Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1705 of 29 July 2025 implementing Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya

                                January 13, 2026                            

Official Journalof the European Union
ENL series

2025/1705
30.7.2025

(1)
On 31 July 2015, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333.

(2)
Pursuant to Article 17(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333, the Council has reviewed the lists of designated persons and entities set out in Annexes II and IV to that Decision.

(3)
The Council has concluded that the entry for one person should be deleted, and that the restrictive measures against all other persons and entities in the lists set out in Annexes II and IV to Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333 should be maintained.

(4)
Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333 should therefore be amended accordingly,

(1)
in Annex II (‘List of persons and entities referred to in Article 8(2)’), Part A (‘Persons’), entry 9 (concerning HOUEJ, Mohamad Ali) is deleted;

(2)
in Annex IV (‘List of persons and entities referred to in Article 9(2)’), Part A (‘Persons’), entry 9 (concerning HOUEJ, Mohamad Ali) is deleted.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 31(2) thereof,

Having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333 of 31 July 2015 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya, and repealing Decision 2011/137/CFSP (1), and in particular Article 12(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

(1) On 31 July 2015, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333.

(2) Pursuant to Article 17(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333, the Council has reviewed the lists of designated persons and entities set out in Annexes II and IV to that Decision.

(3) The Council has concluded that the entry for one person should be deleted, and that the restrictive measures against all other persons and entities in the lists set out in Annexes II and IV to Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333 should be maintained.

(4) Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Annexes II and IV to Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333 are amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333 is amended as follows:
(1) in Annex II (‘List of persons and entities referred to in Article 8(2)’), Part A (‘Persons’), entry 9 (concerning HOUEJ, Mohamad Ali) is deleted;

(2) in Annex IV (‘List of persons and entities referred to in Article 9(2)’), Part A (‘Persons’), entry 9 (concerning HOUEJ, Mohamad Ali) is deleted.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1582 of 29 July 2025 concerning certain emergency measures relating to infection with lumpy skin disease virus in Italy and repealing Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1318 (notified under document C(2025) 5362)

                                January 13, 2026                            

Official Journalof the European Union
ENL series

2025/1582
1.8.2025

(1)
Infection with lumpy skin disease virus is an infectious, vector-borne disease affecting bovine animals. Its occurrence can have a severe impact on the concerned animal population and on the profitability of farming, also causing disturbance to movements of those animals and products thereof within the Union and exports to third countries.

(2)
In the event of an outbreak of an infection with lumpy skin disease virus in bovine animals, there is a serious risk of the spread of that disease to other establishments of bovine animals particularly due its main mode of transmission through vectors.

(3)
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687(2)supplements the rules for the control of the listed diseases referred to in Article 9(1), points (a), (b) and (c), of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, and defined as category A, B and C diseases in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1882(3). In particular, Articles 21 and 22 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 provide for the establishment of a restricted zone in the event of an outbreak of a category A disease, including infection with lumpy skin disease virus, and for certain measures to be applied therein. In addition, Article 21(1) of that Delegated Regulation provides that the restricted zone is to comprise at least a protection zone, a surveillance zone, and, if necessary, further restricted zones around or adjacent to the protection and surveillance zones.

(4)
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1318(4)was adopted on the basis of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, and it lays down certain interim emergency measures relating to infection with lumpy skin disease virus in Italy.

(5)
More particularly, Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1318 requires the establishment of restricted zones in the sense of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 in that Member State, and determine the areas listed in their respective Annexes as such zones.

(6)
Since the adoption of Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1318, Italy has notified the Commission of 25 additional outbreaks of infection with lumpy skin disease virus in establishments keeping bovine animals in the provinces of Nuoro and Sassari, in the region of Sardinia, as well as one additional outbreak in the region of Lombardy, which were reported between 25 June and 17 July 2025. In response to these outbreaks, Italy has established protection and surveillance zones, as well as further restricted zones, in the provinces of Nuoro and Sassari, in the region of Sardinia, as well as protection and surveillance zones in the region of Lombardy, where the disease control measures laid down in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 are applied. In addition, Italy has established a surveillance zone in an area bordering France, in response to the outbreak confirmed by France on 12 July 2025 in regions close to the Italian border.

(7)
The size of the areas indicated as protection zones and the surveillance zones as well as the further restricted zone in the Annex to this Decision, as well as the duration of the measures to be applied therein, are based on the criteria laid down in Article 64(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/429 as well as on the rules laid down in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687. The criteria applied for the choice of the size of the protection zone and the surveillance zone, as well as of the duration of the measures to be applied therein, include the consideration of not only the epidemiological situation as regards infection with lumpy skin disease virus in the areas affected by that disease, but also of other epidemiological factors, including geographical parameters and the risk for the further spread of the disease in view of the presence of insect vectors. The chosen duration of the measures foreseen in this Decision has also taken into account the international standards of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code of the World Organisation for Animal Health(5).

(8)
Regulation (EU) 2016/429, in particular Article 69, provides that the competent authority of a Member State may use emergency protective vaccination where necessary for the effective control of a listed disease in kept animals. To that end, the competent authority is to establish vaccination zones and implement an official vaccination plan that meets specific requirements. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/361(6), which supplements Regulation (EU) 2016/429 lays down, inter alia, the specific rules to be implemented by Member States when using emergency protective vaccination in bovine animals to prevent or control a listed disease. That Delegated Regulation also contains the conditions under which the movement of vaccinated animals and products thereof may be allowed. Specific conditions for emergency protective vaccination against infection with lumpy skin disease are laid down in Annex IX to that Delegated Regulation.

(9)
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/140(7)lays down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2016/429 with regard to the Union antigen, vaccine and diagnostic reagent banks. In particular, it lays out the procedural and technical requirements under Article 8 for Member States to request emergency access to vaccines, including those for lumpy skin disease, from vaccine banks.

(10)
On 1 July 2025, Italy submitted to the Commission its official vaccination plan for emergency protective vaccination against infection with lumpy skin disease. The plan includes information on the geographical and administrative scope of the vaccination zones, the number of establishments and animals to be vaccinated, and the duration of the vaccination, as required by Article 6(4), point (a), of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/361. They also requested sufficient vaccine doses from the Union vaccine bank, in accordance with Article 8 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/140 in order to commence emergency protective vaccination in the entire territory of the region of Sardinia

(11)
The conditions under which Italy is to apply emergency protective vaccination against infection with lumpy skin disease virus, as well as the risk-mitigating measures that are to be taken for the movement of vaccinated animals and their products are laid down in Annex IX to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/361. In line with these conditions, vaccination may be implemented in vaccination zones I or II, depending on the confirmation of infection with lumpy skin disease virus.

(12)
The type, size and duration of vaccination zones I and II may need to be adjusted in the light of the evolving epidemiological situation and the progress of the vaccination campaigns, particularly taking into account the evolving level of vaccine coverage achieved. Where appropriate or necessary, a vaccination zone II or part thereof may need to be converted into a vaccination zone I and vice versa, in line with the criteria set out in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/361 and based on the information provided by the competent authorities of the affected Member States. Accordingly, it is necessary to indicate, in the Annex to this Decision, the dates for the conversion of one type of vaccination zone to another.

(13)
In view of the current epidemiological situation and the risk that infection with lumpy skin disease virus can spread through sub-clinically infected bovine animals, it is necessary to prohibit the movement of such animals from any location within the protection, surveillance, or further restricted zones to destinations outside the external perimeters of the further restricted zones in Italy or outside that Member State. To that end, specific areas in the territories of Italy had to be identified where enhanced measures like those applicable in further restricted zones, as provided for in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, should be applied, and from where movements of bovine animals outside the external perimeters of those areas or beyond are also prohibited until a certain date.

(14)
In order to prevent any unnecessary disturbance to trade within the Union, and to avoid unjustified barriers to trade being imposed by third countries, the areas identified as protection, surveillance and further restricted zones, as well as the vaccination zones, should be set out in the Annex to this Decision, and the duration of those measures fixed, in collaboration with those Member States.

(15)
To ensure legal clarity, the restricted zones and vaccination zones should be clearly defined in terms of their geographical scope and their duration to prevent the further spread of the disease within Italy to other Member States or to third countries. In light of the epidemiological situation, the provisions of this Decision should apply as soon as possible.

(16)
Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1318 should, therefore, be repealed and replaced by this Decision.

(17)
The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,

(a)
restricted zones, which comprise the protection, surveillance and further restricted zones, are established immediately by the competent authorities of those Member States in accordance with Article 21 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, and under the conditions laid down in that Article;

(b)
vaccination zones are established immediately by the competent authorities of those Member States in accordance with Part 1 of Annex IX to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/361, and under the conditions laid down in that Annex;

(c)
the protection, surveillance and further restricted zones referred to in point (a) as well as the vaccination zones referred to in point (b) comprise at least the areas listed in Annexes I and III to this Decision;

(d)
the measures required to be applied in the protection, surveillance and further restricted zones as well as the vaccination zones are applied at least until the dates listed in the Annexes to this Decision.

Administrative area and ADIS reference number of the outbreak
Areas established as protection and surveillance zones, part of the restricted zone, referred to in Article 1
Date until applicable

Sardinia regionIT-LSD-2025-00001IT-LSD-2025-00003IT-LSD-2025-00004IT-LSD-2025-00005IT-LSD-2025-00006IT-LSD-2025-00007IT-LSD-2025-00008IT-LSD-2025-00009IT-LSD-2025-00010IT-LSD-2025-00011IT-LSD-2025-00012IT-LSD-2025-00013IT-LSD-2025-00014IT-LSD-2025-00015IT-LSD-2025-00016IT-LSD-2025-00017IT-LSD-2025-00018IT-LSD-2025-00019IT-LSD-2025-00020IT-LSD-2025-00021IT-LSD-2025-00022IT-LSD-2025-00023IT-LSD-2025-00024IT-LSD-2025-00025IT-LSD-2025-00026IT-LSD-2025-00027
Protection zone:Those parts of the region of Sardinia, contained within a circle of a radius of 20 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 40.30429, Long. 9.22154 (2025/1), Lat. 40.31139, Long. 9.09821 (2025/3), Lat. 40.24291, Long. 9.22451 (2025/4), Lat. 40.392626, Long. 9.018567 (2025/5), Lat. 40.2623, Long. 9.082244 (2025/6), Lat. 40.22246, Long. 9.19132 (2025/7), Lat. 40.335997, Long. 9.123835 (2025/8), Lat. 40.28903, 9.102816 Long.(2025/9), Lat. 40.209698, Long. 9.177213 (2025/10), Lat. 40.24404, Long. 9.13817 (2025/11), Lat. 40.33445, Long. 9.15608 (2025/12), Lat. 40.319967 Long. 9.100123 (2025/13), Lat. 40.3451 Long. 9.2594 (2025/14), Lat. 40.3121, Long. 9.2046 (2025/15), Lat. 40.34778, Long. 9.16083 (2025/16), Lat. 40.24096, Long. 9.093 (2025/17), Lat. 40.35071, Long. 9.132964 (2025/18), Lat. 40.3399, Long. 9.167 (2025/19), Lat. 40.725228, Long. 9.485748 (2025/20), Lat. 40.467998, Long. 9.151939 (2025/21), Lat. 40.28833, Long. 9.157329 (2025/22), Lat. 40.24569, Long. 9.20289 (2025/23), Lat. 40.260758, Long. 9.168392 (2025/24), Lat. 40.33221, Long. 9.08099 (2025/25), Lat. 40.280527, Long. 9.116003 (2025/26), Lat. 40.3192, Long. 9.1386 (2025/27).
18.8.2025

Surveillance zone:Those parts of the region of Sardinia, contained within a circle of a radius of 50 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 40.30429, Long. 9.22154 (2025/1), Lat. 40.30429, Long. 9.22154 (2025/1), Lat. 40.31139, Long. 9.09821 (2025/3), Lat. 40.24291, Long. 9.22451 (2025/4), Lat. 40.392626, Long. 9.018567 (2025/5), Lat. 40.2623, Long. 9.082244 (2025/6), Lat. 40.22246, Long. 9.19132 (2025/7), Lat. 40.335997, Long. 9.123835 (2025/8), Lat. 40.28903, Long. 9.102816 (2025/9), Lat. 40.209698 Long. 9.177213 (2025/10), Lat. 40.24404, Long. 9.13817 (2025/11), Lat. 40.33445, Long. 9.15608 (2025/12), Lat. 40.319967, Long. 9.100123 (2025/13), Lat. 40.3451, Long. 9.2594 (2025/14), Lat. 40.3121, Long. 9.2046 (2025/15), Lat. 40.34778, Long. 9.16083 (2025/16), Lat. 40.24096, Long. 9.093 (2025/17), Lat. 40.35071, Long. 9.132964 (2025/18), Lat. 40.3399, Long. 9.167 (2025/19), Lat. 40.725228 Long. 9.485748 (2025/20), Lat. 40.467998, Long. 9.151939 (2025/21), Lat. 40.28833, Long. 9.157329 (2025/22), Lat. 40.24569, Long. 9.20289 (2025/23), Lat. 40.260758, Long. 9.168392 (2025/24), Lat. 40.33221, Long. 9.08099 (2025/25), Lat. 40.280527, Long. 9.116003 (2025/26), Lat. 40.3192, Long. 9.1386 (2025/27)
19.8.2025 – 4.9.2025

Surveillance zone:Those parts of the region of Sardinia, contained within a circle of a radius of 20 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates 40.30429, Long. 9.22154 (2025/1), Lat. 40.30429, Long. 9.22154 (2025/1), Lat. 40.31139, Long. 9.09821 (2025/3), Lat. 40.24291, Long. 9.22451 (2025/4), Lat. 40.392626, Long. 9.018567 (2025/5), Lat. 40.2623, Long. 9.082244 (2025/6), Lat. 40.22246, Long. 9.19132 (2025/7), Lat. 40.335997, Long. 9.123835 (2025/8), Lat. 40.28903, Long. 9.102816 (2025/9), Lat. 40.209698, Long. 9.177213 (2025/10), Lat. 40.24404, Long. 9.13817 (2025/11), Lat. 40.33445, Long. 9.15608 (2025/12), Lat. 40.319967, Long. 9.100123 (2025/13), Lat. 40.3451, Long. 9.2594 (2025/14), Lat. 40.3121, Long. 9.2046 (2025/15), Lat. 40.34778, Long. 9.16083 (2025/16), Lat. 40.24096, Long. 9.093 (2025/17), Lat. 40.35071, Long. 9.132964 (2025/18), Lat. 40.3399, Long. 9.167 (2025/19), Lat. 40.725228, Long. 9.485748 (2025/20), Lat. 40.467998, Long. 9.151939 (2025/21), Lat. 40.28833, Long. 9.157329 (2025/22), Lat. 40.24569, Long. 9.20289 (2025/23), Lat. 40.260758, Long. 9.168392 (2025/24), Lat. 40.33221, Long. 9.08099 (2025/25), Lat. 40.280527, Long. 9.116003 (2025/26), Lat. 40.3192, Long. 9.1386 (2025/27)), excluding the areas included in the protection zone.
4.9.2025

Lombardy regionIT-LSD-2025-00002
Protection zone:Those parts of the region of Lombardy, contained within a circle of a radius of 20 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 45.197941, Long. 10.814533(2025/2).
25.7.2025

Surveillance zone:Those parts of the region of Lombardy, contained within a circle of a radius of 50 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 45.197941, Long. 10.814533 (2025/2)
26.7.2025 – 11.8.2025

Surveillance zone:Those parts of the region of Lombardy, contained within a circle of a radius of 20 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 45.197941, Long. 10.814533 (2025/2), excluding the areas included in the protection zone.
11.8.2025

Valle d’Aosta regionFR-LSD-2025-00017
Surveillance zone:Those parts of the region of Valle d’Aosta, contained within a circle of a radius of 50 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 45.739081, Long 6.309311 (FR-LSD-2025-00017).
5.9.2025

Administrative area
Areas established as further restricted zone, part of the restricted zone, referred to in Article 1
Date until applicable

Sardinia region
The entire territory of the region of Sardinia, excluding the areas included in any protection or surveillance zone.
4.9.2025

Administrative area
Areas referred to in Article 3
Date until applicable

Sardinia region
The entire territory of the region of Sardinia
4.9.2025 – 30.9.2025

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on transmissible animal diseases and amending and repealing certain acts in the area of animal health (‘Animal Health Law’) (1), and in particular Article 259(1) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Infection with lumpy skin disease virus is an infectious, vector-borne disease affecting bovine animals. Its occurrence can have a severe impact on the concerned animal population and on the profitability of farming, also causing disturbance to movements of those animals and products thereof within the Union and exports to third countries.

(2) In the event of an outbreak of an infection with lumpy skin disease virus in bovine animals, there is a serious risk of the spread of that disease to other establishments of bovine animals particularly due its main mode of transmission through vectors.

(3) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 (2) supplements the rules for the control of the listed diseases referred to in Article 9(1), points (a), (b) and (c), of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, and defined as category A, B and C diseases in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1882 (3). In particular, Articles 21 and 22 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 provide for the establishment of a restricted zone in the event of an outbreak of a category A disease, including infection with lumpy skin disease virus, and for certain measures to be applied therein. In addition, Article 21(1) of that Delegated Regulation provides that the restricted zone is to comprise at least a protection zone, a surveillance zone, and, if necessary, further restricted zones around or adjacent to the protection and surveillance zones.

(4) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1318 (4) was adopted on the basis of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, and it lays down certain interim emergency measures relating to infection with lumpy skin disease virus in Italy.

(5) More particularly, Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1318 requires the establishment of restricted zones in the sense of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 in that Member State, and determine the areas listed in their respective Annexes as such zones.

(6) Since the adoption of Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1318, Italy has notified the Commission of 25 additional outbreaks of infection with lumpy skin disease virus in establishments keeping bovine animals in the provinces of Nuoro and Sassari, in the region of Sardinia, as well as one additional outbreak in the region of Lombardy, which were reported between 25 June and 17 July 2025. In response to these outbreaks, Italy has established protection and surveillance zones, as well as further restricted zones, in the provinces of Nuoro and Sassari, in the region of Sardinia, as well as protection and surveillance zones in the region of Lombardy, where the disease control measures laid down in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 are applied. In addition, Italy has established a surveillance zone in an area bordering France, in response to the outbreak confirmed by France on 12 July 2025 in regions close to the Italian border.

(7) The size of the areas indicated as protection zones and the surveillance zones as well as the further restricted zone in the Annex to this Decision, as well as the duration of the measures to be applied therein, are based on the criteria laid down in Article 64(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/429 as well as on the rules laid down in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687. The criteria applied for the choice of the size of the protection zone and the surveillance zone, as well as of the duration of the measures to be applied therein, include the consideration of not only the epidemiological situation as regards infection with lumpy skin disease virus in the areas affected by that disease, but also of other epidemiological factors, including geographical parameters and the risk for the further spread of the disease in view of the presence of insect vectors. The chosen duration of the measures foreseen in this Decision has also taken into account the international standards of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code of the World Organisation for Animal Health (5).

(8) Regulation (EU) 2016/429, in particular Article 69, provides that the competent authority of a Member State may use emergency protective vaccination where necessary for the effective control of a listed disease in kept animals. To that end, the competent authority is to establish vaccination zones and implement an official vaccination plan that meets specific requirements. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/361 (6), which supplements Regulation (EU) 2016/429 lays down, inter alia, the specific rules to be implemented by Member States when using emergency protective vaccination in bovine animals to prevent or control a listed disease. That Delegated Regulation also contains the conditions under which the movement of vaccinated animals and products thereof may be allowed. Specific conditions for emergency protective vaccination against infection with lumpy skin disease are laid down in Annex IX to that Delegated Regulation.

(9) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/140 (7) lays down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2016/429 with regard to the Union antigen, vaccine and diagnostic reagent banks. In particular, it lays out the procedural and technical requirements under Article 8 for Member States to request emergency access to vaccines, including those for lumpy skin disease, from vaccine banks.

(10) On 1 July 2025, Italy submitted to the Commission its official vaccination plan for emergency protective vaccination against infection with lumpy skin disease. The plan includes information on the geographical and administrative scope of the vaccination zones, the number of establishments and animals to be vaccinated, and the duration of the vaccination, as required by Article 6(4), point (a), of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/361. They also requested sufficient vaccine doses from the Union vaccine bank, in accordance with Article 8 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/140 in order to commence emergency protective vaccination in the entire territory of the region of Sardinia

(11) The conditions under which Italy is to apply emergency protective vaccination against infection with lumpy skin disease virus, as well as the risk-mitigating measures that are to be taken for the movement of vaccinated animals and their products are laid down in Annex IX to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/361. In line with these conditions, vaccination may be implemented in vaccination zones I or II, depending on the confirmation of infection with lumpy skin disease virus.

(12) The type, size and duration of vaccination zones I and II may need to be adjusted in the light of the evolving epidemiological situation and the progress of the vaccination campaigns, particularly taking into account the evolving level of vaccine coverage achieved. Where appropriate or necessary, a vaccination zone II or part thereof may need to be converted into a vaccination zone I and vice versa, in line with the criteria set out in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/361 and based on the information provided by the competent authorities of the affected Member States. Accordingly, it is necessary to indicate, in the Annex to this Decision, the dates for the conversion of one type of vaccination zone to another.

(13) In view of the current epidemiological situation and the risk that infection with lumpy skin disease virus can spread through sub-clinically infected bovine animals, it is necessary to prohibit the movement of such animals from any location within the protection, surveillance, or further restricted zones to destinations outside the external perimeters of the further restricted zones in Italy or outside that Member State. To that end, specific areas in the territories of Italy had to be identified where enhanced measures like those applicable in further restricted zones, as provided for in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, should be applied, and from where movements of bovine animals outside the external perimeters of those areas or beyond are also prohibited until a certain date.

(14) In order to prevent any unnecessary disturbance to trade within the Union, and to avoid unjustified barriers to trade being imposed by third countries, the areas identified as protection, surveillance and further restricted zones, as well as the vaccination zones, should be set out in the Annex to this Decision, and the duration of those measures fixed, in collaboration with those Member States.

(15) To ensure legal clarity, the restricted zones and vaccination zones should be clearly defined in terms of their geographical scope and their duration to prevent the further spread of the disease within Italy to other Member States or to third countries. In light of the epidemiological situation, the provisions of this Decision should apply as soon as possible.

(16) Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1318 should, therefore, be repealed and replaced by this Decision.

(17) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Italy shall ensure that:
(a) restricted zones, which comprise the protection, surveillance and further restricted zones, are established immediately by the competent authorities of those Member States in accordance with Article 21 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, and under the conditions laid down in that Article;

(b) vaccination zones are established immediately by the competent authorities of those Member States in accordance with Part 1 of Annex IX to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/361, and under the conditions laid down in that Annex;

(c) the protection, surveillance and further restricted zones referred to in point (a) as well as the vaccination zones referred to in point (b) comprise at least the areas listed in Annexes I and III to this Decision;

(d) the measures required to be applied in the protection, surveillance and further restricted zones as well as the vaccination zones are applied at least until the dates listed in the Annexes to this Decision.
Italy shall ensure that movements of bovine animals from the protection, surveillance or further restricted zones set out in Annex I to a destination located outside the external perimeter of the further restricted zone in Italy or outside that Member State are prohibited until the dates listed in that Annex.
 1.   Italy shall apply, in the areas listed in Annex II to this Decision, and for the periods specified in that Annex, the measures applicable to further restricted zones, in accordance with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687. 

 2.   Movements of bovine animals from the areas listed in Annex II to this Decision to a destination located outside that area in Italy or outside that Member State are prohibited for the periods specified in that Annex.
Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1318 is repealed.
This Decision is addressed to the Italian Republic.
Part A: Protection and surveillance zones established around the confirmed outbreaksAdministrative area and ADIS reference number of the outbreak

Areas established as protection and surveillance zones, part of the restricted zone, referred to in Article 1

Date until applicable

Sardinia region

IT-LSD-2025-00001

IT-LSD-2025-00003

IT-LSD-2025-00004

IT-LSD-2025-00005

IT-LSD-2025-00006

IT-LSD-2025-00007

IT-LSD-2025-00008

IT-LSD-2025-00009

IT-LSD-2025-00010

IT-LSD-2025-00011

IT-LSD-2025-00012

IT-LSD-2025-00013

IT-LSD-2025-00014

IT-LSD-2025-00015

IT-LSD-2025-00016

IT-LSD-2025-00017

IT-LSD-2025-00018

IT-LSD-2025-00019

IT-LSD-2025-00020

IT-LSD-2025-00021

IT-LSD-2025-00022

IT-LSD-2025-00023

IT-LSD-2025-00024

IT-LSD-2025-00025

IT-LSD-2025-00026

IT-LSD-2025-00027

Protection zone:

Those parts of the region of Sardinia, contained within a circle of a radius of 20 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 40.30429, Long. 9.22154 (2025/1), Lat. 40.31139, Long. 9.09821 (2025/3), Lat. 40.24291, Long. 9.22451 (2025/4), Lat. 40.392626, Long. 9.018567 (2025/5), Lat. 40.2623, Long. 9.082244 (2025/6), Lat. 40.22246, Long. 9.19132 (2025/7), Lat. 40.335997, Long. 9.123835 (2025/8), Lat. 40.28903, 9.102816 Long.(2025/9), Lat. 40.209698, Long. 9.177213 (2025/10), Lat. 40.24404, Long. 9.13817 (2025/11), Lat. 40.33445, Long. 9.15608 (2025/12), Lat. 40.319967 Long. 9.100123 (2025/13), Lat. 40.3451 Long. 9.2594 (2025/14), Lat. 40.3121, Long. 9.2046 (2025/15), Lat. 40.34778, Long. 9.16083 (2025/16), Lat. 40.24096, Long. 9.093 (2025/17), Lat. 40.35071, Long. 9.132964 (2025/18), Lat. 40.3399, Long. 9.167 (2025/19), Lat. 40.725228, Long. 9.485748 (2025/20), Lat. 40.467998, Long. 9.151939 (2025/21), Lat. 40.28833, Long. 9.157329 (2025/22), Lat. 40.24569, Long. 9.20289 (2025/23), Lat. 40.260758, Long. 9.168392 (2025/24), Lat. 40.33221, Long. 9.08099 (2025/25), Lat. 40.280527, Long. 9.116003 (2025/26), Lat. 40.3192, Long. 9.1386 (2025/27).

18.8.2025

Surveillance zone:

Those parts of the region of Sardinia, contained within a circle of a radius of 50 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 40.30429, Long. 9.22154 (2025/1), Lat. 40.30429, Long. 9.22154 (2025/1), Lat. 40.31139, Long. 9.09821 (2025/3), Lat. 40.24291, Long. 9.22451 (2025/4), Lat. 40.392626, Long. 9.018567 (2025/5), Lat. 40.2623, Long. 9.082244 (2025/6), Lat. 40.22246, Long. 9.19132 (2025/7), Lat. 40.335997, Long. 9.123835 (2025/8), Lat. 40.28903, Long. 9.102816 (2025/9), Lat. 40.209698 Long. 9.177213 (2025/10), Lat. 40.24404, Long. 9.13817 (2025/11), Lat. 40.33445, Long. 9.15608 (2025/12), Lat. 40.319967, Long. 9.100123 (2025/13), Lat. 40.3451, Long. 9.2594 (2025/14), Lat. 40.3121, Long. 9.2046 (2025/15), Lat. 40.34778, Long. 9.16083 (2025/16), Lat. 40.24096, Long. 9.093 (2025/17), Lat. 40.35071, Long. 9.132964 (2025/18), Lat. 40.3399, Long. 9.167 (2025/19), Lat. 40.725228 Long. 9.485748 (2025/20), Lat. 40.467998, Long. 9.151939 (2025/21), Lat. 40.28833, Long. 9.157329 (2025/22), Lat. 40.24569, Long. 9.20289 (2025/23), Lat. 40.260758, Long. 9.168392 (2025/24), Lat. 40.33221, Long. 9.08099 (2025/25), Lat. 40.280527, Long. 9.116003 (2025/26), Lat. 40.3192, Long. 9.1386 (2025/27)

19.8.2025 – 4.9.2025

Surveillance zone:

Those parts of the region of Sardinia, contained within a circle of a radius of 20 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates 40.30429, Long. 9.22154 (2025/1), Lat. 40.30429, Long. 9.22154 (2025/1), Lat. 40.31139, Long. 9.09821 (2025/3), Lat. 40.24291, Long. 9.22451 (2025/4), Lat. 40.392626, Long. 9.018567 (2025/5), Lat. 40.2623, Long. 9.082244 (2025/6), Lat. 40.22246, Long. 9.19132 (2025/7), Lat. 40.335997, Long. 9.123835 (2025/8), Lat. 40.28903, Long. 9.102816 (2025/9), Lat. 40.209698, Long. 9.177213 (2025/10), Lat. 40.24404, Long. 9.13817 (2025/11), Lat. 40.33445, Long. 9.15608 (2025/12), Lat. 40.319967, Long. 9.100123 (2025/13), Lat. 40.3451, Long. 9.2594 (2025/14), Lat. 40.3121, Long. 9.2046 (2025/15), Lat. 40.34778, Long. 9.16083 (2025/16), Lat. 40.24096, Long. 9.093 (2025/17), Lat. 40.35071, Long. 9.132964 (2025/18), Lat. 40.3399, Long. 9.167 (2025/19), Lat. 40.725228, Long. 9.485748 (2025/20), Lat. 40.467998, Long. 9.151939 (2025/21), Lat. 40.28833, Long. 9.157329 (2025/22), Lat. 40.24569, Long. 9.20289 (2025/23), Lat. 40.260758, Long. 9.168392 (2025/24), Lat. 40.33221, Long. 9.08099 (2025/25), Lat. 40.280527, Long. 9.116003 (2025/26), Lat. 40.3192, Long. 9.1386 (2025/27)), excluding the areas included in the protection zone.

4.9.2025

Lombardy region

IT-LSD-2025-00002

Protection zone:

Those parts of the region of Lombardy, contained within a circle of a radius of 20 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 45.197941, Long. 10.814533(2025/2).

25.7.2025

Surveillance zone:

Those parts of the region of Lombardy, contained within a circle of a radius of 50 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 45.197941, Long. 10.814533 (2025/2)

26.7.2025 – 11.8.2025

Surveillance zone:

Those parts of the region of Lombardy, contained within a circle of a radius of 20 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 45.197941, Long. 10.814533 (2025/2), excluding the areas included in the protection zone.

11.8.2025

Valle d’Aosta region

FR-LSD-2025-00017

Surveillance zone:

Those parts of the region of Valle d’Aosta, contained within a circle of a radius of 50 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 45.739081, Long 6.309311 (FR-LSD-2025-00017).

5.9.2025

Part B: Further restricted zone

Administrative area

Areas established as further restricted zone, part of the restricted zone, referred to in Article 1

Date until applicable

Sardinia region

The entire territory of the region of Sardinia, excluding the areas included in any protection or surveillance zone.

4.9.2025
Administrative area

Areas referred to in Article 3

Date until applicable

Sardinia region

The entire territory of the region of Sardinia

4.9.2025 – 30.9.2025
Part A: Vaccination zone II
The entire territory of the region of Sardinia until 30.9.2025.
Part B: Vaccination zone I
The entire territory of the region of Sardina as of 1.10.2025.

Council Decision (EU) 2025/1580 of 18 July 2025 amending Decision 1999/70/EC concerning the external auditors of the national central banks, as regards the external auditors of the Deutsche Bundesbank

                                January 13, 2026                            

Official Journalof the European Union
ENL series

2025/1580
30.7.2025

(1)
The accounts of the European Central Bank (ECB) and of the national central banks of the Member States whose currency is the euro are to be audited by independent external auditors recommended by the Governing Council of the ECB and approved by the Council of the European Union.

(2)
The mandate of the current external auditors of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Baker Tilly GmbH & Co. KG Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft, will end following the audit for the financial year 2026. It is therefore necessary to appoint external auditors for the financial year 2027.

(3)
The Deutsche Bundesbank intends to extend the mandate of Baker Tilly GmbH & Co. KG Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft to the financial year 2027. Such an extension is possible in accordance with the contractual arrangements between the Deutsche Bundesbank and Baker Tilly GmbH & Co. KG Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft.

(4)
The Governing Council of the ECB has recommended that Baker Tilly GmbH & Co. KG Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft be appointed as the external auditors of the Deutsche Bundesbank for the financial year 2027.

(5)
Following the recommendation of the Governing Council of the ECB, Council Decision 1999/70/EC(2)should be amended accordingly,

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to Protocol No 4 on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 27.1 thereof,

Having regard to the Recommendation of the European Central Bank of 2 June 2025 to the Council of the European Union on the external auditors of the Deutsche Bundesbank (ECB/2025/19) (1),

Whereas:

(1) The accounts of the European Central Bank (ECB) and of the national central banks of the Member States whose currency is the euro are to be audited by independent external auditors recommended by the Governing Council of the ECB and approved by the Council of the European Union.

(2) The mandate of the current external auditors of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Baker Tilly GmbH & Co. KG Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft, will end following the audit for the financial year 2026. It is therefore necessary to appoint external auditors for the financial year 2027.

(3) The Deutsche Bundesbank intends to extend the mandate of Baker Tilly GmbH & Co. KG Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft to the financial year 2027. Such an extension is possible in accordance with the contractual arrangements between the Deutsche Bundesbank and Baker Tilly GmbH & Co. KG Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft.

(4) The Governing Council of the ECB has recommended that Baker Tilly GmbH & Co. KG Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft be appointed as the external auditors of the Deutsche Bundesbank for the financial year 2027.

(5) Following the recommendation of the Governing Council of the ECB, Council Decision 1999/70/EC (2) should be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
In Article 1 of Decision 1999/70/EC, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:
‘2.   Baker Tilly GmbH & Co. KG Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft are hereby approved as the external auditors of the Deutsche Bundesbank for the financial years 2021 to 2027.’.
This Decision shall take effect on the date of its notification.
This Decision is addressed to the European Central Bank.

Council Decision (EU) 2025/1579 of 18 July 2025 authorising the opening of negotiations with the Republic of Kazakhstan for an agreement on readmission

                                January 13, 2026                            

Official Journalof the European Union
ENL series

2025/1579
30.7.2025

(1)
Negotiations should be opened with a view to concluding an agreement on readmission with the Republic of Kazakhstan (the ‘Agreement’).

(2)
The Commission should ensure that the Agreement is consistent with relevant Union law and policies, including the Union’s commitments under other relevant multilateral agreements.

(3)
Preparations for the negotiations should be conducted well in advance. To that end, the Commission should inform the Council, as early as possible, of the anticipated schedule of the negotiations and of the issues to be negotiated, and consult the Council where necessary. The Commission should also inform the Council of the outcome of each negotiating session.

(4)
In order to respond best to the interests of the Union’s policy on readmission, the authorisation to negotiate should be limited in time, with the possibility of an extension of the period of validity of this Decision. Before the expiry of the period of validity of this Decision, the Council should assess, on the basis of a recommendation from the Commission, whether it is in the Union’s interest to continue the negotiations, taking into account the progress of the negotiations as well as the overall relations between the Union and its Member States and Republic of Kazakhstan. The period of validity of this Decision can be extended under the same procedure. Such time-limited authorisation with the possibility of an extension is not to have the impact of restricting the power of the Union negotiator in its negotiations with the Republic of Kazakhstan.

(5)
In accordance with Article 3 of Protocol No 21 on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Ireland has notified, by a letter of 16 June 2025, its wish to take part in the adoption and application of this Decision.

(6)
In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 22 on the position of Denmark, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this Decision and is not bound by it or subject to its application,

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 79(3), in conjunction with Article 218(3) and (4) thereof,

Having regard to the recommendation from the European Commission,

Whereas:

(1) Negotiations should be opened with a view to concluding an agreement on readmission with the Republic of Kazakhstan (the ‘Agreement’).

(2) The Commission should ensure that the Agreement is consistent with relevant Union law and policies, including the Union’s commitments under other relevant multilateral agreements.

(3) Preparations for the negotiations should be conducted well in advance. To that end, the Commission should inform the Council, as early as possible, of the anticipated schedule of the negotiations and of the issues to be negotiated, and consult the Council where necessary. The Commission should also inform the Council of the outcome of each negotiating session.

(4) In order to respond best to the interests of the Union’s policy on readmission, the authorisation to negotiate should be limited in time, with the possibility of an extension of the period of validity of this Decision. Before the expiry of the period of validity of this Decision, the Council should assess, on the basis of a recommendation from the Commission, whether it is in the Union’s interest to continue the negotiations, taking into account the progress of the negotiations as well as the overall relations between the Union and its Member States and Republic of Kazakhstan. The period of validity of this Decision can be extended under the same procedure. Such time-limited authorisation with the possibility of an extension is not to have the impact of restricting the power of the Union negotiator in its negotiations with the Republic of Kazakhstan.

(5) In accordance with Article 3 of Protocol No 21 on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Ireland has notified, by a letter of 16 June 2025, its wish to take part in the adoption and application of this Decision.

(6) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No 22 on the position of Denmark, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this Decision and is not bound by it or subject to its application,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
 1.   The Commission is hereby authorised to open negotiations for an agreement on readmission with the Republic of Kazakhstan.
 2.   The negotiations shall be conducted on the basis of the negotiating directives of the Council set out in the addendum to this Decision.
 1.   The negotiations shall be conducted in consultation with the Working Party on Integration, Migration and Expulsion, which is the special committee designated by the Council in accordance with Article 218(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
 2.   The Commission shall regularly report to the special committee referred to in paragraph 1 on the steps undertaken pursuant to this Decision, and consult it on a regular basis.
 3.   Whenever so requested by the Council, the Commission shall report to the Council on the conduct and the outcome of the negotiations.
 1.   This Decision shall be valid for a period of five years from the date of its adoption.
 2.   At the latest six months before the end of the period referred to in paragraph 1, the Commission may present to the Council a recommendation to extend that period. The Council shall assess the situation on the basis of that recommendation and may decide to extend the period of validity after carrying out an assessment that takes into account the progress of the negotiations as well as the overall relations between the Union and its Member States and Republic of Kazakhstan.
This Decision is addressed to the Commission.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1577 of 29 July 2025. updating the list of persons, groups and entities covered by Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2025/207

                                January 13, 2026                            

Official Journalof the European Union
ENL series

2025/1577
30.7.2025

(1)
On 27 December 2001, the Council adopted Common Position 2001/931/CFSP(1).

(2)
On 30 January 2025, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2025/207(2), updating the list of persons, groups and entities covered by Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (the ‘list’).

(3)
In accordance with Article 1(6) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, it is necessary to review at regular intervals the names of persons, groups and entities on the list to ensure that there are grounds for keeping them thereon.

(4)
This Decision sets out the result of the review that the Council has carried out in respect of persons, groups and entities covered by the measures in Articles 2 and 3 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP.

(5)
The Council has concluded that the entry for one person should be deleted from the list. At the same time, the Council has verified that competent authorities, as referred to in Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, have taken decisions with regard to all the other persons, groups and entities on the list to the effect that they have been involved in terrorist acts within the meaning of Article 1(3) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP. The Council has also concluded that the measures in Articles 2 and 3 of that Common Position should continue to apply to those persons, groups and entities.

(6)
The list should be updated accordingly, and Decision (CFSP) 2025/207 should be repealed,

1.
ABDOLLAHI Hamed (a.k.a. Mustafa Abdullahi), born 11.8.1960 in Iran. Passport number: D9004878.

2.
AL-DIN Hasan Izz (a.k.a. Garbaya Ahmed, a.k.a. Sa’id, a.k.a. Salwwan Samir), born 1963 in Lebanon, citizen of Lebanon.

3.
AL-NASSER Abdelkarim Hussein Mohamed, born in Al Ihsa (Saudi Arabia), citizen of Saudi Arabia.

4.
AL-YACOUB Ibrahim Salih Mohammed, born 16.10.1966 in Tarut (Saudi Arabia), citizen of Saudi Arabia.

5.
ARBABSIAR Manssor (a.k.a. Mansour Arbabsiar), born 6.3.1955 or 15.3.1955 in Iran. Iranian and US national, passport number: C2002515 (Iran); passport number: 477845448 (USA). National ID number: 07442833, expiry date 15.3.2016 (USA driving licence).

6.
ASSADI Assadollah (a.k.a. Assadollah Asadi), born 22.12.1971 in Tehran (Iran), Iranian national. Iranian diplomatic passport number: D9016657.

7.
BOUYERI Mohammed (a.k.a. Abu Zubair, a.k.a. Sobiar, a.k.a. Abu Zoubair), born 8.3.1978 in Amsterdam (The Netherlands).

8.
HASHEMI MOGHADAM Saeid, born 6.8.1962 in Tehran (Iran), Iranian national. Passport number: D9016290, valid until 4.2.2019.

9.
HASSAN EL HAJJ Hassan, born 22.3.1988 in Zaghdraiya, Sidon, Lebanon, Canadian citizen. Passport number: JX446643 (Canada).

10.
MELIAD Farah, born 5.11.1980 in Sydney (Australia), Australian citizen. Passport number: M2719127 (Australia).

11.
MOHAMMED Khalid Sheikh (a.k.a. Ali Salem, a.k.a. Bin Khalid Fahd Bin Abdallah, a.k.a. Henin Ashraf Refaat Nabith, a.k.a. Wadood Khalid Abdul), born 14.4.1965 or 1.3.1964 in Pakistan, passport number 488555.

12.
SHAHLAI Abdul Reza (a.k.a. Abdol Reza Shala’i, a.k.a. Abd-al Reza Shalai, a.k.a. Abdorreza Shahlai, a.k.a. Abdolreza Shahla’i, a.k.a. Abdul-Reza Shahlaee, a.k.a. Hajj Yusef, a.k.a. Haji Yusif, a.k.a. Hajji Yasir, a.k.a. Hajji Yusif, a.k.a. Yusuf Abu-al-Karkh), born circa 1957 in Iran. Addresses: (1) Kermanshah, Iran, (2) Mehran Military Base, Ilam Province, Iran.

13.
SHAKURI Ali Gholam, born circa 1965 in Tehran, Iran.

1.
‘Abu Nidal Organisation’ – ‘ANO’ (a.k.a. ‘Fatah Revolutionary Council’, a.k.a. ‘Arab Revolutionary Brigades’, a.k.a. ‘Black September’, a.k.a. ‘Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims’).

2.
‘Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade’.

3.
‘Al-Aqsa e.V.’.

4.
‘Babbar Khalsa’.

5.
‘Communist Party of the Philippines’, including ‘New People’s Army’ – ‘NPA’, Philippines.

6.
Directorate for Internal Security of the Iranian Ministry for Intelligence and Security.

7.
‘Gama’a al-Islamiyya’ (a.k.a. ‘Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya’) (‘Islamic Group’ – ‘IG’).

8.
‘İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar Cephesi’ – ‘IBDA-C’ (‘Great Islamic Eastern Warriors Front’).

9.
‘Hamas’, including ‘Hamas-Izz al-Din al-Qassem’.

10.
‘Hizballah Military Wing’ (a.k.a. ‘Hezbollah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizbullah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizbollah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hezballah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hisbollah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizbu’llah Military Wing’ a.k.a. ‘Hizb Allah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Jihad Council’ (and all units reporting to it, including the External Security Organisation)).

11.
‘Hizbul Mujahideen’ – ‘HM’.

12.
‘Khalistan Zindabad Force’ – ‘KZF’.

13.
‘Kurdistan Workers’ Party’ – ‘PKK’ (a.k.a. ‘KADEK’, a.k.a. ‘KONGRA-GEL’).

14.
‘Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’ – ‘LTTE’.

15.
‘Ejército de Liberación Nacional’ (‘National Liberation Army’).

16.
‘Palestinian Islamic Jihad’ – ‘PIJ’.

17.
‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’ – ‘PFLP’.

18.
‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command’ (a.k.a. ‘PFLP – General Command’).

19.
‘Devrimci Halk Kurtuluș Partisi-Cephesi’ – ‘DHKP/C’ (a.k.a. ‘Devrimci Sol’ (‘Revolutionary Left’), a.k.a. ‘Dev Sol’) (‘Revolutionary People’s Liberation Army/Front/Party’).

20.
‘Sendero Luminoso’ – ‘SL’ (‘Shining Path’).

21.
‘Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan’ – ‘TAK’ (a.k.a. ‘Kurdistan Freedom Falcons’, a.k.a. ‘Kurdistan Freedom Hawks’).

22.
‘The Base’.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

(1) On 27 December 2001, the Council adopted Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (1).

(2) On 30 January 2025, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2025/207 (2), updating the list of persons, groups and entities covered by Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (the ‘list’).

(3) In accordance with Article 1(6) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, it is necessary to review at regular intervals the names of persons, groups and entities on the list to ensure that there are grounds for keeping them thereon.

(4) This Decision sets out the result of the review that the Council has carried out in respect of persons, groups and entities covered by the measures in Articles 2 and 3 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP.

(5) The Council has concluded that the entry for one person should be deleted from the list. At the same time, the Council has verified that competent authorities, as referred to in Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, have taken decisions with regard to all the other persons, groups and entities on the list to the effect that they have been involved in terrorist acts within the meaning of Article 1(3) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP. The Council has also concluded that the measures in Articles 2 and 3 of that Common Position should continue to apply to those persons, groups and entities.

(6) The list should be updated accordingly, and Decision (CFSP) 2025/207 should be repealed,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The list of persons, groups and entities covered by the measures in Articles 2 and 3 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP is set out in the Annex to this Decision.
Decision (CFSP) 2025/207 is hereby repealed.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
I.   Persons 1. ABDOLLAHI Hamed (a.k.a. Mustafa Abdullahi), born 11.8.1960 in Iran. Passport number: D9004878. 

 2. AL-DIN Hasan Izz (a.k.a. Garbaya Ahmed, a.k.a. Sa’id, a.k.a. Salwwan Samir), born 1963 in Lebanon, citizen of Lebanon.
 3. AL-NASSER Abdelkarim Hussein Mohamed, born in Al Ihsa (Saudi Arabia), citizen of Saudi Arabia.
 4. AL-YACOUB Ibrahim Salih Mohammed, born 16.10.1966 in Tarut (Saudi Arabia), citizen of Saudi Arabia.
 5. ARBABSIAR Manssor (a.k.a. Mansour Arbabsiar), born 6.3.1955 or 15.3.1955 in Iran. Iranian and US national, passport number: C2002515 (Iran); passport number: 477845448 (USA). National ID number: 07442833, expiry date 15.3.2016 (USA driving licence).
 6. ASSADI Assadollah (a.k.a. Assadollah Asadi), born 22.12.1971 in Tehran (Iran), Iranian national. Iranian diplomatic passport number: D9016657. 

 7. BOUYERI Mohammed (a.k.a. Abu Zubair, a.k.a. Sobiar, a.k.a. Abu Zoubair), born 8.3.1978 in Amsterdam (The Netherlands).
 8. HASHEMI MOGHADAM Saeid, born 6.8.1962 in Tehran (Iran), Iranian national. Passport number: D9016290, valid until 4.2.2019. 

 9. HASSAN EL HAJJ Hassan, born 22.3.1988 in Zaghdraiya, Sidon, Lebanon, Canadian citizen. Passport number: JX446643 (Canada).
 10. MELIAD Farah, born 5.11.1980 in Sydney (Australia), Australian citizen. Passport number: M2719127 (Australia).
 11. MOHAMMED Khalid Sheikh (a.k.a. Ali Salem, a.k.a. Bin Khalid Fahd Bin Abdallah, a.k.a. Henin Ashraf Refaat Nabith, a.k.a. Wadood Khalid Abdul), born 14.4.1965 or 1.3.1964 in Pakistan, passport number 488555. 

 12. SHAHLAI Abdul Reza (a.k.a. Abdol Reza Shala’i, a.k.a. Abd-al Reza Shalai, a.k.a. Abdorreza Shahlai, a.k.a. Abdolreza Shahla’i, a.k.a. Abdul-Reza Shahlaee, a.k.a. Hajj Yusef, a.k.a. Haji Yusif, a.k.a. Hajji Yasir, a.k.a. Hajji Yusif, a.k.a. Yusuf Abu-al-Karkh), born circa 1957 in Iran. Addresses: (1) Kermanshah, Iran, (2) Mehran Military Base, Ilam Province, Iran.
 13. SHAKURI Ali Gholam, born circa 1965 in Tehran, Iran.
II.   Groups and entities
 1. ‘Abu Nidal Organisation’ – ‘ANO’ (a.k.a. ‘Fatah Revolutionary Council’, a.k.a. ‘Arab Revolutionary Brigades’, a.k.a. ‘Black September’, a.k.a. ‘Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims’).
 2. ‘Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade’.
 3. ‘Al-Aqsa e.V.’.
 4. ‘Babbar Khalsa’.
 5. ‘Communist Party of the Philippines’, including ‘New People’s Army’ – ‘NPA’, Philippines.
 6. Directorate for Internal Security of the Iranian Ministry for Intelligence and Security.
 7. ‘Gama’a al-Islamiyya’ (a.k.a. ‘Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya’) (‘Islamic Group’ – ‘IG’).
 8. ‘İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar Cephesi’ – ‘IBDA-C’ (‘Great Islamic Eastern Warriors Front’).
 9. ‘Hamas’, including ‘Hamas-Izz al-Din al-Qassem’.
 10. ‘Hizballah Military Wing’ (a.k.a. ‘Hezbollah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizbullah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizbollah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hezballah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hisbollah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Hizbu’llah Military Wing’ a.k.a. ‘Hizb Allah Military Wing’, a.k.a. ‘Jihad Council’ (and all units reporting to it, including the External Security Organisation)).
 11. ‘Hizbul Mujahideen’ – ‘HM’.
 12. ‘Khalistan Zindabad Force’ – ‘KZF’.
 13. ‘Kurdistan Workers’ Party’ – ‘PKK’ (a.k.a. ‘KADEK’, a.k.a. ‘KONGRA-GEL’).
 14. ‘Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’ – ‘LTTE’.
 15. ‘Ejército de Liberación Nacional’ (‘National Liberation Army’).
 16. ‘Palestinian Islamic Jihad’ – ‘PIJ’.
 17. ‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’ – ‘PFLP’.
 18. ‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command’ (a.k.a. ‘PFLP – General Command’).
 19. ‘Devrimci Halk Kurtuluș Partisi-Cephesi’ – ‘DHKP/C’ (a.k.a. ‘Devrimci Sol’ (‘Revolutionary Left’), a.k.a. ‘Dev Sol’) (‘Revolutionary People’s Liberation Army/Front/Party’).
 20. ‘Sendero Luminoso’ – ‘SL’ (‘Shining Path’).
 21. ‘Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan’ – ‘TAK’ (a.k.a. ‘Kurdistan Freedom Falcons’, a.k.a. ‘Kurdistan Freedom Hawks’).
 22. ‘The Base’.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1575 of 29 July 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2022/2319 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Haiti

                                January 13, 2026                            

Official Journalof the European Union
ENL series

2025/1575
29.7.2025

(1)
On 25 November 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/2319.

(2)
On 8 July 2025, the United Nations Security Council Committee (‘UNSC’) established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 2653 (2022), added two entities to the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures.

(3)
Decision (CFSP) 2022/2319 should therefore be amended accordingly,

1.
GRAN GRIF. Listed pursuant to paragraph 15 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2653 (2022) for the measures listed in paragraph 6 of that Resolution, as further elaborated by paragraph 16(a) of that Resolution.A.k.a.: (a) Gran Grif de Savien (b) Savien gang (c) Baz Gran GrifAddress: HaitiDate of UN designation: 8 July 2025Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee: Gran Grif is the largest gang in Haiti’s Artibonite Department. Since 2022, Gran Grif has been responsible for 80 percent of civilian deaths reported in Artibonite. Gran Grif has attacked the Haitian National Police and the UN-authorized Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, including in the February 2025 attack that killed a Kenyan MSS mission officer. On 11 January 2024, Gran Grif members murdered and dismembered a man after he resisted Gran Grif assaults. On 3 October 2024, the Gran Grif gang, led by Luckson Elan (HTi.007), launched assaults on Pont-Sonde in the Saint Marc commune (Artibonite Department), which reports indicate resulted in the deaths of about 100 individuals and 16 injured. At least five rape cases, one of them involving a minor, have been documented. The massacre also forced more than 6 000 people to flee their homes. On 11 December 2024, Gran Grif killed 70 people in Petite-Rivière-de-l’Artibonite after a self-defense group between December 9 and 10, 2024 lynched 39 individuals accused of complicity with the gang. Between December 2023 and July 2024, the Gran Grif gang kidnapped 157 people over the course of nine separate kidnapping incidents in the Petite-Rivière-de-l’Artibonite. On 30 November 2024, a 22-year-old woman was killed by two bullets to her vagina for refusing to have sexual relations with Gran Grif gang leader Luckson Elan, at Petite-Rivière-de-l’Artibonite. Cases of rape have also been committed by the gang members of Gran Grif. In April and May 2024, two lawyers were killed by the Gran Grif gang. These attacks on the legal profession aim to create a climate of fear and intimidation and constitute serious threats to the exercise of judicial independence and legal representation.

2.
VIV ANSANM. Listed pursuant to paragraph 15 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2653 (2022) for the measures listed in paragraph 6 of that Resolution, as further elaborated by paragraphs 16(a) and 16(g) of that resolution.A.k.a.: (a) Living Together (b) G-9 (c) G9 Family and Allies (d) G9 Fanmi e Alye (e) The Revolutionary Forces of the G9 Family and Allies (f) Fòs Revolisyonè G9 an Fanmi e Alye (g) G-Pèp (h) G-PeopleAddress: HaitiDate of UN designation: 8 July 2025Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee: Viv Ansanm, led by Jimmy Chérizier (HTi.001), is a group formed in September 2023 as a coalition of gangs through an alliance between the two main gang factions operating in Port-au-Prince, G-9 and G-Pèp. The group provides a unified platform for criminal groups to use violence to destabilize Haiti and quash actions aimed at restoring state control. Viv Ansanm has launched coordinated attacks on critical infrastructure in Haiti, including prisons, government buildings, and Haiti’s main airport in Port-au-Prince as part of a campaign that, among other things, forced the resignation of former Haitian prime minister Ariel Henry. The two opposite gang coalitions – G9 and G-Pèp – reactivated the Viv Ansanm coalition on February 29, 2024, to establish a common front against the transition government. From late February to May 2024, Port-au-Prince witnessed unprecedented levels of violence marked by coordinated gang attacks against key government buildings and critical infrastructure. Since then, the level of violence has continued to increase as Viv Ansanm looks to consolidate its territory and conquer additional neighbourhoods in Port-au-Prince. Between 11 and 19 November 2024, Viv Ansanm gangs attacked several locations in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, such as Pernier, Nazon, and Vivy Mitchel, in an attempt to invade Delmas and Pétionville. The resulting violence led to at least 220 deaths, 92 injuries, and nearly 41 000 displaced people. Between 26 and 29 January 2025, Viv Ansanm launched multiple attacks in Kenscoff (West Department), south of Port-au-Prince, aiming to seize control of the area and secure access to the South-East part of the country. It is estimated that between 90 and 150 people were killed in the massacre.The violence also resulted in more than 100 households being destroyed, and the displacement of 3 139 people. Viv Ansanm has launched at least 10 major attacks against the National Palace since early March 2024. Viv Ansanm also repeatedly attacked, inter alia, the Ministries of Justice, Defense and the Interior, the former building of the Cour Supérieure des Comptes et du Contentieux Administratif and the general hospital, as well as Haitian National Police units, including the Unité Départementale de Maintien d’Ordre and the Port-au-Prince police station. In the northern communes of the capital, two gangs that are part of Viv Ansanm, 5 Segonn and Canaan, killed at least 10 people and burned several houses during attacks against the Arcahaïe and Cabaret communes on 6 August 2024, in a bid to extend control along the Port-au-Prince bay area, presumably to facilitate the movement of drugs and access to other areas. Minors have been involved in Viv Ansanm attacks in Port-au-Prince and in managing checkpoints. Children are used for different tasks depending on their age, sex, and skills. For example, girls usually participate in household chores and as spies to collect information from possible kidnapping victims, or to check on police or other gangs’ movements. There are also reports of girls carrying weapons and probably engaging in clashes. Between February and May 2024, Viv Ansanm adopted as a tactic the wanton destruction and ransacking of public and private infrastructure and property in Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. For example, on 24 March 2024, Viv Ansanm launched a large-scale indiscriminate attack on several blocks around the National Palace. The aim of the attack was to empty the area of the population and to cause as much damage as possible. Johnson “Izo” André (HTi.002), the leader of 5 Segonn, has been identified as one of the main aggressors in the attack. In March 2024, the Viv Ansanm destroyed Jude-Anne Hospital and ransacked the Hospital and Saint Martin Health Center in the Delmas 18 neighbourhood.Between February and May 2024, members of the Viv Ansanm vandalized and set fire to the premises of the Faculty of Science, Faculty of Linguistics, Faculty of Agronomy and Veterinary Medicine, Faculty of Medicine and Pharmacy, the École Normale Supérieure at the State University of Haiti, the National School of Arts, the Mixed School Les Frères Nau, and the National Library in Port-au-Prince, among many other educational sites. Since late February 2024, Viv Ansanm members have attacked critical infrastructure, robbed containers carrying first aid supplies, and looted hospitals and pharmacies, among other humanitarian aid sites, particularly in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. Blockaded roadways and the closure of the main airport and seaport have severely restricted the movement of vital supplies and humanitarian personnel. These disruptions have worsened existing shortages and hindered the delivery of crucial humanitarian aid. On March 15, 2024, Viv Ansanm, along with civilians, looted a container with humanitarian aid belonging to UNICEF and containing essential supplies for life-saving aid to children. The closure of the main commercial port in Port-au-Prince (APN/CPS) widely affected the supply chain of basic commodities, leading to shortages of humanitarian equipment.’.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,

Having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2319 of 25 November 2022 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Haiti (1), and in particular Article 4(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

(1) On 25 November 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/2319.

(2) On 8 July 2025, the United Nations Security Council Committee (‘UNSC’) established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 2653 (2022), added two entities to the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures.

(3) Decision (CFSP) 2022/2319 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Annex I to Decision (CFSP) 2022/2319 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

In Annex I to Decision (CFSP) 2022/2319, in the ‘List of persons referred to in Article 1(1), Article 2(1) and Article 3(1), and of entities referred to in Articles 1(1) and 3(1)’, the following heading and entries are added:

                           ‘

                           ENTITIES 1. GRAN GRIF. Listed pursuant to paragraph 15 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2653 (2022) for the measures listed in paragraph 6 of that Resolution, as further elaborated by paragraph 16(a) of that Resolution.

A.k.a.: (a) Gran Grif de Savien (b) Savien gang (c) Baz Gran Grif

Address: Haiti

Date of UN designation: 8 July 2025
Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee: Gran Grif is the largest gang in Haiti’s Artibonite Department. Since 2022, Gran Grif has been responsible for 80 percent of civilian deaths reported in Artibonite. Gran Grif has attacked the Haitian National Police and the UN-authorized Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, including in the February 2025 attack that killed a Kenyan MSS mission officer. On 11 January 2024, Gran Grif members murdered and dismembered a man after he resisted Gran Grif assaults. On 3 October 2024, the Gran Grif gang, led by Luckson Elan (HTi.007), launched assaults on Pont-Sonde in the Saint Marc commune (Artibonite Department), which reports indicate resulted in the deaths of about 100 individuals and 16 injured. At least five rape cases, one of them involving a minor, have been documented. The massacre also forced more than 6 000 people to flee their homes. On 11 December 2024, Gran Grif killed 70 people in Petite-Rivière-de-l’Artibonite after a self-defense group between December 9 and 10, 2024 lynched 39 individuals accused of complicity with the gang. Between December 2023 and July 2024, the Gran Grif gang kidnapped 157 people over the course of nine separate kidnapping incidents in the Petite-Rivière-de-l’Artibonite. On 30 November 2024, a 22-year-old woman was killed by two bullets to her vagina for refusing to have sexual relations with Gran Grif gang leader Luckson Elan, at Petite-Rivière-de-l’Artibonite. Cases of rape have also been committed by the gang members of Gran Grif. In April and May 2024, two lawyers were killed by the Gran Grif gang. These attacks on the legal profession aim to create a climate of fear and intimidation and constitute serious threats to the exercise of judicial independence and legal representation. 2. VIV ANSANM. Listed pursuant to paragraph 15 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2653 (2022) for the measures listed in paragraph 6 of that Resolution, as further elaborated by paragraphs 16(a) and 16(g) of that resolution.

A.k.a.: (a) Living Together (b) G-9 (c) G9 Family and Allies (d) G9 Fanmi e Alye (e) The Revolutionary Forces of the G9 Family and Allies (f) Fòs Revolisyonè G9 an Fanmi e Alye (g) G-Pèp (h) G-People

Address: Haiti

Date of UN designation: 8 July 2025
Additional information from the narrative summary of reasons for listing provided by the Sanctions Committee: Viv Ansanm, led by Jimmy Chérizier (HTi.001), is a group formed in September 2023 as a coalition of gangs through an alliance between the two main gang factions operating in Port-au-Prince, G-9 and G-Pèp. The group provides a unified platform for criminal groups to use violence to destabilize Haiti and quash actions aimed at restoring state control. Viv Ansanm has launched coordinated attacks on critical infrastructure in Haiti, including prisons, government buildings, and Haiti’s main airport in Port-au-Prince as part of a campaign that, among other things, forced the resignation of former Haitian prime minister Ariel Henry. The two opposite gang coalitions – G9 and G-Pèp – reactivated the Viv Ansanm coalition on February 29, 2024, to establish a common front against the transition government. From late February to May 2024, Port-au-Prince witnessed unprecedented levels of violence marked by coordinated gang attacks against key government buildings and critical infrastructure. Since then, the level of violence has continued to increase as Viv Ansanm looks to consolidate its territory and conquer additional neighbourhoods in Port-au-Prince. Between 11 and 19 November 2024, Viv Ansanm gangs attacked several locations in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, such as Pernier, Nazon, and Vivy Mitchel, in an attempt to invade Delmas and Pétionville. The resulting violence led to at least 220 deaths, 92 injuries, and nearly 41 000 displaced people. Between 26 and 29 January 2025, Viv Ansanm launched multiple attacks in Kenscoff (West Department), south of Port-au-Prince, aiming to seize control of the area and secure access to the South-East part of the country. It is estimated that between 90 and 150 people were killed in the massacre.

The violence also resulted in more than 100 households being destroyed, and the displacement of 3 139 people. Viv Ansanm has launched at least 10 major attacks against the National Palace since early March 2024. Viv Ansanm also repeatedly attacked, inter alia, the Ministries of Justice, Defense and the Interior, the former building of the Cour Supérieure des Comptes et du Contentieux Administratif and the general hospital, as well as Haitian National Police units, including the Unité Départementale de Maintien d’Ordre and the Port-au-Prince police station. In the northern communes of the capital, two gangs that are part of Viv Ansanm, 5 Segonn and Canaan, killed at least 10 people and burned several houses during attacks against the Arcahaïe and Cabaret communes on 6 August 2024, in a bid to extend control along the Port-au-Prince bay area, presumably to facilitate the movement of drugs and access to other areas. Minors have been involved in Viv Ansanm attacks in Port-au-Prince and in managing checkpoints. Children are used for different tasks depending on their age, sex, and skills. For example, girls usually participate in household chores and as spies to collect information from possible kidnapping victims, or to check on police or other gangs’ movements. There are also reports of girls carrying weapons and probably engaging in clashes. Between February and May 2024, Viv Ansanm adopted as a tactic the wanton destruction and ransacking of public and private infrastructure and property in Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. For example, on 24 March 2024, Viv Ansanm launched a large-scale indiscriminate attack on several blocks around the National Palace. The aim of the attack was to empty the area of the population and to cause as much damage as possible. Johnson “Izo” André (HTi.002), the leader of 5 Segonn, has been identified as one of the main aggressors in the attack. In March 2024, the Viv Ansanm destroyed Jude-Anne Hospital and ransacked the Hospital and Saint Martin Health Center in the Delmas 18 neighbourhood.

Between February and May 2024, members of the Viv Ansanm vandalized and set fire to the premises of the Faculty of Science, Faculty of Linguistics, Faculty of Agronomy and Veterinary Medicine, Faculty of Medicine and Pharmacy, the École Normale Supérieure at the State University of Haiti, the National School of Arts, the Mixed School Les Frères Nau, and the National Library in Port-au-Prince, among many other educational sites. Since late February 2024, Viv Ansanm members have attacked critical infrastructure, robbed containers carrying first aid supplies, and looted hospitals and pharmacies, among other humanitarian aid sites, particularly in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. Blockaded roadways and the closure of the main airport and seaport have severely restricted the movement of vital supplies and humanitarian personnel. These disruptions have worsened existing shortages and hindered the delivery of crucial humanitarian aid. On March 15, 2024, Viv Ansanm, along with civilians, looted a container with humanitarian aid belonging to UNICEF and containing essential supplies for life-saving aid to children. The closure of the main commercial port in Port-au-Prince (APN/CPS) widely affected the supply chain of basic commodities, leading to shortages of humanitarian equipment.’.

Council Decision (EU) 2025/1563 of 22 July 2025 establishing the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union within the General Council of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as regards the adoption of a decision to grant a WTO waiver permitting the United States to provide duty-free treatment under the US Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA)

                                January 13, 2026                            

Official Journalof the European Union
ENL series

2025/1563
29.7.2025

(1)
The Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (‘WTO Agreement’) entered into force on 1 January 1995.

(2)
Paragraph 2 of Article II of the WTO Agreement provides that the agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 to the WTO Agreement (‘Multilateral Trade Agreements’) are integral parts of the WTO Agreement and are binding on all Members.

(3)
Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX, in exceptional circumstances, the Ministerial Conference may decide to waive an obligation imposed on a Member by the WTO Agreement or by any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.

(4)
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article IX of the WTO Agreement set out the procedures for the granting of waivers concerning the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A, 1B or 1C to the WTO Agreement and their annexes.

(5)
Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article IV of the WTO Agreement, the Ministerial Conference has the authority to take decisions on all matters under any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.

(6)
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article IV of the WTO Agreement, in the intervals between meetings of the Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the General Council of the WTO conducts its functions.

(7)
Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article IX of the WTO Agreement, the WTO usually takes the decisions by consensus.

(8)
The United States was granted a waiver of obligations under paragraph 1 of Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (‘GATT 1994’) on 15 February 1985, for the period from 1 January 1984 to 30 September 1995. On 15 November 1995, the Members renewed the waiver to 30 September 2005 and again on 29 May 2009 to 31 December 2014. On 5 May 2015, the Members extended the waiver in respect of paragraph 1 of Article I of the GATT 1994 to 31 December 2019, and expanded the waiver to cover paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article XIII of the GATT 1994 to the extent necessary for the United States to provide duty-free treatment to imports of eligible products originating in beneficiary countries designated pursuant to the provisions of the US Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (‘CBERA’). On 17 October 2019, the Members extended the waiver in respect of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article XIII of the GATT 1994 to 30 September 2025, to the extent necessary for the United States to provide duty-free treatment to imports of eligible products originating in beneficiary countries designated pursuant to the provisions of CBERA.

(9)
Pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article IX of the WTO Agreement, the United States submitted a request to the General Council to take a decision to grant a WTO waiver to permit the United States to provide duty-free treatment to eligible products originating in Central American and Caribbean countries and territories under CBERA from 1 October 2025 to 30 September 2030.

(10)
The United States justifies the request on the basis of the high prevalence of poverty and instability in the Caribbean Basin countries, particularly in Haiti. Benefits under CBERA are intended to expand economic opportunities and contribute towards a more stable and prosperous region.

(11)
The waiver would not negatively affect either the economy of the Union or the Union’s trade relations with the beneficiaries of the waiver. Moreover, the Union is supportive of actions against poverty and for stability.

(12)
It is appropriate to establish the position to be taken on the Union’s behalf within the General Council to support the United States request to grant the waiver in accordance with Article 218(9) TFEU, as the waiver will be binding on Members of the WTO,

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular the first subparagraph of Article 207(4), in conjunction with Article 218(9) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

Whereas:

(1) The Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (‘WTO Agreement’) entered into force on 1 January 1995.

(2) Paragraph 2 of Article II of the WTO Agreement provides that the agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 to the WTO Agreement (‘Multilateral Trade Agreements’) are integral parts of the WTO Agreement and are binding on all Members.

(3) Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX, in exceptional circumstances, the Ministerial Conference may decide to waive an obligation imposed on a Member by the WTO Agreement or by any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.

(4) Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article IX of the WTO Agreement set out the procedures for the granting of waivers concerning the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A, 1B or 1C to the WTO Agreement and their annexes.

(5) Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article IV of the WTO Agreement, the Ministerial Conference has the authority to take decisions on all matters under any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.

(6) Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article IV of the WTO Agreement, in the intervals between meetings of the Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the General Council of the WTO conducts its functions.

(7) Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article IX of the WTO Agreement, the WTO usually takes the decisions by consensus.

(8) The United States was granted a waiver of obligations under paragraph 1 of Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (‘GATT 1994’) on 15 February 1985, for the period from 1 January 1984 to 30 September 1995. On 15 November 1995, the Members renewed the waiver to 30 September 2005 and again on 29 May 2009 to 31 December 2014. On 5 May 2015, the Members extended the waiver in respect of paragraph 1 of Article I of the GATT 1994 to 31 December 2019, and expanded the waiver to cover paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article XIII of the GATT 1994 to the extent necessary for the United States to provide duty-free treatment to imports of eligible products originating in beneficiary countries designated pursuant to the provisions of the US Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (‘CBERA’). On 17 October 2019, the Members extended the waiver in respect of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article XIII of the GATT 1994 to 30 September 2025, to the extent necessary for the United States to provide duty-free treatment to imports of eligible products originating in beneficiary countries designated pursuant to the provisions of CBERA.

(9) Pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article IX of the WTO Agreement, the United States submitted a request to the General Council to take a decision to grant a WTO waiver to permit the United States to provide duty-free treatment to eligible products originating in Central American and Caribbean countries and territories under CBERA from 1 October 2025 to 30 September 2030.

(10) The United States justifies the request on the basis of the high prevalence of poverty and instability in the Caribbean Basin countries, particularly in Haiti. Benefits under CBERA are intended to expand economic opportunities and contribute towards a more stable and prosperous region.

(11) The waiver would not negatively affect either the economy of the Union or the Union’s trade relations with the beneficiaries of the waiver. Moreover, the Union is supportive of actions against poverty and for stability.

(12) It is appropriate to establish the position to be taken on the Union’s behalf within the General Council to support the United States request to grant the waiver in accordance with Article 218(9) TFEU, as the waiver will be binding on Members of the WTO,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The position to be taken on the Union’s behalf within the General Council of the World Trade Organization (WTO) shall be to support the granting of a WTO waiver permitting the United States to provide duty-free treatment to eligible products originating in Central American and Caribbean countries and territories under the US Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act from 1 October 2025 to 30 September 2030.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1562 of 25 July 2025 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to support the Albanian Armed Forces

                                January 13, 2026                            

Official Journalof the European Union
ENL series

2025/1562
28.7.2025

(1)
Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509(1)establishes the European Peace Facility (EPF) for the financing by Member States of Union actions under the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security pursuant to Article 21(2), point (c), of the Treaty. In particular, pursuant to Article 1(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, the EPF is to be used for the financing of assistance measures such as actions to strengthen the capacities of third States and regional and international organisations relating to military and defence matters.

(2)
The Union is committed to a close relationship in support of a strong, independent and prosperous Albania, based on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, which was signed in 2006 and entered into force in 2009, and on the accession negotiations with Albania, which were opened in 2022.

(3)
The Union commends Albania for its continuing track record of full alignment with the CFSP and recognises Albania’s contribution to the Union’s common security and defence policy (CSDP), including its increased participation in CSDP missions and operations and in the Union’s rapid response forces within the Rapid Deployment Capacity framework.

(4)
On 21 March 2022, the Union approved the Strategic Compass, with the objective of becoming a stronger and more capable security provider, including through the increased use of the EPF in support of partners’ military and defence capabilities.

(5)
In the Brussels Declaration of the EU-Western Balkan Summit of 18 December 2024, the leaders of the Union and its Member States, in consultation with the Western Balkans leaders, reaffirmed their commitment to further developing and strengthening dialogue and cooperation in security and defence, and to further strengthen security and resilience in the region through the EPF.

(6)
On 25 April 2025, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy received a request from Albania for the Union to assist the Albanian Armed Forces to improve their operational effectiveness.

(7)
Assistance measures are to be implemented taking into account the principles and requirements set out in Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, in particular compliance with Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP(2), and in line with the rules for the implementation of revenue and expenditure financed under the EPF.

(8)
The Council reaffirms its determination to protect, promote and fulfil human rights, fundamental freedoms and democratic principles and to strengthen the rule of law and good governance, in compliance with the Charter of the United Nations, with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with international law, in particular international human rights law and international humanitarian law,

(a)
to strengthen the cooperation between the Union and Albania in security and defence;

(b)
to contribute to enhancing the security and defence capacities of the Albanian Armed Forces to improve national security and resilience and thereby better protect the civilian population in crises and emergencies;

(c)
to strengthen Albania’s potential to participate in the Union’s common security and defence policy missions and operations, and in the Rapid Deployment Capacity framework.

(a)
tactical vehicles;

(b)
engineering vehicles;

(c)
light armoured multipurpose vehicles.

(a)
compliance of the units of the Albanian Armed Forces supported under the assistance measure with relevant international law, in particular international human rights law and international humanitarian law;

(b)
proper and efficient use of any assets provided under the assistance measure for the purposes for which they were provided;

(c)
sufficient maintenance of any assets provided under the assistance measure to ensure their usability and operational availability over their life cycle;

(d)
that any assets provided under the assistance measure are not lost or transferred to persons or entities other than those identified in those arrangements.

(a)
delivery verification, whereby EPF delivery certificates are to be signed by the end-user forces upon transfer of ownership;

(b)
reporting on the inventory, whereby the beneficiary is to report annually on the inventory of designated items until such reporting is no longer deemed necessary by the Political and Security Committee (PSC);

(c)
on-site visits, whereby the beneficiary is to grant the High Representative and the EPF auditors access to conduct on-site checks and EPF audits, upon request.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 28(1) and Article 41(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

(1) Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 (1) establishes the European Peace Facility (EPF) for the financing by Member States of Union actions under the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security pursuant to Article 21(2), point (c), of the Treaty. In particular, pursuant to Article 1(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, the EPF is to be used for the financing of assistance measures such as actions to strengthen the capacities of third States and regional and international organisations relating to military and defence matters.

(2) The Union is committed to a close relationship in support of a strong, independent and prosperous Albania, based on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, which was signed in 2006 and entered into force in 2009, and on the accession negotiations with Albania, which were opened in 2022.

(3) The Union commends Albania for its continuing track record of full alignment with the CFSP and recognises Albania’s contribution to the Union’s common security and defence policy (CSDP), including its increased participation in CSDP missions and operations and in the Union’s rapid response forces within the Rapid Deployment Capacity framework.

(4) On 21 March 2022, the Union approved the Strategic Compass, with the objective of becoming a stronger and more capable security provider, including through the increased use of the EPF in support of partners’ military and defence capabilities.

(5) In the Brussels Declaration of the EU-Western Balkan Summit of 18 December 2024, the leaders of the Union and its Member States, in consultation with the Western Balkans leaders, reaffirmed their commitment to further developing and strengthening dialogue and cooperation in security and defence, and to further strengthen security and resilience in the region through the EPF.

(6) On 25 April 2025, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy received a request from Albania for the Union to assist the Albanian Armed Forces to improve their operational effectiveness.

(7) Assistance measures are to be implemented taking into account the principles and requirements set out in Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, in particular compliance with Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2), and in line with the rules for the implementation of revenue and expenditure financed under the EPF.

(8) The Council reaffirms its determination to protect, promote and fulfil human rights, fundamental freedoms and democratic principles and to strengthen the rule of law and good governance, in compliance with the Charter of the United Nations, with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with international law, in particular international human rights law and international humanitarian law,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Establishment, objectives, scope and duration 1.   An assistance measure benefiting Albania (the ‘beneficiary’) to be financed under the European Peace Facility (EPF) (the ‘assistance measure’) is hereby established.
 2.   The objectives of the assistance measure are the following:

(a) to strengthen the cooperation between the Union and Albania in security and defence;

(b) to contribute to enhancing the security and defence capacities of the Albanian Armed Forces to improve national security and resilience and thereby better protect the civilian population in crises and emergencies;

(c) to strengthen Albania’s potential to participate in the Union’s common security and defence policy missions and operations, and in the Rapid Deployment Capacity framework.
 3.   To achieve the objectives set out in paragraph 2, the assistance measure shall finance the following types of equipment not designed to deliver lethal force:

(a) tactical vehicles;

(b) engineering vehicles;

(c) light armoured multipurpose vehicles.

The assistance measure shall also finance related supplies and services, including technical, operational and maintenance training, where needed.
 4.   The duration of the assistance measure shall be 36 months from the date of adoption of this Decision.
Financial arrangements 1.   The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the assistance measure shall be EUR 15 000 000. 

 2.   All expenditure shall be managed in accordance with Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 and in line with the rules for the implementation of revenue and expenditure financed under the EPF.
Arrangements with the beneficiary 1.   The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) shall make the necessary arrangements with the beneficiary to ensure its compliance with the requirements and conditions established by this Decision as a condition for the provision of support under the assistance measure.
 2.   The arrangements referred to in paragraph 1 shall include provisions obliging the beneficiary to ensure:

(a) compliance of the units of the Albanian Armed Forces supported under the assistance measure with relevant international law, in particular international human rights law and international humanitarian law;

(b) proper and efficient use of any assets provided under the assistance measure for the purposes for which they were provided;

(c) sufficient maintenance of any assets provided under the assistance measure to ensure their usability and operational availability over their life cycle;

(d) that any assets provided under the assistance measure are not lost or transferred to persons or entities other than those identified in those arrangements.
 3.   The arrangements referred to in paragraph 1 shall include provisions on the suspension and termination of support under the assistance measure in the event of the beneficiary being found in breach of the obligations set out in paragraph 2. 
Implementation 1.   The High Representative shall be responsible for ensuring the implementation of this Decision in accordance with Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, and in line with the rules for the implementation of revenue and expenditure financed under the EPF and with the Integrated Methodological Framework for assessing and identifying the required measures and controls for assistance measures under the EPF.
 2.   The implementation of the activities referred to in Article 1(3) shall be carried out by the Agenzia Industrie Difesa.
Monitoring, control and evaluation 1.   The High Representative shall monitor the compliance by the beneficiary with the obligations set out in Article 3. That monitoring shall be used to provide awareness of the context and the risks of breaches of the obligations set out in Article 3, and to contribute to the prevention of such breaches, including violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by the units of the Albanian Armed Forces supported under the assistance measure.
 2.   The post-shipment control of equipment and supplies shall be organised as follows:

(a) delivery verification, whereby EPF delivery certificates are to be signed by the end-user forces upon transfer of ownership;

(b) reporting on the inventory, whereby the beneficiary is to report annually on the inventory of designated items until such reporting is no longer deemed necessary by the Political and Security Committee (PSC);

(c) on-site visits, whereby the beneficiary is to grant the High Representative and the EPF auditors access to conduct on-site checks and EPF audits, upon request.
 3.   The High Representative shall conduct a final evaluation upon completion of the assistance measure to assess whether the assistance measure has contributed to reaching the objectives set out in Article 1(2).
ReportingDuring the period of implementation, the High Representative shall provide the PSC with six-monthly reports on the implementation of the assistance measure, in accordance with Article 63 of Decision (CFSP) 2021/509. The administrator for assistance measures shall regularly inform the Facility Committee established by Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 on the implementation of revenue and expenditure in accordance with Article 38 of that Decision, including by providing information on the suppliers and subcontractors involved.
Suspension and termination 1.   The PSC may decide to suspend wholly or partially the implementation of the assistance measure in accordance with Article 64 of Decision (CFSP) 2021/509. 

 2.   The PSC may recommend that the Council terminate the assistance measure.
Entry into forceThis Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1558 of 25 July 2025 amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran

                                January 13, 2026                            

Official Journalof the European Union
ENL series




2025/1558
28.7.2025



(1)
On 26 July 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/413/CFSP(1).



(2)
In accordance with Article 26(1) and (3) of Decision 2010/413/CFSP, the Council has reviewed the list of designated persons and entities set out in Annex II to that Decision.



(3)
The Council has concluded that the entry concerning one person designated in Annex II to Decision 2010/413/CFSP should be removed from that Annex. The restrictive measures against all other persons and entities in the list set out in Annex II to Decision 2010/413/CFSP should be maintained, insofar as their names are not mentioned in Annex VI to that Decision, and 45 entries included in Annex II should be updated.



(4)
Decision 2010/413/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,



(1)
under the heading ‘I. Persons and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities and persons and entities providing support to the Government of Iran.’, the following entries replace the corresponding entries in the list set out under the subheading ‘A. Persons’:NameIdentifying informationReasonsDate of listing‘8.Ebrahim MAHMUDZADEHDOB: 2.4.1955Function: Professor at Malek Ashtar University; Chairman of the Board of Iran Telecommunication CompanyNationality: IranianGender: maleEbrahim Mahmudzadeh is a professor at EU-listed Malek Ashtar University, subordinate to EU-listed Defense Technology and Science Research Centre (DTSRC), which supports Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) with research and development (R&D) services.Faculty members of Malek Ashtar University are involved in research regarding missiles and nuclear power and thereby provide research and development support to the Government of Iran.Ebrahim Mahmudzadeh is also Chairman of the Board of Iran Telecommunication Company, which is partially controlled by the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).Ebrahim Mahmudzadeh therefore provides support to the Government of Iran.23.6.200827.Kamran DANESHJOO (a.k.a. DANESHJOU)Function: Professor at Iran University of Science and TechnologyNationality: IranianGender: maleProfessor at Iran University of Science and Technology. Former Minister of Science, Research and Technology. As project manager of the 111th section of the AMAD Plan, he provided support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.1.12.201129.Milad JAFARI (Milad JAFERI)DOB: 20.9.1974POB: IranNationality: IranianGender: maleAssociated entities: Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG); MACPAR Makina San Ve Tic; Multimat lc ve Dis Ticaret Pazarlama Limited Sirketi; STEP Standart Teknik Parca San ve TIC A.S.Iranian national supplying goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) front companies.1.12.201132.Majid KHANSARIDOB: 1972POB: Khomeini Shahr, IranNationality: IranianGender: maleMajid Khansari plays an influential role in Iran’s nuclear programme. He is the former CEO of Natanz nuclear site, as well as of EU-listed centrifuge manufacturer Kalaye Electric Company (KEC).As an expert in the field of nuclear management, he continues to share his opinion on Iran’s nuclear programme and influence the national debate around that programme.Majid Khansari is therefore involved in Iran’s nuclear or ballistic missile activities.1.12.201140.Hamid SOLTANIFunction: Managing Director of Management Company for Nuclear Power Plant Construction (MASNA)Nationality: IranianGender: maleHamid Soltani is the Managing Director of Management Company for Nuclear Power Plant Construction (MASNA).In this position, he has been involved in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran’s development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.1.12.201142.Javad AL YASINFunction: Head of the Research Centre for Explosion and ImpactNationality: IranianGender: maleHead of the Research Centre for Explosion and Impact, also known as METFAZ.1.12.201153.Fereidoun ABASSI-DAVANI(فریدون عباسی دوانی)(a.k.a. Fereydoon ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereidun ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereydoun ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereidoon ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereidoun ABBASI-DAVANI)Function: senior nuclear scientistDOB: 11.7.1958POB: Abadan, IranNationality: IranianGender: maleFereidoun Abassi-Davani is a former Senior Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) scientist, former Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and former member of the Parliament of Iran. He is a senior nuclear scientist and is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Considering his past high-level roles within the Iranian government and his role as a member of the Parliament of Iran as well as his scientific activities, Fereidoun Abassi-Davani is providing support to the Government of Iran and was directly engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.17.10.2023 (UN: 24.3.2007)’

Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing
‘8.
Ebrahim MAHMUDZADEH
DOB: 2.4.1955Function: Professor at Malek Ashtar University; Chairman of the Board of Iran Telecommunication CompanyNationality: IranianGender: male
Ebrahim Mahmudzadeh is a professor at EU-listed Malek Ashtar University, subordinate to EU-listed Defense Technology and Science Research Centre (DTSRC), which supports Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) with research and development (R&D) services.Faculty members of Malek Ashtar University are involved in research regarding missiles and nuclear power and thereby provide research and development support to the Government of Iran.Ebrahim Mahmudzadeh is also Chairman of the Board of Iran Telecommunication Company, which is partially controlled by the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).Ebrahim Mahmudzadeh therefore provides support to the Government of Iran.
23.6.2008
27.
Kamran DANESHJOO (a.k.a. DANESHJOU)
Function: Professor at Iran University of Science and TechnologyNationality: IranianGender: male
Professor at Iran University of Science and Technology. Former Minister of Science, Research and Technology. As project manager of the 111th section of the AMAD Plan, he provided support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
1.12.2011
29.
Milad JAFARI (Milad JAFERI)
DOB: 20.9.1974POB: IranNationality: IranianGender: maleAssociated entities: Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG); MACPAR Makina San Ve Tic; Multimat lc ve Dis Ticaret Pazarlama Limited Sirketi; STEP Standart Teknik Parca San ve TIC A.S.
Iranian national supplying goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) front companies.
1.12.2011
32.
Majid KHANSARI
DOB: 1972POB: Khomeini Shahr, IranNationality: IranianGender: male
Majid Khansari plays an influential role in Iran’s nuclear programme. He is the former CEO of Natanz nuclear site, as well as of EU-listed centrifuge manufacturer Kalaye Electric Company (KEC).As an expert in the field of nuclear management, he continues to share his opinion on Iran’s nuclear programme and influence the national debate around that programme.Majid Khansari is therefore involved in Iran’s nuclear or ballistic missile activities.
1.12.2011
40.
Hamid SOLTANI
Function: Managing Director of Management Company for Nuclear Power Plant Construction (MASNA)Nationality: IranianGender: male
Hamid Soltani is the Managing Director of Management Company for Nuclear Power Plant Construction (MASNA).In this position, he has been involved in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran’s development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
1.12.2011
42.
Javad AL YASIN
Function: Head of the Research Centre for Explosion and ImpactNationality: IranianGender: male
Head of the Research Centre for Explosion and Impact, also known as METFAZ.
1.12.2011
53.
Fereidoun ABASSI-DAVANI(فریدون عباسی دوانی)(a.k.a. Fereydoon ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereidun ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereydoun ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereidoon ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereidoun ABBASI-DAVANI)
Function: senior nuclear scientistDOB: 11.7.1958POB: Abadan, IranNationality: IranianGender: male
Fereidoun Abassi-Davani is a former Senior Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) scientist, former Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and former member of the Parliament of Iran. He is a senior nuclear scientist and is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Considering his past high-level roles within the Iranian government and his role as a member of the Parliament of Iran as well as his scientific activities, Fereidoun Abassi-Davani is providing support to the Government of Iran and was directly engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
17.10.2023 (UN: 24.3.2007)’


Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing

‘8.
Ebrahim MAHMUDZADEH
DOB: 2.4.1955Function: Professor at Malek Ashtar University; Chairman of the Board of Iran Telecommunication CompanyNationality: IranianGender: male
Ebrahim Mahmudzadeh is a professor at EU-listed Malek Ashtar University, subordinate to EU-listed Defense Technology and Science Research Centre (DTSRC), which supports Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) with research and development (R&D) services.Faculty members of Malek Ashtar University are involved in research regarding missiles and nuclear power and thereby provide research and development support to the Government of Iran.Ebrahim Mahmudzadeh is also Chairman of the Board of Iran Telecommunication Company, which is partially controlled by the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).Ebrahim Mahmudzadeh therefore provides support to the Government of Iran.
23.6.2008

27.
Kamran DANESHJOO (a.k.a. DANESHJOU)
Function: Professor at Iran University of Science and TechnologyNationality: IranianGender: male
Professor at Iran University of Science and Technology. Former Minister of Science, Research and Technology. As project manager of the 111th section of the AMAD Plan, he provided support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
1.12.2011

29.
Milad JAFARI (Milad JAFERI)
DOB: 20.9.1974POB: IranNationality: IranianGender: maleAssociated entities: Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG); MACPAR Makina San Ve Tic; Multimat lc ve Dis Ticaret Pazarlama Limited Sirketi; STEP Standart Teknik Parca San ve TIC A.S.
Iranian national supplying goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) front companies.
1.12.2011

32.
Majid KHANSARI
DOB: 1972POB: Khomeini Shahr, IranNationality: IranianGender: male
Majid Khansari plays an influential role in Iran’s nuclear programme. He is the former CEO of Natanz nuclear site, as well as of EU-listed centrifuge manufacturer Kalaye Electric Company (KEC).As an expert in the field of nuclear management, he continues to share his opinion on Iran’s nuclear programme and influence the national debate around that programme.Majid Khansari is therefore involved in Iran’s nuclear or ballistic missile activities.
1.12.2011

40.
Hamid SOLTANI
Function: Managing Director of Management Company for Nuclear Power Plant Construction (MASNA)Nationality: IranianGender: male
Hamid Soltani is the Managing Director of Management Company for Nuclear Power Plant Construction (MASNA).In this position, he has been involved in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran’s development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
1.12.2011

42.
Javad AL YASIN
Function: Head of the Research Centre for Explosion and ImpactNationality: IranianGender: male
Head of the Research Centre for Explosion and Impact, also known as METFAZ.
1.12.2011

53.
Fereidoun ABASSI-DAVANI(فریدون عباسی دوانی)(a.k.a. Fereydoon ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereidun ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereydoun ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereidoon ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereidoun ABBASI-DAVANI)
Function: senior nuclear scientistDOB: 11.7.1958POB: Abadan, IranNationality: IranianGender: male
Fereidoun Abassi-Davani is a former Senior Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) scientist, former Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and former member of the Parliament of Iran. He is a senior nuclear scientist and is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Considering his past high-level roles within the Iranian government and his role as a member of the Parliament of Iran as well as his scientific activities, Fereidoun Abassi-Davani is providing support to the Government of Iran and was directly engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
17.10.2023 (UN: 24.3.2007)’




Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing

‘8.
Ebrahim MAHMUDZADEH
DOB: 2.4.1955Function: Professor at Malek Ashtar University; Chairman of the Board of Iran Telecommunication CompanyNationality: IranianGender: male
Ebrahim Mahmudzadeh is a professor at EU-listed Malek Ashtar University, subordinate to EU-listed Defense Technology and Science Research Centre (DTSRC), which supports Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) with research and development (R&D) services.Faculty members of Malek Ashtar University are involved in research regarding missiles and nuclear power and thereby provide research and development support to the Government of Iran.Ebrahim Mahmudzadeh is also Chairman of the Board of Iran Telecommunication Company, which is partially controlled by the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).Ebrahim Mahmudzadeh therefore provides support to the Government of Iran.
23.6.2008

27.
Kamran DANESHJOO (a.k.a. DANESHJOU)
Function: Professor at Iran University of Science and TechnologyNationality: IranianGender: male
Professor at Iran University of Science and Technology. Former Minister of Science, Research and Technology. As project manager of the 111th section of the AMAD Plan, he provided support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
1.12.2011

29.
Milad JAFARI (Milad JAFERI)
DOB: 20.9.1974POB: IranNationality: IranianGender: maleAssociated entities: Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG); MACPAR Makina San Ve Tic; Multimat lc ve Dis Ticaret Pazarlama Limited Sirketi; STEP Standart Teknik Parca San ve TIC A.S.
Iranian national supplying goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) front companies.
1.12.2011

32.
Majid KHANSARI
DOB: 1972POB: Khomeini Shahr, IranNationality: IranianGender: male
Majid Khansari plays an influential role in Iran’s nuclear programme. He is the former CEO of Natanz nuclear site, as well as of EU-listed centrifuge manufacturer Kalaye Electric Company (KEC).As an expert in the field of nuclear management, he continues to share his opinion on Iran’s nuclear programme and influence the national debate around that programme.Majid Khansari is therefore involved in Iran’s nuclear or ballistic missile activities.
1.12.2011

40.
Hamid SOLTANI
Function: Managing Director of Management Company for Nuclear Power Plant Construction (MASNA)Nationality: IranianGender: male
Hamid Soltani is the Managing Director of Management Company for Nuclear Power Plant Construction (MASNA).In this position, he has been involved in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran’s development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
1.12.2011

42.
Javad AL YASIN
Function: Head of the Research Centre for Explosion and ImpactNationality: IranianGender: male
Head of the Research Centre for Explosion and Impact, also known as METFAZ.
1.12.2011

53.
Fereidoun ABASSI-DAVANI(فریدون عباسی دوانی)(a.k.a. Fereydoon ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereidun ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereydoun ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereidoon ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereidoun ABBASI-DAVANI)
Function: senior nuclear scientistDOB: 11.7.1958POB: Abadan, IranNationality: IranianGender: male
Fereidoun Abassi-Davani is a former Senior Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) scientist, former Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and former member of the Parliament of Iran. He is a senior nuclear scientist and is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Considering his past high-level roles within the Iranian government and his role as a member of the Parliament of Iran as well as his scientific activities, Fereidoun Abassi-Davani is providing support to the Government of Iran and was directly engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
17.10.2023 (UN: 24.3.2007)’



(2)
under the heading ‘I. Persons and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities and persons and entities providing support to the Government of Iran.’, the following entries replace the corresponding entries in the list set out under the subheading ‘B. Entities’:NameIdentifying informationReasonsDate of listing‘1.Aerospace Industries Organisation, AIOAddress 1: AIO, 28 Shian 5, Lavizan, Tehran, IranAddress 2: Langare Street, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) is a subsidiary of the EU-listed Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) in charge of overseeing Iran’s ballistic missile programme.It supervises several subsidiaries tasked with the production or procurement of different components of the ballistic missile programme.The Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) therefore provides support to the Government of Iran.23.4.200726.Marine Industries (a.k.a. Marine Industries Organisation (MIO), Marine Industries Group (MIG))Address: Pasdaran Ave., PO Box 19585/ 777, Tehran, IranPlace of registration: Tehran, IranDate of registration: 1996Principal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO), Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)Marine Industries is a subsidiary of the EU-listed Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which is a subsidiary of EU-listed Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).Marine Industries is involved in the maritime dimension of Iran’s missile programme, including by building ships that can carry and launch offensive missiles.Marine Industries is therefore an entity involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities and an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.23.4.200732.Parto Sanat Co (a.k.a. Parto Sanaat Co.; Parto Sanat Company; Partonsanat; Partosanat Co.; Partosanat PJSC; Yakan Parto; Bargh Va Electronic Partosanat)Address: No. 2417 Valiasr St., corner of 14th St., PO Box 15178 43316, Tehran, IranManufacturer of frequency changers and it is capable of developing and modifying imported foreign frequency changers in a way that makes them usable in gas centrifuge enrichment. It is deemed to be involved in nuclear proliferation activities.26.7.201035.RakaAssociated entity: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)A department of EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company. Established in late 2006, it was responsible for the construction of the Uranium enrichment plant at Fordow (Qom).26.7.201041.Technology Cooperation Office (TCO) of the Iranian President’s Office (a.k.a. Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation (CITC); Presidential Center for Cooperation on Transformation and Progress)Place of registration: Tehran, IranThe Technology Cooperation Office (TCO) of the Iranian President’s Office operates in the fields of research, biotechnology, nanotechnology, renewable energy and information technology.Its operations go back to 2001 when it was charged with strategic planning and the coordination of Iran’s developmental activities for nanotechnology. It is attached to and supervised by the President’s Office. It acts as a hub in the field and serves as a coordinator and facilitator of connections and collaborations. It maintains connections with the international community, networks between country laboratories, funds Iranian scientists, and engages in teaching.Under its alias, Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation (CITC), it is furthermore part of an interdepartmental system consisting of CITC, the Iranian Ministry of Information and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) under the direct command of the Iranian President. Individuals associated with CITC, acting as Iranian official representatives abroad, also carried out secret functions of scientific and technical intelligence officers.Responsible for Iran’s technological advancement through relevant foreign procurement and training links. It provides support to the Government of Iran.26.7.201042.Yeganeh Energy Sazan Atrak Part (formerly known as Yasa Part) and the following subsidiaries:Address: Ground Floor – Building 0 – Maharat 3 Alley – Maharat Street – Bidak Industrial Area – Badranlu Rural District – Central District – Bojnord City – Northern Khorasan Province, Iran Postal Code: 9418156318Type of entity: Private joint-stock companyPlace of registration: Bojnord – North Khorasan Province, IranRegistration no.: 5219Company dealing with procurement activities related to the purchase of materials and technologies necessary to nuclear and ballistic programmes.26.7.2010(a)Arfa Paint Company (a.k.a. ARFA; Arfa Company)Address 1: Unit 5, 9th floor, Sarve Tower, Saadat Abad, Tehran, IranAddress 2: 16th km Karaj Special Road, Tehran, IranActing on behalf of Yasa Part.26.7.2010(b)Arfeh CompanyAddress: West Lavasani, Tehran, IranActing on behalf of Yasa Part.26.7.2010(d)Hosseini Nejad Trading Co. (a.k.a. Hosseini Nejad Trading Company)Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.26.7.2010(e)Iran Saffron Company (a.k.a. Iransaffron Co.; Iran Safron; Iran Saffron; Iran Saffron Co.)Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.26.7.201057.Hirbod Co (a.k.a. HIRBOD Company)Address 1: Hirbod Co – Flat 2, 3 Second Street, Asad Abadi Avenue, Tehran 14316, IranAddress 2 (factory): Tehran-Saveh Highway, km 80, Mamounieh Industrial Town, at the end of 8th Street, Asad Abadi Tehran, IranDate of registration: 1995Principal place of business: Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)Hirbod Co is one of the leading companies in the field of stainless steel products. It provides steel products, including within security and military apparatus, to many Iranian entities, in particular Arthesh, the Iranian army.Therefore, Hirbod Co is supporting the Government of Iran and provides support for the development of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery systems by Iran.23.5.201160.Paya Parto (a.k.a. Paya Partov; National Centre for Laser Science and Technology)Paya Parto is an entity that researches stable isotope separation, a key parameter for centrifuges component production, as part of Iran’s nuclear programme. It has close ties to the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI), which runs Iran’s Nuclear programme and supervises individual projects. Paya Parto is therefore responsible for providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.23.5.201162.Taghtiran (a.k.a. Taghtiran Kashan Company)Address: Unit 2, No. 3, 2nd Alley, Asad Abadi St., Vali-e asr St., 14316 Tehran, IranPlace of registration: Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO)Taghtiran manufactures stainless steel and carbon steel parts for various entities, including the security and defence industries, such as Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and nuclear facilities, for example, the uranium conversion facility.23.5.201171.Institute of Applied Physics (IAP)Associated entities: Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND); Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)The Institute of Applied Physics provides research and development for Iran’s nuclear programme. It has project partnerships with the EU-listed Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), which is a subsidiary of EU-listed Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), working to weaponise the nuclear programme, which is under the authority of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.The Institute of Applied Physics is therefore involved in Iran’s nuclear programme and in Iran’s ballistic missile activities.23.5.201177.Shahid Beheshti UniversityAddress 1: Daneshju Blvd., Yaman St., Chamran Blvd., P.O. Box 19839-63113, Tehran, IranAddress 2: Shahid Shahriari Square, Evin, P.O. Box 19839-6311369411, Tehran, IranShahid Beheshti University is a public entity which is under the supervision of the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology. Carries out scientific research relevant to the development of nuclear weapons.23.5.201181.Eyvaz Technic (a.k.a. Azarsam Instrument Company)Address 1: No 3, Building 3, Shahid Hamid Sadigh Alley, Shariati Street, Tehran, IranAddress 2: Tehran Province, Tehran, Kooy-e-Mehrzad, Kooy-e-Mehrzad, M78Q+V2R, IranAssociated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)Producer of vacuum equipment that has supplied the uranium enrichment sites at Natanz and Qom/Fordow. In 2011, it supplied pressure transducers to EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC).1.12.201183.Ghani Sazi Uranium Company (a.k.a. Iran Uranium Enrichment Company; Sherkat-e Ghanisazi-ye Uranium)Address: 3, Qarqavol Close, 20th Street, Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC); Iran Centrifuge Technology CompanyGhani Sazi Uranium Company has production contracts with EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) and EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company.1.12.201186.Karanir (a.k.a Karanir Sanat, Moaser; Tajhiz Sanat; Karanir Sanat Co; Moshever Sanat Moaser; TSI; Tajis Sanat; Tajhis Sanat Industries)Address 1: 1139/1 Unit 104 Gol Building, Gol Alley, North Side of Sae, Vali Asr Avenue. PO Box 19395-6439, Tehran, IranAddress 2: Beheshti St., Sabonuchi St., Adaee Alley, No. 2, Unit 301, Tehran, IranKaranir has been involved in purchasing equipment and materials, which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme.1.12.201187.Khala Afarin Pars (a.k.a. PISHRO KHALA AFARIN COMPANY; Vacuum Afarin, Pars Vacuum Company)Address 1: Unit 5, 2nd Floor, No 75, Mehran Afrand St, Sattarkhan St, Tehran.Address 2: No. 94, 4th Floor, Unit 16, Bagherkhan St., Sattarkhan St., Tehran, IranInvolved in purchasing equipment and materials which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme.1.12.201188.MACPAR Makina San Ve TicAddress: Istasyon MH, Sehitler cad, Guldeniz Sit, Number 79/2, Tuzla 34930, Istanbul, TürkiyeAssociated individual: Milad JafariCompany run by EU-designated Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies.1.12.201189.MATSA (Mohandesi Toseh Sokht Atomi Company) (a.k.a. Mohandesi Toseh Sanayeh Atomi (METSA))Address: 90, Fathi Shaghaghi Street, Tehran, Iran.Registration no.: 2833278National ID no.: 10103191030Associated individuals: Mohammad Mohammadi (Managing Director)Associated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)MATSA (Mohandesi Toseh Sokht Atomi Company) is an Iranian company contracted to EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) to provide design and engineering services across the nuclear fuel cycle. It has been procuring equipment for the Natanz uranium enrichment site.1.12.201190.Mobin Sanjesh (a.k.a. Fakoor International Tehran Engineering Company (FITCO))Address: Entry 3, No 11, 12th Street, Miremad Alley, Abbas Abad, Tehran, IranMobin Sanjesh directly participates in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. It provides goods and services for magnetic systems which have a direct application in Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle industry, for example calibration of mass spectrometers.1.12.201191.Multimat lc ve Dis Ticaret Pazarlama Limited Sirketi (a.k.a. MULTIMAT IC VE DIS TIC. PAZ. LTD. STI.; MULTIMAT IC VE DIS TICARET PAZARLAMA LIMITED SIRKETI; MULTIMAT IMPORT AND EXPORT; MULTIMAT LTD.; MULTIMAT TEHRAN; MULTIMAT TRADING COMPANY)Address: Guvendik Mahallesi 132/1 Sokak, Izmir, TürkiyePlace of registration: Izmir, TürkiyeDate of registration: 30.12.1996Associated individual: Milad JafariAssociated entity: Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG)Company run by EU-designated Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies.1.12.201194.Saman Tose’e Asia (SATA)Address: 4th Unit, 51 Sane’e St., N.W. of Jahan Kudak, Africa Blvd., Tehran, Iran 19699-35145Engineering firm involved in supporting a range of large-scale industrial projects including Iran’s uranium enrichment programme, including undeclared work at the uranium enrichment site at Qom/Fordow.1.12.201197.STEP Standart Teknik Parca San ve TIC A.S. (a.k.a. SSTP, Step Standard Technical Components Industry and Trading Corporation, Step Corporation, Step Standart Teknik Parca Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S., Step AS, Step Company, Stap Standart Tek Par San Tic AS, Step Standart Teknyk, Parca San. Ve Tyc. A.S., STEP Standart Teknik Parca San. ve Tic. A.S., Step Standart Teknik Parca Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi, Step A.S., Step S.A., Step Istanbul, Standart Teknik Parca San Ve Tic A.S., Standart Teknik Parca San. Ve Ticaret A.S., Standard Technical Component Industry and Trade Company, Step Standart Teknik Parca San Ve Tic As, Step Istanbul/Standart Teknik Parca San. Ve Tic. A.S.)Address: 79/2 Tuzla, 34940, Istanbul, TürkiyeAssociated individual: Milad JafariAssociated entity: Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG)Company run by Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) through front companies.1.12.2011101.Tosse Silooha (a.k.a. Tosseh Jahad E Silo; Tosee Siloha)Address: NO.3. 50th st., Kalantari sq., Seyed Jamaleddin Asadabadi Ave. (Yousefabad), Tehran, IranTosse Silooha is a company involved in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. It is involved in fabricating components for nuclear power plants such as cooling tower plants, and industrial chimneys. The company is also supporting the Government of Iran.1.12.2011102.Yarsanat (a.k.a. Yar Sanat; Yarestan Vacuumi; Zist Yar Sanat; Yar Sanat Co)Address 1: No. 101, West Zardosht Street, 3rd Floor, 14157 Tehran; IranAddress 2: No. 139 Hoveyzeh Street, 15337, Tehran, IranAddress 3: 15, Fatemi Eshragi Alley, Gerda Afrid Building, science and Technology Park, Tarbiat Modares University, S.S 2 – Development Center, 4th Floor, Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)Procurement company for EU-listed Kalaye Electric Company (KEC). Involved in purchasing equipment and materials, which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme, for example instruments for uranium enrichment.1.12.2011106.Tidewater (a.k.a. Tidewater Middle East Co; Tide Water Khavarmianeh)Postal address: No. 84, Vozara St., Tehran, IranType of entity: Public Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: Tehran, IranRegistration no.: 12341Principal place of business: Tehran, IranOwned or controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).23.1.2012148.Iran Composites Institute (a.k.a. Composites Research Laboratory (CRL))Iran Composites Institute, Iranian University of Science and Technology, 16845-188, Tehran, Iran,Telephone: 98 217 3912858Fax: 98 217 7491206Email: mailto:[email protected]:http://www.irancomposites.orgAssociated entities: Malek Ashtar University; Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (a.k.a. TESA)The Iran Composites Institute is a centre for research and development in the field of composite materials and structures.It was established in cooperation with the Iran University of Science and Technology (IUST) and remains part of it. Through its research, IUST is involved in Iran’s nuclear programme. It is linked to several Iranian academic institutions, including EU-listed Malek Ashtar University which is linked to the EU-listed Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).In the past, Iran Composites Institute had been contracted to provide EU-listed Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (a.k.a. TESA) with IR-2M centrifuge rotors.Iran Composites Institute is therefore providing support to the Government of Iran and entities owned or controlled by it.22.12.2012151.Simatec Development CompanySimatec Development Company has been assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities.22.12.2012153.Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND)Address: Negarestan 3, off Pasdaran Street, Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)The Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) directly supports Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. The IAEA has identified SPND with their concerns over possible military dimensions (PMD) to Iran’s nuclear programme. SPND was run by UN-designated Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi and is part of the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) designated by the EU.22.12.2012161.Sharif University of TechnologyLast address known: Azadi Ave/Street, PO Box 11365-11155, Tehran, IranTel. + 98 21 66 161Email: [email protected] entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)Sharif University of Technology is a Tehran-based university and Iran’s central repository for nuclear research.In the field of ballistic missile research and production, it cooperates with the EU-listed Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), which oversees Iran’s ballistic missile programme on behalf of the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Furthermore, it cooperates with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and supports it, among other activities, in its procurement efforts.Taken together, these show a significant record of engagement with the Government of Iran in military or military-related fields that constitute support to the Government of Iran.8.11.2014’

Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing
‘1.
Aerospace Industries Organisation, AIO
Address 1: AIO, 28 Shian 5, Lavizan, Tehran, IranAddress 2: Langare Street, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)
Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) is a subsidiary of the EU-listed Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) in charge of overseeing Iran’s ballistic missile programme.It supervises several subsidiaries tasked with the production or procurement of different components of the ballistic missile programme.The Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) therefore provides support to the Government of Iran.
23.4.2007
26.
Marine Industries (a.k.a. Marine Industries Organisation (MIO), Marine Industries Group (MIG))
Address: Pasdaran Ave., PO Box 19585/ 777, Tehran, IranPlace of registration: Tehran, IranDate of registration: 1996Principal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO), Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)
Marine Industries is a subsidiary of the EU-listed Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which is a subsidiary of EU-listed Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).Marine Industries is involved in the maritime dimension of Iran’s missile programme, including by building ships that can carry and launch offensive missiles.Marine Industries is therefore an entity involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities and an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.
23.4.2007
32.
Parto Sanat Co (a.k.a. Parto Sanaat Co.; Parto Sanat Company; Partonsanat; Partosanat Co.; Partosanat PJSC; Yakan Parto; Bargh Va Electronic Partosanat)
Address: No. 2417 Valiasr St., corner of 14th St., PO Box 15178 43316, Tehran, Iran
Manufacturer of frequency changers and it is capable of developing and modifying imported foreign frequency changers in a way that makes them usable in gas centrifuge enrichment. It is deemed to be involved in nuclear proliferation activities.
26.7.2010
35.
Raka
Associated entity: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)
A department of EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company. Established in late 2006, it was responsible for the construction of the Uranium enrichment plant at Fordow (Qom).
26.7.2010
41.
Technology Cooperation Office (TCO) of the Iranian President’s Office (a.k.a. Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation (CITC); Presidential Center for Cooperation on Transformation and Progress)
Place of registration: Tehran, Iran
The Technology Cooperation Office (TCO) of the Iranian President’s Office operates in the fields of research, biotechnology, nanotechnology, renewable energy and information technology.Its operations go back to 2001 when it was charged with strategic planning and the coordination of Iran’s developmental activities for nanotechnology. It is attached to and supervised by the President’s Office. It acts as a hub in the field and serves as a coordinator and facilitator of connections and collaborations. It maintains connections with the international community, networks between country laboratories, funds Iranian scientists, and engages in teaching.Under its alias, Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation (CITC), it is furthermore part of an interdepartmental system consisting of CITC, the Iranian Ministry of Information and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) under the direct command of the Iranian President. Individuals associated with CITC, acting as Iranian official representatives abroad, also carried out secret functions of scientific and technical intelligence officers.Responsible for Iran’s technological advancement through relevant foreign procurement and training links. It provides support to the Government of Iran.
26.7.2010
42.
Yeganeh Energy Sazan Atrak Part (formerly known as Yasa Part) and the following subsidiaries:
Address: Ground Floor – Building 0 – Maharat 3 Alley – Maharat Street – Bidak Industrial Area – Badranlu Rural District – Central District – Bojnord City – Northern Khorasan Province, Iran Postal Code: 9418156318Type of entity: Private joint-stock companyPlace of registration: Bojnord – North Khorasan Province, IranRegistration no.: 5219
Company dealing with procurement activities related to the purchase of materials and technologies necessary to nuclear and ballistic programmes.
26.7.2010

(a)Arfa Paint Company (a.k.a. ARFA; Arfa Company)
(a)
Arfa Paint Company (a.k.a. ARFA; Arfa Company)
Address 1: Unit 5, 9th floor, Sarve Tower, Saadat Abad, Tehran, IranAddress 2: 16th km Karaj Special Road, Tehran, Iran
Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.
26.7.2010

(b)Arfeh Company
(b)
Arfeh Company
Address: West Lavasani, Tehran, Iran
Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.
26.7.2010

(d)Hosseini Nejad Trading Co. (a.k.a. Hosseini Nejad Trading Company)
(d)
Hosseini Nejad Trading Co. (a.k.a. Hosseini Nejad Trading Company)

Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.
26.7.2010

(e)Iran Saffron Company (a.k.a. Iransaffron Co.; Iran Safron; Iran Saffron; Iran Saffron Co.)
(e)
Iran Saffron Company (a.k.a. Iransaffron Co.; Iran Safron; Iran Saffron; Iran Saffron Co.)

Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.
26.7.2010
57.
Hirbod Co (a.k.a. HIRBOD Company)
Address 1: Hirbod Co – Flat 2, 3 Second Street, Asad Abadi Avenue, Tehran 14316, IranAddress 2 (factory): Tehran-Saveh Highway, km 80, Mamounieh Industrial Town, at the end of 8th Street, Asad Abadi Tehran, IranDate of registration: 1995Principal place of business: Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)
Hirbod Co is one of the leading companies in the field of stainless steel products. It provides steel products, including within security and military apparatus, to many Iranian entities, in particular Arthesh, the Iranian army.Therefore, Hirbod Co is supporting the Government of Iran and provides support for the development of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery systems by Iran.
23.5.2011
60.
Paya Parto (a.k.a. Paya Partov; National Centre for Laser Science and Technology)

Paya Parto is an entity that researches stable isotope separation, a key parameter for centrifuges component production, as part of Iran’s nuclear programme. It has close ties to the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI), which runs Iran’s Nuclear programme and supervises individual projects. Paya Parto is therefore responsible for providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
23.5.2011
62.
Taghtiran (a.k.a. Taghtiran Kashan Company)
Address: Unit 2, No. 3, 2nd Alley, Asad Abadi St., Vali-e asr St., 14316 Tehran, IranPlace of registration: Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO)
Taghtiran manufactures stainless steel and carbon steel parts for various entities, including the security and defence industries, such as Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and nuclear facilities, for example, the uranium conversion facility.
23.5.2011
71.
Institute of Applied Physics (IAP)
Associated entities: Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND); Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)
The Institute of Applied Physics provides research and development for Iran’s nuclear programme. It has project partnerships with the EU-listed Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), which is a subsidiary of EU-listed Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), working to weaponise the nuclear programme, which is under the authority of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.The Institute of Applied Physics is therefore involved in Iran’s nuclear programme and in Iran’s ballistic missile activities.
23.5.2011
77.
Shahid Beheshti University
Address 1: Daneshju Blvd., Yaman St., Chamran Blvd., P.O. Box 19839-63113, Tehran, IranAddress 2: Shahid Shahriari Square, Evin, P.O. Box 19839-6311369411, Tehran, Iran
Shahid Beheshti University is a public entity which is under the supervision of the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology. Carries out scientific research relevant to the development of nuclear weapons.
23.5.2011
81.
Eyvaz Technic (a.k.a. Azarsam Instrument Company)
Address 1: No 3, Building 3, Shahid Hamid Sadigh Alley, Shariati Street, Tehran, IranAddress 2: Tehran Province, Tehran, Kooy-e-Mehrzad, Kooy-e-Mehrzad, M78Q+V2R, IranAssociated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)
Producer of vacuum equipment that has supplied the uranium enrichment sites at Natanz and Qom/Fordow. In 2011, it supplied pressure transducers to EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC).
1.12.2011
83.
Ghani Sazi Uranium Company (a.k.a. Iran Uranium Enrichment Company; Sherkat-e Ghanisazi-ye Uranium)
Address: 3, Qarqavol Close, 20th Street, Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC); Iran Centrifuge Technology Company
Ghani Sazi Uranium Company has production contracts with EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) and EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company.
1.12.2011
86.
Karanir (a.k.a Karanir Sanat, Moaser; Tajhiz Sanat; Karanir Sanat Co; Moshever Sanat Moaser; TSI; Tajis Sanat; Tajhis Sanat Industries)
Address 1: 1139/1 Unit 104 Gol Building, Gol Alley, North Side of Sae, Vali Asr Avenue. PO Box 19395-6439, Tehran, IranAddress 2: Beheshti St., Sabonuchi St., Adaee Alley, No. 2, Unit 301, Tehran, Iran
Karanir has been involved in purchasing equipment and materials, which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme.
1.12.2011
87.
Khala Afarin Pars (a.k.a. PISHRO KHALA AFARIN COMPANY; Vacuum Afarin, Pars Vacuum Company)
Address 1: Unit 5, 2nd Floor, No 75, Mehran Afrand St, Sattarkhan St, Tehran.Address 2: No. 94, 4th Floor, Unit 16, Bagherkhan St., Sattarkhan St., Tehran, Iran
Involved in purchasing equipment and materials which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme.
1.12.2011
88.
MACPAR Makina San Ve Tic
Address: Istasyon MH, Sehitler cad, Guldeniz Sit, Number 79/2, Tuzla 34930, Istanbul, TürkiyeAssociated individual: Milad Jafari
Company run by EU-designated Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies.
1.12.2011
89.
MATSA (Mohandesi Toseh Sokht Atomi Company) (a.k.a. Mohandesi Toseh Sanayeh Atomi (METSA))
Address: 90, Fathi Shaghaghi Street, Tehran, Iran.Registration no.: 2833278National ID no.: 10103191030Associated individuals: Mohammad Mohammadi (Managing Director)Associated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)
MATSA (Mohandesi Toseh Sokht Atomi Company) is an Iranian company contracted to EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) to provide design and engineering services across the nuclear fuel cycle. It has been procuring equipment for the Natanz uranium enrichment site.
1.12.2011
90.
Mobin Sanjesh (a.k.a. Fakoor International Tehran Engineering Company (FITCO))
Address: Entry 3, No 11, 12th Street, Miremad Alley, Abbas Abad, Tehran, Iran
Mobin Sanjesh directly participates in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. It provides goods and services for magnetic systems which have a direct application in Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle industry, for example calibration of mass spectrometers.
1.12.2011
91.
Multimat lc ve Dis Ticaret Pazarlama Limited Sirketi (a.k.a. MULTIMAT IC VE DIS TIC. PAZ. LTD. STI.; MULTIMAT IC VE DIS TICARET PAZARLAMA LIMITED SIRKETI; MULTIMAT IMPORT AND EXPORT; MULTIMAT LTD.; MULTIMAT TEHRAN; MULTIMAT TRADING COMPANY)
Address: Guvendik Mahallesi 132/1 Sokak, Izmir, TürkiyePlace of registration: Izmir, TürkiyeDate of registration: 30.12.1996Associated individual: Milad JafariAssociated entity: Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG)
Company run by EU-designated Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies.
1.12.2011
94.
Saman Tose’e Asia (SATA)
Address: 4th Unit, 51 Sane’e St., N.W. of Jahan Kudak, Africa Blvd., Tehran, Iran 19699-35145
Engineering firm involved in supporting a range of large-scale industrial projects including Iran’s uranium enrichment programme, including undeclared work at the uranium enrichment site at Qom/Fordow.
1.12.2011
97.
STEP Standart Teknik Parca San ve TIC A.S. (a.k.a. SSTP, Step Standard Technical Components Industry and Trading Corporation, Step Corporation, Step Standart Teknik Parca Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S., Step AS, Step Company, Stap Standart Tek Par San Tic AS, Step Standart Teknyk, Parca San. Ve Tyc. A.S., STEP Standart Teknik Parca San. ve Tic. A.S., Step Standart Teknik Parca Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi, Step A.S., Step S.A., Step Istanbul, Standart Teknik Parca San Ve Tic A.S., Standart Teknik Parca San. Ve Ticaret A.S., Standard Technical Component Industry and Trade Company, Step Standart Teknik Parca San Ve Tic As, Step Istanbul/Standart Teknik Parca San. Ve Tic. A.S.)
Address: 79/2 Tuzla, 34940, Istanbul, TürkiyeAssociated individual: Milad JafariAssociated entity: Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG)
Company run by Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) through front companies.
1.12.2011
101.
Tosse Silooha (a.k.a. Tosseh Jahad E Silo; Tosee Siloha)
Address: NO.3. 50th st., Kalantari sq., Seyed Jamaleddin Asadabadi Ave. (Yousefabad), Tehran, Iran
Tosse Silooha is a company involved in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. It is involved in fabricating components for nuclear power plants such as cooling tower plants, and industrial chimneys. The company is also supporting the Government of Iran.
1.12.2011
102.
Yarsanat (a.k.a. Yar Sanat; Yarestan Vacuumi; Zist Yar Sanat; Yar Sanat Co)
Address 1: No. 101, West Zardosht Street, 3rd Floor, 14157 Tehran; IranAddress 2: No. 139 Hoveyzeh Street, 15337, Tehran, IranAddress 3: 15, Fatemi Eshragi Alley, Gerda Afrid Building, science and Technology Park, Tarbiat Modares University, S.S 2 – Development Center, 4th Floor, Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)
Procurement company for EU-listed Kalaye Electric Company (KEC). Involved in purchasing equipment and materials, which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme, for example instruments for uranium enrichment.
1.12.2011
106.
Tidewater (a.k.a. Tidewater Middle East Co; Tide Water Khavarmianeh)
Postal address: No. 84, Vozara St., Tehran, IranType of entity: Public Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: Tehran, IranRegistration no.: 12341Principal place of business: Tehran, Iran
Owned or controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
23.1.2012
148.
Iran Composites Institute (a.k.a. Composites Research Laboratory (CRL))
Iran Composites Institute, Iranian University of Science and Technology, 16845-188, Tehran, Iran,Telephone: 98 217 3912858Fax: 98 217 7491206Email: mailto:[email protected]:http://www.irancomposites.orgAssociated entities: Malek Ashtar University; Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (a.k.a. TESA)
The Iran Composites Institute is a centre for research and development in the field of composite materials and structures.It was established in cooperation with the Iran University of Science and Technology (IUST) and remains part of it. Through its research, IUST is involved in Iran’s nuclear programme. It is linked to several Iranian academic institutions, including EU-listed Malek Ashtar University which is linked to the EU-listed Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).In the past, Iran Composites Institute had been contracted to provide EU-listed Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (a.k.a. TESA) with IR-2M centrifuge rotors.Iran Composites Institute is therefore providing support to the Government of Iran and entities owned or controlled by it.
22.12.2012
151.
Simatec Development Company

Simatec Development Company has been assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities.
22.12.2012
153.
Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND)
Address: Negarestan 3, off Pasdaran Street, Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)
The Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) directly supports Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. The IAEA has identified SPND with their concerns over possible military dimensions (PMD) to Iran’s nuclear programme. SPND was run by UN-designated Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi and is part of the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) designated by the EU.
22.12.2012
161.
Sharif University of Technology
Last address known: Azadi Ave/Street, PO Box 11365-11155, Tehran, IranTel. + 98 21 66 161Email: [email protected] entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Sharif University of Technology is a Tehran-based university and Iran’s central repository for nuclear research.In the field of ballistic missile research and production, it cooperates with the EU-listed Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), which oversees Iran’s ballistic missile programme on behalf of the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Furthermore, it cooperates with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and supports it, among other activities, in its procurement efforts.Taken together, these show a significant record of engagement with the Government of Iran in military or military-related fields that constitute support to the Government of Iran.
8.11.2014’


Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing

‘1.
Aerospace Industries Organisation, AIO
Address 1: AIO, 28 Shian 5, Lavizan, Tehran, IranAddress 2: Langare Street, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)
Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) is a subsidiary of the EU-listed Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) in charge of overseeing Iran’s ballistic missile programme.It supervises several subsidiaries tasked with the production or procurement of different components of the ballistic missile programme.The Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) therefore provides support to the Government of Iran.
23.4.2007

26.
Marine Industries (a.k.a. Marine Industries Organisation (MIO), Marine Industries Group (MIG))
Address: Pasdaran Ave., PO Box 19585/ 777, Tehran, IranPlace of registration: Tehran, IranDate of registration: 1996Principal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO), Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)
Marine Industries is a subsidiary of the EU-listed Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which is a subsidiary of EU-listed Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).Marine Industries is involved in the maritime dimension of Iran’s missile programme, including by building ships that can carry and launch offensive missiles.Marine Industries is therefore an entity involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities and an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.
23.4.2007

32.
Parto Sanat Co (a.k.a. Parto Sanaat Co.; Parto Sanat Company; Partonsanat; Partosanat Co.; Partosanat PJSC; Yakan Parto; Bargh Va Electronic Partosanat)
Address: No. 2417 Valiasr St., corner of 14th St., PO Box 15178 43316, Tehran, Iran
Manufacturer of frequency changers and it is capable of developing and modifying imported foreign frequency changers in a way that makes them usable in gas centrifuge enrichment. It is deemed to be involved in nuclear proliferation activities.
26.7.2010

35.
Raka
Associated entity: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)
A department of EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company. Established in late 2006, it was responsible for the construction of the Uranium enrichment plant at Fordow (Qom).
26.7.2010

41.
Technology Cooperation Office (TCO) of the Iranian President’s Office (a.k.a. Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation (CITC); Presidential Center for Cooperation on Transformation and Progress)
Place of registration: Tehran, Iran
The Technology Cooperation Office (TCO) of the Iranian President’s Office operates in the fields of research, biotechnology, nanotechnology, renewable energy and information technology.Its operations go back to 2001 when it was charged with strategic planning and the coordination of Iran’s developmental activities for nanotechnology. It is attached to and supervised by the President’s Office. It acts as a hub in the field and serves as a coordinator and facilitator of connections and collaborations. It maintains connections with the international community, networks between country laboratories, funds Iranian scientists, and engages in teaching.Under its alias, Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation (CITC), it is furthermore part of an interdepartmental system consisting of CITC, the Iranian Ministry of Information and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) under the direct command of the Iranian President. Individuals associated with CITC, acting as Iranian official representatives abroad, also carried out secret functions of scientific and technical intelligence officers.Responsible for Iran’s technological advancement through relevant foreign procurement and training links. It provides support to the Government of Iran.
26.7.2010

42.
Yeganeh Energy Sazan Atrak Part (formerly known as Yasa Part) and the following subsidiaries:
Address: Ground Floor – Building 0 – Maharat 3 Alley – Maharat Street – Bidak Industrial Area – Badranlu Rural District – Central District – Bojnord City – Northern Khorasan Province, Iran Postal Code: 9418156318Type of entity: Private joint-stock companyPlace of registration: Bojnord – North Khorasan Province, IranRegistration no.: 5219
Company dealing with procurement activities related to the purchase of materials and technologies necessary to nuclear and ballistic programmes.
26.7.2010


(a)Arfa Paint Company (a.k.a. ARFA; Arfa Company)
(a)
Arfa Paint Company (a.k.a. ARFA; Arfa Company)
Address 1: Unit 5, 9th floor, Sarve Tower, Saadat Abad, Tehran, IranAddress 2: 16th km Karaj Special Road, Tehran, Iran
Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.
26.7.2010

(a)
Arfa Paint Company (a.k.a. ARFA; Arfa Company)


(b)Arfeh Company
(b)
Arfeh Company
Address: West Lavasani, Tehran, Iran
Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.
26.7.2010

(b)
Arfeh Company


(d)Hosseini Nejad Trading Co. (a.k.a. Hosseini Nejad Trading Company)
(d)
Hosseini Nejad Trading Co. (a.k.a. Hosseini Nejad Trading Company)

Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.
26.7.2010

(d)
Hosseini Nejad Trading Co. (a.k.a. Hosseini Nejad Trading Company)


(e)Iran Saffron Company (a.k.a. Iransaffron Co.; Iran Safron; Iran Saffron; Iran Saffron Co.)
(e)
Iran Saffron Company (a.k.a. Iransaffron Co.; Iran Safron; Iran Saffron; Iran Saffron Co.)

Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.
26.7.2010

(e)
Iran Saffron Company (a.k.a. Iransaffron Co.; Iran Safron; Iran Saffron; Iran Saffron Co.)

57.
Hirbod Co (a.k.a. HIRBOD Company)
Address 1: Hirbod Co – Flat 2, 3 Second Street, Asad Abadi Avenue, Tehran 14316, IranAddress 2 (factory): Tehran-Saveh Highway, km 80, Mamounieh Industrial Town, at the end of 8th Street, Asad Abadi Tehran, IranDate of registration: 1995Principal place of business: Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)
Hirbod Co is one of the leading companies in the field of stainless steel products. It provides steel products, including within security and military apparatus, to many Iranian entities, in particular Arthesh, the Iranian army.Therefore, Hirbod Co is supporting the Government of Iran and provides support for the development of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery systems by Iran.
23.5.2011

60.
Paya Parto (a.k.a. Paya Partov; National Centre for Laser Science and Technology)

Paya Parto is an entity that researches stable isotope separation, a key parameter for centrifuges component production, as part of Iran’s nuclear programme. It has close ties to the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI), which runs Iran’s Nuclear programme and supervises individual projects. Paya Parto is therefore responsible for providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
23.5.2011

62.
Taghtiran (a.k.a. Taghtiran Kashan Company)
Address: Unit 2, No. 3, 2nd Alley, Asad Abadi St., Vali-e asr St., 14316 Tehran, IranPlace of registration: Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO)
Taghtiran manufactures stainless steel and carbon steel parts for various entities, including the security and defence industries, such as Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and nuclear facilities, for example, the uranium conversion facility.
23.5.2011

71.
Institute of Applied Physics (IAP)
Associated entities: Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND); Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)
The Institute of Applied Physics provides research and development for Iran’s nuclear programme. It has project partnerships with the EU-listed Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), which is a subsidiary of EU-listed Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), working to weaponise the nuclear programme, which is under the authority of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.The Institute of Applied Physics is therefore involved in Iran’s nuclear programme and in Iran’s ballistic missile activities.
23.5.2011

77.
Shahid Beheshti University
Address 1: Daneshju Blvd., Yaman St., Chamran Blvd., P.O. Box 19839-63113, Tehran, IranAddress 2: Shahid Shahriari Square, Evin, P.O. Box 19839-6311369411, Tehran, Iran
Shahid Beheshti University is a public entity which is under the supervision of the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology. Carries out scientific research relevant to the development of nuclear weapons.
23.5.2011

81.
Eyvaz Technic (a.k.a. Azarsam Instrument Company)
Address 1: No 3, Building 3, Shahid Hamid Sadigh Alley, Shariati Street, Tehran, IranAddress 2: Tehran Province, Tehran, Kooy-e-Mehrzad, Kooy-e-Mehrzad, M78Q+V2R, IranAssociated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)
Producer of vacuum equipment that has supplied the uranium enrichment sites at Natanz and Qom/Fordow. In 2011, it supplied pressure transducers to EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC).
1.12.2011

83.
Ghani Sazi Uranium Company (a.k.a. Iran Uranium Enrichment Company; Sherkat-e Ghanisazi-ye Uranium)
Address: 3, Qarqavol Close, 20th Street, Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC); Iran Centrifuge Technology Company
Ghani Sazi Uranium Company has production contracts with EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) and EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company.
1.12.2011

86.
Karanir (a.k.a Karanir Sanat, Moaser; Tajhiz Sanat; Karanir Sanat Co; Moshever Sanat Moaser; TSI; Tajis Sanat; Tajhis Sanat Industries)
Address 1: 1139/1 Unit 104 Gol Building, Gol Alley, North Side of Sae, Vali Asr Avenue. PO Box 19395-6439, Tehran, IranAddress 2: Beheshti St., Sabonuchi St., Adaee Alley, No. 2, Unit 301, Tehran, Iran
Karanir has been involved in purchasing equipment and materials, which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme.
1.12.2011

87.
Khala Afarin Pars (a.k.a. PISHRO KHALA AFARIN COMPANY; Vacuum Afarin, Pars Vacuum Company)
Address 1: Unit 5, 2nd Floor, No 75, Mehran Afrand St, Sattarkhan St, Tehran.Address 2: No. 94, 4th Floor, Unit 16, Bagherkhan St., Sattarkhan St., Tehran, Iran
Involved in purchasing equipment and materials which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme.
1.12.2011

88.
MACPAR Makina San Ve Tic
Address: Istasyon MH, Sehitler cad, Guldeniz Sit, Number 79/2, Tuzla 34930, Istanbul, TürkiyeAssociated individual: Milad Jafari
Company run by EU-designated Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies.
1.12.2011

89.
MATSA (Mohandesi Toseh Sokht Atomi Company) (a.k.a. Mohandesi Toseh Sanayeh Atomi (METSA))
Address: 90, Fathi Shaghaghi Street, Tehran, Iran.Registration no.: 2833278National ID no.: 10103191030Associated individuals: Mohammad Mohammadi (Managing Director)Associated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)
MATSA (Mohandesi Toseh Sokht Atomi Company) is an Iranian company contracted to EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) to provide design and engineering services across the nuclear fuel cycle. It has been procuring equipment for the Natanz uranium enrichment site.
1.12.2011

90.
Mobin Sanjesh (a.k.a. Fakoor International Tehran Engineering Company (FITCO))
Address: Entry 3, No 11, 12th Street, Miremad Alley, Abbas Abad, Tehran, Iran
Mobin Sanjesh directly participates in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. It provides goods and services for magnetic systems which have a direct application in Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle industry, for example calibration of mass spectrometers.
1.12.2011

91.
Multimat lc ve Dis Ticaret Pazarlama Limited Sirketi (a.k.a. MULTIMAT IC VE DIS TIC. PAZ. LTD. STI.; MULTIMAT IC VE DIS TICARET PAZARLAMA LIMITED SIRKETI; MULTIMAT IMPORT AND EXPORT; MULTIMAT LTD.; MULTIMAT TEHRAN; MULTIMAT TRADING COMPANY)
Address: Guvendik Mahallesi 132/1 Sokak, Izmir, TürkiyePlace of registration: Izmir, TürkiyeDate of registration: 30.12.1996Associated individual: Milad JafariAssociated entity: Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG)
Company run by EU-designated Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies.
1.12.2011

94.
Saman Tose’e Asia (SATA)
Address: 4th Unit, 51 Sane’e St., N.W. of Jahan Kudak, Africa Blvd., Tehran, Iran 19699-35145
Engineering firm involved in supporting a range of large-scale industrial projects including Iran’s uranium enrichment programme, including undeclared work at the uranium enrichment site at Qom/Fordow.
1.12.2011

97.
STEP Standart Teknik Parca San ve TIC A.S. (a.k.a. SSTP, Step Standard Technical Components Industry and Trading Corporation, Step Corporation, Step Standart Teknik Parca Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S., Step AS, Step Company, Stap Standart Tek Par San Tic AS, Step Standart Teknyk, Parca San. Ve Tyc. A.S., STEP Standart Teknik Parca San. ve Tic. A.S., Step Standart Teknik Parca Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi, Step A.S., Step S.A., Step Istanbul, Standart Teknik Parca San Ve Tic A.S., Standart Teknik Parca San. Ve Ticaret A.S., Standard Technical Component Industry and Trade Company, Step Standart Teknik Parca San Ve Tic As, Step Istanbul/Standart Teknik Parca San. Ve Tic. A.S.)
Address: 79/2 Tuzla, 34940, Istanbul, TürkiyeAssociated individual: Milad JafariAssociated entity: Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG)
Company run by Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) through front companies.
1.12.2011

101.
Tosse Silooha (a.k.a. Tosseh Jahad E Silo; Tosee Siloha)
Address: NO.3. 50th st., Kalantari sq., Seyed Jamaleddin Asadabadi Ave. (Yousefabad), Tehran, Iran
Tosse Silooha is a company involved in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. It is involved in fabricating components for nuclear power plants such as cooling tower plants, and industrial chimneys. The company is also supporting the Government of Iran.
1.12.2011

102.
Yarsanat (a.k.a. Yar Sanat; Yarestan Vacuumi; Zist Yar Sanat; Yar Sanat Co)
Address 1: No. 101, West Zardosht Street, 3rd Floor, 14157 Tehran; IranAddress 2: No. 139 Hoveyzeh Street, 15337, Tehran, IranAddress 3: 15, Fatemi Eshragi Alley, Gerda Afrid Building, science and Technology Park, Tarbiat Modares University, S.S 2 – Development Center, 4th Floor, Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)
Procurement company for EU-listed Kalaye Electric Company (KEC). Involved in purchasing equipment and materials, which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme, for example instruments for uranium enrichment.
1.12.2011

106.
Tidewater (a.k.a. Tidewater Middle East Co; Tide Water Khavarmianeh)
Postal address: No. 84, Vozara St., Tehran, IranType of entity: Public Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: Tehran, IranRegistration no.: 12341Principal place of business: Tehran, Iran
Owned or controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
23.1.2012

148.
Iran Composites Institute (a.k.a. Composites Research Laboratory (CRL))
Iran Composites Institute, Iranian University of Science and Technology, 16845-188, Tehran, Iran,Telephone: 98 217 3912858Fax: 98 217 7491206Email: mailto:[email protected]:http://www.irancomposites.orgAssociated entities: Malek Ashtar University; Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (a.k.a. TESA)
The Iran Composites Institute is a centre for research and development in the field of composite materials and structures.It was established in cooperation with the Iran University of Science and Technology (IUST) and remains part of it. Through its research, IUST is involved in Iran’s nuclear programme. It is linked to several Iranian academic institutions, including EU-listed Malek Ashtar University which is linked to the EU-listed Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).In the past, Iran Composites Institute had been contracted to provide EU-listed Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (a.k.a. TESA) with IR-2M centrifuge rotors.Iran Composites Institute is therefore providing support to the Government of Iran and entities owned or controlled by it.
22.12.2012

151.
Simatec Development Company

Simatec Development Company has been assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities.
22.12.2012

153.
Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND)
Address: Negarestan 3, off Pasdaran Street, Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)
The Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) directly supports Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. The IAEA has identified SPND with their concerns over possible military dimensions (PMD) to Iran’s nuclear programme. SPND was run by UN-designated Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi and is part of the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) designated by the EU.
22.12.2012

161.
Sharif University of Technology
Last address known: Azadi Ave/Street, PO Box 11365-11155, Tehran, IranTel. + 98 21 66 161Email: [email protected] entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Sharif University of Technology is a Tehran-based university and Iran’s central repository for nuclear research.In the field of ballistic missile research and production, it cooperates with the EU-listed Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), which oversees Iran’s ballistic missile programme on behalf of the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Furthermore, it cooperates with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and supports it, among other activities, in its procurement efforts.Taken together, these show a significant record of engagement with the Government of Iran in military or military-related fields that constitute support to the Government of Iran.
8.11.2014’




Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing

‘1.
Aerospace Industries Organisation, AIO
Address 1: AIO, 28 Shian 5, Lavizan, Tehran, IranAddress 2: Langare Street, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)
Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) is a subsidiary of the EU-listed Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) in charge of overseeing Iran’s ballistic missile programme.It supervises several subsidiaries tasked with the production or procurement of different components of the ballistic missile programme.The Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) therefore provides support to the Government of Iran.
23.4.2007

26.
Marine Industries (a.k.a. Marine Industries Organisation (MIO), Marine Industries Group (MIG))
Address: Pasdaran Ave., PO Box 19585/ 777, Tehran, IranPlace of registration: Tehran, IranDate of registration: 1996Principal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO), Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)
Marine Industries is a subsidiary of the EU-listed Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which is a subsidiary of EU-listed Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).Marine Industries is involved in the maritime dimension of Iran’s missile programme, including by building ships that can carry and launch offensive missiles.Marine Industries is therefore an entity involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities and an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.
23.4.2007

32.
Parto Sanat Co (a.k.a. Parto Sanaat Co.; Parto Sanat Company; Partonsanat; Partosanat Co.; Partosanat PJSC; Yakan Parto; Bargh Va Electronic Partosanat)
Address: No. 2417 Valiasr St., corner of 14th St., PO Box 15178 43316, Tehran, Iran
Manufacturer of frequency changers and it is capable of developing and modifying imported foreign frequency changers in a way that makes them usable in gas centrifuge enrichment. It is deemed to be involved in nuclear proliferation activities.
26.7.2010

35.
Raka
Associated entity: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)
A department of EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company. Established in late 2006, it was responsible for the construction of the Uranium enrichment plant at Fordow (Qom).
26.7.2010

41.
Technology Cooperation Office (TCO) of the Iranian President’s Office (a.k.a. Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation (CITC); Presidential Center for Cooperation on Transformation and Progress)
Place of registration: Tehran, Iran
The Technology Cooperation Office (TCO) of the Iranian President’s Office operates in the fields of research, biotechnology, nanotechnology, renewable energy and information technology.Its operations go back to 2001 when it was charged with strategic planning and the coordination of Iran’s developmental activities for nanotechnology. It is attached to and supervised by the President’s Office. It acts as a hub in the field and serves as a coordinator and facilitator of connections and collaborations. It maintains connections with the international community, networks between country laboratories, funds Iranian scientists, and engages in teaching.Under its alias, Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation (CITC), it is furthermore part of an interdepartmental system consisting of CITC, the Iranian Ministry of Information and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) under the direct command of the Iranian President. Individuals associated with CITC, acting as Iranian official representatives abroad, also carried out secret functions of scientific and technical intelligence officers.Responsible for Iran’s technological advancement through relevant foreign procurement and training links. It provides support to the Government of Iran.
26.7.2010

42.
Yeganeh Energy Sazan Atrak Part (formerly known as Yasa Part) and the following subsidiaries:
Address: Ground Floor – Building 0 – Maharat 3 Alley – Maharat Street – Bidak Industrial Area – Badranlu Rural District – Central District – Bojnord City – Northern Khorasan Province, Iran Postal Code: 9418156318Type of entity: Private joint-stock companyPlace of registration: Bojnord – North Khorasan Province, IranRegistration no.: 5219
Company dealing with procurement activities related to the purchase of materials and technologies necessary to nuclear and ballistic programmes.
26.7.2010


(a)Arfa Paint Company (a.k.a. ARFA; Arfa Company)
(a)
Arfa Paint Company (a.k.a. ARFA; Arfa Company)
Address 1: Unit 5, 9th floor, Sarve Tower, Saadat Abad, Tehran, IranAddress 2: 16th km Karaj Special Road, Tehran, Iran
Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.
26.7.2010

(a)
Arfa Paint Company (a.k.a. ARFA; Arfa Company)


(b)Arfeh Company
(b)
Arfeh Company
Address: West Lavasani, Tehran, Iran
Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.
26.7.2010

(b)
Arfeh Company


(d)Hosseini Nejad Trading Co. (a.k.a. Hosseini Nejad Trading Company)
(d)
Hosseini Nejad Trading Co. (a.k.a. Hosseini Nejad Trading Company)

Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.
26.7.2010

(d)
Hosseini Nejad Trading Co. (a.k.a. Hosseini Nejad Trading Company)


(e)Iran Saffron Company (a.k.a. Iransaffron Co.; Iran Safron; Iran Saffron; Iran Saffron Co.)
(e)
Iran Saffron Company (a.k.a. Iransaffron Co.; Iran Safron; Iran Saffron; Iran Saffron Co.)

Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.
26.7.2010

(e)
Iran Saffron Company (a.k.a. Iransaffron Co.; Iran Safron; Iran Saffron; Iran Saffron Co.)

57.
Hirbod Co (a.k.a. HIRBOD Company)
Address 1: Hirbod Co – Flat 2, 3 Second Street, Asad Abadi Avenue, Tehran 14316, IranAddress 2 (factory): Tehran-Saveh Highway, km 80, Mamounieh Industrial Town, at the end of 8th Street, Asad Abadi Tehran, IranDate of registration: 1995Principal place of business: Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)
Hirbod Co is one of the leading companies in the field of stainless steel products. It provides steel products, including within security and military apparatus, to many Iranian entities, in particular Arthesh, the Iranian army.Therefore, Hirbod Co is supporting the Government of Iran and provides support for the development of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery systems by Iran.
23.5.2011

60.
Paya Parto (a.k.a. Paya Partov; National Centre for Laser Science and Technology)

Paya Parto is an entity that researches stable isotope separation, a key parameter for centrifuges component production, as part of Iran’s nuclear programme. It has close ties to the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI), which runs Iran’s Nuclear programme and supervises individual projects. Paya Parto is therefore responsible for providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
23.5.2011

62.
Taghtiran (a.k.a. Taghtiran Kashan Company)
Address: Unit 2, No. 3, 2nd Alley, Asad Abadi St., Vali-e asr St., 14316 Tehran, IranPlace of registration: Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO)
Taghtiran manufactures stainless steel and carbon steel parts for various entities, including the security and defence industries, such as Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and nuclear facilities, for example, the uranium conversion facility.
23.5.2011

71.
Institute of Applied Physics (IAP)
Associated entities: Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND); Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)
The Institute of Applied Physics provides research and development for Iran’s nuclear programme. It has project partnerships with the EU-listed Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), which is a subsidiary of EU-listed Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), working to weaponise the nuclear programme, which is under the authority of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.The Institute of Applied Physics is therefore involved in Iran’s nuclear programme and in Iran’s ballistic missile activities.
23.5.2011

77.
Shahid Beheshti University
Address 1: Daneshju Blvd., Yaman St., Chamran Blvd., P.O. Box 19839-63113, Tehran, IranAddress 2: Shahid Shahriari Square, Evin, P.O. Box 19839-6311369411, Tehran, Iran
Shahid Beheshti University is a public entity which is under the supervision of the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology. Carries out scientific research relevant to the development of nuclear weapons.
23.5.2011

81.
Eyvaz Technic (a.k.a. Azarsam Instrument Company)
Address 1: No 3, Building 3, Shahid Hamid Sadigh Alley, Shariati Street, Tehran, IranAddress 2: Tehran Province, Tehran, Kooy-e-Mehrzad, Kooy-e-Mehrzad, M78Q+V2R, IranAssociated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)
Producer of vacuum equipment that has supplied the uranium enrichment sites at Natanz and Qom/Fordow. In 2011, it supplied pressure transducers to EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC).
1.12.2011

83.
Ghani Sazi Uranium Company (a.k.a. Iran Uranium Enrichment Company; Sherkat-e Ghanisazi-ye Uranium)
Address: 3, Qarqavol Close, 20th Street, Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC); Iran Centrifuge Technology Company
Ghani Sazi Uranium Company has production contracts with EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) and EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company.
1.12.2011

86.
Karanir (a.k.a Karanir Sanat, Moaser; Tajhiz Sanat; Karanir Sanat Co; Moshever Sanat Moaser; TSI; Tajis Sanat; Tajhis Sanat Industries)
Address 1: 1139/1 Unit 104 Gol Building, Gol Alley, North Side of Sae, Vali Asr Avenue. PO Box 19395-6439, Tehran, IranAddress 2: Beheshti St., Sabonuchi St., Adaee Alley, No. 2, Unit 301, Tehran, Iran
Karanir has been involved in purchasing equipment and materials, which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme.
1.12.2011

87.
Khala Afarin Pars (a.k.a. PISHRO KHALA AFARIN COMPANY; Vacuum Afarin, Pars Vacuum Company)
Address 1: Unit 5, 2nd Floor, No 75, Mehran Afrand St, Sattarkhan St, Tehran.Address 2: No. 94, 4th Floor, Unit 16, Bagherkhan St., Sattarkhan St., Tehran, Iran
Involved in purchasing equipment and materials which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme.
1.12.2011

88.
MACPAR Makina San Ve Tic
Address: Istasyon MH, Sehitler cad, Guldeniz Sit, Number 79/2, Tuzla 34930, Istanbul, TürkiyeAssociated individual: Milad Jafari
Company run by EU-designated Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies.
1.12.2011

89.
MATSA (Mohandesi Toseh Sokht Atomi Company) (a.k.a. Mohandesi Toseh Sanayeh Atomi (METSA))
Address: 90, Fathi Shaghaghi Street, Tehran, Iran.Registration no.: 2833278National ID no.: 10103191030Associated individuals: Mohammad Mohammadi (Managing Director)Associated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)
MATSA (Mohandesi Toseh Sokht Atomi Company) is an Iranian company contracted to EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) to provide design and engineering services across the nuclear fuel cycle. It has been procuring equipment for the Natanz uranium enrichment site.
1.12.2011

90.
Mobin Sanjesh (a.k.a. Fakoor International Tehran Engineering Company (FITCO))
Address: Entry 3, No 11, 12th Street, Miremad Alley, Abbas Abad, Tehran, Iran
Mobin Sanjesh directly participates in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. It provides goods and services for magnetic systems which have a direct application in Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle industry, for example calibration of mass spectrometers.
1.12.2011

91.
Multimat lc ve Dis Ticaret Pazarlama Limited Sirketi (a.k.a. MULTIMAT IC VE DIS TIC. PAZ. LTD. STI.; MULTIMAT IC VE DIS TICARET PAZARLAMA LIMITED SIRKETI; MULTIMAT IMPORT AND EXPORT; MULTIMAT LTD.; MULTIMAT TEHRAN; MULTIMAT TRADING COMPANY)
Address: Guvendik Mahallesi 132/1 Sokak, Izmir, TürkiyePlace of registration: Izmir, TürkiyeDate of registration: 30.12.1996Associated individual: Milad JafariAssociated entity: Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG)
Company run by EU-designated Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies.
1.12.2011

94.
Saman Tose’e Asia (SATA)
Address: 4th Unit, 51 Sane’e St., N.W. of Jahan Kudak, Africa Blvd., Tehran, Iran 19699-35145
Engineering firm involved in supporting a range of large-scale industrial projects including Iran’s uranium enrichment programme, including undeclared work at the uranium enrichment site at Qom/Fordow.
1.12.2011

97.
STEP Standart Teknik Parca San ve TIC A.S. (a.k.a. SSTP, Step Standard Technical Components Industry and Trading Corporation, Step Corporation, Step Standart Teknik Parca Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S., Step AS, Step Company, Stap Standart Tek Par San Tic AS, Step Standart Teknyk, Parca San. Ve Tyc. A.S., STEP Standart Teknik Parca San. ve Tic. A.S., Step Standart Teknik Parca Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi, Step A.S., Step S.A., Step Istanbul, Standart Teknik Parca San Ve Tic A.S., Standart Teknik Parca San. Ve Ticaret A.S., Standard Technical Component Industry and Trade Company, Step Standart Teknik Parca San Ve Tic As, Step Istanbul/Standart Teknik Parca San. Ve Tic. A.S.)
Address: 79/2 Tuzla, 34940, Istanbul, TürkiyeAssociated individual: Milad JafariAssociated entity: Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG)
Company run by Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) through front companies.
1.12.2011

101.
Tosse Silooha (a.k.a. Tosseh Jahad E Silo; Tosee Siloha)
Address: NO.3. 50th st., Kalantari sq., Seyed Jamaleddin Asadabadi Ave. (Yousefabad), Tehran, Iran
Tosse Silooha is a company involved in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. It is involved in fabricating components for nuclear power plants such as cooling tower plants, and industrial chimneys. The company is also supporting the Government of Iran.
1.12.2011

102.
Yarsanat (a.k.a. Yar Sanat; Yarestan Vacuumi; Zist Yar Sanat; Yar Sanat Co)
Address 1: No. 101, West Zardosht Street, 3rd Floor, 14157 Tehran; IranAddress 2: No. 139 Hoveyzeh Street, 15337, Tehran, IranAddress 3: 15, Fatemi Eshragi Alley, Gerda Afrid Building, science and Technology Park, Tarbiat Modares University, S.S 2 – Development Center, 4th Floor, Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: IranAssociated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)
Procurement company for EU-listed Kalaye Electric Company (KEC). Involved in purchasing equipment and materials, which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme, for example instruments for uranium enrichment.
1.12.2011

106.
Tidewater (a.k.a. Tidewater Middle East Co; Tide Water Khavarmianeh)
Postal address: No. 84, Vozara St., Tehran, IranType of entity: Public Joint Stock CompanyPlace of registration: Tehran, IranRegistration no.: 12341Principal place of business: Tehran, Iran
Owned or controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
23.1.2012

148.
Iran Composites Institute (a.k.a. Composites Research Laboratory (CRL))
Iran Composites Institute, Iranian University of Science and Technology, 16845-188, Tehran, Iran,Telephone: 98 217 3912858Fax: 98 217 7491206Email: mailto:[email protected]:http://www.irancomposites.orgAssociated entities: Malek Ashtar University; Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (a.k.a. TESA)
The Iran Composites Institute is a centre for research and development in the field of composite materials and structures.It was established in cooperation with the Iran University of Science and Technology (IUST) and remains part of it. Through its research, IUST is involved in Iran’s nuclear programme. It is linked to several Iranian academic institutions, including EU-listed Malek Ashtar University which is linked to the EU-listed Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).In the past, Iran Composites Institute had been contracted to provide EU-listed Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (a.k.a. TESA) with IR-2M centrifuge rotors.Iran Composites Institute is therefore providing support to the Government of Iran and entities owned or controlled by it.
22.12.2012

151.
Simatec Development Company

Simatec Development Company has been assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities.
22.12.2012

153.
Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND)
Address: Negarestan 3, off Pasdaran Street, Tehran, IranPrincipal place of business: Tehran, IranAssociated entities: Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)
The Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) directly supports Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. The IAEA has identified SPND with their concerns over possible military dimensions (PMD) to Iran’s nuclear programme. SPND was run by UN-designated Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi and is part of the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) designated by the EU.
22.12.2012

161.
Sharif University of Technology
Last address known: Azadi Ave/Street, PO Box 11365-11155, Tehran, IranTel. + 98 21 66 161Email: [email protected] entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Sharif University of Technology is a Tehran-based university and Iran’s central repository for nuclear research.In the field of ballistic missile research and production, it cooperates with the EU-listed Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), which oversees Iran’s ballistic missile programme on behalf of the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Furthermore, it cooperates with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and supports it, among other activities, in its procurement efforts.Taken together, these show a significant record of engagement with the Government of Iran in military or military-related fields that constitute support to the Government of Iran.
8.11.2014’



(a)
Arfa Paint Company (a.k.a. ARFA; Arfa Company)



(b)
Arfeh Company



(d)
Hosseini Nejad Trading Co. (a.k.a. Hosseini Nejad Trading Company)



(e)
Iran Saffron Company (a.k.a. Iransaffron Co.; Iran Safron; Iran Saffron; Iran Saffron Co.)



(3)
entry 25 (concerning Mohammad Reza ZAHEDI) in the list headed ‘II. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)’, under the subheading ‘A. Persons’ is deleted;



(4)
under the heading ‘II. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)’, the following entries replace the corresponding entries in the list set out under the subheading ‘A. Persons’:NameIdentifying informationReasonsDate of listing‘2.Ali FADAVIDOB: 13.3.1961POB: Ardestan, IranFunction: Deputy Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)Rank: Rear AdmiralNationality: IranianGender: maleRear Admiral Ali Fadavi is Deputy Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and was temporarily acting Commander of the IRGC. He is the former Commander of the IRGC Navy.26.7.20103.Parviz FATAHDOB: 1961POB: Anzal, West Azerbaijan Province, IranNationality: IranianGender: malePassport no.: 6379886494Parviz Fatah is Head of the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO) and a former member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).EIKO is an economic conglomerate under the direct supervision of the Supreme Leader. EIKO, together with two other organisations, is estimated to control more than half of the Iranian economy.Parviz Fatah is therefore providing support to the Government of Iran.26.7.20105.Ali HOSEYNITASHRank: Brigadier-GeneralNationality: IranianGender: maleIslamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier-General Ali Hoseynitash has been the Head of the Strategic Directorate of the Supreme National Security Council since his appointment in 2013.The Supreme National Security Council shapes and coordinates the defence and security policies of Iran, including major decisions regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.Ali Hoseynitash is therefore involved in nuclear and ballistic missile activities and provides support to the Government of Iran.23.6.20087.Mostafa Mohammad NAJJARDOB: 2.12.1956POB: Tehran, IranRank: Brigadier-GeneralNationality: IranianGender: maleBrigadier-General Mostafa Najjar has been a senior advisor to the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces on Knowledge and Technology Industry since September 2013. He is the former Minister for the Interior (2009-2013) and former Minister of the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) (2005-2009), responsible for all military programmes, including ballistic missiles programmes. Member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).23.6.20089.Mohammad PAKPURDOB: 1961Rank: Brigadier-GeneralNationality: IranianGender: maleCommander of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces.26.7.201011.Hossein SALAMI(حسین سلامی)(a.k.a. Hosein SALIMI; Hussain SALIMI; Hosain SALIMI; Husain SALIMI; Hossein SALIMI; Hossein SALEEMI; Hussain SALEEMI; Husain SALEEMI; Hosein SALEEMI)DOB: 1960POB: Isfahan, IranFunction: Commander in Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)Rank: Maj. GeneralNationality: IranianGender: malePassport No.: D08531177Commander in Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).26.7.2010 (UN: 23.12.2006)12.Ali SHAMSHIRIFunction: Deputy Assistant and Advisor to the Supreme LeaderRank: Brigadier-GeneralNationality: IranianGender: maleIslamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier-General Ali Shamshiri is Deputy Assistant and Advisor to the Supreme Leader in his role as Commander in Chief. Furthermore, he has held senior roles in the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), as head of the Intelligence Protection Organisation of MODAFL.23.6.200813.Ahmad VAHIDIDOB: 27.6.1958POB: Shiraz, IranRank: Brigadier-GeneralNationality: IranianGender: maleBrigadier-General Ahmad Vahidi has been a prominent member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) since 1979. He was appointed as Deputy Chief for Intelligence in 1981, played a role in organising the Ministry of Intelligence, became the first commander of the IRGC Quds Force in 1988 and was in charge of the IRGC Intelligence Unit. He further set up a number of IRGC garrisons that are responsible for organising terrorist activities. In 1997, he was transferred to the Ministry of Defense. He has been nominated as Defence Minister in 2009 and served in this post until 2013. He is still a high-ranking figure within the IRGC.23.6.2008’

Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing
‘2.
Ali FADAVI
DOB: 13.3.1961POB: Ardestan, IranFunction: Deputy Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)Rank: Rear AdmiralNationality: IranianGender: male
Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi is Deputy Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and was temporarily acting Commander of the IRGC. He is the former Commander of the IRGC Navy.
26.7.2010
3.
Parviz FATAH
DOB: 1961POB: Anzal, West Azerbaijan Province, IranNationality: IranianGender: malePassport no.: 6379886494
Parviz Fatah is Head of the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO) and a former member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).EIKO is an economic conglomerate under the direct supervision of the Supreme Leader. EIKO, together with two other organisations, is estimated to control more than half of the Iranian economy.Parviz Fatah is therefore providing support to the Government of Iran.
26.7.2010
5.
Ali HOSEYNITASH
Rank: Brigadier-GeneralNationality: IranianGender: male
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier-General Ali Hoseynitash has been the Head of the Strategic Directorate of the Supreme National Security Council since his appointment in 2013.The Supreme National Security Council shapes and coordinates the defence and security policies of Iran, including major decisions regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.Ali Hoseynitash is therefore involved in nuclear and ballistic missile activities and provides support to the Government of Iran.
23.6.2008
7.
Mostafa Mohammad NAJJAR
DOB: 2.12.1956POB: Tehran, IranRank: Brigadier-GeneralNationality: IranianGender: male
Brigadier-General Mostafa Najjar has been a senior advisor to the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces on Knowledge and Technology Industry since September 2013. He is the former Minister for the Interior (2009-2013) and former Minister of the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) (2005-2009), responsible for all military programmes, including ballistic missiles programmes. Member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
23.6.2008
9.
Mohammad PAKPUR
DOB: 1961Rank: Brigadier-GeneralNationality: IranianGender: male
Commander of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces.
26.7.2010
11.
Hossein SALAMI(حسین سلامی)(a.k.a. Hosein SALIMI; Hussain SALIMI; Hosain SALIMI; Husain SALIMI; Hossein SALIMI; Hossein SALEEMI; Hussain SALEEMI; Husain SALEEMI; Hosein SALEEMI)
DOB: 1960POB: Isfahan, IranFunction: Commander in Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)Rank: Maj. GeneralNationality: IranianGender: malePassport No.: D08531177
Commander in Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
26.7.2010 (UN: 23.12.2006)
12.
Ali SHAMSHIRI
Function: Deputy Assistant and Advisor to the Supreme LeaderRank: Brigadier-GeneralNationality: IranianGender: male
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier-General Ali Shamshiri is Deputy Assistant and Advisor to the Supreme Leader in his role as Commander in Chief. Furthermore, he has held senior roles in the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), as head of the Intelligence Protection Organisation of MODAFL.
23.6.2008
13.
Ahmad VAHIDI
DOB: 27.6.1958POB: Shiraz, IranRank: Brigadier-GeneralNationality: IranianGender: male
Brigadier-General Ahmad Vahidi has been a prominent member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) since 1979. He was appointed as Deputy Chief for Intelligence in 1981, played a role in organising the Ministry of Intelligence, became the first commander of the IRGC Quds Force in 1988 and was in charge of the IRGC Intelligence Unit. He further set up a number of IRGC garrisons that are responsible for organising terrorist activities. In 1997, he was transferred to the Ministry of Defense. He has been nominated as Defence Minister in 2009 and served in this post until 2013. He is still a high-ranking figure within the IRGC.
23.6.2008’


Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing

‘2.
Ali FADAVI
DOB: 13.3.1961POB: Ardestan, IranFunction: Deputy Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)Rank: Rear AdmiralNationality: IranianGender: male
Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi is Deputy Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and was temporarily acting Commander of the IRGC. He is the former Commander of the IRGC Navy.
26.7.2010

3.
Parviz FATAH
DOB: 1961POB: Anzal, West Azerbaijan Province, IranNationality: IranianGender: malePassport no.: 6379886494
Parviz Fatah is Head of the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO) and a former member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).EIKO is an economic conglomerate under the direct supervision of the Supreme Leader. EIKO, together with two other organisations, is estimated to control more than half of the Iranian economy.Parviz Fatah is therefore providing support to the Government of Iran.
26.7.2010

5.
Ali HOSEYNITASH
Rank: Brigadier-GeneralNationality: IranianGender: male
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier-General Ali Hoseynitash has been the Head of the Strategic Directorate of the Supreme National Security Council since his appointment in 2013.The Supreme National Security Council shapes and coordinates the defence and security policies of Iran, including major decisions regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.Ali Hoseynitash is therefore involved in nuclear and ballistic missile activities and provides support to the Government of Iran.
23.6.2008

7.
Mostafa Mohammad NAJJAR
DOB: 2.12.1956POB: Tehran, IranRank: Brigadier-GeneralNationality: IranianGender: male
Brigadier-General Mostafa Najjar has been a senior advisor to the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces on Knowledge and Technology Industry since September 2013. He is the former Minister for the Interior (2009-2013) and former Minister of the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) (2005-2009), responsible for all military programmes, including ballistic missiles programmes. Member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
23.6.2008

9.
Mohammad PAKPUR
DOB: 1961Rank: Brigadier-GeneralNationality: IranianGender: male
Commander of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces.
26.7.2010

11.
Hossein SALAMI(حسین سلامی)(a.k.a. Hosein SALIMI; Hussain SALIMI; Hosain SALIMI; Husain SALIMI; Hossein SALIMI; Hossein SALEEMI; Hussain SALEEMI; Husain SALEEMI; Hosein SALEEMI)
DOB: 1960POB: Isfahan, IranFunction: Commander in Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)Rank: Maj. GeneralNationality: IranianGender: malePassport No.: D08531177
Commander in Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
26.7.2010 (UN: 23.12.2006)

12.
Ali SHAMSHIRI
Function: Deputy Assistant and Advisor to the Supreme LeaderRank: Brigadier-GeneralNationality: IranianGender: male
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier-General Ali Shamshiri is Deputy Assistant and Advisor to the Supreme Leader in his role as Commander in Chief. Furthermore, he has held senior roles in the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), as head of the Intelligence Protection Organisation of MODAFL.
23.6.2008

13.
Ahmad VAHIDI
DOB: 27.6.1958POB: Shiraz, IranRank: Brigadier-GeneralNationality: IranianGender: male
Brigadier-General Ahmad Vahidi has been a prominent member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) since 1979. He was appointed as Deputy Chief for Intelligence in 1981, played a role in organising the Ministry of Intelligence, became the first commander of the IRGC Quds Force in 1988 and was in charge of the IRGC Intelligence Unit. He further set up a number of IRGC garrisons that are responsible for organising terrorist activities. In 1997, he was transferred to the Ministry of Defense. He has been nominated as Defence Minister in 2009 and served in this post until 2013. He is still a high-ranking figure within the IRGC.
23.6.2008’




Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing

‘2.
Ali FADAVI
DOB: 13.3.1961POB: Ardestan, IranFunction: Deputy Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)Rank: Rear AdmiralNationality: IranianGender: male
Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi is Deputy Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and was temporarily acting Commander of the IRGC. He is the former Commander of the IRGC Navy.
26.7.2010

3.
Parviz FATAH
DOB: 1961POB: Anzal, West Azerbaijan Province, IranNationality: IranianGender: malePassport no.: 6379886494
Parviz Fatah is Head of the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO) and a former member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).EIKO is an economic conglomerate under the direct supervision of the Supreme Leader. EIKO, together with two other organisations, is estimated to control more than half of the Iranian economy.Parviz Fatah is therefore providing support to the Government of Iran.
26.7.2010

5.
Ali HOSEYNITASH
Rank: Brigadier-GeneralNationality: IranianGender: male
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier-General Ali Hoseynitash has been the Head of the Strategic Directorate of the Supreme National Security Council since his appointment in 2013.The Supreme National Security Council shapes and coordinates the defence and security policies of Iran, including major decisions regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.Ali Hoseynitash is therefore involved in nuclear and ballistic missile activities and provides support to the Government of Iran.
23.6.2008

7.
Mostafa Mohammad NAJJAR
DOB: 2.12.1956POB: Tehran, IranRank: Brigadier-GeneralNationality: IranianGender: male
Brigadier-General Mostafa Najjar has been a senior advisor to the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces on Knowledge and Technology Industry since September 2013. He is the former Minister for the Interior (2009-2013) and former Minister of the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) (2005-2009), responsible for all military programmes, including ballistic missiles programmes. Member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
23.6.2008

9.
Mohammad PAKPUR
DOB: 1961Rank: Brigadier-GeneralNationality: IranianGender: male
Commander of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces.
26.7.2010

11.
Hossein SALAMI(حسین سلامی)(a.k.a. Hosein SALIMI; Hussain SALIMI; Hosain SALIMI; Husain SALIMI; Hossein SALIMI; Hossein SALEEMI; Hussain SALEEMI; Husain SALEEMI; Hosein SALEEMI)
DOB: 1960POB: Isfahan, IranFunction: Commander in Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)Rank: Maj. GeneralNationality: IranianGender: malePassport No.: D08531177
Commander in Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
26.7.2010 (UN: 23.12.2006)

12.
Ali SHAMSHIRI
Function: Deputy Assistant and Advisor to the Supreme LeaderRank: Brigadier-GeneralNationality: IranianGender: male
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier-General Ali Shamshiri is Deputy Assistant and Advisor to the Supreme Leader in his role as Commander in Chief. Furthermore, he has held senior roles in the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), as head of the Intelligence Protection Organisation of MODAFL.
23.6.2008

13.
Ahmad VAHIDI
DOB: 27.6.1958POB: Shiraz, IranRank: Brigadier-GeneralNationality: IranianGender: male
Brigadier-General Ahmad Vahidi has been a prominent member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) since 1979. He was appointed as Deputy Chief for Intelligence in 1981, played a role in organising the Ministry of Intelligence, became the first commander of the IRGC Quds Force in 1988 and was in charge of the IRGC Intelligence Unit. He further set up a number of IRGC garrisons that are responsible for organising terrorist activities. In 1997, he was transferred to the Ministry of Defense. He has been nominated as Defence Minister in 2009 and served in this post until 2013. He is still a high-ranking figure within the IRGC.
23.6.2008’



(5)
under the heading ‘II. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)’, the following entries replace the corresponding entries in the list set out under the subheading ‘B. Entities’:NameIdentifying informationReasonsDate of listing‘7.Bonyad Taavon Sepah (a.k.a. IRGC Cooperative Foundation; Bonyad-e Ta’avon-Sepah; Sepah Cooperative Foundation)Address: Niayes Highway, Seoul Street, Tehran, IranBonyad Taavon Sepah, also known as the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, was formed by the Commanders of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to structure the IRGC's investments and to provide the IRGC’s permanent personnel with financial loans, mortgages, business loans, as well as with land and construction materials.It is controlled by the IRGC. Bonyad Taavon Sepah’s Board of Trustees is composed of nine members, eight of whom are IRGC members. These officers include the IRGC’s Commander in Chief, who is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, the Supreme Leader’s representative to the IRGC, the Basij commander, the IRGC Ground Forces commander, the IRGC Air Force commander, the IRGC Navy commander, the head of the IRGC Information Security Organisation, a senior IRGC officer from the Armed Forces General Staff and a senior IRGC officer from the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).23.5.201111.Behnam Sahriyari Trading CompanyPostal address: Ziba Building, 10th Floor, Northern Sohrevardi Street, Tehran, IranBehnam Sahriyari Trading Company is owned by Behnam Sahriyari, who leads the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Unit 190, which conducts arms smuggling operations. He uses his company as a front for IRGC weapons transfers. Therefore, Behnam Sahriyari Trading Company is involved in the shipment of arms on behalf of the IRGC.23.1.2012’

Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing
‘7.
Bonyad Taavon Sepah (a.k.a. IRGC Cooperative Foundation; Bonyad-e Ta’avon-Sepah; Sepah Cooperative Foundation)
Address: Niayes Highway, Seoul Street, Tehran, Iran
Bonyad Taavon Sepah, also known as the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, was formed by the Commanders of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to structure the IRGC's investments and to provide the IRGC’s permanent personnel with financial loans, mortgages, business loans, as well as with land and construction materials.It is controlled by the IRGC. Bonyad Taavon Sepah’s Board of Trustees is composed of nine members, eight of whom are IRGC members. These officers include the IRGC’s Commander in Chief, who is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, the Supreme Leader’s representative to the IRGC, the Basij commander, the IRGC Ground Forces commander, the IRGC Air Force commander, the IRGC Navy commander, the head of the IRGC Information Security Organisation, a senior IRGC officer from the Armed Forces General Staff and a senior IRGC officer from the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).
23.5.2011
11.
Behnam Sahriyari Trading Company
Postal address: Ziba Building, 10th Floor, Northern Sohrevardi Street, Tehran, Iran
Behnam Sahriyari Trading Company is owned by Behnam Sahriyari, who leads the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Unit 190, which conducts arms smuggling operations. He uses his company as a front for IRGC weapons transfers. Therefore, Behnam Sahriyari Trading Company is involved in the shipment of arms on behalf of the IRGC.
23.1.2012’


Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing

‘7.
Bonyad Taavon Sepah (a.k.a. IRGC Cooperative Foundation; Bonyad-e Ta’avon-Sepah; Sepah Cooperative Foundation)
Address: Niayes Highway, Seoul Street, Tehran, Iran
Bonyad Taavon Sepah, also known as the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, was formed by the Commanders of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to structure the IRGC's investments and to provide the IRGC’s permanent personnel with financial loans, mortgages, business loans, as well as with land and construction materials.It is controlled by the IRGC. Bonyad Taavon Sepah’s Board of Trustees is composed of nine members, eight of whom are IRGC members. These officers include the IRGC’s Commander in Chief, who is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, the Supreme Leader’s representative to the IRGC, the Basij commander, the IRGC Ground Forces commander, the IRGC Air Force commander, the IRGC Navy commander, the head of the IRGC Information Security Organisation, a senior IRGC officer from the Armed Forces General Staff and a senior IRGC officer from the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).
23.5.2011

11.
Behnam Sahriyari Trading Company
Postal address: Ziba Building, 10th Floor, Northern Sohrevardi Street, Tehran, Iran
Behnam Sahriyari Trading Company is owned by Behnam Sahriyari, who leads the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Unit 190, which conducts arms smuggling operations. He uses his company as a front for IRGC weapons transfers. Therefore, Behnam Sahriyari Trading Company is involved in the shipment of arms on behalf of the IRGC.
23.1.2012’




Name
Identifying information
Reasons
Date of listing

‘7.
Bonyad Taavon Sepah (a.k.a. IRGC Cooperative Foundation; Bonyad-e Ta’avon-Sepah; Sepah Cooperative Foundation)
Address: Niayes Highway, Seoul Street, Tehran, Iran
Bonyad Taavon Sepah, also known as the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, was formed by the Commanders of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to structure the IRGC's investments and to provide the IRGC’s permanent personnel with financial loans, mortgages, business loans, as well as with land and construction materials.It is controlled by the IRGC. Bonyad Taavon Sepah’s Board of Trustees is composed of nine members, eight of whom are IRGC members. These officers include the IRGC’s Commander in Chief, who is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, the Supreme Leader’s representative to the IRGC, the Basij commander, the IRGC Ground Forces commander, the IRGC Air Force commander, the IRGC Navy commander, the head of the IRGC Information Security Organisation, a senior IRGC officer from the Armed Forces General Staff and a senior IRGC officer from the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).
23.5.2011

11.
Behnam Sahriyari Trading Company
Postal address: Ziba Building, 10th Floor, Northern Sohrevardi Street, Tehran, Iran
Behnam Sahriyari Trading Company is owned by Behnam Sahriyari, who leads the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Unit 190, which conducts arms smuggling operations. He uses his company as a front for IRGC weapons transfers. Therefore, Behnam Sahriyari Trading Company is involved in the shipment of arms on behalf of the IRGC.
23.1.2012’

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

(1) On 26 July 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/413/CFSP (1).

(2) In accordance with Article 26(1) and (3) of Decision 2010/413/CFSP, the Council has reviewed the list of designated persons and entities set out in Annex II to that Decision.

(3) The Council has concluded that the entry concerning one person designated in Annex II to Decision 2010/413/CFSP should be removed from that Annex. The restrictive measures against all other persons and entities in the list set out in Annex II to Decision 2010/413/CFSP should be maintained, insofar as their names are not mentioned in Annex VI to that Decision, and 45 entries included in Annex II should be updated.

(4) Decision 2010/413/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Annex II to Decision 2010/413/CFSP is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Annex II to Decision 2010/413/CFSP is amended as follows:
(1) under the heading ‘I. Persons and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities and persons and entities providing support to the Government of Iran.’, the following entries replace the corresponding entries in the list set out under the subheading ‘A. Persons’:
Name

Identifying information

Reasons

Date of listing

‘8. Ebrahim MAHMUDZADEH

DOB: 2.4.1955

Function: Professor at Malek Ashtar University; Chairman of the Board of Iran Telecommunication Company

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Ebrahim Mahmudzadeh is a professor at EU-listed Malek Ashtar University, subordinate to EU-listed Defense Technology and Science Research Centre (DTSRC), which supports Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) with research and development (R&D) services.

Faculty members of Malek Ashtar University are involved in research regarding missiles and nuclear power and thereby provide research and development support to the Government of Iran.

Ebrahim Mahmudzadeh is also Chairman of the Board of Iran Telecommunication Company, which is partially controlled by the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Ebrahim Mahmudzadeh therefore provides support to the Government of Iran.

23.6.2008 27. Kamran DANESHJOO (a.k.a. DANESHJOU)

Function: Professor at Iran University of Science and Technology

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Professor at Iran University of Science and Technology. Former Minister of Science, Research and Technology. As project manager of the 111th section of the AMAD Plan, he provided support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.

1.12.2011 29. Milad JAFARI (Milad JAFERI)

DOB: 20.9.1974

POB: Iran

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Associated entities: Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG); MACPAR Makina San Ve Tic; Multimat lc ve Dis Ticaret Pazarlama Limited Sirketi; STEP Standart Teknik Parca San ve TIC A.S.

Iranian national supplying goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) front companies.

1.12.2011 32. Majid KHANSARI

DOB: 1972

POB: Khomeini Shahr, Iran

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Majid Khansari plays an influential role in Iran’s nuclear programme. He is the former CEO of Natanz nuclear site, as well as of EU-listed centrifuge manufacturer Kalaye Electric Company (KEC).

As an expert in the field of nuclear management, he continues to share his opinion on Iran’s nuclear programme and influence the national debate around that programme.

Majid Khansari is therefore involved in Iran’s nuclear or ballistic missile activities.

1.12.2011 40. Hamid SOLTANI

Function: Managing Director of Management Company for Nuclear Power Plant Construction (MASNA)

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Hamid Soltani is the Managing Director of Management Company for Nuclear Power Plant Construction (MASNA).

In this position, he has been involved in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran’s development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.

1.12.2011 42. Javad AL YASIN

Function: Head of the Research Centre for Explosion and Impact

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Head of the Research Centre for Explosion and Impact, also known as METFAZ.

1.12.2011 53. Fereidoun ABASSI-DAVANI

(فریدون عباسی دوانی)

(a.k.a. Fereydoon ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereidun ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereydoun ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereidoon ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereidoun ABBASI-DAVANI)

Function: senior nuclear scientist

DOB: 11.7.1958

POB: Abadan, Iran

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Fereidoun Abassi-Davani is a former Senior Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) scientist, former Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and former member of the Parliament of Iran. He is a senior nuclear scientist and is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Considering his past high-level roles within the Iranian government and his role as a member of the Parliament of Iran as well as his scientific activities, Fereidoun Abassi-Davani is providing support to the Government of Iran and was directly engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.

17.10.2023 (UN: 24.3.2007)’

(2) under the heading ‘I. Persons and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities and persons and entities providing support to the Government of Iran.’, the following entries replace the corresponding entries in the list set out under the subheading ‘B. Entities’:
Name

Identifying information

Reasons

Date of listing

‘1. Aerospace Industries Organisation, AIO

Address 1: AIO, 28 Shian 5, Lavizan, Tehran, Iran

Address 2: Langare Street, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, Iran

Associated entities: Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)

Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) is a subsidiary of the EU-listed Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) in charge of overseeing Iran’s ballistic missile programme.

It supervises several subsidiaries tasked with the production or procurement of different components of the ballistic missile programme.

The Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) therefore provides support to the Government of Iran.

23.4.2007 26. Marine Industries (a.k.a. Marine Industries Organisation (MIO), Marine Industries Group (MIG))

Address: Pasdaran Ave., PO Box 19585/ 777, Tehran, Iran

Place of registration: Tehran, Iran

Date of registration: 1996

Principal place of business: Iran

Associated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO), Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)

Marine Industries is a subsidiary of the EU-listed Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which is a subsidiary of EU-listed Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).

Marine Industries is involved in the maritime dimension of Iran’s missile programme, including by building ships that can carry and launch offensive missiles.

Marine Industries is therefore an entity involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities and an entity providing support to the Government of Iran.

23.4.2007 32. Parto Sanat Co (a.k.a. Parto Sanaat Co.; Parto Sanat Company; Partonsanat; Partosanat Co.; Partosanat PJSC; Yakan Parto; Bargh Va Electronic Partosanat)

Address: No. 2417 Valiasr St., corner of 14th St., PO Box 15178 43316, Tehran, Iran

Manufacturer of frequency changers and it is capable of developing and modifying imported foreign frequency changers in a way that makes them usable in gas centrifuge enrichment. It is deemed to be involved in nuclear proliferation activities.

26.7.2010 35. Raka

Associated entity: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)

A department of EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company. Established in late 2006, it was responsible for the construction of the Uranium enrichment plant at Fordow (Qom).

26.7.2010 41. Technology Cooperation Office (TCO) of the Iranian President’s Office (a.k.a. Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation (CITC); Presidential Center for Cooperation on Transformation and Progress)

Place of registration: Tehran, Iran

The Technology Cooperation Office (TCO) of the Iranian President’s Office operates in the fields of research, biotechnology, nanotechnology, renewable energy and information technology.

Its operations go back to 2001 when it was charged with strategic planning and the coordination of Iran’s developmental activities for nanotechnology. It is attached to and supervised by the President’s Office. It acts as a hub in the field and serves as a coordinator and facilitator of connections and collaborations. It maintains connections with the international community, networks between country laboratories, funds Iranian scientists, and engages in teaching.

Under its alias, Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation (CITC), it is furthermore part of an interdepartmental system consisting of CITC, the Iranian Ministry of Information and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) under the direct command of the Iranian President. Individuals associated with CITC, acting as Iranian official representatives abroad, also carried out secret functions of scientific and technical intelligence officers.

Responsible for Iran’s technological advancement through relevant foreign procurement and training links. It provides support to the Government of Iran.

26.7.2010 42. Yeganeh Energy Sazan Atrak Part (formerly known as Yasa Part) and the following subsidiaries:

Address: Ground Floor – Building 0 – Maharat 3 Alley – Maharat Street – Bidak Industrial Area – Badranlu Rural District – Central District – Bojnord City – Northern Khorasan Province, Iran Postal Code: 9418156318

Type of entity: Private joint-stock company

Place of registration: Bojnord – North Khorasan Province, Iran

Registration no.: 5219

Company dealing with procurement activities related to the purchase of materials and technologies necessary to nuclear and ballistic programmes.

26.7.2010
(a) Arfa Paint Company (a.k.a. ARFA; Arfa Company)

Address 1: Unit 5, 9th floor, Sarve Tower, Saadat Abad, Tehran, Iran

Address 2: 16th km Karaj Special Road, Tehran, Iran

Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.

26.7.2010
(b) Arfeh Company

Address: West Lavasani, Tehran, Iran

Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.

26.7.2010
(d) Hosseini Nejad Trading Co. (a.k.a. Hosseini Nejad Trading Company)
Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.

26.7.2010
(e) Iran Saffron Company (a.k.a. Iransaffron Co.; Iran Safron; Iran Saffron; Iran Saffron Co.)
Acting on behalf of Yasa Part.

26.7.2010 57. Hirbod Co (a.k.a. HIRBOD Company)

Address 1: Hirbod Co – Flat 2, 3 Second Street, Asad Abadi Avenue, Tehran 14316, Iran

Address 2 (factory): Tehran-Saveh Highway, km 80, Mamounieh Industrial Town, at the end of 8th Street, Asad Abadi Tehran, Iran

Date of registration: 1995

Principal place of business: Tehran, Iran

Associated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)

Hirbod Co is one of the leading companies in the field of stainless steel products. It provides steel products, including within security and military apparatus, to many Iranian entities, in particular Arthesh, the Iranian army.

Therefore, Hirbod Co is supporting the Government of Iran and provides support for the development of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery systems by Iran.

23.5.2011 60. Paya Parto (a.k.a. Paya Partov; National Centre for Laser Science and Technology)
Paya Parto is an entity that researches stable isotope separation, a key parameter for centrifuges component production, as part of Iran’s nuclear programme. It has close ties to the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI), which runs Iran’s Nuclear programme and supervises individual projects. Paya Parto is therefore responsible for providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.

23.5.2011 62. Taghtiran (a.k.a. Taghtiran Kashan Company)

Address: Unit 2, No. 3, 2nd Alley, Asad Abadi St., Vali-e asr St., 14316 Tehran, Iran

Place of registration: Tehran, Iran

Principal place of business: Tehran, Iran

Associated entities: Defense Industries Organization (DIO)

Taghtiran manufactures stainless steel and carbon steel parts for various entities, including the security and defence industries, such as Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and nuclear facilities, for example, the uranium conversion facility.

23.5.2011 71. Institute of Applied Physics (IAP)

Associated entities: Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND); Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)

The Institute of Applied Physics provides research and development for Iran’s nuclear programme. It has project partnerships with the EU-listed Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), which is a subsidiary of EU-listed Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), working to weaponise the nuclear programme, which is under the authority of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.

The Institute of Applied Physics is therefore involved in Iran’s nuclear programme and in Iran’s ballistic missile activities.

23.5.2011 77. Shahid Beheshti University

Address 1: Daneshju Blvd., Yaman St., Chamran Blvd., P.O. Box 19839-63113, Tehran, Iran

Address 2: Shahid Shahriari Square, Evin, P.O. Box 19839-6311369411, Tehran, Iran

Shahid Beheshti University is a public entity which is under the supervision of the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology. Carries out scientific research relevant to the development of nuclear weapons.

23.5.2011 81. Eyvaz Technic (a.k.a. Azarsam Instrument Company)

Address 1: No 3, Building 3, Shahid Hamid Sadigh Alley, Shariati Street, Tehran, Iran

Address 2: Tehran Province, Tehran, Kooy-e-Mehrzad, Kooy-e-Mehrzad, M78Q+V2R, Iran

Associated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)

Producer of vacuum equipment that has supplied the uranium enrichment sites at Natanz and Qom/Fordow. In 2011, it supplied pressure transducers to EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC).

1.12.2011 83. Ghani Sazi Uranium Company (a.k.a. Iran Uranium Enrichment Company; Sherkat-e Ghanisazi-ye Uranium)

Address: 3, Qarqavol Close, 20th Street, Tehran, Iran

Associated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC); Iran Centrifuge Technology Company

Ghani Sazi Uranium Company has production contracts with EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) and EU-designated Iran Centrifuge Technology Company.

1.12.2011 86. Karanir (a.k.a Karanir Sanat, Moaser; Tajhiz Sanat; Karanir Sanat Co; Moshever Sanat Moaser; TSI; Tajis Sanat; Tajhis Sanat Industries)

Address 1: 1139/1 Unit 104 Gol Building, Gol Alley, North Side of Sae, Vali Asr Avenue. PO Box 19395-6439, Tehran, Iran

Address 2: Beheshti St., Sabonuchi St., Adaee Alley, No. 2, Unit 301, Tehran, Iran

Karanir has been involved in purchasing equipment and materials, which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme.

1.12.2011 87. Khala Afarin Pars (a.k.a. PISHRO KHALA AFARIN COMPANY; Vacuum Afarin, Pars Vacuum Company)

Address 1: Unit 5, 2nd Floor, No 75, Mehran Afrand St, Sattarkhan St, Tehran.

Address 2: No. 94, 4th Floor, Unit 16, Bagherkhan St., Sattarkhan St., Tehran, Iran

Involved in purchasing equipment and materials which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme.

1.12.2011 88. MACPAR Makina San Ve Tic

Address: Istasyon MH, Sehitler cad, Guldeniz Sit, Number 79/2, Tuzla 34930, Istanbul, Türkiye

Associated individual: Milad Jafari

Company run by EU-designated Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies.

1.12.2011 89. MATSA (Mohandesi Toseh Sokht Atomi Company) (a.k.a. Mohandesi Toseh Sanayeh Atomi (METSA))

Address: 90, Fathi Shaghaghi Street, Tehran, Iran.

Registration no.: 2833278

National ID no.: 10103191030

Associated individuals: Mohammad Mohammadi (Managing Director)

Associated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)

MATSA (Mohandesi Toseh Sokht Atomi Company) is an Iranian company contracted to EU-designated Kalaye Electric Company (KEC) to provide design and engineering services across the nuclear fuel cycle. It has been procuring equipment for the Natanz uranium enrichment site.

1.12.2011 90. Mobin Sanjesh (a.k.a. Fakoor International Tehran Engineering Company (FITCO))

Address: Entry 3, No 11, 12th Street, Miremad Alley, Abbas Abad, Tehran, Iran

Mobin Sanjesh directly participates in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. It provides goods and services for magnetic systems which have a direct application in Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle industry, for example calibration of mass spectrometers.

1.12.2011 91. Multimat lc ve Dis Ticaret Pazarlama Limited Sirketi (a.k.a. MULTIMAT IC VE DIS TIC. PAZ. LTD. STI.; MULTIMAT IC VE DIS TICARET PAZARLAMA LIMITED SIRKETI; MULTIMAT IMPORT AND EXPORT; MULTIMAT LTD.; MULTIMAT TEHRAN; MULTIMAT TRADING COMPANY)

Address: Guvendik Mahallesi 132/1 Sokak, Izmir, Türkiye

Place of registration: Izmir, Türkiye

Date of registration: 30.12.1996

Associated individual: Milad Jafari

Associated entity: Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG)

Company run by EU-designated Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) through front companies.

1.12.2011 94. Saman Tose’e Asia (SATA)

Address: 4th Unit, 51 Sane’e St., N.W. of Jahan Kudak, Africa Blvd., Tehran, Iran 19699-35145

Engineering firm involved in supporting a range of large-scale industrial projects including Iran’s uranium enrichment programme, including undeclared work at the uranium enrichment site at Qom/Fordow.

1.12.2011 97. STEP Standart Teknik Parca San ve TIC A.S. (a.k.a. SSTP, Step Standard Technical Components Industry and Trading Corporation, Step Corporation, Step Standart Teknik Parca Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S., Step AS, Step Company, Stap Standart Tek Par San Tic AS, Step Standart Teknyk, Parca San. Ve Tyc. A.S., STEP Standart Teknik Parca San. ve Tic. A.S., Step Standart Teknik Parca Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi, Step A.S., Step S.A., Step Istanbul, Standart Teknik Parca San Ve Tic A.S., Standart Teknik Parca San. Ve Ticaret A.S., Standard Technical Component Industry and Trade Company, Step Standart Teknik Parca San Ve Tic As, Step Istanbul/Standart Teknik Parca San. Ve Tic. A.S.)

Address: 79/2 Tuzla, 34940, Istanbul, Türkiye

Associated individual: Milad Jafari

Associated entity: Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG)

Company run by Milad Jafari who has supplied goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) through front companies.

1.12.2011 101. Tosse Silooha (a.k.a. Tosseh Jahad E Silo; Tosee Siloha)

Address: NO.3. 50th st., Kalantari sq., Seyed Jamaleddin Asadabadi Ave. (Yousefabad), Tehran, Iran

Tosse Silooha is a company involved in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. It is involved in fabricating components for nuclear power plants such as cooling tower plants, and industrial chimneys. The company is also supporting the Government of Iran.

1.12.2011 102. Yarsanat (a.k.a. Yar Sanat; Yarestan Vacuumi; Zist Yar Sanat; Yar Sanat Co)

Address 1: No. 101, West Zardosht Street, 3rd Floor, 14157 Tehran; Iran

Address 2: No. 139 Hoveyzeh Street, 15337, Tehran, Iran

Address 3: 15, Fatemi Eshragi Alley, Gerda Afrid Building, science and Technology Park, Tarbiat Modares University, S.S 2 – Development Center, 4th Floor, Tehran, Iran

Principal place of business: Iran

Associated entities: Kalaye Electric Company (KEC)

Procurement company for EU-listed Kalaye Electric Company (KEC). Involved in purchasing equipment and materials, which have direct applications in the Iranian nuclear programme, for example instruments for uranium enrichment.

1.12.2011 106. Tidewater (a.k.a. Tidewater Middle East Co; Tide Water Khavarmianeh)

Postal address: No. 84, Vozara St., Tehran, Iran

Type of entity: Public Joint Stock Company

Place of registration: Tehran, Iran

Registration no.: 12341

Principal place of business: Tehran, Iran

Owned or controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

23.1.2012 148. Iran Composites Institute (a.k.a. Composites Research Laboratory (CRL))

Iran Composites Institute, Iranian University of Science and Technology, 16845-188, Tehran, Iran,

Telephone: 98 217 3912858

Fax: 98 217 7491206

Email: mailto:[email protected]

Website: http://www.irancomposites.org

Associated entities: Malek Ashtar University; Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (a.k.a. TESA)

The Iran Composites Institute is a centre for research and development in the field of composite materials and structures.

It was established in cooperation with the Iran University of Science and Technology (IUST) and remains part of it. Through its research, IUST is involved in Iran’s nuclear programme. It is linked to several Iranian academic institutions, including EU-listed Malek Ashtar University which is linked to the EU-listed Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).

In the past, Iran Composites Institute had been contracted to provide EU-listed Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (a.k.a. TESA) with IR-2M centrifuge rotors.

Iran Composites Institute is therefore providing support to the Government of Iran and entities owned or controlled by it.

22.12.2012 151. Simatec Development Company
Simatec Development Company has been assisting designated entities to violate the provisions of UN and EU sanctions on Iran and is directly supporting Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities.

22.12.2012 153. Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND)

Address: Negarestan 3, off Pasdaran Street, Tehran, Iran

Principal place of business: Tehran, Iran

Associated entities: Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)

The Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) directly supports Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities. The IAEA has identified SPND with their concerns over possible military dimensions (PMD) to Iran’s nuclear programme. SPND was run by UN-designated Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi and is part of the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) designated by the EU.

22.12.2012 161. Sharif University of Technology

Last address known: Azadi Ave/Street, PO Box 11365-11155, Tehran, Iran

Tel. + 98 21 66 161

Email: [email protected]

Associated entities: Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO); Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

Sharif University of Technology is a Tehran-based university and Iran’s central repository for nuclear research.

In the field of ballistic missile research and production, it cooperates with the EU-listed Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), which oversees Iran’s ballistic missile programme on behalf of the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Furthermore, it cooperates with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and supports it, among other activities, in its procurement efforts.

Taken together, these show a significant record of engagement with the Government of Iran in military or military-related fields that constitute support to the Government of Iran.

8.11.2014’

(3) entry 25 (concerning Mohammad Reza ZAHEDI) in the list headed ‘II. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)’, under the subheading ‘A. Persons’ is deleted;

(4) under the heading ‘II. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)’, the following entries replace the corresponding entries in the list set out under the subheading ‘A. Persons’:
Name

Identifying information

Reasons

Date of listing

‘2. Ali FADAVI

DOB: 13.3.1961

POB: Ardestan, Iran

Function: Deputy Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

Rank: Rear Admiral

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi is Deputy Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and was temporarily acting Commander of the IRGC. He is the former Commander of the IRGC Navy.

26.7.2010 3. Parviz FATAH

DOB: 1961

POB: Anzal, West Azerbaijan Province, Iran

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Passport no.: 6379886494

Parviz Fatah is Head of the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO) and a former member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

EIKO is an economic conglomerate under the direct supervision of the Supreme Leader. EIKO, together with two other organisations, is estimated to control more than half of the Iranian economy.

Parviz Fatah is therefore providing support to the Government of Iran.

26.7.2010 5. Ali HOSEYNITASH

Rank: Brigadier-General

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier-General Ali Hoseynitash has been the Head of the Strategic Directorate of the Supreme National Security Council since his appointment in 2013. The Supreme National Security Council shapes and coordinates the defence and security policies of Iran, including major decisions regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.

Ali Hoseynitash is therefore involved in nuclear and ballistic missile activities and provides support to the Government of Iran.

23.6.2008 7. Mostafa Mohammad NAJJAR

DOB: 2.12.1956

POB: Tehran, Iran

Rank: Brigadier-General

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Brigadier-General Mostafa Najjar has been a senior advisor to the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces on Knowledge and Technology Industry since September 2013. He is the former Minister for the Interior (2009-2013) and former Minister of the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) (2005-2009), responsible for all military programmes, including ballistic missiles programmes. Member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

23.6.2008 9. Mohammad PAKPUR

DOB: 1961

Rank: Brigadier-General

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Commander of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces.

26.7.2010 11. Hossein SALAMI

(حسین سلامی)

(a.k.a. Hosein SALIMI; Hussain SALIMI; Hosain SALIMI; Husain SALIMI; Hossein SALIMI; Hossein SALEEMI; Hussain SALEEMI; Husain SALEEMI; Hosein SALEEMI)

DOB: 1960

POB: Isfahan, Iran

Function: Commander in Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

Rank: Maj. General

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Passport No.: D08531177

Commander in Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

26.7.2010 (UN: 23.12.2006) 12. Ali SHAMSHIRI

Function: Deputy Assistant and Advisor to the Supreme Leader

Rank: Brigadier-General

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier-General Ali Shamshiri is Deputy Assistant and Advisor to the Supreme Leader in his role as Commander in Chief. Furthermore, he has held senior roles in the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), as head of the Intelligence Protection Organisation of MODAFL.

23.6.2008 13. Ahmad VAHIDI

DOB: 27.6.1958

POB: Shiraz, Iran

Rank: Brigadier-General

Nationality: Iranian

Gender: male

Brigadier-General Ahmad Vahidi has been a prominent member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) since 1979. He was appointed as Deputy Chief for Intelligence in 1981, played a role in organising the Ministry of Intelligence, became the first commander of the IRGC Quds Force in 1988 and was in charge of the IRGC Intelligence Unit. He further set up a number of IRGC garrisons that are responsible for organising terrorist activities. In 1997, he was transferred to the Ministry of Defense. He has been nominated as Defence Minister in 2009 and served in this post until 2013. He is still a high-ranking figure within the IRGC.

23.6.2008’

(5) under the heading ‘II. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)’, the following entries replace the corresponding entries in the list set out under the subheading ‘B. Entities’:
Name

Identifying information

Reasons

Date of listing

‘7. Bonyad Taavon Sepah (a.k.a. IRGC Cooperative Foundation; Bonyad-e Ta’avon-Sepah; Sepah Cooperative Foundation)

Address: Niayes Highway, Seoul Street, Tehran, Iran

Bonyad Taavon Sepah, also known as the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, was formed by the Commanders of the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to structure the IRGC’s investments and to provide the IRGC’s permanent personnel with financial loans, mortgages, business loans, as well as with land and construction materials.

It is controlled by the IRGC. Bonyad Taavon Sepah’s Board of Trustees is composed of nine members, eight of whom are IRGC members. These officers include the IRGC’s Commander in Chief, who is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, the Supreme Leader’s representative to the IRGC, the Basij commander, the IRGC Ground Forces commander, the IRGC Air Force commander, the IRGC Navy commander, the head of the IRGC Information Security Organisation, a senior IRGC officer from the Armed Forces General Staff and a senior IRGC officer from the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).

23.5.2011 11. Behnam Sahriyari Trading Company

Postal address: Ziba Building, 10th Floor, Northern Sohrevardi Street, Tehran, Iran

Behnam Sahriyari Trading Company is owned by Behnam Sahriyari, who leads the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Unit 190, which conducts arms smuggling operations. He uses his company as a front for IRGC weapons transfers. Therefore, Behnam Sahriyari Trading Company is involved in the shipment of arms on behalf of the IRGC.

23.1.2012’
			

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1555 of 25 July 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2021/1277 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Lebanon

                                January 13, 2026                            

Official Journalof the European Union
ENL series

2025/1555
28.7.2025

(1)
On 30 July 2021, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2021/1277(1), which concerns restrictive measures in view of the situation in Lebanon.

(2)
Decision (CFSP) 2021/1277 applies until 31 July 2025. On the basis of a review of that Decision, the restrictive measures set out therein should be renewed until 31 July 2026.

(3)
Decision (CFSP) 2021/1277 should therefore be amended accordingly,

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

(1) On 30 July 2021, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2021/1277 (1), which concerns restrictive measures in view of the situation in Lebanon.

(2) Decision (CFSP) 2021/1277 applies until 31 July 2025. On the basis of a review of that Decision, the restrictive measures set out therein should be renewed until 31 July 2026.

(3) Decision (CFSP) 2021/1277 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
In Article 9, first paragraph, of Decision (CFSP) 2021/1277, the date ‘31 July 2025’ is replaced by that of ‘31 July 2026’.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Administrative area and ADIS reference number of the outbreak	Areas established as protection and surveillance zones, part of the restricted zone, referred to in Article 1	Date until applicable
Sardinia regionIT-LSD-2025-00001IT-LSD-2025-00003IT-LSD-2025-00004IT-LSD-2025-00005IT-LSD-2025-00006IT-LSD-2025-00007IT-LSD-2025-00008IT-LSD-2025-00009IT-LSD-2025-00010IT-LSD-2025-00011IT-LSD-2025-00012IT-LSD-2025-00013IT-LSD-2025-00014IT-LSD-2025-00015IT-LSD-2025-00016IT-LSD-2025-00017IT-LSD-2025-00018IT-LSD-2025-00019IT-LSD-2025-00020IT-LSD-2025-00021IT-LSD-2025-00022IT-LSD-2025-00023IT-LSD-2025-00024IT-LSD-2025-00025IT-LSD-2025-00026IT-LSD-2025-00027	Protection zone:Those parts of the region of Sardinia, contained within a circle of a radius of 20 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 40.30429, Long. 9.22154 (2025/1), Lat. 40.31139, Long. 9.09821 (2025/3), Lat. 40.24291, Long. 9.22451 (2025/4), Lat. 40.392626, Long. 9.018567 (2025/5), Lat. 40.2623, Long. 9.082244 (2025/6), Lat. 40.22246, Long. 9.19132 (2025/7), Lat. 40.335997, Long. 9.123835 (2025/8), Lat. 40.28903, 9.102816 Long.(2025/9), Lat. 40.209698, Long. 9.177213 (2025/10), Lat. 40.24404, Long. 9.13817 (2025/11), Lat. 40.33445, Long. 9.15608 (2025/12), Lat. 40.319967 Long. 9.100123 (2025/13), Lat. 40.3451 Long. 9.2594 (2025/14), Lat. 40.3121, Long. 9.2046 (2025/15), Lat. 40.34778, Long. 9.16083 (2025/16), Lat. 40.24096, Long. 9.093 (2025/17), Lat. 40.35071, Long. 9.132964 (2025/18), Lat. 40.3399, Long. 9.167 (2025/19), Lat. 40.725228, Long. 9.485748 (2025/20), Lat. 40.467998, Long. 9.151939 (2025/21), Lat. 40.28833, Long. 9.157329 (2025/22), Lat. 40.24569, Long. 9.20289 (2025/23), Lat. 40.260758, Long. 9.168392 (2025/24), Lat. 40.33221, Long. 9.08099 (2025/25), Lat. 40.280527, Long. 9.116003 (2025/26), Lat. 40.3192, Long. 9.1386 (2025/27).	18.8.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of the region of Sardinia, contained within a circle of a radius of 50 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 40.30429, Long. 9.22154 (2025/1), Lat. 40.30429, Long. 9.22154 (2025/1), Lat. 40.31139, Long. 9.09821 (2025/3), Lat. 40.24291, Long. 9.22451 (2025/4), Lat. 40.392626, Long. 9.018567 (2025/5), Lat. 40.2623, Long. 9.082244 (2025/6), Lat. 40.22246, Long. 9.19132 (2025/7), Lat. 40.335997, Long. 9.123835 (2025/8), Lat. 40.28903, Long. 9.102816 (2025/9), Lat. 40.209698 Long. 9.177213 (2025/10), Lat. 40.24404, Long. 9.13817 (2025/11), Lat. 40.33445, Long. 9.15608 (2025/12), Lat. 40.319967, Long. 9.100123 (2025/13), Lat. 40.3451, Long. 9.2594 (2025/14), Lat. 40.3121, Long. 9.2046 (2025/15), Lat. 40.34778, Long. 9.16083 (2025/16), Lat. 40.24096, Long. 9.093 (2025/17), Lat. 40.35071, Long. 9.132964 (2025/18), Lat. 40.3399, Long. 9.167 (2025/19), Lat. 40.725228 Long. 9.485748 (2025/20), Lat. 40.467998, Long. 9.151939 (2025/21), Lat. 40.28833, Long. 9.157329 (2025/22), Lat. 40.24569, Long. 9.20289 (2025/23), Lat. 40.260758, Long. 9.168392 (2025/24), Lat. 40.33221, Long. 9.08099 (2025/25), Lat. 40.280527, Long. 9.116003 (2025/26), Lat. 40.3192, Long. 9.1386 (2025/27)	19.8.2025 – 4.9.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of the region of Sardinia, contained within a circle of a radius of 20 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates 40.30429, Long. 9.22154 (2025/1), Lat. 40.30429, Long. 9.22154 (2025/1), Lat. 40.31139, Long. 9.09821 (2025/3), Lat. 40.24291, Long. 9.22451 (2025/4), Lat. 40.392626, Long. 9.018567 (2025/5), Lat. 40.2623, Long. 9.082244 (2025/6), Lat. 40.22246, Long. 9.19132 (2025/7), Lat. 40.335997, Long. 9.123835 (2025/8), Lat. 40.28903, Long. 9.102816 (2025/9), Lat. 40.209698, Long. 9.177213 (2025/10), Lat. 40.24404, Long. 9.13817 (2025/11), Lat. 40.33445, Long. 9.15608 (2025/12), Lat. 40.319967, Long. 9.100123 (2025/13), Lat. 40.3451, Long. 9.2594 (2025/14), Lat. 40.3121, Long. 9.2046 (2025/15), Lat. 40.34778, Long. 9.16083 (2025/16), Lat. 40.24096, Long. 9.093 (2025/17), Lat. 40.35071, Long. 9.132964 (2025/18), Lat. 40.3399, Long. 9.167 (2025/19), Lat. 40.725228, Long. 9.485748 (2025/20), Lat. 40.467998, Long. 9.151939 (2025/21), Lat. 40.28833, Long. 9.157329 (2025/22), Lat. 40.24569, Long. 9.20289 (2025/23), Lat. 40.260758, Long. 9.168392 (2025/24), Lat. 40.33221, Long. 9.08099 (2025/25), Lat. 40.280527, Long. 9.116003 (2025/26), Lat. 40.3192, Long. 9.1386 (2025/27)), excluding the areas included in the protection zone.	4.9.2025
Lombardy regionIT-LSD-2025-00002	Protection zone:Those parts of the region of Lombardy, contained within a circle of a radius of 20 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 45.197941, Long. 10.814533(2025/2).	25.7.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of the region of Lombardy, contained within a circle of a radius of 50 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 45.197941, Long. 10.814533 (2025/2)	26.7.2025 – 11.8.2025
Surveillance zone:Those parts of the region of Lombardy, contained within a circle of a radius of 20 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 45.197941, Long. 10.814533 (2025/2), excluding the areas included in the protection zone.	11.8.2025
Valle d’Aosta regionFR-LSD-2025-00017	Surveillance zone:Those parts of the region of Valle d’Aosta, contained within a circle of a radius of 50 kilometres, centred on UTM 30, ETRS89 coordinates Lat. 45.739081, Long 6.309311 (FR-LSD-2025-00017).	5.9.2025

Administrative area	Areas established as further restricted zone, part of the restricted zone, referred to in Article 1	Date until applicable
Sardinia region	The entire territory of the region of Sardinia, excluding the areas included in any protection or surveillance zone.	4.9.2025

Administrative area	Areas referred to in Article 3	Date until applicable
Sardinia region	The entire territory of the region of Sardinia	4.9.2025 – 30.9.2025

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
‘8.	Ebrahim MAHMUDZADEH	DOB: 2.4.1955Function: Professor at Malek Ashtar University; Chairman of the Board of Iran Telecommunication CompanyNationality: IranianGender: male	Ebrahim Mahmudzadeh is a professor at EU-listed Malek Ashtar University, subordinate to EU-listed Defense Technology and Science Research Centre (DTSRC), which supports Iran’s Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) with research and development (R&D) services.Faculty members of Malek Ashtar University are involved in research regarding missiles and nuclear power and thereby provide research and development support to the Government of Iran.Ebrahim Mahmudzadeh is also Chairman of the Board of Iran Telecommunication Company, which is partially controlled by the EU-listed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).Ebrahim Mahmudzadeh therefore provides support to the Government of Iran.	23.6.2008
27.	Kamran DANESHJOO (a.k.a. DANESHJOU)	Function: Professor at Iran University of Science and TechnologyNationality: IranianGender: male	Professor at Iran University of Science and Technology. Former Minister of Science, Research and Technology. As project manager of the 111th section of the AMAD Plan, he provided support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.	1.12.2011
29.	Milad JAFARI (Milad JAFERI)	DOB: 20.9.1974POB: IranNationality: IranianGender: maleAssociated entities: Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG); MACPAR Makina San Ve Tic; Multimat lc ve Dis Ticaret Pazarlama Limited Sirketi; STEP Standart Teknik Parca San ve TIC A.S.	Iranian national supplying goods, mostly metals, to EU-designated Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) front companies.	1.12.2011
32.	Majid KHANSARI	DOB: 1972POB: Khomeini Shahr, IranNationality: IranianGender: male	Majid Khansari plays an influential role in Iran’s nuclear programme. He is the former CEO of Natanz nuclear site, as well as of EU-listed centrifuge manufacturer Kalaye Electric Company (KEC).As an expert in the field of nuclear management, he continues to share his opinion on Iran’s nuclear programme and influence the national debate around that programme.Majid Khansari is therefore involved in Iran’s nuclear or ballistic missile activities.	1.12.2011
40.	Hamid SOLTANI	Function: Managing Director of Management Company for Nuclear Power Plant Construction (MASNA)Nationality: IranianGender: male	Hamid Soltani is the Managing Director of Management Company for Nuclear Power Plant Construction (MASNA).In this position, he has been involved in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran’s development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.	1.12.2011
42.	Javad AL YASIN	Function: Head of the Research Centre for Explosion and ImpactNationality: IranianGender: male	Head of the Research Centre for Explosion and Impact, also known as METFAZ.	1.12.2011
53.	Fereidoun ABASSI-DAVANI(فریدون عباسی دوانی)(a.k.a. Fereydoon ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereidun ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereydoun ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereidoon ABASSI-DAVANI; Fereidoun ABBASI-DAVANI)	Function: senior nuclear scientistDOB: 11.7.1958POB: Abadan, IranNationality: IranianGender: male	Fereidoun Abassi-Davani is a former Senior Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) scientist, former Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and former member of the Parliament of Iran. He is a senior nuclear scientist and is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Considering his past high-level roles within the Iranian government and his role as a member of the Parliament of Iran as well as his scientific activities, Fereidoun Abassi-Davani is providing support to the Government of Iran and was directly engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.	17.10.2023 (UN: 24.3.2007)’