Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2565 of 15 December 2025 in support of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its aspects and the Global Framework on Ammunition

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/2565 16.12.2025
(1) On 19 November 2018, the Council adopted the EU Strategy against Illicit Firearms, Small Arms & Light Weapons and their Ammunition, entitled ‘Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens’ (the ‘EU SALW Strategy’), which sets the guidelines for Union action in the field of small arms and light weapons (SALW). The EU SALW Strategy considers the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN PoA) as the global framework to counter the threat posed by illicit SALW and supports its full and effective implementation at national, regional, and global levels.
(2) On 17 October 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/1965(1), which continued the Union’s support for the UN PoA. Through Decision 2022/1965 and other relevant EU support, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), its regional centres and implementing partners have been able to implement projects to combat the trafficking of SALW and ammunition in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean.
(3) On 28 June 2024, States at the Fourth Review Conference on the UN PoA and the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (ITI), adopted by consensus a forward-looking outcome document. States collectively agreed on ways to further combat illicit SALW, including through the establishment of a new state-led Open-ended Technical Expert Group (OETEG) to address developments in SALW manufacturing, technology and design, on improving gender-responsive SALW control and on enhancing the participation of young people in SALW control processes.
(4) On 27 June 2025, a Preparatory Meeting of States on the Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management (GFA) adopted Recommendations in preparation for the 2027 Meeting of States and on Process and modalities for the effective implementation of the GFA, including recommendations to the UN Secretariat, of which UNODA is an office.
(5) On 14 April 2025, the Council adopted Conclusions on Arms Export Control, which included the strengthening of multilateral commitments, such as UN PoA, the ITI and the GFA, and enhancing technical implementation through measures like stockpile management (including through support for capacity building of third states), record-keeping, transfer controls and tracing,
(a) the strengthening of relevant international frameworks and of global policy frameworks; and,
(b) the translation of global policy frameworks into action through the support to multilateral processes, regional cooperation and targeted national support, which will contribute to combating illicit SALW and ammunition, while helping to prevent armed violence and conflict.The project is designed to build the resilience of States and civil society organisations to prevent the illicit trafficking of arms and ammunition due to diversion, and to strengthen weapons and ammunition management globally.
(a) to strengthen forward-looking and action-oriented policy outcomes under the GFA, the UN PoA and the ITI;
(b) to support the coordinated and strengthened implementation of the international instruments at the national, sub-regional and regional level; and,
(c) to leverage SALW and ammunition control in broader peace and security efforts frameworks to more effectively prevent armed violence and promote peace and development.
1. Strengthening forward-looking and action-oriented policy outcomes under the UN GFA, PoA and ITI
2. Support the coordinated and strengthened implementation of the international instruments at the national, subregional and regional level
3. Leverage SALW and ammunition control in broader peace and security efforts frameworks to more effectively prevent armed violence and sustain peace and development.
— Increased coordination with relevant organizations, including through other projects funded by the EU.
— Strengthened civil society’s engagement at all levels.
— A mainstreamed gender perspective throughout project activities.
— Member States are well informed of the objectives and measures of the GFA, supporting more prepared participation and submission of voluntary initial overviews ahead of the First Meeting of States on the GFA.
— Member States and relevant stakeholders have strengthened technical knowledge and capacity on the implementation of the PoA and ITI and developments in SALW manufacturing, technology, and design, leading to more informed Biennial Meetings of States and the deliberations of the OETEG. Participation in intergovernmental processes on SALW and ammunition is inclusive and representative of affected States and a broad range of stakeholders.
Countries from subregions Regional centre Indicative Venue
CaribbeanLatin America UNLIREC Virtual (two meetings)
South AsiaSoutheast AsiaCentral AsiaNortheast Asiathe Pacific UNRCPD Kathmandu, Nepal (one meeting)
Middle EastNorth Africa UNRCPD and UNREC Location to be decided (one meeting)
East AfricaSouthern AfricaWest AfricaCentral Africa UNREC Locations to be decided (two meetings)
i. Up to six (6) regional preparatory meetings are organized for the GFA.
ii. Up to four (4) virtual expert roundtables on ammunition are held ahead of the 2027 Meeting of States on the GFA.
iii. Up to eight (8) global and regional virtual expert webinars in the intersessional period of the OETEG are held.
iv. Sponsorship of up to fifteen (15) participants from developing or severely affected States to attend political conferences.
v. A sponsorship programme and guide for civil society organizations to enhance representation and substantive contribution to the PoA and GFA processes.
— Enhanced implementation of the UN PoA, ITI and GFA through national assistance to States and development of enhanced tools.
— Strengthened regional coordination to reduce illicit SALW and ammunition.
— Support to the ASEAN Declaration on Combating Arms Smuggling:To reduce the illicit proliferation of arms and ammunition in ASEAN States, a series of sub-regional seminars, workshops, and work sessions will be held, including thematic meetings, peer-to-peer exchanges and visits to translate the political commitments of the ASEAN Declaration into actionable objectives, targets, and indicators, while also supporting other relevant regional mechanisms. UNRCPD will provide guidance throughout the process, working alongside relevant regional stakeholders, including civil society organizations and regional bodies such as the ASEAN. The initiative will align with the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime and other relevant regional fora to ensure synergy and integration with existing mechanisms. The initiative will involve implementing partners and additional donors to support the process, ensuring coordination and secure sustainable support for the implementation of the ASEAN Declaration. Furthermore, the activities will promote synergies with other key frameworks, such as the ASEAN Regional Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security, aligning regional political commitments with broader peace and security agendas.
— Strengthening role of the National Points of Contacts (NPCs) and coordination mechanisms under the UN PoA and the GFA:Building on UNRCPD’s previous work in establishing regional cooperation mechanisms, such as the PoA NPCs community for Asia-Pacific and the Regional Cooperation Mechanism on Conventional Arms launched in 2023, this initiative aims to expand the PoA NPC community to include government officials working on the GFA.
— Assessments and in-country assistance in up to three countries:Dedicated assistance will be provided at the national level to support regulatory frameworks, the design and management of SALW and ammunition control systems, and operational support as requested. This support could include training, workshops, meetings, data collection, technical assistance and/or research activities, and will ensure that all activities are gender-responsive and inclusive. The initiative will assist up to three beneficiary states, including one Middle East country, in coordination with other relevant actors, and will serve as a catalyst to complement other funding streams, including SALIENT, UNSCAR, and the Arms Trade Treaty Voluntary Trust Fund, to bolster regional capacity and enhance coordination in SALW control and ammunition management.
— Four in-country assistance activities, including two assessments:Building on the delivery of assessment missions and in-country assistance for the development of National Action plans (NAP) on SALW in Burundi and in The Gambia, UNREC will sustain its support to these two countries in implementing their NAPs. Also, the center will extend support to two additional selected States in strengthening their national SALW control and/or ammunition management capacities. Selected countries may receive assistance using the MOSAIC Assessment Tool and be provided with technical support and targeted capacity-building to strengthen implementation of the global frameworks based on their needs assessment. As part of the offer of assistance, UNREC is expanding beyond SALW control to also cover ammunition management and support for the implementation of the GFA, including support for reporting and submission of initial overviews. The assistance will promote the use of existing assessment tools on ammunition.
— Fostering a continental community of practitioners for SALW and ammunition control:Building on UNREC’s engagement with a wide range of experts on SALW and ammunition on the African continent, the initiative will encompass a series of online sessions for national authorities, technical experts, civil society organizations, academia, continental and regional institutions, and relevant UN entities. Fostering the continental community of practitioners on SALW and ammunition will create a platform of reflections/engagements to i) boost the implementation of international, continental, regional and national instruments on illicit SALW and ammunition management; ii) share lessons learnt and best practices for the effective implementation of arms control initiatives; and iii) formulate key policy and action-oriented recommendations to counter the rapid proliferation of SALW and ammunition. For instance, key thematics including the impact of emerging technologies on SALW and disarmament education involving youth may be discussed.
— Support development of an ANDEAN Roadmap:Development of a Roadmap for Andean States (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) with a view to support the operationalization of the Resolution Action Plan of Decision 922 on Security (Plan de Acción Resolutivo de la Decisión 922 en materia de Seguridad), adopted in January 2024 by the Andean Community. The Plan includes, among other priorities, enhanced cooperation to combat arms trafficking. Activities will consist of sub-regional seminars, workshops, and technical working sessions (including drafting and thematic meetings). The development of the roadmap will be carried out in collaboration with the Department of Public Security of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Secretariat of the Andean Community (Communidad Andina, CAN), complementing actions under the EU Council Decision (CFSP) adopted on 16 July 2025.
— Strengthening ammunition marking practices in Latin America and the Caribbean in support of the implementation of the Global Framework on Ammunition.Ammunition marking in Latin America and the Caribbean is strengthened through the development of a regional publication of good practices, updated training materials, and work with national authorities to enhance marking practices including through the delivery of marking courses in selected countries. Technical capabilities of ballistic and forensic laboratories are enhanced through specialized training on weapons marking recovery. Separately, national efforts to combat and interdict illicit trafficking of weapons and ammunition may be supported through targeted capacity-building courses.
i. The MOSAIC Assessment Tool is updated with additional user-friendly features and criteria, based on user feedback.
ii. Training on and utilization of the MOSAIC Assessment Tool by diverse stakeholders (including linked to Activity 2.3.3 as feasible).
iii. In Asia Pacific:a.Action Plan of the ASEAN Declaration on combating arms smuggling in southeast Asia is developed.b.Assistance mapping sessions and virtual training workshops for NPCs.c.Development of a Toolkit for NPCs.d.Assessments and in-country assistance in up to three countries. a. Action Plan of the ASEAN Declaration on combating arms smuggling in southeast Asia is developed. b. Assistance mapping sessions and virtual training workshops for NPCs. c. Development of a Toolkit for NPCs. d. Assessments and in-country assistance in up to three countries.
a. Action Plan of the ASEAN Declaration on combating arms smuggling in southeast Asia is developed.
b. Assistance mapping sessions and virtual training workshops for NPCs.
c. Development of a Toolkit for NPCs.
d. Assessments and in-country assistance in up to three countries.
a. Action Plan of the ASEAN Declaration on combating arms smuggling in southeast Asia is developed.
b. Assistance mapping sessions and virtual training workshops for NPCs.
c. Development of a Toolkit for NPCs.
d. Assessments and in-country assistance in up to three countries.
iv. In Africa:a.MOSAIC assessments in up to two (2) countries.b.Technical in-country assistance in up to four (4) States to implement the UN PoA, ITI and GFA and promote existing tools.c.The continental community of practitioners for SALW and ammunition holds quarterly sessions, for a total of 12 online and hybrid events. a. MOSAIC assessments in up to two (2) countries. b. Technical in-country assistance in up to four (4) States to implement the UN PoA, ITI and GFA and promote existing tools. c. The continental community of practitioners for SALW and ammunition holds quarterly sessions, for a total of 12 online and hybrid events.
a. MOSAIC assessments in up to two (2) countries.
b. Technical in-country assistance in up to four (4) States to implement the UN PoA, ITI and GFA and promote existing tools.
c. The continental community of practitioners for SALW and ammunition holds quarterly sessions, for a total of 12 online and hybrid events.
a. MOSAIC assessments in up to two (2) countries.
b. Technical in-country assistance in up to four (4) States to implement the UN PoA, ITI and GFA and promote existing tools.
c. The continental community of practitioners for SALW and ammunition holds quarterly sessions, for a total of 12 online and hybrid events.
v. In Latin America and the Caribbean:a.A Roadmap for Andean States to Prevent the Illicit Trafficking and Proliferation of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives is developed together with the Organization of American States and the Secretariat of the Andean Community and adopted.b.One (1) paper on ammunition marking in Latin America and the Caribbean is produced, analyzing regional challenges, effective practices and developing practical recommendations.c.UNLIREC's SALW marking course and related materials are revised and expanded to include additional content on ammunition marking.d.Up to four (4) in-person courses/workshops on ammunition or SALW marking and/or on strengthening efforts to combat illicit SALW and ammunition trafficking delivered in Latin America and the Caribbean.e.Ballistic and forensic laboratories in the region benefit from capacity-building through a practical course on the recovery of weapons markings.f.Capacity-building for ballistic and forensic laboratories through practical course on recovery of weapons marking carried out in at least two (2) countries in Latin America and/or the Caribbean. a. A Roadmap for Andean States to Prevent the Illicit Trafficking and Proliferation of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives is developed together with the Organization of American States and the Secretariat of the Andean Community and adopted. b. One (1) paper on ammunition marking in Latin America and the Caribbean is produced, analyzing regional challenges, effective practices and developing practical recommendations. c. UNLIREC's SALW marking course and related materials are revised and expanded to include additional content on ammunition marking. d. Up to four (4) in-person courses/workshops on ammunition or SALW marking and/or on strengthening efforts to combat illicit SALW and ammunition trafficking delivered in Latin America and the Caribbean. e. Ballistic and forensic laboratories in the region benefit from capacity-building through a practical course on the recovery of weapons markings. f. Capacity-building for ballistic and forensic laboratories through practical course on recovery of weapons marking carried out in at least two (2) countries in Latin America and/or the Caribbean.
a. A Roadmap for Andean States to Prevent the Illicit Trafficking and Proliferation of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives is developed together with the Organization of American States and the Secretariat of the Andean Community and adopted.
b. One (1) paper on ammunition marking in Latin America and the Caribbean is produced, analyzing regional challenges, effective practices and developing practical recommendations.
c. UNLIREC's SALW marking course and related materials are revised and expanded to include additional content on ammunition marking.
d. Up to four (4) in-person courses/workshops on ammunition or SALW marking and/or on strengthening efforts to combat illicit SALW and ammunition trafficking delivered in Latin America and the Caribbean.
e. Ballistic and forensic laboratories in the region benefit from capacity-building through a practical course on the recovery of weapons markings.
f. Capacity-building for ballistic and forensic laboratories through practical course on recovery of weapons marking carried out in at least two (2) countries in Latin America and/or the Caribbean.
a. A Roadmap for Andean States to Prevent the Illicit Trafficking and Proliferation of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives is developed together with the Organization of American States and the Secretariat of the Andean Community and adopted.
b. One (1) paper on ammunition marking in Latin America and the Caribbean is produced, analyzing regional challenges, effective practices and developing practical recommendations.
c. UNLIREC's SALW marking course and related materials are revised and expanded to include additional content on ammunition marking.
d. Up to four (4) in-person courses/workshops on ammunition or SALW marking and/or on strengthening efforts to combat illicit SALW and ammunition trafficking delivered in Latin America and the Caribbean.
e. Ballistic and forensic laboratories in the region benefit from capacity-building through a practical course on the recovery of weapons markings.
f. Capacity-building for ballistic and forensic laboratories through practical course on recovery of weapons marking carried out in at least two (2) countries in Latin America and/or the Caribbean.
vi. A booklet for civil society and/or parliamentarians, to support governments upon request for implementing the UN PoA, ITI and the GFA through existing tools and piloted in up to three (3) countries.
— Strengthen collective efforts to prevent armed violence and sustain peace through SALW and ammunition control.
— Contribute to implementation of the Pact for the Future through integration of SALW control and ammunition management in national prevention, peacebuilding and sustainable development efforts.
— Strengthen gender-responsive SALW control efforts.
— Strengthen cooperation with civil society organizations and young people to reduce the demand for illicit SALW and ammunition and implement the PoA, ITI and GFA.
i. A resource package on integrating SALW control and ammunition management into prevention and peacebuilding efforts:a.A mapping of initiatives and actors addressing SALW/ammunition and prevention and peacebuilding.b.Development of a guidance note on good practices for linking SALW control and ammunition management in national prevention efforts, in line with the Pact for the Future and the Secretary-General’s ‘A New Agenda for Peace’.c.A list of customizable national targets that can be used in national action plans and strategies addressing SALW, ammunition, WPS, YPS and prevention frameworks.d.Development of MOSAIC module 02.10 ‘Small arms and light weapons control in the context of preventing armed violence’ to be translated into at least two languages.e.Outreach and communications campaign focused on linking SALW control and ammunition management for more effective prevention and peacebuilding.f.Online website (‘resource hub’) for States to access tools and options for support in integrating SALW control and ammunition management into broader prevention, peacebuilding and sustainable development efforts. a. A mapping of initiatives and actors addressing SALW/ammunition and prevention and peacebuilding. b. Development of a guidance note on good practices for linking SALW control and ammunition management in national prevention efforts, in line with the Pact for the Future and the Secretary-General’s ‘A New Agenda for Peace’. c. A list of customizable national targets that can be used in national action plans and strategies addressing SALW, ammunition, WPS, YPS and prevention frameworks. d. Development of MOSAIC module 02.10 ‘Small arms and light weapons control in the context of preventing armed violence’ to be translated into at least two languages. e. Outreach and communications campaign focused on linking SALW control and ammunition management for more effective prevention and peacebuilding. f. Online website (‘resource hub’) for States to access tools and options for support in integrating SALW control and ammunition management into broader prevention, peacebuilding and sustainable development efforts.
a. A mapping of initiatives and actors addressing SALW/ammunition and prevention and peacebuilding.
b. Development of a guidance note on good practices for linking SALW control and ammunition management in national prevention efforts, in line with the Pact for the Future and the Secretary-General’s ‘A New Agenda for Peace’.
c. A list of customizable national targets that can be used in national action plans and strategies addressing SALW, ammunition, WPS, YPS and prevention frameworks.
d. Development of MOSAIC module 02.10 ‘Small arms and light weapons control in the context of preventing armed violence’ to be translated into at least two languages.
e. Outreach and communications campaign focused on linking SALW control and ammunition management for more effective prevention and peacebuilding.
f. Online website (‘resource hub’) for States to access tools and options for support in integrating SALW control and ammunition management into broader prevention, peacebuilding and sustainable development efforts.
a. A mapping of initiatives and actors addressing SALW/ammunition and prevention and peacebuilding.
b. Development of a guidance note on good practices for linking SALW control and ammunition management in national prevention efforts, in line with the Pact for the Future and the Secretary-General’s ‘A New Agenda for Peace’.
c. A list of customizable national targets that can be used in national action plans and strategies addressing SALW, ammunition, WPS, YPS and prevention frameworks.
d. Development of MOSAIC module 02.10 ‘Small arms and light weapons control in the context of preventing armed violence’ to be translated into at least two languages.
e. Outreach and communications campaign focused on linking SALW control and ammunition management for more effective prevention and peacebuilding.
f. Online website (‘resource hub’) for States to access tools and options for support in integrating SALW control and ammunition management into broader prevention, peacebuilding and sustainable development efforts.
ii. Publication of a toolkit to enhance collection of data related to SALW and ammunition control and disaggregated by gender, age and disability.
iii. Publication of an African/African Union Operational Guidance Note on Gender, SALW and Ammunition.
iv. Creation of an informal network of young people with expertise in prevention through SALW and ammunition control.
v. Preventing Firearms in Schools’ initiative for Latin America and Caribbean States, which may include awareness raising webinars, the delivery of education material, and/or the provision of technical support to a selected country on the planning, conceptualization, drafting and completion of guidelines for school authorities to prevent and respond to the presence and use of firearms in schools.
vi. A grants programme to empower relevant civil society organizations to strengthen community-level action and youth engagement for SALW control and ammunition management in affected communities.
vii. Continued engagement in the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) National Focal Point Network, Security Council WPS Informal Experts Group and the UN-Action network against Conflict-related Sexual Violence, as well as the Pathfinder’s Halving Global Violence campaign.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 19 November 2018, the Council adopted the EU Strategy against Illicit Firearms, Small Arms & Light Weapons and their Ammunition, entitled ‘Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens’ (the ‘EU SALW Strategy’), which sets the guidelines for Union action in the field of small arms and light weapons (SALW). The EU SALW Strategy considers the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN PoA) as the global framework to counter the threat posed by illicit SALW and supports its full and effective implementation at national, regional, and global levels.
(2) On 17 October 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/1965(1), which continued the Union’s support for the UN PoA. Through Decision 2022/1965 and other relevant EU support, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), its regional centres and implementing partners have been able to implement projects to combat the trafficking of SALW and ammunition in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean.
(3) On 28 June 2024, States at the Fourth Review Conference on the UN PoA and the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (ITI), adopted by consensus a forward-looking outcome document. States collectively agreed on ways to further combat illicit SALW, including through the establishment of a new state-led Open-ended Technical Expert Group (OETEG) to address developments in SALW manufacturing, technology and design, on improving gender-responsive SALW control and on enhancing the participation of young people in SALW control processes.
(4) On 27 June 2025, a Preparatory Meeting of States on the Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management (GFA) adopted Recommendations in preparation for the 2027 Meeting of States and on Process and modalities for the effective implementation of the GFA, including recommendations to the UN Secretariat, of which UNODA is an office.
(5) On 14 April 2025, the Council adopted Conclusions on Arms Export Control, which included the strengthening of multilateral commitments, such as UN PoA, the ITI and the GFA, and enhancing technical implementation through measures like stockpile management (including through support for capacity building of third states), record-keeping, transfer controls and tracing,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
1. In line with the EU SALW Strategy, the purpose of this Decision is to reduce the prevalence of illicit arms and ammunition and prevent their devastating human cost. This will be achieved through:
(a)
the strengthening of relevant international frameworks and of global policy frameworks; and,
(b)
the translation of global policy frameworks into action through the support to multilateral processes, regional cooperation and targeted national support, which will contribute to combating illicit SALW and ammunition, while helping to prevent armed violence and conflict.
The project is designed to build the resilience of States and civil society organisations to prevent the illicit trafficking of arms and ammunition due to diversion, and to strengthen weapons and ammunition management globally.
2. Pursuant to paragraph 1, the objectives of this Decision are the following:
(a)
to strengthen forward-looking and action-oriented policy outcomes under the GFA, the UN PoA and the ITI;
(b)
to support the coordinated and strengthened implementation of the international instruments at the national, sub-regional and regional level; and,
(c)
to leverage SALW and ammunition control in broader peace and security efforts frameworks to more effectively prevent armed violence and promote peace and development.
3. A detailed description of the project is set out in the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2
1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (‘HR’) shall be responsible for implementing this Decision.
2. The technical implementation of the project referred to in Article 1 shall be carried out by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA).
3. The UNODA shall perform its tasks under the responsibility of the HR. For that purpose, the HR shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the UNODA.

Article 3
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the project financed by the Union shall be EUR 4 399 030,86.
2. The expenditure financed by the reference amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.
3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure referred to in paragraph 1. For that purpose, it shall conclude the necessary financing agreement with the UNODA. The financing agreement shall stipulate that the UNODA has to ensure the visibility of the Union’s contribution, appropriate to its size.
4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.

Article 4
1. The HR shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular narrative reports prepared by the UNODA. Those reports shall form the basis of the evaluation to be carried out by the Council.
2. The Commission shall report on the financial aspects of the project referred to in Article 1.

Article 5
1. This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
2. This Decision shall expire 36 months after the date of conclusion of the financing agreement referred to in Article 3(3). However, it shall expire 6 months after the date of its entry into force if no such financing agreement has been concluded within that period.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 19 November 2018, the Council adopted the EU Strategy against Illicit Firearms, Small Arms & Light Weapons and their Ammunition, entitled ‘Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens’ (the ‘EU SALW Strategy’), which sets the guidelines for Union action in the field of small arms and light weapons (SALW). The EU SALW Strategy considers the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN PoA) as the global framework to counter the threat posed by illicit SALW and supports its full and effective implementation at national, regional, and global levels.
(2) On 17 October 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/1965(1), which continued the Union’s support for the UN PoA. Through Decision 2022/1965 and other relevant EU support, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), its regional centres and implementing partners have been able to implement projects to combat the trafficking of SALW and ammunition in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean.
(3) On 28 June 2024, States at the Fourth Review Conference on the UN PoA and the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (ITI), adopted by consensus a forward-looking outcome document. States collectively agreed on ways to further combat illicit SALW, including through the establishment of a new state-led Open-ended Technical Expert Group (OETEG) to address developments in SALW manufacturing, technology and design, on improving gender-responsive SALW control and on enhancing the participation of young people in SALW control processes.
(4) On 27 June 2025, a Preparatory Meeting of States on the Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management (GFA) adopted Recommendations in preparation for the 2027 Meeting of States and on Process and modalities for the effective implementation of the GFA, including recommendations to the UN Secretariat, of which UNODA is an office.
(5) On 14 April 2025, the Council adopted Conclusions on Arms Export Control, which included the strengthening of multilateral commitments, such as UN PoA, the ITI and the GFA, and enhancing technical implementation through measures like stockpile management (including through support for capacity building of third states), record-keeping, transfer controls and tracing,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
1. In line with the EU SALW Strategy, the purpose of this Decision is to reduce the prevalence of illicit arms and ammunition and prevent their devastating human cost. This will be achieved through:
(a)
the strengthening of relevant international frameworks and of global policy frameworks; and,
(b)
the translation of global policy frameworks into action through the support to multilateral processes, regional cooperation and targeted national support, which will contribute to combating illicit SALW and ammunition, while helping to prevent armed violence and conflict.
The project is designed to build the resilience of States and civil society organisations to prevent the illicit trafficking of arms and ammunition due to diversion, and to strengthen weapons and ammunition management globally.
2. Pursuant to paragraph 1, the objectives of this Decision are the following:
(a)
to strengthen forward-looking and action-oriented policy outcomes under the GFA, the UN PoA and the ITI;
(b)
to support the coordinated and strengthened implementation of the international instruments at the national, sub-regional and regional level; and,
(c)
to leverage SALW and ammunition control in broader peace and security efforts frameworks to more effectively prevent armed violence and promote peace and development.
3. A detailed description of the project is set out in the Annex to this Decision.
1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (‘HR’) shall be responsible for implementing this Decision.
2. The technical implementation of the project referred to in Article 1 shall be carried out by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA).
3. The UNODA shall perform its tasks under the responsibility of the HR. For that purpose, the HR shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the UNODA.
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the project financed by the Union shall be EUR 4 399 030,86.
2. The expenditure financed by the reference amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.
3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure referred to in paragraph 1. For that purpose, it shall conclude the necessary financing agreement with the UNODA. The financing agreement shall stipulate that the UNODA has to ensure the visibility of the Union’s contribution, appropriate to its size.
4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.
1. The HR shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular narrative reports prepared by the UNODA. Those reports shall form the basis of the evaluation to be carried out by the Council.
2. The Commission shall report on the financial aspects of the project referred to in Article 1.
1. This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
2. This Decision shall expire 36 months after the date of conclusion of the financing agreement referred to in Article 3(3). However, it shall expire 6 months after the date of its entry into force if no such financing agreement has been concluded within that period.
ANNEX
Project document
for a Council Decision (CFSP) in support of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Global Framework on Ammunition
I. BACKGROUND
Small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition are the leading cause of violent deaths, in conflict and non-conflict settings. In fact, every two minutes, a life is lost to ammunition fired from small arms globally.
Both the demand and supply of SALW and conventional ammunition are intensifying as a result of geopolitical tensions, regional instabilities and the increasing outbreak of armed conflict. Past conflicts and political uncertainty have shown that even legally acquired weapons and ammunition are at risk of being diverted to unauthorized users, perpetuating instability far beyond their points of origin. In fragile contexts, the widespread availability of SALW and ammunition fuels ongoing armed violence, organized crime and thwarts sustainable development.
The multifaceted problem of illicit SALW and conventional ammunition requires concerted effort at international, regional, subregional, national levels and grassroots to prevent their devastating human costs. Crucial steps to prevent diversion and to eradicate the illicit trade in SALW recognized by the EU Strategy ‘Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens’ and EU Council Conclusions of 14 April 2025 on Arms Export Control include: strengthening multilateral commitments, such as the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN PoA), the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) and the new Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management (GFA), and enhancing technical implementation through measures like stockpile management (including through support for capacity building of third states), record-keeping, transfer controls and tracing.
Further, and as recognized in the Pact for the Future adopted by UN Member States in 2024, practical SALW and ammunition control tools can be leveraged to prevent armed violence and armed conflicts. Integration of these practices in National Prevention Strategies, peacebuilding efforts and sustainable development plans will build resilience in States and communities, and combat the demand for these weapons and ammunition.
Opportunity for progress
In a strained multilateral environment for advancing global commitments and cooperation on disarmament and arms control, multilateral cooperation on small arms and light weapons and conventional ammunition stands out as areas of forward progress. For instance, in 2023, the UN General Assembly added to its international disarmament commitments through the adoption of the GFA, the first dedicated instrument to address safety and security risks across the ammunition lifecycle, with the aim to prevent diversion and illicit trafficking and to mitigate unplanned explosions.
In 2024, States at the Fourth Review Conference on the UN Programme of Action (PoA) and International Tracing Instrument (ITI) adopted by consensus of a forward-looking outcome document. States collectively agreed on ways to further combat illicit SALW, including through the establishment of a new State-led Open-ended Technical Expert Group (OETEG) to address developments in SALW manufacturing, technology and design, on improving gender-responsive SALW control and on enhancing the participation of young people in SALW control processes.
States have opportunities in the next three years to further drive collective commitments and accelerate the implementation of these critical frameworks at all levels and in line with the EU’s strategic directions. The first ever meeting of States under the GFA will take place in 2027, while the UN PoA will hold two biennial meetings of States in 2026 and 2028, including the first convening of the OETEG. The success of all these meetings depends on (i) strong preparatory work, with regional meetings that serve as essential building blocks for negotiated action, and (ii) ensuring inclusive and effective participation from diverse States and organizations.
Recognizing the achievements and impact of previous projects
Through recent EU support, including EU Council decision (CFSP) 2022/1965, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), its regional centres and implementing partners have established multilayer support to States. By leveraging the UN’s unique convening position as well as its role as Secretariat of relevant intergovernmental processes, along with its presence in Africa, Asia and the Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean, UNODA and its implementing partners were able to assist States in strengthening global frameworks while also translating them into technical implementation.
For example, the project facilitated global policy development in the context of the PoA through extensive preparatory work of the Review Conference such as a series of expert seminars and regional preparatory meetings which ensured identification and alignment of national and regional priorities. These advanced conversations led to more effective and smoother negotiations at the Conference, which ultimately produced a consensus outcome document.
At the regional and national levels, the project facilitated regional cooperation including the development of a Central American and Dominican Republic Roadmap to Prevent the Illicit Trafficking and Proliferation of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives, and significantly expanded national capacities on SALW control. It delivered specialized training in combating illicit arms trafficking in El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, and capacity-building to national contact points in Asia and the Pacific resulting in the highest submission of national reports on the Programme of Action in a decade. In Sri Lanka, armoury facilities were constructed to enhance stockpile security, and officers received training on weapons management. In Papua New Guinea, where illicit SALW continued to rise and represent a challenge in throughout the project period, UNODA provided technical risk assessments and the development of a National Action Plan on SALW. In the Gambia and Burundi, the project supported the establishment of SALW National Action Plans, and in Burundi faulty marking machines were repaired while in the Democratic Republic of Congo, targeted assistance on tracing of illicit SALW were delivered. Moreover, the Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC) self-assessment tool (1) was launched to enable national authorities to review and improve SALW systems in areas like marking, tracing, and stockpile management.
Gender mainstreaming in SALW control was also strengthened under the project through regional coordination, seminars, and national training. These efforts resulted in the integration of gender considerations into national action plans, and institutional exchange between gender and SALW practitioners. While global financial support for civil society organizations declined over the project period, the project managed to uphold and expand important community-based engagement through targeted advocacy campaigns, grassroots initiatives, and civil society organizations’ participation in multilateral meetings.
A project designed on proven approaches while addressing emerging trends
The achievements, partnerships and momentum built under the previous project will serve to underpin the next phase as key structural and strategic components will remain. Gender mainstreaming continues to be a core principle, and partnerships with civil society and specialized organizations, such as the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) are maintained. The project also preserves its complementarity with other EU-funded project, with additional focus on synergies for technical implementation with initiatives including those implemented by the UNDP-SEESAC, OAS, LAS, OSCE, GICHD-AMAT, CAR, and SAS, as well as with Arms Trade Treaty-related efforts led by BAFA and Expertise France and with EMPACT.
The new phase of the project also introduces new elements. Most notably by broadening the thematic coverage to include both the GFA and the Pact for the Future. It places increased emphasis on technological developments in the area of SALW, recognizing their evolving impact through both challenges and opportunities for arms control. Additionally, the project strengthens the integration of SALW and ammunition control into broader prevention and peacebuilding efforts, aligning with comprehensive approaches for sustainable peace and development. Finally, the geographical scope of the project is broadened to also cover the Middle East and North Africa, in addition to Africa, Asia and the Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean covered under the previous project.
II. PROJECT OBJECTIVES, OUTCOMES AND ACTIVITIES
The project’s overriding objective is to reduce the prevalence of illicit arms and ammunition and prevent their devastating human cost through strengthening relevant international frameworks. It will accomplish this by strengthening global policy frameworks and translating them into action through supporting multilateral processes, regional cooperation and targeted national support, contributing to combating illicit SALW and ammunition, while helping to prevent armed violence and conflict. The project is designed to build resilience of States and civil society organizations to prevent the illicit trafficking of arms and ammunition due to diversion and to strengthen weapons and ammunition management globally.
This objective will be achieved through downstream and upstream approaches at local, national, sub-regional, regional and global levels, across three pillars to achieve the following sub-objectives: 1. Strengthening forward-looking and action-oriented policy outcomes under the UN GFA, PoA and ITI 2. Support the coordinated and strengthened implementation of the international instruments at the national, subregional and regional level 3. Leverage SALW and ammunition control in broader peace and security efforts frameworks to more effectively prevent armed violence and sustain peace and development.
Cross-cutting expected outcomes include:
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Increased coordination with relevant organizations, including through other projects funded by the EU.
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Strengthened civil society’s engagement at all levels.
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A mainstreamed gender perspective throughout project activities.
Objective 1: Strengthening forward-looking and action-oriented policy outcomes under the UN GFA, PoA and ITI.
1.2 Outcomes
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Member States are well informed of the objectives and measures of the GFA, supporting more prepared participation and submission of voluntary initial overviews ahead of the First Meeting of States on the GFA.
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Member States and relevant stakeholders have strengthened technical knowledge and capacity on the implementation of the PoA and ITI and developments in SALW manufacturing, technology, and design, leading to more informed Biennial Meetings of States and the deliberations of the OETEG. Participation in intergovernmental processes on SALW and ammunition is inclusive and representative of affected States and a broad range of stakeholders.
1.3 Activities
1.3.1 Global Framework on Ammunition: Regional Preparatory meetings for the first Meeting of States
Ahead of the first Meeting of States on the GFA in 2027, a series of regional preparatory meetings are held to provide a platform for States and regional organizations to identify region-specific ammunition management challenges and priorities. Special focus will be given to support preparations for submission of voluntary initial overviews in 2026. A summary report will be made available to the Chair, outlining key discussions points of the meetings for use in deliberations. Each meeting will also serve to enhance knowledge on practical national implementation within regional contexts.
Countries from subregions
Regional centre
Indicative Venue
Caribbean
Latin America
UNLIREC
Virtual (two meetings)
South Asia
Southeast Asia
Central Asia
Northeast Asia
the Pacific
UNRCPD
Kathmandu, Nepal (one meeting)
Middle East
North Africa
UNRCPD and UNREC
Location to be decided (one meeting)
East Africa
Southern Africa
West Africa
Central Africa
UNREC
Locations to be decided (two meetings)
1.3.2 Development of action-oriented recommendations in support of the first Meeting of States on the Global Framework on Ammunition in 2027
A series of virtual expert roundtables are organized, and the findings and recommendations of each roundtable will be translated and published online for States to consider ahead of the Meeting of States. These reports will also be presented and discussed at the regional preparatory meetings and could serve as a contribution to States’ deliberations on themes of future governmental technical experts meetings.
1.3.3 Expert webinars to generate substantive material and build regional capacity on developments in SALW manufacturing, technology and design
The OETEG on developments in SALW technologies, manufacturing and design will convene within the week of the Biennial Meetings of States in 2026 and 2028, tasked with developing agreed recommendations by consensus for consideration by States within the PoA political process by 2030. To respond to the needs of States and the Chair in the intersessional period, regional and global virtual webinars for experts and diplomats will be held to generate knowledge, build capacity and inform the development of recommendations.
1.3.4 Sponsorship for participants of developing or severely affected States to attend key intergovernmental Meetings on SALW and Ammunition
Many developing countries or those severely affected by SALW and ammunition are often unable to attend the New York-based conferences. A sponsorship programme for selected countries will enable more diverse participation, thus enriching the deliberations at the 2027 GFA Meeting of States and other meetings under the UN PoA as needed.
Participants will be identified by UNODA, including its regional centres, based on established criteria to ensure diverse participation The sponsorship will include a capacity-building component to develop knowledge on the substantive content of the discussions as well as developing skills to participate in the political process, and a networking component to bring together participants. Where relevant, the sponsorship considers collaboration with the UN-led fellowships on SALW and Ammunition. The sponsorship will prioritize equal, full, and effective participation of women.
1.3.5 Enhanced civil society participation in global intergovernmental processes
Ahead of the GFA Meeting of States and the Biennial Meeting of States on the PoA including the OETEG, IANSA will produce materials including a guide to coordinate priorities and strategies for civil society engagement. Additionally, a sponsorship programme for civil society, including youth representatives, to attend the meetings will be conducted.
1.4 Outputs
i.
Up to six (6) regional preparatory meetings are organized for the GFA.
ii.
Up to four (4) virtual expert roundtables on ammunition are held ahead of the 2027 Meeting of States on the GFA.
iii.
Up to eight (8) global and regional virtual expert webinars in the intersessional period of the OETEG are held.
iv.
Sponsorship of up to fifteen (15) participants from developing or severely affected States to attend political conferences.
v.
A sponsorship programme and guide for civil society organizations to enhance representation and substantive contribution to the PoA and GFA processes.
Objective 2: Support the coordination and strengthened implementation of the international instruments at the national, subregional and regional level
2.2. Outcomes
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Enhanced implementation of the UN PoA, ITI and GFA through national assistance to States and development of enhanced tools.
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Strengthened regional coordination to reduce illicit SALW and ammunition.
2.3 Activities
2.3.1 Enhancing MOSAIC and strengthening the MOSAIC Assessment Tool
The awareness and utility of the MOSAIC Assessment Tool is enhanced through rollout and multistakeholder training as well as development of additional assessment criteria and new features for the software component. Based on user feedback, the repository of assessment criteria of the MOSAIC Assessment Tool will be expanded to cover additional MOSAIC modules, thereby enabling assessments on other relevant areas of SALW control. These activities will be implemented in collaboration with UNIDIR and Member States.
2.3.2 Support States to strengthen implementation efforts and cooperation of the UN PoA/ITI and the Global Framework on Ammunition
In Asia-Pacific implemented by UNRCPD
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Support to the ASEAN Declaration on Combating Arms Smuggling: To reduce the illicit proliferation of arms and ammunition in ASEAN States, a series of sub-regional seminars, workshops, and work sessions will be held, including thematic meetings, peer-to-peer exchanges and visits to translate the political commitments of the ASEAN Declaration into actionable objectives, targets, and indicators, while also supporting other relevant regional mechanisms. UNRCPD will provide guidance throughout the process, working alongside relevant regional stakeholders, including civil society organizations and regional bodies such as the ASEAN. The initiative will align with the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime and other relevant regional fora to ensure synergy and integration with existing mechanisms. The initiative will involve implementing partners and additional donors to support the process, ensuring coordination and secure sustainable support for the implementation of the ASEAN Declaration. Furthermore, the activities will promote synergies with other key frameworks, such as the ASEAN Regional Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security, aligning regional political commitments with broader peace and security agendas.
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Strengthening role of the National Points of Contacts (NPCs) and coordination mechanisms under the UN PoA and the GFA: Building on UNRCPD’s previous work in establishing regional cooperation mechanisms, such as the PoA NPCs community for Asia-Pacific and the Regional Cooperation Mechanism on Conventional Arms launched in 2023, this initiative aims to expand the PoA NPC community to include government officials working on the GFA.
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Assessments and in-country assistance in up to three countries: Dedicated assistance will be provided at the national level to support regulatory frameworks, the design and management of SALW and ammunition control systems, and operational support as requested. This support could include training, workshops, meetings, data collection, technical assistance and/or research activities, and will ensure that all activities are gender-responsive and inclusive. The initiative will assist up to three beneficiary states, including one Middle East country, in coordination with other relevant actors, and will serve as a catalyst to complement other funding streams, including SALIENT, UNSCAR, and the Arms Trade Treaty Voluntary Trust Fund, to bolster regional capacity and enhance coordination in SALW control and ammunition management.
In Africa implemented by UNREC
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Four in-country assistance activities, including two assessments: Building on the delivery of assessment missions and in-country assistance for the development of National Action plans (NAP) on SALW in Burundi and in The Gambia, UNREC will sustain its support to these two countries in implementing their NAPs. Also, the center will extend support to two additional selected States in strengthening their national SALW control and/or ammunition management capacities. Selected countries may receive assistance using the MOSAIC Assessment Tool and be provided with technical support and targeted capacity-building to strengthen implementation of the global frameworks based on their needs assessment. As part of the offer of assistance, UNREC is expanding beyond SALW control to also cover ammunition management and support for the implementation of the GFA, including support for reporting and submission of initial overviews. The assistance will promote the use of existing assessment tools on ammunition.
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Fostering a continental community of practitioners for SALW and ammunition control: Building on UNREC’s engagement with a wide range of experts on SALW and ammunition on the African continent, the initiative will encompass a series of online sessions for national authorities, technical experts, civil society organizations, academia, continental and regional institutions, and relevant UN entities. Fostering the continental community of practitioners on SALW and ammunition will create a platform of reflections/engagements to i) boost the implementation of international, continental, regional and national instruments on illicit SALW and ammunition management; ii) share lessons learnt and best practices for the effective implementation of arms control initiatives; and iii) formulate key policy and action-oriented recommendations to counter the rapid proliferation of SALW and ammunition. For instance, key thematics including the impact of emerging technologies on SALW and disarmament education involving youth may be discussed.
In Latin America and the Caribbean implemented by UNLIREC
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Support development of an ANDEAN Roadmap: Development of a Roadmap for Andean States (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) with a view to support the operationalization of the Resolution Action Plan of Decision 922 on Security (Plan de Acción Resolutivo de la Decisión 922 en materia de Seguridad), adopted in January 2024 by the Andean Community. The Plan includes, among other priorities, enhanced cooperation to combat arms trafficking. Activities will consist of sub-regional seminars, workshops, and technical working sessions (including drafting and thematic meetings). The development of the roadmap will be carried out in collaboration with the Department of Public Security of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Secretariat of the Andean Community (Communidad Andina, CAN), complementing actions under the EU Council Decision (CFSP) adopted on 16 July 2025. —
Strengthening ammunition marking practices in Latin America and the Caribbean in support of the implementation of the Global Framework on Ammunition. Ammunition marking in Latin America and the Caribbean is strengthened through the development of a regional publication of good practices, updated training materials, and work with national authorities to enhance marking practices including through the delivery of marking courses in selected countries. Technical capabilities of ballistic and forensic laboratories are enhanced through specialized training on weapons marking recovery. Separately, national efforts to combat and interdict illicit trafficking of weapons and ammunition may be supported through targeted capacity-building courses.
2.3.3.
Booklet and targeted assistance to civil society and parliamentarians in up to three (3) countries on effective support to national authorities to implement the UN PoA/ITI and the GFA: Given the highly developed expertise of some national civil society organizations in issues related to the UN PoA, ITI and GFA, a set of assistance to pilot organizations and parliamentarians is conducted in up to three countries. The assistance includes a booklet aiming at supporting the universalization of the GFA under the main angle ‘what can civil society do?’ including how to utilize materials and tools produced by other EU-Council decision projects by UNODA and other partner organizations as well as support national reporting or target-setting. The assistance will be a concrete contribution to Objective 15 of the GFA.
2.4 Outputs
i.
The MOSAIC Assessment Tool is updated with additional user-friendly features and criteria, based on user feedback.
ii.
Training on and utilization of the MOSAIC Assessment Tool by diverse stakeholders (including linked to Activity 2.3.3 as feasible).
iii.
In Asia Pacific:
a.
Action Plan of the ASEAN Declaration on combating arms smuggling in southeast Asia is developed.
b.
Assistance mapping sessions and virtual training workshops for NPCs.
c.
Development of a Toolkit for NPCs.
d.
Assessments and in-country assistance in up to three countries.
iv.
In Africa:
a.
MOSAIC assessments in up to two (2) countries.
b.
Technical in-country assistance in up to four (4) States to implement the UN PoA, ITI and GFA and promote existing tools.
c.
The continental community of practitioners for SALW and ammunition holds quarterly sessions, for a total of 12 online and hybrid events.
v.
In Latin America and the Caribbean:
a.
A Roadmap for Andean States to Prevent the Illicit Trafficking and Proliferation of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives is developed together with the Organization of American States and the Secretariat of the Andean Community and adopted.
b.
One (1) paper on ammunition marking in Latin America and the Caribbean is produced, analyzing regional challenges, effective practices and developing practical recommendations.
c.
UNLIREC’s SALW marking course and related materials are revised and expanded to include additional content on ammunition marking.
d.
Up to four (4) in-person courses/workshops on ammunition or SALW marking and/or on strengthening efforts to combat illicit SALW and ammunition trafficking delivered in Latin America and the Caribbean.
e.
Ballistic and forensic laboratories in the region benefit from capacity-building through a practical course on the recovery of weapons markings.
f.
Capacity-building for ballistic and forensic laboratories through practical course on recovery of weapons marking carried out in at least two (2) countries in Latin America and/or the Caribbean.
vi.
A booklet for civil society and/or parliamentarians, to support governments upon request for implementing the UN PoA, ITI and the GFA through existing tools and piloted in up to three (3) countries.
Objective 3: Leverage SALW and ammunition control in broader peace and security efforts to more effectively prevent armed violence and sustain peace and development.
3.2 Outcomes
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Strengthen collective efforts to prevent armed violence and sustain peace through SALW and ammunition control.
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Contribute to implementation of the Pact for the Future through integration of SALW control and ammunition management in national prevention, peacebuilding and sustainable development efforts.
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Strengthen gender-responsive SALW control efforts.
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Strengthen cooperation with civil society organizations and young people to reduce the demand for illicit SALW and ammunition and implement the PoA, ITI and GFA.
3.3 Activities
3.3.1 Development of a ‘package of support’ for the integration of SALW control and ammunition management into prevention and peacebuilding efforts
A package of support for States to integrate SALW control and ammunition management into national prevention strategies, peacebuilding activities and development plans will be developed. The package will include a range of products such as a mapping of existing prevention and SALW/ammunition initiatives and actors; a guidance note on good practices for strengthening linkages between these areas; development of customizable examples of national targets for States’ use; a new MOSAIC module on preventing armed violence (translated in at least two languages); and a global awareness raising and outreach campaign. These materials, along with other relevant existing resources, will be featured on a dedicated website on SALW control and ammunition management and sustaining peace that can serve as a resource hub for States in their efforts in this regard.
3.3.2 Data collection toolkit on SALW and ammunition
A toolkit for States and relevant organizations is developed to provide good practices and guidance for gender/sex, age and disability disaggregated data indicators and variables related to SALW and ammunition. The toolkit will also provide guidance on ethical data collection and privacy, will provide references to existing work in this area, including that developed under the Arms Trade Treaty, and may be featured on the ‘resource hub’.
3.3.3 Development and launch of African/AU Operational Guidance Note on Gender, SALW and Ammunition
UNREC and the African Union will develop an Operational Guidance Note on Gender, SALW and Ammunition. This will support operationalization of the UNODA-AU cooperation matrix signed in 2023 and will implement key recommendations of the UNREC Gender and Disarmament workshops held in 2025, through which initial consultations on and scoping of the note took place. The note will provide guidance on developing gender-responsive SALW policymaking and programming, supporting women’s full, equal, and effective participation in arms control decision-making and developing of national action plans that integrate gender and youth perspectives and needs. The note will also provide guidance on best practices for data collection, monitoring and evaluation on gender-sensitive SALW programs (linked to Activity 3.3.2).
3.3.4 Support an informal network of youth experts on SALW and ammunition to promote their work to prevent violence and implement relevant global frameworks
This initiative will foster an informal, youth-led network of experts in the field of SALW and ammunition, enabling knowledge-sharing, coordination of actions, and amplification of their papers and voices in UN-supported activities on the UN PoA, ITI and GFA, with a focus on contributions to violence prevention and sustaining peace. Where feasible, youth experts will be invited to participate in the Project’s activities under pillars I and II (ex. Activities 1.3.1, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 2.3.2 and 2.3.3).
3.3.5 Preventing Firearms in Schools Initiative
Awareness and institutional capacity to address the presence of firearms in schools in Latin America and the Caribbean is strengthened through national webinars, dissemination of educational materials, and/or tailored technical support to States, including the development of guidelines for school authorities to prevent and respond to firearm-related incidents.
3.3.6 Civil society small grants programme
A small grants programme for civil society is conducted to support fact-based advocacy initiatives by relevant civil society organizations to constructively engage relevant authorities and the public. Some small grants will be provided in connection with the regional preparatory meetings on ammunition (Activity 1.3.1).
3.3.7 Engagement in broader peace and security and development fora
Expert engagement in other relevant peace and security and development fora will help to promote SALW and conventional ammunition control in achieving peace and security objectives and the sustainable development goals, including Goals 5 (gender equality and empowerment) and Goals 16 (peaceful and inclusive societies). Participation in networks such as the Women, Peace and Security Focal Points Network and The Pathfinders’ Halving Global Violence campaign will enable UNODA to seize on synergies to promote comprehensive approaches to peace and security and identify opportunities to engage a wider community on the importance of SALW and ammunition control to achieve mutual goals.
3.4 Outputs
i.
A resource package on integrating SALW control and ammunition management into prevention and peacebuilding efforts:
a.
A mapping of initiatives and actors addressing SALW/ammunition and prevention and peacebuilding.
b.
Development of a guidance note on good practices for linking SALW control and ammunition management in national prevention efforts, in line with the Pact for the Future and the Secretary-General’s ‘A New Agenda for Peace’.
c.
A list of customizable national targets that can be used in national action plans and strategies addressing SALW, ammunition, WPS, YPS and prevention frameworks.
d.
Development of MOSAIC module 02.10 ‘Small arms and light weapons control in the context of preventing armed violence’ to be translated into at least two languages.
e.
Outreach and communications campaign focused on linking SALW control and ammunition management for more effective prevention and peacebuilding.
f.
Online website (‘resource hub’) for States to access tools and options for support in integrating SALW control and ammunition management into broader prevention, peacebuilding and sustainable development efforts.
ii.
Publication of a toolkit to enhance collection of data related to SALW and ammunition control and disaggregated by gender, age and disability.
iii.
Publication of an African/African Union Operational Guidance Note on Gender, SALW and Ammunition.
iv.
Creation of an informal network of young people with expertise in prevention through SALW and ammunition control.
v.
Preventing Firearms in Schools’ initiative for Latin America and Caribbean States, which may include awareness raising webinars, the delivery of education material, and/or the provision of technical support to a selected country on the planning, conceptualization, drafting and completion of guidelines for school authorities to prevent and respond to the presence and use of firearms in schools.
vi.
A grants programme to empower relevant civil society organizations to strengthen community-level action and youth engagement for SALW control and ammunition management in affected communities.
vii.
Continued engagement in the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) National Focal Point Network, Security Council WPS Informal Experts Group and the UN-Action network against Conflict-related Sexual Violence, as well as the Pathfinder’s Halving Global Violence campaign. 3. OUTREACH AND PARTNERSHIPS
Building on past EU-UNODA cooperation, and through the UN’s global convening power, the project will link key UN entities, governments, regional organizations, civil society, and research institutions.
The project will support the dissemination of information and outputs of the proposed activities to a broad and diverse audience. Furthermore, outreach will be undertaken within all relevant actions through media engagement, side events and web tools.
UNODA and its implementing partners will generate sustained impact through effective awareness-raising, advocacy, outreach, and partnerships. UNODA will make use of a range of communication tools, including a webpage, new outreach campaign, written press releases, Saving Lives Bulletin, select social media tools, side events and informal briefings. The implementation of all actions will be tracked through monitoring and evaluation tools, including participant surveys and regular meetings of the respective working groups.
UNODA will take all appropriate measures to ensure proper visibility of the European Union’s contribution to the action. Such measures will be carried out in accordance with the Commission’s Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Actions.
Coordination with a wide range of partners, including those benefiting from other EU Council Decisions, will be ensured throughout the project implementation. UNODA will promote the use of technical tools for assessing, marking, tracing, physical security and stockpile management, with due regard for those funded or co-funded by the EU.
UNODA will continue to engage to promote the project and its outcomes by participating in relevant networks, forums or groups, and continue to manage the informal Coordination Mechanism on Gender and SALW, which was established under the previous EU-funded project in 2019. 4. BENEFICIARIES
This project will benefit diverse stakeholders related to small arms and light weapons control and ammunition management. This includes regional organizations, national authorities and/or security services and defence forces as well as civil society operating at the national and community-levels in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, and North Africa and the Middle East. Furthermore, this project will also collaborate with national authorities and civil society working on prevention and peacebuilding, strengthening mutual efforts to reduce armed violence. In the project’s dedicated focus on more inclusive approaches to peace and security, women, youth and other marginalized groups will also be beneficiaries. 5. DURATION
The total estimated duration of the project, including all activities under its three pillars, will be 36 months. 6. REPORTING
UNODA will prepare regular reports in line with the negotiated agreement.

(1) The Assessment Tool is a software tool to support assessment based on good practice criteria in area like stockpile management, marking and tracing of SALW and was developed under EU Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1965.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2598 of 15 December 2025 in support of the Hague Code of Conduct and ballistic missile non-proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/2598 16.12.2025
(1) On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
(2) On 17 November 2003, the Council adopted Common Position 2003/805/CFSP(1), calling for the Union to convince as many countries as possible to subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct, especially those with ballistic missile capabilities. That Common Position also called for the further development and implementation of the Code, especially its confidence-building measures, and for the promotion of a closer relationship between the Code and the United Nations multilateral non-proliferation system.
(3) The 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy emphasises that the Union will step up its contribution to collective security.
(4) The 2022 Strategic Compass for Security and Defence refers to the persistent threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and expresses the Union’s objective of reinforcing concrete Union actions in support of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control goals.
(5) The Council has previously adopted five Decisions in support of the Hague Code of Conduct and ballistic missile non-proliferation, namely Decisions 2008/974/CFSP(2), 2012/423/CFSP(3), 2014/913/CFSP(4), (CFSP) 2017/2370(5), and (CFSP) 2023/124(6),
(a) promote universal subscription to the Hague Code of Conduct;
(b) promote the full implementation of the Hague Code of Conduct by subscribing states; and
(c) contribute to better integrating the Hague Code of Conduct into efforts to curb the proliferation of ballistic missiles.
(a) To promote the subscription to the Code in view of its universality, including by promoting dialogue among subscribing and non-subscribing States;
(b) To promote the full implementation of the Code by subscribing States;
(c) To contribute to better inserting the Code in efforts to curb the proliferation of ballistic missiles. This includes reinforcing the Code's visibility and raising public awareness about the risks and threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation, as well as exploring, in particular through studies, dynamics in ballistic missile proliferation, space developments and possibilities of enhancing the Code and of promoting interaction between the Code and other relevant multilateral instruments.
(a) Universalisation, implementation and integration of the Code to non-proliferation framework. The outputs relating to the universalisation, implementation and integration of the Code to non-proliferation framework will consist in various outreach and inreach efforts. Outreach events will aim at increasing awareness about the HCoC, and promote the Union objectives of universality of the Code. Events organised will also improve the implementation of the Code and the involvement of all subscribing States in its work, provide a platform for state officials and experts to exchange informally on strategic issues and thereby help building confidence among States. Specifically, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS) will organise:(i)Four regional and/or sub-regional seminars(possibly in South Asia, Middle East, Central America and the Caribbean and Africa). Such events shall be carried out in close collaboration with the respective host governments and, if appropriate, relevant academia. The events will be conducted as a priority for the benefit of non-Subscribing States. A special emphasis will be given to the participation of subscribing states that are ‘regional champions’, in order to address priorities and perspectives from a regional point of view. Regional experts, representatives from regional organisations, officials of the UNODA regional offices, FRS experts, EU and Member States officials, the Chair and the Immediate Central Contact (ICC) will be associated. The participation of private actors, in particular from space companies, could be considered when relevant. Interactivity will be encouraged during these meetings held over one or one and a half day.(ii)Meetings with officials from selected non-subscribing Statesshowing potential interest in joining the Code. These technical meetings will take place in capitals or in other relevant locations (UN venues – New York, Vienna, and Geneva, regional organisations…). Targeted non-subscribing states will include the states that have been involved in outreach activities for several years and especially those voting in favour of UNGA resolutions in support of the Code. Specific attention will be given to supporting political demarches led by the EU and Member States in order to complement and facilitate these outreach efforts through tailored presentations and debate. In cooperation with the HCoC Chair, the ICC or other EU Member States, outreach meetings will also be organised in the margins of UNGA First Committee (luncheons and bilateral meetings).(iii)Three lunchtime side-eventswill be organised in the margins of the Annual Regular Meeting (ARM) of the HCoC in Vienna, allowing the HCoC community, in particular delegates attending the ARM, to interact with missile experts and discuss current trends regarding proliferation. Specific topics could allow for the participation of agencies based in Vienna and in particular the UNODA and the UNOOSA. In 2027, the side event will be used to mark the 25th anniversary of the HCoC.(iv)Two side-events in the margins of UNGA First Committeeto support UNGA resolutions in New York (in 2026 and 2028). The events’ dates will be chosen to allow the attendance of the delegates attending the First as well as the Fourth Committees. Prior to the presentation of the resolutions to the First Committee, assistance will be provided upon request to the Chair, the ICC or other member states to increase the support of First Committee voting States to the UNGA resolution presented in support of the Code.(v)Assistance in various forms to the ICCin order to increase the implementation of the Code through various engagement towards subscribing States (capacity building in States to submit Annual Declarations and nominate Points of Contact, translations, modification of the online platform, assistance to the Chair and the ICC in preparations and in terms of content for a potential informal intersessional meeting or other formats to discuss the development of the Code, …). (i) Four regional and/or sub-regional seminars(possibly in South Asia, Middle East, Central America and the Caribbean and Africa). Such events shall be carried out in close collaboration with the respective host governments and, if appropriate, relevant academia. The events will be conducted as a priority for the benefit of non-Subscribing States. A special emphasis will be given to the participation of subscribing states that are ‘regional champions’, in order to address priorities and perspectives from a regional point of view. Regional experts, representatives from regional organisations, officials of the UNODA regional offices, FRS experts, EU and Member States officials, the Chair and the Immediate Central Contact (ICC) will be associated. The participation of private actors, in particular from space companies, could be considered when relevant. Interactivity will be encouraged during these meetings held over one or one and a half day. (ii) Meetings with officials from selected non-subscribing Statesshowing potential interest in joining the Code. These technical meetings will take place in capitals or in other relevant locations (UN venues – New York, Vienna, and Geneva, regional organisations…). Targeted non-subscribing states will include the states that have been involved in outreach activities for several years and especially those voting in favour of UNGA resolutions in support of the Code. Specific attention will be given to supporting political demarches led by the EU and Member States in order to complement and facilitate these outreach efforts through tailored presentations and debate. In cooperation with the HCoC Chair, the ICC or other EU Member States, outreach meetings will also be organised in the margins of UNGA First Committee (luncheons and bilateral meetings). (iii) Three lunchtime side-eventswill be organised in the margins of the Annual Regular Meeting (ARM) of the HCoC in Vienna, allowing the HCoC community, in particular delegates attending the ARM, to interact with missile experts and discuss current trends regarding proliferation. Specific topics could allow for the participation of agencies based in Vienna and in particular the UNODA and the UNOOSA. In 2027, the side event will be used to mark the 25th anniversary of the HCoC. (iv) Two side-events in the margins of UNGA First Committeeto support UNGA resolutions in New York (in 2026 and 2028). The events’ dates will be chosen to allow the attendance of the delegates attending the First as well as the Fourth Committees. Prior to the presentation of the resolutions to the First Committee, assistance will be provided upon request to the Chair, the ICC or other member states to increase the support of First Committee voting States to the UNGA resolution presented in support of the Code. (v) Assistance in various forms to the ICCin order to increase the implementation of the Code through various engagement towards subscribing States (capacity building in States to submit Annual Declarations and nominate Points of Contact, translations, modification of the online platform, assistance to the Chair and the ICC in preparations and in terms of content for a potential informal intersessional meeting or other formats to discuss the development of the Code, …).
(i) Four regional and/or sub-regional seminars(possibly in South Asia, Middle East, Central America and the Caribbean and Africa). Such events shall be carried out in close collaboration with the respective host governments and, if appropriate, relevant academia. The events will be conducted as a priority for the benefit of non-Subscribing States. A special emphasis will be given to the participation of subscribing states that are ‘regional champions’, in order to address priorities and perspectives from a regional point of view. Regional experts, representatives from regional organisations, officials of the UNODA regional offices, FRS experts, EU and Member States officials, the Chair and the Immediate Central Contact (ICC) will be associated. The participation of private actors, in particular from space companies, could be considered when relevant. Interactivity will be encouraged during these meetings held over one or one and a half day.
(ii) Meetings with officials from selected non-subscribing Statesshowing potential interest in joining the Code. These technical meetings will take place in capitals or in other relevant locations (UN venues – New York, Vienna, and Geneva, regional organisations…). Targeted non-subscribing states will include the states that have been involved in outreach activities for several years and especially those voting in favour of UNGA resolutions in support of the Code. Specific attention will be given to supporting political demarches led by the EU and Member States in order to complement and facilitate these outreach efforts through tailored presentations and debate. In cooperation with the HCoC Chair, the ICC or other EU Member States, outreach meetings will also be organised in the margins of UNGA First Committee (luncheons and bilateral meetings).
(iii) Three lunchtime side-eventswill be organised in the margins of the Annual Regular Meeting (ARM) of the HCoC in Vienna, allowing the HCoC community, in particular delegates attending the ARM, to interact with missile experts and discuss current trends regarding proliferation. Specific topics could allow for the participation of agencies based in Vienna and in particular the UNODA and the UNOOSA. In 2027, the side event will be used to mark the 25th anniversary of the HCoC.
(iv) Two side-events in the margins of UNGA First Committeeto support UNGA resolutions in New York (in 2026 and 2028). The events’ dates will be chosen to allow the attendance of the delegates attending the First as well as the Fourth Committees. Prior to the presentation of the resolutions to the First Committee, assistance will be provided upon request to the Chair, the ICC or other member states to increase the support of First Committee voting States to the UNGA resolution presented in support of the Code.
(v) Assistance in various forms to the ICCin order to increase the implementation of the Code through various engagement towards subscribing States (capacity building in States to submit Annual Declarations and nominate Points of Contact, translations, modification of the online platform, assistance to the Chair and the ICC in preparations and in terms of content for a potential informal intersessional meeting or other formats to discuss the development of the Code, …).
(i) Four regional and/or sub-regional seminars(possibly in South Asia, Middle East, Central America and the Caribbean and Africa). Such events shall be carried out in close collaboration with the respective host governments and, if appropriate, relevant academia. The events will be conducted as a priority for the benefit of non-Subscribing States. A special emphasis will be given to the participation of subscribing states that are ‘regional champions’, in order to address priorities and perspectives from a regional point of view. Regional experts, representatives from regional organisations, officials of the UNODA regional offices, FRS experts, EU and Member States officials, the Chair and the Immediate Central Contact (ICC) will be associated. The participation of private actors, in particular from space companies, could be considered when relevant. Interactivity will be encouraged during these meetings held over one or one and a half day.
(ii) Meetings with officials from selected non-subscribing Statesshowing potential interest in joining the Code. These technical meetings will take place in capitals or in other relevant locations (UN venues – New York, Vienna, and Geneva, regional organisations…). Targeted non-subscribing states will include the states that have been involved in outreach activities for several years and especially those voting in favour of UNGA resolutions in support of the Code. Specific attention will be given to supporting political demarches led by the EU and Member States in order to complement and facilitate these outreach efforts through tailored presentations and debate. In cooperation with the HCoC Chair, the ICC or other EU Member States, outreach meetings will also be organised in the margins of UNGA First Committee (luncheons and bilateral meetings).
(iii) Three lunchtime side-eventswill be organised in the margins of the Annual Regular Meeting (ARM) of the HCoC in Vienna, allowing the HCoC community, in particular delegates attending the ARM, to interact with missile experts and discuss current trends regarding proliferation. Specific topics could allow for the participation of agencies based in Vienna and in particular the UNODA and the UNOOSA. In 2027, the side event will be used to mark the 25th anniversary of the HCoC.
(iv) Two side-events in the margins of UNGA First Committeeto support UNGA resolutions in New York (in 2026 and 2028). The events’ dates will be chosen to allow the attendance of the delegates attending the First as well as the Fourth Committees. Prior to the presentation of the resolutions to the First Committee, assistance will be provided upon request to the Chair, the ICC or other member states to increase the support of First Committee voting States to the UNGA resolution presented in support of the Code.
(v) Assistance in various forms to the ICCin order to increase the implementation of the Code through various engagement towards subscribing States (capacity building in States to submit Annual Declarations and nominate Points of Contact, translations, modification of the online platform, assistance to the Chair and the ICC in preparations and in terms of content for a potential informal intersessional meeting or other formats to discuss the development of the Code, …).
(b) Awareness raising on the HCoC and missile proliferation. The action will generate outputs contributing to raising awareness on ballistic missile non-proliferation. It will allow the HCoC community to have access to relevant documentation and expertise regarding ballistic missiles, space launchers and associated events and technological developments. It will give a chance to a new generation of professionals to be familiarised with the stakes of ballistic missile proliferation. Finally, it will aim at ensuring that the proliferation of missiles and the HCoC are fully integrated in conversation about arms control, WMD non-proliferation and strategic stability.(i)Engaging the next generation. Two new cohorts of the Ballistic Missile Non Proliferation Youth Group will be selected and accompanied in order to raise awareness about the Code and train young professionals from various regions on these issues. Both will work together for one year, and participate in various online activities and in one in-person event. The selection of the fellows will aim at creating synergies with the UNIDIR Space Security Fellows Programme. Academic institutions and experts will be invited to contribute their knowledge to the group and possibly to host a meeting. A short written deliverable will be expected at the end of both sessions in which the Youth Group will make recommendations on the future of the Code.(ii)Engaging the New Space community. As the importance of the HCoC as an instrument contributing to space regulation has been emphasised in recent years, it is essential to widen the outreach towards the New Space industry and to raise awareness on missile proliferation risks and the role of transparency. Thus, a hybrid capacity-building workshop will be organised during the course of the project. This workshop will:(1)Include in the discussion the topic of proliferation challenges and international non-proliferation norms(2)Discuss the role of CBMs and study how transparency can be envisaged while preserving sensitive information(3)Favour broad participation and the inclusion of more traditional actors to allow sharing of experience and good practices(iii)Updating knowledge on ballistic proliferation. Building on the expertise accumulated over the years on missile proliferation, space and related issues by the FRS team, this heading will aim at updating and refreshing the existing corpus of information published on the issue by the FRS, in order for officials and interested public to access authoritative information, but also to present it in a more didactic manner and create new contents according to needs. In particular, FRS will under this heading:(1)Update the Ballistic Missile & Launcher Database and make sure that representatives from Member States and relevant actors can have access.(2)Work on responsive publication of short analysis (one page) on major developments regarding ballistic missiles and launchers.(3)Update existing short papers and create educational material to emphasise the current trends regarding missile proliferation and space launch trends, through visual infographics.(4)Publish one research paper on a key topic related to missile proliferation and space launches.(iv)Raising awareness on the project. FRS will continue to develop and use communication tools (website, social network …) to promote the project and the EU’s support for the HCoC. This heading will also give the means of presenting the HCoC in other non-proliferation key fora, in regional meetings, and in the margins of the OEWG on PAROS in all its aspects. Participation to the UNIDIR space security conference will also be encouraged. (i) Engaging the next generation. Two new cohorts of the Ballistic Missile Non Proliferation Youth Group will be selected and accompanied in order to raise awareness about the Code and train young professionals from various regions on these issues. Both will work together for one year, and participate in various online activities and in one in-person event. The selection of the fellows will aim at creating synergies with the UNIDIR Space Security Fellows Programme. Academic institutions and experts will be invited to contribute their knowledge to the group and possibly to host a meeting. A short written deliverable will be expected at the end of both sessions in which the Youth Group will make recommendations on the future of the Code. (ii) Engaging the New Space community. As the importance of the HCoC as an instrument contributing to space regulation has been emphasised in recent years, it is essential to widen the outreach towards the New Space industry and to raise awareness on missile proliferation risks and the role of transparency. Thus, a hybrid capacity-building workshop will be organised during the course of the project. This workshop will:(1)Include in the discussion the topic of proliferation challenges and international non-proliferation norms(2)Discuss the role of CBMs and study how transparency can be envisaged while preserving sensitive information(3)Favour broad participation and the inclusion of more traditional actors to allow sharing of experience and good practices (1) Include in the discussion the topic of proliferation challenges and international non-proliferation norms (2) Discuss the role of CBMs and study how transparency can be envisaged while preserving sensitive information (3) Favour broad participation and the inclusion of more traditional actors to allow sharing of experience and good practices (iii) Updating knowledge on ballistic proliferation. Building on the expertise accumulated over the years on missile proliferation, space and related issues by the FRS team, this heading will aim at updating and refreshing the existing corpus of information published on the issue by the FRS, in order for officials and interested public to access authoritative information, but also to present it in a more didactic manner and create new contents according to needs. In particular, FRS will under this heading:(1)Update the Ballistic Missile & Launcher Database and make sure that representatives from Member States and relevant actors can have access.(2)Work on responsive publication of short analysis (one page) on major developments regarding ballistic missiles and launchers.(3)Update existing short papers and create educational material to emphasise the current trends regarding missile proliferation and space launch trends, through visual infographics.(4)Publish one research paper on a key topic related to missile proliferation and space launches. (1) Update the Ballistic Missile & Launcher Database and make sure that representatives from Member States and relevant actors can have access. (2) Work on responsive publication of short analysis (one page) on major developments regarding ballistic missiles and launchers. (3) Update existing short papers and create educational material to emphasise the current trends regarding missile proliferation and space launch trends, through visual infographics. (4) Publish one research paper on a key topic related to missile proliferation and space launches. (iv) Raising awareness on the project. FRS will continue to develop and use communication tools (website, social network …) to promote the project and the EU’s support for the HCoC. This heading will also give the means of presenting the HCoC in other non-proliferation key fora, in regional meetings, and in the margins of the OEWG on PAROS in all its aspects. Participation to the UNIDIR space security conference will also be encouraged.
(i) Engaging the next generation. Two new cohorts of the Ballistic Missile Non Proliferation Youth Group will be selected and accompanied in order to raise awareness about the Code and train young professionals from various regions on these issues. Both will work together for one year, and participate in various online activities and in one in-person event. The selection of the fellows will aim at creating synergies with the UNIDIR Space Security Fellows Programme. Academic institutions and experts will be invited to contribute their knowledge to the group and possibly to host a meeting. A short written deliverable will be expected at the end of both sessions in which the Youth Group will make recommendations on the future of the Code.
(ii) Engaging the New Space community. As the importance of the HCoC as an instrument contributing to space regulation has been emphasised in recent years, it is essential to widen the outreach towards the New Space industry and to raise awareness on missile proliferation risks and the role of transparency. Thus, a hybrid capacity-building workshop will be organised during the course of the project. This workshop will:(1)Include in the discussion the topic of proliferation challenges and international non-proliferation norms(2)Discuss the role of CBMs and study how transparency can be envisaged while preserving sensitive information(3)Favour broad participation and the inclusion of more traditional actors to allow sharing of experience and good practices (1) Include in the discussion the topic of proliferation challenges and international non-proliferation norms (2) Discuss the role of CBMs and study how transparency can be envisaged while preserving sensitive information (3) Favour broad participation and the inclusion of more traditional actors to allow sharing of experience and good practices
(1) Include in the discussion the topic of proliferation challenges and international non-proliferation norms
(2) Discuss the role of CBMs and study how transparency can be envisaged while preserving sensitive information
(3) Favour broad participation and the inclusion of more traditional actors to allow sharing of experience and good practices
(iii) Updating knowledge on ballistic proliferation. Building on the expertise accumulated over the years on missile proliferation, space and related issues by the FRS team, this heading will aim at updating and refreshing the existing corpus of information published on the issue by the FRS, in order for officials and interested public to access authoritative information, but also to present it in a more didactic manner and create new contents according to needs. In particular, FRS will under this heading:(1)Update the Ballistic Missile & Launcher Database and make sure that representatives from Member States and relevant actors can have access.(2)Work on responsive publication of short analysis (one page) on major developments regarding ballistic missiles and launchers.(3)Update existing short papers and create educational material to emphasise the current trends regarding missile proliferation and space launch trends, through visual infographics.(4)Publish one research paper on a key topic related to missile proliferation and space launches. (1) Update the Ballistic Missile & Launcher Database and make sure that representatives from Member States and relevant actors can have access. (2) Work on responsive publication of short analysis (one page) on major developments regarding ballistic missiles and launchers. (3) Update existing short papers and create educational material to emphasise the current trends regarding missile proliferation and space launch trends, through visual infographics. (4) Publish one research paper on a key topic related to missile proliferation and space launches.
(1) Update the Ballistic Missile & Launcher Database and make sure that representatives from Member States and relevant actors can have access.
(2) Work on responsive publication of short analysis (one page) on major developments regarding ballistic missiles and launchers.
(3) Update existing short papers and create educational material to emphasise the current trends regarding missile proliferation and space launch trends, through visual infographics.
(4) Publish one research paper on a key topic related to missile proliferation and space launches.
(iv) Raising awareness on the project. FRS will continue to develop and use communication tools (website, social network …) to promote the project and the EU’s support for the HCoC. This heading will also give the means of presenting the HCoC in other non-proliferation key fora, in regional meetings, and in the margins of the OEWG on PAROS in all its aspects. Participation to the UNIDIR space security conference will also be encouraged.
(i) Engaging the next generation. Two new cohorts of the Ballistic Missile Non Proliferation Youth Group will be selected and accompanied in order to raise awareness about the Code and train young professionals from various regions on these issues. Both will work together for one year, and participate in various online activities and in one in-person event. The selection of the fellows will aim at creating synergies with the UNIDIR Space Security Fellows Programme. Academic institutions and experts will be invited to contribute their knowledge to the group and possibly to host a meeting. A short written deliverable will be expected at the end of both sessions in which the Youth Group will make recommendations on the future of the Code.
(ii) Engaging the New Space community. As the importance of the HCoC as an instrument contributing to space regulation has been emphasised in recent years, it is essential to widen the outreach towards the New Space industry and to raise awareness on missile proliferation risks and the role of transparency. Thus, a hybrid capacity-building workshop will be organised during the course of the project. This workshop will:(1)Include in the discussion the topic of proliferation challenges and international non-proliferation norms(2)Discuss the role of CBMs and study how transparency can be envisaged while preserving sensitive information(3)Favour broad participation and the inclusion of more traditional actors to allow sharing of experience and good practices (1) Include in the discussion the topic of proliferation challenges and international non-proliferation norms (2) Discuss the role of CBMs and study how transparency can be envisaged while preserving sensitive information (3) Favour broad participation and the inclusion of more traditional actors to allow sharing of experience and good practices
(1) Include in the discussion the topic of proliferation challenges and international non-proliferation norms
(2) Discuss the role of CBMs and study how transparency can be envisaged while preserving sensitive information
(3) Favour broad participation and the inclusion of more traditional actors to allow sharing of experience and good practices
(1) Include in the discussion the topic of proliferation challenges and international non-proliferation norms
(2) Discuss the role of CBMs and study how transparency can be envisaged while preserving sensitive information
(3) Favour broad participation and the inclusion of more traditional actors to allow sharing of experience and good practices
(iii) Updating knowledge on ballistic proliferation. Building on the expertise accumulated over the years on missile proliferation, space and related issues by the FRS team, this heading will aim at updating and refreshing the existing corpus of information published on the issue by the FRS, in order for officials and interested public to access authoritative information, but also to present it in a more didactic manner and create new contents according to needs. In particular, FRS will under this heading:(1)Update the Ballistic Missile & Launcher Database and make sure that representatives from Member States and relevant actors can have access.(2)Work on responsive publication of short analysis (one page) on major developments regarding ballistic missiles and launchers.(3)Update existing short papers and create educational material to emphasise the current trends regarding missile proliferation and space launch trends, through visual infographics.(4)Publish one research paper on a key topic related to missile proliferation and space launches. (1) Update the Ballistic Missile & Launcher Database and make sure that representatives from Member States and relevant actors can have access. (2) Work on responsive publication of short analysis (one page) on major developments regarding ballistic missiles and launchers. (3) Update existing short papers and create educational material to emphasise the current trends regarding missile proliferation and space launch trends, through visual infographics. (4) Publish one research paper on a key topic related to missile proliferation and space launches.
(1) Update the Ballistic Missile & Launcher Database and make sure that representatives from Member States and relevant actors can have access.
(2) Work on responsive publication of short analysis (one page) on major developments regarding ballistic missiles and launchers.
(3) Update existing short papers and create educational material to emphasise the current trends regarding missile proliferation and space launch trends, through visual infographics.
(4) Publish one research paper on a key topic related to missile proliferation and space launches.
(1) Update the Ballistic Missile & Launcher Database and make sure that representatives from Member States and relevant actors can have access.
(2) Work on responsive publication of short analysis (one page) on major developments regarding ballistic missiles and launchers.
(3) Update existing short papers and create educational material to emphasise the current trends regarding missile proliferation and space launch trends, through visual infographics.
(4) Publish one research paper on a key topic related to missile proliferation and space launches.
(iv) Raising awareness on the project. FRS will continue to develop and use communication tools (website, social network …) to promote the project and the EU’s support for the HCoC. This heading will also give the means of presenting the HCoC in other non-proliferation key fora, in regional meetings, and in the margins of the OEWG on PAROS in all its aspects. Participation to the UNIDIR space security conference will also be encouraged.
(a) States, both subscribing and non-subscribing States to the Code;
(b) government officials, policymakers, regulators, experts, especially representing a younger generation of experts;
(c) international, regional and sub-regional organisations;
(d) academia and civil society, especially representing a younger generation of experts;
(e) the HCoC Chair;
(f) the HCoC Immediate Central Contact (Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
(g) other Member States willing to promote the HCoC.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
(2) On 17 November 2003, the Council adopted Common Position 2003/805/CFSP(1), calling for the Union to convince as many countries as possible to subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct, especially those with ballistic missile capabilities. That Common Position also called for the further development and implementation of the Code, especially its confidence-building measures, and for the promotion of a closer relationship between the Code and the United Nations multilateral non-proliferation system.
(3) The 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy emphasises that the Union will step up its contribution to collective security.
(4) The 2022 Strategic Compass for Security and Defence refers to the persistent threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and expresses the Union’s objective of reinforcing concrete Union actions in support of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control goals.
(5) The Council has previously adopted five Decisions in support of the Hague Code of Conduct and ballistic missile non-proliferation, namely Decisions 2008/974/CFSP(2), 2012/423/CFSP(3), 2014/913/CFSP(4), (CFSP) 2017/2370(5), and (CFSP) 2023/124(6),
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
1. With a view to the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy and the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, the Union shall further support the universalisation, full implementation and enhancement of the Hague Code of Conduct through an operational action.
2. The objectives of the operational action referred to in paragraph 1 shall be to:
(a)
promote universal subscription to the Hague Code of Conduct;
(b)
promote the full implementation of the Hague Code of Conduct by subscribing states; and
(c)
contribute to better integrating the Hague Code of Conduct into efforts to curb the proliferation of ballistic missiles.
3. A detailed description of the operational action referred to in paragraph 1 is set out in the Annex.
1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.
2. The technical implementation of the operational action referred to in Article 1 shall be carried out by theFondation pour la recherche stratégique(FRS).
3. The FRS shall perform the task referred to in paragraph 2 under the supervision of the High Representative. For that purpose, the High Representative shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the FRS.
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the action referred to in Article 1 shall be EUR 1 099 446,40.
2. The expenditure financed by the reference amount set out in paragraph 1 (the ‘expenditure’) shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the Union’s budget.
3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure. For that purpose, it shall conclude the necessary agreement with the FRS (the ‘agreement’). The agreement shall stipulate that the FRS is to ensure the visibility of the Union’s contribution in a manner appropriate to the size of that contribution.
4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the agreement as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in doing so and of the date of conclusion of the agreement.
1. The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular reports prepared by the FRS. Those reports shall form the basis of an evaluation carried out by the Council.
2. The Commission shall provide information on the financial aspects of the action referred to in Article 1.
1. This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
2. This Decision shall expire 36 months after the date of conclusion of the agreement. However, it shall expire six months after the date of its entry into force if the agreement has not been concluded within that period.

1.   BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE

ANNEXThe Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (the ‘Code’/‘HCoC’) is an international agreement adopted in 2002 to curb the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). The Code also contains confidence-building measures to reduce the risks of miscalculation posed by the flight tests of ballistic missiles and launches of peaceful satellite-launcher vehicles. More than twenty years after its adoption, the Code is more relevant than ever as ballistic technologies continue to be developed in many regions of the world and as tensions between countries that possess these technologies make any transparency and communication mechanism essential to avoid escalation. While the Code currently counts 145 member states, further efforts are needed in view of its full universalisation. The EU contributes to essential outreach efforts to promote the universalisation of the Code as well as its implementation and integration in the wider non-proliferation regime.
2. OVERALL OBJECTIVE
The overall objective of this Action is to contribute to international peace and security, confidence and transparency and to the implementation the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by promoting the universalisation, the full implementation and the enhancement of the Code. This Action will complement and support the Union’s diplomatic engagement with subscribing States and non-subscribing States to the Code.
3. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES
The specific objectives of the action are:

(a) | To promote the subscription to the Code in view of its universality, including by promoting dialogue among subscribing and non-subscribing States;
(b) | To promote the full implementation of the Code by subscribing States;
(c) | To contribute to better inserting the Code in efforts to curb the proliferation of ballistic missiles. This includes reinforcing the Code’s visibility and raising public awareness about the risks and threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation, as well as exploring, in particular through studies, dynamics in ballistic missile proliferation, space developments and possibilities of enhancing the Code and of promoting interaction between the Code and other relevant multilateral instruments.4. EXPECTED OUTPUTS

(a) | Universalisation, implementation and integration of the Code to non-proliferation framework. The outputs relating to the universalisation, implementation and integration of the Code to non-proliferation framework will consist in various outreach and inreach efforts. Outreach events will aim at increasing awareness about the HCoC, and promote the Union objectives of universality of the Code. Events organised will also improve the implementation of the Code and the involvement of all subscribing States in its work, provide a platform for state officials and experts to exchange informally on strategic issues and thereby help building confidence among States. Specifically, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS) will organise:(i)Four regional and/or sub-regional seminars(possibly in South Asia, Middle East, Central America and the Caribbean and Africa). Such events shall be carried out in close collaboration with the respective host governments and, if appropriate, relevant academia. The events will be conducted as a priority for the benefit of non-Subscribing States. A special emphasis will be given to the participation of subscribing states that are ‘regional champions’, in order to address priorities and perspectives from a regional point of view. Regional experts, representatives from regional organisations, officials of the UNODA regional offices, FRS experts, EU and Member States officials, the Chair and the Immediate Central Contact (ICC) will be associated. The participation of private actors, in particular from space companies, could be considered when relevant. Interactivity will be encouraged during these meetings held over one or one and a half day.(ii)Meetings with officials from selected non-subscribing Statesshowing potential interest in joining the Code. These technical meetings will take place in capitals or in other relevant locations (UN venues – New York, Vienna, and Geneva, regional organisations…). Targeted non-subscribing states will include the states that have been involved in outreach activities for several years and especially those voting in favour of UNGA resolutions in support of the Code. Specific attention will be given to supporting political demarches led by the EU and Member States in order to complement and facilitate these outreach efforts through tailored presentations and debate. In cooperation with the HCoC Chair, the ICC or other EU Member States, outreach meetings will also be organised in the margins of UNGA First Committee (luncheons and bilateral meetings).(iii)Three lunchtime side-eventswill be organised in the margins of the Annual Regular Meeting (ARM) of the HCoC in Vienna, allowing the HCoC community, in particular delegates attending the ARM, to interact with missile experts and discuss current trends regarding proliferation. Specific topics could allow for the participation of agencies based in Vienna and in particular the UNODA and the UNOOSA. In 2027, the side event will be used to mark the 25th anniversary of the HCoC.(iv)Two side-events in the margins of UNGA First Committeeto support UNGA resolutions in New York (in 2026 and 2028). The events’ dates will be chosen to allow the attendance of the delegates attending the First as well as the Fourth Committees. Prior to the presentation of the resolutions to the First Committee, assistance will be provided upon request to the Chair, the ICC or other member states to increase the support of First Committee voting States to the UNGA resolution presented in support of the Code.(v)Assistance in various forms to the ICCin order to increase the implementation of the Code through various engagement towards subscribing States (capacity building in States to submit Annual Declarations and nominate Points of Contact, translations, modification of the online platform, assistance to the Chair and the ICC in preparations and in terms of content for a potential informal intersessional meeting or other formats to discuss the development of the Code, …). | (i) | Four regional and/or sub-regional seminars(possibly in South Asia, Middle East, Central America and the Caribbean and Africa). Such events shall be carried out in close collaboration with the respective host governments and, if appropriate, relevant academia. The events will be conducted as a priority for the benefit of non-Subscribing States. A special emphasis will be given to the participation of subscribing states that are ‘regional champions’, in order to address priorities and perspectives from a regional point of view. Regional experts, representatives from regional organisations, officials of the UNODA regional offices, FRS experts, EU and Member States officials, the Chair and the Immediate Central Contact (ICC) will be associated. The participation of private actors, in particular from space companies, could be considered when relevant. Interactivity will be encouraged during these meetings held over one or one and a half day. | (ii) | Meetings with officials from selected non-subscribing Statesshowing potential interest in joining the Code. These technical meetings will take place in capitals or in other relevant locations (UN venues – New York, Vienna, and Geneva, regional organisations…). Targeted non-subscribing states will include the states that have been involved in outreach activities for several years and especially those voting in favour of UNGA resolutions in support of the Code. Specific attention will be given to supporting political demarches led by the EU and Member States in order to complement and facilitate these outreach efforts through tailored presentations and debate. In cooperation with the HCoC Chair, the ICC or other EU Member States, outreach meetings will also be organised in the margins of UNGA First Committee (luncheons and bilateral meetings). | (iii) | Three lunchtime side-eventswill be organised in the margins of the Annual Regular Meeting (ARM) of the HCoC in Vienna, allowing the HCoC community, in particular delegates attending the ARM, to interact with missile experts and discuss current trends regarding proliferation. Specific topics could allow for the participation of agencies based in Vienna and in particular the UNODA and the UNOOSA. In 2027, the side event will be used to mark the 25th anniversary of the HCoC. | (iv) | Two side-events in the margins of UNGA First Committeeto support UNGA resolutions in New York (in 2026 and 2028). The events’ dates will be chosen to allow the attendance of the delegates attending the First as well as the Fourth Committees. Prior to the presentation of the resolutions to the First Committee, assistance will be provided upon request to the Chair, the ICC or other member states to increase the support of First Committee voting States to the UNGA resolution presented in support of the Code. | (v) | Assistance in various forms to the ICCin order to increase the implementation of the Code through various engagement towards subscribing States (capacity building in States to submit Annual Declarations and nominate Points of Contact, translations, modification of the online platform, assistance to the Chair and the ICC in preparations and in terms of content for a potential informal intersessional meeting or other formats to discuss the development of the Code, …).
(i) | Four regional and/or sub-regional seminars(possibly in South Asia, Middle East, Central America and the Caribbean and Africa). Such events shall be carried out in close collaboration with the respective host governments and, if appropriate, relevant academia. The events will be conducted as a priority for the benefit of non-Subscribing States. A special emphasis will be given to the participation of subscribing states that are ‘regional champions’, in order to address priorities and perspectives from a regional point of view. Regional experts, representatives from regional organisations, officials of the UNODA regional offices, FRS experts, EU and Member States officials, the Chair and the Immediate Central Contact (ICC) will be associated. The participation of private actors, in particular from space companies, could be considered when relevant. Interactivity will be encouraged during these meetings held over one or one and a half day.
(ii) | Meetings with officials from selected non-subscribing Statesshowing potential interest in joining the Code. These technical meetings will take place in capitals or in other relevant locations (UN venues – New York, Vienna, and Geneva, regional organisations…). Targeted non-subscribing states will include the states that have been involved in outreach activities for several years and especially those voting in favour of UNGA resolutions in support of the Code. Specific attention will be given to supporting political demarches led by the EU and Member States in order to complement and facilitate these outreach efforts through tailored presentations and debate. In cooperation with the HCoC Chair, the ICC or other EU Member States, outreach meetings will also be organised in the margins of UNGA First Committee (luncheons and bilateral meetings).
(iii) | Three lunchtime side-eventswill be organised in the margins of the Annual Regular Meeting (ARM) of the HCoC in Vienna, allowing the HCoC community, in particular delegates attending the ARM, to interact with missile experts and discuss current trends regarding proliferation. Specific topics could allow for the participation of agencies based in Vienna and in particular the UNODA and the UNOOSA. In 2027, the side event will be used to mark the 25th anniversary of the HCoC.
(iv) | Two side-events in the margins of UNGA First Committeeto support UNGA resolutions in New York (in 2026 and 2028). The events’ dates will be chosen to allow the attendance of the delegates attending the First as well as the Fourth Committees. Prior to the presentation of the resolutions to the First Committee, assistance will be provided upon request to the Chair, the ICC or other member states to increase the support of First Committee voting States to the UNGA resolution presented in support of the Code.
(v) | Assistance in various forms to the ICCin order to increase the implementation of the Code through various engagement towards subscribing States (capacity building in States to submit Annual Declarations and nominate Points of Contact, translations, modification of the online platform, assistance to the Chair and the ICC in preparations and in terms of content for a potential informal intersessional meeting or other formats to discuss the development of the Code, …).
(b) | Awareness raising on the HCoC and missile proliferation. The action will generate outputs contributing to raising awareness on ballistic missile non-proliferation. It will allow the HCoC community to have access to relevant documentation and expertise regarding ballistic missiles, space launchers and associated events and technological developments. It will give a chance to a new generation of professionals to be familiarised with the stakes of ballistic missile proliferation. Finally, it will aim at ensuring that the proliferation of missiles and the HCoC are fully integrated in conversation about arms control, WMD non-proliferation and strategic stability.(i)Engaging the next generation. Two new cohorts of the Ballistic Missile Non Proliferation Youth Group will be selected and accompanied in order to raise awareness about the Code and train young professionals from various regions on these issues. Both will work together for one year, and participate in various online activities and in one in-person event. The selection of the fellows will aim at creating synergies with the UNIDIR Space Security Fellows Programme. Academic institutions and experts will be invited to contribute their knowledge to the group and possibly to host a meeting. A short written deliverable will be expected at the end of both sessions in which the Youth Group will make recommendations on the future of the Code.(ii)Engaging the New Space community. As the importance of the HCoC as an instrument contributing to space regulation has been emphasised in recent years, it is essential to widen the outreach towards the New Space industry and to raise awareness on missile proliferation risks and the role of transparency. Thus, a hybrid capacity-building workshop will be organised during the course of the project. This workshop will:(1)Include in the discussion the topic of proliferation challenges and international non-proliferation norms(2)Discuss the role of CBMs and study how transparency can be envisaged while preserving sensitive information(3)Favour broad participation and the inclusion of more traditional actors to allow sharing of experience and good practices(iii)Updating knowledge on ballistic proliferation. Building on the expertise accumulated over the years on missile proliferation, space and related issues by the FRS team, this heading will aim at updating and refreshing the existing corpus of information published on the issue by the FRS, in order for officials and interested public to access authoritative information, but also to present it in a more didactic manner and create new contents according to needs. In particular, FRS will under this heading:(1)Update the Ballistic Missile & Launcher Database and make sure that representatives from Member States and relevant actors can have access.(2)Work on responsive publication of short analysis (one page) on major developments regarding ballistic missiles and launchers.(3)Update existing short papers and create educational material to emphasise the current trends regarding missile proliferation and space launch trends, through visual infographics.(4)Publish one research paper on a key topic related to missile proliferation and space launches.(iv)Raising awareness on the project. FRS will continue to develop and use communication tools (website, social network …) to promote the project and the EU’s support for the HCoC. This heading will also give the means of presenting the HCoC in other non-proliferation key fora, in regional meetings, and in the margins of the OEWG on PAROS in all its aspects. Participation to the UNIDIR space security conference will also be encouraged. | (i) | Engaging the next generation. Two new cohorts of the Ballistic Missile Non Proliferation Youth Group will be selected and accompanied in order to raise awareness about the Code and train young professionals from various regions on these issues. Both will work together for one year, and participate in various online activities and in one in-person event. The selection of the fellows will aim at creating synergies with the UNIDIR Space Security Fellows Programme. Academic institutions and experts will be invited to contribute their knowledge to the group and possibly to host a meeting. A short written deliverable will be expected at the end of both sessions in which the Youth Group will make recommendations on the future of the Code. | (ii) | Engaging the New Space community. As the importance of the HCoC as an instrument contributing to space regulation has been emphasised in recent years, it is essential to widen the outreach towards the New Space industry and to raise awareness on missile proliferation risks and the role of transparency. Thus, a hybrid capacity-building workshop will be organised during the course of the project. This workshop will:(1)Include in the discussion the topic of proliferation challenges and international non-proliferation norms(2)Discuss the role of CBMs and study how transparency can be envisaged while preserving sensitive information(3)Favour broad participation and the inclusion of more traditional actors to allow sharing of experience and good practices | (1) | Include in the discussion the topic of proliferation challenges and international non-proliferation norms | (2) | Discuss the role of CBMs and study how transparency can be envisaged while preserving sensitive information | (3) | Favour broad participation and the inclusion of more traditional actors to allow sharing of experience and good practices | (iii) | Updating knowledge on ballistic proliferation. Building on the expertise accumulated over the years on missile proliferation, space and related issues by the FRS team, this heading will aim at updating and refreshing the existing corpus of information published on the issue by the FRS, in order for officials and interested public to access authoritative information, but also to present it in a more didactic manner and create new contents according to needs. In particular, FRS will under this heading:(1)Update the Ballistic Missile & Launcher Database and make sure that representatives from Member States and relevant actors can have access.(2)Work on responsive publication of short analysis (one page) on major developments regarding ballistic missiles and launchers.(3)Update existing short papers and create educational material to emphasise the current trends regarding missile proliferation and space launch trends, through visual infographics.(4)Publish one research paper on a key topic related to missile proliferation and space launches. | (1) | Update the Ballistic Missile & Launcher Database and make sure that representatives from Member States and relevant actors can have access. | (2) | Work on responsive publication of short analysis (one page) on major developments regarding ballistic missiles and launchers. | (3) | Update existing short papers and create educational material to emphasise the current trends regarding missile proliferation and space launch trends, through visual infographics. | (4) | Publish one research paper on a key topic related to missile proliferation and space launches. | (iv) | Raising awareness on the project. FRS will continue to develop and use communication tools (website, social network …) to promote the project and the EU’s support for the HCoC. This heading will also give the means of presenting the HCoC in other non-proliferation key fora, in regional meetings, and in the margins of the OEWG on PAROS in all its aspects. Participation to the UNIDIR space security conference will also be encouraged.
(i) | Engaging the next generation. Two new cohorts of the Ballistic Missile Non Proliferation Youth Group will be selected and accompanied in order to raise awareness about the Code and train young professionals from various regions on these issues. Both will work together for one year, and participate in various online activities and in one in-person event. The selection of the fellows will aim at creating synergies with the UNIDIR Space Security Fellows Programme. Academic institutions and experts will be invited to contribute their knowledge to the group and possibly to host a meeting. A short written deliverable will be expected at the end of both sessions in which the Youth Group will make recommendations on the future of the Code.
(ii) | Engaging the New Space community. As the importance of the HCoC as an instrument contributing to space regulation has been emphasised in recent years, it is essential to widen the outreach towards the New Space industry and to raise awareness on missile proliferation risks and the role of transparency. Thus, a hybrid capacity-building workshop will be organised during the course of the project. This workshop will:(1)Include in the discussion the topic of proliferation challenges and international non-proliferation norms(2)Discuss the role of CBMs and study how transparency can be envisaged while preserving sensitive information(3)Favour broad participation and the inclusion of more traditional actors to allow sharing of experience and good practices | (1) | Include in the discussion the topic of proliferation challenges and international non-proliferation norms | (2) | Discuss the role of CBMs and study how transparency can be envisaged while preserving sensitive information | (3) | Favour broad participation and the inclusion of more traditional actors to allow sharing of experience and good practices
(1) | Include in the discussion the topic of proliferation challenges and international non-proliferation norms
(2) | Discuss the role of CBMs and study how transparency can be envisaged while preserving sensitive information
(3) | Favour broad participation and the inclusion of more traditional actors to allow sharing of experience and good practices
(iii) | Updating knowledge on ballistic proliferation. Building on the expertise accumulated over the years on missile proliferation, space and related issues by the FRS team, this heading will aim at updating and refreshing the existing corpus of information published on the issue by the FRS, in order for officials and interested public to access authoritative information, but also to present it in a more didactic manner and create new contents according to needs. In particular, FRS will under this heading:(1)Update the Ballistic Missile & Launcher Database and make sure that representatives from Member States and relevant actors can have access.(2)Work on responsive publication of short analysis (one page) on major developments regarding ballistic missiles and launchers.(3)Update existing short papers and create educational material to emphasise the current trends regarding missile proliferation and space launch trends, through visual infographics.(4)Publish one research paper on a key topic related to missile proliferation and space launches. | (1) | Update the Ballistic Missile & Launcher Database and make sure that representatives from Member States and relevant actors can have access. | (2) | Work on responsive publication of short analysis (one page) on major developments regarding ballistic missiles and launchers. | (3) | Update existing short papers and create educational material to emphasise the current trends regarding missile proliferation and space launch trends, through visual infographics. | (4) | Publish one research paper on a key topic related to missile proliferation and space launches.
(1) | Update the Ballistic Missile & Launcher Database and make sure that representatives from Member States and relevant actors can have access.
(2) | Work on responsive publication of short analysis (one page) on major developments regarding ballistic missiles and launchers.
(3) | Update existing short papers and create educational material to emphasise the current trends regarding missile proliferation and space launch trends, through visual infographics.
(4) | Publish one research paper on a key topic related to missile proliferation and space launches.
(iv) | Raising awareness on the project. FRS will continue to develop and use communication tools (website, social network …) to promote the project and the EU’s support for the HCoC. This heading will also give the means of presenting the HCoC in other non-proliferation key fora, in regional meetings, and in the margins of the OEWG on PAROS in all its aspects. Participation to the UNIDIR space security conference will also be encouraged.5. FINAL BENEFICIARIES

(a) | States, both subscribing and non-subscribing States to the Code;
(b) | government officials, policymakers, regulators, experts, especially representing a younger generation of experts;
(c) | international, regional and sub-regional organisations;
(d) | academia and civil society, especially representing a younger generation of experts;
(e) | the HCoC Chair;
(f) | the HCoC Immediate Central Contact (Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
(g) | other Member States willing to promote the HCoC.6. VENUE
FRS will select, in consultation with the relevant services of the EEAS, potential venues for the meetings, workshops and other events. The criteria used for choosing the venues will include the willingness and commitment of a relevant State or intergovernmental organisation in a particular region to host the event. Specific locations of country visits or country-specific activities will depend on invitations from interested States or intergovernmental organisations. Although the value of face-to-face meetings and events is of paramount importance, virtual meetings will be organised where appropriate to ensure cost efficiency.
7. DURATION
The total estimated duration of the action is 36 months.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/2519 of 15 December 2025 amending Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/740 as regards harmonised standards for olfactory board games, cosmetic kits and gustative games and on migration of certain elements from toys

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/2519 16.12.2025
(1) In accordance with Article 13 of Directive 2009/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(2), toys which are in conformity with harmonised standards or parts thereof, the references of which have been published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union, are to be presumed to be in conformity with the requirements covered by those standards or parts thereof set out in Article 10 of Directive 2009/48/EC and Annex II to that Directive.
(2) Directive 2009/48/EC lays down, in Part III of Annex II thereto, specific requirements in order to ensure that there are no risks of adverse effects on human health due to exposure to the chemical substances or mixtures of which the toys are composed or which they contain. Moreover, Article 10(2) lays down the general safety requirement.
(3) By Implementing Decision C(2022)7410(3), the Commission made a request to the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (Cenelec) for the drafting of new and the revision of existing harmonised standards in support of Directive 2009/48/EC.
(4) On the basis of the request set out in Implementing Decision C(2022)7410, CEN revised harmonised standards EN 71-13:2021+A1:2022 ‘Safety of toys – Part 13: Olfactory board games, cosmetic kits and gustative games’ and EN 71-3:2019+A1:2021 ‘Safety of toys – Part 3:Migration of certain elements’, the references of which are published by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/740(4).This resulted in the adoption of harmonised standards EN 71-13:2021+A2:2024 and EN 71-3:2019+A2:2024.
(5) The Commission, together with CEN, has assessed whether those standards comply with the request set out in Implementing Decision C(2022) 7410.
(6) Harmonized standards EN 71-13:2021+A2:2024 and EN 71-3:2019+A2:2024 satisfy the requirements which they aim to cover and which are set out in Directive 2009/48/EC. It is therefore appropriate to publish the references of those standards in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.
(7) The Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/740 lists the references of harmonised standards drafted in support of Directive 2009/48/EC. To ensure that the references of harmonised standards drafted in support of Directive 2009/48/EC are listed in one act, the references of EN 71-13:2021+A2:2024 and EN 71-3:2019+A2:2024 should be included in Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/740.
(8) Harmonised standard EN 71-13:2021+A2:2024 and EN 71-3:2019+A2:2024 replace harmonised standard EN 71-13:2021+A1:2022 and 71-3:2019+A1:2021 respectively. It is therefore necessary to withdraw the references of those standards from theOfficial Journal of the European Union. In order to allow toy manufacturers sufficient time to adapt their products to the revised specifications in standards EN 71-13:2021+A2:2024 and EN 71-3:2019+A2:2024, it is necessary to defer the withdrawal of the references of harmonised standards EN 71-13:2021+A1:2022 and 71-3:2019+A1:2021.
(9) Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/740 should therefore be amended accordingly.
(10) Compliance with a harmonised standard confers a presumption of conformity with the corresponding essential requirements set out in Union harmonisation legislation from the date of publication of the reference of such standard in theOfficial Journal of the European Union. This Decision should therefore enter into force on the day of its publication,
(1) rows 3 and 9 are deleted;
(2) the following rows are inserted in sequential order:NoReference of the standard‘3a.71-3:2019+A2:2024Safety of toys – Part 3: Migration of certain elements’;‘9a.EN 71-13:2021+A2:2024Safety of toys – Part 13: Olfactory board games, cosmetic kits and gustative games’. No Reference of the standard ‘3a. 71-3:2019+A2:2024Safety of toys – Part 3: Migration of certain elements’; ‘9a. EN 71-13:2021+A2:2024Safety of toys – Part 13: Olfactory board games, cosmetic kits and gustative games’.
No Reference of the standard
‘3a. 71-3:2019+A2:2024Safety of toys – Part 3: Migration of certain elements’;
‘9a. EN 71-13:2021+A2:2024Safety of toys – Part 13: Olfactory board games, cosmetic kits and gustative games’.
No Reference of the standard
‘3a. 71-3:2019+A2:2024Safety of toys – Part 3: Migration of certain elements’;
‘9a. EN 71-13:2021+A2:2024Safety of toys – Part 13: Olfactory board games, cosmetic kits and gustative games’.
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on European standardisation, amending Council Directives 89/686/EEC and 93/15/EEC and Directives 94/9/EC, 94/25/EC, 95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 98/34/EC, 2004/22/EC, 2007/23/EC, 2009/23/EC and 2009/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Decision 87/95/EEC and Decision No 1673/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(1), and in particular Article 10(6) thereof,
(1) In accordance with Article 13 of Directive 2009/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(2), toys which are in conformity with harmonised standards or parts thereof, the references of which have been published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union, are to be presumed to be in conformity with the requirements covered by those standards or parts thereof set out in Article 10 of Directive 2009/48/EC and Annex II to that Directive.
(2) Directive 2009/48/EC lays down, in Part III of Annex II thereto, specific requirements in order to ensure that there are no risks of adverse effects on human health due to exposure to the chemical substances or mixtures of which the toys are composed or which they contain. Moreover, Article 10(2) lays down the general safety requirement.
(3) By Implementing Decision C(2022)7410(3), the Commission made a request to the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (Cenelec) for the drafting of new and the revision of existing harmonised standards in support of Directive 2009/48/EC.
(4) On the basis of the request set out in Implementing Decision C(2022)7410, CEN revised harmonised standards EN 71-13:2021+A1:2022 ‘Safety of toys – Part 13: Olfactory board games, cosmetic kits and gustative games’ and EN 71-3:2019+A1:2021 ‘Safety of toys – Part 3:Migration of certain elements’, the references of which are published by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/740(4).This resulted in the adoption of harmonised standards EN 71-13:2021+A2:2024 and EN 71-3:2019+A2:2024.
(5) The Commission, together with CEN, has assessed whether those standards comply with the request set out in Implementing Decision C(2022) 7410.
(6) Harmonized standards EN 71-13:2021+A2:2024 and EN 71-3:2019+A2:2024 satisfy the requirements which they aim to cover and which are set out in Directive 2009/48/EC. It is therefore appropriate to publish the references of those standards in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.
(7) The Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/740 lists the references of harmonised standards drafted in support of Directive 2009/48/EC. To ensure that the references of harmonised standards drafted in support of Directive 2009/48/EC are listed in one act, the references of EN 71-13:2021+A2:2024 and EN 71-3:2019+A2:2024 should be included in Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/740.
(8) Harmonised standard EN 71-13:2021+A2:2024 and EN 71-3:2019+A2:2024 replace harmonised standard EN 71-13:2021+A1:2022 and 71-3:2019+A1:2021 respectively. It is therefore necessary to withdraw the references of those standards from theOfficial Journal of the European Union. In order to allow toy manufacturers sufficient time to adapt their products to the revised specifications in standards EN 71-13:2021+A2:2024 and EN 71-3:2019+A2:2024, it is necessary to defer the withdrawal of the references of harmonised standards EN 71-13:2021+A1:2022 and 71-3:2019+A1:2021.
(9) Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/740 should therefore be amended accordingly.
(10) Compliance with a harmonised standard confers a presumption of conformity with the corresponding essential requirements set out in Union harmonisation legislation from the date of publication of the reference of such standard in theOfficial Journal of the European Union. This Decision should therefore enter into force on the day of its publication,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
The Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/740 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2
This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.
Point (1) of the Annex shall apply from 16 June 2027.
Point (2) of the Annex shall apply from the day of publication of this Decision in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on European standardisation, amending Council Directives 89/686/EEC and 93/15/EEC and Directives 94/9/EC, 94/25/EC, 95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 98/34/EC, 2004/22/EC, 2007/23/EC, 2009/23/EC and 2009/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Decision 87/95/EEC and Decision No 1673/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(1), and in particular Article 10(6) thereof,
(1) In accordance with Article 13 of Directive 2009/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(2), toys which are in conformity with harmonised standards or parts thereof, the references of which have been published in theOfficial Journal of the European Union, are to be presumed to be in conformity with the requirements covered by those standards or parts thereof set out in Article 10 of Directive 2009/48/EC and Annex II to that Directive.
(2) Directive 2009/48/EC lays down, in Part III of Annex II thereto, specific requirements in order to ensure that there are no risks of adverse effects on human health due to exposure to the chemical substances or mixtures of which the toys are composed or which they contain. Moreover, Article 10(2) lays down the general safety requirement.
(3) By Implementing Decision C(2022)7410(3), the Commission made a request to the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (Cenelec) for the drafting of new and the revision of existing harmonised standards in support of Directive 2009/48/EC.
(4) On the basis of the request set out in Implementing Decision C(2022)7410, CEN revised harmonised standards EN 71-13:2021+A1:2022 ‘Safety of toys – Part 13: Olfactory board games, cosmetic kits and gustative games’ and EN 71-3:2019+A1:2021 ‘Safety of toys – Part 3:Migration of certain elements’, the references of which are published by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/740(4).This resulted in the adoption of harmonised standards EN 71-13:2021+A2:2024 and EN 71-3:2019+A2:2024.
(5) The Commission, together with CEN, has assessed whether those standards comply with the request set out in Implementing Decision C(2022) 7410.
(6) Harmonized standards EN 71-13:2021+A2:2024 and EN 71-3:2019+A2:2024 satisfy the requirements which they aim to cover and which are set out in Directive 2009/48/EC. It is therefore appropriate to publish the references of those standards in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.
(7) The Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/740 lists the references of harmonised standards drafted in support of Directive 2009/48/EC. To ensure that the references of harmonised standards drafted in support of Directive 2009/48/EC are listed in one act, the references of EN 71-13:2021+A2:2024 and EN 71-3:2019+A2:2024 should be included in Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/740.
(8) Harmonised standard EN 71-13:2021+A2:2024 and EN 71-3:2019+A2:2024 replace harmonised standard EN 71-13:2021+A1:2022 and 71-3:2019+A1:2021 respectively. It is therefore necessary to withdraw the references of those standards from theOfficial Journal of the European Union. In order to allow toy manufacturers sufficient time to adapt their products to the revised specifications in standards EN 71-13:2021+A2:2024 and EN 71-3:2019+A2:2024, it is necessary to defer the withdrawal of the references of harmonised standards EN 71-13:2021+A1:2022 and 71-3:2019+A1:2021.
(9) Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/740 should therefore be amended accordingly.
(10) Compliance with a harmonised standard confers a presumption of conformity with the corresponding essential requirements set out in Union harmonisation legislation from the date of publication of the reference of such standard in theOfficial Journal of the European Union. This Decision should therefore enter into force on the day of its publication,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/740 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.
Point (1) of the Annex shall apply from 16 June 2027.
Point (2) of the Annex shall apply from the day of publication of this Decision in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.
ANNEXThe Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/740 is amended as follows:

(1) | rows 3 and 9 are deleted;
(2) | the following rows are inserted in sequential order:NoReference of the standard‘3a.71-3:2019+A2:2024Safety of toys – Part 3: Migration of certain elements’;‘9a.EN 71-13:2021+A2:2024Safety of toys – Part 13: Olfactory board games, cosmetic kits and gustative games’. | No | Reference of the standard | ‘3a. | 71-3:2019+A2:2024Safety of toys – Part 3: Migration of certain elements’; | ‘9a. | EN 71-13:2021+A2:2024Safety of toys – Part 13: Olfactory board games, cosmetic kits and gustative games’.
No | Reference of the standard
‘3a. | 71-3:2019+A2:2024Safety of toys – Part 3: Migration of certain elements’;
‘9a. | EN 71-13:2021+A2:2024Safety of toys – Part 13: Olfactory board games, cosmetic kits and gustative games’.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2585 of 15 December 2025 amending Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/2585 16.12.2025
(1) On 15 October 2012, the Council adopted Decision 2012/642/CFSP(1).
(2) On 15 December 2020, the Council adopted conclusions calling for further enhanced responses at Union level to counter hybrid threats, including disinformation, and to strengthen resilience. The Council noted that new technologies and crises offer opportunities for hostile actors to expand their interference activities. Those activities pose additional challenges for Member States and Union institutions.
(3) Following the adoption of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence in March 2022, the Union established the EU hybrid toolbox. That toolbox comprises the preventive, cooperative, stability-building, restrictive and support measures referred to in the 21 June 2022 Council conclusions on a Framework for a coordinated EU response to hybrid campaigns.
(4) In its conclusions of 21 June 2022, as well as those of 18 July 2022, the Council reiterated the call for the High Representative and the Commission to present options, fully respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, for well-defined measures that could be taken against actors engaged in Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (‘FIMI’) where necessary to protect public order and security in the Union. That call came against the backdrop of the 2018 Action Plan Against Disinformation, and the Rapid Alert System which was set up in 2019 to facilitate the exchange of information and best practices among Union institutions and Member States on countering disinformation.
(5) In February 2023, the European External Action Service published a report on FIMI threats, in which it defined FIMI as a mostly non-illegal pattern of behaviour that threatens or has the potential to negatively impact values, procedures and political processes. Such activity is manipulative in character and conducted in an intentional and coordinated manner by state or non-state actors, including their proxies inside and outside of their own territory. That report was followed up by the development of the FIMI toolbox, which was endorsed by the Council in December 2023 which provides a shared framework for responses, alongside the European External Action Service methodology for detecting and responding to FIMI campaigns.
(6) In its conclusions of 19 February 2024, the Council strongly condemned hybrid attacks at the Union’s external borders, including the instrumentalisation of migrants by the Belarusian regime, in which Russia was complicit, for political purposes.
(7) On 11 December 2024, the Commission adopted a communication to support the Member States in countering hybrid threats from the weaponisation by Russia and Belarus of migration and in strengthening security at the EU’s external borders.
(8) In its conclusions of 21 May 2024, the Council acknowledged that state and non-state actors are increasingly using hybrid tactics, posing a growing threat to the security of the Union, its Member States and its partners and called on Union institutions and the Member States to step up action to monitor attempts by foreign actors to interfere in the Union’s democratic process.
(9) In its conclusions of 23 October 2025, the European Council pointed to Russia’s and Belarus’ intensified hybrid attacks and the recent violations of the Union’s airspace.
(10) On 29 October 2025, the High Representative issued a statement on behalf of the European Union condemning Belarus’ persistent, provocative and unacceptable actions against the Union and the Member States. Meteorological balloon incursions into Lithuania’s airspace from Belarus, which have disrupted hundreds of flights and inflicted substantial losses on Lithuanian airports and thousands of travellers, are an attempt to intimidate Union citizens by posing direct threats to civilian aviation and risk destabilising a Member State of the Union. Those balloons are not merely smuggling tools, rather their incursions occur in the context of a broader targeted hybrid campaign, along with other actions, including state-sponsored migrant smuggling.
(11) The Council therefore considers it necessary to introduce in Decision 2012/642/CFSP an additional criterion for the listing of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Republic of Belarus which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, including in cases where it results in the disruption of the functioning of critical infrastructure, where it is reasonable to believe the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies were at least aware of the potential effects.
(12) Decision 2012/642/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,
(1) Article 3(1) is amended as follows:(a)the following points are inserted:‘(ca)are responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Republic of Belarus which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure;(cb)are natural persons supporting the persons engaged in activities referred to in point (ca);’;(b)point (f) is replaced by the following:‘(f)are natural persons associated with persons referred to in points (b), (c), (ca), (d) or (e).’. (a) the following points are inserted:‘(ca)are responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Republic of Belarus which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure;(cb)are natural persons supporting the persons engaged in activities referred to in point (ca);’; ‘(ca) are responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Republic of Belarus which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure; (i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference; (ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure; (iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure; (cb) are natural persons supporting the persons engaged in activities referred to in point (ca);’ (b) point (f) is replaced by the following:‘(f)are natural persons associated with persons referred to in points (b), (c), (ca), (d) or (e).’. ‘(f) are natural persons associated with persons referred to in points (b), (c), (ca), (d) or (e).’.
(a) the following points are inserted:‘(ca)are responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Republic of Belarus which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure;(cb)are natural persons supporting the persons engaged in activities referred to in point (ca);’; ‘(ca) are responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Republic of Belarus which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure; (i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference; (ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure; (iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure; (cb) are natural persons supporting the persons engaged in activities referred to in point (ca);’
‘(ca) are responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Republic of Belarus which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure; (i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference; (ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure; (iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure;
(i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;
(ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;
(iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure;
(cb) are natural persons supporting the persons engaged in activities referred to in point (ca);’
(b) point (f) is replaced by the following:‘(f)are natural persons associated with persons referred to in points (b), (c), (ca), (d) or (e).’. ‘(f) are natural persons associated with persons referred to in points (b), (c), (ca), (d) or (e).’.
‘(f) are natural persons associated with persons referred to in points (b), (c), (ca), (d) or (e).’.
(a) the following points are inserted:‘(ca)are responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Republic of Belarus which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure;(cb)are natural persons supporting the persons engaged in activities referred to in point (ca);’; ‘(ca) are responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Republic of Belarus which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure; (i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference; (ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure; (iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure; (cb) are natural persons supporting the persons engaged in activities referred to in point (ca);’
‘(ca) are responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Republic of Belarus which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure; (i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference; (ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure; (iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure;
(i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;
(ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;
(iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure;
(cb) are natural persons supporting the persons engaged in activities referred to in point (ca);’
‘(ca) are responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Republic of Belarus which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure; (i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference; (ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure; (iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure;
(i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;
(ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;
(iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure;
(i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;
(ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;
(iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure;
(cb) are natural persons supporting the persons engaged in activities referred to in point (ca);’
(b) point (f) is replaced by the following:‘(f)are natural persons associated with persons referred to in points (b), (c), (ca), (d) or (e).’. ‘(f) are natural persons associated with persons referred to in points (b), (c), (ca), (d) or (e).’.
‘(f) are natural persons associated with persons referred to in points (b), (c), (ca), (d) or (e).’.
‘(f) are natural persons associated with persons referred to in points (b), (c), (ca), (d) or (e).’.
(2) Article 4(1) is amended as follows:(a)the following points are inserted:‘(ca)natural or legal persons, entities or bodies responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Republic of Belarus which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure;(cb)natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting the persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in point (ca);’;(b)point (f) is replaced by the following:‘(f)natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (b), (c), (ca), (d) or (da).’. (a) the following points are inserted:‘(ca)natural or legal persons, entities or bodies responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Republic of Belarus which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure;(cb)natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting the persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in point (ca);’; ‘(ca) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Republic of Belarus which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure; (i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference; (ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure; (iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure; (cb) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting the persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in point (ca);’ (b) point (f) is replaced by the following:‘(f)natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (b), (c), (ca), (d) or (da).’. ‘(f) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (b), (c), (ca), (d) or (da).’.
(a) the following points are inserted:‘(ca)natural or legal persons, entities or bodies responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Republic of Belarus which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure;(cb)natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting the persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in point (ca);’; ‘(ca) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Republic of Belarus which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure; (i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference; (ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure; (iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure; (cb) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting the persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in point (ca);’
‘(ca) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Republic of Belarus which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure; (i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference; (ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure; (iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure;
(i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;
(ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;
(iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure;
(cb) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting the persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in point (ca);’
(b) point (f) is replaced by the following:‘(f)natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (b), (c), (ca), (d) or (da).’. ‘(f) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (b), (c), (ca), (d) or (da).’.
‘(f) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (b), (c), (ca), (d) or (da).’.
(a) the following points are inserted:‘(ca)natural or legal persons, entities or bodies responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Republic of Belarus which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure;(cb)natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting the persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in point (ca);’; ‘(ca) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Republic of Belarus which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure; (i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference; (ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure; (iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure; (cb) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting the persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in point (ca);’
‘(ca) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Republic of Belarus which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure; (i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference; (ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure; (iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure;
(i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;
(ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;
(iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure;
(cb) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting the persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in point (ca);’
‘(ca) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Republic of Belarus which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:(i)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;(ii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;(iii)planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure; (i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference; (ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure; (iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure;
(i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;
(ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;
(iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure;
(i) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;
(ii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;
(iii) planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure;
(cb) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting the persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in point (ca);’
(b) point (f) is replaced by the following:‘(f)natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (b), (c), (ca), (d) or (da).’. ‘(f) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (b), (c), (ca), (d) or (da).’.
‘(f) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (b), (c), (ca), (d) or (da).’.
‘(f) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (b), (c), (ca), (d) or (da).’.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
(1) On 15 October 2012, the Council adopted Decision 2012/642/CFSP(1).
(2) On 15 December 2020, the Council adopted conclusions calling for further enhanced responses at Union level to counter hybrid threats, including disinformation, and to strengthen resilience. The Council noted that new technologies and crises offer opportunities for hostile actors to expand their interference activities. Those activities pose additional challenges for Member States and Union institutions.
(3) Following the adoption of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence in March 2022, the Union established the EU hybrid toolbox. That toolbox comprises the preventive, cooperative, stability-building, restrictive and support measures referred to in the 21 June 2022 Council conclusions on a Framework for a coordinated EU response to hybrid campaigns.
(4) In its conclusions of 21 June 2022, as well as those of 18 July 2022, the Council reiterated the call for the High Representative and the Commission to present options, fully respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, for well-defined measures that could be taken against actors engaged in Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (‘FIMI’) where necessary to protect public order and security in the Union. That call came against the backdrop of the 2018 Action Plan Against Disinformation, and the Rapid Alert System which was set up in 2019 to facilitate the exchange of information and best practices among Union institutions and Member States on countering disinformation.
(5) In February 2023, the European External Action Service published a report on FIMI threats, in which it defined FIMI as a mostly non-illegal pattern of behaviour that threatens or has the potential to negatively impact values, procedures and political processes. Such activity is manipulative in character and conducted in an intentional and coordinated manner by state or non-state actors, including their proxies inside and outside of their own territory. That report was followed up by the development of the FIMI toolbox, which was endorsed by the Council in December 2023 which provides a shared framework for responses, alongside the European External Action Service methodology for detecting and responding to FIMI campaigns.
(6) In its conclusions of 19 February 2024, the Council strongly condemned hybrid attacks at the Union’s external borders, including the instrumentalisation of migrants by the Belarusian regime, in which Russia was complicit, for political purposes.
(7) On 11 December 2024, the Commission adopted a communication to support the Member States in countering hybrid threats from the weaponisation by Russia and Belarus of migration and in strengthening security at the EU’s external borders.
(8) In its conclusions of 21 May 2024, the Council acknowledged that state and non-state actors are increasingly using hybrid tactics, posing a growing threat to the security of the Union, its Member States and its partners and called on Union institutions and the Member States to step up action to monitor attempts by foreign actors to interfere in the Union’s democratic process.
(9) In its conclusions of 23 October 2025, the European Council pointed to Russia’s and Belarus’ intensified hybrid attacks and the recent violations of the Union’s airspace.
(10) On 29 October 2025, the High Representative issued a statement on behalf of the European Union condemning Belarus’ persistent, provocative and unacceptable actions against the Union and the Member States. Meteorological balloon incursions into Lithuania’s airspace from Belarus, which have disrupted hundreds of flights and inflicted substantial losses on Lithuanian airports and thousands of travellers, are an attempt to intimidate Union citizens by posing direct threats to civilian aviation and risk destabilising a Member State of the Union. Those balloons are not merely smuggling tools, rather their incursions occur in the context of a broader targeted hybrid campaign, along with other actions, including state-sponsored migrant smuggling.
(11) The Council therefore considers it necessary to introduce in Decision 2012/642/CFSP an additional criterion for the listing of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Republic of Belarus which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, including in cases where it results in the disruption of the functioning of critical infrastructure, where it is reasonable to believe the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies were at least aware of the potential effects.
(12) Decision 2012/642/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Decision 2012/642/CFSP is amended as follows:
(1)
Article 3(1) is amended as follows:
(a)
the following points are inserted:
‘(ca)
are responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Republic of Belarus which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:
(i)
planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;
(ii)
planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;
(iii)
planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure;
(cb)
are natural persons supporting the persons engaged in activities referred to in point (ca);’
;
(b)
point (f) is replaced by the following:
‘(f)
are natural persons associated with persons referred to in points (b), (c), (ca), (d) or (e).’.
(2)
Article 4(1) is amended as follows:
(a)
the following points are inserted:
‘(ca)
natural or legal persons, entities or bodies responsible for, implementing, supporting, benefitting from, involved in or facilitating actions or policies attributable to the Republic of Belarus which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, through the following actions:
(i)
planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference;
(ii)
planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating any actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest, including by unauthorised entry into the territory of a Member State, including its airspace, or aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure;
(iii)
planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting, or otherwise facilitating or enabling widespread or systematic actions disrupting the functioning of critical infrastructure;
(cb)
natural or legal persons, entities or bodies supporting the persons, entities or bodies engaged in activities referred to in point (ca);’
;
(b)
point (f) is replaced by the following:
‘(f)
natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with the persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (b), (c), (ca), (d) or (da).’.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.

Council Decision (EU) 2025/1884 of 15 December 2025 on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union in the EPA Council, in the Committee of Senior Officials and in the EPA Consultative Committee, established by the Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and the Republic of Kenya, Member of the East African Community, of the other part, as regards the Recommendation of the Committee of Senior Officials to the EPA Council on participation in the EPA Consultative Committee, the Decision of the EPA Council on participation in the EPA Consultative Committee, the Decision of the Committee of Senior Officials on its agreement with the EPA Consultative Committee’s adoption of its Rules of Procedure and the Decision of the EPA Consultative Committee on the adoption of its Rules of Procedure

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/1884 18.12.2025
(1) The Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the European Union, of the one part, and the Republic of Kenya, Member of the East African Community, of the other part(1)(the ‘Agreement’), entered into force on 1 July 2024.
(2) Pursuant to Articles 104, 106 and 108 of the Agreement, the EPA Council, the Committee of Senior Officials and the EPA Consultative Committee (the ‘three institutions’) were, respectively, established.
(3) Pursuant to Article 108(2) of the Agreement, the EPA Council is to determine the participation in the EPA Consultative Committee, upon recommendations from the Committee of Senior Officials.
(4) Pursuant to Article 108(4) of the Agreement, the EPA Consultative Committee is to adopt its Rules of Procedure, in agreement with the Committee of Senior Officials.
(5) It is appropriate to establish the position to be taken on the Union’s behalf within the three institutions, as the Recommendation of the Committee of Senior Officials to the EPA Council on participation in the EPA Consultative Committee, the Decision of the EPA Council on participation in the EPA Consultative Committee, the Decision of the Committee of Senior Officials on its agreement with the EPA Consultative Committee’s adoption of its Rules of Procedure and the Decision of the EPA Consultative Committee on the adoption of its Rules of Procedure will have legal effects in the Union.
(6) The position of the Union within the three institutions as regards the Recommendation of the Committee of Senior Officials to the EPA Council on participation in the EPA Consultative Committee, the Decision of the EPA Council on participation in the EPA Consultative Committee, the Decision of the Committee of Senior Officials on its agreement with the EPA Consultative Committee’s adoption of its Rules of Procedure and the Decision of the EPA Consultative Committee on the adoption of its Rules of Procedure should be based on the respective draft Recommendation and draft Decisions of the three institutions attached to this Decision,
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 207(4), first subparagraph, in conjunction with Article 218(9) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
(1) The Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the European Union, of the one part, and the Republic of Kenya, Member of the East African Community, of the other part(1)(the ‘Agreement’), entered into force on 1 July 2024.
(2) Pursuant to Articles 104, 106 and 108 of the Agreement, the EPA Council, the Committee of Senior Officials and the EPA Consultative Committee (the ‘three institutions’) were, respectively, established.
(3) Pursuant to Article 108(2) of the Agreement, the EPA Council is to determine the participation in the EPA Consultative Committee, upon recommendations from the Committee of Senior Officials.
(4) Pursuant to Article 108(4) of the Agreement, the EPA Consultative Committee is to adopt its Rules of Procedure, in agreement with the Committee of Senior Officials.
(5) It is appropriate to establish the position to be taken on the Union’s behalf within the three institutions, as the Recommendation of the Committee of Senior Officials to the EPA Council on participation in the EPA Consultative Committee, the Decision of the EPA Council on participation in the EPA Consultative Committee, the Decision of the Committee of Senior Officials on its agreement with the EPA Consultative Committee’s adoption of its Rules of Procedure and the Decision of the EPA Consultative Committee on the adoption of its Rules of Procedure will have legal effects in the Union.
(6) The position of the Union within the three institutions as regards the Recommendation of the Committee of Senior Officials to the EPA Council on participation in the EPA Consultative Committee, the Decision of the EPA Council on participation in the EPA Consultative Committee, the Decision of the Committee of Senior Officials on its agreement with the EPA Consultative Committee’s adoption of its Rules of Procedure and the Decision of the EPA Consultative Committee on the adoption of its Rules of Procedure should be based on the respective draft Recommendation and draft Decisions of the three institutions attached to this Decision,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The position to be taken on the Union’s behalf within the Committee of Senior Officials, established under Article 106 of the Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and the Republic of Kenya, Member of the East African Community, of the other part (the ‘Agreement’), regarding the Recommendation to the EPA Council on participation in the EPA Consultative Committee shall be based on the draft Recommendation of the Committee of Senior Officials attached to this Decision (Annex I).
The position to be taken on the Union’s behalf within the EPA Council, established under Article 104 of the Agreement, regarding the Decision on participation in the EPA Consultative Committee shall be based on the draft Decision of the EPA Council attached to this Decision (Annex II).
The position to be taken on the Union’s behalf within the Committee of Senior Officials, established under Article 106 of the Agreement, regarding the Decision on its agreement with the EPA Consultative Committee’s adoption of its Rules of Procedure shall be based on the draft Decision of the Committee of Senior Officials attached to this Decision (Annex III).
The position to be taken on the Union’s behalf within the EPA Consultative Committee, established under Article 108 of the Agreement, regarding the Decision on the adoption of its Rules of Procedure shall be based on the draft Decision of the EPA Consultative Committee attached to this Decision (Annex IV).
This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

Council Decision (EU) 2025/2624 of 15 December 2025 amending Decision (EU) 2023/746 as regards the extension of the period of its application and as regards its Annex

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/2624 19.12.2025
(1) The Convention on International Civil Aviation, which was signed in Chicago on 7 December 1944, (the ‘Chicago Convention’) and which regulates international air transport, entered into force on 4 April 1947. It established the International Civil Aviation Organization (‘ICAO’).
(2) The Member States are Contracting Parties to the Chicago Convention and ICAO Contracting States, while the Union has observer status in certain ICAO bodies. Six Member States are currently represented in the Council of the ICAO (the ‘ICAO Council’).
(3) Pursuant to Article 37 of the Chicago Convention, ICAO is to adopt and amend international standards and recommended practices and procedures dealing, for instance, with communication systems and air navigation aids, rules of the air and air traffic control practices and such other matters concerned with the safety, regularity, and efficiency of air navigation as may from time to time appear appropriate.
(4) Pursuant to Article 38 of the Chicago Convention, any ICAO Contracting State which finds it impracticable to comply in all respects with any international standard or to bring its own regulations or practices into full accord with any international standard after amendment of the latter, or which deems it necessary to adopt regulations or practices differing in any particular respect from those established by an international standard, is to give immediate notification to ICAO of the differences between its own regulations or practices and those established by the international standard. In the case of amendments to international standards, any State which does not make the appropriate amendments to its own regulations or practices is to give notice to the ICAO Council within sixty days of the adoption of the amendment to the international standard or indicate the action which it proposes to take.
(5) Pursuant to Article 54(l) of the Chicago Convention, the ICAO Council is to adopt international Standards and Recommended Practices (‘SARPs’), and designate them as Annexes to the Chicago Convention (‘ICAO Annexes’).
(6) Pursuant to Article 90 of the Chicago Convention, any ICAO Annex or any amendment to an ICAO Annex becomes effective within three months after its submission to the ICAO Contracting States, or at the end of such longer period of time as the ICAO Council prescribes, unless in the meantime a majority of ICAO Contracting States register their disapproval. Once they have been adopted by the ICAO Council and have become effective, international standards are binding on all ICAO Contracting States, including all Member States of the Union, in accordance with and within the limits set out in the Chicago Convention, in particular in Articles 37 and 38 thereof.
(7) The internal rules of the ICAO, in particular those which cause the latest versions of documents for decisions regarding new SARPs or amendments to SARPs to be available to the ICAO Council only late, the deadlines set by the ICAO for ICAO Contracting States to notify differences with respect to international standards, as well as the sheer number of differences in the areas of civil aviation safety, air navigation and air traffic management to be notified each year, make it difficult to establish the position to be taken on the Union’s behalf in a Council Decision based on Article 218(9) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in a timely manner for new SARPs or amendments to SARPs to be adopted, or for each difference to be notified.
(8) It is therefore appropriate to establish the criteria and procedure to be followed for establishing the position to be taken on the Union’s behalf regarding the adoption of SARPs or amendments to SARPs, insofar as those SARPs are capable of decisively influencing the content of Union law in the area of civil aviation, as well as regarding decisions to disapprove or not to disapprove SARPs pursuant to Article 90 of the Chicago Convention and regarding the notification of differences with respect to international standards pursuant to Article 38 of the Chicago Convention.
(9) Given the specificity of civil aviation safety, air navigation and air traffic management compared to other areas dealt with by the ICAO, in particular the high number of SARPs adopted in those areas by the ICAO Council every year and the number of differences to be notified every year, this Decision should relate solely to civil aviation safety, air navigation and air traffic management in order to streamline processes to swiftly establish the position to be taken on the Union’s behalf for the adoption of new SARPs and amendments to SARPs, the decisions to disapprove or not to disapprove SARPs or amendments to SARPs adopted by the ICAO Council and deal with the numerous notifications in an efficient way.
(10) The SARPs adopted by the ICAO Council in the field of civil aviation safety, air navigation and air traffic management can concern matters of Union exclusive competence and might be capable of decisively influencing the content of Union law. It is therefore efficient and appropriate, by means of a decision, to establish the criteria and procedure to be followed for establishing the position to be taken on the Union’s behalf with respect to SARPs in those fields, without prejudice to the rights and obligations of Member States as ICAO Contracting States under the Chicago Convention. At ICAO level, civil aviation safety, air navigation and air traffic management SARPs are mainly contained in ICAO Annexes 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 18 and 19.
(11) At Union level, the requirements contained in SARPs for civil aviation safety are mainly reflected and referred to in Regulations (EU) 2018/1139(1)and (EC) No 2111/2005(2)of the European Parliament and of the Council and in the implementing and delegated acts adopted on the basis thereof, in particular Commission Regulations (EU) No 1178/2011(3), (EU) No 748/2012(4), (EU) No 965/2012(5), (EU) No 139/2014(6), (EU) No 452/2014(7), (EU) No 1321/2014(8)and (EU) 2015/640(9), Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947(10), Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945(11), and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/664(12).
(12) At Union level, the requirements contained in SARPs for air navigation and air traffic management are mainly reflected and referred to in Regulations (EC) No 549/2004(13), (EC) No 550/2004(14)and (EU) 2024/2803(15)of the European Parliament and of the Council and in the implementing and delegated acts adopted on the basis thereof, in particular Commission Regulation (EU) No 1332/2011(16), Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 923/2012(17), Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/340(18)and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1048(19).
(13) This Decision should concern only the positions to be taken on Union’s behalf within the ICAO in areas in which the Union has exclusive competence. This Decision is without prejudice to the possibility for the Council to adopt, upon a Commission proposal, decisions based on Article 218(9) TFEU establishing the position to be taken on the Union’s behalf within the ICAO, in particular in areas falling outside the scope of this Decision, including where the shared competence of the Union has not yet been exercised.
(14) The period of application of Council Decision (EU) 2023/746(20)should be extended for another ICAO triennial cycle, namely until 31 December 2028. The Commission should submit to the Council a written evaluation of the application of that Decision to serve as the basis for any potential extension or amendment to that Decision.
(15) The implementation of this Decision should not entail a breach of Member States’ obligations under Union law or of their international obligations under the Chicago Convention.
(16) For the purposes of the implementation of this Decision, Member States and the Commission, in line with the Union’s observer status, should act in close cooperation in accordance with their duty of sincere cooperation.
(17) Decision (EU) 2023/746 should therefore be amended accordingly,
(1) in Article 7, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:‘1.   This Decision shall apply until 31 December 2028.’;
(2) the Annex is amended as follows:(a)under the title ‘Objectives’, point (4) is replaced by the following:‘4.To promote the development and deployment of efficient, performant and interoperable air navigation services, in accordance with Regulations (EC) No 549/2004, (EC) No 550/2004 and (EU) 2024/2803, and taking account of the Global Air Navigation Plan and aviation system block upgrades (ASBUs).’;(b)under the title ‘Guidelines’, point (2(c)) is replaced by the following:‘(c)support the development and implementation of rules, policies and actions in the field of Air Traffic Management and Air Navigation Services (ATM/ANS), in particular in line with Resolutions A42-6, A42-7 and A42-8.’. (a) under the title ‘Objectives’, point (4) is replaced by the following:‘4.To promote the development and deployment of efficient, performant and interoperable air navigation services, in accordance with Regulations (EC) No 549/2004, (EC) No 550/2004 and (EU) 2024/2803, and taking account of the Global Air Navigation Plan and aviation system block upgrades (ASBUs).’; ‘4. To promote the development and deployment of efficient, performant and interoperable air navigation services, in accordance with Regulations (EC) No 549/2004, (EC) No 550/2004 and (EU) 2024/2803, and taking account of the Global Air Navigation Plan and aviation system block upgrades (ASBUs).’ (b) under the title ‘Guidelines’, point (2(c)) is replaced by the following:‘(c)support the development and implementation of rules, policies and actions in the field of Air Traffic Management and Air Navigation Services (ATM/ANS), in particular in line with Resolutions A42-6, A42-7 and A42-8.’. ‘(c) support the development and implementation of rules, policies and actions in the field of Air Traffic Management and Air Navigation Services (ATM/ANS), in particular in line with Resolutions A42-6, A42-7 and A42-8.’.
(a) under the title ‘Objectives’, point (4) is replaced by the following:‘4.To promote the development and deployment of efficient, performant and interoperable air navigation services, in accordance with Regulations (EC) No 549/2004, (EC) No 550/2004 and (EU) 2024/2803, and taking account of the Global Air Navigation Plan and aviation system block upgrades (ASBUs).’; ‘4. To promote the development and deployment of efficient, performant and interoperable air navigation services, in accordance with Regulations (EC) No 549/2004, (EC) No 550/2004 and (EU) 2024/2803, and taking account of the Global Air Navigation Plan and aviation system block upgrades (ASBUs).’
‘4. To promote the development and deployment of efficient, performant and interoperable air navigation services, in accordance with Regulations (EC) No 549/2004, (EC) No 550/2004 and (EU) 2024/2803, and taking account of the Global Air Navigation Plan and aviation system block upgrades (ASBUs).’
(b) under the title ‘Guidelines’, point (2(c)) is replaced by the following:‘(c)support the development and implementation of rules, policies and actions in the field of Air Traffic Management and Air Navigation Services (ATM/ANS), in particular in line with Resolutions A42-6, A42-7 and A42-8.’. ‘(c) support the development and implementation of rules, policies and actions in the field of Air Traffic Management and Air Navigation Services (ATM/ANS), in particular in line with Resolutions A42-6, A42-7 and A42-8.’.
‘(c) support the development and implementation of rules, policies and actions in the field of Air Traffic Management and Air Navigation Services (ATM/ANS), in particular in line with Resolutions A42-6, A42-7 and A42-8.’.
(a) under the title ‘Objectives’, point (4) is replaced by the following:‘4.To promote the development and deployment of efficient, performant and interoperable air navigation services, in accordance with Regulations (EC) No 549/2004, (EC) No 550/2004 and (EU) 2024/2803, and taking account of the Global Air Navigation Plan and aviation system block upgrades (ASBUs).’; ‘4. To promote the development and deployment of efficient, performant and interoperable air navigation services, in accordance with Regulations (EC) No 549/2004, (EC) No 550/2004 and (EU) 2024/2803, and taking account of the Global Air Navigation Plan and aviation system block upgrades (ASBUs).’
‘4. To promote the development and deployment of efficient, performant and interoperable air navigation services, in accordance with Regulations (EC) No 549/2004, (EC) No 550/2004 and (EU) 2024/2803, and taking account of the Global Air Navigation Plan and aviation system block upgrades (ASBUs).’
‘4. To promote the development and deployment of efficient, performant and interoperable air navigation services, in accordance with Regulations (EC) No 549/2004, (EC) No 550/2004 and (EU) 2024/2803, and taking account of the Global Air Navigation Plan and aviation system block upgrades (ASBUs).’
(b) under the title ‘Guidelines’, point (2(c)) is replaced by the following:‘(c)support the development and implementation of rules, policies and actions in the field of Air Traffic Management and Air Navigation Services (ATM/ANS), in particular in line with Resolutions A42-6, A42-7 and A42-8.’. ‘(c) support the development and implementation of rules, policies and actions in the field of Air Traffic Management and Air Navigation Services (ATM/ANS), in particular in line with Resolutions A42-6, A42-7 and A42-8.’.
‘(c) support the development and implementation of rules, policies and actions in the field of Air Traffic Management and Air Navigation Services (ATM/ANS), in particular in line with Resolutions A42-6, A42-7 and A42-8.’.
‘(c) support the development and implementation of rules, policies and actions in the field of Air Traffic Management and Air Navigation Services (ATM/ANS), in particular in line with Resolutions A42-6, A42-7 and A42-8.’.
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 100(2), in conjunction with Article 218(9) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
(1) The Convention on International Civil Aviation, which was signed in Chicago on 7 December 1944, (the ‘Chicago Convention’) and which regulates international air transport, entered into force on 4 April 1947. It established the International Civil Aviation Organization (‘ICAO’).
(2) The Member States are Contracting Parties to the Chicago Convention and ICAO Contracting States, while the Union has observer status in certain ICAO bodies. Six Member States are currently represented in the Council of the ICAO (the ‘ICAO Council’).
(3) Pursuant to Article 37 of the Chicago Convention, ICAO is to adopt and amend international standards and recommended practices and procedures dealing, for instance, with communication systems and air navigation aids, rules of the air and air traffic control practices and such other matters concerned with the safety, regularity, and efficiency of air navigation as may from time to time appear appropriate.
(4) Pursuant to Article 38 of the Chicago Convention, any ICAO Contracting State which finds it impracticable to comply in all respects with any international standard or to bring its own regulations or practices into full accord with any international standard after amendment of the latter, or which deems it necessary to adopt regulations or practices differing in any particular respect from those established by an international standard, is to give immediate notification to ICAO of the differences between its own regulations or practices and those established by the international standard. In the case of amendments to international standards, any State which does not make the appropriate amendments to its own regulations or practices is to give notice to the ICAO Council within sixty days of the adoption of the amendment to the international standard or indicate the action which it proposes to take.
(5) Pursuant to Article 54(l) of the Chicago Convention, the ICAO Council is to adopt international Standards and Recommended Practices (‘SARPs’), and designate them as Annexes to the Chicago Convention (‘ICAO Annexes’).
(6) Pursuant to Article 90 of the Chicago Convention, any ICAO Annex or any amendment to an ICAO Annex becomes effective within three months after its submission to the ICAO Contracting States, or at the end of such longer period of time as the ICAO Council prescribes, unless in the meantime a majority of ICAO Contracting States register their disapproval. Once they have been adopted by the ICAO Council and have become effective, international standards are binding on all ICAO Contracting States, including all Member States of the Union, in accordance with and within the limits set out in the Chicago Convention, in particular in Articles 37 and 38 thereof.
(7) The internal rules of the ICAO, in particular those which cause the latest versions of documents for decisions regarding new SARPs or amendments to SARPs to be available to the ICAO Council only late, the deadlines set by the ICAO for ICAO Contracting States to notify differences with respect to international standards, as well as the sheer number of differences in the areas of civil aviation safety, air navigation and air traffic management to be notified each year, make it difficult to establish the position to be taken on the Union’s behalf in a Council Decision based on Article 218(9) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in a timely manner for new SARPs or amendments to SARPs to be adopted, or for each difference to be notified.
(8) It is therefore appropriate to establish the criteria and procedure to be followed for establishing the position to be taken on the Union’s behalf regarding the adoption of SARPs or amendments to SARPs, insofar as those SARPs are capable of decisively influencing the content of Union law in the area of civil aviation, as well as regarding decisions to disapprove or not to disapprove SARPs pursuant to Article 90 of the Chicago Convention and regarding the notification of differences with respect to international standards pursuant to Article 38 of the Chicago Convention.
(9) Given the specificity of civil aviation safety, air navigation and air traffic management compared to other areas dealt with by the ICAO, in particular the high number of SARPs adopted in those areas by the ICAO Council every year and the number of differences to be notified every year, this Decision should relate solely to civil aviation safety, air navigation and air traffic management in order to streamline processes to swiftly establish the position to be taken on the Union’s behalf for the adoption of new SARPs and amendments to SARPs, the decisions to disapprove or not to disapprove SARPs or amendments to SARPs adopted by the ICAO Council and deal with the numerous notifications in an efficient way.
(10) The SARPs adopted by the ICAO Council in the field of civil aviation safety, air navigation and air traffic management can concern matters of Union exclusive competence and might be capable of decisively influencing the content of Union law. It is therefore efficient and appropriate, by means of a decision, to establish the criteria and procedure to be followed for establishing the position to be taken on the Union’s behalf with respect to SARPs in those fields, without prejudice to the rights and obligations of Member States as ICAO Contracting States under the Chicago Convention. At ICAO level, civil aviation safety, air navigation and air traffic management SARPs are mainly contained in ICAO Annexes 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 18 and 19.
(11) At Union level, the requirements contained in SARPs for civil aviation safety are mainly reflected and referred to in Regulations (EU) 2018/1139(1)and (EC) No 2111/2005(2)of the European Parliament and of the Council and in the implementing and delegated acts adopted on the basis thereof, in particular Commission Regulations (EU) No 1178/2011(3), (EU) No 748/2012(4), (EU) No 965/2012(5), (EU) No 139/2014(6), (EU) No 452/2014(7), (EU) No 1321/2014(8)and (EU) 2015/640(9), Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947(10), Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945(11), and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/664(12).
(12) At Union level, the requirements contained in SARPs for air navigation and air traffic management are mainly reflected and referred to in Regulations (EC) No 549/2004(13), (EC) No 550/2004(14)and (EU) 2024/2803(15)of the European Parliament and of the Council and in the implementing and delegated acts adopted on the basis thereof, in particular Commission Regulation (EU) No 1332/2011(16), Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 923/2012(17), Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/340(18)and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1048(19).
(13) This Decision should concern only the positions to be taken on Union’s behalf within the ICAO in areas in which the Union has exclusive competence. This Decision is without prejudice to the possibility for the Council to adopt, upon a Commission proposal, decisions based on Article 218(9) TFEU establishing the position to be taken on the Union’s behalf within the ICAO, in particular in areas falling outside the scope of this Decision, including where the shared competence of the Union has not yet been exercised.
(14) The period of application of Council Decision (EU) 2023/746(20)should be extended for another ICAO triennial cycle, namely until 31 December 2028. The Commission should submit to the Council a written evaluation of the application of that Decision to serve as the basis for any potential extension or amendment to that Decision.
(15) The implementation of this Decision should not entail a breach of Member States’ obligations under Union law or of their international obligations under the Chicago Convention.
(16) For the purposes of the implementation of this Decision, Member States and the Commission, in line with the Union’s observer status, should act in close cooperation in accordance with their duty of sincere cooperation.
(17) Decision (EU) 2023/746 should therefore be amended accordingly,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Decision (EU) 2023/746 is amended as follows:
(1)
in Article 7, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:
‘1. This Decision shall apply until 31 December 2028.’
(2)
the Annex is amended as follows:
(a)
under the title ‘Objectives’, point (4) is replaced by the following:
‘4.
To promote the development and deployment of efficient, performant and interoperable air navigation services, in accordance with Regulations (EC) No 549/2004, (EC) No 550/2004 and (EU) 2024/2803, and taking account of the Global Air Navigation Plan and aviation system block upgrades (ASBUs).’
;
(b)
under the title ‘Guidelines’, point (2(c)) is replaced by the following:
‘(c)
support the development and implementation of rules, policies and actions in the field of Air Traffic Management and Air Navigation Services (ATM/ANS), in particular in line with Resolutions A42-6, A42-7 and A42-8.’.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/2541 of 16 December 2025 on renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (notified under document C(2025) 8558)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/2541 18.12.2025
(1) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/2281(2)authorised the placing on the market of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427. The scope of that authorisation also covers the placing on the market of products, other than food and feed, containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON 87427 for the same uses as any other maize, with the exception of cultivation.
(2) On 19 March 2024, Bayer Agriculture B.V., based in Belgium, on behalf of Bayer CropScience LP, based in the United States of America (‘the applicant’), submitted an application to the Commission, in accordance with Articles 11 and 23 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, for the renewal of that authorisation.
(3) On 13 May 2025, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) issued a favourable scientific opinion on genetically modified maize MON 87427(3)in accordance with Articles 6 and 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003. It concluded that the renewal application did not contain evidence of any new hazards, modified exposure or scientific uncertainties that would change the conclusions of the original risk assessment on genetically modified maize MON 87427, issued by the Authority in 2015(4).
(4) In its scientific opinion, the Authority considered all the questions and concerns raised by the Member States in the context of the consultation of the national competent authorities as provided for in Article 6(4) and Article 18(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(5) The Authority also concluded that the monitoring plan for environmental effects, consisting of a general surveillance plan, submitted by the applicant, is in line with the intended uses of the products.
(6) Taking into account those conclusions, the authorisation for the placing on the market of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427 and of products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON 87427 for other uses than food or feed, with the exception of cultivation, should be renewed.
(7) A unique identifier has been assigned to genetically modified maize MON 87427, in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 65/2004(5), in the context of its initial authorisation by Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/2281. That unique identifier should continue to be used.
(8) As regards the products covered by this Decision, no specific labelling requirements, other than those provided for in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6), appear to be necessary. However, in order to ensure that the use of products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON 87427 remains within the limits of the authorisation granted by this Decision, the labelling of such products, with the exception of foods and food ingredients, should contain a clear indication that they are not intended for cultivation.
(9) The authorisation holder should submit annual reports on the implementation and on the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan for environmental effects. Those results should be presented in accordance with the requirements laid down in Commission Decision 2009/770/EC(7).
(10) The opinion of the Authority does not justify the imposition of specific conditions or restrictions for the placing on the market, for the use and handling, including post-market monitoring requirements regarding the consumption of the food and feed containing, consisting of, or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427, or for the protection of particular ecosystems/environment or geographical areas, as provided for in Article 6(5)(e) and Article 18(5)(e) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(11) All relevant information on the authorisation of the products covered by this Decision should be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(12) This Decision is to be notified through the Biosafety Clearing-House to the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity pursuant to Article 9(1) and Article 15(2)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 1946/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(8).
(13) The Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed has not delivered an opinion within the time limit laid down by its Chairman. This implementing act was deemed to be necessary and the chair submitted it to the appeal committee for further deliberation. The appeal committee did not deliver an opinion,
(a) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-87427-7;
(b) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-87427-7;
(c) products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-87427-7 for uses other than those provided for in points (a) and (b), with the exception of cultivation.
Name : Bayer CropScience LP
Address : 800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri 63167, United States of America
(1) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-87427-7;
(2) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-87427-7;
(3) products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-87427-7 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.
(1) For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘maize’.
(2) The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of the genetically modified maize MON-87427-7, with the exception of products referred to in point (b)(1).
(1) event-specific real-time quantitative PCR methods validated for genetically modified maize MON-87427-7;
(2) validated by the EU Reference Laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttps://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/method-validations
(3) reference material: AOCS 0512-A2 (for MON-87427-7) and AOCS 0406-A (for its non-GM counterpart) are accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society athttps://www.aocs.org/technical-products/certified-reference-materials-crms/.
Note: links to the relevant documents may need to be modified over time. Those modifications will be made available to the public via the updating of the Community register of genetically modified food and feed.
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed(1), and in particular to Article 11(3) and Article 23(3) thereof,
(1) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/2281(2)authorised the placing on the market of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427. The scope of that authorisation also covers the placing on the market of products, other than food and feed, containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON 87427 for the same uses as any other maize, with the exception of cultivation.
(2) On 19 March 2024, Bayer Agriculture B.V., based in Belgium, on behalf of Bayer CropScience LP, based in the United States of America (‘the applicant’), submitted an application to the Commission, in accordance with Articles 11 and 23 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, for the renewal of that authorisation.
(3) On 13 May 2025, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) issued a favourable scientific opinion on genetically modified maize MON 87427(3)in accordance with Articles 6 and 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003. It concluded that the renewal application did not contain evidence of any new hazards, modified exposure or scientific uncertainties that would change the conclusions of the original risk assessment on genetically modified maize MON 87427, issued by the Authority in 2015(4).
(4) In its scientific opinion, the Authority considered all the questions and concerns raised by the Member States in the context of the consultation of the national competent authorities as provided for in Article 6(4) and Article 18(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(5) The Authority also concluded that the monitoring plan for environmental effects, consisting of a general surveillance plan, submitted by the applicant, is in line with the intended uses of the products.
(6) Taking into account those conclusions, the authorisation for the placing on the market of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427 and of products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON 87427 for other uses than food or feed, with the exception of cultivation, should be renewed.
(7) A unique identifier has been assigned to genetically modified maize MON 87427, in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 65/2004(5), in the context of its initial authorisation by Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/2281. That unique identifier should continue to be used.
(8) As regards the products covered by this Decision, no specific labelling requirements, other than those provided for in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6), appear to be necessary. However, in order to ensure that the use of products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON 87427 remains within the limits of the authorisation granted by this Decision, the labelling of such products, with the exception of foods and food ingredients, should contain a clear indication that they are not intended for cultivation.
(9) The authorisation holder should submit annual reports on the implementation and on the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan for environmental effects. Those results should be presented in accordance with the requirements laid down in Commission Decision 2009/770/EC(7).
(10) The opinion of the Authority does not justify the imposition of specific conditions or restrictions for the placing on the market, for the use and handling, including post-market monitoring requirements regarding the consumption of the food and feed containing, consisting of, or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427, or for the protection of particular ecosystems/environment or geographical areas, as provided for in Article 6(5)(e) and Article 18(5)(e) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(11) All relevant information on the authorisation of the products covered by this Decision should be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(12) This Decision is to be notified through the Biosafety Clearing-House to the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity pursuant to Article 9(1) and Article 15(2)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 1946/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(8).
(13) The Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed has not delivered an opinion within the time limit laid down by its Chairman. This implementing act was deemed to be necessary and the chair submitted it to the appeal committee for further deliberation. The appeal committee did not deliver an opinion,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Genetically modified organism and unique identifier
Article 1
Genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON 87427, as specified in point (b) of the Annex to this Decision, is assigned the unique identifier MON-87427-7, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 65/2004.

Renewal of the authorisation
Article 2
The authorisation for the placing on the market of the following products is renewed in accordance with the conditions set out in this Decision:
(a)
foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-87427-7;
(b)
feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-87427-7;
(c)
products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-87427-7 for uses other than those provided for in points (a) and (b), with the exception of cultivation.

Labelling
Article 3
1. For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘maize’.
2. The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON-87427-7, referred to in Article 1, with the exception of products referred to in Article 2, point (a).

Method for detection
Article 4
The method set out in point (d) of the Annex shall apply for the detection of genetically modified maize MON-87427-7.

Monitoring plan for environmental effects
Article 5
1. The authorisation holder shall ensure that the monitoring plan for environmental effects, as set out in point (h) of the Annex, is put in place and implemented.
2. The authorisation holder shall submit to the Commission annual reports on the implementation and the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan in accordance with the format set out in Decision 2009/770/EC.

Community register
Article 6
The information set out in the Annex shall be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed, as referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.

Authorisation holder
Article 7
The authorisation holder shall be Bayer CropScience LP, United States of America, represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Belgium.

Validity
Article 8
This Decision shall apply for a period of 10 years from the date of its notification.

Addressee
Article 9
This Decision is addressed to Bayer CropScience LP, 800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri 63167, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture BV, Scheldelaan 460, 2040 Antwerp, BELGIUM.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed(1), and in particular to Article 11(3) and Article 23(3) thereof,
(1) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/2281(2)authorised the placing on the market of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427. The scope of that authorisation also covers the placing on the market of products, other than food and feed, containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON 87427 for the same uses as any other maize, with the exception of cultivation.
(2) On 19 March 2024, Bayer Agriculture B.V., based in Belgium, on behalf of Bayer CropScience LP, based in the United States of America (‘the applicant’), submitted an application to the Commission, in accordance with Articles 11 and 23 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, for the renewal of that authorisation.
(3) On 13 May 2025, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) issued a favourable scientific opinion on genetically modified maize MON 87427(3)in accordance with Articles 6 and 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003. It concluded that the renewal application did not contain evidence of any new hazards, modified exposure or scientific uncertainties that would change the conclusions of the original risk assessment on genetically modified maize MON 87427, issued by the Authority in 2015(4).
(4) In its scientific opinion, the Authority considered all the questions and concerns raised by the Member States in the context of the consultation of the national competent authorities as provided for in Article 6(4) and Article 18(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(5) The Authority also concluded that the monitoring plan for environmental effects, consisting of a general surveillance plan, submitted by the applicant, is in line with the intended uses of the products.
(6) Taking into account those conclusions, the authorisation for the placing on the market of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427 and of products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON 87427 for other uses than food or feed, with the exception of cultivation, should be renewed.
(7) A unique identifier has been assigned to genetically modified maize MON 87427, in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 65/2004(5), in the context of its initial authorisation by Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/2281. That unique identifier should continue to be used.
(8) As regards the products covered by this Decision, no specific labelling requirements, other than those provided for in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6), appear to be necessary. However, in order to ensure that the use of products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON 87427 remains within the limits of the authorisation granted by this Decision, the labelling of such products, with the exception of foods and food ingredients, should contain a clear indication that they are not intended for cultivation.
(9) The authorisation holder should submit annual reports on the implementation and on the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan for environmental effects. Those results should be presented in accordance with the requirements laid down in Commission Decision 2009/770/EC(7).
(10) The opinion of the Authority does not justify the imposition of specific conditions or restrictions for the placing on the market, for the use and handling, including post-market monitoring requirements regarding the consumption of the food and feed containing, consisting of, or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427, or for the protection of particular ecosystems/environment or geographical areas, as provided for in Article 6(5)(e) and Article 18(5)(e) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(11) All relevant information on the authorisation of the products covered by this Decision should be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(12) This Decision is to be notified through the Biosafety Clearing-House to the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity pursuant to Article 9(1) and Article 15(2)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 1946/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(8).
(13) The Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed has not delivered an opinion within the time limit laid down by its Chairman. This implementing act was deemed to be necessary and the chair submitted it to the appeal committee for further deliberation. The appeal committee did not deliver an opinion,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Genetically modified organism and unique identifier

Genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON 87427, as specified in point (b) of the Annex to this Decision, is assigned the unique identifier MON-87427-7, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 65/2004.

Renewal of the authorisation

The authorisation for the placing on the market of the following products is renewed in accordance with the conditions set out in this Decision:
(a)
foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-87427-7;
(b)
feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-87427-7;
(c)
products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-87427-7 for uses other than those provided for in points (a) and (b), with the exception of cultivation.

Labelling

1. For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘maize’.
2. The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize MON-87427-7, referred to in Article 1, with the exception of products referred to in Article 2, point (a).

Method for detection

The method set out in point (d) of the Annex shall apply for the detection of genetically modified maize MON-87427-7.

Monitoring plan for environmental effects

1. The authorisation holder shall ensure that the monitoring plan for environmental effects, as set out in point (h) of the Annex, is put in place and implemented.
2. The authorisation holder shall submit to the Commission annual reports on the implementation and the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan in accordance with the format set out in Decision 2009/770/EC.

Community register

The information set out in the Annex shall be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed, as referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.

Authorisation holder

The authorisation holder shall be Bayer CropScience LP, United States of America, represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Belgium.

Validity

This Decision shall apply for a period of 10 years from the date of its notification.

Addressee

This Decision is addressed to Bayer CropScience LP, 800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri 63167, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture BV, Scheldelaan 460, 2040 Antwerp, BELGIUM.

(a)   Applicant and authorisation holder:

ANNEX
Name | : | Bayer CropScience LP
Address | : | 800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri 63167, United States of AmericaRepresented in the Union by: Bayer Agriculture BV, Scheldelaan 460, 2040 Antwerp, Belgium.
(b) Designation and specification of the products:

(1) | foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-87427-7;
(2) | feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-87427-7;
(3) | products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) MON-87427-7 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.The genetically modified maize MON-87427-7 expresses the CP4 EPSPS gene which confers tissue-selective tolerance to glyphosate herbicides. The CP4 EPSPS expression is absent or limited in male reproductive tissues, which eliminates or reduces the need for detasseling when MON-87427-7 is used as female parent in hybrid maize seed production.
(c) Labelling:

(1) | For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘maize’.
(2) | The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of the genetically modified maize MON-87427-7, with the exception of products referred to in point (b)(1).(d) Method for detection:

(1) | event-specific real-time quantitative PCR methods validated for genetically modified maize MON-87427-7;
(2) | validated by the EU Reference Laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttps://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/method-validations
(3) | reference material: AOCS 0512-A2 (for MON-87427-7) and AOCS 0406-A (for its non-GM counterpart) are accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society athttps://www.aocs.org/technical-products/certified-reference-materials-crms/.(e) Unique identifier:
MON-87427-7
(f) Information required pursuant to Annex II to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity:
[Biosafety Clearing-House, Record ID number:published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed when notified].
(g) Conditions or restrictions on the placing on the market, use or handling of the products:
Not required.
(h) Monitoring plan for environmental effects:
Monitoring plan for environmental effects in accordance with Annex VII to Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(1).
[Link:plan published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed]
(i) Post-market monitoring requirements for the use of the food for human consumption
Not required.

Note: | links to the relevant documents may need to be modified over time. Those modifications will be made available to the public via the updating of the Community register of genetically modified food and feed.
(1) Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC (OJ L 106, 17.4.2001, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2001/18/oj).

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/2544 of 16 December 2025 authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DAS1131 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (notified under document C(2025) 7934)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/2544 18.12.2025
(1) On 17 June 2022, Corteva Agriscience Belgium B.V., based in Belgium, on behalf of Corteva Agriscience LLC, based in the United States, submitted an application to the national competent authority of the Netherlands for the placing on the market of foods, food ingredients and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DAS1131, in accordance with Articles 5 and 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (‘the application’). The application also covered the placing on the market of products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DAS1131 for uses other than food and feed, with the exception of cultivation.
(2) Pursuant to Article 5(5) and Article 17(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, the application included information and conclusions about the risk assessment carried out in accordance with the principles set out in Annex II to Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(2). It also included the information required pursuant to Annexes III and IV to that Directive and a monitoring plan for environmental effects in accordance with Annex VII to that Directive.
(3) On 19 March 2025, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) issued a favourable scientific opinion on genetically modified maize DAS1131 in accordance with Articles 6 and 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003(3). The Authority concluded that genetically modified maize DAS1131, as described in the application, is as safe as its conventional counterpart and the tested non-genetically modified maize reference varieties with respect to the potential effects on human and animal health and the environment. The Authority also concluded that the consumption of genetically modified maize DAS1131 does not represent any nutritional concern.
(4) In its scientific opinion, the Authority considered all the questions and concerns raised by the Member States in the context of the consultation of the national competent authorities as provided for in Article 6(4) and Article 18(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(5) The Authority also concluded that the monitoring plan for the environmental effects, submitted by the applicant, consisting of a general surveillance plan, is in line with the intended uses of the products.
(6) Taking into account those conclusions, the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DAS1131 should be authorised for the uses listed in the application.
(7) A unique identifier should be assigned to genetically modified maize DAS1131 in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 65/2004(4).
(8) For the products covered by this Decision, no specific labelling requirements, other than those provided for in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5), appear to be necessary. However, in order to ensure that the use of those products remains within the limits of the authorisation granted by this Decision, the labelling of the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DAS1131, with the exception of foods and food ingredients, should contain a clear indication that they are not intended for cultivation.
(9) The authorisation holder should submit annual reports on the implementation and on the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan for environmental effects. Those results should be presented in accordance with the requirements laid down in Commission Decision 2009/770/EC(6).
(10) The opinion of the Authority does not justify the imposition of other specific conditions or restrictions for the placing on the market, for the use and handling of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DAS1131 or for the protection of particular ecosystems/environment and/or geographical areas, as provided for in Article 6(5), point (e), and Article 18(5), point (e), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(11) All relevant information on the authorisation of the products covered by this Decision should be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(12) This Decision is to be notified through the Biosafety Clearing-House to the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, pursuant to Article 9(1) and Article 15(2), point (c), of Regulation (EC) No 1946/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(7).
(13) The Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed has not delivered an opinion within the time limit laid down by its Chairman. This implementing act was deemed to be necessary and the chair submitted it to the appeal committee for further deliberation. The appeal committee did not deliver an opinion,
(a) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3;
(b) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3;
(c) products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3 for uses other than those provided for in points (a) and (b), with the exception of cultivation.
(a) Applicant and authorisation holder:Name:Corteva Agriscience LLCAddress:9330 Zionsville Road, Indianapolis, IN 46268-1054, United States;represented in the Union by Corteva Agriscience Belgium B.V., rue Montoyer 25, 1000 Brussels, Belgium. Name : Corteva Agriscience LLC Address : 9330 Zionsville Road, Indianapolis, IN 46268-1054, United States;
Name : Corteva Agriscience LLC
Address : 9330 Zionsville Road, Indianapolis, IN 46268-1054, United States;
Name : Corteva Agriscience LLC
Address : 9330 Zionsville Road, Indianapolis, IN 46268-1054, United States;
(b) Designation and specification of the products:(1)foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) DAS-Ø1131-3;(2)feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) DAS-Ø1131-3;(3)products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) DAS-Ø1131-3 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.The genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3 expresses theDGT-28 EPSPSgene, which confers tolerance to glyphosate herbicide and theCry1Da2gene, which confers protection against certain lepidopteran insect pests. (1) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) DAS-Ø1131-3; (2) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) DAS-Ø1131-3; (3) products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) DAS-Ø1131-3 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.
(1) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) DAS-Ø1131-3;
(2) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) DAS-Ø1131-3;
(3) products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) DAS-Ø1131-3 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.
(1) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) DAS-Ø1131-3;
(2) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) DAS-Ø1131-3;
(3) products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) DAS-Ø1131-3 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.
(c) Labelling:(1)For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘maize’.(2)The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3, with the exception of products referred to in point (b)(1). (1) For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘maize’. (2) The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3, with the exception of products referred to in point (b)(1).
(1) For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘maize’.
(2) The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3, with the exception of products referred to in point (b)(1).
(1) For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘maize’.
(2) The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3, with the exception of products referred to in point (b)(1).
(d) Method for detection:(1)event specific real-time PCR based method for the quantification of genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3;(2)validated by the EU reference laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttp://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/StatusOfDossiers.aspx;(3)reference material: AOCS 0922-B (for DAS-Ø1131-3) and AOCS 0922-A (for its non-GM counterpart), are accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society (AOCS), athttps://www.aocs.org/ (1) event specific real-time PCR based method for the quantification of genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3; (2) validated by the EU reference laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttp://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/StatusOfDossiers.aspx; (3) reference material: AOCS 0922-B (for DAS-Ø1131-3) and AOCS 0922-A (for its non-GM counterpart), are accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society (AOCS), athttps://www.aocs.org/
(1) event specific real-time PCR based method for the quantification of genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3;
(2) validated by the EU reference laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttp://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/StatusOfDossiers.aspx;
(3) reference material: AOCS 0922-B (for DAS-Ø1131-3) and AOCS 0922-A (for its non-GM counterpart), are accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society (AOCS), athttps://www.aocs.org/
(1) event specific real-time PCR based method for the quantification of genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3;
(2) validated by the EU reference laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttp://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/StatusOfDossiers.aspx;
(3) reference material: AOCS 0922-B (for DAS-Ø1131-3) and AOCS 0922-A (for its non-GM counterpart), are accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society (AOCS), athttps://www.aocs.org/
(e) Unique identifier:DAS-Ø1131-3
(f) Information required under Annex II to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity:[Biosafety Clearing-House, Record ID number:published in the register of genetically modified food and feed when notified].
(g) Conditions or restrictions on the placing on the market, use or handling of the products:Not required.
(h) Monitoring plan for environmental effects:Monitoring plan for environmental effects in accordance with Annex VII to Directive 2001/18/EC.[Link:plan published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed]
(i) Post-market monitoring requirements for the use of the food for human consumption:Not required.
Note: links to relevant documents may need to be modified over time. Those modifications will be made available to the public via the updating of the Community register of genetically modified food and feed.
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed(1), and in particular Article 7(3) and Article 19(3) thereof,
(1) On 17 June 2022, Corteva Agriscience Belgium B.V., based in Belgium, on behalf of Corteva Agriscience LLC, based in the United States, submitted an application to the national competent authority of the Netherlands for the placing on the market of foods, food ingredients and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DAS1131, in accordance with Articles 5 and 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (‘the application’). The application also covered the placing on the market of products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DAS1131 for uses other than food and feed, with the exception of cultivation.
(2) Pursuant to Article 5(5) and Article 17(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, the application included information and conclusions about the risk assessment carried out in accordance with the principles set out in Annex II to Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(2). It also included the information required pursuant to Annexes III and IV to that Directive and a monitoring plan for environmental effects in accordance with Annex VII to that Directive.
(3) On 19 March 2025, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) issued a favourable scientific opinion on genetically modified maize DAS1131 in accordance with Articles 6 and 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003(3). The Authority concluded that genetically modified maize DAS1131, as described in the application, is as safe as its conventional counterpart and the tested non-genetically modified maize reference varieties with respect to the potential effects on human and animal health and the environment. The Authority also concluded that the consumption of genetically modified maize DAS1131 does not represent any nutritional concern.
(4) In its scientific opinion, the Authority considered all the questions and concerns raised by the Member States in the context of the consultation of the national competent authorities as provided for in Article 6(4) and Article 18(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(5) The Authority also concluded that the monitoring plan for the environmental effects, submitted by the applicant, consisting of a general surveillance plan, is in line with the intended uses of the products.
(6) Taking into account those conclusions, the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DAS1131 should be authorised for the uses listed in the application.
(7) A unique identifier should be assigned to genetically modified maize DAS1131 in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 65/2004(4).
(8) For the products covered by this Decision, no specific labelling requirements, other than those provided for in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5), appear to be necessary. However, in order to ensure that the use of those products remains within the limits of the authorisation granted by this Decision, the labelling of the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DAS1131, with the exception of foods and food ingredients, should contain a clear indication that they are not intended for cultivation.
(9) The authorisation holder should submit annual reports on the implementation and on the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan for environmental effects. Those results should be presented in accordance with the requirements laid down in Commission Decision 2009/770/EC(6).
(10) The opinion of the Authority does not justify the imposition of other specific conditions or restrictions for the placing on the market, for the use and handling of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DAS1131 or for the protection of particular ecosystems/environment and/or geographical areas, as provided for in Article 6(5), point (e), and Article 18(5), point (e), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(11) All relevant information on the authorisation of the products covered by this Decision should be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(12) This Decision is to be notified through the Biosafety Clearing-House to the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, pursuant to Article 9(1) and Article 15(2), point (c), of Regulation (EC) No 1946/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(7).
(13) The Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed has not delivered an opinion within the time limit laid down by its Chairman. This implementing act was deemed to be necessary and the chair submitted it to the appeal committee for further deliberation. The appeal committee did not deliver an opinion,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Genetically modified organism and unique identifier
Article 1
Genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.)DAS1131, as specified in point (b) of the Annex to this Decision, is assigned the unique identifier DAS-Ø1131-3, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 65/2004.

Authorisation
Article 2
The following products are authorised for the purposes of Article 4(2) and Article 16(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, in accordance with the conditions set out in this Decision:
(a)
foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3;
(b)
feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3;
(c)
products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3 for uses other than those provided for in points (a) and (b), with the exception of cultivation.

Labelling
Article 3
1. For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the name of the organism shall be ‘maize’.
2. The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3 as referred to in Article 1, with the exception of products referred to in Article 2, point (a).

Method for detection
Article 4
The method set out in point (d) of the Annex shall apply for the detection of genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3.

Monitoring plan for environmental effects
Article 5
1. The authorisation holder shall ensure that the monitoring plan for environmental effects, as set out in point (h) of the Annex, is put in place and implemented.
2. The authorisation holder shall submit to the Commission annual reports on the implementation and the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan in accordance with the format set out in Decision 2009/770/EC.

Community register
Article 6
The information set out in the Annex shall be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed, as referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.

Authorisation holder
Article 7
The authorisation holder shall be Corteva Agriscience LLC, represented in the Union by Corteva Agriscience Belgium B.V.

Validity
Article 8
This Decision shall apply for a period of 10 years from the date of its notification.

Addressee
Article 9
This Decision is addressed to Corteva Agriscience LLC, 9330 Zionsville Road, Indianapolis, Indiana, 46268-1054, United States, represented in the Union by Corteva Agriscience Belgium B.V., rue Montoyer 25, 1000 Brussels, Belgium.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed(1), and in particular Article 7(3) and Article 19(3) thereof,
(1) On 17 June 2022, Corteva Agriscience Belgium B.V., based in Belgium, on behalf of Corteva Agriscience LLC, based in the United States, submitted an application to the national competent authority of the Netherlands for the placing on the market of foods, food ingredients and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DAS1131, in accordance with Articles 5 and 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (‘the application’). The application also covered the placing on the market of products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DAS1131 for uses other than food and feed, with the exception of cultivation.
(2) Pursuant to Article 5(5) and Article 17(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, the application included information and conclusions about the risk assessment carried out in accordance with the principles set out in Annex II to Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(2). It also included the information required pursuant to Annexes III and IV to that Directive and a monitoring plan for environmental effects in accordance with Annex VII to that Directive.
(3) On 19 March 2025, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) issued a favourable scientific opinion on genetically modified maize DAS1131 in accordance with Articles 6 and 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003(3). The Authority concluded that genetically modified maize DAS1131, as described in the application, is as safe as its conventional counterpart and the tested non-genetically modified maize reference varieties with respect to the potential effects on human and animal health and the environment. The Authority also concluded that the consumption of genetically modified maize DAS1131 does not represent any nutritional concern.
(4) In its scientific opinion, the Authority considered all the questions and concerns raised by the Member States in the context of the consultation of the national competent authorities as provided for in Article 6(4) and Article 18(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(5) The Authority also concluded that the monitoring plan for the environmental effects, submitted by the applicant, consisting of a general surveillance plan, is in line with the intended uses of the products.
(6) Taking into account those conclusions, the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DAS1131 should be authorised for the uses listed in the application.
(7) A unique identifier should be assigned to genetically modified maize DAS1131 in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 65/2004(4).
(8) For the products covered by this Decision, no specific labelling requirements, other than those provided for in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5), appear to be necessary. However, in order to ensure that the use of those products remains within the limits of the authorisation granted by this Decision, the labelling of the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DAS1131, with the exception of foods and food ingredients, should contain a clear indication that they are not intended for cultivation.
(9) The authorisation holder should submit annual reports on the implementation and on the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan for environmental effects. Those results should be presented in accordance with the requirements laid down in Commission Decision 2009/770/EC(6).
(10) The opinion of the Authority does not justify the imposition of other specific conditions or restrictions for the placing on the market, for the use and handling of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DAS1131 or for the protection of particular ecosystems/environment and/or geographical areas, as provided for in Article 6(5), point (e), and Article 18(5), point (e), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(11) All relevant information on the authorisation of the products covered by this Decision should be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(12) This Decision is to be notified through the Biosafety Clearing-House to the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, pursuant to Article 9(1) and Article 15(2), point (c), of Regulation (EC) No 1946/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(7).
(13) The Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed has not delivered an opinion within the time limit laid down by its Chairman. This implementing act was deemed to be necessary and the chair submitted it to the appeal committee for further deliberation. The appeal committee did not deliver an opinion,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Genetically modified organism and unique identifier

Genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.)DAS1131, as specified in point (b) of the Annex to this Decision, is assigned the unique identifier DAS-Ø1131-3, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 65/2004.

Authorisation

The following products are authorised for the purposes of Article 4(2) and Article 16(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, in accordance with the conditions set out in this Decision:
(a)
foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3;
(b)
feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3;
(c)
products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3 for uses other than those provided for in points (a) and (b), with the exception of cultivation.

Labelling

1. For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the name of the organism shall be ‘maize’.
2. The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3 as referred to in Article 1, with the exception of products referred to in Article 2, point (a).

Method for detection

The method set out in point (d) of the Annex shall apply for the detection of genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3.

Monitoring plan for environmental effects

1. The authorisation holder shall ensure that the monitoring plan for environmental effects, as set out in point (h) of the Annex, is put in place and implemented.
2. The authorisation holder shall submit to the Commission annual reports on the implementation and the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan in accordance with the format set out in Decision 2009/770/EC.

Community register

The information set out in the Annex shall be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed, as referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.

Authorisation holder

The authorisation holder shall be Corteva Agriscience LLC, represented in the Union by Corteva Agriscience Belgium B.V.

Validity

This Decision shall apply for a period of 10 years from the date of its notification.

Addressee

This Decision is addressed to Corteva Agriscience LLC, 9330 Zionsville Road, Indianapolis, Indiana, 46268-1054, United States, represented in the Union by Corteva Agriscience Belgium B.V., rue Montoyer 25, 1000 Brussels, Belgium.
ANNEX
(a) | Applicant and authorisation holder:Name:Corteva Agriscience LLCAddress:9330 Zionsville Road, Indianapolis, IN 46268-1054, United States;represented in the Union by Corteva Agriscience Belgium B.V., rue Montoyer 25, 1000 Brussels, Belgium. | Name | : | Corteva Agriscience LLC | Address | : | 9330 Zionsville Road, Indianapolis, IN 46268-1054, United States;
Name | : | Corteva Agriscience LLC
Address | : | 9330 Zionsville Road, Indianapolis, IN 46268-1054, United States;
(b) | Designation and specification of the products:(1)foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) DAS-Ø1131-3;(2)feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) DAS-Ø1131-3;(3)products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) DAS-Ø1131-3 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.The genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3 expresses theDGT-28 EPSPSgene, which confers tolerance to glyphosate herbicide and theCry1Da2gene, which confers protection against certain lepidopteran insect pests. | (1) | foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) DAS-Ø1131-3; | (2) | feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) DAS-Ø1131-3; | (3) | products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) DAS-Ø1131-3 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.
(1) | foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) DAS-Ø1131-3;
(2) | feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) DAS-Ø1131-3;
(3) | products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize (Zea maysL.) DAS-Ø1131-3 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.
(c) | Labelling:(1)For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘maize’.(2)The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3, with the exception of products referred to in point (b)(1). | (1) | For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘maize’. | (2) | The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3, with the exception of products referred to in point (b)(1).
(1) | For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘maize’.
(2) | The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3, with the exception of products referred to in point (b)(1).
(d) | Method for detection:(1)event specific real-time PCR based method for the quantification of genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3;(2)validated by the EU reference laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttp://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/StatusOfDossiers.aspx;(3)reference material: AOCS 0922-B (for DAS-Ø1131-3) and AOCS 0922-A (for its non-GM counterpart), are accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society (AOCS), athttps://www.aocs.org/ | (1) | event specific real-time PCR based method for the quantification of genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3; | (2) | validated by the EU reference laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttp://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/StatusOfDossiers.aspx; | (3) | reference material: AOCS 0922-B (for DAS-Ø1131-3) and AOCS 0922-A (for its non-GM counterpart), are accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society (AOCS), athttps://www.aocs.org/
(1) | event specific real-time PCR based method for the quantification of genetically modified maize DAS-Ø1131-3;
(2) | validated by the EU reference laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttp://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/StatusOfDossiers.aspx;
(3) | reference material: AOCS 0922-B (for DAS-Ø1131-3) and AOCS 0922-A (for its non-GM counterpart), are accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society (AOCS), athttps://www.aocs.org/
(e) | Unique identifier:DAS-Ø1131-3
(f) | Information required under Annex II to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity:[Biosafety Clearing-House, Record ID number:published in the register of genetically modified food and feed when notified].
(g) | Conditions or restrictions on the placing on the market, use or handling of the products:Not required.
(h) | Monitoring plan for environmental effects:Monitoring plan for environmental effects in accordance with Annex VII to Directive 2001/18/EC.[Link:plan published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed]
(i) | Post-market monitoring requirements for the use of the food for human consumption:Not required.
Note: | links to relevant documents may need to be modified over time. Those modifications will be made available to the public via the updating of the Community register of genetically modified food and feed.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/2542 of 16 December 2025 on renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape MON 88302 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (notified under document C(2025) 7875)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/2542 18.12.2025
(1) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/687(2)authorised the placing on the market of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape MON 88302. The scope of that authorisation also covers the placing on the market of products, other than food and feed, containing or consisting of genetically modified oilseed rape MON 88302 for the same uses as any other oilseed rape, with the exception of cultivation.
(2) On 28 February 2024, Bayer Agriculture B.V., based in Belgium, on behalf of Bayer CropScience LP, based in the United States of America, (‘the applicant’) submitted an application to the Commission, in accordance with Articles 11 and 23 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, for the renewal of that authorisation.
(3) On 13 May 2025, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) issued a favourable scientific opinion on genetically modified oilseed rape MON 88302(3)in accordance with Articles 6 and 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003. It concluded that the renewal application did not contain evidence of any new hazards, modified exposure or scientific uncertainties that would change the conclusions of the original risk assessment on genetically modified oilseed rape MON 88302, issued by the Authority in 2014(4).
(4) In its scientific opinion, the Authority considered all the questions and concerns raised by the Member States in the context of the consultation of the national competent authorities as provided for in Article 6(4) and Article 18(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(5) The Authority also concluded that the monitoring plan for environmental effects, consisting of a general surveillance plan, as submitted by the applicant, is in line with the intended uses of the products.
(6) Taking into account those conclusions, the authorisation for the placing on the market of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically oilseed rape MON 88302 and of products containing or consisting of genetically modified oilseed rape MON 88302 for uses other than food and feed, with the exception of cultivation, should be renewed.
(7) A unique identifier has been assigned to genetically modified oilseed rape MON 88302, in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 65/2004(5), in the context of its initial authorisation by Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/687. That unique identifier should continue to be used.
(8) As regards the products covered by this Decision, no specific labelling requirements, other than those provided for in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6), appear to be necessary. However, in order to ensure that the use of products containing or consisting of genetically modified oilseed rape MON 88302 remains within the limits of the authorisation granted by this Decision, the labelling of such products, with the exception of foods and food ingredients, should contain a clear indication that they are not intended for cultivation.
(9) The authorisation holder should submit annual reports on the implementation and on the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan for environmental effects. Those results should be presented in accordance with the requirements laid down in Commission Decision 2009/770/EC(7).
(10) The opinion of the Authority does not justify the imposition of specific conditions or restrictions for the placing on the market, for the use and handling, including post-market monitoring requirements regarding the consumption of the food and feed containing, consisting of, or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape MON 88302, or for the protection of particular ecosystems/environment or geographical areas, as provided for in Article 6(5)(e) and Article 18(5)(e) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(11) All relevant information on the authorisation of the products covered by this Decision should be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(12) This Decision is to be notified through the Biosafety Clearing-House to the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity pursuant to Article 9(1) and Article 15(2)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 1946/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(8).
(13) The Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed has not delivered an opinion within the time limit laid down by its Chairman. This implementing act was deemed to be necessary and the chair submitted it to the appeal committee for further deliberation. The appeal committee did not deliver an opinion,
(a) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napusL.) MON-883Ø2-9;
(b) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napusL.) MON-883Ø2-9;
(c) products containing or consisting of genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napusL.) MON-883Ø2-9 for uses other than those provided for in points (a) and (b), with the exception of cultivation.
(a) Applicant and authorisation holder:Name:Bayer CropScience LPAddress:800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri 63167, United States of AmericaRepresented in the Union by: Bayer Agriculture BV, Scheldelaan 460, 2040 Antwerp, Belgium. Name : Bayer CropScience LP Address : 800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri 63167, United States of America
Name : Bayer CropScience LP
Address : 800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri 63167, United States of America
Name : Bayer CropScience LP
Address : 800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri 63167, United States of America
(b) Designation and specification of the products:(1)foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napus L.)MON-883Ø2-9;(2)feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napusL.) MON-883Ø2-9;(3)products containing or consisting of genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napusL.) MON-883Ø2-9 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.The genetically modified oilseed rape MON-883Ø2-9 expresses the CP4 EPSPS gene, which confers tolerance to glyphosate-based herbicides. (1) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napus L.)MON-883Ø2-9; (2) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napusL.) MON-883Ø2-9; (3) products containing or consisting of genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napusL.) MON-883Ø2-9 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.
(1) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napus L.)MON-883Ø2-9;
(2) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napusL.) MON-883Ø2-9;
(3) products containing or consisting of genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napusL.) MON-883Ø2-9 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.
(1) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napus L.)MON-883Ø2-9;
(2) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napusL.) MON-883Ø2-9;
(3) products containing or consisting of genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napusL.) MON-883Ø2-9 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.
(c) Labelling:(1)For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘oilseed rape’.(2)The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of the genetically modified oilseed rape MON-883Ø2-9, with the exception of products referred to in point (b)(1). (1) For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘oilseed rape’. (2) The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of the genetically modified oilseed rape MON-883Ø2-9, with the exception of products referred to in point (b)(1).
(1) For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘oilseed rape’.
(2) The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of the genetically modified oilseed rape MON-883Ø2-9, with the exception of products referred to in point (b)(1).
(1) For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘oilseed rape’.
(2) The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of the genetically modified oilseed rape MON-883Ø2-9, with the exception of products referred to in point (b)(1).
(d) Method for detection:(1)event-specific real-time quantitative PCR methods validated for genetically modified oilseed rape MON-883Ø2-9;(2)validated by the EU Reference Laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttps://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/method-validations(3)reference material: AOCS 1011-A (for MON-883Ø2-9) and AOCS 0304-A (for its non-GM counterpart) are accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society athttps://www.aocs.org/technical-products/certified-reference-materials-crms/. (1) event-specific real-time quantitative PCR methods validated for genetically modified oilseed rape MON-883Ø2-9; (2) validated by the EU Reference Laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttps://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/method-validations (3) reference material: AOCS 1011-A (for MON-883Ø2-9) and AOCS 0304-A (for its non-GM counterpart) are accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society athttps://www.aocs.org/technical-products/certified-reference-materials-crms/.
(1) event-specific real-time quantitative PCR methods validated for genetically modified oilseed rape MON-883Ø2-9;
(2) validated by the EU Reference Laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttps://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/method-validations
(3) reference material: AOCS 1011-A (for MON-883Ø2-9) and AOCS 0304-A (for its non-GM counterpart) are accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society athttps://www.aocs.org/technical-products/certified-reference-materials-crms/.
(1) event-specific real-time quantitative PCR methods validated for genetically modified oilseed rape MON-883Ø2-9;
(2) validated by the EU Reference Laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttps://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/method-validations
(3) reference material: AOCS 1011-A (for MON-883Ø2-9) and AOCS 0304-A (for its non-GM counterpart) are accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society athttps://www.aocs.org/technical-products/certified-reference-materials-crms/.
(e) Unique identifier:MON-883Ø2-9
(f) Information required pursuant to Annex II to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity:[Biosafety Clearing-House, Record ID number:published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed when notified].
(g) Conditions or restrictions on the placing on the market, use or handling of the products:Not required.
(h) Monitoring plan for environmental effects:Monitoring plan for environmental effects in accordance with Annex VII to Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(1).[Link:plan published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed]
(i) Post-market monitoring requirements for the use of the food for human consumptionNot required.
Note: links to the relevant documents may need to be modified over time. Those modifications will be made available to the public via the updating of the Community register of genetically modified food and feed.
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed(1), and in particular to Article 11(3) and Article 23(3) thereof,
(1) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/687(2)authorised the placing on the market of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape MON 88302. The scope of that authorisation also covers the placing on the market of products, other than food and feed, containing or consisting of genetically modified oilseed rape MON 88302 for the same uses as any other oilseed rape, with the exception of cultivation.
(2) On 28 February 2024, Bayer Agriculture B.V., based in Belgium, on behalf of Bayer CropScience LP, based in the United States of America, (‘the applicant’) submitted an application to the Commission, in accordance with Articles 11 and 23 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, for the renewal of that authorisation.
(3) On 13 May 2025, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) issued a favourable scientific opinion on genetically modified oilseed rape MON 88302(3)in accordance with Articles 6 and 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003. It concluded that the renewal application did not contain evidence of any new hazards, modified exposure or scientific uncertainties that would change the conclusions of the original risk assessment on genetically modified oilseed rape MON 88302, issued by the Authority in 2014(4).
(4) In its scientific opinion, the Authority considered all the questions and concerns raised by the Member States in the context of the consultation of the national competent authorities as provided for in Article 6(4) and Article 18(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(5) The Authority also concluded that the monitoring plan for environmental effects, consisting of a general surveillance plan, as submitted by the applicant, is in line with the intended uses of the products.
(6) Taking into account those conclusions, the authorisation for the placing on the market of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically oilseed rape MON 88302 and of products containing or consisting of genetically modified oilseed rape MON 88302 for uses other than food and feed, with the exception of cultivation, should be renewed.
(7) A unique identifier has been assigned to genetically modified oilseed rape MON 88302, in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 65/2004(5), in the context of its initial authorisation by Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/687. That unique identifier should continue to be used.
(8) As regards the products covered by this Decision, no specific labelling requirements, other than those provided for in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6), appear to be necessary. However, in order to ensure that the use of products containing or consisting of genetically modified oilseed rape MON 88302 remains within the limits of the authorisation granted by this Decision, the labelling of such products, with the exception of foods and food ingredients, should contain a clear indication that they are not intended for cultivation.
(9) The authorisation holder should submit annual reports on the implementation and on the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan for environmental effects. Those results should be presented in accordance with the requirements laid down in Commission Decision 2009/770/EC(7).
(10) The opinion of the Authority does not justify the imposition of specific conditions or restrictions for the placing on the market, for the use and handling, including post-market monitoring requirements regarding the consumption of the food and feed containing, consisting of, or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape MON 88302, or for the protection of particular ecosystems/environment or geographical areas, as provided for in Article 6(5)(e) and Article 18(5)(e) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(11) All relevant information on the authorisation of the products covered by this Decision should be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(12) This Decision is to be notified through the Biosafety Clearing-House to the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity pursuant to Article 9(1) and Article 15(2)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 1946/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(8).
(13) The Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed has not delivered an opinion within the time limit laid down by its Chairman. This implementing act was deemed to be necessary and the chair submitted it to the appeal committee for further deliberation. The appeal committee did not deliver an opinion,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Genetically modified organism and unique identifier
Article 1
Genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napusL.) MON 88302, as specified in point (b) of the Annex to this Decision, is assigned the unique identifier MON-883Ø2-9, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 65/2004.

Renewal of the authorisation
Article 2
The authorisation for the placing on the market of the following products is renewed in accordance with the conditions set out in this Decision:
(a)
foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napusL.) MON-883Ø2-9;
(b)
feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napusL.) MON-883Ø2-9;
(c)
products containing or consisting of genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napusL.) MON-883Ø2-9 for uses other than those provided for in points (a) and (b), with the exception of cultivation.

Labelling
Article 3
1. For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘oilseed rape’.
2. The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of genetically modified oilseed rape MON-883Ø2-9, referred to in Article 1, with the exception of products referred to Article 2, point (a).

Method for detection
Article 4
The method set out in point (d) of the Annex shall apply for the detection of genetically modified oilseed rape MON-883Ø2-9.

Monitoring plan for environmental effects
Article 5
1. The authorisation holder shall ensure that the monitoring plan for environmental effects, as set out in point (h) of the Annex, is put in place and implemented.
2. The authorisation holder shall submit to the Commission annual reports on the implementation and the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan in accordance with the format set out in Decision 2009/770/EC.

Community register
Article 6
The information set out in the Annex shall be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed, as referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.

Authorisation holder
Article 7
The authorisation holder shall be Bayer CropScience LP, United States of America, represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Belgium.

Validity
Article 8
This Decision shall apply for a period of 10 years from the date of its notification.

Addressee
Article 9
This Decision is addressed to Bayer CropScience LP, 800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri 63167, United States of America, represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Scheldelaan 460, 2040 Antwerp, Belgium.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed(1), and in particular to Article 11(3) and Article 23(3) thereof,
(1) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/687(2)authorised the placing on the market of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape MON 88302. The scope of that authorisation also covers the placing on the market of products, other than food and feed, containing or consisting of genetically modified oilseed rape MON 88302 for the same uses as any other oilseed rape, with the exception of cultivation.
(2) On 28 February 2024, Bayer Agriculture B.V., based in Belgium, on behalf of Bayer CropScience LP, based in the United States of America, (‘the applicant’) submitted an application to the Commission, in accordance with Articles 11 and 23 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, for the renewal of that authorisation.
(3) On 13 May 2025, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) issued a favourable scientific opinion on genetically modified oilseed rape MON 88302(3)in accordance with Articles 6 and 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003. It concluded that the renewal application did not contain evidence of any new hazards, modified exposure or scientific uncertainties that would change the conclusions of the original risk assessment on genetically modified oilseed rape MON 88302, issued by the Authority in 2014(4).
(4) In its scientific opinion, the Authority considered all the questions and concerns raised by the Member States in the context of the consultation of the national competent authorities as provided for in Article 6(4) and Article 18(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(5) The Authority also concluded that the monitoring plan for environmental effects, consisting of a general surveillance plan, as submitted by the applicant, is in line with the intended uses of the products.
(6) Taking into account those conclusions, the authorisation for the placing on the market of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically oilseed rape MON 88302 and of products containing or consisting of genetically modified oilseed rape MON 88302 for uses other than food and feed, with the exception of cultivation, should be renewed.
(7) A unique identifier has been assigned to genetically modified oilseed rape MON 88302, in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 65/2004(5), in the context of its initial authorisation by Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/687. That unique identifier should continue to be used.
(8) As regards the products covered by this Decision, no specific labelling requirements, other than those provided for in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6), appear to be necessary. However, in order to ensure that the use of products containing or consisting of genetically modified oilseed rape MON 88302 remains within the limits of the authorisation granted by this Decision, the labelling of such products, with the exception of foods and food ingredients, should contain a clear indication that they are not intended for cultivation.
(9) The authorisation holder should submit annual reports on the implementation and on the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan for environmental effects. Those results should be presented in accordance with the requirements laid down in Commission Decision 2009/770/EC(7).
(10) The opinion of the Authority does not justify the imposition of specific conditions or restrictions for the placing on the market, for the use and handling, including post-market monitoring requirements regarding the consumption of the food and feed containing, consisting of, or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape MON 88302, or for the protection of particular ecosystems/environment or geographical areas, as provided for in Article 6(5)(e) and Article 18(5)(e) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(11) All relevant information on the authorisation of the products covered by this Decision should be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(12) This Decision is to be notified through the Biosafety Clearing-House to the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity pursuant to Article 9(1) and Article 15(2)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 1946/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(8).
(13) The Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed has not delivered an opinion within the time limit laid down by its Chairman. This implementing act was deemed to be necessary and the chair submitted it to the appeal committee for further deliberation. The appeal committee did not deliver an opinion,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Genetically modified organism and unique identifier

Genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napusL.) MON 88302, as specified in point (b) of the Annex to this Decision, is assigned the unique identifier MON-883Ø2-9, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 65/2004.

Renewal of the authorisation

The authorisation for the placing on the market of the following products is renewed in accordance with the conditions set out in this Decision:
(a)
foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napusL.) MON-883Ø2-9;
(b)
feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napusL.) MON-883Ø2-9;
(c)
products containing or consisting of genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napusL.) MON-883Ø2-9 for uses other than those provided for in points (a) and (b), with the exception of cultivation.

Labelling

1. For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘oilseed rape’.
2. The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of genetically modified oilseed rape MON-883Ø2-9, referred to in Article 1, with the exception of products referred to Article 2, point (a).

Method for detection

The method set out in point (d) of the Annex shall apply for the detection of genetically modified oilseed rape MON-883Ø2-9.

Monitoring plan for environmental effects

1. The authorisation holder shall ensure that the monitoring plan for environmental effects, as set out in point (h) of the Annex, is put in place and implemented.
2. The authorisation holder shall submit to the Commission annual reports on the implementation and the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan in accordance with the format set out in Decision 2009/770/EC.

Community register

The information set out in the Annex shall be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed, as referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.

Authorisation holder

The authorisation holder shall be Bayer CropScience LP, United States of America, represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Belgium.

Validity

This Decision shall apply for a period of 10 years from the date of its notification.

Addressee

This Decision is addressed to Bayer CropScience LP, 800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri 63167, United States of America, represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Scheldelaan 460, 2040 Antwerp, Belgium.
ANNEX
(a) | Applicant and authorisation holder:Name:Bayer CropScience LPAddress:800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri 63167, United States of AmericaRepresented in the Union by: Bayer Agriculture BV, Scheldelaan 460, 2040 Antwerp, Belgium. | Name | : | Bayer CropScience LP | Address | : | 800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri 63167, United States of America
Name | : | Bayer CropScience LP
Address | : | 800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri 63167, United States of America
(b) | Designation and specification of the products:(1)foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napus L.)MON-883Ø2-9;(2)feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napusL.) MON-883Ø2-9;(3)products containing or consisting of genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napusL.) MON-883Ø2-9 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.The genetically modified oilseed rape MON-883Ø2-9 expresses the CP4 EPSPS gene, which confers tolerance to glyphosate-based herbicides. | (1) | foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napus L.)MON-883Ø2-9; | (2) | feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napusL.) MON-883Ø2-9; | (3) | products containing or consisting of genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napusL.) MON-883Ø2-9 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.
(1) | foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napus L.)MON-883Ø2-9;
(2) | feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napusL.) MON-883Ø2-9;
(3) | products containing or consisting of genetically modified oilseed rape (Brassica napusL.) MON-883Ø2-9 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.
(c) | Labelling:(1)For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘oilseed rape’.(2)The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of the genetically modified oilseed rape MON-883Ø2-9, with the exception of products referred to in point (b)(1). | (1) | For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘oilseed rape’. | (2) | The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of the genetically modified oilseed rape MON-883Ø2-9, with the exception of products referred to in point (b)(1).
(1) | For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘oilseed rape’.
(2) | The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of the genetically modified oilseed rape MON-883Ø2-9, with the exception of products referred to in point (b)(1).
(d) | Method for detection:(1)event-specific real-time quantitative PCR methods validated for genetically modified oilseed rape MON-883Ø2-9;(2)validated by the EU Reference Laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttps://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/method-validations(3)reference material: AOCS 1011-A (for MON-883Ø2-9) and AOCS 0304-A (for its non-GM counterpart) are accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society athttps://www.aocs.org/technical-products/certified-reference-materials-crms/. | (1) | event-specific real-time quantitative PCR methods validated for genetically modified oilseed rape MON-883Ø2-9; | (2) | validated by the EU Reference Laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttps://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/method-validations | (3) | reference material: AOCS 1011-A (for MON-883Ø2-9) and AOCS 0304-A (for its non-GM counterpart) are accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society athttps://www.aocs.org/technical-products/certified-reference-materials-crms/.
(1) | event-specific real-time quantitative PCR methods validated for genetically modified oilseed rape MON-883Ø2-9;
(2) | validated by the EU Reference Laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttps://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/method-validations
(3) | reference material: AOCS 1011-A (for MON-883Ø2-9) and AOCS 0304-A (for its non-GM counterpart) are accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society athttps://www.aocs.org/technical-products/certified-reference-materials-crms/.
(e) | Unique identifier:MON-883Ø2-9
(f) | Information required pursuant to Annex II to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity:[Biosafety Clearing-House, Record ID number:published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed when notified].
(g) | Conditions or restrictions on the placing on the market, use or handling of the products:Not required.
(h) | Monitoring plan for environmental effects:Monitoring plan for environmental effects in accordance with Annex VII to Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(1).[Link:plan published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed]
(i) | Post-market monitoring requirements for the use of the food for human consumptionNot required.
Note: | links to the relevant documents may need to be modified over time. Those modifications will be made available to the public via the updating of the Community register of genetically modified food and feed.
(1) Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC (OJ L 106, 17.4.2001, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2001/18/oj).

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/2554 of 16 December 2025 renewing the authorisation for the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 87708 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (notified under document C(2025) 8555)

Official Journalof the European Union ENL series
2025/2554 18.12.2025
(1) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/700(2)authorised the placing on the market of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 87708. The scope of that authorisation also covered the placing on the market of products other than food and feed containing or consisting of genetically modified soybean MON 87708, for the same uses as any other soybean, with the exception of cultivation.
(2) On 8 March 2024, Bayer Agriculture B.V., based in Belgium, on behalf of Bayer CropScience LP, based in the United States of America, (‘the applicant’) submitted an application to the Commission for the renewal of that authorisation.
(3) On 13 May 2025, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) issued a favourable scientific opinion on genetically modified soybean MON 87708(3)in accordance with Articles 6 and 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003. It concluded that the renewal application did not contain evidence of any new hazards, modified exposure or scientific uncertainties that would change the conclusions of the original risk assessment on genetically modified soybean MON 87708, adopted by the Authority in 2013(4).
(4) In its scientific opinion, the Authority considered all the questions and concerns raised by the Member States in the context of the consultation of the national competent authorities, as provided for in Article 6(4) and Article 18(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(5) The Authority also concluded that the monitoring plan for environmental effects, consisting of a general surveillance plan, as submitted by the applicant, is in line with the intended uses of the products.
(6) Taking into account those conclusions, the authorisation for the placing on the market of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 87708 and of products containing or consisting of genetically modified soybean MON 87708, for uses other than food and feed, with the exception of cultivation, should be renewed.
(7) A unique identifier has been assigned to genetically modified soybean MON 87708 in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 65/2004(5), in the context of the initial authorisation by Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/700. That unique identifier should continue to be used.
(8) As regards the products covered by this Decision, no specific labelling requirements other than those provided for in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6), appear to be necessary. However, in order to ensure that the use of products containing or consisting of genetically modified soybean MON 87708 remains within the limits of the authorisation granted by this Decision, the labelling of such products, with the exception of food and food ingredients, should contain a clear indication that they are not intended for cultivation.
(9) The authorisation holder should submit annual reports on the implementation and on the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan for environmental effects. Those results should be presented in accordance with the requirements laid down in Commission Decision 2009/770/EC(7).
(10) The opinion of the Authority does not justify the imposition of specific conditions or restrictions for the placing on the market, for the use and handling, including post-market monitoring requirements regarding the consumption of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 87708 or for the protection of particular ecosystems/environment and/or geographical areas, as provided for in Article 6(5), point (e), and Article 18(5), point (e) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(11) All relevant information on the authorisation of the products covered by this Decision should be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(12) This Decision is to be notified through the Biosafety Clearing-House to the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity pursuant to Article 9(1) and Article 15(2), point (c) of Regulation (EC) No 1946/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(8).
(13) The Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed has not delivered an opinion within the time limit laid down by its Chairman. This implementing act was deemed to be necessary and the chair submitted it to the appeal committee for further deliberation. The appeal committee did not deliver an opinion,
(a) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9;
(b) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9;
(c) products containing or consisting of genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9, for uses other than those provided for in points (a) and (b), with the exception of cultivation.
(a) Applicant and authorisation holder:Name:Bayer CropScience LPAddress:800 N.Lindbergh Boulevard, St Louis, MO, 63167, United States,represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Scheldelaan 460, 2040, Antwerp, Belgium. Name: Name: Bayer CropScience LP Bayer CropScience LP Address: Address: 800 N.Lindbergh Boulevard, St Louis, MO, 63167, United States, 800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St Louis, MO, 63167, United States, represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Scheldelaan 460, 2040, Antwerp, Belgium. represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Scheldelaan 460, 2040, Antwerp, Belgium.
Name: Name: Bayer CropScience LP Bayer CropScience LP
Name:
Bayer CropScience LP
Address: Address: 800 N.Lindbergh Boulevard, St Louis, MO, 63167, United States, 800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St Louis, MO, 63167, United States,
Address:
800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St Louis, MO, 63167, United States,
represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Scheldelaan 460, 2040, Antwerp, Belgium. represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Scheldelaan 460, 2040, Antwerp, Belgium.
represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Scheldelaan 460, 2040, Antwerp, Belgium.
Name: Name: Bayer CropScience LP Bayer CropScience LP
Name:
Bayer CropScience LP
Address: Address: 800 N.Lindbergh Boulevard, St Louis, MO, 63167, United States, 800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St Louis, MO, 63167, United States,
Address:
800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St Louis, MO, 63167, United States,
represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Scheldelaan 460, 2040, Antwerp, Belgium. represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Scheldelaan 460, 2040, Antwerp, Belgium.
represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Scheldelaan 460, 2040, Antwerp, Belgium.
Name:
Bayer CropScience LP
Address:
800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St Louis, MO, 63167, United States,
represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Scheldelaan 460, 2040, Antwerp, Belgium.
(b) Designation and specification of the products:(1)foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9;(2)feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9;(3)products containing or consisting of genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.The genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9 expresses thedmogene, which confers tolerance to dicamba-based herbicides. (1) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9; (2) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9; (3) products containing or consisting of genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.
(1) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9;
(2) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9;
(3) products containing or consisting of genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.
(1) foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9;
(2) feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9;
(3) products containing or consisting of genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.
(c) Labelling:(1)For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the name of the organism shall be ‘soybean’.(2)The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of the genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9, with the exception of the products referred to in point (b)(1). (1) For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the name of the organism shall be ‘soybean’. (2) The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of the genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9, with the exception of the products referred to in point (b)(1).
(1) For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the name of the organism shall be ‘soybean’.
(2) The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of the genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9, with the exception of the products referred to in point (b)(1).
(1) For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the name of the organism shall be ‘soybean’.
(2) The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of the genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9, with the exception of the products referred to in point (b)(1).
(d) Method for detection:(1)Event specific real-time PCR based method for the quantification of genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9;(2)validated by the EU reference laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttps://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/method-validations;(3)reference material: AOCS 0311-A (for MON-877Ø8-9) and AOCS 0906-A (for the non-GM counterpart) is accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society (AOCS), athttps://www.aocs.org/crm?SSO=True. (1) Event specific real-time PCR based method for the quantification of genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9; (2) validated by the EU reference laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttps://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/method-validations; (3) reference material: AOCS 0311-A (for MON-877Ø8-9) and AOCS 0906-A (for the non-GM counterpart) is accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society (AOCS), athttps://www.aocs.org/crm?SSO=True.
(1) Event specific real-time PCR based method for the quantification of genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9;
(2) validated by the EU reference laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttps://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/method-validations;
(3) reference material: AOCS 0311-A (for MON-877Ø8-9) and AOCS 0906-A (for the non-GM counterpart) is accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society (AOCS), athttps://www.aocs.org/crm?SSO=True.
(1) Event specific real-time PCR based method for the quantification of genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9;
(2) validated by the EU reference laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttps://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/method-validations;
(3) reference material: AOCS 0311-A (for MON-877Ø8-9) and AOCS 0906-A (for the non-GM counterpart) is accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society (AOCS), athttps://www.aocs.org/crm?SSO=True.
(e) Unique identifier:MON-877Ø8-9
(f) Information required under Annex II to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity:[Biosafety Clearing-House, Record ID number:published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed when notified].
(g) Conditions or restrictions on the placing on the market, use or handling of the products:Not required.
(h) Monitoring plan for environmental effects:Monitoring plan for environmental effects in accordance with Annex VII to Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(*1).*[Link:plan published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed] * [Link:plan published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed]
* [Link:plan published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed]
* [Link:plan published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed]
(i) Post-market monitoring requirements for the use of the food for human consumption:Not required.
Note: links to the relevant documents may need to be modified over time. Those modifications will be made available to the public via the updating of the Community register of genetically modified food and feed.
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed(1), and in particular Articles 11(3) and 23(3) thereof,
(1) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/700(2)authorised the placing on the market of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 87708. The scope of that authorisation also covered the placing on the market of products other than food and feed containing or consisting of genetically modified soybean MON 87708, for the same uses as any other soybean, with the exception of cultivation.
(2) On 8 March 2024, Bayer Agriculture B.V., based in Belgium, on behalf of Bayer CropScience LP, based in the United States of America, (‘the applicant’) submitted an application to the Commission for the renewal of that authorisation.
(3) On 13 May 2025, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) issued a favourable scientific opinion on genetically modified soybean MON 87708(3)in accordance with Articles 6 and 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003. It concluded that the renewal application did not contain evidence of any new hazards, modified exposure or scientific uncertainties that would change the conclusions of the original risk assessment on genetically modified soybean MON 87708, adopted by the Authority in 2013(4).
(4) In its scientific opinion, the Authority considered all the questions and concerns raised by the Member States in the context of the consultation of the national competent authorities, as provided for in Article 6(4) and Article 18(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(5) The Authority also concluded that the monitoring plan for environmental effects, consisting of a general surveillance plan, as submitted by the applicant, is in line with the intended uses of the products.
(6) Taking into account those conclusions, the authorisation for the placing on the market of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 87708 and of products containing or consisting of genetically modified soybean MON 87708, for uses other than food and feed, with the exception of cultivation, should be renewed.
(7) A unique identifier has been assigned to genetically modified soybean MON 87708 in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 65/2004(5), in the context of the initial authorisation by Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/700. That unique identifier should continue to be used.
(8) As regards the products covered by this Decision, no specific labelling requirements other than those provided for in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6), appear to be necessary. However, in order to ensure that the use of products containing or consisting of genetically modified soybean MON 87708 remains within the limits of the authorisation granted by this Decision, the labelling of such products, with the exception of food and food ingredients, should contain a clear indication that they are not intended for cultivation.
(9) The authorisation holder should submit annual reports on the implementation and on the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan for environmental effects. Those results should be presented in accordance with the requirements laid down in Commission Decision 2009/770/EC(7).
(10) The opinion of the Authority does not justify the imposition of specific conditions or restrictions for the placing on the market, for the use and handling, including post-market monitoring requirements regarding the consumption of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 87708 or for the protection of particular ecosystems/environment and/or geographical areas, as provided for in Article 6(5), point (e), and Article 18(5), point (e) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(11) All relevant information on the authorisation of the products covered by this Decision should be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(12) This Decision is to be notified through the Biosafety Clearing-House to the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity pursuant to Article 9(1) and Article 15(2), point (c) of Regulation (EC) No 1946/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(8).
(13) The Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed has not delivered an opinion within the time limit laid down by its Chairman. This implementing act was deemed to be necessary and the chair submitted it to the appeal committee for further deliberation. The appeal committee did not deliver an opinion,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Genetically modified organism and unique identifier
Article 1
Genetically modified soybean (Glycine max(L.) Merr.) MON 87708, as specified in point (b) the Annex, is assigned the unique identifier MON-877Ø8-9, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 65/2004.

Renewal of the authorisation
Article 2
The authorisation for the placing on the market of the following products is renewed as regards:
(a)
foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9;
(b)
feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9;
(c)
products containing or consisting of genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9, for uses other than those provided for in points (a) and (b), with the exception of cultivation.

Labelling
Article 3
1. For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the name of the organism shall be ‘soybean’.
2. The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of genetically modified soybean, referred to in Article 1, with the exception of products referred to in Article 2, point (a).

Method for detection
Article 4
The method set out in point (d) of the Annex shall apply for the detection of genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9.

Monitoring for environmental effects
Article 5
1. The authorisation holder shall ensure that the monitoring plan for environmental effects, as set out in point (h) of the Annex, is put in place and implemented.
2. The authorisation holder shall submit to the Commission annual reports on the implementation and the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan in accordance with the format set out in Decision 2009/770/EC.

Community register
Article 6
The information set out in the Annex to this Decision shall be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.

Authorisation holder
Article 7
The authorisation holder shall be Bayer CropScience LP, United States of America, represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Belgium.

Validity
Article 8
This Decision shall apply for a period of 10 years from the date of its notification.

Addressee
Article 9
This Decision is addressed to Bayer CropScience LP, 800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St Louis, MO 63167, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Scheldelaan 460, 2040, Antwerp, BELGIUM.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed(1), and in particular Articles 11(3) and 23(3) thereof,
(1) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/700(2)authorised the placing on the market of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 87708. The scope of that authorisation also covered the placing on the market of products other than food and feed containing or consisting of genetically modified soybean MON 87708, for the same uses as any other soybean, with the exception of cultivation.
(2) On 8 March 2024, Bayer Agriculture B.V., based in Belgium, on behalf of Bayer CropScience LP, based in the United States of America, (‘the applicant’) submitted an application to the Commission for the renewal of that authorisation.
(3) On 13 May 2025, the European Food Safety Authority (‘the Authority’) issued a favourable scientific opinion on genetically modified soybean MON 87708(3)in accordance with Articles 6 and 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003. It concluded that the renewal application did not contain evidence of any new hazards, modified exposure or scientific uncertainties that would change the conclusions of the original risk assessment on genetically modified soybean MON 87708, adopted by the Authority in 2013(4).
(4) In its scientific opinion, the Authority considered all the questions and concerns raised by the Member States in the context of the consultation of the national competent authorities, as provided for in Article 6(4) and Article 18(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(5) The Authority also concluded that the monitoring plan for environmental effects, consisting of a general surveillance plan, as submitted by the applicant, is in line with the intended uses of the products.
(6) Taking into account those conclusions, the authorisation for the placing on the market of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 87708 and of products containing or consisting of genetically modified soybean MON 87708, for uses other than food and feed, with the exception of cultivation, should be renewed.
(7) A unique identifier has been assigned to genetically modified soybean MON 87708 in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 65/2004(5), in the context of the initial authorisation by Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/700. That unique identifier should continue to be used.
(8) As regards the products covered by this Decision, no specific labelling requirements other than those provided for in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6), appear to be necessary. However, in order to ensure that the use of products containing or consisting of genetically modified soybean MON 87708 remains within the limits of the authorisation granted by this Decision, the labelling of such products, with the exception of food and food ingredients, should contain a clear indication that they are not intended for cultivation.
(9) The authorisation holder should submit annual reports on the implementation and on the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan for environmental effects. Those results should be presented in accordance with the requirements laid down in Commission Decision 2009/770/EC(7).
(10) The opinion of the Authority does not justify the imposition of specific conditions or restrictions for the placing on the market, for the use and handling, including post-market monitoring requirements regarding the consumption of food and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON 87708 or for the protection of particular ecosystems/environment and/or geographical areas, as provided for in Article 6(5), point (e), and Article 18(5), point (e) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(11) All relevant information on the authorisation of the products covered by this Decision should be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.
(12) This Decision is to be notified through the Biosafety Clearing-House to the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity pursuant to Article 9(1) and Article 15(2), point (c) of Regulation (EC) No 1946/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council(8).
(13) The Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed has not delivered an opinion within the time limit laid down by its Chairman. This implementing act was deemed to be necessary and the chair submitted it to the appeal committee for further deliberation. The appeal committee did not deliver an opinion,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Genetically modified organism and unique identifier

Genetically modified soybean (Glycine max(L.) Merr.) MON 87708, as specified in point (b) the Annex, is assigned the unique identifier MON-877Ø8-9, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 65/2004.

Renewal of the authorisation

The authorisation for the placing on the market of the following products is renewed as regards:
(a)
foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9;
(b)
feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9;
(c)
products containing or consisting of genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9, for uses other than those provided for in points (a) and (b), with the exception of cultivation.

Labelling

1. For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the name of the organism shall be ‘soybean’.
2. The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of genetically modified soybean, referred to in Article 1, with the exception of products referred to in Article 2, point (a).

Method for detection

The method set out in point (d) of the Annex shall apply for the detection of genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9.

Monitoring for environmental effects

1. The authorisation holder shall ensure that the monitoring plan for environmental effects, as set out in point (h) of the Annex, is put in place and implemented.
2. The authorisation holder shall submit to the Commission annual reports on the implementation and the results of the activities set out in the monitoring plan in accordance with the format set out in Decision 2009/770/EC.

Community register

The information set out in the Annex to this Decision shall be entered in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed referred to in Article 28(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003.

Authorisation holder

The authorisation holder shall be Bayer CropScience LP, United States of America, represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Belgium.

Validity

This Decision shall apply for a period of 10 years from the date of its notification.

Addressee

This Decision is addressed to Bayer CropScience LP, 800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard, St Louis, MO 63167, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Scheldelaan 460, 2040, Antwerp, BELGIUM.
ANNEX
(a) | Applicant and authorisation holder:Name:Bayer CropScience LPAddress:800 N.Lindbergh Boulevard, St Louis, MO, 63167, United States,represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Scheldelaan 460, 2040, Antwerp, Belgium. | Name: | | Name: | Bayer CropScience LP | | Bayer CropScience LP | Address: | | Address: | 800 N.Lindbergh Boulevard, St Louis, MO, 63167, United States, | 800 N. | Lindbergh Boulevard, St Louis, MO, 63167, United States, | represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Scheldelaan 460, 2040, Antwerp, Belgium. | | represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Scheldelaan 460, 2040, Antwerp, Belgium.
Name: | | Name: | Bayer CropScience LP | | Bayer CropScience LP
| Name:
| Bayer CropScience LP
Address: | | Address: | 800 N.Lindbergh Boulevard, St Louis, MO, 63167, United States, | 800 N. | Lindbergh Boulevard, St Louis, MO, 63167, United States,
| Address:
800 N. | Lindbergh Boulevard, St Louis, MO, 63167, United States,
represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Scheldelaan 460, 2040, Antwerp, Belgium. | | represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Scheldelaan 460, 2040, Antwerp, Belgium.
| represented in the Union by Bayer Agriculture B.V., Scheldelaan 460, 2040, Antwerp, Belgium.
(b) | Designation and specification of the products:(1)foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9;(2)feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9;(3)products containing or consisting of genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.The genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9 expresses thedmogene, which confers tolerance to dicamba-based herbicides. | (1) | foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9; | (2) | feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9; | (3) | products containing or consisting of genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.
(1) | foods and food ingredients containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9;
(2) | feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9;
(3) | products containing or consisting of genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9 for uses other than those provided for in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.
(c) | Labelling:(1)For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the name of the organism shall be ‘soybean’.(2)The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of the genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9, with the exception of the products referred to in point (b)(1). | (1) | For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the name of the organism shall be ‘soybean’. | (2) | The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of the genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9, with the exception of the products referred to in point (b)(1).
(1) | For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Article 13(1) and Article 25(2), points (a) and (b), of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the name of the organism shall be ‘soybean’.
(2) | The words ‘not for cultivation’ shall appear on the label of and in the documents accompanying the products containing or consisting of the genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9, with the exception of the products referred to in point (b)(1).
(d) | Method for detection:(1)Event specific real-time PCR based method for the quantification of genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9;(2)validated by the EU reference laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttps://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/method-validations;(3)reference material: AOCS 0311-A (for MON-877Ø8-9) and AOCS 0906-A (for the non-GM counterpart) is accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society (AOCS), athttps://www.aocs.org/crm?SSO=True. | (1) | Event specific real-time PCR based method for the quantification of genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9; | (2) | validated by the EU reference laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttps://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/method-validations; | (3) | reference material: AOCS 0311-A (for MON-877Ø8-9) and AOCS 0906-A (for the non-GM counterpart) is accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society (AOCS), athttps://www.aocs.org/crm?SSO=True.
(1) | Event specific real-time PCR based method for the quantification of genetically modified soybean MON-877Ø8-9;
(2) | validated by the EU reference laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published athttps://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/method-validations;
(3) | reference material: AOCS 0311-A (for MON-877Ø8-9) and AOCS 0906-A (for the non-GM counterpart) is accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society (AOCS), athttps://www.aocs.org/crm?SSO=True.
(e) | Unique identifier:MON-877Ø8-9
(f) | Information required under Annex II to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity:[Biosafety Clearing-House, Record ID number:published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed when notified].
(g) | Conditions or restrictions on the placing on the market, use or handling of the products:Not required.
(h) | Monitoring plan for environmental effects:Monitoring plan for environmental effects in accordance with Annex VII to Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(*1).*[Link:plan published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed] | * | [Link:plan published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed]
* | [Link:plan published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed]
(i) | Post-market monitoring requirements for the use of the food for human consumption:Not required.
Note: | links to the relevant documents may need to be modified over time. Those modifications will be made available to the public via the updating of the Community register of genetically modified food and feed.
(*1) Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC (OJ L 106, 17.4.2001, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2001/18/oj).