong ODES Industry Co. Ltd.Chinese: 山东奥德斯工业股份有限公司
Address: Zibo Comprehensive Bonded Zone North District Cotton 4-8# (post code 250000), People’s Republic of ChinaAddress: Warehouse No. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, Zibo Bonded Logistics Park, Zibo High-tech Industrial Development Zone, Shandong Province (post code 255086), People’s Republic of ChinaType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of Registration: People’s Republic of ChinaDate of registration: 7.11.2007Unified social credit code: 91370303MA3ERW0G0MImport and export enterprise code: 3700MA3ERW0G0
Shandong ODES Industry Co. Ltd. is a Chinese company manufacturing and selling all-terrain vehicles (ATVs). After the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the company started to supply the Russian Armed Forces with ATVs, which have been used for military operations in Ukraine.Therefore, Shandong ODES Industry Co. Ltd. is supporting actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
19.7.2025

613.
Limited Liability Company “Ulyanovsk Machine Tool Plant”Russian: Общество с ограниченной ответственностью “Ульяновский станкостроительный завод”a.k.a. LLC “Ulyanovsk Machine Tool Plant”
Address: 432072, Ulyanovsk Region, G Ulyanovsk, General-Leutenant Badanova Street, Building 1, Russian FederationType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of Registration: Russian FederationDate of Registration: 4.6.2012Registration Number: 1127325003706Tax Identification Number: 7325113708
LLC “Ulyanovsk Machine Tool Plant” is a Russian company specialising in the production of Computer Numerical Control machine tools and therefore active in an important field for Russia’s military and industrial complex. The company was previously owned by the German companies Gildemeister Beteiligungen GmbH and DMG Mori. In February 2024, LLC “Ulyanovsk Machine Tool Plant” was subject to an asset seizure ordered by decree of the President of the Russian Federation and transferred to the Russian Federal Agency for State Property Management (Rosimushchestvo).Ownership and control of LLC “Ulyanovsk Machine Tool Plant” have therefore been compulsorily transferred by the Government of the Russian Federation to Rosimushchestvo without the consent of the Union entities which previously owned or controlled it.
19.7.2025

614.
Wuhan Global Sensor Technology Co. LtdChinese: 武汉高芯科技有限公司a.k.a. GSTiR
Address: No. 6 Huanglongshan South Rd, Wuhan 430205, People’s Republic of ChinaType of entitiy: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of Registration: People’s Republic of ChinaDate of registration: 28.4.2013Unified Social Credit Code: 914201000668186736
Wuhan Global Sensor Technology Co. Ltd is a Chinese technology and electronics company. It delivers electronic military goods, such as infrared detectors and other optical components, to the Russian military and industrial complex, supporting the production of military goods for the Russian Armed Forces.Therefore, Wuhan Global Sensor Technology Co. Ltd is supporting materially Russia’s military and industrial complex.
19.7.2025

615.
Joint Stock Company Scientific and Production Enterprise “Military Technologies”Russian: Акционерное общество Научно-Производственное Предприятие “Военные Технологии”a.k.a. JSC NPP “Military Technologies”a.k.a. АО НПП “Военные Технологии”
Address: Serdobolskaya street 65, Saint Petersburg, 197342, Russian FederationPlace of registration: Russian FederationDate of registration: 30.3.2007Registration number: 1077847228447Tax Identification Number: 7813374541
JSC Scientific and Production Enterprise “Military Technologies” is a Russian defence enterprise that develops and manufactures high-tech and high-quality complex military-technical equipment, automated control systems and open-source software and decision support systems. The company, on the orders of the Russian Ministry of Defence, has developed the 1A50 Komandor-VT tablet artillery system, which was presented at the Army-2023 military technical forum. For that development, JSC Scientific and Production Enterprise “Military Technologies” used experience gained by its hardware and software being implemented in the frontline of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. In 2024, a batch of its portable tablets designed for preparation and control of artillery fire was sent to an artillery unit for testing in combat conditions.Therefore, JSC Scientific and Production Enterprise “Military Technologies” is supporting materially actions which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Moreover, it is supporting materially and benefitting from the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine. JSC Scientific and Production Enterprise “Military Technologies” is also forming part of Russia’s military and industrial complex.
19.7.2025

616.
Joint Stock Company Scientific and Production Association “POISK”Russian: Акционерное общество “Научно-Производственное Объединение ‘ПОИСК’”a.k.a. JSC Scientific and Production Association “POISK”a.k.a. JSC NPO “POISK”
Address: 188662, Leningrad region, Vsevolozhsk district, Murino, Lesnaya street 3, Russian FederationType of entity: Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: Russian FederationDate of registration: 11.12.2014Registration number: 1144703004380INN: 4703142849
JSC Scientific and Production Association “POISK” is a leading Russian manufacturer of weapons and ammunition as well as a leading entity for the development of mechanical, electromechanical and electronic multifunctional fuses for ammunition. It has well-established cooperation with some of the major Russian defence companies, such as Tekhmash, Air Defence Concern Almaz-Antey and Tactical Missile Weapons Corporation. In recent years, JSC Scientific and Production Association “POISK” has developed over 20 different types of fuse for all types of ammunition used by the Russian army in its war of aggression against Ukraine. Moreover, the company is the developer of the 9E133M safety and actuating mechanism for the 9M723 Iskander-M ballistic missiles.Moreover, JSC Company Scientific and Production association “POISK” is part of JSC Technodinamika, an entity listed by the Union, which is part of the State Corporation Rostec.Therefore, JSC Company Scientific and Production association “POISK” is supporting materially actions which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.JSC Company Scientific and Production association “POISK” is also supporting Russia’s military and industrial complex and the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine. It is further associated with JSC Technodinamika.
19.7.2025

617.
Aqua Fleet Management Limited Liability CompanyAzerbaijani: “Aqua Fleet Management” Məhdud Məsuliyyətli Cəmiyyətia.k.a. Aqua Fleet Management LLC
Address Apartment 25, Building 5, Sulh Street, Sumqayit, AzerbaijanType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: AzerbaijanDate of registration: 15.8.2024IMO Number: 0052896Tax Identification Number: 2907592941
Aqua Fleet Management LLC is a company registered in Azerbaijan, which manages a fleet of three vessels. The vessels in the company’s fleet are EDERRA (IMO: 9258026), SAURI (IMO: 9266475) and TEMIRO (IMO: 9209972), all of which are listed under Annex XVI to Decision 2014/512/CFSP. Aqua Fleet Management LLC is the ship manager and technical manager for all three vessels. All three vessels have transported crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33). As both the ship manager and technical manager of the vessels, Aqua Fleet Management LLC is therefore managing and operating vessels that transport crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33).
19.7.2025

618.
Sapang Shipping Inc
Address: 12th Floor, Standard Chartered Tower, Bank Street, Cybercity, Ebene, Republic of MauritiusType of entity: IncorporatedPlace of registration: Republic of MauritiusDate of registration: 11.1.2024Registration Number: C204177IMO number: 6474841
Sapang Shipping Inc is a company registered in Mauritius and is the registered owner and ship manager of crude oil tanker ARGENT (formerly JAGUAR, IMO: 9293002). ARGENT is not registered with the International Group of Protection and Indemnity Clubs and therefore is sailing without a trusted liability cover. It is also the only vessel managed by Sapang Shipping Inc, which indicates that it operates under a non-transparent corporate governance policy. ARGENT has changed management companies and flag state multiple times in the last few years and has also sailed without a flag. It has also not verified its Automatic Identification Systems on multiple occasions. ARGENT is a vessel that has transported crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33). As both the registered owner and ship manager of the tanker, Sapang Shipping Inc is therefore managing and operating a vessel that transports crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33).
19.7.2025

619.
Zhu Jiang Shipmanagement Co., Ltd
Address: RM.1801, EASEY COMM. BLDG., 253-261 Hennessy Road, Wan Chai, Hong KongType of entity: Private Company Limited by sharesPlace of registration: Hong KongDate of registration: 11.11.2024Registration Number: 77314802IMO: 0113880
Zhu Jiang Shipmanagement Co., Ltd is a company registered in Hong Kong and is the technical manager of crude oil tanker ARGENT (formerly JAGUAR, IMO: 9293002). ARGENT is not registered with the International Group of Protection and Indemnity Clubs and therefore is sailing without a trusted liability cover. It is also the only vessel managed by Zhu Jiang Shipmanagement Co., Ltd, which indicates that it operates under a non-transparent corporate governance policy. ARGENT has changed management companies and flag state multiple times in the last few years and has also sailed without a flag. It has also not verified its Automatic Identification Systems on multiple occasions. ARGENT is a vessel that has transported crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33). As the technical manager of the tanker, Zhu Jiang Shipmanagement Co., Ltd is therefore managing and operating a vessel that transports crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33).
19.7.2025

620.
Redbird Corporate Services Ltd
Address: 3rd Floor, Standard Chartered Tower, Cybercity, Ebene 72201, Republic of MauritiusType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: Republic of MauritiusDate of registration: 27.10.2003Registration number: C48211
Redbird Corporate Services Ltd is a company registered in Mauritius, which offers corporate and trust services in Mauritius. It is the registered agent of Sapang Shipping Inc, a company registered in Mauritius, which is the registered owner and ship manager of crude oil tanker ARGENT (formerly JAGUAR, IMO: 9293002). The role of the registered agent is to ensure compliance with local regulations and handle the administrative functions of the company. ARGENT is not registered with the International Group of Protection and Indemnity Clubs and therefore is sailing without a trusted liability cover. It is also the only vessel managed by Sapang Shipping Inc, which indicates that it operates under a non-transparent corporate governance policy. ARGENT has changed management companies and flag state multiple times in the last few years and has also sailed without a flag. It has also not verified its Automatic Identification Systems on multiple occasions. As the registered agent of the company, Redbird Corporate Services Ltd is therefore associated with Sapang Shipping Inc.
19.7.2025

621.
Tarabya Logistics Ltd
Address: 154A/155A, Building N280, Al Taweelah, Abu Dhabi, United Arab EmiratesType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: United Arab EmiratesIMO number: 0108990
Tarabya Logistics Ltd is a UAE-based company which manages several vessels that have engaged in irregular and high-risk shipping practices, such as sailing with Automatic Identification Systems gaps and high-risk ship-to-ship transfers, while transporting oil originating in Russia or exported from Russia. Therefore, Tarabya Logistics Ltd is managing vessels that transport crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33).
19.7.2025

622.
Limited Liability Company “Plant of Special Equipment”Russian: Общество с Ограниченной Ответственностью “Завод Специального Оборудования”a.k.a. LLC “Plant of Special Equipment”a.k.a. OOO “ZSO”
Address: 142450, Moscow Region, Bogorodsky G., G. Staraya Kupavna, G Staraya Kupavna, Tup Maly, D. 3, Pomeshch. 74, Russian FederationType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: Russian FederationDate of registration: 23.9.2005Registration number: 1057748342629Tax Individual Number: 7722557040
LLC “Plant of Special Equipment” is a military-industrial company that provides products and services (such as repair of radio-electronic products) for companies, including Roscosmos and Rostec, involved in the production of missile systems, air defence and space defence systems, artillery weapons and armoured vehicles. The company holds a licence related to the use of information constituting a State secret, as well as licences for maintenance and servicing of weapons and military equipment issued by the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation. Therefore, LLC “Plant of Special Equipment” is supporting materially Russia’s military and industrial complex, including by being involved in the development, production or supply of military technology and equipment.
19.7.2025

623.
Joint Stock Company “Research Institute of Modern Telecommunication Technologies”Russian: Акционерное Общество “Научно-Исследовательский Институт Современных Телекоммуникационных Технологий”a.k.a. JSC “Research Institute of Modern Telecommunication Technologies”a.k.a. AO “NII STT”a.k.a. АО “НИИ СТТ”
Address: 214012, Smolensk region, Smolensk, st. Novo-Leningradskaya, 10, Russian FederationType of entity: Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: Russian FederationDate of registration: 26.12.2002Registration number: 1026701461160Tax Identification Number: 6730046954
JSC “Research Institute of Modern Telecommunication Technologies” specialises in the production of radio and television transmitting equipment. It also produces weapons and ammunition. The products of JSC “Research Institute of Modern Telecommunication Technologies” are used by Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular its unmanned aerial vehicle Merlin-VR.Therefore, JSC “Research Institute of Modern Telecommunication Technologies” is supporting materially actions which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Moreover, it is supporting materially Russia’s military and industrial complex and the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.
19.7.2025

624.
Monolink Group FZCOArabic: مجموعة مونولينك ش.م.حa.k.a. Axiom Internationala.k.a. EKN Trading
Address: Office Number 001, Building A2, Dubai Silicon Oasis, DDP, Dubai, United Arab EmiratesType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: United Arab EmiratesRegistration number: DSO-ZZCO-16068
Monolink Group FZCO is a Dubai-based entity that provides global logistics services. It supplies imported goods to Russian industry sectors, including the energy and extractives sectors. In addition, Monolink Group FZCO participates in Russia’s coal export schemes.Furthermore, the Russian State-funded radio Sputnik continued to broadcast its content in the United States by paying for radio frequencies through Monolink Group FZCO.Thus, Monolink Group FZCO is supporting and benefitting from the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.
19.7.2025

625.
2Rivers DMCCa.k.a. 2Riversa.k.a. Coral Energy DMCC
Address: 3902-A Unit No.1 Platinum Tower, Dubai, United Arab EmiratesPlace of registration: Dubai, United Arab EmiratesDate of registration: 19.1.2018
2Rivers DMCC is a Dubai-based oil-trading company. Along with 2Rivers PTE Ltd, also owned by Vetus Investments, it forms the 2Rivers Group, previously known as Coral Energy. The 2Rivers Group enables shipments and export of Russian oil, notably from Rosneft, by concealing the actual origin of the oil. In particular, the 2Rivers Group controls a large proportion of the vessels in Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet”. The 2Rivers Group continues to operate the same network as Coral Energy, which includes associated entities such as Nord Axis and Bellatrix Energy, regardless of its change in name and ownership, as demonstrated by the connection between the previous owner and the new management. Furthermore, the energy sector, in particular the oil sector, is a sector providing substantial revenue to the Russian Government.Therefore, 2Rivers DMCC is significantly frustrating the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, in particular Article 3m. It is also involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.
19.7.2025

626.
2Rivers PTE Ltda.k.a. 2Riversa.k.a. Coral Energy PTE Ltd
Address: 336 Smith Street, #04-304, New BridgeCentre, Singapore 050336, SingaporeType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: SingaporeDate of registration: 11.12.2014Registration number: 549300V3GQ2MCTQAIV68
2Rivers PTE Ltd is a Singapore-based oil-trading company. Along with 2Rivers DMCC, also owned by Vetus Investments, it forms the 2Rivers Group, previously known as Coral Energy. The 2Rivers Group enables shipments and export of Russian oil, notably from Rosneft, by concealing the actual origin of the oil. In particular, the 2Rivers Group controls a large proportion of the vessels in Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet”. The 2Rivers Group continues to operate the same network as Coral Energy, which includes associated entities such as Nord Axis and Bellatrix Energy, regardless of its change in name and ownership, as demonstrated by the connection between the previous owner and the new management. Furthermore, the energy sector, in particular the oil sector, is a sector providing substantial revenue to the Russian Government.Therefore, 2Rivers PTE Ltd is significantly frustrating the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, in particular Article 3m. It is also involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.
19.7.2025

627.
Limited Liability Company “Aeroscan”Russian: Общество с Ограниченной Ответственностью “Аэроскан”a.k.a. LLC “Aeroscan”a.k.a. OOO “Аэроскан”
Address: 127055, Moscow, Perunovsky per. 3 building 2, floor 2 room 11, Russian FederationType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: Russian FederationDate of registration: 7.12.2017Registration Number: 1175658025179Tax Identification Number: 5603045794
LLC Aeroscan is a Russian commercial operator that provides services in the areas of aerial photography, video and thermal imaging monitoring and laser scanning for unmanned aerial systems. It also is part of the Zala Aero group of companies which specialises in the development and production of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), in particular Lancet loitering munitions and reconnaissance UAVs. Lancet loitering munitions and the Z-16 UAVs are actively used by the Russian army in its war of aggression against Ukraine. LLC Aeroscan also manufactures, in cooperation with Zala Aero Group, the new military reconnaissance, artillery fire and battlefield surveillance Zala Z-20 UAVs which are also used by the Russian army in its war of aggression against Ukraine.Therefore, LLC Aeroscan is supporting materially actions which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Moreover, it is supporting materially Russia’s military and industrial complex and the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.
19.7.2025

628.
Milavous Group Ltda.k.a. Milavous Groupa.k.a. Milavus Group
Address: ICD Brookfield Place, Trade Centre DIFC 37th Floor, Dubai, United Arab EmiratesType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: United Arab Emirates
Milavous Group Ltd is a Dubai-based shipping and commodity trading company, led by Hossein Shamkhani. He uses the company to blend crude oil along with various petroleum products from Russia and to rebrand for exporting purposes, thereby concealing their origin. Therefore, Milavous Group Ltd is involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine. Furthermore, Milavous Group Ltd is associated with Hossein Shamkhani.
19.7.2025

629.
Admiral Groupa.k.a. Admiral Group Shipping Company
Address: 903B, Sama Tower, Sheikh Zayed Road, Dubai, United Arab EmiratesType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: United Arab EmiratesDate of registration: 2011
Admiral Group is a Dubai-based shipping company, led by Hossein Shamkhani. He uses the company to transport and sell Russian crude oil. Therefore, Admiral Group is involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine. Furthermore, Admiral Group is associated with its Director, Hossein Shamkhani.
19.7.2025

630.
Twister Shipmanagement LLC-FZa.k.a. Starfish Ship Management LLC-FZ
Address: 6th Floor, Meydan Grandstand, Al Meydan Road, Nad Al Sheba, Dubai, United Arab EmiratesType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of Registration United Arab EmiratesIMO number: 0024553
Twister Shipmanagement LLC-FZ is a Dubai-based company which manages oil tankers transporting crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33). Twister Shipmanagement LLC-FZ is therefore providing technical support to the operations of vessels that transport crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33).
19.7.2025

631.
Joint Stock Company “Izhevsk Mechanical Plant”Russian: Акционерное Общество “Ижевский механический завод”a.k.a. JSC “Izhevsk Mechanical Plant”a.k.a. JSC IMZ
Address: 8 Promyshlennaya str., Izhevsk, 426063, Udmurt Republic, Russian FederationType of entity: Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: Russian FederationDate of registration: 17.12.2012Registration number: 1121841007958Tax Identification Number: 1841030037
JSC “Izhevsk Mechanical Plant” is one of the largest multi-profile manufacturers in Russia, and its primary products include combat weapons, components for missile systems, and high-precision castings. It produces weapons for the Russian Armed Forces operating in Ukraine. Therefore, JSC “Izhevsk Mechanical Plant” is supporting materially actions which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Furthermore, it is forming part of Russia’s military and industrial complex.
19.7.2025

632.
Limited Liability Company “Volgotrans”Oбщество с ограниченной ответственностью “Bолготранс”a.k.a. LLC “Vogotrans”a.k.a. ООО “Волготранс”
Address: Belorusskaya 132, Samara, Russian FederationType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: Russian FederationDate of registration: 30.9.2009Registration number: 1096317003970Principal place of business: Russian FederationTax Identification Number: 6317079434
LLC Volgotrans is a Russian company operating a fleet of several tankers and carrying out transportation of crude oil and oil products by sea, including for export purposes. The energy sector, especially oil, provides substantial revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. Therefore, LLC Volgotrans is an entity involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.
19.7.2025

633.
Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Morozov Plant”Russian: Федеральное Государственное Унитарное Предприятие “Завод Имени Морозова”a.k.a. FSUE “Morozov Plant”
Address: 188679, Leningrad region, Vsevolozhsk district, urban settlement of Morozov, st. Chekalova 3, Russian FederationType of entity: Federal State Unitary EnterprisePlace of registration: Russian FederationDate of registration: 25.2.2003Registration number: 1034700561895Tax Identification Number: 4703009607
FSUE “Morozov Plant” is a State enterprise involved in the production of ammunition and military equipment for the Russian Government. Therefore, FSUE “Morozov Plant” is forming part of Russia’s military and industrial complex.
19.7.2025

634.
Joint Stock Company “Ploshchad”Russian: Акционерное Общество “Площадь”a.k.a. JSC “Ploshchad”a.k.a. JSC “Square”
Adress: 109380, Moscow, Lyublino Municipal District, Chaginskaya st. 4, Building 13, Room 9/3, Russian FederationType of entity: Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: Russian FederationDate of registration: 10.7.2023Registration number: 1237700463032Tax Identification Number: 9723203841Website:https://areasystems.tech/
JSC “Ploshchad” is a Russian company specialised in the development and implementation of robotic systems which provides comprehensive solutions for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). It is involved, together with KB Microb, in the design and manufacture of the FPV, Microb and Microb-10 UAVs which are used by the Russian Armed Forces in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. JSC “Ploshchad” is, in particular, responsible for the development of the target acquisition system of those UAVs.Following successful testing of those UAVs by the Russian Armed Forces in the second half of 2024, including in the conflict zone in Ukraine, more than 3 000 UAVs were delivered to the Russian army by January 2025.Therefore, JSC “Ploshchad” is forming part of Russia’s military and industrial complex by being involved in the development of military technology and equipment, and it is supporting materially actions that undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
19.7.2025

635.
Limited Liability Company “Krafttek”Russian: Общество с ограниченной ответственностью “Крафттек”a.k.a. LLC “Krafttek”a.k.a. LLC “Crafftech”
Address: 196006, St. Petersburg, Vn. Ter. G, Moskovskaya Zastava Municipal District, Moskovsky Avenue 120A, Building 1, Room 23-N, Russian FederationType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: Russian FederationDate of registration: 18.8.2015Registration number: 1157847282603Tax Identification Number: 7840038027Website:https://crafttech.ru/
LLC “Krafttek” is a significant system integrator and software developer in Russia. The company is responsible for wholesale software trading, as well as for wholesale trade in computing equipment, telecommunications equipment and other office equipment. In 2024, public data showed that Russian military manufacturers were able to use western microchips for the production of military equipment. The tools and equipment needed to manufacture such microchips were imported by LLC “Krafttek” in circumvention of Union restrictive measures. Since the imposition of Union restrictive measures prohibiting the export of microchips and microchip-manufacturing equipment to Russia, LLC “Krafttek” has been actively involved in circumventing such restrictive measures through acting as the Russia-based recipient of illegally exported goods and technologies. Therefore, LLC “Krafttek” is an entity circumventing Union restrictive measures by activities which have the aim or result of frustrating the prohibitions of Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. Further, LLC “Krafttek”, by supplying Russian industry with components, is supporting the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.
19.7.2025

636.
Intershipping Services Limited Liability Companya.k.a. Intershipping Services LLC
Address: Al Shorafa Tower 2, Office no 1903, 19th Floor,Sheikh Rashid Bin Humaid Al Nuaimi StreetRashidiya 3, P.O Box: 4295, Ajman, United Arab EmiratesType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: United Arab Emirates
Intershipping Services LLC is an entity based in the UAE. It operates the Gabon international flag registry, which has been flagging vessels transporting Russian crude oil or petroleum products following the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including vessels controlled by Sovcomflot.Through its owner’s family relations and its Indian office, registered as Intershipping Services Hub Private Limited, Intershipping Services LLC is also operating the Comoros international flag registry, which has been flagging vessels transporting Russian crude oil or petroleum products following the introduction of Western restrictive measures against Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet”.Several vessels flagged through the Gabon and Comoros international flag registries have regularly engaged in high-risk shipping practices. Such practices include not maintaining adequate liability insurance, carrying out unsafe operations, intentionally taking measures to avoid ship detection such as switching off their Automatic Identification Systems or not operating under a transparent corporate governance policy that assures the welfare and safety of those on board and the protection of the marine environment.Therefore, Intershipping Service LLC is providing support to the operations of vessels that transport crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33).
19.7.2025

637.
Intershipping Services Hub Private Limiteda.k.a. Intershipping Services Hub Private Ltd.
Address: 302, 3rd Floor, Sushmore, Linking Road, Khar (W), Mumbai- 400052, Maharashtra, IndiaType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: IndiaDate of registration: 2.11.2018Registration number: 316730Corportate Identification Number: U74990MH2018PTC316730
Intershipping Services Hub Private Limited is an entity based in India, as the local branch of the UAE-based entity Intershipping Service LLC. Intershipping Service LLC is operating the Gabon international flag registry, which has been flagging vessels transporting Russian crude oil or petroleum products following the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including vessels controlled by Sovcomflot.Intershipping Services Hub Private Limited is also operating the Comoros international flag registry, which has been flagging vessels transporting Russian crude oil or petroleum products following the introduction of Western restrictive measures against Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet”.Several vessels flagged through the Gabon and Comoros international flag registries have regularly engaged in high-risk shipping practices. Such practices include not maintaining adequate liability insurance, carrying out unsafe operations, intentionally taking measures to avoid ship detection such as switching off their Automatic Identification Systems or not operating under a transparent corporate governance policy that ensures the welfare and safety of those on board and the protection of the marine environment.Therefore, Intershipping Services Hub Private Limited is associated with Intershipping Service LLC and is providing support to the operations of vessels that transport crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33).
19.7.2025

638.
Public Law Company “Territorial Development Fund”Russian: Публично-правовая компания “Фонд развития территорий”a.k.a. Territorial Development Fund
Address: Moscow, Yuzhnoportovy Municipal District, Sharikopodshipnikovskaya St. 2.5, Russian FederationType of entity: Public Law CompanyPlace of registration: Russian FederationDate of registration: 20.10.2017Registration number: 5177746100032
The Territorial Development Fund is a public law company operating under the Ministry of Construction of the Russian Federation and founded by the Government of the Russian Federation. In particular, the Territorial Development Fund manages the so-called free economic zone in the illegally occupied territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, which was created by the Government of the Russian Federation to grant benefits and privileges to companies that operate in those illegally occupied territories.Therefore, the Territorial Development Fund is supporting materially actions which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and stability and security in Ukraine.
19.7.2025

639.
Nayara Energy Limited
Address: 5th Floor, Jet Airways Godrej BKC, Plot No. C-68 G Block, Bandra Kurla Complex, Bandra East, Mumbai – 400 051, Maharashtra, IndiaType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: IndiaDate of registration: 11.9.1989Corporate Identification Number (CIN): U11100GJ1989PLC032116
Nayara Energy Limited is an entity established in India and operating an important refinery in Vadinar. That refinery is 49 % owned by the Russian State oil company Rosneft, and is a major refiner of Russian crude oil. The energy sector, in particular the oil sector, is a sector providing substantial revenue to the Russian Government.Therefore, Nayara Energy is involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.
19.7.2025

640.
ACE Electronic HK Co., Limiteda.k.a. ACE (HK) Electronics Technology Co., Ltd
Address: 18F Block B, World Trade Plaza, No. 9 Fuhong Road, Futian District, Shenzhen, People’s Republic of ChinaOther addresses: 9F International Technology Building No. 3007, Shennan Avenue, Futian District, Shenzhen, People’s Republic of China;E2 Unit, 22/F Kingsway Industrial Building Phase II, 147-175 Wo Yi Hop Road, Kwai Chung, New Territories, Hong Kong;E2 Unit, 22/F Kingsway Industrial Building Phase II, 167-175 Wo Yi Hop Road, Kwai Chung, New Territories, Hong Kong;Room 1021, Bailey Commercial Centre, 87-105 Chatham Road South, Tsim Sha Tsui, Kowloon, Hong Kong;Unit 04 7/F Bright Way Tower, No. 33 Mong Kok Road, Kowloon, Hong KongType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: Hong KongBusiness registration number: 69987857Company registration number: 2756979Website: www.ace-chip.com
ACE Electronic HK Co., Limited (“ACE Electronic”) is an entity registered in Hong Kong that supplies electronic components to Russian industries, including the military industry. Some of the company’s partners are military-industrial companies themselves, such as CJSC “NPF ‘Micran’”, which produces combat control systems. Other of the company’s partners, such as LLC NPK Fotonika, act as intermediaries supplying components to military-industrial companies. Due to the high consumption of military products, Russia’s military industry is dependent on imports of semiconductors and other electronic components. Since the imposition of Union restrictive measures prohibiting the export of various electronic components to Russia, ACE Electronic is actively involved in providing Russia-based recipients with electronic components, including semiconductor devices.Therefore, ACE Electronic is an entity supporting materially Russia’s military and industrial complex, including by being involved in the development, production or supply of military technology and equipment.
19.7.2025

641.
Bellatrix Energy Limiteda.k.a. Bellatrix Energya.k.a. BX Energy Ltd
Address: Unit 601, 6/F of Mill 5 of the Mills, 45 Pak Tin Par Street, Hong KongType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: Hong KongBuisness registration number: 72465672
Bellatrix Energy Limited is a Hong Kong-based company that is part of a network of companies that enables shipments and export of Russian oil, notably from Rosneft, organised around the 2Rivers Group, with shareholders sharing the same address in Dubai and contributing to laundering Russian oil through ship-to-ship transfers. Following the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022, Bellatrix Energy Limited has become an important trader of oil originating from major Russian companies. The energy sector, in particular the oil sector, is a sector providing substantial revenue to the Russian Government.Therefore, Bellatrix Energy Limited is significantly frustrating the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, in particular Article 3m. It is also involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine. Bellatrix Energy is also associated with 2Rivers DMCC and 2Rivers PTE LTD.
19.7.2025’.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

(1) On 17 March 2014, the Council adopted Decision 2014/145/CFSP (1).

(2) In its conclusions of 19 December 2024, the European Council reiterated its resolute condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations, and reaffirmed its continued support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. The European Council stated that efforts to further limit Russia’s ability to wage war must continue. It also expressed the Union’s readiness to step up pressure on Russia, including by adopting further sanctions.

(3) In view of the gravity of the situation, it is appropriate to adopt further restrictive measures.

(4) In particular, the Council considers that 14 persons and 41 entities responsible for actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine should be added to the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in the Annex to Decision 2014/145/CFSP.

(5) Decision 2014/145/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The Annex to Decision 2014/145/CFSP is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
PersonsThe following persons and entities are added to the list of persons, entities and bodies set out in the Annex to Decision 2014/145/CFSP:
Name

Identifying information

Reasons

Date of listing

‘1945. Svetlana Ivanovna NIKOLAYEVA

Russian: Светлана Ивановна НИКОЛАЕВА

Function: Businessperson

DOB: 15.11.1964

Nationality: Russian

Gender: female

Tax Identification Number: 503219217814

Svetlana Nikolayeva is a Russian businessperson holding managing positions and business interests in the Russian military and industrial complex. She is the wife of Konstantin Yuryevich Nikolayev.

In particular, Svetlana Nikolayeva is the Chief Executive Officer of the Russian defence company Promtekhnologiya LLC, which owns the trademark “ORSIS” and which supplies rifles for the Russian military and security services that are used in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Svetlana Nikolayeva’s position as Chief Executive Officer of Promtekhnologiya LLC contributes to concealing her husband’s controlling influence over the company. In addition, Svetlana Nikolayeva holds interests in the Russian companies ScanEx and LLC Resource. Those companies cooperate with the Russian military and security services, supplying them with military hardware which has been used in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

Svetlana Nikolayeva is therefore supporting and benefitting from the Government of the Russian Federation and supporting actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine. She is also supporting Russia’s military and industrial complex, including by being involved in the development, production or supply of military technology and equipment.

Furthermore, Svetlana Nikolayeva is associated with Konstantin Yuryevich Nikolayev.

19.7.2025 1946. Lin ZHONGHENG

Chinese: 林仲恒

Function: Owner of Shenzhen Biguang Trading Co. Ltd

Nationality: Chinese

Gender: male

Lin Zhongheng is a Chinese businessperson. He controls and represents Shenzhen Biguang Trading Co. Ltd, a provider of technological hardware based in the People’s Republic of China.

Shenzhen Biguang Trading Co. Ltd repeatedly transferred goods of Union origin to Russia while those goods were subject to Union export restrictions under Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. Lin Zhongheng therefore facilitated infringements of the prohibition against circumvention of the Union restrictive measures regime imposed on the Russian Federation and thus additionally significantly frustrated existing provisions of Union restrictive measures.

19.7.2025 1947. Aleksandr Sergeyevich USHKO

Russian: Александр Сергеевич УШКО

Function: Lead Marketing Manager of LLC “Open Systems Development Technology” (LLC TROS)

DOB: 15.1.1991

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Passport number: 550403152

Aleksandr Ushko is the Lead Marketing Manager of LLC “Open Systems Development Technology” (LLC TROS), a Russia-based entity that manufactures metalworking equipment and is a wholesaler of machine tools. He is the son of Sergey Ushko, the CEO of LLC TROS, who is subject to Union restrictive measures. Since the imposition of Union restrictive measures prohibiting the export of lathes to Russia, LLC TROS is actively involved in circumventing such restrictive measures by acting as the Russia-based recipient of illegally exported lathes. Aleksandr Ushko helped his father to participate in an import scheme in order to provide machine tools and other dual-use equipment to Russia.

Therefore, Aleksandr Ushko is facilitating infringements of the prohibition against circumvention of Union restrictive measures.

19.7.2025 1948. Felix Feliksovych PLESKACHEVSKY

Russian: Феликс Феликсович ПЛЕСКАЧЕВСЬКИЙ

Function: General Director of JSC Scientific and Production Association “POISK”

DOB: 11.5.1967

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Felix Pleskachevsky is the General Director of JSC Scientific and Production Association “POISK”, a leading Russian manufacturer of weapons and ammunition as well as a leading entity for the development of mechanical, electromechanical and electronic multifunctional fuses for ammunition. The company has well-established cooperation with some of the major Russian defence companies, such as Tekhmash, Air Defence Concern Almaz-Antey and Tactical Missile Weapons Corporation. In recent years, JSC Scientific and Production Association “POISK” has developed over 20 different types of fuse for all types of ammunition used by the Russian army in its war of aggression against Ukraine. Moreover, the company is the developer of the 9E133M safety and actuating mechanism for the 9M723 Iskander-M ballistic missiles.

Moreover, JSC Scientific and Production Association “POISK” is part of JSC Technodinamika, an entity listed by the Union, which is in turn part of the State Corporation Rostec.

Therefore, Felix Pleskachevsky is supporting materially actions which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

Felix Pleskachevsky is also supporting Russia’s military and industrial complex and the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.

19.7.2025 1949. Abhinav KAMAL

Function: Captain of crude oil tanker ARGENT (formerly JAGUAR, IMO: 9293002)

Date of birth: 6.7.1984

Nationality: Indian

Gender: male

Abhinav Kamal is the captain of crude oil tanker ARGENT (formerly JAGUAR, IMO: 9293002). ARGENT is not registered with the International Group of Protection and Indemity Clubs and therefore is sailing without a trusted liability cover. It is also the only vessel managed by Sapang Shipping Inc (registered owner and ship manager) and Zhu Jiang Shipmanagement Co (technical manager), which indicates that it operates under a non-transparent corporate governance policy. ARGENT has changed management companies and flag state multiple times in the last few years and has also sailed without a flag. It has also not verified its Automatic Identification Systems on multiple occasions. ARGENT is a vessel that has transported crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33). As captain of the ARGENT, Abhinav Kamal therefore provides material, technical or financial support to the operations of a vessel that transports crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly Resolution A.1192(33). As captain of the ARGENT, he is moreover associated with Sapang Shipping Inc, which is managing and operating a vessel that transports crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33).

19.7.2025 1950. Nikita Aleksandrovich ZAKHAROV

Russian: Никита Александрович ЗАХАРОВ

Function: Owner of LLC Aeroscan

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Tax Identification Number: 184101937739

Nikita Zakharov is a Russian businessperson, and founder and owner of LLC Aeroscan. LLC Aeroscan is a Russian commercial operator that provides services in the areas of aerial photography, video and thermal imaging monitoring and laser scanning for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). It is also part of the ZALA Aero group of companies which specialises in the development and production of UAVs, in particular Lancet loitering munitions and reconnaissance UAVs. Lancet loitering munitions and the Z-16 UAVs are actively used by the Russian army in its war of aggression against Ukraine. LLC Aeroscan also manufactures, in cooperation with Zala Aero Group, the new military reconnaissance, artillery fire and battlefield surveillance Zala Z-20 UAVs which are also used by the Russian army in its war of aggression against Ukraine.

Therefore, Nikita Zakharov is supporting materially actions which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Moreover, he is supporting materially Russia’s military and industrial complex and the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.

19.7.2025 1951. Hossein SHAMKHANI

Farsi: شمخانی حسین

a.k.a. Mohammad Hossein SHAMKHANI

Function: Director of Admiral Shipping

DOB: 1984 or 1985

POB: Tehran, Iran

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

ID number: 0070293384

Hossein Shamkhani is a businessperson active in the Russian oil trade and a central player in Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet”. He uses the company Milavous Group Ltd to blend crude oil with various petroleum products from Russia and to rebrand for exporting purposes, thereby concealing their origin. Additionally, as Director of the company Admiral Shipping, he is involved in transporting and selling Russian crude oil. Therefore, Hossein Shamkhani is involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.

19.7.2025 1952. Viktor Sergeevich FOFANOV

Russian: Виктор Сергеевич ФОФАНОВ

Function: General Director of LLC Volgotrans

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Tax Identification Number: 631630065950

Viktor Fofanov is the General Director of LLC Volgotrans, a Russian company operating a fleet of several tankers and carrying out transportation of crude oil and oil products by sea, including for export purposes. The energy sector, especially oil, provides substantial revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. Therefore, as the General Director of LLC Volgotrans, Viktor Fofanov is a businessperson involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine. As the General Director of LLC Volgotrans, Viktor Fofanov is associated with LLC Volgotrans.

19.7.2025 1953. Olga Vasilyevna BUROVA

Russian: Ольга Васильевна БУРОВА

Ukrainian: Ольга Василівна БУРОВА

Function: so-called “First Deputy Minister of Culture of the Republic of Crimea”

DOB: 29.8.1972

POB: Zelenchukskaya, USSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: female

Olga Burova has been the so-called “First Deputy Minister of Culture of the Republic of Crimea” since 15 May 2023. In that role, she has promoted Crimea as a centre of Russian culture and as a part of Russian history, and supported its illegal annexation by Russia in 2014. In taking on and acting in this capacity, Olga Burova is supporting and implementing actions or policies which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

19.7.2025 1954. Ilshat Ilgizovich SHAGIAKHMETOV

Russian: Ильшат Ильгизович ШАГИАХМЕТОВ

Function: General Director of the Territorial Development Fund

DOB: 4.6.1985

POB: Kazan, USSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Ilshat Shagiakhmetov is the General Director of the Territorial Development Fund, a public law company operating under the Ministry of Construction of the Russian Federation and founded by the Government of the Russian Federation. In particular, the Territorial Development Fund manages the so-called free economic zone in the illegally occupied territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, which was created by the Government of the Russian Federation to grant benefits and privileges to companies that operate in those illegally occupied territories.

In acting in this capacity, Ilshat Shagiakhmetov is supporting and implementing actions or policies which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

19.7.2025 1955. Vladimir Olegovich KURYANOV

Russian: Владимир Олегович КУРЬЯНОВ

Function: Acting Rector of the V.I. Vernadsky Crimean Federal University

DOB: 23.1.1960

POB: Simferopol, USSR (now Ukraine)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Since 22 June 2023, Vladimir Kuryanov has been the acting Rector of the V.I. Vernadsky Crimean Federal University. He is supporting policies which contribute to the militarised education of Ukrainian children and young people and which undermine Ukrainian history and language. He has committed the University to supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including by allowing military training in the University of students who are to be sent to the frontline.

In taking on and acting in this capacity, Vladimir Kuryanov is supporting and implementing actions or policies which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

19.7.2025 1956. Karen Georgievich SHAKHNAZAROV

Russian: Карен Георгиевич ШАХНАЗАРОВ

Function: General Director of Mosfilm

DOB: 8.7.1952

POB: Krasnodar, USSR (now Russian Federation)

Nationality: Russian

Gender: male

Tax Identification Number: 771002632970

Karen Shakhnazarov is the General Director of Mosfilm, a Russian State-owned film studio. He maintains a close relationship with President Vladimir Putin, and they share a mutual admiration for each other’s work and actions.

Karen Shakhnazarov received various orders, merits, medals and State prizes from the Government of the Russian Federation for his work and engagement. In his function as the General Director of Mosfilm, Karen Shakhnazarov supported Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine verbally and ideologically in his public speeches and interviews. Furthermore, Mosfilm delivered humanitarian, technical, financial and material support to the Russian military, including providing it with military equipment that was previously used for staging purposes in Mosfilm’s film production.

Therefore, Karen Shakhnazarov is responsible for actions undermining and threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. He is supporting and benefitting from the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.

19.7.2025 1957. Tatyana Petrovna LITVINENKO

Russian: Татьяна Петровна ЛИТВИНЕНКО

Function: Businessperson

DOB: 2.5.1958

Nationality: Russian

Gender: female

Tax Individual Number: 780158958115

Tatyana Litvinenko is a major shareholder of PhosAgro, a globally leading producer of phosphate fertilisers. Russia is the world’s leading exporter of fertilisers, a sector which provides substantial revenue to the Russian Government. Tatyana Litvinenko is therefore a businessperson involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.

19.7.2025 1958. Ahmed KERIMOV

Function: shareholder of the 2Rivers Group

Nationality: Azerbaijani

Gender: male

Ahmed Kerimov is a shareholder of the 2Rivers Group, a UAE-based oil-trading group previously known as Coral Energy, which enables shipments and export of Russian oil, notably from Rosneft, by concealing the actual origin of the oil. In particular, the 2 Rivers Group controls a large proportion of the vessels in Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet”. The 2Rivers Group continues to operate the same network as Coral Energy, which includes associated entities such as Nord Axis and Bellatrix Energy, regardless of its change in name and ownership, as demonstrated by the connection between the previous owner and the new management. Furthermore, the energy sector, in particular the oil sector, is a sector providing substantial revenue to the Russian Government.

Therefore, Ahmed Kerimov is significantly frustrating the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, in particular Article 3m. He is also involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.

19.7.2025’

Entities
Name

Identifying information

Reasons

Date of listing

‘601. Joint Stock Company “Research Institute of Measuring Instruments – Novosibirsk Plant Named After Komintern”

Russian: Акционерное Общество “Нии Измерительных Приборов – Новосибирский Завод Имени Коминтерна”

a.k.a. AO “NPO NIIIP-NZIK”

a.k.a. JSC “Research Institute of Measuring Instruments – Novosibirsk Plant Named After Komintern”

Address: Novosibirsk, Planetnaya Street 32, Russian Federation

Type of entity: Joint Stock Company

Place of registration: Russian Federation

Date of registration: 20.9.2002

Registration Number: 1025400510827

Tax Identification Number: 5401199015

KPP: 540101001

JSC “Research Institute of Measuring Instruments – Novosibirsk Plant Named After Komintern” is a Russian entity responsible for the production of radar, radio navigation equipment and radio remote control equipment.

The company is involved in the upgrading of the “Listva” remote demining machine, which is used by the Russian military in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

Therefore, JSC “Research Institute of Measuring Instruments – Novosibirsk Plant Named After Komintern” is supporting Russia’s military and industrial complex, including by being involved in the development, production or supply of military technology and equipment.

19.7.2025 602. Joint Stock Company “Research Institute of Semiconductor Devices”

Russian: Акционерное Общество “Научно Исследовательский Институт Полупроводниковых Приборов”

a.k.a. AO “NIIPP”

a.k.a. JSC “Research Institute of Semiconductor Devices”

Address: Tomsk, krasnoarmeyskaya street 99A, Russian Federation

Type of entity: Joint Stock Company

Place of registration: Russian Federation

Date of registration: 19.12.2003

Registration Number: 1037000170690

Tax Identification Number: 7017084932

KPP: 701701001

JSC “Research Institute of Semiconductor Devices” is a military industrial company. It develops technologies and produces electronic components, primarily for the military industry. For instance, the company creates miniature LEDs that can be used as part of special-purpose equipment, including to enable operations in extreme conditions.

Therefore, JSC “Research Institute of Semiconductor Devices” is supporting Russia’s military and industrial complex, including by being involved in the development, production or supply of military technology and equipment.

19.7.2025 603. Closed Joint Stock Company “Moscow Mechanical Plant of Special Equipment”

Russian: Закрытое Акционерное Общество “Московский Механический Завод Специального Оборудования”

a.k.a. CJSC “Moscow Mechanical Plant of Special Equipment”

a.k.a. ZAO “MMZSO”

Address: 121357, Moscow, Municipal District Mozhaisky, Vereiskaya Street, D. 29a, building 1, floor 2, room 1, Russian Federation

Type of entity: Closed Joint Stock Company

Place of registration: Russian Federation

Date of registration: 20.2.2007

Registration Number: 1075032002682

Tax Identification Number: 5032164385

KPP: 773101001

CJSC “Moscow Mechanical Plant of Special Equipment” is a Russian company that develops military equipment, including technical equipment for ships of the Russian fleet, supporting the country’s defence capabilities. The company is licenced by the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation to manufacture, sell, repair, maintain, install and test weapons and military equipment.

Therefore, CJSC “Moscow Mechanical Plant of Special Equipment” is supporting Russia’s military and industrial complex, including by being involved in the development, production or supply of military technology and equipment.

19.7.2025 604. Joint Stock Company “Polymer”

Russian: Акционерное Общество “Полимер”

a.k.a. JSC “Polymer”

a.k.a. АО “Полимер”

Address: 4 Proizvodstvennaya Street, Chapeavsk, 446100, Samara region, Russian Federation

Type of entity: Joint Stock Company

Place of registration: Russian Federation

Date of registration: 8.12.2002

Registration number: 1026303177119

Tax Identification Number: 6335005315

JSC Polymer is a Russia-based company integrated into the structure of NPK Tekhmash JSC, part of the State Corporation Rostec, which is responsible for executing the State armament programme and fulfilling the State defence orders. It is specialised in the manufacture of weapons, ammunition and explosives, and supplies its products to the Russian Armed Forces and companies of the Russian military and industrial complex. As explained by the General Director of JSC Polymer, the company’s military production has increased since 2022 with a view to responding to the needs of the Russian Armed Forces in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

Therefore, JSC Polymer is forming part of Russia’s military and industrial complex and is supporting materially actions which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

19.7.2025 605. Joint Stock Company “Scientific Production Enterprise ‘Rubin’”

Russian: Акционерное Общество “Научно-Производственное Предприятие ‘Рубин’”

a.k.a. JSC “Scientific Production Enterprise ‘Rubin’”

a.k.a. JSC NPP Rubin

a.k.a. АО НПП Рубин

Address: 440015 Penzenskaya Oblast, city of Penza, Baydukova Street, bldg. 2, Russian Federation

Type of entity: Joint Stock Company

Place of registration: Russian Federation

Date of registration: 5.12.2003

Registration number: 1035802518531

Tax Identification Number: 5835049453

JSC “Scientific Production Enterprise ‘Rubin’” is a leading company of the Russian defence industry which manufactures mobile automated control and communication systems designed for military applications. The company holds an active State licence in Russia for the maintenance and servicing of weapons and military equipment. It plays a significant role in the supply chain of the Russian Armed Forces, supplying them with specialised military equipment. Among the various systems produced for the Russian army is the air defence control system “Magistr-SV”, which has been deployed in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

Therefore, JSC “Scientific Production Enterprise ‘Rubin’” is forming part of Russia’s military and industrial complex and is supporting materially actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

19.7.2025 606. Joint Stock Company “Aleksinsky Experimental Mechanical Plant”

Russian: Акционерное Общество “Алексинский опытный механический завод”

a.k.a. JSC “Aleksinsky Experimental Mechanical Plant”

a.k.a. JSC “AEMP”

a.k.a. АО “АОМЗ”

Address: 10, Metallistov Str., 301365, Aleksin, Tula Region, Russian Federation

Type of entity: Joint Stock Company

Place of registation: Russian Federation

Registration number: 1127154040122

Tax Identification Number: 7111504768

Telephone: + 7 (48753) 5-94-05

Fax: + 7 (48753) 5-60-37

Email: [email protected]

Website: http://www.aleksinomz.ru

JSC “Aleksinsky Experimental Mechanical Plant” produces weapons in Tula in the Russian Federation. It was added to the list of strategic organisations of the Russian Government in 2022. The company is part of the Russian military and industrial complex and supports it materially, including by being involved in the development, production and supply of military technology and equipment. The Deputy Head of the Security Council of the Russian Federation visited JSC “Aleksinsky Experimental Mechanical Plant” to inspect weapons production, and the company hosted a meeting of the working group of the Military-Industrial Commission of the Russian Federation. The recognition of JSC “Aleksinsky Experimental Mechanical Plant” and the involvement of the Russian Government demonstrate its strategic importance in the Russian defence sector.

Therefore, JSC “Aleksinsky Experimental Mechanical Plant” is supporting materially actions which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. In addition, JSC “Aleksinsky Experimental Mechanical Plant” is forming part of Russia’s military and industrial complex.

19.7.2025 607. Joint Stock Company “State Ryazan Instrument Plant”

Russian: Акционерное Общество “Государственный Рязанский приборный завод”

a.k.a. JSC “State Ryazan Instrument Plant”

a.k.a. JSC “GRPZ”

a.k.a. АО “ГРПЗ”

Address: 32 Seminarskaya Str., 390000, Ryazan, Russian Federation

Type of entity: Joint Stock Company

Place of registration: Russian Federation

Registration number: 1116234013598

Date of registration: 20.12.2011

Tax Identification Number: 6234098539

JSC “State Ryazan Instrument Plant” is the largest Russian enterprise for serial production and support of radar systems and communications equipment.

The company’s main sphere of activity is the manufacture of radar, radio navigation equipment and remote-control radio equipment, which is used in fighter jets such as MiG-29, Su-27, Su-30, Su-35 and fifth-generation fighter jet Su-57 (T-50) and in helicopters such as Mi 8, Mi 17, Mi-35 and Mi-28N. JSC “State Ryazan Instrument Plant” also has an active State licence that allows it to provide maintenance and servicing of weapons and military equipment.

Therefore, JSC “State Ryazan Instrument Plant” is supporting materially actions which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Moreover, as a military equipment supplier to armed forces of the Russian Federation, JSC “State Ryazan Instrument Plant” is supporting Russia’s military and industrial complex.

19.7.2025 608. Joint Stock Company “NPO Stekloplastik named after N.N. Trofimov”

Russian: Акционерное Общество “НПО Стеклопластик имени Н.Н. Трофимова”

a.k.a. JSC “NPO Stekloplastik named after N.N. Trofimov”

a.k.a. NPO Stekloplastik

Address: 141551, Moscow region, Solnechnogorsk urban district, Andreevka urban settlement, building 3A/4, Russian Federation

Type of entity: Joint Stock Company

Place of registration: Russian Federation

Date of registration: 30.12.1992

Registration number: 1035008852097

Tax Identification Number: 5044000039

KPP: 504401001

JSC “NPO Stekloplastik named after N.N. Trofimov” is the largest scientific and production centre in Russia dedicated to creating glass fibre materials and their composites.

In the first three quarters of 2024, JSC “NPO Stekloplastik named after N.N. Trofimov” supplied its products directly to the Iskander production facilities, including to plants assembling the Iskander missiles, to the developer of the Iskander missile, and to a plant that manufactures solid rocket engines. In addition, the company supplied products to multiple other enterprises of the military and industrial complex of the Russian Federation that are subject to restrictive measures.

Since 2021, the company has had a steady increase in total revenue, indicating that it is actively involved in Russia’s war-time economy.

Therefore, JSC “NPO Stekloplastik named after N.N. Trofimov” is supporting materially actions which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

19.7.2025 609. Limited Liability Company “Open Systems Development Technology”

Russian: Общество с ограниченной ответственностью “Технология Pазвития Открытых Систем”

a.k.a. LLC “Open Systems Development Technology”

a.k.a. LLC “TROS”

a.k.a. OOO “T.P.O.C.”

a.k.a. LLC “T.R.O.S”

Address: 105082, Russian Federation, Moscow, Bolshaya Pochtovaya Street., 26 “B”, bldg. 1, room 401

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company

Place of registration: Russian Federation

Date of registration: 6.12.2014

Registration number: 5147746464256

Principal place of business: Russian Federation

Tax Identification Number: 7706818288

KPP: 770101001

LLC “Open Systems Development Technology” is a Russia-based entity that supplies metalworking equipment. Since the imposition of Union restrictive measures prohibiting the export of lathes to Russia, LLC “Open Systems Development Technology” is actively involved in circumventing such restrictive measures by acting as the Russia-based recipient of illegally exported lathes. An import scheme organised by Sergey Ushko, Director of LLC “Open Systems Development Technology”, supplies machine tools (including lathes) of Union origin to Russia. Therefore, LLC “Open Systems Development Technology” is an entity circumventing Union restrictive measures by activities which have the aim or result of frustrating the provisions of Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. 19.7.2025 610. Limited Liability Company “Inroel”

Russian: Общество с ограниченной ответственностью “Инроел”

a.k.a. LLC “INROEL”

Address: St. Petersburg, Arsenalnaya st., building 4, Russian Federation

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company

Place of registration: Russian Federation

Date of registration: 5.8.2021

Registration number: 1217800120724

Tax Identification Number: 7811763398

LLC “Inroel” provides metal processing services to companies in the Russian defence sector, including several companies who have been subject to Union restrictive measures for manufacturing weapons systems used by the Russian Armed Forces in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Customers of LLC “Inroel” include JSC Concern VKO Almaz-Antey, JSC “Equality”, LLC “Special Technology Center”, JSC “Radio Engineering Equipment Plant”, JSC Concern “Granit-Electron” and JSC “Plant named after A.A. Kulakov”. The main website of LLC “Inroel” also identifies the defence industry complex as one of the sectors placing orders with the company.

Therefore, LLC “Inroel” is supporting materially Russia’s military and industrial complex.

19.7.2025 611. Public Joint Stock Company “Yakutsk Fuel and Energy Company”

Russian: Публичное Акционерное Общество “Якутская Топливно-Энергетическая Компания”

a.k.a. PJSC “Yakutsk Fuel and Energy Company”

Address: 678214, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Vilyuysky U., P. Kysyl-SYR, Lenin Str. 4, Russian Federation

Type of entity: Public Joint Stock Company

Place of registration: Russian Federation

Date of registration: 20.11.2002 / 16.5.1964

Registration number: 1021401062187

Tax Identificiation Number: 1435032049

KPP: 141001001

PJSC “Yakutsk Fuel and Energy Company” is a Russian company active in the field of energy production and exploration with a particular focus on natural gas (LNG). It operates the future Yaktuia LNG Project. PJSC “Yakutsk Fuel and Energy Company” is also included in the list of strategically important enterprises of the Russian Federation in the fuel and energy complex.

PJSC “Yakutsk Fuel and Energy Company” is therefore involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.

19.7.2025 612. Shandong ODES Industry Co. Ltd.

Chinese: 山东奥德斯工业股份有限公司

Address: Zibo Comprehensive Bonded Zone North District Cotton 4-8# (post code 250000), People’s Republic of China

Address: Warehouse No. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, Zibo Bonded Logistics Park, Zibo High-tech Industrial Development Zone, Shandong Province (post code 255086), People’s Republic of China

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company

Place of Registration: People’s Republic of China

Date of registration: 7.11.2007

Unified social credit code: 91370303MA3ERW0G0M

Import and export enterprise code: 3700MA3ERW0G0

Shandong ODES Industry Co. Ltd. is a Chinese company manufacturing and selling all-terrain vehicles (ATVs). After the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the company started to supply the Russian Armed Forces with ATVs, which have been used for military operations in Ukraine.

Therefore, Shandong ODES Industry Co. Ltd. is supporting actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

19.7.2025 613. Limited Liability Company “Ulyanovsk Machine Tool Plant”

Russian: Общество с ограниченной ответственностью “Ульяновский станкостроительный завод”

a.k.a. LLC “Ulyanovsk Machine Tool Plant”

Address: 432072, Ulyanovsk Region, G Ulyanovsk, General-Leutenant Badanova Street, Building 1, Russian Federation

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company

Place of Registration: Russian Federation

Date of Registration: 4.6.2012

Registration Number: 1127325003706

Tax Identification Number: 7325113708

LLC “Ulyanovsk Machine Tool Plant” is a Russian company specialising in the production of Computer Numerical Control machine tools and therefore active in an important field for Russia’s military and industrial complex. The company was previously owned by the German companies Gildemeister Beteiligungen GmbH and DMG Mori. In February 2024, LLC “Ulyanovsk Machine Tool Plant” was subject to an asset seizure ordered by decree of the President of the Russian Federation and transferred to the Russian Federal Agency for State Property Management (Rosimushchestvo).

Ownership and control of LLC “Ulyanovsk Machine Tool Plant” have therefore been compulsorily transferred by the Government of the Russian Federation to Rosimushchestvo without the consent of the Union entities which previously owned or controlled it.

19.7.2025 614. Wuhan Global Sensor Technology Co. Ltd

Chinese: 武汉高芯科技有限公司

a.k.a. GSTiR

Address: No. 6 Huanglongshan South Rd, Wuhan 430205, People’s Republic of China

Type of entitiy: Limited Liability Company

Place of Registration: People’s Republic of China

Date of registration: 28.4.2013

Unified Social Credit Code: 914201000668186736

Wuhan Global Sensor Technology Co. Ltd is a Chinese technology and electronics company. It delivers electronic military goods, such as infrared detectors and other optical components, to the Russian military and industrial complex, supporting the production of military goods for the Russian Armed Forces.

Therefore, Wuhan Global Sensor Technology Co. Ltd is supporting materially Russia’s military and industrial complex.

19.7.2025 615. Joint Stock Company Scientific and Production Enterprise “Military Technologies”

Russian: Акционерное общество Научно-Производственное Предприятие “Военные Технологии”

a.k.a. JSC NPP “Military Technologies”

a.k.a. АО НПП “Военные Технологии”

Address: Serdobolskaya street 65, Saint Petersburg, 197342, Russian Federation

Place of registration: Russian Federation

Date of registration: 30.3.2007

Registration number: 1077847228447

Tax Identification Number: 7813374541

JSC Scientific and Production Enterprise “Military Technologies” is a Russian defence enterprise that develops and manufactures high-tech and high-quality complex military-technical equipment, automated control systems and open-source software and decision support systems. The company, on the orders of the Russian Ministry of Defence, has developed the 1A50 Komandor-VT tablet artillery system, which was presented at the Army-2023 military technical forum. For that development, JSC Scientific and Production Enterprise “Military Technologies” used experience gained by its hardware and software being implemented in the frontline of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. In 2024, a batch of its portable tablets designed for preparation and control of artillery fire was sent to an artillery unit for testing in combat conditions.

Therefore, JSC Scientific and Production Enterprise “Military Technologies” is supporting materially actions which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Moreover, it is supporting materially and benefitting from the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine. JSC Scientific and Production Enterprise “Military Technologies” is also forming part of Russia’s military and industrial complex.

19.7.2025 616. Joint Stock Company Scientific and Production Association “POISK”

Russian: Акционерное общество “Научно-Производственное Объединение ‘ПОИСК’”

a.k.a. JSC Scientific and Production Association “POISK”

a.k.a. JSC NPO “POISK”

Address: 188662, Leningrad region, Vsevolozhsk district, Murino, Lesnaya street 3, Russian Federation

Type of entity: Joint Stock Company

Place of registration: Russian Federation

Date of registration: 11.12.2014

Registration number: 1144703004380

INN: 4703142849

JSC Scientific and Production Association “POISK” is a leading Russian manufacturer of weapons and ammunition as well as a leading entity for the development of mechanical, electromechanical and electronic multifunctional fuses for ammunition. It has well-established cooperation with some of the major Russian defence companies, such as Tekhmash, Air Defence Concern Almaz-Antey and Tactical Missile Weapons Corporation. In recent years, JSC Scientific and Production Association “POISK” has developed over 20 different types of fuse for all types of ammunition used by the Russian army in its war of aggression against Ukraine. Moreover, the company is the developer of the 9E133M safety and actuating mechanism for the 9M723 Iskander-M ballistic missiles.

Moreover, JSC Company Scientific and Production association “POISK” is part of JSC Technodinamika, an entity listed by the Union, which is part of the State Corporation Rostec.

Therefore, JSC Company Scientific and Production association “POISK” is supporting materially actions which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

JSC Company Scientific and Production association “POISK” is also supporting Russia’s military and industrial complex and the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine. It is further associated with JSC Technodinamika.

19.7.2025 617. Aqua Fleet Management Limited Liability Company

Azerbaijani: “Aqua Fleet Management” Məhdud Məsuliyyətli Cəmiyyəti

a.k.a. Aqua Fleet Management LLC

Address Apartment 25, Building 5, Sulh Street, Sumqayit, Azerbaijan

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company

Place of registration: Azerbaijan

Date of registration: 15.8.2024

IMO Number: 0052896

Tax Identification Number: 2907592941

Aqua Fleet Management LLC is a company registered in Azerbaijan, which manages a fleet of three vessels. The vessels in the company’s fleet are EDERRA (IMO: 9258026), SAURI (IMO: 9266475) and TEMIRO (IMO: 9209972), all of which are listed under Annex XVI to Decision 2014/512/CFSP. Aqua Fleet Management LLC is the ship manager and technical manager for all three vessels. All three vessels have transported crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33). As both the ship manager and technical manager of the vessels, Aqua Fleet Management LLC is therefore managing and operating vessels that transport crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33).

19.7.2025 618. Sapang Shipping Inc

Address: 12th Floor, Standard Chartered Tower, Bank Street, Cybercity, Ebene, Republic of Mauritius

Type of entity: Incorporated

Place of registration: Republic of Mauritius

Date of registration: 11.1.2024

Registration Number: C204177

IMO number: 6474841

Sapang Shipping Inc is a company registered in Mauritius and is the registered owner and ship manager of crude oil tanker ARGENT (formerly JAGUAR, IMO: 9293002). ARGENT is not registered with the International Group of Protection and Indemnity Clubs and therefore is sailing without a trusted liability cover. It is also the only vessel managed by Sapang Shipping Inc, which indicates that it operates under a non-transparent corporate governance policy. ARGENT has changed management companies and flag state multiple times in the last few years and has also sailed without a flag. It has also not verified its Automatic Identification Systems on multiple occasions. ARGENT is a vessel that has transported crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33). As both the registered owner and ship manager of the tanker, Sapang Shipping Inc is therefore managing and operating a vessel that transports crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33).

19.7.2025 619. Zhu Jiang Shipmanagement Co., Ltd

Address: RM.1801, EASEY COMM. BLDG., 253-261 Hennessy Road, Wan Chai, Hong Kong

Type of entity: Private Company Limited by shares

Place of registration: Hong Kong

Date of registration: 11.11.2024

Registration Number: 77314802

IMO: 0113880

Zhu Jiang Shipmanagement Co., Ltd is a company registered in Hong Kong and is the technical manager of crude oil tanker ARGENT (formerly JAGUAR, IMO: 9293002). ARGENT is not registered with the International Group of Protection and Indemnity Clubs and therefore is sailing without a trusted liability cover. It is also the only vessel managed by Zhu Jiang Shipmanagement Co., Ltd, which indicates that it operates under a non-transparent corporate governance policy. ARGENT has changed management companies and flag state multiple times in the last few years and has also sailed without a flag. It has also not verified its Automatic Identification Systems on multiple occasions. ARGENT is a vessel that has transported crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33). As the technical manager of the tanker, Zhu Jiang Shipmanagement Co., Ltd is therefore managing and operating a vessel that transports crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33).

19.7.2025 620. Redbird Corporate Services Ltd

Address: 3rd Floor, Standard Chartered Tower, Cybercity, Ebene 72201, Republic of Mauritius

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company

Place of registration: Republic of Mauritius

Date of registration: 27.10.2003

Registration number: C48211

Redbird Corporate Services Ltd is a company registered in Mauritius, which offers corporate and trust services in Mauritius. It is the registered agent of Sapang Shipping Inc, a company registered in Mauritius, which is the registered owner and ship manager of crude oil tanker ARGENT (formerly JAGUAR, IMO: 9293002). The role of the registered agent is to ensure compliance with local regulations and handle the administrative functions of the company. ARGENT is not registered with the International Group of Protection and Indemnity Clubs and therefore is sailing without a trusted liability cover. It is also the only vessel managed by Sapang Shipping Inc, which indicates that it operates under a non-transparent corporate governance policy. ARGENT has changed management companies and flag state multiple times in the last few years and has also sailed without a flag. It has also not verified its Automatic Identification Systems on multiple occasions. As the registered agent of the company, Redbird Corporate Services Ltd is therefore associated with Sapang Shipping Inc.

19.7.2025 621. Tarabya Logistics Ltd

Address: 154A/155A, Building N280, Al Taweelah, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company

Place of registration: United Arab Emirates

IMO number: 0108990

Tarabya Logistics Ltd is a UAE-based company which manages several vessels that have engaged in irregular and high-risk shipping practices, such as sailing with Automatic Identification Systems gaps and high-risk ship-to-ship transfers, while transporting oil originating in Russia or exported from Russia. Therefore, Tarabya Logistics Ltd is managing vessels that transport crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33).

19.7.2025 622. Limited Liability Company “Plant of Special Equipment”

Russian: Общество с Ограниченной Ответственностью “Завод Специального Оборудования”

a.k.a. LLC “Plant of Special Equipment”

a.k.a. OOO “ZSO”

Address: 142450, Moscow Region, Bogorodsky G., G. Staraya Kupavna, G Staraya Kupavna, Tup Maly, D. 3, Pomeshch. 74, Russian Federation

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company

Place of registration: Russian Federation

Date of registration: 23.9.2005

Registration number: 1057748342629

Tax Individual Number: 7722557040

LLC “Plant of Special Equipment” is a military-industrial company that provides products and services (such as repair of radio-electronic products) for companies, including Roscosmos and Rostec, involved in the production of missile systems, air defence and space defence systems, artillery weapons and armoured vehicles. The company holds a licence related to the use of information constituting a State secret, as well as licences for maintenance and servicing of weapons and military equipment issued by the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation. Therefore, LLC “Plant of Special Equipment” is supporting materially Russia’s military and industrial complex, including by being involved in the development, production or supply of military technology and equipment.

19.7.2025 623. Joint Stock Company “Research Institute of Modern Telecommunication Technologies”

Russian: Акционерное Общество “Научно-Исследовательский Институт Современных Телекоммуникационных Технологий”

a.k.a. JSC “Research Institute of Modern Telecommunication Technologies”

a.k.a. AO “NII STT”

a.k.a. АО “НИИ СТТ”

Address: 214012, Smolensk region, Smolensk, st. Novo-Leningradskaya, 10, Russian Federation

Type of entity: Joint Stock Company

Place of registration: Russian Federation

Date of registration: 26.12.2002

Registration number: 1026701461160

Tax Identification Number: 6730046954

JSC “Research Institute of Modern Telecommunication Technologies” specialises in the production of radio and television transmitting equipment. It also produces weapons and ammunition. The products of JSC “Research Institute of Modern Telecommunication Technologies” are used by Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular its unmanned aerial vehicle Merlin-VR.

Therefore, JSC “Research Institute of Modern Telecommunication Technologies” is supporting materially actions which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Moreover, it is supporting materially Russia’s military and industrial complex and the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.

19.7.2025 624. Monolink Group FZCO

Arabic: مجموعة مونولينك ش.م.ح

a.k.a. Axiom International

a.k.a. EKN Trading

Address: Office Number 001, Building A2, Dubai Silicon Oasis, DDP, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company

Place of registration: United Arab Emirates

Registration number: DSO-ZZCO-16068

Monolink Group FZCO is a Dubai-based entity that provides global logistics services. It supplies imported goods to Russian industry sectors, including the energy and extractives sectors. In addition, Monolink Group FZCO participates in Russia’s coal export schemes.

Furthermore, the Russian State-funded radio Sputnik continued to broadcast its content in the United States by paying for radio frequencies through Monolink Group FZCO.

Thus, Monolink Group FZCO is supporting and benefitting from the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.

19.7.2025 625. 2Rivers DMCC

a.k.a. 2Rivers

a.k.a. Coral Energy DMCC

Address: 3902-A Unit No.1 Platinum Tower, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Place of registration: Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Date of registration: 19.1.2018

2Rivers DMCC is a Dubai-based oil-trading company. Along with 2Rivers PTE Ltd, also owned by Vetus Investments, it forms the 2Rivers Group, previously known as Coral Energy. The 2Rivers Group enables shipments and export of Russian oil, notably from Rosneft, by concealing the actual origin of the oil. In particular, the 2Rivers Group controls a large proportion of the vessels in Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet”. The 2Rivers Group continues to operate the same network as Coral Energy, which includes associated entities such as Nord Axis and Bellatrix Energy, regardless of its change in name and ownership, as demonstrated by the connection between the previous owner and the new management. Furthermore, the energy sector, in particular the oil sector, is a sector providing substantial revenue to the Russian Government.

Therefore, 2Rivers DMCC is significantly frustrating the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, in particular Article 3m. It is also involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.

19.7.2025 626. 2Rivers PTE Ltd

a.k.a. 2Rivers

a.k.a. Coral Energy PTE Ltd

Address: 336 Smith Street, #04-304, New Bridge

Centre, Singapore 050336, Singapore

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company

Place of registration: Singapore

Date of registration: 11.12.2014

Registration number: 549300V3GQ2MCTQAIV68

2Rivers PTE Ltd is a Singapore-based oil-trading company. Along with 2Rivers DMCC, also owned by Vetus Investments, it forms the 2Rivers Group, previously known as Coral Energy. The 2Rivers Group enables shipments and export of Russian oil, notably from Rosneft, by concealing the actual origin of the oil. In particular, the 2Rivers Group controls a large proportion of the vessels in Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet”. The 2Rivers Group continues to operate the same network as Coral Energy, which includes associated entities such as Nord Axis and Bellatrix Energy, regardless of its change in name and ownership, as demonstrated by the connection between the previous owner and the new management. Furthermore, the energy sector, in particular the oil sector, is a sector providing substantial revenue to the Russian Government.

Therefore, 2Rivers PTE Ltd is significantly frustrating the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, in particular Article 3m. It is also involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.

19.7.2025 627. Limited Liability Company “Aeroscan”

Russian: Общество с Ограниченной Ответственностью “Аэроскан”

a.k.a. LLC “Aeroscan”

a.k.a. OOO “Аэроскан”

Address: 127055, Moscow, Perunovsky per. 3 building 2, floor 2 room 11, Russian Federation

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company

Place of registration: Russian Federation

Date of registration: 7.12.2017

Registration Number: 1175658025179

Tax Identification Number: 5603045794

LLC Aeroscan is a Russian commercial operator that provides services in the areas of aerial photography, video and thermal imaging monitoring and laser scanning for unmanned aerial systems. It also is part of the Zala Aero group of companies which specialises in the development and production of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), in particular Lancet loitering munitions and reconnaissance UAVs. Lancet loitering munitions and the Z-16 UAVs are actively used by the Russian army in its war of aggression against Ukraine. LLC Aeroscan also manufactures, in cooperation with Zala Aero Group, the new military reconnaissance, artillery fire and battlefield surveillance Zala Z-20 UAVs which are also used by the Russian army in its war of aggression against Ukraine.

Therefore, LLC Aeroscan is supporting materially actions which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Moreover, it is supporting materially Russia’s military and industrial complex and the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.

19.7.2025 628. Milavous Group Ltd

a.k.a. Milavous Group

a.k.a. Milavus Group

Address: ICD Brookfield Place, Trade Centre DIFC 37th Floor, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company

Place of registration: United Arab Emirates

Milavous Group Ltd is a Dubai-based shipping and commodity trading company, led by Hossein Shamkhani. He uses the company to blend crude oil along with various petroleum products from Russia and to rebrand for exporting purposes, thereby concealing their origin. Therefore, Milavous Group Ltd is involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine. Furthermore, Milavous Group Ltd is associated with Hossein Shamkhani.

19.7.2025 629. Admiral Group

a.k.a. Admiral Group Shipping Company

Address: 903B, Sama Tower, Sheikh Zayed Road, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company

Place of registration: United Arab Emirates

Date of registration: 2011

Admiral Group is a Dubai-based shipping company, led by Hossein Shamkhani. He uses the company to transport and sell Russian crude oil. Therefore, Admiral Group is involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine. Furthermore, Admiral Group is associated with its Director, Hossein Shamkhani.

19.7.2025 630. Twister Shipmanagement LLC-FZ

a.k.a. Starfish Ship Management LLC-FZ

Address: 6th Floor, Meydan Grandstand, Al Meydan Road, Nad Al Sheba, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company

Place of Registration United Arab Emirates

IMO number: 0024553

Twister Shipmanagement LLC-FZ is a Dubai-based company which manages oil tankers transporting crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33). Twister Shipmanagement LLC-FZ is therefore providing technical support to the operations of vessels that transport crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33).

19.7.2025 631. Joint Stock Company “Izhevsk Mechanical Plant”

Russian: Акционерное Общество “Ижевский механический завод”

a.k.a. JSC “Izhevsk Mechanical Plant”

a.k.a. JSC IMZ

Address: 8 Promyshlennaya str., Izhevsk, 426063, Udmurt Republic, Russian Federation

Type of entity: Joint Stock Company

Place of registration: Russian Federation

Date of registration: 17.12.2012

Registration number: 1121841007958

Tax Identification Number: 1841030037

JSC “Izhevsk Mechanical Plant” is one of the largest multi-profile manufacturers in Russia, and its primary products include combat weapons, components for missile systems, and high-precision castings. It produces weapons for the Russian Armed Forces operating in Ukraine. Therefore, JSC “Izhevsk Mechanical Plant” is supporting materially actions which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Furthermore, it is forming part of Russia’s military and industrial complex.

19.7.2025 632. Limited Liability Company “Volgotrans”

Oбщество с ограниченной ответственностью “Bолготранс”

a.k.a. LLC “Vogotrans”

a.k.a. ООО “Волготранс”

Address: Belorusskaya 132, Samara, Russian Federation

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company

Place of registration: Russian Federation

Date of registration: 30.9.2009

Registration number: 1096317003970

Principal place of business: Russian Federation

Tax Identification Number: 6317079434

LLC Volgotrans is a Russian company operating a fleet of several tankers and carrying out transportation of crude oil and oil products by sea, including for export purposes. The energy sector, especially oil, provides substantial revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. Therefore, LLC Volgotrans is an entity involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.

19.7.2025 633. Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Morozov Plant”

Russian: Федеральное Государственное Унитарное Предприятие “Завод Имени Морозова”

a.k.a. FSUE “Morozov Plant”

Address: 188679, Leningrad region, Vsevolozhsk district, urban settlement of Morozov, st. Chekalova 3, Russian Federation

Type of entity: Federal State Unitary Enterprise

Place of registration: Russian Federation

Date of registration: 25.2.2003

Registration number: 1034700561895

Tax Identification Number: 4703009607

FSUE “Morozov Plant” is a State enterprise involved in the production of ammunition and military equipment for the Russian Government. Therefore, FSUE “Morozov Plant” is forming part of Russia’s military and industrial complex.

19.7.2025 634. Joint Stock Company “Ploshchad”

Russian: Акционерное Общество “Площадь”

a.k.a. JSC “Ploshchad”

a.k.a. JSC “Square”

Adress: 109380, Moscow, Lyublino Municipal District, Chaginskaya st. 4, Building 13, Room 9/3, Russian Federation

Type of entity: Joint Stock Company

Place of registration: Russian Federation

Date of registration: 10.7.2023

Registration number: 1237700463032

Tax Identification Number: 9723203841

Website: https://areasystems.tech/

JSC “Ploshchad” is a Russian company specialised in the development and implementation of robotic systems which provides comprehensive solutions for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). It is involved, together with KB Microb, in the design and manufacture of the FPV, Microb and Microb-10 UAVs which are used by the Russian Armed Forces in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. JSC “Ploshchad” is, in particular, responsible for the development of the target acquisition system of those UAVs.

Following successful testing of those UAVs by the Russian Armed Forces in the second half of 2024, including in the conflict zone in Ukraine, more than 3 000  UAVs were delivered to the Russian army by January 2025. Therefore, JSC “Ploshchad” is forming part of Russia’s military and industrial complex by being involved in the development of military technology and equipment, and it is supporting materially actions that undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

19.7.2025 635. Limited Liability Company “Krafttek”

Russian: Общество с ограниченной ответственностью “Крафттек”

a.k.a. LLC “Krafttek”

a.k.a. LLC “Crafftech”

Address: 196006, St. Petersburg, Vn. Ter. G, Moskovskaya Zastava Municipal District, Moskovsky Avenue 120A, Building 1, Room 23-N, Russian Federation

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company

Place of registration: Russian Federation

Date of registration: 18.8.2015

Registration number: 1157847282603

Tax Identification Number: 7840038027

Website: https://crafttech.ru/

LLC “Krafttek” is a significant system integrator and software developer in Russia. The company is responsible for wholesale software trading, as well as for wholesale trade in computing equipment, telecommunications equipment and other office equipment. In 2024, public data showed that Russian military manufacturers were able to use western microchips for the production of military equipment. The tools and equipment needed to manufacture such microchips were imported by LLC “Krafttek” in circumvention of Union restrictive measures. Since the imposition of Union restrictive measures prohibiting the export of microchips and microchip-manufacturing equipment to Russia, LLC “Krafttek” has been actively involved in circumventing such restrictive measures through acting as the Russia-based recipient of illegally exported goods and technologies. Therefore, LLC “Krafttek” is an entity circumventing Union restrictive measures by activities which have the aim or result of frustrating the prohibitions of Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. Further, LLC “Krafttek”, by supplying Russian industry with components, is supporting the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.

19.7.2025 636. Intershipping Services Limited Liability Company

a.k.a. Intershipping Services LLC

Address: Al Shorafa Tower 2, Office no 1903, 19th Floor,

Sheikh Rashid Bin Humaid Al Nuaimi Street

Rashidiya 3, P.O Box: 4295, Ajman, United Arab Emirates

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company

Place of registration: United Arab Emirates

Intershipping Services LLC is an entity based in the UAE. It operates the Gabon international flag registry, which has been flagging vessels transporting Russian crude oil or petroleum products following the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including vessels controlled by Sovcomflot.

Through its owner’s family relations and its Indian office, registered as Intershipping Services Hub Private Limited, Intershipping Services LLC is also operating the Comoros international flag registry, which has been flagging vessels transporting Russian crude oil or petroleum products following the introduction of Western restrictive measures against Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet”.

Several vessels flagged through the Gabon and Comoros international flag registries have regularly engaged in high-risk shipping practices. Such practices include not maintaining adequate liability insurance, carrying out unsafe operations, intentionally taking measures to avoid ship detection such as switching off their Automatic Identification Systems or not operating under a transparent corporate governance policy that assures the welfare and safety of those on board and the protection of the marine environment.

Therefore, Intershipping Service LLC is providing support to the operations of vessels that transport crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33).

19.7.2025 637. Intershipping Services Hub Private Limited

a.k.a. Intershipping Services Hub Private Ltd.

Address: 302, 3rd Floor, Sushmore, Linking Road, Khar (W), Mumbai- 400052, Maharashtra, India

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company

Place of registration: India

Date of registration: 2.11.2018

Registration number: 316730

Corportate Identification Number: U74990MH2018PTC316730

Intershipping Services Hub Private Limited is an entity based in India, as the local branch of the UAE-based entity Intershipping Service LLC. Intershipping Service LLC is operating the Gabon international flag registry, which has been flagging vessels transporting Russian crude oil or petroleum products following the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including vessels controlled by Sovcomflot.

Intershipping Services Hub Private Limited is also operating the Comoros international flag registry, which has been flagging vessels transporting Russian crude oil or petroleum products following the introduction of Western restrictive measures against Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet”.

Several vessels flagged through the Gabon and Comoros international flag registries have regularly engaged in high-risk shipping practices. Such practices include not maintaining adequate liability insurance, carrying out unsafe operations, intentionally taking measures to avoid ship detection such as switching off their Automatic Identification Systems or not operating under a transparent corporate governance policy that ensures the welfare and safety of those on board and the protection of the marine environment.

Therefore, Intershipping Services Hub Private Limited is associated with Intershipping Service LLC and is providing support to the operations of vessels that transport crude oil or petroleum products, originating in Russia or exported from Russia, while practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33).

19.7.2025 638. Public Law Company “Territorial Development Fund”

Russian: Публично-правовая компания “Фонд развития территорий”

a.k.a. Territorial Development Fund

Address: Moscow, Yuzhnoportovy Municipal District, Sharikopodshipnikovskaya St. 2.5, Russian Federation

Type of entity: Public Law Company

Place of registration: Russian Federation

Date of registration: 20.10.2017

Registration number: 5177746100032

The Territorial Development Fund is a public law company operating under the Ministry of Construction of the Russian Federation and founded by the Government of the Russian Federation. In particular, the Territorial Development Fund manages the so-called free economic zone in the illegally occupied territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, which was created by the Government of the Russian Federation to grant benefits and privileges to companies that operate in those illegally occupied territories.

Therefore, the Territorial Development Fund is supporting materially actions which undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and stability and security in Ukraine.

19.7.2025 639. Nayara Energy Limited

Address: 5th Floor, Jet Airways Godrej BKC, Plot No. C-68 G Block, Bandra Kurla Complex, Bandra East, Mumbai – 400 051, Maharashtra, India

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company

Place of registration: India

Date of registration: 11.9.1989

Corporate Identification Number (CIN): U11100GJ1989PLC032116

Nayara Energy Limited is an entity established in India and operating an important refinery in Vadinar. That refinery is 49 % owned by the Russian State oil company Rosneft, and is a major refiner of Russian crude oil. The energy sector, in particular the oil sector, is a sector providing substantial revenue to the Russian Government.

Therefore, Nayara Energy is involved in an economic sector providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.

19.7.2025 640. ACE Electronic HK Co., Limited

a.k.a. ACE (HK) Electronics Technology Co., Ltd

Address: 18F Block B, World Trade Plaza, No. 9 Fuhong Road, Futian District, Shenzhen, People’s Republic of China

Other addresses: 9F International Technology Building No. 3007, Shennan Avenue, Futian District, Shenzhen, People’s Republic of China;

E2 Unit, 22/F Kingsway Industrial Building Phase II, 147-175 Wo Yi Hop Road, Kwai Chung, New Territories, Hong Kong;

E2 Unit, 22/F Kingsway Industrial Building Phase II, 167-175 Wo Yi Hop Road, Kwai Chung, New Territories, Hong Kong;

Room 1021, Bailey Commercial Centre, 87-105 Chatham Road South, Tsim Sha Tsui, Kowloon, Hong Kong;

Unit 04 7/F Bright Way Tower, No. 33 Mong Kok Road, Kowloon, Hong Kong

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company

Place of registration: Hong Kong

Business registration number: 69987857

Company registration number: 2756979

Website: www.ace-chip.com

ACE Electronic HK Co., Limited (“ACE Electronic”) is an entity registered in Hong Kong that supplies electronic components to Russian industries, including the military industry. Some of the company’s partners are military-industrial companies themselves, such as CJSC “NPF ‘Micran’”, which produces combat control systems. Other of the company’s partners, such as LLC NPK Fotonika, act as intermediaries supplying components to military-industrial companies. Due to the high consumption of military products, Russia’s military industry is dependent on imports of semiconductors and other electronic components. Since the imposition of Union restrictive measures prohibiting the export of various electronic components to Russia, ACE Electronic is actively involved in providing Russia-based recipients with electronic components, including semiconductor devices.

Therefore, ACE Electronic is an entity supporting materially Russia’s military and industrial complex, including by being involved in the development, production or supply of military technology and equipment.

19.7.2025 641. Bellatrix Energy Limited

a.k.a. Bellatrix Energy

a.k.a. BX Energy Ltd

Address: Unit 601, 6/F of Mill 5 of the Mills, 45 Pak Tin Par Street, Hong Kong

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company

Place of registration: Hong Kong

Buisness registration number: 72465672

Bellatrix Energy Limited is a Hong Kong-based company that is part of a network of companies that enables shipments and export of Russian oil, notably from Rosneft, organised around the 2Rivers Group, with shareholders sharing the same address in Dubai and contributing to laundering Russian oil through ship-to-ship transfers. Following the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022, Bellatrix Energy Limited has become an important trader of oil originating from major Russian companies. The energy sector, in particular the oil sector, is a sector providing substantial revenue to the Russian Government.

Therefore, Bellatrix Energy Limited is significantly frustrating the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, in particular Article 3m. It is also involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine. Bellatrix Energy is also associated with 2Rivers DMCC and 2Rivers PTE LTD.

19.7.2025’.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1473 of 18 July 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2020/1465 on a European Union action in support of the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism in Yemen

                                January 13, 2026                            

Official Journalof the European Union
ENL series

2025/1473
21.7.2025

(1)
On 18 September 2018, based on a request by the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM), the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2018/1249(1)on a European Union action in support of UNVIM.

(2)
On 12 October 2020, based on a request by UNVIM, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2020/1465(2)and renewed Union action in support of UNVIM.

(3)
On 28 September 2024, based on a request by UNVIM, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2024/2503(3)and renewed Union action in support of UNVIM for a period of 12 months, until 30 September 2025.

(4)
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2722 (2024) condemned the provision of arms and related materiel of all types to the Houthis, in violation of UNSCR 2216 (2015), and called for additional practical cooperation to prevent the Houthis from acquiring the materiel necessary to carry out further attacks.

(5)
UNSCR 2742 (2024) extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission to support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) in order to support the implementation of the agreement on the City of Hodeidah and the ports of Hodeidah, Saleef and Ras Issa set out in the Stockholm Agreement concluded on 13 December 2018 by the parties to the conflict in Yemen and endorsed by UNSCR 2451 (2018) and UNSCR 2452 (2019).

(6)
On 20 May 2025, the Council stated that the Union condemns arms proliferation benefiting the Houthis and other armed non-state groups, including terrorist-designated organisations such Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula (AQAP), in violation of international law, as well as the dramatic increase in the trafficking of weapons across Yemen, the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, which is jeopardising regional stability. The Council furthermore stated that the Union will continue supporting UNVIM, while calling for a reinforcement of its mandate in order to enhance its role and efficiency in the enforcement of the United Nations embargo under UNSCR 2216 (2015).

(7)
UNVIM requested further support from the Union for one year.

(8)
The Union should renew for one year its support to UNVIM for the implementation of its mandate.

(9)
A new financial reference amount should therefore be added to cover the period from 1 October 2025 until 30 September 2026.

(10)
Decision (CFSP) 2020/1465 should be amended accordingly,

(1)
in Article 3(1), the following indent is added:‘—EUR 2 200 000 for the period from 1 October 2025 until 30 September 2026.’;
‘—
EUR 2 200 000 for the period from 1 October 2025 until 30 September 2026.’

‘—
EUR 2 200 000 for the period from 1 October 2025 until 30 September 2026.’

‘—
EUR 2 200 000 for the period from 1 October 2025 until 30 September 2026.’

(2)
in Article 5, the third paragraph is replaced by the following:‘It shall expire on 30 September 2026.’.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union and in particular Article 28(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

(1) On 18 September 2018, based on a request by the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM), the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2018/1249 (1) on a European Union action in support of UNVIM.

(2) On 12 October 2020, based on a request by UNVIM, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2020/1465 (2) and renewed Union action in support of UNVIM.

(3) On 28 September 2024, based on a request by UNVIM, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2024/2503 (3) and renewed Union action in support of UNVIM for a period of 12 months, until 30 September 2025.

(4) United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2722 (2024) condemned the provision of arms and related materiel of all types to the Houthis, in violation of UNSCR 2216 (2015), and called for additional practical cooperation to prevent the Houthis from acquiring the materiel necessary to carry out further attacks.

(5) UNSCR 2742 (2024) extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission to support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) in order to support the implementation of the agreement on the City of Hodeidah and the ports of Hodeidah, Saleef and Ras Issa set out in the Stockholm Agreement concluded on 13 December 2018 by the parties to the conflict in Yemen and endorsed by UNSCR 2451 (2018) and UNSCR 2452 (2019).

(6) On 20 May 2025, the Council stated that the Union condemns arms proliferation benefiting the Houthis and other armed non-state groups, including terrorist-designated organisations such Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula (AQAP), in violation of international law, as well as the dramatic increase in the trafficking of weapons across Yemen, the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, which is jeopardising regional stability. The Council furthermore stated that the Union will continue supporting UNVIM, while calling for a reinforcement of its mandate in order to enhance its role and efficiency in the enforcement of the United Nations embargo under UNSCR 2216 (2015).

(7) UNVIM requested further support from the Union for one year.

(8) The Union should renew for one year its support to UNVIM for the implementation of its mandate.

(9) A new financial reference amount should therefore be added to cover the period from 1 October 2025 until 30 September 2026.

(10) Decision (CFSP) 2020/1465 should be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Decision (CFSP) 2020/1465 is amended as follows:
(1) in Article 3(1), the following indent is added:

‘—

EUR 2 200 000 for the period from 1 October 2025 until 30 September 2026.’

;

(2) in Article 5, the third paragraph is replaced by the following:

‘It shall expire on 30 September 2026.’.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

It shall apply from 1 October 2025.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1471 of 18 July 2025 amending Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine

                                January 13, 2026                            

Official Journalof the European Union
ENL series

2025/1471
19.7.2025

(1)
On 15 October 2012, the Council adopted Decision 2012/642/CFSP(1).

(2)
On 24 February 2022, the President of the Russian Federation announced a military operation in Ukraine and Russian armed forces began an attack on Ukraine, including from the territory of Belarus. That attack was a blatant violation of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

(3)
In its conclusions of 19 February 2024, the Council strongly condemned the continued support provided by the Belarusian regime to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and called on Belarus to refrain from such action and to abide by its international obligations.

(4)
In view of the gravity of the situation, and in response to Belarus’s continued involvement in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, it is appropriate to introduce additional restrictive measures.

(5)
In particular, it is appropriate to prohibit the procurement from Belarus of arms and related materiel of all types.

(6)
In order to strengthen the effectiveness of the restrictive measures imposed in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, it is necessary to address the risk of circumvention of those measures through indirect exports via third countries. Certain goods and technology might contribute to Belarus’s military and technological enhancement or to the development of its defence and security sector, including when exported under the guise of being intended for civilian end-use. The prohibition on indirect exports covers the export of items that are subject to restrictive measures, including via a third country. Competent authorities should take timely preventive action where there is a credible risk that such items exported to third countries might ultimately be diverted to Belarus. Therefore, it is appropriate to provide Member States with an optional administrative mechanism that enables national competent authorities to require prior authorisation for exports of items which might contribute to Belarus’s military and technological enhancement or to the development of its defence and security sector, to any third country, where the exporter has been informed that there is sufficient reason to suspect that the end destination of the items may be in Belarus or that the end-use of the items may be for Belarusian entities. This measure is not intended to impose a new blanket restriction, but to equip Member States with an effective and proportionate tool to investigate and prevent possible circumvention of restrictive measures, while ensuring a harmonised interpretation and legal clarity for exporters. The scope of the indirect export prohibition clause should not be affected by this measure. It is at the discretion of Member States to decide whether this measure or the indirect export prohibition clause is to be applied as a mechanism of enforcement in cases in which the end destination of the items may be in Belarus or the end-use of the items may be for Belarusian entities.

(7)
It is also appropriate to expand into a transaction ban, the existing prohibition to provide specialised financial messaging services to certain Belarusian credit institutions and their Belarusian subsidiaries, which are relevant for the Belarusian financial system, and which are already the subject of restrictive measures imposed by the Union. In addition, it is appropriate to add exemptions related to the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States or of partner countries in Belarus, and, to transactions made by nationals of a Member State who are residents in Belarus. It is also appropriate to add a derogation for transactions which are strictly necessary for the divestment from Belarus or for the wind-down of business activities in Belarus. It is recalled that Union restrictive measures do not have extra-territorial effect and do not bind operators incorporated under the laws of third countries, including those of Belarus. Therefore, transactions between legal persons, entities or bodies incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State and their subsidiaries in third countries do not qualify as a violation of this prohibition, including if credit or financial institutions subject to the ban are involved in such transactions. The exemptions and the derogation in Article 2y of Decision 2012/642/CFSP are without prejudice to the prohibition on operators in the Union to provide financial messaging services to the entities listed in Annex V.

(8)
In addition, it is appropriate to expand the list of items which might contribute to Belarus’s military and technological enhancement or to the development of its defence and security sector, by listing items which have been used by Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine and items which contribute to the development or production of Belarus’s military systems, including chemical precursors to energetic materials, spare parts for machine tools, additional computer numerical control (CNC) machines and constituent chemicals for propellants.

(9)
Moreover, it is appropriate to expand the list of goods subject to export restrictions which might contribute to the enhancement of Belarusian industrial capacities, such as machinery, chemicals, some metals and plastics. In order to minimise the risk of circumvention of restrictive measures, it is also appropriate to extend the list of goods and technology subject to the prohibition on transit via the territory of Belarus.

(10)
Member States should, with due respect for their applicable international obligations, not recognise or enforce any injunction, order, relief, judgment of a court other than a court of a Member State or other court, arbitral or administrative decision issued in proceedings other than those in the Member States pursuant to or derived from investor-State dispute settlement proceedings in connection with measures imposed under Decision 2012/642/CFSP. The effective implementation of the no claims clause should be regarded as the public policy of the Union and the Member States for the purposes of the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards or judicial or administrative decisions. As a result, the recognition or enforcement by Member States of an injunction, order, relief, judgment of a court other than a court of a Member State or other court, arbitral or administrative decision issued in proceedings other than those in the Member States pursuant to or derived from investor-State dispute settlement proceedings which could lead to the satisfaction of any claims in connection with measures imposed under Decision 2012/642/CFSP should be regarded as violating the public policy of the Union and the Member States. This provision should be without prejudice to the obligation of a Member State to participate and to defend itself in proceedings initiated against it and to ask for the recognition and enforcement of an award that grants it the reimbursement of costs.

(11)
While satisfaction of claims in connection with measures imposed under Decision 2012/642/CFSP is prohibited in the Union, including in out-of-court settlement proceedings, there is evidence to suggest that Belarusian persons, entities or bodies, or persons, entities or bodies acting through or on behalf of one of those Belarusian persons, entities or bodies, or owned or controlled by such persons, entities or bodies, seek or might seek to abusively initiate and pursue dispute settlement proceedings outside of the Union in connection with measures imposed under Decision 2012/642/CFSP, or seek or might seek to illegally obtain recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards granted through such abusive dispute settlement proceedings. It is therefore necessary to enable competent authorities or the Union, where applicable, to recover in proceedings before a court of a Member State any damages caused, including legal costs and costs incurred in the event of non-compliance with the arbitral award by the other party, from those persons, entities or bodies and from persons, entities or bodies that own or control those persons, entities or bodies, as a consequence of an investor-State dispute settlement in connection with measures imposed under Decision 2012/642/CFSP, provided that all available legal remedies in the relevant jurisdiction have been exercised. Competent authorities should recover such damages in accordance with Union law and customary rules of international law.

(12)
Where Member States are confronted with arbitral awards rendered against them in investor-State dispute settlement proceedings in connection with measures imposed under Decision 2012/642/CFSP, they should invoke any objection available to them in domestic or foreign proceedings for the recognition and enforcement of such awards. This includes raising the objection that the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of the country where recognition and enforcement is sought, pursuant to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958.

(13)
The application of the forum necessitatis provision should be extended.

(14)
It is also appropriate to amend the title to Annex II, in order to include all the relevant provisions in which reference to that Annex is made.

(15)
Further action by the Union is needed in order to implement certain measures.

(16)
Decision 2012/642/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,

(1)
the following article is inserted:‘Article 1aa1.   It shall be prohibited to purchase, import or transfer, directly or indirectly, arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, into the Union if they originate in Belarus or are exported from Belarus.2.   The prohibitions in paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to the import, purchase or transfer related to:(a)the provision of spare parts and services necessary for the maintenance and safety of existing capabilities within the Union; or(b)the execution of contracts concluded before 20 July 2025, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.’;
(a)
the provision of spare parts and services necessary for the maintenance and safety of existing capabilities within the Union; or
(b)
the execution of contracts concluded before 20 July 2025, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.’

(a)
the provision of spare parts and services necessary for the maintenance and safety of existing capabilities within the Union; or

(b)
the execution of contracts concluded before 20 July 2025, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.’

(a)
the provision of spare parts and services necessary for the maintenance and safety of existing capabilities within the Union; or

(b)
the execution of contracts concluded before 20 July 2025, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.’

(2)
Article 1b is amended as follows:(a)the following paragraphs are inserted:‘3a.   The prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 3 shall not apply to the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods falling under CN codes 3204 11 , 3204 12 , 3204 13 , 3204 14 , 3204 15 , 3204 16 , 3204 17 , 3204 18 , 3204 19 , 3204 20 , 3506 10 , 3506 91 , 3907 10 , 3907 21 , 3907 30 , 3907 50 , 3907 61 , 3907 69 and 3907 99 , that is necessary for the execution until 21 October 2025 of contracts concluded before 20 July 2025, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.3b.   The prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 3 shall not apply to the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods falling under CN code 9032 89 that is necessary for the execution until 21 January 2026 of contracts concluded before 20 July 2025, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.’;(b)paragraph 13 is replaced by the following:‘13.   The competent authorities of the Member States may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the sale, supply, transfer or export of the following goods, or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, after having determined that such goods or the provision of related technical or financial assistance are necessary for personal household use of natural persons in Belarus:(a)goods falling under CN code 8417 20 ;(b)copper tubes, pipes and pipe fittings falling under CN codes 7411 or 7412 that have an internal diameter of up to 50 mm;(c)goods falling under CN code 8414 60 ;(d)goods falling under CN 3916 20 when strictly necessary for the sale of PVC flooring.’;
(a)
the following paragraphs are inserted:‘3a.   The prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 3 shall not apply to the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods falling under CN codes 3204 11 , 3204 12 , 3204 13 , 3204 14 , 3204 15 , 3204 16 , 3204 17 , 3204 18 , 3204 19 , 3204 20 , 3506 10 , 3506 91 , 3907 10 , 3907 21 , 3907 30 , 3907 50 , 3907 61 , 3907 69 and 3907 99 , that is necessary for the execution until 21 October 2025 of contracts concluded before 20 July 2025, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.3b.   The prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 3 shall not apply to the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods falling under CN code 9032 89 that is necessary for the execution until 21 January 2026 of contracts concluded before 20 July 2025, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.’;
(b)
paragraph 13 is replaced by the following:‘13.   The competent authorities of the Member States may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the sale, supply, transfer or export of the following goods, or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, after having determined that such goods or the provision of related technical or financial assistance are necessary for personal household use of natural persons in Belarus:(a)goods falling under CN code 8417 20 ;(b)copper tubes, pipes and pipe fittings falling under CN codes 7411 or 7412 that have an internal diameter of up to 50 mm;(c)goods falling under CN code 8414 60 ;(d)goods falling under CN 3916 20 when strictly necessary for the sale of PVC flooring.’;
(a)
goods falling under CN code 8417 20 ;
(b)
copper tubes, pipes and pipe fittings falling under CN codes 7411 or 7412 that have an internal diameter of up to 50 mm;
(c)
goods falling under CN code 8414 60 ;
(d)
goods falling under CN 3916 20 when strictly necessary for the sale of PVC flooring.’

(a)
the following paragraphs are inserted:‘3a.   The prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 3 shall not apply to the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods falling under CN codes 3204 11 , 3204 12 , 3204 13 , 3204 14 , 3204 15 , 3204 16 , 3204 17 , 3204 18 , 3204 19 , 3204 20 , 3506 10 , 3506 91 , 3907 10 , 3907 21 , 3907 30 , 3907 50 , 3907 61 , 3907 69 and 3907 99 , that is necessary for the execution until 21 October 2025 of contracts concluded before 20 July 2025, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.3b.   The prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 3 shall not apply to the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods falling under CN code 9032 89 that is necessary for the execution until 21 January 2026 of contracts concluded before 20 July 2025, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.’;

(b)
paragraph 13 is replaced by the following:‘13.   The competent authorities of the Member States may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the sale, supply, transfer or export of the following goods, or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, after having determined that such goods or the provision of related technical or financial assistance are necessary for personal household use of natural persons in Belarus:(a)goods falling under CN code 8417 20 ;(b)copper tubes, pipes and pipe fittings falling under CN codes 7411 or 7412 that have an internal diameter of up to 50 mm;(c)goods falling under CN code 8414 60 ;(d)goods falling under CN 3916 20 when strictly necessary for the sale of PVC flooring.’;
(a)
goods falling under CN code 8417 20 ;
(b)
copper tubes, pipes and pipe fittings falling under CN codes 7411 or 7412 that have an internal diameter of up to 50 mm;
(c)
goods falling under CN code 8414 60 ;
(d)
goods falling under CN 3916 20 when strictly necessary for the sale of PVC flooring.’

(a)
goods falling under CN code 8417 20 ;

(b)
copper tubes, pipes and pipe fittings falling under CN codes 7411 or 7412 that have an internal diameter of up to 50 mm;

(c)
goods falling under CN code 8414 60 ;

(d)
goods falling under CN 3916 20 when strictly necessary for the sale of PVC flooring.’

(a)
the following paragraphs are inserted:‘3a.   The prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 3 shall not apply to the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods falling under CN codes 3204 11 , 3204 12 , 3204 13 , 3204 14 , 3204 15 , 3204 16 , 3204 17 , 3204 18 , 3204 19 , 3204 20 , 3506 10 , 3506 91 , 3907 10 , 3907 21 , 3907 30 , 3907 50 , 3907 61 , 3907 69 and 3907 99 , that is necessary for the execution until 21 October 2025 of contracts concluded before 20 July 2025, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.3b.   The prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 3 shall not apply to the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods falling under CN code 9032 89 that is necessary for the execution until 21 January 2026 of contracts concluded before 20 July 2025, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.’;

(b)
paragraph 13 is replaced by the following:‘13.   The competent authorities of the Member States may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the sale, supply, transfer or export of the following goods, or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, after having determined that such goods or the provision of related technical or financial assistance are necessary for personal household use of natural persons in Belarus:(a)goods falling under CN code 8417 20 ;(b)copper tubes, pipes and pipe fittings falling under CN codes 7411 or 7412 that have an internal diameter of up to 50 mm;(c)goods falling under CN code 8414 60 ;(d)goods falling under CN 3916 20 when strictly necessary for the sale of PVC flooring.’;
(a)
goods falling under CN code 8417 20 ;
(b)
copper tubes, pipes and pipe fittings falling under CN codes 7411 or 7412 that have an internal diameter of up to 50 mm;
(c)
goods falling under CN code 8414 60 ;
(d)
goods falling under CN 3916 20 when strictly necessary for the sale of PVC flooring.’

(a)
goods falling under CN code 8417 20 ;

(b)
copper tubes, pipes and pipe fittings falling under CN codes 7411 or 7412 that have an internal diameter of up to 50 mm;

(c)
goods falling under CN code 8414 60 ;

(d)
goods falling under CN 3916 20 when strictly necessary for the sale of PVC flooring.’

(a)
goods falling under CN code 8417 20 ;

(b)
copper tubes, pipes and pipe fittings falling under CN codes 7411 or 7412 that have an internal diameter of up to 50 mm;

(c)
goods falling under CN code 8414 60 ;

(d)
goods falling under CN 3916 20 when strictly necessary for the sale of PVC flooring.’

(3)
Article 2d is amended as follows:(a)the following paragraph is inserted:‘1aa.   Without prejudice to the prohibition on indirect exports in paragraph 1 of this Article and Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2021/821, an authorisation shall be required for the export of goods and technology which might contribute to Belarus’s military and technological enhancement, or the development of the defence and security sector, to any third country other than Belarus, if the exporter has been informed by the competent authority of the Member State where the exporter is resident or established that the items in question are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus, or for use in Belarus.’;(b)the following paragraph is inserted:‘6a.   Where an authorisation is required in accordance with paragraph 1aa, the competent authorities shall proceed in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2021/821, which shall applymutatis mutandis.’;
(a)
the following paragraph is inserted:‘1aa.   Without prejudice to the prohibition on indirect exports in paragraph 1 of this Article and Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2021/821, an authorisation shall be required for the export of goods and technology which might contribute to Belarus’s military and technological enhancement, or the development of the defence and security sector, to any third country other than Belarus, if the exporter has been informed by the competent authority of the Member State where the exporter is resident or established that the items in question are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus, or for use in Belarus.’;
(b)
the following paragraph is inserted:‘6a.   Where an authorisation is required in accordance with paragraph 1aa, the competent authorities shall proceed in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2021/821, which shall applymutatis mutandis.’;

(a)
the following paragraph is inserted:‘1aa.   Without prejudice to the prohibition on indirect exports in paragraph 1 of this Article and Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2021/821, an authorisation shall be required for the export of goods and technology which might contribute to Belarus’s military and technological enhancement, or the development of the defence and security sector, to any third country other than Belarus, if the exporter has been informed by the competent authority of the Member State where the exporter is resident or established that the items in question are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus, or for use in Belarus.’;

(b)
the following paragraph is inserted:‘6a.   Where an authorisation is required in accordance with paragraph 1aa, the competent authorities shall proceed in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2021/821, which shall applymutatis mutandis.’;

(a)
the following paragraph is inserted:‘1aa.   Without prejudice to the prohibition on indirect exports in paragraph 1 of this Article and Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2021/821, an authorisation shall be required for the export of goods and technology which might contribute to Belarus’s military and technological enhancement, or the development of the defence and security sector, to any third country other than Belarus, if the exporter has been informed by the competent authority of the Member State where the exporter is resident or established that the items in question are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus, or for use in Belarus.’;

(b)
the following paragraph is inserted:‘6a.   Where an authorisation is required in accordance with paragraph 1aa, the competent authorities shall proceed in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2021/821, which shall applymutatis mutandis.’;

(4)
Article 2n is replaced by the following:‘Article 2n1.   No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Decision, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, notably a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:(a)designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I;(b)any natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Articles 2h, 2i, 2j or 2y, or listed in Annex II, III or V;(c)any other Belarussian person, entity or body, including the Belarusian government;(d)any person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (a), (b) or (c) of this paragraph.2.   No injunction, order, relief, judgment of a judicial court other than a court of a Member State or other court, arbitral or administrative decision issued in proceedings other than those in the Member States pursuant to or derived from investor-State dispute settlement proceedings against a Member State which could lead to the satisfaction of any claims in connection with measures imposed under this Decision shall be recognised, given effect or enforced in a Member State if it is invoked by any persons, entities or bodies referred to in paragraph 1, points (a), (b), (c) or (d), or persons, entities or bodies that own or control those persons, entities or bodies.3.   No request for assistance during an investigation or other proceedings, and no punishment or other penalty based on an injunction, order, relief, judgment of a court other than a court of a Member State or other court, arbitral or administrative decision issued in proceedings other than those in the Member States pursuant to or derived from investor-State dispute settlement proceedings against a Member State in connection with measures imposed under this Decision shall be recognised, given effect or enforced in a Member State if it is invoked by any persons, entities or bodies referred to in paragraph 1, points (a), (b), (c) or (d), or persons, entities or bodies that own or control those persons, entities or bodies.4.   In any proceedings for the enforcement of a claim, the onus of proving that satisfying the claim is not prohibited by paragraph 1 shall be on the person seeking the enforcement of that claim.5.   This Article is without prejudice to the right of the persons, entities and bodies referred to in paragraph 1 to judicial review of the legality of the non-performance of contractual obligations in accordance with this Decision.’;
(a)
designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I;
(b)
any natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Articles 2h, 2i, 2j or 2y, or listed in Annex II, III or V;
(c)
any other Belarussian person, entity or body, including the Belarusian government;
(d)
any person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (a), (b) or (c) of this paragraph.

(a)
designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I;

(b)
any natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Articles 2h, 2i, 2j or 2y, or listed in Annex II, III or V;

(c)
any other Belarussian person, entity or body, including the Belarusian government;

(d)
any person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (a), (b) or (c) of this paragraph.

(a)
designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I;

(b)
any natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Articles 2h, 2i, 2j or 2y, or listed in Annex II, III or V;

(c)
any other Belarussian person, entity or body, including the Belarusian government;

(d)
any person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (a), (b) or (c) of this paragraph.

(5)
the following articles are inserted:‘Article 2naAny Member State shall, where applicable, take any appropriate measures to recover or be entitled to recover, in judicial proceedings before the competent courts of a Member State, any direct or indirect damages, including legal costs, incurred by that Member State as a consequence of investor-State dispute settlement proceedings brought against a Member State in connection with measures imposed under this Decision. The Member State shall, where applicable, be entitled to recover such damages from any persons, entities or bodies referred to in Article 2n(1), points (a), (b), (c) or (d), which initiated, intervened or participated in the investor-State dispute settlement or which seek to enforce any award, decision or judgment related to the investor-State dispute settlement and persons, entities or bodies that own or control any of those persons, entities or bodies.Where applicable, the Union shall be entitled to recover any damages incurred by it under the same conditions.Article 2nbMember States shall raise any available objection to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards that were rendered against them in investor-State dispute settlement proceedings in connection with measures imposed under this Decision.’;

(6)
Article 2y is amended as follows:(a)paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:‘1.   It shall be prohibited to engage, directly or indirectly, in any transaction with legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex V or with any legal person, entity or body established in Belarus whose proprietary rights are directly or indirectly owned for more than 50 % by an entity listed in Annex V.’;(b)the following paragraphs are inserted:‘1a.   The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to transactions:(a)that are necessary for the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States or of partner countries in Belarus, including delegations, embassies and missions, or international organisations in Belarus enjoying immunities in accordance with international law; or(b)made by nationals of a Member State who are residents of Belarus and were so before 24 February 2022.1b.   By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, transactions which are strictly necessary for divestment from Belarus or the wind-down of business activities in Belarus.’;
(a)
paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:‘1.   It shall be prohibited to engage, directly or indirectly, in any transaction with legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex V or with any legal person, entity or body established in Belarus whose proprietary rights are directly or indirectly owned for more than 50 % by an entity listed in Annex V.’;
(b)
the following paragraphs are inserted:‘1a.   The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to transactions:(a)that are necessary for the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States or of partner countries in Belarus, including delegations, embassies and missions, or international organisations in Belarus enjoying immunities in accordance with international law; or(b)made by nationals of a Member State who are residents of Belarus and were so before 24 February 2022.1b.   By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, transactions which are strictly necessary for divestment from Belarus or the wind-down of business activities in Belarus.’;
(a)
that are necessary for the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States or of partner countries in Belarus, including delegations, embassies and missions, or international organisations in Belarus enjoying immunities in accordance with international law; or
(b)
made by nationals of a Member State who are residents of Belarus and were so before 24 February 2022.

(a)
paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:‘1.   It shall be prohibited to engage, directly or indirectly, in any transaction with legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex V or with any legal person, entity or body established in Belarus whose proprietary rights are directly or indirectly owned for more than 50 % by an entity listed in Annex V.’;

(b)
the following paragraphs are inserted:‘1a.   The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to transactions:(a)that are necessary for the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States or of partner countries in Belarus, including delegations, embassies and missions, or international organisations in Belarus enjoying immunities in accordance with international law; or(b)made by nationals of a Member State who are residents of Belarus and were so before 24 February 2022.1b.   By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, transactions which are strictly necessary for divestment from Belarus or the wind-down of business activities in Belarus.’;
(a)
that are necessary for the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States or of partner countries in Belarus, including delegations, embassies and missions, or international organisations in Belarus enjoying immunities in accordance with international law; or
(b)
made by nationals of a Member State who are residents of Belarus and were so before 24 February 2022.

(a)
that are necessary for the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States or of partner countries in Belarus, including delegations, embassies and missions, or international organisations in Belarus enjoying immunities in accordance with international law; or

(b)
made by nationals of a Member State who are residents of Belarus and were so before 24 February 2022.

(a)
paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:‘1.   It shall be prohibited to engage, directly or indirectly, in any transaction with legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex V or with any legal person, entity or body established in Belarus whose proprietary rights are directly or indirectly owned for more than 50 % by an entity listed in Annex V.’;

(b)
the following paragraphs are inserted:‘1a.   The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to transactions:(a)that are necessary for the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States or of partner countries in Belarus, including delegations, embassies and missions, or international organisations in Belarus enjoying immunities in accordance with international law; or(b)made by nationals of a Member State who are residents of Belarus and were so before 24 February 2022.1b.   By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, transactions which are strictly necessary for divestment from Belarus or the wind-down of business activities in Belarus.’;
(a)
that are necessary for the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States or of partner countries in Belarus, including delegations, embassies and missions, or international organisations in Belarus enjoying immunities in accordance with international law; or
(b)
made by nationals of a Member State who are residents of Belarus and were so before 24 February 2022.

(a)
that are necessary for the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States or of partner countries in Belarus, including delegations, embassies and missions, or international organisations in Belarus enjoying immunities in accordance with international law; or

(b)
made by nationals of a Member State who are residents of Belarus and were so before 24 February 2022.

(a)
that are necessary for the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States or of partner countries in Belarus, including delegations, embassies and missions, or international organisations in Belarus enjoying immunities in accordance with international law; or

(b)
made by nationals of a Member State who are residents of Belarus and were so before 24 February 2022.

(7)
Annex II is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union and in particular Article 29 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

(1) On 15 October 2012, the Council adopted Decision 2012/642/CFSP (1).

(2) On 24 February 2022, the President of the Russian Federation announced a military operation in Ukraine and Russian armed forces began an attack on Ukraine, including from the territory of Belarus. That attack was a blatant violation of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

(3) In its conclusions of 19 February 2024, the Council strongly condemned the continued support provided by the Belarusian regime to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and called on Belarus to refrain from such action and to abide by its international obligations.

(4) In view of the gravity of the situation, and in response to Belarus’s continued involvement in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, it is appropriate to introduce additional restrictive measures.

(5) In particular, it is appropriate to prohibit the procurement from Belarus of arms and related materiel of all types.

(6) In order to strengthen the effectiveness of the restrictive measures imposed in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, it is necessary to address the risk of circumvention of those measures through indirect exports via third countries. Certain goods and technology might contribute to Belarus’s military and technological enhancement or to the development of its defence and security sector, including when exported under the guise of being intended for civilian end-use. The prohibition on indirect exports covers the export of items that are subject to restrictive measures, including via a third country. Competent authorities should take timely preventive action where there is a credible risk that such items exported to third countries might ultimately be diverted to Belarus. Therefore, it is appropriate to provide Member States with an optional administrative mechanism that enables national competent authorities to require prior authorisation for exports of items which might contribute to Belarus’s military and technological enhancement or to the development of its defence and security sector, to any third country, where the exporter has been informed that there is sufficient reason to suspect that the end destination of the items may be in Belarus or that the end-use of the items may be for Belarusian entities. This measure is not intended to impose a new blanket restriction, but to equip Member States with an effective and proportionate tool to investigate and prevent possible circumvention of restrictive measures, while ensuring a harmonised interpretation and legal clarity for exporters. The scope of the indirect export prohibition clause should not be affected by this measure. It is at the discretion of Member States to decide whether this measure or the indirect export prohibition clause is to be applied as a mechanism of enforcement in cases in which the end destination of the items may be in Belarus or the end-use of the items may be for Belarusian entities.

(7) It is also appropriate to expand into a transaction ban, the existing prohibition to provide specialised financial messaging services to certain Belarusian credit institutions and their Belarusian subsidiaries, which are relevant for the Belarusian financial system, and which are already the subject of restrictive measures imposed by the Union. In addition, it is appropriate to add exemptions related to the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States or of partner countries in Belarus, and, to transactions made by nationals of a Member State who are residents in Belarus. It is also appropriate to add a derogation for transactions which are strictly necessary for the divestment from Belarus or for the wind-down of business activities in Belarus. It is recalled that Union restrictive measures do not have extra-territorial effect and do not bind operators incorporated under the laws of third countries, including those of Belarus. Therefore, transactions between legal persons, entities or bodies incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State and their subsidiaries in third countries do not qualify as a violation of this prohibition, including if credit or financial institutions subject to the ban are involved in such transactions. The exemptions and the derogation in Article 2y of Decision 2012/642/CFSP are without prejudice to the prohibition on operators in the Union to provide financial messaging services to the entities listed in Annex V.

(8) In addition, it is appropriate to expand the list of items which might contribute to Belarus’s military and technological enhancement or to the development of its defence and security sector, by listing items which have been used by Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine and items which contribute to the development or production of Belarus’s military systems, including chemical precursors to energetic materials, spare parts for machine tools, additional computer numerical control (CNC) machines and constituent chemicals for propellants.

(9) Moreover, it is appropriate to expand the list of goods subject to export restrictions which might contribute to the enhancement of Belarusian industrial capacities, such as machinery, chemicals, some metals and plastics. In order to minimise the risk of circumvention of restrictive measures, it is also appropriate to extend the list of goods and technology subject to the prohibition on transit via the territory of Belarus.

(10) Member States should, with due respect for their applicable international obligations, not recognise or enforce any injunction, order, relief, judgment of a court other than a court of a Member State or other court, arbitral or administrative decision issued in proceedings other than those in the Member States pursuant to or derived from investor-State dispute settlement proceedings in connection with measures imposed under Decision 2012/642/CFSP. The effective implementation of the no claims clause should be regarded as the public policy of the Union and the Member States for the purposes of the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards or judicial or administrative decisions. As a result, the recognition or enforcement by Member States of an injunction, order, relief, judgment of a court other than a court of a Member State or other court, arbitral or administrative decision issued in proceedings other than those in the Member States pursuant to or derived from investor-State dispute settlement proceedings which could lead to the satisfaction of any claims in connection with measures imposed under Decision 2012/642/CFSP should be regarded as violating the public policy of the Union and the Member States. This provision should be without prejudice to the obligation of a Member State to participate and to defend itself in proceedings initiated against it and to ask for the recognition and enforcement of an award that grants it the reimbursement of costs.

(11) While satisfaction of claims in connection with measures imposed under Decision 2012/642/CFSP is prohibited in the Union, including in out-of-court settlement proceedings, there is evidence to suggest that Belarusian persons, entities or bodies, or persons, entities or bodies acting through or on behalf of one of those Belarusian persons, entities or bodies, or owned or controlled by such persons, entities or bodies, seek or might seek to abusively initiate and pursue dispute settlement proceedings outside of the Union in connection with measures imposed under Decision 2012/642/CFSP, or seek or might seek to illegally obtain recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards granted through such abusive dispute settlement proceedings. It is therefore necessary to enable competent authorities or the Union, where applicable, to recover in proceedings before a court of a Member State any damages caused, including legal costs and costs incurred in the event of non-compliance with the arbitral award by the other party, from those persons, entities or bodies and from persons, entities or bodies that own or control those persons, entities or bodies, as a consequence of an investor-State dispute settlement in connection with measures imposed under Decision 2012/642/CFSP, provided that all available legal remedies in the relevant jurisdiction have been exercised. Competent authorities should recover such damages in accordance with Union law and customary rules of international law.

(12) Where Member States are confronted with arbitral awards rendered against them in investor-State dispute settlement proceedings in connection with measures imposed under Decision 2012/642/CFSP, they should invoke any objection available to them in domestic or foreign proceedings for the recognition and enforcement of such awards. This includes raising the objection that the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of the country where recognition and enforcement is sought, pursuant to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958.

(13) The application of the forum necessitatis provision should be extended.

(14) It is also appropriate to amend the title to Annex II, in order to include all the relevant provisions in which reference to that Annex is made.

(15) Further action by the Union is needed in order to implement certain measures.

(16) Decision 2012/642/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Decision 2012/642/CFSP is amended as follows:
(1) the following article is inserted:

‘Article 1aa 1.   It shall be prohibited to purchase, import or transfer, directly or indirectly, arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, into the Union if they originate in Belarus or are exported from Belarus. 2.   The prohibitions in paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to the import, purchase or transfer related to:

(a) the provision of spare parts and services necessary for the maintenance and safety of existing capabilities within the Union; or

(b) the execution of contracts concluded before 20 July 2025, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.’

;

(2) Article 1b is amended as follows:

(a) the following paragraphs are inserted:

‘3a.   The prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 3 shall not apply to the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods falling under CN codes 3204 11 , 3204 12 , 3204 13 , 3204 14 , 3204 15 , 3204 16 , 3204 17 , 3204 18 , 3204 19 , 3204 20 , 3506 10 , 3506 91 , 3907 10 , 3907 21 , 3907 30 , 3907 50 , 3907 61 , 3907 69  and 3907 99 , that is necessary for the execution until 21 October 2025 of contracts concluded before 20 July 2025, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.

3b.   The prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 3 shall not apply to the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods falling under CN code 9032 89  that is necessary for the execution until 21 January 2026 of contracts concluded before 20 July 2025, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.’

;

(b) paragraph 13 is replaced by the following:

‘13.   The competent authorities of the Member States may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the sale, supply, transfer or export of the following goods, or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, after having determined that such goods or the provision of related technical or financial assistance are necessary for personal household use of natural persons in Belarus:

(a) goods falling under CN code 8417 20 ;

(b) copper tubes, pipes and pipe fittings falling under CN codes 7411  or 7412  that have an internal diameter of up to 50 mm;

(c) goods falling under CN code 8414 60 ;

(d) goods falling under CN 3916 20  when strictly necessary for the sale of PVC flooring.’

;

(3) Article 2d is amended as follows:

(a) the following paragraph is inserted:

‘1aa.   Without prejudice to the prohibition on indirect exports in paragraph 1 of this Article and Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2021/821, an authorisation shall be required for the export of goods and technology which might contribute to Belarus’s military and technological enhancement, or the development of the defence and security sector, to any third country other than Belarus, if the exporter has been informed by the competent authority of the Member State where the exporter is resident or established that the items in question are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus, or for use in Belarus.’

;

(b) the following paragraph is inserted:

‘6a.   Where an authorisation is required in accordance with paragraph 1aa, the competent authorities shall proceed in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2021/821, which shall apply mutatis mutandis.’

;

(4) Article 2n is replaced by the following:

‘Article 2n 1.   No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Decision, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, notably a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:

(a) designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I;

(b) any natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Articles 2h, 2i, 2j or 2y, or listed in Annex II, III or V;

(c) any other Belarussian person, entity or body, including the Belarusian government;

(d) any person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (a), (b) or (c) of this paragraph. 2.   No injunction, order, relief, judgment of a judicial court other than a court of a Member State or other court, arbitral or administrative decision issued in proceedings other than those in the Member States pursuant to or derived from investor-State dispute settlement proceedings against a Member State which could lead to the satisfaction of any claims in connection with measures imposed under this Decision shall be recognised, given effect or enforced in a Member State if it is invoked by any persons, entities or bodies referred to in paragraph 1, points (a), (b), (c) or (d), or persons, entities or bodies that own or control those persons, entities or bodies. 3.   No request for assistance during an investigation or other proceedings, and no punishment or other penalty based on an injunction, order, relief, judgment of a court other than a court of a Member State or other court, arbitral or administrative decision issued in proceedings other than those in the Member States pursuant to or derived from investor-State dispute settlement proceedings against a Member State in connection with measures imposed under this Decision shall be recognised, given effect or enforced in a Member State if it is invoked by any persons, entities or bodies referred to in paragraph 1, points (a), (b), (c) or (d), or persons, entities or bodies that own or control those persons, entities or bodies. 4.   In any proceedings for the enforcement of a claim, the onus of proving that satisfying the claim is not prohibited by paragraph 1 shall be on the person seeking the enforcement of that claim. 5.   This Article is without prejudice to the right of the persons, entities and bodies referred to in paragraph 1 to judicial review of the legality of the non-performance of contractual obligations in accordance with this Decision.’

;

(5) the following articles are inserted:

‘Article 2na

Any Member State shall, where applicable, take any appropriate measures to recover or be entitled to recover, in judicial proceedings before the competent courts of a Member State, any direct or indirect damages, including legal costs, incurred by that Member State as a consequence of investor-State dispute settlement proceedings brought against a Member State in connection with measures imposed under this Decision. The Member State shall, where applicable, be entitled to recover such damages from any persons, entities or bodies referred to in Article 2n(1), points (a), (b), (c) or (d), which initiated, intervened or participated in the investor-State dispute settlement or which seek to enforce any award, decision or judgment related to the investor-State dispute settlement and persons, entities or bodies that own or control any of those persons, entities or bodies.

Where applicable, the Union shall be entitled to recover any damages incurred by it under the same conditions.

Article 2nb

Member States shall raise any available objection to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards that were rendered against them in investor-State dispute settlement proceedings in connection with measures imposed under this Decision.’

;

(6) Article 2y is amended as follows:

(a) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘1.   It shall be prohibited to engage, directly or indirectly, in any transaction with legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex V or with any legal person, entity or body established in Belarus whose proprietary rights are directly or indirectly owned for more than 50 % by an entity listed in Annex V.’

;

(b) the following paragraphs are inserted:

‘1a.   The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to transactions:

(a) that are necessary for the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States or of partner countries in Belarus, including delegations, embassies and missions, or international organisations in Belarus enjoying immunities in accordance with international law; or

(b) made by nationals of a Member State who are residents of Belarus and were so before 24 February 2022. 1b.   By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, transactions which are strictly necessary for divestment from Belarus or the wind-down of business activities in Belarus.’

;

(7) Annex II is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
The title and heading of Annex II to Decision 2012/642/CFSP are replaced by the following:
                     ‘ANNEX II

LIST OF LEGAL PERSONS, ENTITIES OR BODIES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLES 2c(7), 2d(7) AND 2da’.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1464 of 17 July 2025 on the harmonised standard EN 60335-2-14:2006 on particular requirements for kitchen machines drafted in support of Directive 2014/35/EU of the European Parliament and the Council

                                January 13, 2026                            

Official Journalof the European Union
ENL series

2025/1464
18.7.2025

(1)
In accordance with Article 12 of Directive 2014/35/EU of the European Parliament and the Council(2), electrical equipment manufactured in conformity with a harmonised standard, the reference to which has been published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union, is to be presumed to comply with the essential health and safety requirements covered by such harmonised standard.

(2)
By letter M/511 of 8 November 2012, the Commission made a request to the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN), the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (Cenelec), and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) to provide the full list of the titles of harmonised standards and for the drafting, revision and the completion of harmonised standards, for electrical equipment designed for use within certain voltage limits in support of Directive 2014/35/EU (‘the request’).

(3)
On the basis of this request, CEN and Cenelec drafted harmonised standard EN 60335-2-14:2006, on particular requirements for kitchen machines, as amended by EN 60335-2-14:2006/A12:2016, EN 60335-2-14:2006/A11:2012, EN 60335-2-14:2006/A1:2008 and corrected by EN 60335-2-14:2006/AC:2007 and EN 60335-2-14:2006/A11:2012/AC:2016. The reference of the standard was last published in theOfficial Journal of the European Unionby Commission communication 2016/C 173/06(3).

(4)
On 15 December 2014, Germany raised a formal objection in accordance with Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 against harmonised standard EN 60335-2-14:2006, as amended by EN 60335-2-14:2006/A12:2016, EN 60335-2-14:2006/A11:2012, EN 60335-2-14:2006/A1:2008 and corrected by EN 60335-2-14:2006/AC:2007 and EN 60335-2-14:2006/A11:2012/AC:2016. Germany explained that the harmonised standard does not meet the safety objectives of points 1(d), 2(a) and 2(c) of Annex I to Directive 2006/95/EC, as the standard lays down inadequate provisions concerning the non-touchability of cutting blades in blenders (with the exception of hand-held blenders) when these are in operation. Germany argued that the test probe, which is used according to the standard, to assess the accessibility of a mixer’s cutting blades, is not based on the dimensions of the human body or anthropometric data.

(5)
On 26 February 2014, Directive 2014/35/EU was adopted, repealing Directive 2006/95/EC from 20 April 2016. Harmonised standards were first published under Directive 2014/35/EU by Commission communication 2016/C 249/03(4). The communication did not include a reference to harmonised standard EN 60335-2-14:2006, therefore there could no longer be a presumption of conformity with Directive 2014/35/EU.

(6)
On 12 August 2021, Germany submitted a subsequent update concerning the formal objection of 15 December 2014 against harmonised standard EN 60335-2-14:2006, as last amended by EN 60335-2-14/A2:2021, explaining that it still did not fully comply with the safety objectives of points 1(c), 2(a), 2(c) and 3(b) of Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU.

(7)
The formal objection was discussed in the Committee on Electrical Equipment in its meeting on 25 June 2024.

(8)
Having examined standard EN 60335-2-14:2006 as amended and corrected, together with Member States’ representatives of the Committee on Electrical Equipment, the Commission concluded that the harmonised standard fails to meet the safety objectives laid down in points 1(c), 2(a), 2(c) and 3(b) of Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU.

(9)
Taking into consideration the above, the reference to standard EN 60335-2-14:2006 ‘Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-14: Particular requirements for kitchen machines’ as amended by EN 60335-2-14:2006/A12:2016, EN 60335-2-14:2006/A11:2012, EN 60335-2-14:2006/A1:2008 and corrected by EN 60335-2-14:2006/AC:2007 and EN 60335-2-14:2006/A11:2012/AC:2016, should not be published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union,

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on European standardisation, amending Council Directives 89/686/EEC and 93/15/EEC and Directives 94/9/EC, 94/25/EC, 95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 98/34/EC, 2004/22/EC, 2007/23/EC, 2009/23/EC and 2009/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Decision 87/95/EEC and Decision No 1673/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (1), and in particular Article 11(1), point (a), thereof,

After consulting the committee established by Article 22(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012,

Whereas:

(1) In accordance with Article 12 of Directive 2014/35/EU of the European Parliament and the Council (2), electrical equipment manufactured in conformity with a harmonised standard, the reference to which has been published in the Official Journal of the European Union, is to be presumed to comply with the essential health and safety requirements covered by such harmonised standard.

(2) By letter M/511 of 8 November 2012, the Commission made a request to the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN), the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (Cenelec), and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) to provide the full list of the titles of harmonised standards and for the drafting, revision and the completion of harmonised standards, for electrical equipment designed for use within certain voltage limits in support of Directive 2014/35/EU (‘the request’).

(3) On the basis of this request, CEN and Cenelec drafted harmonised standard EN 60335-2-14:2006, on particular requirements for kitchen machines, as amended by EN 60335-2-14:2006/A12:2016, EN 60335-2-14:2006/A11:2012, EN 60335-2-14:2006/A1:2008 and corrected by EN 60335-2-14:2006/AC:2007 and EN 60335-2-14:2006/A11:2012/AC:2016. The reference of the standard was last published in the Official Journal of the European Union by Commission communication 2016/C 173/06 (3).

(4) On 15 December 2014, Germany raised a formal objection in accordance with Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 against harmonised standard EN 60335-2-14:2006, as amended by EN 60335-2-14:2006/A12:2016, EN 60335-2-14:2006/A11:2012, EN 60335-2-14:2006/A1:2008 and corrected by EN 60335-2-14:2006/AC:2007 and EN 60335-2-14:2006/A11:2012/AC:2016. Germany explained that the harmonised standard does not meet the safety objectives of points 1(d), 2(a) and 2(c) of Annex I to Directive 2006/95/EC, as the standard lays down inadequate provisions concerning the non-touchability of cutting blades in blenders (with the exception of hand-held blenders) when these are in operation. Germany argued that the test probe, which is used according to the standard, to assess the accessibility of a mixer’s cutting blades, is not based on the dimensions of the human body or anthropometric data.

(5) On 26 February 2014, Directive 2014/35/EU was adopted, repealing Directive 2006/95/EC from 20 April 2016. Harmonised standards were first published under Directive 2014/35/EU by Commission communication 2016/C 249/03 (4). The communication did not include a reference to harmonised standard EN 60335-2-14:2006, therefore there could no longer be a presumption of conformity with Directive 2014/35/EU.

(6) On 12 August 2021, Germany submitted a subsequent update concerning the formal objection of 15 December 2014 against harmonised standard EN 60335-2-14:2006, as last amended by EN 60335-2-14/A2:2021, explaining that it still did not fully comply with the safety objectives of points 1(c), 2(a), 2(c) and 3(b) of Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU.

(7) The formal objection was discussed in the Committee on Electrical Equipment in its meeting on 25 June 2024.

(8) Having examined standard EN 60335-2-14:2006 as amended and corrected, together with Member States’ representatives of the Committee on Electrical Equipment, the Commission concluded that the harmonised standard fails to meet the safety objectives laid down in points 1(c), 2(a), 2(c) and 3(b) of Annex I to Directive 2014/35/EU.

(9) Taking into consideration the above, the reference to standard EN 60335-2-14:2006 ‘Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-14: Particular requirements for kitchen machines’ as amended by EN 60335-2-14:2006/A12:2016, EN 60335-2-14:2006/A11:2012, EN 60335-2-14:2006/A1:2008 and corrected by EN 60335-2-14:2006/AC:2007 and EN 60335-2-14:2006/A11:2012/AC:2016, should not be published in the Official Journal of the European Union,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The Commission hereby decides not to publish the reference of the harmonised standard EN 60335-2-14:2006 ‘Household and similar electrical appliances – Safety – Part 2-14: Particular requirements for kitchen machines’ as amended by EN 60335-2-14:2006/A12:2016, EN 60335-2-14:2006/A11:2012, EN 60335-2-14:2006/A1:2008 and corrected by EN 60335-2-14:2006/AC:2007 and EN 60335-2-14:2006/A11:2012/AC:2016, in the Official Journal of the European Union.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2025/1461 of 18 July 2025 implementing Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine

                                January 13, 2026                            

Official Journalof the European Union
ENL series




2025/1461
19.7.2025



(1)
On 15 October 2012, the Council adopted Decision 2012/642/CFSP.



(2)
In view of the gravity of the situation, eight entities should be included in the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in Annex I to Decision 2012/642/CFSP.



(3)
In addition, it is appropriate to add a new entity to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in Annex II to Decision 2012/642/CFSP, which is the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictions with regard to authorisations for the sale, supply, transfer or export of dual-use goods and technology, and goods and technology which might contribute to Belarus’s military and technological enhancement, or to the development of its defence and security sector.



(4)
Annexes I and II to Decision 2012/642/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,



(1)
In Annex I, the following entries are added to the list set out in section ‘B. Legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in Article 4(1)’:NamesTranscription of Belarusian spelling Transcription of Russian spellingNames(Belarusian spelling) (Russian spelling)Identifying InformationReasons for listingDate of listing‘48.State-owned Foreign Trade Unitary Enterprise BelvneshpromserviceДзяржаўнае знешнегандлёвае ўнітарнае прадпрыемства БелзнешпрамсэрвісГосударственное внешнеторговое унитарное предприятие БелвнешпромсервисAddress: 2 Kazinets street, Minsk, 220099, BelarusDate of registration: 14.7.1992Tax identification number: 100128724Phone: + 375 17 272 07 08Fax: + 375 17 260 18 87Email: [email protected]:https://www.bvpservice.by/Associated individuals: Director General Aleksandr Yakovlevich AnischenkoState-owned Foreign Trade Unitary Enterprise Belvneshpromservice was established in order to promote Belarusian defence products in foreign markets. It specialises in the export of high-tech products for military purposes and has the right to upgrade, repair and supply military goods for the Belarusian Air Defence, Air Force and Land Forces. Therefore, State-owned Foreign Trade Unitary Enterprise Belvneshpromservice is supporting the military and industrial complex of Belarus.19.7.202549.OKB TSP Scientific Production Limited Liability CompanyНауково-виробниче товариство з обмеженою відповідальністю “ОКБ ТСП”Научно-производственное общество с ограниченной ответственностью “ОКБ ТСП”Address: Frantsiska Skoriny Street, building 1, unit 21, 220076 Minsk, BelarusDate of registration: 8.7.2002Tax identification number: 190369982Phone: + 375 17 311 05 69Email: [email protected]:https://sdc.okbtsp.comOKB TSP Scientific Production Limited Liability Company is a defence company involved in the development, production and design of weapons. It holds manufacturing and foreign trade licences issued by the State Authority for Military Industry of the Republic of Belarus. It produces equipment such as military vehicles and anti-aircraft systems. Therefore, OKB TSP Scientific Production Limited Liability Company is an entity forming part of the military and industrial complex of Belarus.19.7.202550.KB Unmanned Helicopters (UAVHeli)КБ Беспілотныя ВерталётыООО КБ Беспилотныйе вертолетыAddress: d. 47, korp. 14, ul. Yanki Mavra, Minsk, 220015, BelarusDate of registration: 27.4.2017Registration number: 192807396KB Unmanned Helicopters (UAVHeli) is a Belarusian company which produces aircraft and aircraft equipment. The company produces unmanned helicopters specifically equipped and designed to be used in a military context.Therefore, KB Unmanned Helicopters is an entity forming part of the military and industrial complex of Belarus, including by being involved in the development and production of military technology and equipment.19.7.202551.Legmash Plant OJSCa.k.a. ZAVOD SHVEINYKH MASHIN OAOa.k.a. OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE OBSCHESTVO BELORUSSKIY METALLURGICHESKIY ZAVODa.k.a. OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE OBSCHESTVO ZAVOD LEGMASHАдкрытае акцыянернае таварыства Завод “Легмаш”Address: Vostochny Lane, 17, Orsha, 211390, BelarusDate of registration: 6.5.1994Registration number: 300228934Phone: +375 216 42 00 91Website:https://legmash.by/Email: [email protected] Plant OJSC is a Belarusian plant which produces 152-mm and 122-mm shells for cannon artillery (including howitzers D-30, D-20, Msta-B, Giatsint-B, and the self-propelled modifications thereof). The facility also manufactures 122-mm unguided rockets of the 9M22U-1 line for the 9K51 Grad MLRS multiple rocket launcher. Therefore, Legmash Plant OJSC is an entity forming part of the military and industrial complex of Belarus.Legmash Plant OJSC receives extensive tax benefits, regulated by presidential legislation and the Belarusian Government. Therefore, Legmash Plant OJSC is also benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.19.7.202552.Research and Production Unitary Enterprise “Scientific and Technical Center ‘LEMT’ BelOMO”a.k.a. UP NTTS LEMT BELOMOНауково-виробниче унітарне підприємство “Науково-технічний центр ‘ЛЕМТ’ БєлОМО”Address: D. 23, korp. 1, Nezhiloe pomeshchenie, Makaenka street, Minsk, 220114, BelarusType of entity: State-Owned EnterprisePlace of registration: BelarusDate of registration: 26.05.1992Registration number: 100230590The Belarusian Scientific and Technical Center “LEMT” is owned by the state enterprise BelOMO. LEMT manufactures optical sights and systems for conventional weapons, laser rangefinders, distance measurement modules based on diode lasers, and laser fire control systems. LEMT sights are used in the AK-12 automatic rifles produced by Russia’s Kalashnikov. Therefore, LEMT forms a part of the military and industrial complex of Belarus, including by being involved in the development and production of military technology and equipment.19.7.202553.Laser Devices and Technologiesa.k.a. Laser Devices and Technologies Limited Liability CompanyОбщество с ограниченной ответственностью “Лазерные приборы и технологии”Таварыства з абмежаванай адказнасцю “Лазерныя прыборы і тэхналогіі”Address: Tsentralnaya Street, House 2, Room 116, Demidovichsky Village Council, Yutski Village, Dzerzhinsky District, Minsk Region, BelarusType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: BelarusDate of registration: 10.2.2017Registration number: 691827047Principal place of business: Minsk, BelarusLLC Laser Devices and Technologies, formerly known as LLC Laboratory of Additive Technologies, is a Belarusian company specialising in gaskets. It supplies components to military end-users such as Peleng and Uralvagonzavod. The company also provides parts for the production of panoramic sights (PKP) for Russian T-72 and T-90 tanks.Thus, LLC Laser Devices and Technologies provides components to Belarus’s military and industrial sectors, supporting the country’s military and technological advancements, as well as the development of its defence and security capabilities.19.7.202554.JSC Vistana.k.a. Open Joint Stock Company “VISTAN”Адкрытае акцыянернае таварыства “ВIСТАН”Открытое акционерное общество “ВИСТАН”Address: Dimitrova street, 36/7, 210627, Vitebsk, BelarusType of entity: Open Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: Vitebsk, BelarusDate of registration: 1.2.1994Registration number: 300029332Principal place of business: BelarusWebsite:https://vistan.ru/index.htmlE-mail: [email protected]@vistan.ruJSC Vistan is a Belarusian manufacturer of machine tools, including CNC machining centres, cylindrical grinders, centreless grinding machines, gear processing equipment, and lathes. These are dual-use technologies used in the production of military goods. JSC Vistan exports over 60 % of its products to Russia and supplies machine tools to Russian defence-related enterprises, including JSC “Krasny Oktyabr”. The company is part of a Belarus-Russia import-substitution program and is receiving US$15 000 000 in funding backed by Russian state financial support, to expand gear-processing machine production.Additionally, JSC Vistan has received Russian government funding for the development of strategic aviation projects, indicating its contribution to the Russian military-industrial complex. Therefore, JSC Vistan forms a part of the Belarusian military and industrial complex and contributes to the military and technological improvement of Belarus, and the development of its defence and security sector.19.7.202555.Rukhservomotor LLCa.k.a. OOO Ruchservomotora.k.a. TAA Ruchservamatora.k.a. OOO Rukhservomotora.k.a. Limited Liability Company “Rukhservomotor”TAA РухсерваматорOOO РухсервомоторAddress: 5 Montazhnikov Street, 220019, Minsk, BelarusType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: BelarusDate of registration: 24.2.2000Registration number: 800002497Principal place of business: Minsk, BelarusWebsite:https://eng.e-motors.tech/https://lasercut.by/Phone: + 375 17 390 54 47+375 17 390 30 76Fax: + 375 17 390 54 48Email: [email protected] LLC is a Belarusian company which focuses on the development and manufacturing of precision coordinate systems. It supplies companies which are military end-users with goods with military end-use. The company participates in the production of panoramic sights (PKP) for Russian T-72 and T-90 tanks.Therefore, Rukhservomotor LLC forms a part of the Belarusian military and industrial complex, and contributes to the military and technological improvement of Belarus, and the development of its defence and security sector.19.7.2025’

NamesTranscription of Belarusian spelling Transcription of Russian spelling
Names(Belarusian spelling) (Russian spelling)
Identifying Information
Reasons for listing
Date of listing
‘48.
State-owned Foreign Trade Unitary Enterprise Belvneshpromservice
Дзяржаўнае знешнегандлёвае ўнітарнае прадпрыемства БелзнешпрамсэрвісГосударственное внешнеторговое унитарное предприятие Белвнешпромсервис
Address: 2 Kazinets street, Minsk, 220099, BelarusDate of registration: 14.7.1992Tax identification number: 100128724Phone: + 375 17 272 07 08Fax: + 375 17 260 18 87Email: [email protected]:https://www.bvpservice.by/Associated individuals: Director General Aleksandr Yakovlevich Anischenko
State-owned Foreign Trade Unitary Enterprise Belvneshpromservice was established in order to promote Belarusian defence products in foreign markets. It specialises in the export of high-tech products for military purposes and has the right to upgrade, repair and supply military goods for the Belarusian Air Defence, Air Force and Land Forces. Therefore, State-owned Foreign Trade Unitary Enterprise Belvneshpromservice is supporting the military and industrial complex of Belarus.
19.7.2025
49.
OKB TSP Scientific Production Limited Liability Company
Науково-виробниче товариство з обмеженою відповідальністю “ОКБ ТСП”Научно-производственное общество с ограниченной ответственностью “ОКБ ТСП”
Address: Frantsiska Skoriny Street, building 1, unit 21, 220076 Minsk, BelarusDate of registration: 8.7.2002Tax identification number: 190369982Phone: + 375 17 311 05 69Email: [email protected]:https://sdc.okbtsp.com
OKB TSP Scientific Production Limited Liability Company is a defence company involved in the development, production and design of weapons. It holds manufacturing and foreign trade licences issued by the State Authority for Military Industry of the Republic of Belarus. It produces equipment such as military vehicles and anti-aircraft systems. Therefore, OKB TSP Scientific Production Limited Liability Company is an entity forming part of the military and industrial complex of Belarus.
19.7.2025
50.
KB Unmanned Helicopters (UAVHeli)
КБ Беспілотныя ВерталётыООО КБ Беспилотныйе вертолеты
Address: d. 47, korp. 14, ul. Yanki Mavra, Minsk, 220015, BelarusDate of registration: 27.4.2017Registration number: 192807396
KB Unmanned Helicopters (UAVHeli) is a Belarusian company which produces aircraft and aircraft equipment. The company produces unmanned helicopters specifically equipped and designed to be used in a military context.Therefore, KB Unmanned Helicopters is an entity forming part of the military and industrial complex of Belarus, including by being involved in the development and production of military technology and equipment.
19.7.2025
51.
Legmash Plant OJSCa.k.a. ZAVOD SHVEINYKH MASHIN OAOa.k.a. OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE OBSCHESTVO BELORUSSKIY METALLURGICHESKIY ZAVODa.k.a. OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE OBSCHESTVO ZAVOD LEGMASH
Адкрытае акцыянернае таварыства Завод “Легмаш”
Address: Vostochny Lane, 17, Orsha, 211390, BelarusDate of registration: 6.5.1994Registration number: 300228934Phone: +375 216 42 00 91Website:https://legmash.by/Email: [email protected]
Legmash Plant OJSC is a Belarusian plant which produces 152-mm and 122-mm shells for cannon artillery (including howitzers D-30, D-20, Msta-B, Giatsint-B, and the self-propelled modifications thereof). The facility also manufactures 122-mm unguided rockets of the 9M22U-1 line for the 9K51 Grad MLRS multiple rocket launcher. Therefore, Legmash Plant OJSC is an entity forming part of the military and industrial complex of Belarus.Legmash Plant OJSC receives extensive tax benefits, regulated by presidential legislation and the Belarusian Government. Therefore, Legmash Plant OJSC is also benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.
19.7.2025
52.
Research and Production Unitary Enterprise “Scientific and Technical Center ‘LEMT’ BelOMO”a.k.a. UP NTTS LEMT BELOMO
Науково-виробниче унітарне підприємство “Науково-технічний центр ‘ЛЕМТ’ БєлОМО”
Address: D. 23, korp. 1, Nezhiloe pomeshchenie, Makaenka street, Minsk, 220114, BelarusType of entity: State-Owned EnterprisePlace of registration: BelarusDate of registration: 26.05.1992Registration number: 100230590
The Belarusian Scientific and Technical Center “LEMT” is owned by the state enterprise BelOMO. LEMT manufactures optical sights and systems for conventional weapons, laser rangefinders, distance measurement modules based on diode lasers, and laser fire control systems. LEMT sights are used in the AK-12 automatic rifles produced by Russia’s Kalashnikov. Therefore, LEMT forms a part of the military and industrial complex of Belarus, including by being involved in the development and production of military technology and equipment.
19.7.2025
53.
Laser Devices and Technologiesa.k.a. Laser Devices and Technologies Limited Liability Company
Общество с ограниченной ответственностью “Лазерные приборы и технологии”Таварыства з абмежаванай адказнасцю “Лазерныя прыборы і тэхналогіі”
Address: Tsentralnaya Street, House 2, Room 116, Demidovichsky Village Council, Yutski Village, Dzerzhinsky District, Minsk Region, BelarusType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: BelarusDate of registration: 10.2.2017Registration number: 691827047Principal place of business: Minsk, Belarus
LLC Laser Devices and Technologies, formerly known as LLC Laboratory of Additive Technologies, is a Belarusian company specialising in gaskets. It supplies components to military end-users such as Peleng and Uralvagonzavod. The company also provides parts for the production of panoramic sights (PKP) for Russian T-72 and T-90 tanks.Thus, LLC Laser Devices and Technologies provides components to Belarus’s military and industrial sectors, supporting the country’s military and technological advancements, as well as the development of its defence and security capabilities.
19.7.2025
54.
JSC Vistana.k.a. Open Joint Stock Company “VISTAN”
Адкрытае акцыянернае таварыства “ВIСТАН”Открытое акционерное общество “ВИСТАН”
Address: Dimitrova street, 36/7, 210627, Vitebsk, BelarusType of entity: Open Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: Vitebsk, BelarusDate of registration: 1.2.1994Registration number: 300029332Principal place of business: BelarusWebsite:https://vistan.ru/index.htmlE-mail: [email protected]@vistan.ru
JSC Vistan is a Belarusian manufacturer of machine tools, including CNC machining centres, cylindrical grinders, centreless grinding machines, gear processing equipment, and lathes. These are dual-use technologies used in the production of military goods. JSC Vistan exports over 60 % of its products to Russia and supplies machine tools to Russian defence-related enterprises, including JSC “Krasny Oktyabr”. The company is part of a Belarus-Russia import-substitution program and is receiving US$15 000 000 in funding backed by Russian state financial support, to expand gear-processing machine production.Additionally, JSC Vistan has received Russian government funding for the development of strategic aviation projects, indicating its contribution to the Russian military-industrial complex. Therefore, JSC Vistan forms a part of the Belarusian military and industrial complex and contributes to the military and technological improvement of Belarus, and the development of its defence and security sector.
19.7.2025
55.
Rukhservomotor LLCa.k.a. OOO Ruchservomotora.k.a. TAA Ruchservamatora.k.a. OOO Rukhservomotora.k.a. Limited Liability Company “Rukhservomotor”
TAA РухсерваматорOOO Рухсервомотор
Address: 5 Montazhnikov Street, 220019, Minsk, BelarusType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: BelarusDate of registration: 24.2.2000Registration number: 800002497Principal place of business: Minsk, BelarusWebsite:https://eng.e-motors.tech/https://lasercut.by/Phone: + 375 17 390 54 47+375 17 390 30 76Fax: + 375 17 390 54 48Email: [email protected]
Rukhservomotor LLC is a Belarusian company which focuses on the development and manufacturing of precision coordinate systems. It supplies companies which are military end-users with goods with military end-use. The company participates in the production of panoramic sights (PKP) for Russian T-72 and T-90 tanks.Therefore, Rukhservomotor LLC forms a part of the Belarusian military and industrial complex, and contributes to the military and technological improvement of Belarus, and the development of its defence and security sector.
19.7.2025’


NamesTranscription of Belarusian spelling Transcription of Russian spelling
Names(Belarusian spelling) (Russian spelling)
Identifying Information
Reasons for listing
Date of listing

‘48.
State-owned Foreign Trade Unitary Enterprise Belvneshpromservice
Дзяржаўнае знешнегандлёвае ўнітарнае прадпрыемства БелзнешпрамсэрвісГосударственное внешнеторговое унитарное предприятие Белвнешпромсервис
Address: 2 Kazinets street, Minsk, 220099, BelarusDate of registration: 14.7.1992Tax identification number: 100128724Phone: + 375 17 272 07 08Fax: + 375 17 260 18 87Email: [email protected]:https://www.bvpservice.by/Associated individuals: Director General Aleksandr Yakovlevich Anischenko
State-owned Foreign Trade Unitary Enterprise Belvneshpromservice was established in order to promote Belarusian defence products in foreign markets. It specialises in the export of high-tech products for military purposes and has the right to upgrade, repair and supply military goods for the Belarusian Air Defence, Air Force and Land Forces. Therefore, State-owned Foreign Trade Unitary Enterprise Belvneshpromservice is supporting the military and industrial complex of Belarus.
19.7.2025

49.
OKB TSP Scientific Production Limited Liability Company
Науково-виробниче товариство з обмеженою відповідальністю “ОКБ ТСП”Научно-производственное общество с ограниченной ответственностью “ОКБ ТСП”
Address: Frantsiska Skoriny Street, building 1, unit 21, 220076 Minsk, BelarusDate of registration: 8.7.2002Tax identification number: 190369982Phone: + 375 17 311 05 69Email: [email protected]:https://sdc.okbtsp.com
OKB TSP Scientific Production Limited Liability Company is a defence company involved in the development, production and design of weapons. It holds manufacturing and foreign trade licences issued by the State Authority for Military Industry of the Republic of Belarus. It produces equipment such as military vehicles and anti-aircraft systems. Therefore, OKB TSP Scientific Production Limited Liability Company is an entity forming part of the military and industrial complex of Belarus.
19.7.2025

50.
KB Unmanned Helicopters (UAVHeli)
КБ Беспілотныя ВерталётыООО КБ Беспилотныйе вертолеты
Address: d. 47, korp. 14, ul. Yanki Mavra, Minsk, 220015, BelarusDate of registration: 27.4.2017Registration number: 192807396
KB Unmanned Helicopters (UAVHeli) is a Belarusian company which produces aircraft and aircraft equipment. The company produces unmanned helicopters specifically equipped and designed to be used in a military context.Therefore, KB Unmanned Helicopters is an entity forming part of the military and industrial complex of Belarus, including by being involved in the development and production of military technology and equipment.
19.7.2025

51.
Legmash Plant OJSCa.k.a. ZAVOD SHVEINYKH MASHIN OAOa.k.a. OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE OBSCHESTVO BELORUSSKIY METALLURGICHESKIY ZAVODa.k.a. OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE OBSCHESTVO ZAVOD LEGMASH
Адкрытае акцыянернае таварыства Завод “Легмаш”
Address: Vostochny Lane, 17, Orsha, 211390, BelarusDate of registration: 6.5.1994Registration number: 300228934Phone: +375 216 42 00 91Website:https://legmash.by/Email: [email protected]
Legmash Plant OJSC is a Belarusian plant which produces 152-mm and 122-mm shells for cannon artillery (including howitzers D-30, D-20, Msta-B, Giatsint-B, and the self-propelled modifications thereof). The facility also manufactures 122-mm unguided rockets of the 9M22U-1 line for the 9K51 Grad MLRS multiple rocket launcher. Therefore, Legmash Plant OJSC is an entity forming part of the military and industrial complex of Belarus.Legmash Plant OJSC receives extensive tax benefits, regulated by presidential legislation and the Belarusian Government. Therefore, Legmash Plant OJSC is also benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.
19.7.2025

52.
Research and Production Unitary Enterprise “Scientific and Technical Center ‘LEMT’ BelOMO”a.k.a. UP NTTS LEMT BELOMO
Науково-виробниче унітарне підприємство “Науково-технічний центр ‘ЛЕМТ’ БєлОМО”
Address: D. 23, korp. 1, Nezhiloe pomeshchenie, Makaenka street, Minsk, 220114, BelarusType of entity: State-Owned EnterprisePlace of registration: BelarusDate of registration: 26.05.1992Registration number: 100230590
The Belarusian Scientific and Technical Center “LEMT” is owned by the state enterprise BelOMO. LEMT manufactures optical sights and systems for conventional weapons, laser rangefinders, distance measurement modules based on diode lasers, and laser fire control systems. LEMT sights are used in the AK-12 automatic rifles produced by Russia’s Kalashnikov. Therefore, LEMT forms a part of the military and industrial complex of Belarus, including by being involved in the development and production of military technology and equipment.
19.7.2025

53.
Laser Devices and Technologiesa.k.a. Laser Devices and Technologies Limited Liability Company
Общество с ограниченной ответственностью “Лазерные приборы и технологии”Таварыства з абмежаванай адказнасцю “Лазерныя прыборы і тэхналогіі”
Address: Tsentralnaya Street, House 2, Room 116, Demidovichsky Village Council, Yutski Village, Dzerzhinsky District, Minsk Region, BelarusType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: BelarusDate of registration: 10.2.2017Registration number: 691827047Principal place of business: Minsk, Belarus
LLC Laser Devices and Technologies, formerly known as LLC Laboratory of Additive Technologies, is a Belarusian company specialising in gaskets. It supplies components to military end-users such as Peleng and Uralvagonzavod. The company also provides parts for the production of panoramic sights (PKP) for Russian T-72 and T-90 tanks.Thus, LLC Laser Devices and Technologies provides components to Belarus’s military and industrial sectors, supporting the country’s military and technological advancements, as well as the development of its defence and security capabilities.
19.7.2025

54.
JSC Vistana.k.a. Open Joint Stock Company “VISTAN”
Адкрытае акцыянернае таварыства “ВIСТАН”Открытое акционерное общество “ВИСТАН”
Address: Dimitrova street, 36/7, 210627, Vitebsk, BelarusType of entity: Open Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: Vitebsk, BelarusDate of registration: 1.2.1994Registration number: 300029332Principal place of business: BelarusWebsite:https://vistan.ru/index.htmlE-mail: [email protected]@vistan.ru
JSC Vistan is a Belarusian manufacturer of machine tools, including CNC machining centres, cylindrical grinders, centreless grinding machines, gear processing equipment, and lathes. These are dual-use technologies used in the production of military goods. JSC Vistan exports over 60 % of its products to Russia and supplies machine tools to Russian defence-related enterprises, including JSC “Krasny Oktyabr”. The company is part of a Belarus-Russia import-substitution program and is receiving US$15 000 000 in funding backed by Russian state financial support, to expand gear-processing machine production.Additionally, JSC Vistan has received Russian government funding for the development of strategic aviation projects, indicating its contribution to the Russian military-industrial complex. Therefore, JSC Vistan forms a part of the Belarusian military and industrial complex and contributes to the military and technological improvement of Belarus, and the development of its defence and security sector.
19.7.2025

55.
Rukhservomotor LLCa.k.a. OOO Ruchservomotora.k.a. TAA Ruchservamatora.k.a. OOO Rukhservomotora.k.a. Limited Liability Company “Rukhservomotor”
TAA РухсерваматорOOO Рухсервомотор
Address: 5 Montazhnikov Street, 220019, Minsk, BelarusType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: BelarusDate of registration: 24.2.2000Registration number: 800002497Principal place of business: Minsk, BelarusWebsite:https://eng.e-motors.tech/https://lasercut.by/Phone: + 375 17 390 54 47+375 17 390 30 76Fax: + 375 17 390 54 48Email: [email protected]
Rukhservomotor LLC is a Belarusian company which focuses on the development and manufacturing of precision coordinate systems. It supplies companies which are military end-users with goods with military end-use. The company participates in the production of panoramic sights (PKP) for Russian T-72 and T-90 tanks.Therefore, Rukhservomotor LLC forms a part of the Belarusian military and industrial complex, and contributes to the military and technological improvement of Belarus, and the development of its defence and security sector.
19.7.2025’




NamesTranscription of Belarusian spelling Transcription of Russian spelling
Names(Belarusian spelling) (Russian spelling)
Identifying Information
Reasons for listing
Date of listing

‘48.
State-owned Foreign Trade Unitary Enterprise Belvneshpromservice
Дзяржаўнае знешнегандлёвае ўнітарнае прадпрыемства БелзнешпрамсэрвісГосударственное внешнеторговое унитарное предприятие Белвнешпромсервис
Address: 2 Kazinets street, Minsk, 220099, BelarusDate of registration: 14.7.1992Tax identification number: 100128724Phone: + 375 17 272 07 08Fax: + 375 17 260 18 87Email: [email protected]:https://www.bvpservice.by/Associated individuals: Director General Aleksandr Yakovlevich Anischenko
State-owned Foreign Trade Unitary Enterprise Belvneshpromservice was established in order to promote Belarusian defence products in foreign markets. It specialises in the export of high-tech products for military purposes and has the right to upgrade, repair and supply military goods for the Belarusian Air Defence, Air Force and Land Forces. Therefore, State-owned Foreign Trade Unitary Enterprise Belvneshpromservice is supporting the military and industrial complex of Belarus.
19.7.2025

49.
OKB TSP Scientific Production Limited Liability Company
Науково-виробниче товариство з обмеженою відповідальністю “ОКБ ТСП”Научно-производственное общество с ограниченной ответственностью “ОКБ ТСП”
Address: Frantsiska Skoriny Street, building 1, unit 21, 220076 Minsk, BelarusDate of registration: 8.7.2002Tax identification number: 190369982Phone: + 375 17 311 05 69Email: [email protected]:https://sdc.okbtsp.com
OKB TSP Scientific Production Limited Liability Company is a defence company involved in the development, production and design of weapons. It holds manufacturing and foreign trade licences issued by the State Authority for Military Industry of the Republic of Belarus. It produces equipment such as military vehicles and anti-aircraft systems. Therefore, OKB TSP Scientific Production Limited Liability Company is an entity forming part of the military and industrial complex of Belarus.
19.7.2025

50.
KB Unmanned Helicopters (UAVHeli)
КБ Беспілотныя ВерталётыООО КБ Беспилотныйе вертолеты
Address: d. 47, korp. 14, ul. Yanki Mavra, Minsk, 220015, BelarusDate of registration: 27.4.2017Registration number: 192807396
KB Unmanned Helicopters (UAVHeli) is a Belarusian company which produces aircraft and aircraft equipment. The company produces unmanned helicopters specifically equipped and designed to be used in a military context.Therefore, KB Unmanned Helicopters is an entity forming part of the military and industrial complex of Belarus, including by being involved in the development and production of military technology and equipment.
19.7.2025

51.
Legmash Plant OJSCa.k.a. ZAVOD SHVEINYKH MASHIN OAOa.k.a. OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE OBSCHESTVO BELORUSSKIY METALLURGICHESKIY ZAVODa.k.a. OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE OBSCHESTVO ZAVOD LEGMASH
Адкрытае акцыянернае таварыства Завод “Легмаш”
Address: Vostochny Lane, 17, Orsha, 211390, BelarusDate of registration: 6.5.1994Registration number: 300228934Phone: +375 216 42 00 91Website:https://legmash.by/Email: [email protected]
Legmash Plant OJSC is a Belarusian plant which produces 152-mm and 122-mm shells for cannon artillery (including howitzers D-30, D-20, Msta-B, Giatsint-B, and the self-propelled modifications thereof). The facility also manufactures 122-mm unguided rockets of the 9M22U-1 line for the 9K51 Grad MLRS multiple rocket launcher. Therefore, Legmash Plant OJSC is an entity forming part of the military and industrial complex of Belarus.Legmash Plant OJSC receives extensive tax benefits, regulated by presidential legislation and the Belarusian Government. Therefore, Legmash Plant OJSC is also benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.
19.7.2025

52.
Research and Production Unitary Enterprise “Scientific and Technical Center ‘LEMT’ BelOMO”a.k.a. UP NTTS LEMT BELOMO
Науково-виробниче унітарне підприємство “Науково-технічний центр ‘ЛЕМТ’ БєлОМО”
Address: D. 23, korp. 1, Nezhiloe pomeshchenie, Makaenka street, Minsk, 220114, BelarusType of entity: State-Owned EnterprisePlace of registration: BelarusDate of registration: 26.05.1992Registration number: 100230590
The Belarusian Scientific and Technical Center “LEMT” is owned by the state enterprise BelOMO. LEMT manufactures optical sights and systems for conventional weapons, laser rangefinders, distance measurement modules based on diode lasers, and laser fire control systems. LEMT sights are used in the AK-12 automatic rifles produced by Russia’s Kalashnikov. Therefore, LEMT forms a part of the military and industrial complex of Belarus, including by being involved in the development and production of military technology and equipment.
19.7.2025

53.
Laser Devices and Technologiesa.k.a. Laser Devices and Technologies Limited Liability Company
Общество с ограниченной ответственностью “Лазерные приборы и технологии”Таварыства з абмежаванай адказнасцю “Лазерныя прыборы і тэхналогіі”
Address: Tsentralnaya Street, House 2, Room 116, Demidovichsky Village Council, Yutski Village, Dzerzhinsky District, Minsk Region, BelarusType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: BelarusDate of registration: 10.2.2017Registration number: 691827047Principal place of business: Minsk, Belarus
LLC Laser Devices and Technologies, formerly known as LLC Laboratory of Additive Technologies, is a Belarusian company specialising in gaskets. It supplies components to military end-users such as Peleng and Uralvagonzavod. The company also provides parts for the production of panoramic sights (PKP) for Russian T-72 and T-90 tanks.Thus, LLC Laser Devices and Technologies provides components to Belarus’s military and industrial sectors, supporting the country’s military and technological advancements, as well as the development of its defence and security capabilities.
19.7.2025

54.
JSC Vistana.k.a. Open Joint Stock Company “VISTAN”
Адкрытае акцыянернае таварыства “ВIСТАН”Открытое акционерное общество “ВИСТАН”
Address: Dimitrova street, 36/7, 210627, Vitebsk, BelarusType of entity: Open Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: Vitebsk, BelarusDate of registration: 1.2.1994Registration number: 300029332Principal place of business: BelarusWebsite:https://vistan.ru/index.htmlE-mail: [email protected]@vistan.ru
JSC Vistan is a Belarusian manufacturer of machine tools, including CNC machining centres, cylindrical grinders, centreless grinding machines, gear processing equipment, and lathes. These are dual-use technologies used in the production of military goods. JSC Vistan exports over 60 % of its products to Russia and supplies machine tools to Russian defence-related enterprises, including JSC “Krasny Oktyabr”. The company is part of a Belarus-Russia import-substitution program and is receiving US$15 000 000 in funding backed by Russian state financial support, to expand gear-processing machine production.Additionally, JSC Vistan has received Russian government funding for the development of strategic aviation projects, indicating its contribution to the Russian military-industrial complex. Therefore, JSC Vistan forms a part of the Belarusian military and industrial complex and contributes to the military and technological improvement of Belarus, and the development of its defence and security sector.
19.7.2025

55.
Rukhservomotor LLCa.k.a. OOO Ruchservomotora.k.a. TAA Ruchservamatora.k.a. OOO Rukhservomotora.k.a. Limited Liability Company “Rukhservomotor”
TAA РухсерваматорOOO Рухсервомотор
Address: 5 Montazhnikov Street, 220019, Minsk, BelarusType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: BelarusDate of registration: 24.2.2000Registration number: 800002497Principal place of business: Minsk, BelarusWebsite:https://eng.e-motors.tech/https://lasercut.by/Phone: + 375 17 390 54 47+375 17 390 30 76Fax: + 375 17 390 54 48Email: [email protected]
Rukhservomotor LLC is a Belarusian company which focuses on the development and manufacturing of precision coordinate systems. It supplies companies which are military end-users with goods with military end-use. The company participates in the production of panoramic sights (PKP) for Russian T-72 and T-90 tanks.Therefore, Rukhservomotor LLC forms a part of the Belarusian military and industrial complex, and contributes to the military and technological improvement of Belarus, and the development of its defence and security sector.
19.7.2025’



(2)
in Annex II, the following entry is added:‘Legmash Plant OJSC’.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 31(2) thereof,

Having regard to Council Decision 2012/642/CFSP of 15 October 2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (1), and in particular Article 6(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

(1) On 15 October 2012, the Council adopted Decision 2012/642/CFSP.

(2) In view of the gravity of the situation, eight entities should be included in the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in Annex I to Decision 2012/642/CFSP.

(3) In addition, it is appropriate to add a new entity to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in Annex II to Decision 2012/642/CFSP, which is the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictions with regard to authorisations for the sale, supply, transfer or export of dual-use goods and technology, and goods and technology which might contribute to Belarus’s military and technological enhancement, or to the development of its defence and security sector.

(4) Annexes I and II to Decision 2012/642/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Annexes I and II to Decision 2012/642/CFSP are hereby amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union, with the exception of the amendments to Annex II to Decision 2012/642/CFSP, which shall enter into force on the day following that of the publication of this Decision in the Official Journal of the European Union.
The Annexes to Decision 2012/642/CFSP are amended as follows:
(1) In Annex I, the following entries are added to the list set out in section ‘B. Legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in Article 4(1)’:
Names

Transcription of Belarusian spelling Transcription of Russian spelling

Names

(Belarusian spelling) (Russian spelling)

Identifying Information

Reasons for listing

Date of listing

‘48. State-owned Foreign Trade Unitary Enterprise Belvneshpromservice

Дзяржаўнае знешнегандлёвае ўнітарнае прадпрыемства Белзнешпрамсэрвіс

Государственное внешнеторговое унитарное предприятие Белвнешпромсервис

Address: 2 Kazinets street, Minsk, 220099, Belarus

Date of registration: 14.7.1992

Tax identification number: 100128724

Phone: + 375 17 272 07 08

Fax: + 375 17 260 18 87

Email: [email protected]

Website: https://www.bvpservice.by/

Associated individuals: Director General Aleksandr Yakovlevich Anischenko

State-owned Foreign Trade Unitary Enterprise Belvneshpromservice was established in order to promote Belarusian defence products in foreign markets. It specialises in the export of high-tech products for military purposes and has the right to upgrade, repair and supply military goods for the Belarusian Air Defence, Air Force and Land Forces. Therefore, State-owned Foreign Trade Unitary Enterprise Belvneshpromservice is supporting the military and industrial complex of Belarus.

19.7.2025 49. OKB TSP Scientific Production Limited Liability Company

Науково-виробниче товариство з обмеженою відповідальністю “ОКБ ТСП”

Научно-производственное общество с ограниченной ответственностью “ОКБ ТСП”

Address: Frantsiska Skoriny Street, building 1, unit 21, 220076 Minsk, Belarus

Date of registration: 8.7.2002

Tax identification number: 190369982

Phone: + 375 17 311 05 69

Email: [email protected]

Website: https://sdc.okbtsp.com

OKB TSP Scientific Production Limited Liability Company is a defence company involved in the development, production and design of weapons. It holds manufacturing and foreign trade licences issued by the State Authority for Military Industry of the Republic of Belarus. It produces equipment such as military vehicles and anti-aircraft systems. Therefore, OKB TSP Scientific Production Limited Liability Company is an entity forming part of the military and industrial complex of Belarus.

19.7.2025 50. KB Unmanned Helicopters (UAVHeli)

КБ Беспілотныя Верталёты

ООО КБ Беспилотныйе вертолеты

Address: d. 47, korp. 14, ul. Yanki Mavra, Minsk, 220015, Belarus

Date of registration: 27.4.2017

Registration number: 192807396

KB Unmanned Helicopters (UAVHeli) is a Belarusian company which produces aircraft and aircraft equipment. The company produces unmanned helicopters specifically equipped and designed to be used in a military context.

Therefore, KB Unmanned Helicopters is an entity forming part of the military and industrial complex of Belarus, including by being involved in the development and production of military technology and equipment.

19.7.2025 51. Legmash Plant OJSC

a.k.a. ZAVOD SHVEINYKH MASHIN OAO

a.k.a. OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE OBSCHESTVO BELORUSSKIY METALLURGICHESKIY ZAVOD

a.k.a. OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE OBSCHESTVO ZAVOD LEGMASH

Адкрытае акцыянернае таварыства Завод “Легмаш”

Address: Vostochny Lane, 17, Orsha, 211390, Belarus

Date of registration: 6.5.1994

Registration number: 300228934

Phone: +375 216 42 00 91

Website: https://legmash.by/

Email: [email protected]

Legmash Plant OJSC is a Belarusian plant which produces 152-mm and 122-mm shells for cannon artillery (including howitzers D-30, D-20, Msta-B, Giatsint-B, and the self-propelled modifications thereof). The facility also manufactures 122-mm unguided rockets of the 9M22U-1 line for the 9K51 Grad MLRS multiple rocket launcher. Therefore, Legmash Plant OJSC is an entity forming part of the military and industrial complex of Belarus.

Legmash Plant OJSC receives extensive tax benefits, regulated by presidential legislation and the Belarusian Government. Therefore, Legmash Plant OJSC is also benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.

19.7.2025 52. Research and Production Unitary Enterprise “Scientific and Technical Center ‘LEMT’ BelOMO”

a.k.a. UP NTTS LEMT BELOMO

Науково-виробниче унітарне підприємство “Науково-технічний центр ‘ЛЕМТ’ БєлОМО”

Address: D. 23, korp. 1, Nezhiloe pomeshchenie, Makaenka street, Minsk, 220114, Belarus

Type of entity: State-Owned Enterprise

Place of registration: Belarus

Date of registration: 26.05.1992

Registration number: 100230590

The Belarusian Scientific and Technical Center “LEMT” is owned by the state enterprise BelOMO. LEMT manufactures optical sights and systems for conventional weapons, laser rangefinders, distance measurement modules based on diode lasers, and laser fire control systems. LEMT sights are used in the AK-12 automatic rifles produced by Russia’s Kalashnikov. Therefore, LEMT forms a part of the military and industrial complex of Belarus, including by being involved in the development and production of military technology and equipment.

19.7.2025 53. Laser Devices and Technologies

a.k.a. Laser Devices and Technologies Limited Liability Company

Общество с ограниченной ответственностью “Лазерные приборы и технологии”

Таварыства з абмежаванай адказнасцю “Лазерныя прыборы і тэхналогіі”

Address: Tsentralnaya Street, House 2, Room 116, Demidovichsky Village Council, Yutski Village, Dzerzhinsky District, Minsk Region, Belarus

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company

Place of registration: Belarus

Date of registration: 10.2.2017

Registration number: 691827047

Principal place of business: Minsk, Belarus

LLC Laser Devices and Technologies, formerly known as LLC Laboratory of Additive Technologies, is a Belarusian company specialising in gaskets. It supplies components to military end-users such as Peleng and Uralvagonzavod. The company also provides parts for the production of panoramic sights (PKP) for Russian T-72 and T-90 tanks.

Thus, LLC Laser Devices and Technologies provides components to Belarus’s military and industrial sectors, supporting the country’s military and technological advancements, as well as the development of its defence and security capabilities.

19.7.2025 54. JSC Vistan

a.k.a. Open Joint Stock Company “VISTAN”

Адкрытае акцыянернае таварыства “ВIСТАН”

Открытое акционерное общество “ВИСТАН”

Address: Dimitrova street, 36/7, 210627, Vitebsk, Belarus

Type of entity: Open Joint Stock Company

Place of registration: Vitebsk, Belarus

Date of registration: 1.2.1994

Registration number: 300029332

Principal place of business: Belarus

Website: https://vistan.ru/index.html

E-mail: [email protected]

[email protected]

JSC Vistan is a Belarusian manufacturer of machine tools, including CNC machining centres, cylindrical grinders, centreless grinding machines, gear processing equipment, and lathes. These are dual-use technologies used in the production of military goods. JSC Vistan exports over 60 % of its products to Russia and supplies machine tools to Russian defence-related enterprises, including JSC “Krasny Oktyabr”. The company is part of a Belarus-Russia import-substitution program and is receiving US$15 000 000  in funding backed by Russian state financial support, to expand gear-processing machine production.

Additionally, JSC Vistan has received Russian government funding for the development of strategic aviation projects, indicating its contribution to the Russian military-industrial complex. Therefore, JSC Vistan forms a part of the Belarusian military and industrial complex and contributes to the military and technological improvement of Belarus, and the development of its defence and security sector.

19.7.2025 55. Rukhservomotor LLC

a.k.a. OOO Ruchservomotor

a.k.a. TAA Ruchservamator

a.k.a. OOO Rukhservomotor

a.k.a. Limited Liability Company “Rukhservomotor”

TAA Рухсерваматор

OOO Рухсервомотор

Address: 5 Montazhnikov Street, 220019, Minsk, Belarus

Type of entity: Limited Liability Company

Place of registration: Belarus

Date of registration: 24.2.2000

Registration number: 800002497

Principal place of business: Minsk, Belarus

Website: https://eng.e-motors.tech/

https://lasercut.by/

Phone: + 375 17 390 54 47

+375 17 390 30 76

Fax: + 375 17 390 54 48

Email: [email protected]

Rukhservomotor LLC is a Belarusian company which focuses on the development and manufacturing of precision coordinate systems. It supplies companies which are military end-users with goods with military end-use. The company participates in the production of panoramic sights (PKP) for Russian T-72 and T-90 tanks.

Therefore, Rukhservomotor LLC forms a part of the Belarusian military and industrial complex, and contributes to the military and technological improvement of Belarus, and the development of its defence and security sector.

19.7.2025’

(2) in Annex II, the following entry is added:

                           ‘Legmash Plant OJSC’.
			

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
‘11.	Abu Aqla Mohamed Ahmed KAIKAL	Nationality: SudaneseGender: maleFunction: Commander of a SAF-affiliated militiaAssociated entities: SAF	Abu Aqla Mohamed Ahmed Kaikal is a Sudanese Military Commander who served in the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the Jazira state in Sudan until he defected to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in October 2024. In December 2023, he was appointed by the RSF as Governor of the Jazira state, after the RSF violently took over that area. The RSF is responsible for attacking cities and humanitarian hubs in the Jazira state, leading to massive displacement of civilians, hunger, shortage of medicines and impediment of humanitarian aid. Jazira state specifically has been a centre of violence committed by the RSF during Kaikal’s governorship. Therefore, Abu Aqla Mohamed Ahmed Kaikal is responsible for actions and policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. In addition, he is responsible for directing acts in Sudan that constitute serious human rights violations, and for obstructing the delivery of, access to and distribution of humanitarian assistance in Sudan.	18.7.2025
12.	Hussein BARSHAM	Nationality: SudaneseGender: maleFunction: Military Field Commander of the RSFAssociated entities: RSF; Misseria tribe	Hussein Barsham is a Military Field Commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), an organisation that has been accused by international non-governmental organisations of ethnic cleansing and even genocide against the Masalit tribe and other non-Arab groups in Darfur.As a Commander, Hussein Barsham has led RSF soldiers in the capture of the Baleela airport from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and the capture of localities in the West Kordofan state, such as Meiram. He has played a leading role in RSF operations that have resulted in mass atrocities, including targeted killings, ethnic violence, forced displacement and violence against civilians, particularly in Darfur and other conflict-affected regions of Sudan. Under his command, RSF forces have been involved in mass killings and atrocities. Barsham has been engaged in the fighting in the Kordofan region. He has led attacks on several localities and has been present at the sites of atrocities and mass executions committed by soldiers under his command. Such acts constitute war crimes.Hussein Barsham is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. He is also responsible for undermining efforts to resume the political transition in Sudan and for directing or committing acts in Sudan that constitute serious human rights violations or abuses or violations of international humanitarian law.	18.7.2025’

Region and ADIS reference number of the outbreak	Areas established as protection and surveillance zones, part of the restricted zone in Bulgaria referred to in Article 1	Date until applicable
Region of BurgasBG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00007	Surveillance zone:Those parts of the region of Burgas, contained within a circle of a radius of 15 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.3872, Long. 27.2608 (2025/7), excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.	29.7.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of the region of Burgas, contained within a circle of a radius of 5 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.3872, Long. 27.2608 (2025/7).	15.7.2025 -29.7.2025
Region of PlovdivBG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00008BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00009BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00010BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00011BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00012BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00013BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00014BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00015BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00016BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00017BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00018BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00021BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00022BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00023BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00024BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00025BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00026BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00027BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00028BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00029BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00030BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00031BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00032BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00033BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00034BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00035BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00036BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00039BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00040BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00041BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00042BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00043BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00044BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00045BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00046BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00047BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00048BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00049BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00050BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00051BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00052BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00053BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00054BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00055BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00056BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00057BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00058BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00059BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00060BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00061BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00062BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00063BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00064BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00065BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00067BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00068BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00069BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00070BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00071BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00072BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00073BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00074BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00075BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00076BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00077	Protection zone:Those parts of the regions of Plovdiv and Stara Zagora contained within a circle of a radius of 5 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat.42.1944, Long. 24.8528 (2025/8), Lat. 42.1823, Long. 24.8337 (2025/9), Lat. 42.1889, Long. 24.8137 (2025/10), Lat. 42.1862, Long. 24.8316 (2025/11), Lat. 42.1856, Long. 24.8456 (2025/12), Lat. 42.2312, Long. 24.9357 (2025/13), Lat. 42.2308, Long. 24.9368 (2025/14), Lat. 42.18222, Long. 24.86694 (2025/15), Lat. 42.1873, Long. 24.8456 (2025/16), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/17), Lat. 42.06, Long. 25.1658 (2025/18) Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/17), Lat. 42.23, Long. 24.9391 (2025/21), Lat. 42.231703, Long. 24.938912 (2025/22), Lat. 42.2306, Long. 24.9369 (2025/23), Lat. 42.2319, Long. 24.9362 (2025/24), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/25), Lat. 42.2051, Long. 24.87314 (2025/26), Lat. 42.2069, Long. 24.78666 (2025/27), Lat. 42.233, Long. 24.9405 (2025/28), Lat. 42.2316, Long. 24.94214 (2025/29), Lat. 42.2602, Long. 24.8751 (2025/30), Lat. 42.20922, Long. 24.95578 (2025/31), Lat. 42.2089, Long. 24.9508 (2025/32), Lat. 42.2092, Long. 24.9525 (2025/33), Lat. 42.1886, Long. 24.9265 (2025/34), Lat. 42.1886, Long. 24.9265 (2025/35), Lat. 42.1925, Long. 24.9329 (2025/36), Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/37), Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/38), Lat. 42.200845, Long. 24.790453 (2025/39), Lat. 42.2463, Long. 24.7957 (2025/40), Lat. 42.202878, Long 24.690226 (2025/41), Lat. 42.2829, Long. 24.9637 (2025/42), Lat. 42.2363, Long. 24.8297 (2025/43), Lat. 42.1872, Long. 24.9242 (2025/44), Lat. 42.2308, Long 25.0438 (2025/45), Lat. 42.2401, Long. 25.0556 (2025/46), Lat. 42.2037, Long. 25.0513 (2025/47), Lat. 42.1959, Long. 25.0566 (2025/48), Lat. 42.2977, Long. 24.9179 (2025/49), Lat. 42.1369, Long. 24.9082 (2025/50), Lat. 42.1481, Long. 24.9055 (2025/51), Lat. 42.2333, Long. 24.8135 (2025/52), Lat. 42.3188, Long. 24.8888 (2025/53), Lat. 42.1903, Long. 25.034 (2025/54), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/55), Lat. 42.2828, Long. 24.7528 (2025/56), Lat. 42.1061, Long. 24.8812 (2025/57), Lat. 42.2116, Long. 24.9584 (2025/58), Lat. 42.2559, Long. 24.6802 (2025/59), Lat. 41.9946, Long. 25.2278 (2025/60), Lat. 42.0248, Long. 25.096 (2025/61), Lat. 42.0341, Long. 25.1186 (2025/62), Lat. 42.0973, Long. 24.8738 (2025/63), Lat. 42.2008, Long. 25.049 (2025/64), Lat. 42.21546, Long. 24.62801 (2025/65), Lat. 42.3695, Long. 24.7158 (2025/67), Lat. 42.2753, Long. 25.1217 (2025/68), Lat. 42.2883, Long. 24.6303 (2025/69), Lat. 42.3705, Long. 24.725 (2025/70), Lat. 42.371, Long. 24.7229 (2025/71), Lat. 42.3288, Long. 24.6784 (2025/72), Lat. 42.3263, Long. 24.6724 (2025/73), Lat. 42.1929, Long. 24.635 (2025/74), Lat. 42.0567, Long. 24.7664 (2025/75), Lat. 42.1295, Long. 25.04 (2025/76), Lat. 42.3826, Long. 24.7806 (2025/77).	24.8.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of the regions of Plovdiv, Stara Zagora, Haskovo and Pazardzhik contained within a circle of a radius of 15 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.1944, Long. 24.8528 (2025/8), Lat. 42.1823, Long. 24.8337 (2025/9), Lat. 42.1889, Long. 24.8137 (2025/10), Lat. 42.1862, Long. 24.8316 (2025/11), Lat. 42.1856, Long. 24.8456 (2025/12), Lat. 42.2312, Long. 24.9357 (2025/13), Lat. 42.2308, Long. 24.9368 (2025/14), Lat. 42.18222, Long. 24.86694 (2025/15), Lat. 42.1873, Long. 24.8456 (2025/16), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/17), Lat. 42.06, Long. 25.1658 (2025/18), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/17), Lat. 42.23, Long. 24.9391 (2025/21), Lat. 42.231703, Long. 24.938912 (2025/22), Lat. 42.2306, Long. 24.9369 (2025/23), Lat. 42.2319, Long. 24.9362 (2025/24), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/25), Lat. 42.2051, Long. 24.87314 (2025/26), Lat. 42.2069, Long. 24.78666 (2025/27), Lat. 42.233, Long. 24.9405 (2025/28), Lat. 42.2316, Long. 24.94214 (2025/29), Lat. 42.2602, Long. 24.8751 (2025/30), Lat. 42.20922, Long. 24.95578 (2025/31), Lat. 42.2089, Long. 24.9508 (2025/32), Lat. 42.2092, Long. 24.9525 (2025/33), Lat. 42.1886, Long. 24.9265 (2025/34), Lat. 42.1886, Long. 24.9265 (2025/35), Lat. 42.1925, Long. 24.9329 (2025/36), Lat. 42.200845, Long. 24.790453 (2025/39), Lat. 42.2463, Long. 24.7957 (2025/40), Lat. 42.202878, Long. 24.690226 (2025/41), Lat. 42.2829, Long. 24.9637 (2025/42), Lat. 42.2363, Long. 24.8297 (2025/43), Lat. 42.1872, Long. 24.9242 (2025/44), Lat. 42.2308, Long 25.0438 (2025/45), Lat. 42.2401, Long. 25.0556 (2025/46), Lat. 42.2037, Long. 25.0513 (2025/47), Lat. 42.1959, Long. 25.0566 (2025/48), Lat. 42.2977, Long 24.9179 (2025/49), Lat. 42.1369, Long. 24.9082 (2025/50), Lat. 42.1481, Long. 24.9055 (2025/51), Lat. 42.2333, Long. 24.8135 (2025/52), Lat. 42.3188, Long 24.8888 (2025/53), Lat. 42.1903, Long. 25.034 (2025/54), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/55), Lat. 42.2828, Long. 24.7528 (2025/56), Lat. 42.1061, Long. 24.8812 (2025/57), Lat. 42.2116, Long. 24.9584 (2025/58), Lat. 42.2559, Long. 24.6802 (2025/59), Lat. 41.9946, Long. 25.2278 (2025/60), Lat. 42.0248, Long. 25.096 (2025/61), Lat. 42.0341, Long. 25.1186 (2025/62), Lat. 42.0973, Long. 24.8738 (2025/63), Lat. 42.2008, Long. 25.049 (2025/64), Lat. 42.21546, Long. 24.62801 (2025/65), Lat. 42.3695, Long. 24.7158 (2025/67), Lat. 42.2753, Long. 25.1217 (2025/68), Lat. 42.2883, Long. 24.6303 (2025/69), Lat. 42.3705, Long. 24.725 (2025/70), Lat. 42.371, Long. 24.7229 (2025/71), Lat. 42.3288, Long. 24.6784 (2025/72), Lat. 42.3263, Long. 24.6724 (2025/73), Lat. 42.1929, Long. 24.635 (2025/74), Lat. 42.0567, Long. 24.7664 (2025/75), Lat. 42.1295, Long. 25.04 (2025/76), Lat. 42.3826, Long. 24.7806 (2025/77). excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.	8.9.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of the regions of Plovdiv and Stara Zagora, contained within a circle of a radius of 5 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.1944, Long. 24.8528 (2025/8), Lat. 42.1823, Long. 24.8337 (2025/9), Lat.42.1889, Long. 24.8137(2025/10), Lat. 42.1862, Long. 24.8316 (2025/11), Lat. 42.1856, Long. 24.8456 (2025/12), Lat. 42.2312, Long. 24.9357 (2025/13), Lat. 42.2308, Long. 24.9368 (2025/14), Lat. 42.18222, Long. 24.86694 (2025/15), Lat. 42.1873, Long. 24.8456 (2025/16), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/17), Lat. 42.06, Long. 25.1658 (2025/18), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/17), Lat. 42.23, Long. 24.9391 (2025/21), Lat. 42.231703, Long. 24.938912 (2025/22), Lat. 42.2306, Long. 24.9369 (2025/23), Lat. 42.2319, Long. 24.9362 (2025/24), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/25), Lat. 42.2051, Long. 24.87314 (2025/26), Lat. 42.2069, Long. 24.78666 (2025/27), Lat. 42.233, Long. 24.9405 (2025/28), Lat. 42.2316, Long. 24.94214 (2025/29), Lat. 42.2602, Long. 24.8751 (2025/30), Lat. 42.20922, Long. 24.95578 (2025/31), Lat. 42.2089, Long. 24.9508 (2025/32), Lat. 42.2092, Long. 24.9525 (2025/33), Lat. 42.1886, Long. 24.9265 (2025/34), Lat. 42.1886, Long. 24.9265 (2025/35), Lat. 42.1925, Long. 24.9329 (2025/36), Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/37), Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/38), Lat. 42.200845, Long. 24.790453 (2025/39), Lat. 42.2463, Long. 24.7957 (2025/40), Lat. 42.202878, Long 24.690226 (2025/41), Lat. 42.2829, Long. 24.9637 (2025/42), Lat. 42.2363, Long. 24.8297 (2025/43), Lat. 42.1872, Long. 24.9242 (2025/44), Lat. 42.2308, Long 25.0438 (2025/45), Lat. 42.2401, Long. 25.0556 (2025/46), Lat. 42.2037, Long. 25.0513 (2025/47), Lat. 42.1959, Long. 25.0566 (2025/48), Lat. 42.2977, Long 24.9179 (2025/49), Lat. 42.1369, Long. 24.9082 (2025/50), Lat. 42.1481, Long. 24.9055 (2025/51), Lat. 42.2333, Long. 24.8135 (2025/52), Lat. 42.3188, Long 24.8888 (2025/53), Lat. 42.1903, Long. 25.034 (2025/54), Lat. 42.19416, Long. 24.78666 (2025/55), Lat. 42.2828, Long. 24.7528 (2025/56), Lat. 42.1061, Long. 24.8812 (2025/57), Lat. 42.2116, Long. 24.9584 (2025/58), Lat. 42.2559, Long. 24.6802 (2025/59), Lat. 41.9946, Long. 25.2278 (2025/60), Lat. 42.0248, Long. 25.096 (2025/61), Lat. 42.0341, Long. 25.1186 (2025/62), Lat. 42.0973, Long. 24.8738 (2025/63), Lat. 42.2008, Long. 25.049 (2025/64), Lat. 42.21546, Long. 24.62801 (2025/65), Lat. 42.3695, Long. 24.7158 (2025/67), Lat. 42.2753, Long. 25.1217 (2025/68), Lat. 42.2883, Long. 24.6303 (2025/69), Lat. 42.3705, Long. 24.725 (2025/70), Lat. 42.371, Long. 24.7229 (2025/71), Lat. 42.3288, Long. 24.6784 (2025/72), Lat. 42.3263, Long. 24.6724 (2025/73), Lat. 42.1929, Long. 24.635 (2025/74), Lat. 42.0567, Long. 24.7664 (2025/75), Lat. 42.1295, Long. 25.04 (2025/76), Lat. 42.3826, Long. 24.7806 (2025/77).	25.8.2025 – 8.9.2025
Region of Stara ZagoraBG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00037BG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00038	Protection zone:Those parts of the region of Stara Zagora, contained within a circle of a radius of 5 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/37), Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/38).	17.8.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of the regions of Stara Zagora and Gabrovo contained within a circle of a radius of 15 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/37), Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/38), excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.	1.9.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of the region of Stara Zagora, contained within a circle of a radius of 5 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/37), Lat. 42.6871, Long. 25.3287 (2025/38).	18.8.2025-1.9.2025
Region of HaskovoBG-CAPRIPOX-2025-00066	Protection zone:Those parts of the region of Haskovo, contained within a circle of a radius of 5 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 41.7227, Long. 26.325 (2025/66).	24.8.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of the region of Haskovo, contained within a circle of a radius of 15 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 41.7227, Long. 26.325 (2025/66), excluding the areas contained in the protection zone.	8.9.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of the region of Haskovo, contained within a circle of a radius of 5 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 41.7227, Long. 26.325 (2025/66).	25.8.2025 -8.9.2025

Further restricted zone	Region	Areas included in the further restricted zones established in Bulgaria as referred to in Article 2	Date until applicable
Further restricted zone No 1	Region of Plovdiv	The entire region of Plovdiv excluding the areas included in any protection or surveillance zone.	8.9.2025
Region of Haskovo	The municipalities of Dimitrovgrad, and Mineralni Bani, excluding the areas included in any protection or surveillance zone.
Further restricted zone No 2	Region of Stara Zagora	The municipalities of Pavel Bajna, Kazanlak, Bratja Daskalovi and Cirpan, excluding the areas included in any protection or surveillance zone.	1.9.2025
Region of Gabrovo	The entire region of Gabrovo, excluding the areas included in any protection or surveillance zone

Area	Region	Areas, referred to in Article 3	Date until applicable
Area No 1	Region of Plovdiv	The entire region of Plovdiv.	9.9.2025-8.10.2025
Region of Haskovo	The municipalities of Dimitrovgrad, and Mineralni Bani.
Area No 2	Region of Stara Zagora	The municipalities of Pavel Bajna, Kazanlak, Bratja Daskalovi and Cirpan.	2.9.2025-1.10.2025
Region of Gabrovo	The entire region of Gabrovo.

No	Obligated entities	Local tax registration number	Operational CO2injection capacity contribution obligation by 2030 (in thousand tonnes per annum)
1	Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij B.V.	NL003014861B01	6 350
2	OMV PETROM SA	RO 1590082	5 880
3	S.N.G.N ROMGAZ S.A.	RO 14056826	4 120
4	ORLEN S.A. (poprzednio Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo S.A.)	7740001454	4 100
5	Eni S.A.	00484960588	3 230
6	Wintershall Dea Deutschland GmbH	DE 814756974	1 980
7	TotalEnergies EP Nederland B.V.	NL001766971B01	1 590
8	MOL Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Nyrt.	10625790-4-44	1 560
9	SHELL ITALIA E&P	05160421003	1 550
10	BlueNord Energy Denmark A/S	78342714	1 340
11	Oldenburgische Erdölgesellschaft mbH	DE 204823786	1 270
12	NAM Offshore B.V.	NL863955058B01	1 220
13	INA-INDUSTRIJA NAFTE, d.d	OIB-27759560625	1 150
14	TotalEnergies EP Danmark A/S concessionaire	22757318	1 130
15	OMV Austria	ATU57544036	960
16	Eni Energy Netherlands B.V.	NL001649103B01	880
17	TOTALENERGIES EP ITALIA	10569621005	830
18	Neptune Energy Deutschland GmbH	DE 811127999	770
19	Nordsøfonden	29435065	730
20	BEB Erdgas und Erdöl GmbH & Co. KG	DE 282430970	630
21	Petrogas E&P Netherlands B.V.	NL007409825B01	580
22	Nephin Energy Limited	3514113IH	550
23	ENI MEDITERRANEA IDROCARBURI	12300000150	510
24	Vermilion Energy Corrib Ireland Limited	8249996O	470
25	Rockrose (NL) CS1 B.V.	NL001799782B01	450
26	Vermilion Energy Netherlands B.V.	NL812927254B01	450
27	TotalEnergies Denmark ASW, Filial af TotalEnergies Denmark ASW, INC., USA	53592716	440
28	MITSUI E&P ITALIA B	11835991008	420
29	ENERGEAN ITALY	10245700967	410
30	Mobil Erdgas und Erdöl GmbH	DE 811140133	400
31	VERMILION REP	79410964837	390
32	Lakocsa Koncessziós Kft.	25500002-2-44	390
33	Kistos NL2 B.V.	NL855336717B01	370
34	Exxonmobil Producing Netherlands B.V.	NL814970175B01	330
35	ONE-Dyas B.V.	NL008848087B01	330
36	Vermilion Energy Germany GmbH & Co. KG	DE 292 126 532	320
37	Wintershall Noordzee B.V.	NL005614260B01	310
38	TAQA Offshore B.V.	NL814079386B01	290
39	INEOS Energy (Syd Arne) ApS	73589118	250
40	Black Sea Oil & Gas S.A.	RO 21288144	250
41	INEOS E&P A/S	73349613	250
42	Vermilion Energy Ireland Limited	6602191R	240
43	Dana Petroleum Netherlands B.V.	NL005658214B01	170
44	B8 Sp. z o.o. BALTIC Sp. k. a.	5833163579	160

(1)	in Article 3(1), the following indent is added:‘—EUR 2 200 000 for the period from 1 October 2025 until 30 September 2026.’;	‘—	EUR 2 200 000 for the period from 1 October 2025 until 30 September 2026.’
‘—	EUR 2 200 000 for the period from 1 October 2025 until 30 September 2026.’

(1)	the following article is inserted:‘Article 1aa1. It shall be prohibited to purchase, import or transfer, directly or indirectly, arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, into the Union if they originate in Belarus or are exported from Belarus.2. The prohibitions in paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to the import, purchase or transfer related to:(a)the provision of spare parts and services necessary for the maintenance and safety of existing capabilities within the Union; or(b)the execution of contracts concluded before 20 July 2025, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.’;	(a)	the provision of spare parts and services necessary for the maintenance and safety of existing capabilities within the Union; or	(b)	the execution of contracts concluded before 20 July 2025, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.’
(a)	the provision of spare parts and services necessary for the maintenance and safety of existing capabilities within the Union; or
(b)	the execution of contracts concluded before 20 July 2025, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.’

(b)	paragraph 13 is replaced by the following:‘13. The competent authorities of the Member States may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the sale, supply, transfer or export of the following goods, or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, after having determined that such goods or the provision of related technical or financial assistance are necessary for personal household use of natural persons in Belarus:(a)goods falling under CN code 8417 20 ;(b)copper tubes, pipes and pipe fittings falling under CN codes 7411 or 7412 that have an internal diameter of up to 50 mm;(c)goods falling under CN code 8414 60 ;(d)goods falling under CN 3916 20 when strictly necessary for the sale of PVC flooring.’;	(a)	goods falling under CN code 8417 20 ;	(b)	copper tubes, pipes and pipe fittings falling under CN codes 7411 or 7412 that have an internal diameter of up to 50 mm;	(c)	goods falling under CN code 8414 60 ;	(d)	goods falling under CN 3916 20 when strictly necessary for the sale of PVC flooring.’
(a)	goods falling under CN code 8417 20 ;
(b)	copper tubes, pipes and pipe fittings falling under CN codes 7411 or 7412 that have an internal diameter of up to 50 mm;
(c)	goods falling under CN code 8414 60 ;
(d)	goods falling under CN 3916 20 when strictly necessary for the sale of PVC flooring.’

(3)	Article 2d is amended as follows:(a)the following paragraph is inserted:‘1aa. Without prejudice to the prohibition on indirect exports in paragraph 1 of this Article and Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2021/821, an authorisation shall be required for the export of goods and technology which might contribute to Belarus’s military and technological enhancement, or the development of the defence and security sector, to any third country other than Belarus, if the exporter has been informed by the competent authority of the Member State where the exporter is resident or established that the items in question are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus, or for use in Belarus.’;(b)the following paragraph is inserted:‘6a. Where an authorisation is required in accordance with paragraph 1aa, the competent authorities shall proceed in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2021/821, which shall applymutatis mutandis.’;	(a)	the following paragraph is inserted:‘1aa. Without prejudice to the prohibition on indirect exports in paragraph 1 of this Article and Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2021/821, an authorisation shall be required for the export of goods and technology which might contribute to Belarus’s military and technological enhancement, or the development of the defence and security sector, to any third country other than Belarus, if the exporter has been informed by the competent authority of the Member State where the exporter is resident or established that the items in question are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus, or for use in Belarus.’;	(b)	the following paragraph is inserted:‘6a. Where an authorisation is required in accordance with paragraph 1aa, the competent authorities shall proceed in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2021/821, which shall applymutatis mutandis.’;
(a)	the following paragraph is inserted:‘1aa. Without prejudice to the prohibition on indirect exports in paragraph 1 of this Article and Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2021/821, an authorisation shall be required for the export of goods and technology which might contribute to Belarus’s military and technological enhancement, or the development of the defence and security sector, to any third country other than Belarus, if the exporter has been informed by the competent authority of the Member State where the exporter is resident or established that the items in question are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for any natural or legal person, entity or body in Belarus, or for use in Belarus.’;
(b)	the following paragraph is inserted:‘6a. Where an authorisation is required in accordance with paragraph 1aa, the competent authorities shall proceed in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2021/821, which shall applymutatis mutandis.’;

(4)	Article 2n is replaced by the following:‘Article 2n1. No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Decision, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, notably a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:(a)designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I;(b)any natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Articles 2h, 2i, 2j or 2y, or listed in Annex II, III or V;(c)any other Belarussian person, entity or body, including the Belarusian government;(d)any person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (a), (b) or (c) of this paragraph.2. No injunction, order, relief, judgment of a judicial court other than a court of a Member State or other court, arbitral or administrative decision issued in proceedings other than those in the Member States pursuant to or derived from investor-State dispute settlement proceedings against a Member State which could lead to the satisfaction of any claims in connection with measures imposed under this Decision shall be recognised, given effect or enforced in a Member State if it is invoked by any persons, entities or bodies referred to in paragraph 1, points (a), (b), (c) or (d), or persons, entities or bodies that own or control those persons, entities or bodies.3. No request for assistance during an investigation or other proceedings, and no punishment or other penalty based on an injunction, order, relief, judgment of a court other than a court of a Member State or other court, arbitral or administrative decision issued in proceedings other than those in the Member States pursuant to or derived from investor-State dispute settlement proceedings against a Member State in connection with measures imposed under this Decision shall be recognised, given effect or enforced in a Member State if it is invoked by any persons, entities or bodies referred to in paragraph 1, points (a), (b), (c) or (d), or persons, entities or bodies that own or control those persons, entities or bodies.4. In any proceedings for the enforcement of a claim, the onus of proving that satisfying the claim is not prohibited by paragraph 1 shall be on the person seeking the enforcement of that claim.5. This Article is without prejudice to the right of the persons, entities and bodies referred to in paragraph 1 to judicial review of the legality of the non-performance of contractual obligations in accordance with this Decision.’;	(a)	designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I;	(b)	any natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Articles 2h, 2i, 2j or 2y, or listed in Annex II, III or V;	(c)	any other Belarussian person, entity or body, including the Belarusian government;	(d)	any person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (a), (b) or (c) of this paragraph.
(a)	designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I;
(b)	any natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in Articles 2h, 2i, 2j or 2y, or listed in Annex II, III or V;
(c)	any other Belarussian person, entity or body, including the Belarusian government;
(d)	any person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (a), (b) or (c) of this paragraph.

(6)	Article 2y is amended as follows:(a)paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:‘1. It shall be prohibited to engage, directly or indirectly, in any transaction with legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex V or with any legal person, entity or body established in Belarus whose proprietary rights are directly or indirectly owned for more than 50 % by an entity listed in Annex V.’;(b)the following paragraphs are inserted:‘1a. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to transactions:(a)that are necessary for the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States or of partner countries in Belarus, including delegations, embassies and missions, or international organisations in Belarus enjoying immunities in accordance with international law; or(b)made by nationals of a Member State who are residents of Belarus and were so before 24 February 2022.1b. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, transactions which are strictly necessary for divestment from Belarus or the wind-down of business activities in Belarus.’;	(a)	paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:‘1. It shall be prohibited to engage, directly or indirectly, in any transaction with legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex V or with any legal person, entity or body established in Belarus whose proprietary rights are directly or indirectly owned for more than 50 % by an entity listed in Annex V.’;	(b)	the following paragraphs are inserted:‘1a. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to transactions:(a)that are necessary for the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States or of partner countries in Belarus, including delegations, embassies and missions, or international organisations in Belarus enjoying immunities in accordance with international law; or(b)made by nationals of a Member State who are residents of Belarus and were so before 24 February 2022.1b. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, transactions which are strictly necessary for divestment from Belarus or the wind-down of business activities in Belarus.’;	(a)	that are necessary for the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States or of partner countries in Belarus, including delegations, embassies and missions, or international organisations in Belarus enjoying immunities in accordance with international law; or	(b)	made by nationals of a Member State who are residents of Belarus and were so before 24 February 2022.
(a)	paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:‘1. It shall be prohibited to engage, directly or indirectly, in any transaction with legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex V or with any legal person, entity or body established in Belarus whose proprietary rights are directly or indirectly owned for more than 50 % by an entity listed in Annex V.’;
(b)	the following paragraphs are inserted:‘1a. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to transactions:(a)that are necessary for the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States or of partner countries in Belarus, including delegations, embassies and missions, or international organisations in Belarus enjoying immunities in accordance with international law; or(b)made by nationals of a Member State who are residents of Belarus and were so before 24 February 2022.1b. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, transactions which are strictly necessary for divestment from Belarus or the wind-down of business activities in Belarus.’;	(a)	that are necessary for the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States or of partner countries in Belarus, including delegations, embassies and missions, or international organisations in Belarus enjoying immunities in accordance with international law; or	(b)	made by nationals of a Member State who are residents of Belarus and were so before 24 February 2022.
(a)	that are necessary for the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States or of partner countries in Belarus, including delegations, embassies and missions, or international organisations in Belarus enjoying immunities in accordance with international law; or
(b)	made by nationals of a Member State who are residents of Belarus and were so before 24 February 2022.

	NamesTranscription of Belarusian spelling Transcription of Russian spelling	Names(Belarusian spelling) (Russian spelling)	Identifying Information	Reasons for listing	Date of listing
‘48.	State-owned Foreign Trade Unitary Enterprise Belvneshpromservice	Дзяржаўнае знешнегандлёвае ўнітарнае прадпрыемства БелзнешпрамсэрвісГосударственное внешнеторговое унитарное предприятие Белвнешпромсервис	Address: 2 Kazinets street, Minsk, 220099, BelarusDate of registration: 14.7.1992Tax identification number: 100128724Phone: + 375 17 272 07 08Fax: + 375 17 260 18 87Email: [email protected]:https://www.bvpservice.by/Associated individuals: Director General Aleksandr Yakovlevich Anischenko	State-owned Foreign Trade Unitary Enterprise Belvneshpromservice was established in order to promote Belarusian defence products in foreign markets. It specialises in the export of high-tech products for military purposes and has the right to upgrade, repair and supply military goods for the Belarusian Air Defence, Air Force and Land Forces. Therefore, State-owned Foreign Trade Unitary Enterprise Belvneshpromservice is supporting the military and industrial complex of Belarus.	19.7.2025
49.	OKB TSP Scientific Production Limited Liability Company	Науково-виробниче товариство з обмеженою відповідальністю “ОКБ ТСП”Научно-производственное общество с ограниченной ответственностью “ОКБ ТСП”	Address: Frantsiska Skoriny Street, building 1, unit 21, 220076 Minsk, BelarusDate of registration: 8.7.2002Tax identification number: 190369982Phone: + 375 17 311 05 69Email: [email protected]:https://sdc.okbtsp.com	OKB TSP Scientific Production Limited Liability Company is a defence company involved in the development, production and design of weapons. It holds manufacturing and foreign trade licences issued by the State Authority for Military Industry of the Republic of Belarus. It produces equipment such as military vehicles and anti-aircraft systems. Therefore, OKB TSP Scientific Production Limited Liability Company is an entity forming part of the military and industrial complex of Belarus.	19.7.2025
50.	KB Unmanned Helicopters (UAVHeli)	КБ Беспілотныя ВерталётыООО КБ Беспилотныйе вертолеты	Address: d. 47, korp. 14, ul. Yanki Mavra, Minsk, 220015, BelarusDate of registration: 27.4.2017Registration number: 192807396	KB Unmanned Helicopters (UAVHeli) is a Belarusian company which produces aircraft and aircraft equipment. The company produces unmanned helicopters specifically equipped and designed to be used in a military context.Therefore, KB Unmanned Helicopters is an entity forming part of the military and industrial complex of Belarus, including by being involved in the development and production of military technology and equipment.	19.7.2025
51.	Legmash Plant OJSCa.k.a. ZAVOD SHVEINYKH MASHIN OAOa.k.a. OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE OBSCHESTVO BELORUSSKIY METALLURGICHESKIY ZAVODa.k.a. OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE OBSCHESTVO ZAVOD LEGMASH	Адкрытае акцыянернае таварыства Завод “Легмаш”	Address: Vostochny Lane, 17, Orsha, 211390, BelarusDate of registration: 6.5.1994Registration number: 300228934Phone: +375 216 42 00 91Website:https://legmash.by/Email: [email protected]	Legmash Plant OJSC is a Belarusian plant which produces 152-mm and 122-mm shells for cannon artillery (including howitzers D-30, D-20, Msta-B, Giatsint-B, and the self-propelled modifications thereof). The facility also manufactures 122-mm unguided rockets of the 9M22U-1 line for the 9K51 Grad MLRS multiple rocket launcher. Therefore, Legmash Plant OJSC is an entity forming part of the military and industrial complex of Belarus.Legmash Plant OJSC receives extensive tax benefits, regulated by presidential legislation and the Belarusian Government. Therefore, Legmash Plant OJSC is also benefitting from the Lukashenka regime.	19.7.2025
52.	Research and Production Unitary Enterprise “Scientific and Technical Center ‘LEMT’ BelOMO”a.k.a. UP NTTS LEMT BELOMO	Науково-виробниче унітарне підприємство “Науково-технічний центр ‘ЛЕМТ’ БєлОМО”	Address: D. 23, korp. 1, Nezhiloe pomeshchenie, Makaenka street, Minsk, 220114, BelarusType of entity: State-Owned EnterprisePlace of registration: BelarusDate of registration: 26.05.1992Registration number: 100230590	The Belarusian Scientific and Technical Center “LEMT” is owned by the state enterprise BelOMO. LEMT manufactures optical sights and systems for conventional weapons, laser rangefinders, distance measurement modules based on diode lasers, and laser fire control systems. LEMT sights are used in the AK-12 automatic rifles produced by Russia’s Kalashnikov. Therefore, LEMT forms a part of the military and industrial complex of Belarus, including by being involved in the development and production of military technology and equipment.	19.7.2025
53.	Laser Devices and Technologiesa.k.a. Laser Devices and Technologies Limited Liability Company	Общество с ограниченной ответственностью “Лазерные приборы и технологии”Таварыства з абмежаванай адказнасцю “Лазерныя прыборы і тэхналогіі”	Address: Tsentralnaya Street, House 2, Room 116, Demidovichsky Village Council, Yutski Village, Dzerzhinsky District, Minsk Region, BelarusType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: BelarusDate of registration: 10.2.2017Registration number: 691827047Principal place of business: Minsk, Belarus	LLC Laser Devices and Technologies, formerly known as LLC Laboratory of Additive Technologies, is a Belarusian company specialising in gaskets. It supplies components to military end-users such as Peleng and Uralvagonzavod. The company also provides parts for the production of panoramic sights (PKP) for Russian T-72 and T-90 tanks.Thus, LLC Laser Devices and Technologies provides components to Belarus’s military and industrial sectors, supporting the country’s military and technological advancements, as well as the development of its defence and security capabilities.	19.7.2025
54.	JSC Vistana.k.a. Open Joint Stock Company “VISTAN”	Адкрытае акцыянернае таварыства “ВIСТАН”Открытое акционерное общество “ВИСТАН”	Address: Dimitrova street, 36/7, 210627, Vitebsk, BelarusType of entity: Open Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: Vitebsk, BelarusDate of registration: 1.2.1994Registration number: 300029332Principal place of business: BelarusWebsite:https://vistan.ru/index.htmlE-mail: [email protected]@vistan.ru	JSC Vistan is a Belarusian manufacturer of machine tools, including CNC machining centres, cylindrical grinders, centreless grinding machines, gear processing equipment, and lathes. These are dual-use technologies used in the production of military goods. JSC Vistan exports over 60 % of its products to Russia and supplies machine tools to Russian defence-related enterprises, including JSC “Krasny Oktyabr”. The company is part of a Belarus-Russia import-substitution program and is receiving US$15 000 000 in funding backed by Russian state financial support, to expand gear-processing machine production.Additionally, JSC Vistan has received Russian government funding for the development of strategic aviation projects, indicating its contribution to the Russian military-industrial complex. Therefore, JSC Vistan forms a part of the Belarusian military and industrial complex and contributes to the military and technological improvement of Belarus, and the development of its defence and security sector.	19.7.2025
55.	Rukhservomotor LLCa.k.a. OOO Ruchservomotora.k.a. TAA Ruchservamatora.k.a. OOO Rukhservomotora.k.a. Limited Liability Company “Rukhservomotor”	TAA РухсерваматорOOO Рухсервомотор	Address: 5 Montazhnikov Street, 220019, Minsk, BelarusType of entity: Limited Liability CompanyPlace of registration: BelarusDate of registration: 24.2.2000Registration number: 800002497Principal place of business: Minsk, BelarusWebsite:https://eng.e-motors.tech/https://lasercut.by/Phone: + 375 17 390 54 47+375 17 390 30 76Fax: + 375 17 390 54 48Email: [email protected]	Rukhservomotor LLC is a Belarusian company which focuses on the development and manufacturing of precision coordinate systems. It supplies companies which are military end-users with goods with military end-use. The company participates in the production of panoramic sights (PKP) for Russian T-72 and T-90 tanks.Therefore, Rukhservomotor LLC forms a part of the Belarusian military and industrial complex, and contributes to the military and technological improvement of Belarus, and the development of its defence and security sector.	19.7.2025’