Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1554 of 25 July 2025 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to support the Djibouti Armed Forces

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1554 28.7.2025
(1) Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509(1)establishes the European Peace Facility (EPF) for the financing by Member States of Union actions under the common foreign and security policy to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security pursuant to Article 21(2), point (c), of the Treaty. In particular, pursuant to Article 1(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, the EPF is to be used for the financing of assistance measures such as actions to strengthen the capacities of third States and regional and international organisations relating to military and defence matters.
(2) On 24 October 2023, the Council adopted conclusions approving the Union’s revised Maritime Security Strategy and its Action Plan, laying out the framework for the Union to take further action to safeguard its interests at sea and to protect its citizens, values and economy, while promoting international rules and full compliance with international instruments, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
(3) Since October 2023, numerous Houthi attacks have targeted vessels in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman. Such attacks jeopardise the lives of seamen on vessels, and constitute a breach of the freedom of navigation on the high seas and of the right of transit passage in straits used for international navigation enshrined in UNCLOS. Those attacks also have an adverse impact on merchant shipping and on the economies of many countries in the Union and in the region.
(4) On 10 January 2024, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2722 (2024), condemning in the strongest terms the Houthi attacks on merchant and commercial vessels, underscoring the importance of the exercise of navigational rights and freedoms by vessels of all states in the Red Sea, including for merchant and commercial vessels transiting the Baab al-Mandab Strait, in accordance with international law, demanding that the Houthis immediately cease all such attacks, affirming that the exercise of navigational rights and freedoms by merchant and commercial vessels, in accordance with international law, must be respected, and taking note of the right of United Nations member states, in accordance with international law, to defend their vessels from attacks, including those that undermine navigational rights and freedoms.
(5) In the context of the Red Sea crisis, strengthening the Djibouti Armed Forces is an important element to contribute to safeguarding maritime security in the region.
(6) On 8 January 2025, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy received a request from Djibouti for the Union to assist the Djibouti Armed Forces with the procurement of key equipment, infrastructure and services to strengthen the capabilities of its navy.
(7) Assistance measures are to be implemented taking into account the principles and requirements set out in Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, in particular compliance with Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP(2), and in line with the rules for the implementation of revenue and expenditure financed under the EPF.
(8) The Council reaffirms its determination to protect, promote and fulfil human rights, fundamental freedoms and democratic principles and to strengthen the rule of law and good governance, in compliance with the Charter of the United Nations, with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with international law, in particular international human rights law and international humanitarian law,
(a) to strengthen cooperation on security and defence between the Union and Djibouti;
(b) to contribute to enhancing the overall capacities of the Djibouti Armed Forces in safeguarding their sovereignty and rights in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, to strengthen maritime security in the Red Sea and, thereby, to better protect sea lines of communication, commercial vessels and maritime resources, coastal populations and their livelihoods against a wide spectrum of maritime crises;
(c) to strengthen Djibouti’s potential in maritime domain awareness, complementing the Union’s common security and defence policy operations and initiatives in the Red Sea.
(a) implementation of a resilience plan for the patrol vessels, through the provision of training in naval education and equipment for specialised workshops, as well as the restoration of part of the Djiboutian maritime assets;
(b) a coastal surveillance station including functional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets and a floating pontoon;
(c) rapid intervention assets for the Djiboutian Navy.
(a) compliance of the units of the Djibouti Armed Forces supported under the assistance measure with relevant international law, in particular international human rights law and international humanitarian law;
(b) proper and efficient use of any assets provided under the assistance measure for the purposes for which they were provided;
(c) sufficient maintenance of any assets provided under the assistance measure to ensure their usability and operational availability over their life cycle;
(d) that any assets provided under the assistance measure are not lost or transferred to persons or entities other than those identified in those arrangements.
(a) delivery verification, whereby EPF delivery certificates are to be signed by the end-user forces upon transfer of ownership;
(b) reporting, whereby the beneficiary is to report annually on the activities conducted with the equipment, supplies and services provided under the assistance measure and on the inventory of designated items until such reporting is no longer deemed necessary by the Political and Security Committee (PSC);
(c) on-site visits, whereby the beneficiary is to grant the High Representative and the EPF auditors access to conduct on-site checks and EPF audits, upon request.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 28(1) and Article 41(2) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 (1) establishes the European Peace Facility (EPF) for the financing by Member States of Union actions under the common foreign and security policy to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security pursuant to Article 21(2), point (c), of the Treaty. In particular, pursuant to Article 1(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, the EPF is to be used for the financing of assistance measures such as actions to strengthen the capacities of third States and regional and international organisations relating to military and defence matters.
(2) On 24 October 2023, the Council adopted conclusions approving the Union’s revised Maritime Security Strategy and its Action Plan, laying out the framework for the Union to take further action to safeguard its interests at sea and to protect its citizens, values and economy, while promoting international rules and full compliance with international instruments, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
(3) Since October 2023, numerous Houthi attacks have targeted vessels in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman. Such attacks jeopardise the lives of seamen on vessels, and constitute a breach of the freedom of navigation on the high seas and of the right of transit passage in straits used for international navigation enshrined in UNCLOS. Those attacks also have an adverse impact on merchant shipping and on the economies of many countries in the Union and in the region.
(4) On 10 January 2024, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2722 (2024), condemning in the strongest terms the Houthi attacks on merchant and commercial vessels, underscoring the importance of the exercise of navigational rights and freedoms by vessels of all states in the Red Sea, including for merchant and commercial vessels transiting the Baab al-Mandab Strait, in accordance with international law, demanding that the Houthis immediately cease all such attacks, affirming that the exercise of navigational rights and freedoms by merchant and commercial vessels, in accordance with international law, must be respected, and taking note of the right of United Nations member states, in accordance with international law, to defend their vessels from attacks, including those that undermine navigational rights and freedoms.
(5) In the context of the Red Sea crisis, strengthening the Djibouti Armed Forces is an important element to contribute to safeguarding maritime security in the region.
(6) On 8 January 2025, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy received a request from Djibouti for the Union to assist the Djibouti Armed Forces with the procurement of key equipment, infrastructure and services to strengthen the capabilities of its navy.
(7) Assistance measures are to be implemented taking into account the principles and requirements set out in Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, in particular compliance with Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2), and in line with the rules for the implementation of revenue and expenditure financed under the EPF.
(8) The Council reaffirms its determination to protect, promote and fulfil human rights, fundamental freedoms and democratic principles and to strengthen the rule of law and good governance, in compliance with the Charter of the United Nations, with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with international law, in particular international human rights law and international humanitarian law,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Establishment, objectives, scope and duration

1. An assistance measure benefiting Djibouti (the ‘beneficiary’) to be financed under the European Peace Facility (EPF) (the ‘assistance measure’) is hereby established.

2. The objectives of the assistance measure are the following:
(a) to strengthen cooperation on security and defence between the Union and Djibouti;
(b) to contribute to enhancing the overall capacities of the Djibouti Armed Forces in safeguarding their sovereignty and rights in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, to strengthen maritime security in the Red Sea and, thereby, to better protect sea lines of communication, commercial vessels and maritime resources, coastal populations and their livelihoods against a wide spectrum of maritime crises;
(c) to strengthen Djibouti’s potential in maritime domain awareness, complementing the Union’s common security and defence policy operations and initiatives in the Red Sea.

3. To achieve the objectives set out in paragraph 2, the assistance measure shall finance the following types of equipment not designed to deliver lethal force, and the following infrastructure, supplies and services, including technical training:
(a) implementation of a resilience plan for the patrol vessels, through the provision of training in naval education and equipment for specialised workshops, as well as the restoration of part of the Djiboutian maritime assets;
(b) a coastal surveillance station including functional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets and a floating pontoon;
(c) rapid intervention assets for the Djiboutian Navy.

4. The duration of the assistance measure shall be 42 months from the date of adoption of this Decision.

Financial arrangements

1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the assistance measure shall be EUR 10 000 000.
2. All expenditure shall be managed in accordance with Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 and in line with the rules for the implementation of revenue and expenditure financed under the EPF.

Arrangements with the beneficiary

1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) shall make the necessary arrangements with the beneficiary to ensure its compliance with the requirements and conditions established by this Decision as a condition for the provision of support under the assistance measure.

2. The arrangements referred to in paragraph 1 shall include provisions obliging the beneficiary to ensure:
(a) compliance of the units of the Djibouti Armed Forces supported under the assistance measure with relevant international law, in particular international human rights law and international humanitarian law;
(b) proper and efficient use of any assets provided under the assistance measure for the purposes for which they were provided;
(c) sufficient maintenance of any assets provided under the assistance measure to ensure their usability and operational availability over their life cycle;
(d) that any assets provided under the assistance measure are not lost or transferred to persons or entities other than those identified in those arrangements.

3. The arrangements referred to in paragraph 1 shall include provisions on the suspension and termination of support under the assistance measure in the event of the beneficiary being found in breach of the obligations set out in paragraph 2.

Implementation

1. The High Representative shall be responsible for ensuring the implementation of this Decision in accordance with Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, and in line with the rules for the implementation of revenue and expenditure financed under the EPF and with the Integrated Methodological Framework for assessing and identifying the required measures and controls for assistance measures under the EPF.

2. The implementation of the activities referred to in Article 1(3) shall be carried out by Défense Conseil International – DCI Group.

Monitoring, control and evaluation

1. The High Representative shall monitor the compliance by the beneficiary with the obligations set out in Article 3. That monitoring shall be used to provide awareness of the context and the risks of breaches of the obligations set out in Article 3, and to contribute to the prevention of such breaches, including violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by the units of the Djibouti Armed Forces supported under the assistance measure.

2. The post-shipment control of equipment and supplies shall be organised as follows:
(a) delivery verification, whereby EPF delivery certificates are to be signed by the end-user forces upon transfer of ownership;
(b) reporting, whereby the beneficiary is to report annually on the activities conducted with the equipment, supplies and services provided under the assistance measure and on the inventory of designated items until such reporting is no longer deemed necessary by the Political and Security Committee (PSC);
(c) on-site visits, whereby the beneficiary is to grant the High Representative and the EPF auditors access to conduct on-site checks and EPF audits, upon request.

3. The High Representative shall conduct a final evaluation upon completion of the assistance measure to assess whether the assistance measure has contributed to reaching the objectives set out in Article 1(2).

Reporting

During the period of implementation, the High Representative shall provide the PSC with six-monthly reports on the implementation of the assistance measure, in accordance with Article 63 of Decision (CFSP) 2021/509. The administrator for assistance measures shall regularly inform the Facility Committee established by Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 on the implementation of revenue and expenditure in accordance with Article 38 of that Decision, including by providing information on the suppliers and subcontractors involved.

Suspension and termination

1. The PSC may decide to suspend wholly or partially the implementation of the assistance measure in accordance with Article 64 of Decision (CFSP) 2021/509.
2. The PSC may recommend that the Council terminate the assistance measure.

Entry into force

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Council Decision (EU) 2025/1552 of 3 March 2025 on the signing and conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Armenia establishing a framework for the participation of the Republic of Armenia in European Union crisis management operations

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1552 31.7.2025
(1) The Council, by Decision adopted on 29 April 2024, authorised the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to open negotiations with Armenia for an agreement between the Union and Armenia establishing a framework for the participation of Armenia in European Union crisis management operations.
(2) On the basis of that authorisation, such an agreement has been negotiated between the Union and Armenia.
(3) The Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Armenia establishing a framework for the participation of the Republic of Armenia in European Union crisis management operations should be approved on behalf of the Union, and its signing authorised in order to bind the Union,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 37 thereof, in conjunction with Article 218(5) and (6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) The Council, by Decision adopted on 29 April 2024, authorised the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to open negotiations with Armenia for an agreement between the Union and Armenia establishing a framework for the participation of Armenia in European Union crisis management operations.
(2) On the basis of that authorisation, such an agreement has been negotiated between the Union and Armenia.
(3) The Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Armenia establishing a framework for the participation of the Republic of Armenia in European Union crisis management operations should be approved on behalf of the Union, and its signing authorised in order to bind the Union,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Armenia establishing a framework for the participation of the Republic of Armenia in European Union crisis management operations is hereby approved on behalf of the Union (1). Its signing, expressing the consent of the Union to be bound by the Agreement, is hereby authorised.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1547 of 25 July 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2023/1532 concerning restrictive measures in view of Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities in the Middle East and the Red Sea region

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1547 25.7.2025
(1) On 20 July 2023, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/1532(1).
(2) On the basis of a review of Decision (CFSP) 2023/1532, the restrictive measures set out therein should be renewed until 27 July 2026, and the entries concerning two persons and one entity listed in the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2023/1532 should be updated.
(3) Decision (CFSP) 2023/1532 should therefore be amended accordingly,
(1) in Article 10 the date ‘27 July 2025’ is replaced by the date ‘27 July 2026’;
(2) Annex I is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
(1) in the list entitled ‘A. Natural persons’, entries 7 and 20 are replaced by the following:Names (Transliteration into Latin script)NamesIdentifying informationReasons for listingDate of listing‘7.Mohammad-Reza Gharaei ASHTIANI(Farsi spelling)Position(s): Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed ForcesDOB: 1960POB: Tehran, IranNationality: IranianGender: maleMohammad-Reza Gharaei Ashtiani has been the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces since August 2024.He was the Minister of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran (August 2021-August 2024) and was responsible for the EU-listed Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).MODAFL is responsible for the planning, logistics and funding of Iran’s Armed Forces. It is also a key player in Iran’s defence industry with multiple conglomerates and subordinates active in research and development, maintenance and manufacturing of military equipment, including the manufacturing of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).MODAFL is also involved in the set-up of a joint plant for the production of UAVs and the sale of UAVs to Russia intended for use in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.In his function as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Mohammad-Reza Gharaei Ashtiani coordinates and oversees the conventional army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and is a close associate of the Supreme Leader of Iran. As he oversees the IRGC, this also includes the IRGC Aerospace Force, responsible for Iran’s UAV program. He is thus in a supervising role for both the missile and the UAV program. In his role, he is also supporting Iranian military cooperation with Russia.As Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Mohammad-Reza Gharaei Ashtiani is directly involved in Iran’s UAV and missile programmes and is involved in transferring Iran’s UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.31.5.202420.Mohammad Reza KHIABANIمحمدرضا مدرس خیابانی(Farsi spelling)Position(s): Director of IRISLNationality: IranianGender: maleAssociated entities: Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC/SSJO)Mohammad Reza Khiabani is the director of the EU-listed Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which is a major Iranian maritime carrier.For years, ships belonging to or managed by IRISL or its affiliated companies, have been implicated in shipping military related cargo and other activities aimed at providing support to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, in particular in relation with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and some of its branches, notably the (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) and the (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC/SSJO).The (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) converts container ships owned or previously owned by IRISL Group into drone carriers. The IRGCN is part of the IRGC, and includes an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) division and a missiles division. The IRGCN is involved in Iran’s UAV and missile programmes and involved in transferring Iran’s missiles to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region.The IRGC/SSJO is a research and development unit that is part of the IRGC that develops and manufactures ground penetrating radar, communication systems, weaponry, combat vehicles and electronic cyberwarfare equipment. The IRGC/SSJO is involved in Iran’s UAV and missile programmes and in transferring Iranian UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.Therefore, in his principal managerial position as director of IRISL, Mohammad Reza Khiabani is involved in transferring Iran’s UAVs or missiles or related technologies to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, and is associated with branches of the IRGC, in particular the (EU-listed) IRGC/SSJO and the (EU-listed) IRGCN.18.11.2024’; Names (Transliteration into Latin script) Names Identifying information Reasons for listing Date of listing ‘7. Mohammad-Reza Gharaei ASHTIANI (Farsi spelling) Position(s): Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed ForcesDOB: 1960POB: Tehran, IranNationality: IranianGender: male Mohammad-Reza Gharaei Ashtiani has been the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces since August 2024.He was the Minister of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran (August 2021-August 2024) and was responsible for the EU-listed Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).MODAFL is responsible for the planning, logistics and funding of Iran’s Armed Forces. It is also a key player in Iran’s defence industry with multiple conglomerates and subordinates active in research and development, maintenance and manufacturing of military equipment, including the manufacturing of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).MODAFL is also involved in the set-up of a joint plant for the production of UAVs and the sale of UAVs to Russia intended for use in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.In his function as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Mohammad-Reza Gharaei Ashtiani coordinates and oversees the conventional army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and is a close associate of the Supreme Leader of Iran. As he oversees the IRGC, this also includes the IRGC Aerospace Force, responsible for Iran’s UAV program. He is thus in a supervising role for both the missile and the UAV program. In his role, he is also supporting Iranian military cooperation with Russia.As Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Mohammad-Reza Gharaei Ashtiani is directly involved in Iran’s UAV and missile programmes and is involved in transferring Iran’s UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine. 31.5.2024 20. Mohammad Reza KHIABANI محمدرضا مدرس خیابانی(Farsi spelling) Position(s): Director of IRISLNationality: IranianGender: maleAssociated entities: Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC/SSJO) Mohammad Reza Khiabani is the director of the EU-listed Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which is a major Iranian maritime carrier.For years, ships belonging to or managed by IRISL or its affiliated companies, have been implicated in shipping military related cargo and other activities aimed at providing support to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, in particular in relation with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and some of its branches, notably the (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) and the (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC/SSJO).The (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) converts container ships owned or previously owned by IRISL Group into drone carriers. The IRGCN is part of the IRGC, and includes an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) division and a missiles division. The IRGCN is involved in Iran’s UAV and missile programmes and involved in transferring Iran’s missiles to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region.The IRGC/SSJO is a research and development unit that is part of the IRGC that develops and manufactures ground penetrating radar, communication systems, weaponry, combat vehicles and electronic cyberwarfare equipment. The IRGC/SSJO is involved in Iran’s UAV and missile programmes and in transferring Iranian UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.Therefore, in his principal managerial position as director of IRISL, Mohammad Reza Khiabani is involved in transferring Iran’s UAVs or missiles or related technologies to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, and is associated with branches of the IRGC, in particular the (EU-listed) IRGC/SSJO and the (EU-listed) IRGCN. 18.11.2024’;
Names (Transliteration into Latin script) Names Identifying information Reasons for listing Date of listing
‘7. Mohammad-Reza Gharaei ASHTIANI (Farsi spelling) Position(s): Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed ForcesDOB: 1960POB: Tehran, IranNationality: IranianGender: male Mohammad-Reza Gharaei Ashtiani has been the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces since August 2024.He was the Minister of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran (August 2021-August 2024) and was responsible for the EU-listed Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).MODAFL is responsible for the planning, logistics and funding of Iran’s Armed Forces. It is also a key player in Iran’s defence industry with multiple conglomerates and subordinates active in research and development, maintenance and manufacturing of military equipment, including the manufacturing of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).MODAFL is also involved in the set-up of a joint plant for the production of UAVs and the sale of UAVs to Russia intended for use in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.In his function as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Mohammad-Reza Gharaei Ashtiani coordinates and oversees the conventional army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and is a close associate of the Supreme Leader of Iran. As he oversees the IRGC, this also includes the IRGC Aerospace Force, responsible for Iran’s UAV program. He is thus in a supervising role for both the missile and the UAV program. In his role, he is also supporting Iranian military cooperation with Russia.As Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Mohammad-Reza Gharaei Ashtiani is directly involved in Iran’s UAV and missile programmes and is involved in transferring Iran’s UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine. 31.5.2024
20. Mohammad Reza KHIABANI محمدرضا مدرس خیابانی(Farsi spelling) Position(s): Director of IRISLNationality: IranianGender: maleAssociated entities: Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC/SSJO) Mohammad Reza Khiabani is the director of the EU-listed Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which is a major Iranian maritime carrier.For years, ships belonging to or managed by IRISL or its affiliated companies, have been implicated in shipping military related cargo and other activities aimed at providing support to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, in particular in relation with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and some of its branches, notably the (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) and the (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC/SSJO).The (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) converts container ships owned or previously owned by IRISL Group into drone carriers. The IRGCN is part of the IRGC, and includes an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) division and a missiles division. The IRGCN is involved in Iran’s UAV and missile programmes and involved in transferring Iran’s missiles to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region.The IRGC/SSJO is a research and development unit that is part of the IRGC that develops and manufactures ground penetrating radar, communication systems, weaponry, combat vehicles and electronic cyberwarfare equipment. The IRGC/SSJO is involved in Iran’s UAV and missile programmes and in transferring Iranian UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.Therefore, in his principal managerial position as director of IRISL, Mohammad Reza Khiabani is involved in transferring Iran’s UAVs or missiles or related technologies to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, and is associated with branches of the IRGC, in particular the (EU-listed) IRGC/SSJO and the (EU-listed) IRGCN. 18.11.2024’;
Names (Transliteration into Latin script) Names Identifying information Reasons for listing Date of listing
‘7. Mohammad-Reza Gharaei ASHTIANI (Farsi spelling) Position(s): Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed ForcesDOB: 1960POB: Tehran, IranNationality: IranianGender: male Mohammad-Reza Gharaei Ashtiani has been the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces since August 2024.He was the Minister of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran (August 2021-August 2024) and was responsible for the EU-listed Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).MODAFL is responsible for the planning, logistics and funding of Iran’s Armed Forces. It is also a key player in Iran’s defence industry with multiple conglomerates and subordinates active in research and development, maintenance and manufacturing of military equipment, including the manufacturing of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).MODAFL is also involved in the set-up of a joint plant for the production of UAVs and the sale of UAVs to Russia intended for use in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.In his function as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Mohammad-Reza Gharaei Ashtiani coordinates and oversees the conventional army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and is a close associate of the Supreme Leader of Iran. As he oversees the IRGC, this also includes the IRGC Aerospace Force, responsible for Iran’s UAV program. He is thus in a supervising role for both the missile and the UAV program. In his role, he is also supporting Iranian military cooperation with Russia.As Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Mohammad-Reza Gharaei Ashtiani is directly involved in Iran’s UAV and missile programmes and is involved in transferring Iran’s UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine. 31.5.2024
20. Mohammad Reza KHIABANI محمدرضا مدرس خیابانی(Farsi spelling) Position(s): Director of IRISLNationality: IranianGender: maleAssociated entities: Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC/SSJO) Mohammad Reza Khiabani is the director of the EU-listed Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which is a major Iranian maritime carrier.For years, ships belonging to or managed by IRISL or its affiliated companies, have been implicated in shipping military related cargo and other activities aimed at providing support to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, in particular in relation with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and some of its branches, notably the (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) and the (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC/SSJO).The (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) converts container ships owned or previously owned by IRISL Group into drone carriers. The IRGCN is part of the IRGC, and includes an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) division and a missiles division. The IRGCN is involved in Iran’s UAV and missile programmes and involved in transferring Iran’s missiles to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region.The IRGC/SSJO is a research and development unit that is part of the IRGC that develops and manufactures ground penetrating radar, communication systems, weaponry, combat vehicles and electronic cyberwarfare equipment. The IRGC/SSJO is involved in Iran’s UAV and missile programmes and in transferring Iranian UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.Therefore, in his principal managerial position as director of IRISL, Mohammad Reza Khiabani is involved in transferring Iran’s UAVs or missiles or related technologies to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, and is associated with branches of the IRGC, in particular the (EU-listed) IRGC/SSJO and the (EU-listed) IRGCN. 18.11.2024’;
(2) in the list entitled ‘B. Legal persons, entities and bodies’, entry 20 is replaced by the following:Names (Transliteration into Latin script)NamesIdentifying informationReasons for listingDate of listing‘20.Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)گروه کشتیرانی جمهوری اسلامی ایران(Farsi spelling)Place of registration: IranAssociated individuals: Mohammad Reza Khiabani (director)Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC/SSJO)Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) is a major Iranian maritime carrier.For years, ships belonging to or managed by IRISL or its affiliated companies, have been implicated in shipping military related cargo and other activities aimed at providing support to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, in particular in relation with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and some of its branches, notably the (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) and the (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC/SSJO).The (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) converts container ships owned or previously owned by IRISL Group into drone carriers. The IRGCN is part of the IRGC, and includes an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) division and a missiles division. The IRGCN is involved in Iran’s UAV and missile programmes and involved in transferring Iran’s missiles to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region.The IRGC/SSJO is a research and development unit that is part of the IRGC that develops and manufactures ground penetrating radar, communication systems, weaponry, combat vehicles and electronic cyberwarfare equipment. The IRGC/SSJO is involved in Iran’s UAV and missile programmes and in transferring Iranian UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.Therefore, IRISL is involved in transferring Iran’s UAVs or missiles or related technologies to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, and is associated with branches of the IRGC, in particular the (EU-listed) IRGC/SSJO and the (EU-listed) IRGCN.18.11.2024’. Names (Transliteration into Latin script) Names Identifying information Reasons for listing Date of listing ‘20. Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) گروه کشتیرانی جمهوری اسلامی ایران(Farsi spelling) Place of registration: IranAssociated individuals: Mohammad Reza Khiabani (director)Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC/SSJO) Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) is a major Iranian maritime carrier.For years, ships belonging to or managed by IRISL or its affiliated companies, have been implicated in shipping military related cargo and other activities aimed at providing support to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, in particular in relation with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and some of its branches, notably the (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) and the (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC/SSJO).The (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) converts container ships owned or previously owned by IRISL Group into drone carriers. The IRGCN is part of the IRGC, and includes an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) division and a missiles division. The IRGCN is involved in Iran’s UAV and missile programmes and involved in transferring Iran’s missiles to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region.The IRGC/SSJO is a research and development unit that is part of the IRGC that develops and manufactures ground penetrating radar, communication systems, weaponry, combat vehicles and electronic cyberwarfare equipment. The IRGC/SSJO is involved in Iran’s UAV and missile programmes and in transferring Iranian UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.Therefore, IRISL is involved in transferring Iran’s UAVs or missiles or related technologies to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, and is associated with branches of the IRGC, in particular the (EU-listed) IRGC/SSJO and the (EU-listed) IRGCN. 18.11.2024’.
Names (Transliteration into Latin script) Names Identifying information Reasons for listing Date of listing
‘20. Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) گروه کشتیرانی جمهوری اسلامی ایران(Farsi spelling) Place of registration: IranAssociated individuals: Mohammad Reza Khiabani (director)Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC/SSJO) Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) is a major Iranian maritime carrier.For years, ships belonging to or managed by IRISL or its affiliated companies, have been implicated in shipping military related cargo and other activities aimed at providing support to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, in particular in relation with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and some of its branches, notably the (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) and the (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC/SSJO).The (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) converts container ships owned or previously owned by IRISL Group into drone carriers. The IRGCN is part of the IRGC, and includes an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) division and a missiles division. The IRGCN is involved in Iran’s UAV and missile programmes and involved in transferring Iran’s missiles to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region.The IRGC/SSJO is a research and development unit that is part of the IRGC that develops and manufactures ground penetrating radar, communication systems, weaponry, combat vehicles and electronic cyberwarfare equipment. The IRGC/SSJO is involved in Iran’s UAV and missile programmes and in transferring Iranian UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.Therefore, IRISL is involved in transferring Iran’s UAVs or missiles or related technologies to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, and is associated with branches of the IRGC, in particular the (EU-listed) IRGC/SSJO and the (EU-listed) IRGCN. 18.11.2024’.
Names (Transliteration into Latin script) Names Identifying information Reasons for listing Date of listing
‘20. Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) گروه کشتیرانی جمهوری اسلامی ایران(Farsi spelling) Place of registration: IranAssociated individuals: Mohammad Reza Khiabani (director)Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC/SSJO) Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) is a major Iranian maritime carrier.For years, ships belonging to or managed by IRISL or its affiliated companies, have been implicated in shipping military related cargo and other activities aimed at providing support to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, in particular in relation with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and some of its branches, notably the (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) and the (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC/SSJO).The (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) converts container ships owned or previously owned by IRISL Group into drone carriers. The IRGCN is part of the IRGC, and includes an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) division and a missiles division. The IRGCN is involved in Iran’s UAV and missile programmes and involved in transferring Iran’s missiles to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region.The IRGC/SSJO is a research and development unit that is part of the IRGC that develops and manufactures ground penetrating radar, communication systems, weaponry, combat vehicles and electronic cyberwarfare equipment. The IRGC/SSJO is involved in Iran’s UAV and missile programmes and in transferring Iranian UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.Therefore, IRISL is involved in transferring Iran’s UAVs or missiles or related technologies to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, and is associated with branches of the IRGC, in particular the (EU-listed) IRGC/SSJO and the (EU-listed) IRGCN. 18.11.2024’.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 20 July 2023, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/1532 (1).
(2) On the basis of a review of Decision (CFSP) 2023/1532, the restrictive measures set out therein should be renewed until 27 July 2026, and the entries concerning two persons and one entity listed in the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2023/1532 should be updated.
(3) Decision (CFSP) 2023/1532 should therefore be amended accordingly,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Decision (CFSP) 2023/1532 is amended as follows:

(1) in Article 10 the date ‘27 July 2025’ is replaced by the date ‘27 July 2026’;
(2) Annex I is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.

This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Annex I to Decision (CFSP) 2023/1532, entitled ‘List of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Articles 2 and 3’, is amended as follows:

(1) in the list entitled ‘A. Natural persons’, entries 7 and 20 are replaced by the following:

Names (Transliteration into Latin script)
Names
Identifying information
Reasons for listing
Date of listing
‘7. Mohammad-Reza Gharaei ASHTIANI
(Farsi spelling)
Position(s): Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces
DOB: 1960
POB: Tehran, Iran
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Mohammad-Reza Gharaei Ashtiani has been the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces since August 2024. He was the Minister of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran (August 2021-August 2024) and was responsible for the EU-listed Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).
MODAFL is responsible for the planning, logistics and funding of Iran’s Armed Forces. It is also a key player in Iran’s defence industry with multiple conglomerates and subordinates active in research and development, maintenance and manufacturing of military equipment, including the manufacturing of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
MODAFL is also involved in the set-up of a joint plant for the production of UAVs and the sale of UAVs to Russia intended for use in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
In his function as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Mohammad-Reza Gharaei Ashtiani coordinates and oversees the conventional army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and is a close associate of the Supreme Leader of Iran. As he oversees the IRGC, this also includes the IRGC Aerospace Force, responsible for Iran’s UAV program. He is thus in a supervising role for both the missile and the UAV program. In his role, he is also supporting Iranian military cooperation with Russia.
As Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Mohammad-Reza Gharaei Ashtiani is directly involved in Iran’s UAV and missile programmes and is involved in transferring Iran’s UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.
31.5.2024 20. Mohammad Reza KHIABANI
محمدرضا مدرس خیابانی
(Farsi spelling)
Position(s): Director of IRISL
Nationality: Iranian
Gender: male
Associated entities: Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC/SSJO)
Mohammad Reza Khiabani is the director of the EU-listed Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which is a major Iranian maritime carrier.
For years, ships belonging to or managed by IRISL or its affiliated companies, have been implicated in shipping military related cargo and other activities aimed at providing support to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, in particular in relation with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and some of its branches, notably the (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) and the (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC/SSJO).
The (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) converts container ships owned or previously owned by IRISL Group into drone carriers. The IRGCN is part of the IRGC, and includes an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) division and a missiles division. The IRGCN is involved in Iran’s UAV and missile programmes and involved in transferring Iran’s missiles to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region.
The IRGC/SSJO is a research and development unit that is part of the IRGC that develops and manufactures ground penetrating radar, communication systems, weaponry, combat vehicles and electronic cyberwarfare equipment. The IRGC/SSJO is involved in Iran’s UAV and missile programmes and in transferring Iranian UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.
Therefore, in his principal managerial position as director of IRISL, Mohammad Reza Khiabani is involved in transferring Iran’s UAVs or missiles or related technologies to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, and is associated with branches of the IRGC, in particular the (EU-listed) IRGC/SSJO and the (EU-listed) IRGCN.
18.11.2024’;

(2) in the list entitled ‘B. Legal persons, entities and bodies’, entry 20 is replaced by the following:

Names (Transliteration into Latin script)
Names
Identifying information
Reasons for listing
Date of listing
‘20. Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)
گروه کشتیرانی جمهوری اسلامی ایران
(Farsi spelling)
Place of registration: Iran
Associated individuals: Mohammad Reza Khiabani (director)
Associated entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC/SSJO)
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) is a major Iranian maritime carrier.
For years, ships belonging to or managed by IRISL or its affiliated companies, have been implicated in shipping military related cargo and other activities aimed at providing support to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, in particular in relation with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and some of its branches, notably the (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) and the (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation (IRGC/SSJO).
The (EU-listed) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) converts container ships owned or previously owned by IRISL Group into drone carriers. The IRGCN is part of the IRGC, and includes an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) division and a missiles division. The IRGCN is involved in Iran’s UAV and missile programmes and involved in transferring Iran’s missiles to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region.
The IRGC/SSJO is a research and development unit that is part of the IRGC that develops and manufactures ground penetrating radar, communication systems, weaponry, combat vehicles and electronic cyberwarfare equipment. The IRGC/SSJO is involved in Iran’s UAV and missile programmes and in transferring Iranian UAVs to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine.
Therefore, IRISL is involved in transferring Iran’s UAVs or missiles or related technologies to Russia in support of its war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities undermining peace and security in the Middle East and the Red Sea region, and is associated with branches of the IRGC, in particular the (EU-listed) IRGC/SSJO and the (EU-listed) IRGCN.
18.11.2024’.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1544 of 30 July 2025 determining the date from which the Entry/Exit System is to start operations pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 of the European Parliament and of the Council

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1544 31.7.2025
(1) Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 established the Entry/Exit System (EES). The EES is a system which records electronically the time and place of entry and exit of third-country nationals admitted for a short stay to the territory of the Member States and which calculates the duration of their authorised stay.
(2) Since the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226, the Commission, Member States and the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-Lisa) have completed the necessary technical and legal arrangements to collect and transmit data to the EES.
(3) Article 66(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 sets out a number of conditions which are to be fulfilled before the EES starts operations. Those conditions have all been fulfilled. The implementing and delegated acts necessary for the operation of the EES have been adopted(2); eu-Lisa has declared the successful completion of a comprehensive test of the EES, which was conducted in cooperation with the Member States; Member States have notified that they have validated the technical and legal arrangements to collect and transmit the data referred to in Articles 16 to 20 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 to the EES; and the Member States have made notifications to the Commission regarding the controller, the competent authorities having access to enter, rectify, complete, erase, consult or search data in EES, their designated authorities and central access points.
(4) It is therefore appropriate to determine the date from which the operations of the EES start.
(5) The Council endorsed the Interoperability Roadmap on 5 March 2025 indicating October 2025 as the timeline for starting the EES operations.
(6) 12 October 2025 is the most appropriate date enabling Member States to achieve the EES objectives in a timely manner, as it avoids coincidence with peak traffic periods at the external borders.
(7) In order to allow all parties concerned to make the practical arrangements necessary to prepare for the start of operations of the EES, this Decision should enter into force on the day of its publication.
(8) Given that Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 builds upon the Schengenacquis, Denmark notified its decision to implement Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 in its national law, in accordance with Article 4 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Denmark is therefore bound by this Decision.
(9) This Decision does not constitute a development of the provisions of the Schengenacquisin which Ireland takes part in accordance with Council Decision 2002/192/EC(3); Ireland is therefore not taking part in the adoption of this Decision and is not bound by it or subject to its application.
(10) As regards Iceland and Norway, this Decision constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengenacquiswithin the meaning of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning those States association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengenacquis(4), which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point A of Council Decision 1999/437/EC(5).
(11) As regards Switzerland, this Decision constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengenacquiswithin the meaning of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengenacquis(6), which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point A of Decision 1999/437/EC, read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2008/146/EC(7).
(12) As regards Liechtenstein, this Decision constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengenacquiswithin the meaning of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengenacquis(8)which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point A of Decision 1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2011/350/EU(9).
(13) As regards Cyprus, the provisions of the Schengenacquisrelating to the Schengen Information System have been put into effect by Council Decision (EU) 2023/870(10). However, the operation of the EES also requires the granting of passive access to the Visa Information System once the verification in accordance with the applicable Schengen evaluation procedure has been successfully completed. The EES should be operated only by a Member State which fulfils this condition at the start of the operation of the EES. Therefore, Cyprus which is not operating the EES from the start of operations should be connected to the EES, in accordance with the procedure set out in Regulation (EU) 2017/2226, as soon as all of the conditions are met,
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017 establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third-country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 and Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 (1), and in particular Article 66(1) thereof,
Whereas:
(1) Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 established the Entry/Exit System (EES). The EES is a system which records electronically the time and place of entry and exit of third-country nationals admitted for a short stay to the territory of the Member States and which calculates the duration of their authorised stay.
(2) Since the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226, the Commission, Member States and the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-Lisa) have completed the necessary technical and legal arrangements to collect and transmit data to the EES.
(3) Article 66(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 sets out a number of conditions which are to be fulfilled before the EES starts operations. Those conditions have all been fulfilled. The implementing and delegated acts necessary for the operation of the EES have been adopted (2); eu-Lisa has declared the successful completion of a comprehensive test of the EES, which was conducted in cooperation with the Member States; Member States have notified that they have validated the technical and legal arrangements to collect and transmit the data referred to in Articles 16 to 20 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 to the EES; and the Member States have made notifications to the Commission regarding the controller, the competent authorities having access to enter, rectify, complete, erase, consult or search data in EES, their designated authorities and central access points.
(4) It is therefore appropriate to determine the date from which the operations of the EES start.
(5) The Council endorsed the Interoperability Roadmap on 5 March 2025 indicating October 2025 as the timeline for starting the EES operations.
(6) 12 October 2025 is the most appropriate date enabling Member States to achieve the EES objectives in a timely manner, as it avoids coincidence with peak traffic periods at the external borders.
(7) In order to allow all parties concerned to make the practical arrangements necessary to prepare for the start of operations of the EES, this Decision should enter into force on the day of its publication.
(8) Given that Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 builds upon the Schengen acquis, Denmark notified its decision to implement Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 in its national law, in accordance with Article 4 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Denmark is therefore bound by this Decision.
(9) This Decision does not constitute a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in which Ireland takes part in accordance with Council Decision 2002/192/EC (3); Ireland is therefore not taking part in the adoption of this Decision and is not bound by it or subject to its application.
(10) As regards Iceland and Norway, this Decision constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning those States association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (4), which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point A of Council Decision 1999/437/EC (5).
(11) As regards Switzerland, this Decision constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (6), which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point A of Decision 1999/437/EC, read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2008/146/EC (7).
(12) As regards Liechtenstein, this Decision constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (8) which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point A of Decision 1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2011/350/EU (9).
(13) As regards Cyprus, the provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Schengen Information System have been put into effect by Council Decision (EU) 2023/870 (10). However, the operation of the EES also requires the granting of passive access to the Visa Information System once the verification in accordance with the applicable Schengen evaluation procedure has been successfully completed. The EES should be operated only by a Member State which fulfils this condition at the start of the operation of the EES. Therefore, Cyprus which is not operating the EES from the start of operations should be connected to the EES, in accordance with the procedure set out in Regulation (EU) 2017/2226, as soon as all of the conditions are met,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The Entry/Exit System established by Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 shall start operations on 12 October 2025.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1546 of 30 July 2025 on refusing protection in the Union of the Appellation of Origin ГЖЕЛЬ (GZHEL) registered in the International Register of Appellations of Origin and Geographical Indications of the Geneva Act

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1546 31.7.2025
(1) In accordance with Article 5(1) and (2) of the 2015 Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement on Appellations of Origin and Geographical Indications(2)(the ‘Geneva Act’), the Competent Authorities of each Contracting Party to the Geneva Act may file applications for international registration of an appellation of origin (AO) or geographical indication with the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which registers it in the International Register in accordance with Article 6 of the Geneva Act. In accordance with Article 9 of the Geneva Act, the other Contracting Parties are to protect registered AOs and geographical indications on their territories within their own legal system subject to any refusal, renunciation, invalidation or cancellation.
(2) In accordance with Article 6(4) of the Geneva Act, on 3 October 2024, the International Bureau of the WIPO (‘the International Bureau’) notified the Commission that the name ГЖЕЛЬ (GZHEL), applied by the Russian Federation, had been recorded as an AO in the International Register of Appellations of Origin and Geographical Indications under the Geneva Act. The name designates decorative and applied ceramic products (porcelain, majolica, fireclay, pottery) from the village of Turygino, in the Ramenskiy District, in the Moscow Region.
(3) Since there is no protection at Union level for geographical indications designating crafts products to date, the international registration of the AO ГЖЕЛЬ (GZHEL) was not published. In accordance with Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1753, only the international registration notified by the International Bureau relating to products in respect of which protection at Union level of geographical indications is provided are to be published in theOfficial Journal of the European Unionto enable possible opposition to be lodged. Regulation (EU) 2023/2411 of the European Parliament and of the Council(3), providing for protection of geographical indications designating craft and industrial products will become applicable from 1 December 2025 in order to provide that registrations of craft and industrial geographical indications from third countries notified by WIPO are published in theOfficial Journal of the European Unionand assessed with a view to granting protection.
(4) Therefore, in accordance with Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1753, the protection in the Union of the name ГЖЕЛЬ (GZHEL), designating decorative and applied ceramic products, registered as AO in the International Register under the Geneva Act should be refused.
(5) In addition, in accordance with Article 5s(1) of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014(4), competent institutions under Union law, including the Commission, are not allowed to accept new applications for registration of geographical indications filed by Russian nationals or natural persons residing in Russia or by legal persons established in Russia.
(6) Furthermore, in accordance with Article 5s(4) of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, the Union, when acting under the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, is obliged to use best efforts to ensure that WIPO or intellectual property offices constituted under Union law do not accept new applications for intellectual property rights by any Russian nationals or natural persons residing in Russia, or by legal persons, entities or bodies established in Russia.
(7) As AO ГЖЕЛЬ (GZHEL) has been notified to the Union for protection following its registration in the International Register, it is not possible to ensure that WIPO will not accept new applications for intellectual property rights by any Russian nationals or natural persons residing in Russia, or by legal persons, entities or bodies established in Russia. However, the protection sought for intellectual property rights, and in particular geographical indications, related to Russia should not be granted in the Union.
(8) As long as such restrictive measures against the applications and the protection of intellectual property rights concerning any Russian nationals or natural persons residing in Russia, or legal persons, entities or bodies established in Russia, are in force, the Commission should act in a way to stop the granting of any such protection of AO or geographical indication.
(9) Since several Member States, namely, Czechia, France, Hungary, Portugal and Slovakia are contracting parties to the Geneva Act, and considering the lack of competence of Member States to decide on national protection of an AO due to the fact that it is exclusive Union competence since the Union’s accession to the Geneva Act in 2019, it is necessary to clarify that the refusal to ГЖЕЛЬ (GZHEL) applies to the whole territory of the Union. Furthermore, given the exclusive competence of the Union on the matter and the role the Commission exercises within the Geneva Act, of competent authority for the Union and for those Member States that are contracting parties to the Geneva Act, such refusal should be notified to WIPO on behalf of the Union and on behalf of Czechia, France, Hungary, Portugal and Slovakia.
(10) Although they are not competent to adopt decisions on the national protection of the AOs registered under the Geneva Act, in order to ensure consistency in protection of those AOs throughout the territory of the Union, Bulgaria and Italy, being signatories of the Lisbon Agreement, but not having yet acceded to the Geneva Act, should notify WIPO of the refusal of the protection of the AO ГЖЕЛЬ (GZHEL), if they accede to the Geneva Act, within one year from that accession.
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/1753 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the action of the Union following its accession to the Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement on Appellations of Origin and Geographical Indications (1), and in particular Article 7(2) thereof,
Whereas:
(1) In accordance with Article 5(1) and (2) of the 2015 Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement on Appellations of Origin and Geographical Indications (2) (the ‘Geneva Act’), the Competent Authorities of each Contracting Party to the Geneva Act may file applications for international registration of an appellation of origin (AO) or geographical indication with the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which registers it in the International Register in accordance with Article 6 of the Geneva Act. In accordance with Article 9 of the Geneva Act, the other Contracting Parties are to protect registered AOs and geographical indications on their territories within their own legal system subject to any refusal, renunciation, invalidation or cancellation.
(2) In accordance with Article 6(4) of the Geneva Act, on 3 October 2024, the International Bureau of the WIPO (‘the International Bureau’) notified the Commission that the name ГЖЕЛЬ (GZHEL), applied by the Russian Federation, had been recorded as an AO in the International Register of Appellations of Origin and Geographical Indications under the Geneva Act. The name designates decorative and applied ceramic products (porcelain, majolica, fireclay, pottery) from the village of Turygino, in the Ramenskiy District, in the Moscow Region.
(3) Since there is no protection at Union level for geographical indications designating crafts products to date, the international registration of the AO ГЖЕЛЬ (GZHEL) was not published. In accordance with Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1753, only the international registration notified by the International Bureau relating to products in respect of which protection at Union level of geographical indications is provided are to be published in the Official Journal of the European Union to enable possible opposition to be lodged. Regulation (EU) 2023/2411 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3), providing for protection of geographical indications designating craft and industrial products will become applicable from 1 December 2025 in order to provide that registrations of craft and industrial geographical indications from third countries notified by WIPO are published in the Official Journal of the European Union and assessed with a view to granting protection.
(4) Therefore, in accordance with Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1753, the protection in the Union of the name ГЖЕЛЬ (GZHEL), designating decorative and applied ceramic products, registered as AO in the International Register under the Geneva Act should be refused.
(5) In addition, in accordance with Article 5s(1) of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (4), competent institutions under Union law, including the Commission, are not allowed to accept new applications for registration of geographical indications filed by Russian nationals or natural persons residing in Russia or by legal persons established in Russia.
(6) Furthermore, in accordance with Article 5s(4) of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, the Union, when acting under the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, is obliged to use best efforts to ensure that WIPO or intellectual property offices constituted under Union law do not accept new applications for intellectual property rights by any Russian nationals or natural persons residing in Russia, or by legal persons, entities or bodies established in Russia.
(7) As AO ГЖЕЛЬ (GZHEL) has been notified to the Union for protection following its registration in the International Register, it is not possible to ensure that WIPO will not accept new applications for intellectual property rights by any Russian nationals or natural persons residing in Russia, or by legal persons, entities or bodies established in Russia. However, the protection sought for intellectual property rights, and in particular geographical indications, related to Russia should not be granted in the Union.
(8) As long as such restrictive measures against the applications and the protection of intellectual property rights concerning any Russian nationals or natural persons residing in Russia, or legal persons, entities or bodies established in Russia, are in force, the Commission should act in a way to stop the granting of any such protection of AO or geographical indication.
(9) Since several Member States, namely, Czechia, France, Hungary, Portugal and Slovakia are contracting parties to the Geneva Act, and considering the lack of competence of Member States to decide on national protection of an AO due to the fact that it is exclusive Union competence since the Union’s accession to the Geneva Act in 2019, it is necessary to clarify that the refusal to ГЖЕЛЬ (GZHEL) applies to the whole territory of the Union. Furthermore, given the exclusive competence of the Union on the matter and the role the Commission exercises within the Geneva Act, of competent authority for the Union and for those Member States that are contracting parties to the Geneva Act, such refusal should be notified to WIPO on behalf of the Union and on behalf of Czechia, France, Hungary, Portugal and Slovakia.
(10) Although they are not competent to adopt decisions on the national protection of the AOs registered under the Geneva Act, in order to ensure consistency in protection of those AOs throughout the territory of the Union, Bulgaria and Italy, being signatories of the Lisbon Agreement, but not having yet acceded to the Geneva Act, should notify WIPO of the refusal of the protection of the AO ГЖЕЛЬ (GZHEL), if they accede to the Geneva Act, within one year from that accession.
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The protection of the name ГЖЕЛЬ (GZHEL), which is registered as an Appellation of Origin (AO) in the International Register, is hereby refused in the Union.
The refusal of protection referred to in Article 1 applies to the entire territory of the Union. It shall be notified to the World Intellectual Property Organisation (‘WIPO’) on behalf of the Union and also on behalf of Czechia, France, Hungary, Portugal and Slovakia, as contracting parties to the Geneva Act.
Bulgaria and Italy shall notify WIPO of the refusal of protection concerning the AO ГЖЕЛЬ (GZHEL), within one year from their accession to the Geneva Act.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
It shall be notified to the World Intellectual Property Organization.

Council Decision (EU) 2025/1541 of 18 July 2025 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of the Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and the Republic of Ecuador, of the other part, on cooperation between the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and the Ecuadorian authorities competent for combating serious crime and terrorism

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1541 25.7.2025
(1) Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council(1)provides that it is possible for the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) to transfer personal data to an authority of a third country on the basis of, inter alia, an international agreement concluded between the Union and that third country pursuant to Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), adducing adequate safeguards with respect to the protection of privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals.
(2) On 15 May 2023, the Council authorised the Commission to open negotiations with the Republic of Ecuador for an agreement on the exchange of personal data between Europol and the Ecuadorian authorities competent for fighting serious crime and terrorism.
(3) The negotiations for the Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and the Republic of Ecuador, of the other part, on cooperation between the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and the Ecuadorian authorities competent for combating serious crime and terrorism (the ‘Agreement’) were successfully concluded, and the text of the Agreement was initialled on 3 March 2025.
(4) The Agreement establishes cooperative relations between Europol and the competent authorities of Ecuador, and allows for the transfer of personal and non-personal data between them, with a view to combating serious crime and terrorism and protecting the security of the Union and its citizens.
(5) The Agreement ensures full respect for the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’), including the right to respect for private and family life, recognised in Article 7 of the Charter, the right to the protection of personal data, recognised in Article 8 of the Charter, and the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, recognised in Article 47 of the Charter. The Agreement includes adequate safeguards for the protection of personal data transferred by Europol under the Agreement.
(6) The Agreement does not affect, and is without prejudice to, the transfer of personal data or other forms of cooperation between the authorities responsible for safeguarding national security.
(7) Ireland is bound by Regulation (EU) 2016/794 and is therefore taking part in the adoption of this Decision.
(8) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 22 on the position of Denmark, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the TFEU, Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this Decision and is not bound by it or subject to its application.
(9) The European Data Protection Supervisor was consulted in accordance with Article 42(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council(2)and delivered an opinion on 17 July 2025.
(10) Therefore, the Agreement should be signed,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 16(2) and Article 88, in conjunction with Article 218(5), thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Whereas:
(1) Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) provides that it is possible for the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) to transfer personal data to an authority of a third country on the basis of, inter alia, an international agreement concluded between the Union and that third country pursuant to Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), adducing adequate safeguards with respect to the protection of privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals.
(2) On 15 May 2023, the Council authorised the Commission to open negotiations with the Republic of Ecuador for an agreement on the exchange of personal data between Europol and the Ecuadorian authorities competent for fighting serious crime and terrorism.
(3) The negotiations for the Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and the Republic of Ecuador, of the other part, on cooperation between the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and the Ecuadorian authorities competent for combating serious crime and terrorism (the ‘Agreement’) were successfully concluded, and the text of the Agreement was initialled on 3 March 2025.
(4) The Agreement establishes cooperative relations between Europol and the competent authorities of Ecuador, and allows for the transfer of personal and non-personal data between them, with a view to combating serious crime and terrorism and protecting the security of the Union and its citizens.
(5) The Agreement ensures full respect for the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’), including the right to respect for private and family life, recognised in Article 7 of the Charter, the right to the protection of personal data, recognised in Article 8 of the Charter, and the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, recognised in Article 47 of the Charter. The Agreement includes adequate safeguards for the protection of personal data transferred by Europol under the Agreement.
(6) The Agreement does not affect, and is without prejudice to, the transfer of personal data or other forms of cooperation between the authorities responsible for safeguarding national security.
(7) Ireland is bound by Regulation (EU) 2016/794 and is therefore taking part in the adoption of this Decision.
(8) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 22 on the position of Denmark, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the TFEU, Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this Decision and is not bound by it or subject to its application.
(9) The European Data Protection Supervisor was consulted in accordance with Article 42(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) and delivered an opinion on 17 July 2025.
(10) Therefore, the Agreement should be signed,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The signing of the Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and the Republic of Ecuador, of the other part, on cooperation between the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and the Ecuadorian authorities competent for combating serious crime and terrorism is hereby authorised on behalf of the Union, subject to the conclusion of the said Agreement (3).
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Council Decision (EU) 2025/1540 of 18 July 2025 amending Decision 2013/488/EU on the security rules for protecting EU classified information

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1540 25.7.2025
(1) Appendix B to Council Decision 2013/488/EU(2)contains a table of equivalence of security classifications.
(2) Appendix C to Decision 2013/488/EU contains a list of national security authorities (NSAs).
(3) On 14 April 2025, Belgium notified the General Secretariat of the Council of changes to its security classifications. Those changes introduce an additional fourth Belgian classification level ‘RESTREINT (Loi 11.12.1998) – BEPERKT (Wet 11.12.1998)’.
(4) On 12 June 2025, Belgium notified the General Secretariat of the Council of changes to its NSA regarding the NSA’s contact details and the competent ministry.
(5) Decision 2013/488/EU should therefore be amended accordingly,
EU TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET SECRET UE/EU SECRET CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED
Belgium TRÈS SECRET (Loi 11.12.1998)ZEER GEHEIM (Wet 11.12.1998) SECRET (Loi 11.12.1998)GEHEIM (Wet 11.12.1998) CONFIDENTIEL (Loi 11.12.1998)VERTROUWELIJK (Wet 11.12.1998) RESTREINT (Loi 11.12.1998)BEPERKT (Wet 11.12.1998)
Bulgaria Cтpoгo ceкретно Ceкретно Поверително За служебно ползване
Czechia Přísně tajné Tajné Důvěrné Vyhrazené
Denmark YDERST HEMMELIGT HEMMELIGT FORTROLIGT TIL TJENESTEBRUG
Germany STRENG GEHEIM GEHEIM VS(1)VERTRAULICH VS – NUR FÜR DEN DIENSTGEBRAUCH
Estonia Täiesti salajane Salajane Konfidentsiaalne Piiratud
Ireland Top Secret Secret Confidential Restricted
Greece Άκρως ΑπόρρητοAbr: ΑΑΠ ΑπόρρητοAbr: (ΑΠ) ΕμπιστευτικόΑbr: (ΕΜ) Περιορισμένης ΧρήσηςAbr: (ΠΧ)
Spain SECRETO RESERVADO CONFIDENCIAL DIFUSIÓN LIMITADA
France TRÈS SECRETTRÈS SECRET DÉFENSE(2a) SECRETSECRET DÉFENSE(2a) CONFIDENTIEL DÉFENSE(2a),(2b) nota(2c)below
Croatia VRLO TAJNO TAJNO POVJERLJIVO OGRANIČENO
Italy Segretissimo Segreto Riservatissimo Riservato
Cyprus Άκρως ΑπόρρητοΑbr: (ΑΑΠ) ΑπόρρητοΑbr: (ΑΠ) ΕμπιστευτικόΑbr: (ΕΜ) Περιορισμένης ΧρήσηςΑbr: (ΠΧ)
Latvia Sevišķi slepeni Slepeni Konfidenciāli Dienesta vajadzībām
Lithuania Visiškai slaptai Slaptai Konfidencialiai Riboto naudojimo
Luxembourg Très Secret Lux Secret Lux Confidentiel Lux Restreint Lux
Hungary Szigorúan titkos! Titkos! Bizalmas! Korlátozott terjesztésű!
Malta L-Ogħla SegretezzaTop Secret SigrietSecret KunfidenzjaliConfidential RistrettRestricted(3)
Netherlands Stg. ZEER GEHEIM Stg. GEHEIM Stg. CONFIDENTIEEL Dep. VERTROUWELIJK
Austria Streng Geheim Geheim Vertraulich Eingeschränkt
Poland Ściśle Tajne Tajne Poufne Zastrzeżone
Portugal Muito Secreto Secreto Confidencial Reservado
Romania Strict secret de importanță deosebită Strict secret Secret Secret de serviciu
Slovenia STROGO TAJNO TAJNO ZAUPNO INTERNO
Slovakia Prísne tajné Tajné Dôverné Vyhradené
Finland ERITTÄIN SALAINEN YTTERST HEMLIG SALAINEN HEMLIG LUOTTAMUKSELLINEN KONFIDENTIELL KÄYTTÖ RAJOITETTU BEGRÄNSAD TILLGÅNG
Sweden Kvalificerat hemlig Hemlig Konfidentiell Begränsat hemlig
BELGIUMAutorité Nationale de Sécurité/Nationale VeiligheidsoverheidSPF Justice / FOD JustitieRue des Petits Carmes, 151000 BruxellesEmail: [email protected] ESTONIANational Security Authority DepartmentEstonian Foreign Intelligence ServiceRahumäe tee 4B11316 TallinnTel. +372 693 9211Fax +372 693 5001Email: [email protected]
BULGARIAState Commission on Information Security4 Kozloduy Str.1202 SofiaTel. + 359 29333600Fax + 359 29873750Email: [email protected]: www.dksi.bg IRELANDNational Security AuthorityDepartment of Foreign Affairs and Trade76 – 78 Harcourt StreetDublin 2D02 DX45 IrelandTel. 1: + 353 1 4082842Tel. 2: + 353 1 4082724Email: [email protected]
CZECHIANárodní bezpečnostní úřad(National Security Authority)Na Popelce 2/16150 06 Praha 56Tel. + 420 257283335Fax + 420 257283110Email: [email protected]: www.nbu.cz GREECEΓενικό Επιτελείο Εθνικής Άμυνας (ΓΕΕΘΑ)Διεύθυνση Ασφαλείας και ΑντιπληροφοριώνΣΤΓ 1020 -Χολαργός (Αθήνα)ΕλλάδαΤηλ.: + 30 2106572045 (ώρες γραφείου)+ 30 2106572009 (ώρες γραφείου)Φαξ: + 30 2106536279+ 30 2106577612Hellenic National Defence General Staff (HNDGS)Counter Intelligence and Security Directorate (NSA)227-231 HOLARGOSSTG 1020 ATHENSTel. + 30 2106572045+ 30 2106572009Fax + 30 2106536279+ 30 2106577612
DENMARKPolitiets Efterretningstjeneste(Danish Security Intelligence Service)Klausdalsbrovej 12860 SøborgTel. + 45 45 15 90 07Fax + 45 45 15 01 90Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste(Danish Defence Intelligence Service)Kastellet 302100 Copenhagen ØTel. + 45 33325566Fax + 45 33931320 SPAINAutoridad Nacional de SeguridadOficina Nacional de SeguridadCalle Argentona, 3028023 MadridTel. + 34 913725000Fax + 34 913725808Email: [email protected]
GERMANYBundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und HeimatSection ÖS II 5Alt-Moabit 140D-10557 BerlinTel. + 49 30186810Fax + 49 30186811441Email 1: [email protected] 2: [email protected] FRANCESecrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationaleSous-direction Protection du secret (SGDSN/PSD)51 Boulevard de la Tour-Maubourg75700 Paris 07 SPTel. + 33 171758177Fax + 33 171758200
CROATIAOffice of the National Security CouncilCroatian NSAJurjevska 3410000 ZagrebCroatiaTel. + 385 14681222Fax + 385 14686049Email: [email protected]: www.uvns.hr LUXEMBOURGAutorité nationale de SécuritéBoîte postale 23791023 LuxembourgTel. + 352 24782210 centralTel. + 352 24782253 directFax + 352 24782243
ITALYPresidenza del Consiglio dei MinistriDipartimento Informazioni per la Sicurezza (DIS)Ufficio Centrale per la Segretezza (UCSe)Via Galilei, 3200185 RomaTel. + 39 06478601Fax + 39 064885273Email: [email protected] HUNGARYNemzeti Biztonsági Felügyelet(National Security Authority of Hungary)1024 Budapest, Szilágyi Erzsébet fasor 11/BPostal address: 1399 Budapest, Pf. 710/50Tel. + 36-1/391-1862Fax + 36-1/391-1889Email: [email protected]: www.nbf.hu
CYPRUSΥΠΟΥΡΓΕΙΟ ΑΜΥΝΑΣΣΤΡΑΤΙΩΤΙΚΟ ΕΠΙΤΕΛΕΙΟ ΤΟΥ ΥΠΟΥΡΓΟΥ ΑΜΥΝΑΣΕΘΝΙΚΗ ΑΡΧΗ ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑΣ (ΕΑΑ)Υπουργείο ΆμυναςΛεωφόρος Στροβόλου 172-174, 1432ΛευκωσίαΤαχυδρομικός Κώδικας: 2048Τηλεφωνα: + 357 22807569, + 357 22807643, + 357 22807764Τηλεομοιότυπ: + 357 22302351Ηλεκτρονικό Ταχυδρομείο: [email protected] of DefenceMinister’s Military StaffNational Security Authority (NSA)172-174 Strovolou Avenue, 1432NicosiaPostal code: 2048Tel. + 357 22807569, + 357 22807643, + 357 22807764Fax + 357 22302351Email: [email protected] MALTAMinistry for Home Affairs and National SecurityP.O. Box 146MT-VallettaTel. + 356 21249844Fax + 356 25695321
LATVIANational Security AuthorityConstitution Protection Bureau of the Republic of LatviaP.O. Box 286LV-1001 RigaTel. + 371 67025418Email: [email protected] NETHERLANDSMinisterie van Binnenlandse Zaken en KoninkrijksrelatiesPostbus 200102500 EA Den HaagTel. + 31 703204400Fax + 31 703200733Ministerie van DefensieBeveiligingsautoriteitPostbus 207012500 ES Den HaagTel. + 31 703187060Fax + 31 703187522
LITHUANIALietuvos Respublikos paslapčių apsaugos koordinavimo komisija(The Commission for Secrets Protection Coordination of the Republic of Lithuania National Security Authority)Pilaitės ave. 19LT-06264 VilniusTel. + 370 5 706 66128Fax +370 706 66700Email: [email protected] AUSTRIAInformationssicherheitskommissionBundeskanzleramtBallhausplatz 21010 WienTel. + 43 1 53115 202594Fax + 43 1 53109 202594Email: [email protected]
POLANDAgencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego – ABW(Internal Security Agency)2A Rakowiecka St.00-993 WarszawaTel. + 48 225857663Fax + 48 225858509Email: [email protected]: www.abw.gov.pl SLOVAKIANárodný bezpečnostný úrad(National Security Authority)Budatínska 30851 06 BratislavaTel. + 421 2 6869 1111Fax + 421 2 6869 1700Email: [email protected]: www.nbu.gov.sk
PORTUGALPresidência do Conselho de MinistrosAutoridade Nacional de SegurançaRua da Junqueira, 691300-342 LisboaTel. + 351 213031710Fax + 351 213031711 FINLANDNational Security AuthorityMinistry for Foreign AffairsP.O. Box 453FI-00023 GovernmentTel. + 358 9 16055890Email: [email protected]
ROMANIAOficiul Registrului Național al Informațiilor Secrete de Stat– Romanian NSA – ORNISSNational Registry Office for Classified InformationStrada Mureș nr. 4012275 BucharestTel. + 40 212075114Fax + 40 212240714Email: [email protected]: www.orniss.ro SWEDENMinistry for Foreign AffairsSwedish National Security Authority103 39 StockholmTel. + 46 8 405 10 00Email: [email protected]
SLOVENIAUrad Vlade RS za varovanje tajnih podatkovŠmartinska 1521000 LjubljanaTel. + 386 147817570Fax + 386 14781399Email: [email protected]
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 240(3) thereof,
Having regard to Council Decision 2009/937/EU of 1 December 2009 adopting the Council’s Rules of Procedure (1), and in particular Article 24 thereof,
Whereas:
(1) Appendix B to Council Decision 2013/488/EU (2) contains a table of equivalence of security classifications.
(2) Appendix C to Decision 2013/488/EU contains a list of national security authorities (NSAs).
(3) On 14 April 2025, Belgium notified the General Secretariat of the Council of changes to its security classifications. Those changes introduce an additional fourth Belgian classification level ‘RESTREINT (Loi 11.12.1998) – BEPERKT (Wet 11.12.1998)’.
(4) On 12 June 2025, Belgium notified the General Secretariat of the Council of changes to its NSA regarding the NSA’s contact details and the competent ministry.
(5) Decision 2013/488/EU should therefore be amended accordingly,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Appendices B and C to Decision 2013/488/EU are replaced by the text appearing respectively in Annexes I and II to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Appendix B
EQUIVALENCE OF SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS
EU
TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET
SECRET UE/EU SECRET
CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL
RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED
Belgium
TRÈS SECRET (Loi 11.12.1998)
ZEER GEHEIM (Wet 11.12.1998)
SECRET (Loi 11.12.1998)
GEHEIM (Wet 11.12.1998)
CONFIDENTIEL (Loi 11.12.1998)
VERTROUWELIJK (Wet 11.12.1998)
RESTREINT (Loi 11.12.1998)
BEPERKT (Wet 11.12.1998)
Bulgaria
Cтpoгo ceкретно
Ceкретно
Поверително
За служебно ползване
Czechia
Přísně tajné
Tajné
Důvěrné
Vyhrazené
Denmark
YDERST HEMMELIGT
HEMMELIGT
FORTROLIGT
TIL TJENESTEBRUG
Germany
STRENG GEHEIM
GEHEIM
VS (1) VERTRAULICH
VS – NUR FÜR DEN DIENSTGEBRAUCH
Estonia
Täiesti salajane
Salajane
Konfidentsiaalne
Piiratud
Ireland
Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Greece
Άκρως Απόρρητο
Abr: ΑΑΠ
Απόρρητο
Abr: (ΑΠ)
Εμπιστευτικό
Αbr: (ΕΜ)
Περιορισμένης Χρήσης
Abr: (ΠΧ)
Spain
SECRETO
RESERVADO
CONFIDENCIAL
DIFUSIÓN LIMITADA
France
TRÈS SECRET
TRÈS SECRET DÉFENSE (2a)
SECRET
SECRET DÉFENSE (2a)
CONFIDENTIEL DÉFENSE (2a), (2b)
nota (2c) below
Croatia
VRLO TAJNO
TAJNO
POVJERLJIVO
OGRANIČENO
Italy
Segretissimo
Segreto
Riservatissimo
Riservato
Cyprus
Άκρως Απόρρητο
Αbr: (ΑΑΠ)
Απόρρητο
Αbr: (ΑΠ)
Εμπιστευτικό
Αbr: (ΕΜ)
Περιορισμένης Χρήσης
Αbr: (ΠΧ)
Latvia
Sevišķi slepeni
Slepeni
Konfidenciāli
Dienesta vajadzībām
Lithuania
Visiškai slaptai
Slaptai
Konfidencialiai
Riboto naudojimo
Luxembourg
Très Secret Lux
Secret Lux
Confidentiel Lux
Restreint Lux
Hungary
Szigorúan titkos!
Titkos!
Bizalmas!
Korlátozott terjesztésű!
Malta
L-Ogħla Segretezza
Top Secret
Sigriet
Secret
Kunfidenzjali
Confidential
Ristrett
Restricted (3) Netherlands
Stg. ZEER GEHEIM
Stg. GEHEIM
Stg. CONFIDENTIEEL
Dep. VERTROUWELIJK
Austria
Streng Geheim
Geheim
Vertraulich
Eingeschränkt
Poland
Ściśle Tajne
Tajne
Poufne
Zastrzeżone
Portugal
Muito Secreto
Secreto
Confidencial
Reservado
Romania
Strict secret de importanță deosebită
Strict secret
Secret
Secret de serviciu
Slovenia
STROGO TAJNO
TAJNO
ZAUPNO
INTERNO
Slovakia
Prísne tajné
Tajné
Dôverné
Vyhradené
Finland
ERITTÄIN SALAINEN YTTERST HEMLIG
SALAINEN HEMLIG
LUOTTAMUKSELLINEN KONFIDENTIELL
KÄYTTÖ RAJOITETTU BEGRÄNSAD TILLGÅNG
Sweden
Kvalificerat hemlig
Hemlig
Konfidentiell
Begränsat hemlig

(1) Germany: VS = Verschlusssache.

(2a) Information generated by France before 1 July 2021 and classified ‘TRÈS SECRET DÉFENSE’, ‘SECRET DÉFENSE’ and ‘CONFIDENTIEL DÉFENSE’ continue to be handled and protected at the equivalent level of ‘TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET’, ‘SECRET UE/EU SECRET’ and ‘CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL’ respectively.

(2b) France handles and protects ‘CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL’ information in accordance with the French security measures for protecting ‘SECRET’ information.

(2c) France does not use the classification ‘RESTREINT’ in its national system. France handles and protects ‘RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED’ information in a manner no less stringent than the standards and procedures described in the security rules of the Council of the European Union.

(3) The Maltese and English markings for Malta can be used interchangeably.

Appendix C
LIST OF NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES (NSAs)
BELGIUM
Autorité Nationale de Sécurité/Nationale Veiligheidsoverheid
SPF Justice / FOD Justitie
Rue des Petits Carmes, 15
1000 Bruxelles
Email: [email protected]
ESTONIA
National Security Authority Department
Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service
Rahumäe tee 4B
11316 Tallinn
Tel. +372 693 9211
Fax +372 693 5001
Email: [email protected]
BULGARIA
State Commission on Information Security
4 Kozloduy Str.
1202 Sofia
Tel. + 359 29333600
Fax + 359 29873750
Email: [email protected]
Website: www.dksi.bg
IRELAND
National Security Authority
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
76 – 78 Harcourt Street
Dublin 2
D02 DX45 Ireland
Tel. 1: + 353 1 4082842
Tel. 2: + 353 1 4082724
Email: [email protected]
CZECHIA
Národní bezpečnostní úřad
(National Security Authority)
Na Popelce 2/16
150 06 Praha 56
Tel. + 420 257283335
Fax + 420 257283110
Email: [email protected]
Website: www.nbu.cz
GREECE
Γενικό Επιτελείο Εθνικής Άμυνας (ΓΕΕΘΑ)
Διεύθυνση Ασφαλείας και Αντιπληροφοριών
ΣΤΓ 1020 -Χολαργός (Αθήνα)
Ελλάδα
Τηλ.: + 30 2106572045 (ώρες γραφείου)
+ 30 2106572009 (ώρες γραφείου)
Φαξ: + 30 2106536279
+ 30 2106577612
Hellenic National Defence General Staff (HNDGS)
Counter Intelligence and Security Directorate (NSA)
227-231 HOLARGOS
STG 1020 ATHENS
Tel. + 30 2106572045
+ 30 2106572009
Fax + 30 2106536279
+ 30 2106577612
DENMARK
Politiets Efterretningstjeneste
(Danish Security Intelligence Service)
Klausdalsbrovej 1
2860 Søborg
Tel. + 45 45 15 90 07
Fax + 45 45 15 01 90
Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste
(Danish Defence Intelligence Service)
Kastellet 30
2100 Copenhagen Ø
Tel. + 45 33325566
Fax + 45 33931320
SPAIN
Autoridad Nacional de Seguridad
Oficina Nacional de Seguridad
Calle Argentona, 30
28023 Madrid
Tel. + 34 913725000
Fax + 34 913725808
Email: [email protected]
GERMANY
Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat
Section ÖS II 5
Alt-Moabit 140
D-10557 Berlin
Tel. + 49 30186810
Fax + 49 30186811441
Email 1: [email protected]
Email 2: [email protected]
FRANCE
Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale
Sous-direction Protection du secret (SGDSN/PSD)
51 Boulevard de la Tour-Maubourg
75700 Paris 07 SP
Tel. + 33 171758177
Fax + 33 171758200
CROATIA
Office of the National Security Council
Croatian NSA
Jurjevska 34
10000 Zagreb
Croatia
Tel. + 385 14681222
Fax + 385 14686049
Email: [email protected]
Website: www.uvns.hr
LUXEMBOURG
Autorité nationale de Sécurité
Boîte postale 2379
1023 Luxembourg
Tel. + 352 24782210 central
Tel. + 352 24782253 direct
Fax + 352 24782243
ITALY
Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri
Dipartimento Informazioni per la Sicurezza (DIS)
Ufficio Centrale per la Segretezza (UCSe)
Via Galilei, 32
00185 Roma
Tel. + 39 06478601
Fax + 39 064885273
Email: [email protected]
HUNGARY
Nemzeti Biztonsági Felügyelet
(National Security Authority of Hungary)
1024 Budapest, Szilágyi Erzsébet fasor 11/B
Postal address: 1399 Budapest, Pf. 710/50
Tel. + 36-1/391-1862
Fax + 36-1/391-1889
Email: [email protected]
Website: www.nbf.hu
CYPRUS
ΥΠΟΥΡΓΕΙΟ ΑΜΥΝΑΣ
ΣΤΡΑΤΙΩΤΙΚΟ ΕΠΙΤΕΛΕΙΟ ΤΟΥ ΥΠΟΥΡΓΟΥ ΑΜΥΝΑΣ
ΕΘΝΙΚΗ ΑΡΧΗ ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑΣ (ΕΑΑ)
Υπουργείο Άμυνας
Λεωφόρος Στροβόλου 172-174, 1432
Λευκωσία
Ταχυδρομικός Κώδικας: 2048
Τηλεφωνα: + 357 22807569, + 357 22807643, + 357 22807764
Τηλεομοιότυπ: + 357 22302351
Ηλεκτρονικό Ταχυδρομείο: [email protected]
Ministry of Defence
Minister’s Military Staff
National Security Authority (NSA)
172-174 Strovolou Avenue, 1432
Nicosia
Postal code: 2048
Tel. + 357 22807569, + 357 22807643, + 357 22807764
Fax + 357 22302351
Email: [email protected]
MALTA
Ministry for Home Affairs and National Security
P.O. Box 146
MT-Valletta
Tel. + 356 21249844
Fax + 356 25695321
LATVIA
National Security Authority
Constitution Protection Bureau of the Republic of Latvia
P.O. Box 286
LV-1001 Riga
Tel. + 371 67025418
Email: [email protected]
NETHERLANDS
Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties
Postbus 20010
2500 EA Den Haag
Tel. + 31 703204400
Fax + 31 703200733
Ministerie van Defensie
Beveiligingsautoriteit
Postbus 20701
2500 ES Den Haag
Tel. + 31 703187060
Fax + 31 703187522
LITHUANIA
Lietuvos Respublikos paslapčių apsaugos koordinavimo komisija
(The Commission for Secrets Protection Coordination of the Republic of Lithuania National Security Authority)
Pilaitės ave. 19
LT-06264 Vilnius
Tel. + 370 5 706 66128
Fax +370 706 66700
Email: [email protected]
AUSTRIA
Informationssicherheitskommission
Bundeskanzleramt
Ballhausplatz 2
1010 Wien
Tel. + 43 1 53115 202594
Fax + 43 1 53109 202594
Email: [email protected]
POLAND
Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego – ABW
(Internal Security Agency)
2A Rakowiecka St.
00-993 Warszawa
Tel. + 48 225857663
Fax + 48 225858509
Email: [email protected]
Website: www.abw.gov.pl
SLOVAKIA
Národný bezpečnostný úrad
(National Security Authority)
Budatínska 30
851 06 Bratislava
Tel. + 421 2 6869 1111
Fax + 421 2 6869 1700
Email: [email protected]
Website: www.nbu.gov.sk
PORTUGAL
Presidência do Conselho de Ministros
Autoridade Nacional de Segurança
Rua da Junqueira, 69
1300-342 Lisboa
Tel. + 351 213031710
Fax + 351 213031711
FINLAND
National Security Authority
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
P.O. Box 453
FI-00023 Government
Tel. + 358 9 16055890
Email: [email protected]
ROMANIA
Oficiul Registrului Național al Informațiilor Secrete de Stat
– Romanian NSA – ORNISS
National Registry Office for Classified Information
Strada Mureș nr. 4
012275 Bucharest
Tel. + 40 212075114
Fax + 40 212240714
Email: [email protected]
Website: www.orniss.ro
SWEDEN
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Swedish National Security Authority
103 39 Stockholm
Tel. + 46 8 405 10 00
Email: [email protected]
SLOVENIA
Urad Vlade RS za varovanje tajnih podatkov
Šmartinska 152
1000 Ljubljana
Tel. + 386 147817570
Fax + 386 14781399
Email: [email protected]

Council Decision (EU) 2025/1531 of 18 February 2025 on the signing, on behalf of the Union, and provisional application of the Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, on the participation of the Republic of Korea in Union programmes

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1531 31.7.2025
(1) By letter dated 14 February 2022, the Republic of Korea expressed its formal interest in becoming associated to Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2021-2027) established by the Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council(1)(‘Horizon Europe’).
(2) On 15 May 2023, the Council adopted Decision (EU) 2023/1093(2), authorising the opening of negotiations with the Republic of Korea for an agreement on the general principles for the participation of the Republic of Korea in Horizon Europe.
(3) The negotiations have been completed and the Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, on the Participation of the Republic of Korea in Union programmes (‘the Agreement’) was initialled on 29 March 2024. The conclusion of the negotiations was officially announced on 25 March 2024 in Brussels, Belgium. At the request of the Republic of Korea, additional negotiation rounds took place and a modified version of the Agreement text was initialled on 23 September 2024.
(4) The objectives of the Agreement are to establish a longstanding framework for cooperation between the Union and the Republic of Korea and to set out the terms and conditions for the participation of the Republic of Korea in the Union programmes which are opened to its participation in accordance with the basic acts establishing Union programmes as defined in the Agreement. Under the Agreement, the Union will carry out cooperation measures with the Republic of Korea pursuant to Article 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
(5) Pursuant to Article 3(1) of the Agreement, the specific terms and conditions for the participation of the Republic of Korea in any Union programme or activity are subject to the basic acts and as covered by the Protocols to the Agreement.
(6) Pursuant to Article 3(2) of the Agreement, the specific terms and conditions for the participation of the Republic of Korea in Horizon Europe are laid down in the Protocol on the Association of the Republic of Korea to Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2021-2027) (‘Protocol on the Association of Korea to Horizon Europe’) to the Agreement.
(7) In line with the Council’s mandate, the Protocol on the Association of Korea to Horizon Europe was negotiated in parallel to the Agreement and, pursuant to Article 17(9) of the Agreement, forms an integral part thereof. The Republic of Korea associates to Pillar II ‘Global Challenges and European Industrial Competitiveness’ of Horizon Europe.
(8) The Republic of Korea fulfils the criteria set out in Article 16(1), point (d), of Regulation (EU) 2021/695.
(9) The Agreement complies with Article 16(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/695, which requires that the association to Horizon Europe of the third countries under Article 16(1), point (d), of that Regulation be in accordance with the conditions laid down in an agreement covering the participation of such a country or territory in any Union programme, provided that the agreement ensures a fair balance as regards the contributions and benefits of the third country participating in the Union programmes; lays down the conditions of participation in the Union programmes, including the calculation of financial contributions to individual programmes, and their administrative costs; does not confer on the third country any decision-making power in respect of the Union programme, and guarantees the rights of the Union to ensure sound financial management and to protect the Union’s financial interests.
(10) Therefore, the Agreement should be signed.
(11) With the aim of ensuring timely cooperation between the Union and the Republic of Korea in the field of research, technological development and innovation and allowing for the participation of Korean entities in Horizon Europe, the Agreement should be applied provisionally,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Articles 186 and 212 in conjunction with Article 218(5) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
Whereas:
(1) By letter dated 14 February 2022, the Republic of Korea expressed its formal interest in becoming associated to Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2021-2027) established by the Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) (‘Horizon Europe’).
(2) On 15 May 2023, the Council adopted Decision (EU) 2023/1093 (2), authorising the opening of negotiations with the Republic of Korea for an agreement on the general principles for the participation of the Republic of Korea in Horizon Europe.
(3) The negotiations have been completed and the Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, on the Participation of the Republic of Korea in Union programmes (‘the Agreement’) was initialled on 29 March 2024. The conclusion of the negotiations was officially announced on 25 March 2024 in Brussels, Belgium. At the request of the Republic of Korea, additional negotiation rounds took place and a modified version of the Agreement text was initialled on 23 September 2024.
(4) The objectives of the Agreement are to establish a longstanding framework for cooperation between the Union and the Republic of Korea and to set out the terms and conditions for the participation of the Republic of Korea in the Union programmes which are opened to its participation in accordance with the basic acts establishing Union programmes as defined in the Agreement. Under the Agreement, the Union will carry out cooperation measures with the Republic of Korea pursuant to Article 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
(5) Pursuant to Article 3(1) of the Agreement, the specific terms and conditions for the participation of the Republic of Korea in any Union programme or activity are subject to the basic acts and as covered by the Protocols to the Agreement.
(6) Pursuant to Article 3(2) of the Agreement, the specific terms and conditions for the participation of the Republic of Korea in Horizon Europe are laid down in the Protocol on the Association of the Republic of Korea to Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2021-2027) (‘Protocol on the Association of Korea to Horizon Europe’) to the Agreement.
(7) In line with the Council’s mandate, the Protocol on the Association of Korea to Horizon Europe was negotiated in parallel to the Agreement and, pursuant to Article 17(9) of the Agreement, forms an integral part thereof. The Republic of Korea associates to Pillar II ‘Global Challenges and European Industrial Competitiveness’ of Horizon Europe.
(8) The Republic of Korea fulfils the criteria set out in Article 16(1), point (d), of Regulation (EU) 2021/695.
(9) The Agreement complies with Article 16(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/695, which requires that the association to Horizon Europe of the third countries under Article 16(1), point (d), of that Regulation be in accordance with the conditions laid down in an agreement covering the participation of such a country or territory in any Union programme, provided that the agreement ensures a fair balance as regards the contributions and benefits of the third country participating in the Union programmes; lays down the conditions of participation in the Union programmes, including the calculation of financial contributions to individual programmes, and their administrative costs; does not confer on the third country any decision-making power in respect of the Union programme, and guarantees the rights of the Union to ensure sound financial management and to protect the Union’s financial interests.
(10) Therefore, the Agreement should be signed.
(11) With the aim of ensuring timely cooperation between the Union and the Republic of Korea in the field of research, technological development and innovation and allowing for the participation of Korean entities in Horizon Europe, the Agreement should be applied provisionally,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The signing of the Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, on the participation of the Republic of Korea in Union programmes is hereby authorised on behalf of the Union, subject to the conclusion of the Agreement (3).
The Agreement shall be applied provisionally, in accordance with Article 17(2) of the Agreement, as from the date on which the Parties have notified each other of the completion of their internal procedures necessary for that purpose, pending its entry into force.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1529 of 29 July 2025 laying down rules for the application of Directive (EU) 2016/797 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards a request from Finland not to apply the requirement to use the latest ETCS Baseline in the trackside installation set out in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1695 (notified under document C(2025) 5123)

January 13, 2026
Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1529 31.7.2025
(1) On 6 June 2024, Finland submitted to the Commission a request for non-application of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1695(2)to the EKA pilot track until 2035 (the ‘request’). The request was submitted on the basis of Article 7(1), point (c), of Directive (EU) 2016/797.
(2) Under point 7.2.4.2. of Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1695, a control-command signalling trackside subsystem must comply with the Technical Specification for Interoperability in force at the time of the request for authorisation of placing in service of the infrastructure. This would require the installation of the European Train Control System (‘ETCS’) complying with Baseline 4 specifications on the EKA pilot track.
(3) The project referred to in the request consists of installing a control-command and signalling trackside subsystem according to the Baseline 3 system version 2.1 specifications on the EKA ETCS pilot track section area Lielahti-Siuro-Kokemäki-Pori/Rauma ja Pori/Mäntyluoto/Tahkoluoto. This section consists of approximately 190 kilometres of single-track line and 18 stations (the ‘EKA pilot track project’).
(4) According to the documents submitted by Finland, complying with point 7.2.4.2. of Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1695 would entail an additional cost of at least EUR 16,3 million. This is because implementing the latest ETCS Baseline would require an amendment to the signed contract and a redesign of the technical solution to be implemented. This would delay implementation of the project by two and a half years because of the need to notify in the register of infrastructure (RINF)(3)five years in advance of the change of the ETCS functionalities required from vehicles circulating on this line(4). Delaying the implementation of the project could also lead to a loss of co-funding under Finland’s recovery and resilience plan.
(5) As an alternative provision, Finland suggests applying Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/919(5)with all subsequent amendments, which means that only the ETCS Baseline 3 needs to be implemented. Finland intends to install ETCS Baseline 3 system version 2.1. For the future, Finland commits to installing ETCS Baseline 4 by 2035, subject to a new economic viability analysis supporting this step.
(6) Finland has committed to assessing the economic viability of an upgrade of the trackside ETCS to Baseline 4 on the EKA pilot track project at the latest in 2030, including the possibility of introducing the future radio standard Future Railway Mobile Communication System on this line. Finland should inform the Commission about the outcome of the economic analysis in 2030 and on a biennial basis at the end of 2032 and 2034 about the progress regarding the implementation of ETCS Baseline 4 on this line, provided that a respective decision has been taken.
(7) Based on the justification for the request provided by Finland and the alternative provisions proposed, the conditions set out in Article 7(1), point (c), and Article 7(4) of Directive (EU) 2016/797 can be considered as fulfilled for the EKA pilot track project described here. The request should therefore be accepted.
(8) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee referred to in Article 51(1) of Directive (EU) 2016/797,
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Directive (EU) 2016/797 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the interoperability of the rail system within the European Union (1), and in particular Article 7(4) thereof,
Whereas:
(1) On 6 June 2024, Finland submitted to the Commission a request for non-application of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1695 (2) to the EKA pilot track until 2035 (the ‘request’). The request was submitted on the basis of Article 7(1), point (c), of Directive (EU) 2016/797.
(2) Under point 7.2.4.2. of Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1695, a control-command signalling trackside subsystem must comply with the Technical Specification for Interoperability in force at the time of the request for authorisation of placing in service of the infrastructure. This would require the installation of the European Train Control System (‘ETCS’) complying with Baseline 4 specifications on the EKA pilot track.
(3) The project referred to in the request consists of installing a control-command and signalling trackside subsystem according to the Baseline 3 system version 2.1 specifications on the EKA ETCS pilot track section area Lielahti-Siuro-Kokemäki-Pori/Rauma ja Pori/Mäntyluoto/Tahkoluoto. This section consists of approximately 190 kilometres of single-track line and 18 stations (the ‘EKA pilot track project’).
(4) According to the documents submitted by Finland, complying with point 7.2.4.2. of Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1695 would entail an additional cost of at least EUR 16,3 million. This is because implementing the latest ETCS Baseline would require an amendment to the signed contract and a redesign of the technical solution to be implemented. This would delay implementation of the project by two and a half years because of the need to notify in the register of infrastructure (RINF) (3) five years in advance of the change of the ETCS functionalities required from vehicles circulating on this line (4). Delaying the implementation of the project could also lead to a loss of co-funding under Finland’s recovery and resilience plan.
(5) As an alternative provision, Finland suggests applying Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/919 (5) with all subsequent amendments, which means that only the ETCS Baseline 3 needs to be implemented. Finland intends to install ETCS Baseline 3 system version 2.1. For the future, Finland commits to installing ETCS Baseline 4 by 2035, subject to a new economic viability analysis supporting this step.
(6) Finland has committed to assessing the economic viability of an upgrade of the trackside ETCS to Baseline 4 on the EKA pilot track project at the latest in 2030, including the possibility of introducing the future radio standard Future Railway Mobile Communication System on this line. Finland should inform the Commission about the outcome of the economic analysis in 2030 and on a biennial basis at the end of 2032 and 2034 about the progress regarding the implementation of ETCS Baseline 4 on this line, provided that a respective decision has been taken.
(7) Based on the justification for the request provided by Finland and the alternative provisions proposed, the conditions set out in Article 7(1), point (c), and Article 7(4) of Directive (EU) 2016/797 can be considered as fulfilled for the EKA pilot track project described here. The request should therefore be accepted.
(8) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee referred to in Article 51(1) of Directive (EU) 2016/797,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Finland’s request for the non-application of point 7.2.4.2. of Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1695 to the EKA pilot track project is accepted on the condition that the alternative measures proposed by Finland are applied and a reassessment is performed in 2030 on the future economic viability of installing ETCS Baseline 4 on the EKA pilot track.
This Decision is addressed to the Republic of Finland.
It shall apply until 31 December 2035.