Pending: 31990D0014

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Directive 88/407/EEC of 14 June 1988 laying down the animal health requirements applicable to intra-Community trade in and imports of deep-frozen semen of domestic animals of the bovine species (1), and in particular Article 8 thereof; Whereas, in order to draw up a list of third countries from which Member States may authorize importation of semen, it is appropriate to take account of firstly the list of third countries from which Member States authorize imports of bovine animals, secondly of third countries traditionally exporting semen to the Community and finally of the known animal health status of these countries; Whereas, while respecting the limitations arising from the adoption of the list, imports of semen shall continue to be subject to national provisions in respect of health and veterinary inspection in so far as they are not already subject to any Community health protection measures; Whereas further Community measures remain to be adopted in respect of importation of semen; whereas the Commission is continuing its task of preparing such measures with due speed; whereas in the meantime it is necessary to take the first step by drawing up a list of third countries from which Member States authorize importation of semen in order to avoid disruption of trade; Whereas the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
The importation of deep-frozen semen of domestic animals of the bovine species is allowed only from those third countries which appear on the list in the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2
This Decision is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Brussels, 20 December 1989.
For the Commission
Ray MAC SHARRY
Member of the Commission
(1) OJ No L 194, 22. 7. 1988, p. 10.

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Directive 88/407/EEC of 14 June 1988 laying down the animal health requirements applicable to intra-Community trade in and imports of deep-frozen semen of domestic animals of the bovine species (1), and in particular Article 8 thereof; Whereas, in order to draw up a list of third countries from which Member States may authorize importation of semen, it is appropriate to take account of firstly the list of third countries from which Member States authorize imports of bovine animals, secondly of third countries traditionally exporting semen to the Community and finally of the known animal health status of these countries; Whereas, while respecting the limitations arising from the adoption of the list, imports of semen shall continue to be subject to national provisions in respect of health and veterinary inspection in so far as they are not already subject to any Community health protection measures; Whereas further Community measures remain to be adopted in respect of importation of semen; whereas the Commission is continuing its task of preparing such measures with due speed; whereas in the meantime it is necessary to take the first step by drawing up a list of third countries from which Member States authorize importation of semen in order to avoid disruption of trade; Whereas the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The importation of deep-frozen semen of domestic animals of the bovine species is allowed only from those third countries which appear on the list in the Annex to this Decision.
This Decision is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Brussels, 20 December 1989.
For the Commission
Ray MAC SHARRY
Member of the Commission
(1) OJ No L 194, 22. 7. 1988, p. 10.
List of third countries from which Member States authorize importation of deep-frozen semen of domestic animals of the bovine species
1.2 // Australia Austria Canada Czechoslovakia Finland Hungary New Zealand // Poland Romania Sweden Switzerland United States of America Yugoslavia

Pending: 31983D0471

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 805/68 of 27 June 1968 on the common organization of the market in beef and veal (1), as last amended by the Act of Accession of Greece, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 1208/81 of 28 April 1981 determining the Community scale for the classification of carcases of adult bovine animals (2), and in particular the fourth paragraph of Article 5 thereof, Whereas Regulation (EEC) No 1208/81 provided that on-the-spot inspections are to be carried out by a Community Inspection Committee, in order to ensure uniform application of the Community scale for classification in the Community; whereas it is necessary to lay down detailed rules for the implementation of these on-the-spot checks; Whereas the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Beef and Veal, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
The Community Inspection Committee provided for in Article 5 of Regulation (EEC) No 1208/81, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Committee’, shall be responsible for carrying out on-the-spot inspections covering:
(a) the application of the arrangements relating to the Community classification scale for beef carcases;
(b) the inspection of market prices according to the classification scale.

Article 2
1. The Committee shall be composed of Commission experts and experts appointed by the Member States. It will be chaired by one of the Commission experts.
The Member States shall appoint experts on the basis of their independence and ability, particularly in matters of classification of carcases and recording of market prices.
Experts shall not under any circumstances use for personal purposes or divulge information obtained in connection with the work of the Committee.
2. On-the-spot inspections shall be carried out in a given Member State by a delegation of the Committee limited to a maximum of six members, according to the following rules:
– two Commission experts, one of whom shall act as chairman of the Committee,
– one expert of the Member State concerned,
– one expert of the Member State on whose territory the Committee carried out the previous on-the-spot inspection,
– one expert of another Member State which participated in the previous on-the-spot inspection,
– one expert of the Member State on whose territory the Committee will carry out one of the following on-the-spot inspections.
The composition of the Committee for the first inspection shall be decided by the Commission.

Article 3
1. On-the-spot inspections shall be carried out at abattoirs, meat markets, price quotation centres and regional and central services engaged in the implementation of the provision referred to in Article 1.
2. On-the-spot inspections shall be carried out at least once a year in each Member State and may, where necessary, be followed by supplementary visits. To that end, a programme of inspection visits shall be drawn up by the Commission after consulting the Member States. Representatives of the Member State visited may take part in the inspections.
3. Each Member State shall organize the visits which are to be carried out on its territory according to the requirements defined by the Commission. To that end, the Member State shall forward, 30 days before the visit, the detailed programme of the proposed inspection visits to the Commission, which may request any amendment to the programme.
4. The Commission shall inform Member States not later than three weeks prior to each visit of the programme and conduct thereof.

Article 4
1. On completion of each visit, the members of the Committee and the representatives of the Member State visited shall meet to consider the results. The members of the Committee shall then draw conclusions from the visit concerning the points referred to in Article 1.
2. The Committee chairman shall draw up a report containing details of the visit and the conclusions referred to in paragraph 1. The report shall be sent to the Commission and to all Member States as quickly as possible and in any event within 30 days of the completion of the visit.

Article 5
Travel and subsistence expenses of members of the Committee shall be borne by the Commission in accordance with the rules applicable to the reimbursement of travel and subsistence expenses of persons unconnected with the Commission who are called upon by it to act as experts.

Article 6
This Decision is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Brussels, 7 September 1983.
For the Commission
Poul DALSAGER
Member of the Commission
(1) OJ No L 148, 28. 6. 1968, p. 24.
(2) OJ No L 123, 7. 5. 1981, p. 3.

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 805/68 of 27 June 1968 on the common organization of the market in beef and veal (1), as last amended by the Act of Accession of Greece, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 1208/81 of 28 April 1981 determining the Community scale for the classification of carcases of adult bovine animals (2), and in particular the fourth paragraph of Article 5 thereof, Whereas Regulation (EEC) No 1208/81 provided that on-the-spot inspections are to be carried out by a Community Inspection Committee, in order to ensure uniform application of the Community scale for classification in the Community; whereas it is necessary to lay down detailed rules for the implementation of these on-the-spot checks; Whereas the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Beef and Veal, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The Community Inspection Committee provided for in Article 5 of Regulation (EEC) No 1208/81, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Committee’, shall be responsible for carrying out on-the-spot inspections covering:
(a) the application of the arrangements relating to the Community classification scale for beef carcases;
(b) the inspection of market prices according to the classification scale.
1. The Committee shall be composed of Commission experts and experts appointed by the Member States. It will be chaired by one of the Commission experts.
The Member States shall appoint experts on the basis of their independence and ability, particularly in matters of classification of carcases and recording of market prices.
Experts shall not under any circumstances use for personal purposes or divulge information obtained in connection with the work of the Committee.
2. On-the-spot inspections shall be carried out in a given Member State by a delegation of the Committee limited to a maximum of six members, according to the following rules:
– two Commission experts, one of whom shall act as chairman of the Committee,
– one expert of the Member State concerned,
– one expert of the Member State on whose territory the Committee carried out the previous on-the-spot inspection,
– one expert of another Member State which participated in the previous on-the-spot inspection,
– one expert of the Member State on whose territory the Committee will carry out one of the following on-the-spot inspections.
The composition of the Committee for the first inspection shall be decided by the Commission.
1. On-the-spot inspections shall be carried out at abattoirs, meat markets, price quotation centres and regional and central services engaged in the implementation of the provision referred to in Article 1.
2. On-the-spot inspections shall be carried out at least once a year in each Member State and may, where necessary, be followed by supplementary visits. To that end, a programme of inspection visits shall be drawn up by the Commission after consulting the Member States. Representatives of the Member State visited may take part in the inspections.
3. Each Member State shall organize the visits which are to be carried out on its territory according to the requirements defined by the Commission. To that end, the Member State shall forward, 30 days before the visit, the detailed programme of the proposed inspection visits to the Commission, which may request any amendment to the programme.
4. The Commission shall inform Member States not later than three weeks prior to each visit of the programme and conduct thereof.
1. On completion of each visit, the members of the Committee and the representatives of the Member State visited shall meet to consider the results. The members of the Committee shall then draw conclusions from the visit concerning the points referred to in Article 1.
2. The Committee chairman shall draw up a report containing details of the visit and the conclusions referred to in paragraph 1. The report shall be sent to the Commission and to all Member States as quickly as possible and in any event within 30 days of the completion of the visit.
Travel and subsistence expenses of members of the Committee shall be borne by the Commission in accordance with the rules applicable to the reimbursement of travel and subsistence expenses of persons unconnected with the Commission who are called upon by it to act as experts.
This Decision is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Brussels, 7 September 1983.
For the Commission
Poul DALSAGER
Member of the Commission
(1) OJ No L 148, 28. 6. 1968, p. 24.
(2) OJ No L 123, 7. 5. 1981, p. 3.

Pending: 32013D0183

23.4.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 111/52
(1) On 22 December 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/800/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea(1)(the ‘DPRK’) which, inter alia, implemented United Nations Security Council Resolution (‘UNSCR’) 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009).
(2) On 19 December 2011, the Council adopted Decision 2011/860/CFSP(2)which amended Decision 2010/800/CFSP.
(3) On 12 February 2013, the DPRK carried out a nuclear test, in violation of its international obligations under UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2087 (2013), and which represents a serious threat to regional and international peace and security.
(4) On 18 February 2013, the Council adopted Decision 2013/88/CFSP(3)which amended Decision 2010/800/CFSP and inter alia implemented UNSCR 2087 (2013).
(5) On 7 March 2013, the UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 2094 (2013), condemning in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 12 February 2013 in violation and flagrant disregard of the relevant UNSC Resolutions.
(6) In addition, UNSCR 2094 (2013) extends the obligation to prevent any transfers to the DPRK of technical training, advice, services or assistance as imposed in paragraph 8(c) of UNSCR 1718 (2006) to the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as referred to in paragraph 20 of UNSCR 2094 (2013) and to the items referred to in paragraph 22 of that Resolution, and notes that these measures also apply to brokering or intermediary services.
(7) UNSCR 2094 (2013) also extends the financial restrictions provided for by paragraph 8 (d) of UNSCR 1718 (2006) to additional persons and entities and to persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of designated persons and entities, and to entities owned or controlled by them.
(8) UNSCR 2094 (2013) also extends the travel restrictions provided for by paragraph 8 (e) of UNSCR 1718 (2006) to additional persons and to persons acting on behalf of, or at the direction of designated persons.
(9) In addition, UNSCR 2094 (2013) sets out that the travel restrictions provided for by paragraph 8 (e) of UNSCR 1718 (2006) shall also apply to persons whom a State determines are working on behalf of, or at the direction of a designated person or entity, or assisting the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013).
(10) UNSCR 2094 (2013) also determines that a DPRK national working on behalf of, or at the direction of a designated person or entity, or assisting the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013), shall be expelled.
(11) Furthermore, UNSCR 2094 (2013) decides that States shall prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer to, through or from their territories of any financial or other assets or resources, including bulk cash, in relation to activities that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013), or to the evasion of measures imposed by those Resolutions.
(12) UNSCR 2094 (2013) also calls upon States to take measures to prohibit in their territories the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of DPRK banks and to prohibit DPRK banks from establishing new joint ventures and from taking an ownership interest in, or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with banks in their jurisdiction. Equally, States should take measures to prohibit the opening of representative offices or subsidiaries or banking accounts in the DPRK by banks within their territories or under their jurisdiction.
(13) In addition, UNSCR 2094 (2013) prohibits the provision of public financial support for trade with the DPRK where such financial support could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013), or to the evasion of measures imposed by those Resolutions.
(14) UNSCR 2094 (2013) also imposes an obligation to inspect all cargo originating in the DPRK, or that is destined for the DPRK, or brokered or facilitated by the DPRK or its nationals, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf, where there are reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains prohibited items. Where a vessel refuses an inspection, it shall be denied entry.
(15) UNSCR 2094 (2013) also calls upon States to deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft contains prohibited items.
(16) UNSCR 2094 (2013) also extends the prohibition on the supply, sale or transfer of certain military items and technology as set out in paragraphs 8(a) and (b) of UNSCR 1718 (2006) to additional items and technology.
(17) Moreover, UNSCR 2094 (2013) also calls upon all States to prevent the supply, sale or transfer to or from the DPRK or its nationals of any item if the State determines that such item could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or to activities prohibited by UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013).
(18) UNSCR 2094 (2013) clarifies the term “luxury goods”.
(19) UNSCR 2094 (2013) also calls upon all States to exercise enhanced vigilance over DPRK diplomatic personnel.
(20) This Decision respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and in particular the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, the right to property and the right to the protection of personal data. This Decision should be applied in accordance with those rights and principles.
(21) This Decision also fully respects the obligations of Member States under the Charter of the United Nations and the legally binding nature of Security Council Resolutions
(22) For the sake of clarity, Decision 2010/800/CFSP should be repealed and replaced by a new Decision.
(23) Further action by the Union is needed in order to implement certain measures,
(a) arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, with the exception of non-combat vehicles which have been manufactured or fitted with materials to provide ballistic protection, intended solely for protective use of personnel of the Union and its Member States in the DPRK;
(b) all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as determined by the Security Council or the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 12 of UNSCR 1718 (2006) (the ‧Sanctions Committee‧) in accordance with paragraph 8(a)(ii) of UNSCR 1718 (2006), paragraph 5(b) of UNSCR 2087 (2013) and paragraph 20 of UNSCR 2094 (2013), which could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes;
(c) certain other items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or which could contribute to its military activities, which shall include all dual-use goods and technology listed in Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items(4). The Union shall take the necessary measures in order to determine the relevant items to be covered by this provision;
(d) certain key components for the ballistic-missile sector, such as certain types of aluminum used in ballistic-missile related systems. The Union shall take the necessary measures in order to determine the relevant items to be covered by this provision;
(e) any other item that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, activities prohibited by UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013) or by this Decision, or to the evasion of measures imposed by these UNSC Resolutions or by this Decision. The Union shall take the necessary measures in order to determine the relevant items to be covered by this provision.
(a) provide technical training, advice, services, assistance or brokering services, or other intermediary services, related to items and technology referred to in paragraph 1 or to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of those items, directly or indirectly to any person, entity or body in, or for use in, the DPRK;
(b) provide financing or financial assistance related to items and technology referred to in paragraph 1, including, in particular, grants, loans and export credit insurance, as well as insurance and reinsurance, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of these items and technology, or for the provision of related technical training, advice, services, assistance, or brokering services, directly or indirectly to any person, entity or body in, or for use in, the DPRK;
(c) to participate, knowingly or intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibition referred to in points (a) and (b).
(a) banks domiciled in the DPRK;
(b) branches and subsidiaries within the jurisdiction of the Member States of banks domiciled in the DPRK, as listed in Annex IV;
(c) branches and subsidiaries outside the jurisdiction of the Member States of banks domiciled in the DPRK, as listed in Annex V; and
(d) financial entities that are neither domiciled in the DPRK nor within the jurisdiction of the Member States but are controlled by persons and entities domiciled in the DPRK, as listed in Annex V,
(a) exercise continuous monitoring over account activity, including through their programmes on customer due diligence and under their obligations relating to money-laundering and financing of terrorism;
(b) require that all information fields of payment instructions which relate to the originator and beneficiary of the transaction in question be completed, and if that information is not supplied, refuse the transaction;
(c) maintain all records of transactions for a period of five years and make them available to national authorities on request;
(d) if they suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect that funds could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or activities, promptly report their suspicions to the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) or another competent authority designated by the Member State concerned. The FIU or such other competent authority shall have access, directly or indirectly, on a timely basis to the financial, administrative and law enforcement information that it requires to undertake this function properly, including the analysis of suspicious transaction reports.
(a) to establish new joint ventures with banks under the jurisdiction of Member States;
(b) to take an ownership interest in banks under the jurisdiction of Member States;
(c) to establish correspondent banking relationships with banks under the jurisdiction of Member States;
(d) to maintain correspondent banking relationships with banks under the jurisdiction of Member States if Member States have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that this could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missiles programmes or other activities prohibited by UNSC Resolutions 1718(2006), 1874(2009), 2087(2013) or 2094(2013) or by this Decision, or to the evasion of measures imposed by those UNSC Resolutions or by this Decision.
(a) the persons designated by the Sanctions Committee or by the Security Council as being responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, the DPRK's policies in relation to its nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes, together with their family members, or persons acting on their behalf of or at their direction, as listed in Annex I;
(b) the persons not covered by Annex I, as listed in Annex II:(i)who are responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or persons acting on their behalf, or at their direction,(ii)who provide financial services or the transfer to, through, or from the territory of Member States, or involving nationals of Member States or entities organised under their laws, or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources that could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes,(iii)who are involved in, including through the provision of financial services, the supply to or from the DPRK of arms and related material of all types, or the supply to the DPRK of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes; (i) who are responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or persons acting on their behalf, or at their direction, (ii) who provide financial services or the transfer to, through, or from the territory of Member States, or involving nationals of Member States or entities organised under their laws, or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources that could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes, (iii) who are involved in, including through the provision of financial services, the supply to or from the DPRK of arms and related material of all types, or the supply to the DPRK of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes;
(i) who are responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or persons acting on their behalf, or at their direction,
(ii) who provide financial services or the transfer to, through, or from the territory of Member States, or involving nationals of Member States or entities organised under their laws, or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources that could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes,
(iii) who are involved in, including through the provision of financial services, the supply to or from the DPRK of arms and related material of all types, or the supply to the DPRK of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes;
(i) who are responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or persons acting on their behalf, or at their direction,
(ii) who provide financial services or the transfer to, through, or from the territory of Member States, or involving nationals of Member States or entities organised under their laws, or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources that could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes,
(iii) who are involved in, including through the provision of financial services, the supply to or from the DPRK of arms and related material of all types, or the supply to the DPRK of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes;
(c) the persons not covered by Annex I or Annex II working on behalf or at the direction of a person or entity listed in Annex I or Annex II or persons assisting the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013) or of this Decision, as listed in Annex III to this Decision.
(a) as a host country of an international intergovernmental organisation;
(b) as a host country to an international conference convened by, or under the auspices of, the United Nations;
(c) under a multilateral agreement conferring privileges and immunities;
(d) under the 1929 Treaty of Conciliation (Lateran pact) concluded by the Holy See (State of the Vatican City) and Italy.
(a) the persons and entities designated by the Sanctions Committee or by the Security Council as being engaged in or providing support for, including through illicit means, the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missiles-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes, or persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, as listed in Annex I;
(b) the persons and entities not covered by Annex I, as listed in Annex II:(i)that are responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means,(ii)that provide financial services or the transfer to, through, or from the territory of Member States, or involving nationals of Member States or entities organised under their laws, or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources that could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes, or persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them,(iii)that are involved, including through the provision of financial services, in the supply to or from the DPRK of arms and related material of all types, or the supply to the DPRK of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes; (i) that are responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, (ii) that provide financial services or the transfer to, through, or from the territory of Member States, or involving nationals of Member States or entities organised under their laws, or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources that could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes, or persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, (iii) that are involved, including through the provision of financial services, in the supply to or from the DPRK of arms and related material of all types, or the supply to the DPRK of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes;
(i) that are responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means,
(ii) that provide financial services or the transfer to, through, or from the territory of Member States, or involving nationals of Member States or entities organised under their laws, or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources that could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes, or persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them,
(iii) that are involved, including through the provision of financial services, in the supply to or from the DPRK of arms and related material of all types, or the supply to the DPRK of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes;
(i) that are responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means,
(ii) that provide financial services or the transfer to, through, or from the territory of Member States, or involving nationals of Member States or entities organised under their laws, or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources that could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes, or persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them,
(iii) that are involved, including through the provision of financial services, in the supply to or from the DPRK of arms and related material of all types, or the supply to the DPRK of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes;
(c) the persons and entities not covered by Annex I or Annex II working on behalf or at the direction of a person or entity listed in Annex I or Annex II or persons assisting the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013) or of this Decision, as listed in Annex III to this Decision, shall be frozen.
(a) necessary to satisfy basic needs, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;
(b) intended exclusively for the payment of reasonable professional fees and the reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services; or
(c) intended exclusively for the payment of fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for the routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds and economic resources,
(a) necessary for extraordinary expenses. Where appropriate, the Member State concerned shall first notify and get approval from the Sanctions Committee; or
(b) the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment, in which case the funds and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgment, provided that the lien or judgment was entered prior to the date on which the person or entity referred to in paragraph 1 was designated by the Sanctions Committee, the Security Council or by the Council, and is not for the benefit of a person or entity referred to in paragraph 1. Where appropriate the Member State concerned shall first notify the Sanctions Committee.
(a) interest or other earnings on those accounts; or
(b) payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose prior to 14 October 2006,
Name Alias Date of birth Date of designation Other information
1. Yun Ho-jin a.k.a. Yun Ho-chin 13.10.1944 16.7.2009 Director of Namchongang Trading Corporation; oversees the import of items needed for the uranium enrichment programme.
2. Ri Je-son a.k.a. Ri Che-son 1938 16.7.2009 Director of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (GBAE), chief agency directing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear programme; facilitates several nuclear endeavours including GBAE's management of Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre and Namchongang Trading Corporation.
3. Hwang Sok-hwa 16.7.2009 Director in the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (GBAE); involved in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear programme; as Chief of the Scientific Guidance Bureau in the GBAE, served on the Science Committee inside the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research.
4. Ri Hong-sop 1940 16.7.2009 Former director, Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre, oversaw three core facilities that assist in the production of weapons-grade plutonium: the Fuel Fabrication Facility, the Nuclear Reactor, and the Reprocessing Plant.
5. Han Yu-ro 16.7.2009 Director of Korea Ryongaksan General Trading Corporation; involved in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's ballistic missile programme.
6. Paek Chang-Ho Pak Chang-Ho;Paek Ch’ang-Ho Passport: 381420754;Passport Date of Issue: 7 December 2011;Passport Date of Expiration: 7 December 2016;D.O.B. 18 June 1964;P.O.B. Kaesong, DPRK 22.1.2013 Senior official and head of the satellite control center of Korean Committee for Space Technology.
7. Chang Myong-Chin Jang Myong-Jin D.O.B. 1966;Alt. D.O.B. 1965 22.1.2013 General Manager of the Sohae Satellite Launching Station and head of launch center at which the 13 April and 12 December 2012 launches took place.
8. Ra Ky’ong-Su 22.1.2013 Ra Ky’ong-Su is a Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official. In this capacity he has facilitated transactions for TCB. Tanchon was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 as the main DPRK financial entity responsible for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons.
9. Kim Kwang-il 22.1.2013 Kim Kwang-il is a Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official. In this capacity, he has facilitated transactions for TCB and the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). Tanchon was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 as the main DPRK financial entity responsible for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
10. Yo’n Cho’ng Nam 7.3.2013 Chief Representative for the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). The KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK's primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
11. Ko Ch’o’l-Chae 7.3.2013 Deputy Chief Representative for the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). The KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK's primary arms dealer and mainexporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
12. Mun Cho’ng-Ch’o’l 7.3.2013 Mun Cho’ng-Ch’o’l is a TCB official. In this capacity he has facilitated transactions for TCB. Tanchon was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons.
Name Alias Location Date of designation Other information
1. Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation a.k.a. CHANGGWANG SINYONG CORPORATION; a.k.a. EXTERNAL TECHNOLOGY GENERAL CORPORATION; a.k.a. DPRKN MINING DEVELOPMENT TRADING COOPERATION; a.k.a. ‘KOMID’ Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK. 24.4.2009 Primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
2. Korea Ryonbong General Corporation a.k.a. KOREA YONBONG GENERAL CORPORATION; f.k.a. LYONGAKSAN GENERAL TRADING CORPORATION Pot'onggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK; Rakwon- dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK. 24.4.2009 Defence conglomerate specialising in acquisition for DPRK defence industries and support to that country's military-related sales.
3. Tanchon Commercial Bank f.k.a. CHANGGWANG CREDIT BANK; f.k.a., KOREA CHANGGWANG CREDIT BANK Saemul 1-Dong Pyongchon District, Pyongyang, DPRK. 24.4.2009 Main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons.
4. Namchongang Trading Corporation a.k.a. NCG; a.k.a. NAMCHONGANG TRADING; a.k.a. NAM CHON GANG CORPORATION; a.k.a. NOMCHONGANG TRADING CO.; a.k.a. NAM CHONG GAN TRADING CORPORATION Pyongyang, DPRK. 16.7.2009 Namchongang is a DPRK trading company subordinate to the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (GBAE). Namchongang has been involved in the procurement of Japanese-origin vacuum pumps that were identified at a DPRK nuclear facility, as well as nuclear-related procurement associated with a German individual. It has further been involved in the purchase ofaluminium tubes and other equipment specifically suitable for a uranium enrichment programme from the late 1990s. Its representative is a former diplomat who served as DPRK's representative for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities in 2007. Namchongang's proliferation activities are of grave concern given the DPRK's past proliferation activities.
5. Hong Kong Electronics a.k.a. HONG KONG ELECTRONICS KISH CO Sanaee St., Kish Island, Iran. 16.7.2009 Owned or controlled by, or acts or purports to act for or on behalf of Tanchon Commercial Bank and KOMID. Hong Kong Electronics has transferred millions of dollars of proliferation-related funds on behalf of Tanchon Commercial Bank and KOMID (both designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009) since 2007. Hong Kong Electronics has facilitated the movement of money from Iran to the DPRK on behalf of KOMID.
6. Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation a.k.a. KOREA HYOKSIN EXPORT AND IMPORT CORPORATION Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK. 16.7.2009 A DPRK company based in Pyongyang that is subordinate to Korea Ryonbong General Corporation (designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009) and is involved in the development of weapons of mass destruction.
7. General Bureau of Atomic Energy (GBAE) a.k.a. General Department of Atomic Energy (GDAE) Haeudong, Pyongchen District, Pyongyang, DPRK. 16.7.2009 The GBAE is responsible for the DPRK's nuclear programme, which includes the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre and its 5 MWe (25 MWt) plutonium production research reactor, as well as its fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities. The GBAE has held nuclear-related meetings and discussions with the International Atomic Energy Agency. GBAE is the primary DPRK Government agency that oversees nuclear programmes, including the operation of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre.
8. Korean Tangun Trading Corporation Pyongyang, DPRK. 16.7.2009 Korea Tangun Trading Corporation is subordinate to DPRK's Second Academy of Natural Sciences and is primarily responsible for the procurement of commodities and technologies to support DPRK's defence research and development programmes, including, but not limited to, weapons of mass destruction and delivery system programmes and procurement, including materials that are controlled or prohibited under relevant multilateral control regimes.
9. Korean Committee for Space Technology DPRK Committee for Space Technology; Department of Space Technology of the DPRK; Committee for Space Technology; KCST Pyongyang, DPRK 22.1.2013 The Korean Committee for Space Technology (KCST) orchestrated the DPRK’s launches on 13 April 2012 and 12 December 2012 via the satellite control center and Sohae launch area.
10. Bank of East Land Dongbang Bank; Tongbang U’Nhaeng; Tongbang Bank P.O. Box 32,BEL Building,Jonseung-Dung,Moranbong District, Pyongyang, DPRK P.O. Box 32, BEL Building, Jonseung-Dung, Moranbong District, Pyongyang, DPRK 22.1.2013 DPRK financial institution Bank of East Land facilitates weapons-related transactions for, and other support to, arms manufacturer and exporter Green Pine Associated Corporation (Green Pine). Bank of East Land has actively worked with Green Pine to transfer funds in a manner that circumvents sanctions. In 2007 and 2008, Bank of East Land facilitated transactions involving Green Pine and Iranian financial institutions, including Bank Melli and Bank Sepah. The Security Council designated Bank Sepah in Resolution 1747 (2007) for providing support to Iran’s ballistic missile program. Green Pine was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2012.
P.O. Box 32,
BEL Building,
Jonseung-Dung,
Moranbong District, Pyongyang, DPRK
11. Korea Kumryong Trading Corporation 22.1.2013 Used as an alias by the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) to carry out procurement activities. KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporterof goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
12. Tosong Technology Trading Corporation Pyongyang, DPRK 22.1.2013 The Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID) is the parent company of Tosong Technology Trading Corporation. KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
13. Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation Chosun Yunha Machinery Joint Operation Company; Korea Ryenha Machinery J/V Corporation; Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK; Mangungdae-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK; Mangyongdae District, Pyongyang, DPRK 22.1.2013 Korea Ryonbong General Corporation is the parent company of Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation. Korea Ryonbong General Corporation was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is a defence conglomerate specializing in acquisition for DPRK defence industries and support to that country’s military-related sales.
14. Leader (Hong Kong) International Leader International Trading Limited Room 1610 Nan Fung Tower,173 Des Voeux Road,Hong Kong Room 1610 Nan Fung Tower, 173 Des Voeux Road, Hong Kong 22.1.2013 Facilitates shipments on behalf of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
Room 1610 Nan Fung Tower,
173 Des Voeux Road,
Hong Kong
15. Green Pine Associated Corporation Cho’ngsong United Trading Company; Chongsong Yonhap; Ch’o’ngsong Yo’nhap; Chosun Chawo’n Kaebal T’uja Hoesa; Jindallae; Ku’mhaeryong Company LTD; Natural Resources Development and Investment Corporation; Saeingp’il Company c/o Reconnaissance General Bureau Headquarters, Hyongjesan-Guyok, Pyongyang, DPRK;Nungrado, Pyongyang, DPRK 2.5.2012 Green Pine Associated Corporation (“Green Pine”) has taken over many of the activities of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK's primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.Green Pine is also responsible for approximately half of the armsand related materiel exported by the DPRK.Green Pine has been identified for sanctions for exporting arms or related material from North Korea. Green Pine specializes in the production of maritime military craft and armaments, such as submarines, military boats and missile systems, and has exported torpedoes and technical assistance to Iranian defence-related firms.
16. Amroggang Development Banking Corporation Amroggang Development Bank; Amnokkang Development Bank Tongan-dong, Pyongyang, DPRK 2.5.2012 Amroggang, which was established in 2006, is a Tanchon Commercial Bank-related company managed by Tanchon officials. Tanchon plays a role in financing KOMID's sales of ballistic missiles and has also been involved in ballistic missile transactions from KOMID to Iran's Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG). Tanchon Commercial Bank was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK's primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. The Security Council designated SHIG in Resolution 1737 (2006) as an entity involved in Iran’s ballistic missile programme.
17. Korea Heungjin Trading Company Hunjin Trading Co.; Korea Henjin Trading Co.; Korea Hengjin Trading Company Pyongyang, DPRK. 2.5.2012 The Korea Heungjin Trading Company is used by KOMID for trading purposes. It is suspected it has been involved in supplying missile-related goods to Iran’s Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG). Heungjin has been associated with KOMID, and, more specifically, KOMID’s procurement office. Heungjin has been used to procure an advanced digital controller with applications in missile design. KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK's primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. The SecurityCouncil designated SHIG in Resolution 1737 (2006) as an entity involved in Iran’s ballistic missile programme.
18. Second Academy of Natural Sciences 2nd Academy of Natural Sciences; Che 2 Chayon Kwahakwon; Academy of Natural Sciences; Chayon Kwahak-Won; National Defense Academy; Kukpang Kwahak-Won; Second Academy of Natural Sciences Research Institute; Sansri Pyongyang, DPRK 7.3.2013 The Second Academy of Natural Sciences is a national-level organization responsible for research and development of the DPRK’s advanced weapons systems, including missiles and probably nuclear weapons. The Second Academy of Natural Sciences uses a number of subordinate organizations to obtain technology, equipment, and information from overseas, including Tangun Trading Corporation, for use in the DPRK’s missile and probably nuclear weapons programmes. Tangun Trading Corporation was designated by the Sanctions Committee in July 2009 and is primarily responsible for the procurement of commodities and technologies to support DPRK’s defence research and development programmes, including, but not limited to, weapons of mass destruction and delivery system programmes and procurement, including materials that are controlled or prohibited under relevant multilateral control regimes.
19. Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK 7.3.2013 Korea Ryonbong General Corporation is the parent company of Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation. Korea Ryonbong General Corporation was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is a defence conglomerate specializing in acquisition for DPRK defence industries and support to that country’s military-related sales.
P.O. Box 32,
BEL Building,
Jonseung-Dung,
Moranbong District, Pyongyang, DPRK
Room 1610 Nan Fung Tower,
173 Des Voeux Road,
Hong Kong
Name (and possible aliases) Identifying information Reasons
1. CHANG Song-taek (alias JANG Song-Taek) Date of birth: 2.2.1946 or 6.2.1946 or 23.2.1946 (North Hamgyong province)Passport number (as of 2006): PS 736420617 Member of the National Defence Commission. Director of the Administrative Department of the Korean Workers' Party.
2. CHON Chi Bu Member of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy, former technical director of Yongbyon.
3. CHU Kyu-Chang (alias JU Kyu-Chang) Date of birth: between 1928 and 1933 First Deputy Director of the Defence Industry Department (ballistics programme), Korean Workers' Party, Member of the National Defence Commission.
4. HYON Chol-hae Year of birth: 1934 (Manchuria, China) Deputy Director of the General Political Department of the People's Armed Forces (military adviser to late Kim Jong-Il).
5. JON Pyong-ho Year of birth: 1926 Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party, Head of the Central Committee's Military Supplies Industry Department controlling the Second Economic Committee of the Central Committee, member of the National Defence Commission.
6. KIM Yong-chun (alias Young-chun) Date of birth: 4.3.1935Passport number: 554410660 Deputy Chairman of the National Defence Commission, Minister for the People's Armed Forces, special adviser to late Kim Jong-Il on nuclear strategy.
7. O Kuk-Ryol Year of birth: 1931 (Jilin Province, China) Deputy Chairman of the National Defence Commission, supervising the acquisition abroad of advanced technology for nuclear and ballistic programmes.
8. PAEK Se-bong Year of birth: 1946 Chairman of the Second Economic Committee (responsible for the ballistics programme) of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party. Member of the National Defence Commission.
9. PAK Jae-gyong (alias Chae-Kyong) Year of birth: 1933Passport number: 554410661 Deputy Director of the General Political Department of the People's Armed Forces and Deputy Director of the Logistics Bureau of the People's Armed Forces (military adviser to late Kim Jong-II).
10. PYON Yong Rip (alias Yong-Nip) Date of birth: 20.9.1929Passport number: 645310121 (issued on 13.09.2005) President of the Academy of Science, involved in WMD-related biological research.
11. RYOM Yong Director of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (entity designated by the United Nations), in charge of international relations.
12. SO Sang-kuk Date of birth: between 1932 and 1938 Head of the Department of Nuclear Physics, Kim Il Sung University.
13. Lieutenant General Kim Yong Chol (alias: Kim Yong-Chol; Kim Young-Chol; Kim Young-Cheol; Kim Young-Chul) Date of birth: 1946Location: Pyongan-Pukto, North Korea Kim Yong Chol is the commander of Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB).
14. Pak To-Chun Date of birth: 9.3. 1944Place of birth: Jagang, Rangrim Member of the National Security Council. He is in charge of the arms industry. It is reported that he commands the office for nuclear energy. This institution is decisive for DPRK’s nuclear and rocket launcher program.
Name (and possible aliases) Identifying information Reasons
1. Korea Pugang mining and Machinery Corporation ltd Subsidiary of Korea Ryongbong General Corporation (entity designated by the United Nations, 24.4.2009); operates facilities for the production of aluminium powder, which can be used in missiles.
2. Korea Taesong Trading Company Location: Pyongyang Pyongyang-based entity used by the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) for trading purposes (KOMID was designated by the United Nations, 24.4.2009). Korea Taesong Trading Company has acted on behalf of KOMID in dealings with Syria.
3. Korean Ryengwang Trading Corporation Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, North Korea Subsidiary of Korea Ryongbong General Corporation (entity designated by the United Nations, 24.4.2009).
4. Second Economic Committee The Second Economic Committee is involved in key aspects of North Korea’s missile program. The Second Economic Committee is responsible for overseeing the production of North Korea’s ballistic missiles. It also directs the activities of KOMID (KOMID was designated by the United Nations, 24.4.2009). It is a national-level organization responsible for research and development of North Korea’s advanced weapons systems, including missiles and probably nuclear weapons. It uses a number of subordinate organizations to obtain technology, equipment, and information from overseas, including Korea Tangun Trading Corporation, for use in North Korea’s missile and probably nuclear weapons programs.
5. Sobaeku United Corp. (alias Sobaeksu United Corp.) State-owned company, involved in research into, and the acquisition, of sensitive products and equipment. It possesses several deposits of natural graphite, which provide raw material for two processing facilities, which, inter alia, produce graphite blocks that can be used in missiles.
6. Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre Research centre which has taken part in the production of military-grade plutonium. Centre maintained by the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (entity designated by the United Nations, 16.7.2009).
7. Hesong Trading Corporation Pyongyang, DPRK Controlled by Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID) (designated by UNSCR 1718 Sanctions Committee in April 2009): primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Involved in supplies with potential use in ballistic missile program.
8. Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK Controlled by Korea Ryonbong General Corporation (designated by the UNSCR 1718 Sanctions Committee in April 2009): defence conglomerate specialising in acquisition for DPRK defence industries and support to that country's military-related sales
9. Korea International Chemical Joint Venture Company (alias Choson International Chemicals Joint Operation Company; Chosun International Chemicals Joint Operation Company; International Chemical Joint Venture Corporation) Hamhung, South Hamgyong Province, DPRK;Man gyongdae-kuyok, Pyongyang, DPRK;Mangyungdae-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK Controlled by Korea Ryonbong General Corporation (designated by the UNSCR 1718 Sanctions Committee in April 2009): defence conglomerate specialising in acquisition for DPRK defence industries and support to that country's military-related sales
10. Korea Kwangsong Trading Corporation Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK Controlled by Korea Ryonbong General Corporation (designated by the UNSCR 1718 Sanctions Committee in April 2009): defence conglomerate specialising in acquisition for DPRK defence industries and support to that country's military-related sales
11. Munitions Industry Department (a.k.a.: Military Supplies Industry Department) Pyongyang, DPRK Responsible for overseeing activities of North Korea’s military industries, including the Second Economic Committee (SEC) and KOMID. This includes overseeing the development of North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear programmes.Until recently, it was headed by Jon Pyong Ho. Information suggests former Minitions Industry Department (MID) first vice director Chu Kyu-ch’ang (Ju Gyu-chang) is now director of the MID, which is publicly referred to as the Machine Building Industry Department. Chu served as the overall supervisor for North Korea’s missile development, including oversight of the April 5, 2009 Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) missile launch and the failed July 2006 TD-2 launch.
12. Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) (a.k.a.: Chongch’al Ch’ongguk; RGB; KPA Unit 586) Hyongjesan-Guyok, Pyongyang, North Korea;Nungrado, Pyongyang, North Korea. The Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) is North Korea’s premiere intelligence organization, created in early 2009 by the merger of existing intelligence organizations from the Korean Workers’ Party, the Operations Department and Office 35, and the Reconnaissance Bureau of the Korean People’s Army. It falls under direct command of the Ministry of Defence and is primarily in charge of gathering military intelligence. RGB trades in conventional arms and controls the EU-designated North Korean conventional arms firm Green Pine Associated Corporation (Green Pine).
Name (and possible aliases) Identifying information Reasons
1. JON Il-chun Date of birth: 24.8.1941 In February of 2010 KIM Tong-un was discharged from his office as director of Office 39, which is, among other things, in charge of purchasing goods out of the DPRK diplomatic representations bypassing sanctions. He was replaced by JON Il-chun. JON Il-chun is also said to be one of the leading figures in the State Development Bank.
2. KIM Tong-un Former director of "Office 39" of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party, which is involved in proliferation financing.
3. Kim Tong-Myo'ng (a.k.a.: Kim Chin-so'k) Date of birth: 1964,Nationality: North Korean. Kim Tong-Myo'ng acts on behalf of Tanchon Commercial Bank (designated by the 1718 Sanctions Committee in April 2009). Kim Dong Myong has held various positions within Tanchon since at least 2002 and is currently Tanchon's president. He has also played a role in managing Amroggang's affairs (owned or controlled by Tanchon Commercial Bank) using the alias Kim Chin-so'k.
Name (and possible aliases) Identifying information Reasons
1. Korea Daesong Bank (alias: Choson Taesong Unhaeng; Taesong Bank) Address: Segori-dong, Gyongheung St., Potonggang District, PyongyangPhone: 850 2 381 8221Phone: 850 2 18111 ext. 8221Fax: 850 2 381 4576 Address: Segori-dong, Gyongheung St., Potonggang District, Pyongyang Phone: 850 2 381 8221 Phone: 850 2 18111 ext. 8221 Fax: 850 2 381 4576 North Korean financial institution that is directly subordinated to Office 39 and is involved in facilitating North Korea’s proliferation financing projects.
Address: Segori-dong, Gyongheung St., Potonggang District, Pyongyang
Phone: 850 2 381 8221
Phone: 850 2 18111 ext. 8221
Fax: 850 2 381 4576
2. Korea Daesong General Trading Corporation (alias: Daesong Trading; Daesong Trading Company; Korea Daesong Trading Company; Korea Daesong Trading Corporation) Address: Pulgan Gori Dong 1, Potonggang District, PyongyangPhone: 850 2 18111 ext. 8204/8208Phone: 850 2 381 8208/4188Fax: 850 2 381 4431/4432 Address: Pulgan Gori Dong 1, Potonggang District, Pyongyang Phone: 850 2 18111 ext. 8204/8208 Phone: 850 2 381 8208/4188 Fax: 850 2 381 4431/4432 Company that is subordinated to Office 39 and is used to facilitate foreign transactions on behalf of Office 39.Office 39’s Director of Office, Kim Tong-un is listed in Annex V of Council Regulation (EC) No 329/2007.’
Address: Pulgan Gori Dong 1, Potonggang District, Pyongyang
Phone: 850 2 18111 ext. 8204/8208
Phone: 850 2 381 8208/4188
Fax: 850 2 381 4431/4432
3. Korea Kwangson Banking Corp. (KKBC) (a.k.a.: Korea Kwangson Banking Corp; KKBC) Jungson-dong, Sungri Street, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK A subordinate acting on behalf of or at the direction of, owned or controlled by the Korea Ryonbong General Corporation (designated by the UNSCR 1718 Sanctions Committee in April 2009). Provides financial services in support of both Tanchon Commercial Bank (designated by UNSCR1718 Sanctions Committee in April 2009) and Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation (designated by UNSCR1718 Sanctions Committee in July 2009). Since 2008, Tanchon has been utilizing KKBC to facilitate funds transfers likely amounting to millions of dollars, including transfers involving Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) (designated by UNSCR1718 Sanctions Committee in April 2009) related funds from Burma to China in 2009. Additionally, Hyoksin, which the UN described as being involved in the development of weapons of mass destruction, sought to use KKBC in connection with a purchase of dual-use equipment in 2008. KKBC has at least one overseas branch in Dandong, China.
4. Office 39 of The Korean Workers’ Party (a.k.a.: Office #39; Office No. 39; Bureau 39; Central Committee; Third Floor Division 39.) Second KWP Government Building (Korean: Ch’o’ngsa), Chungso’ng, Urban Tower (Korean’Dong), Chung Ward, Pyongyang, North Korea;Chung-Guyok (Central District), Sosong Street, Kyongrim-Dong, Pyongyang, North Korea;Changgwang Street, Pyongyang, North Korea. Office 39 of the Korean Workers’ Party engages in illicit economic activity to support the North Korean government. It has branches throughout the nation that raise and manage funds and is responsible for earning foreign currency for North Korea’s Korean Workers’ Party senior leadership through illicit activities such as narcotics trafficking. Office 39 controls a number of entities inside North Korea and abroad through which it conducts numerous illicit activities including the production, smuggling, and distribution of narcotics. Office 39 has also been involved in the attempted procurement and transfer to North Korea of luxury goods. Office 39 figures among the most important organisations assigned with currency and merchandise acquisition. It is said to have been under the command of late Kim Jong-il. It controls several trading companies some of which are active in illicit activites, among them Daesong General Bureau, part of Daesong group, the largest company group of the country. Office 39 according to some sources entertains representation office in Rome, Beijing, Bangkok,Singapore, Hongkong and Dubai. To the outside office 39 changes name and appearance regularly. Director of office 39, JON il-chun is already listed on the EU sanction list.Office 39 produced methamphetamine in Sangwon, South Pyongan Province and was also involved in the distribution of methamphetamine to small-scale North Korean smugglers for distribution through China and South Korea. Office 39 also operates poppy farms in North Hamkyo’ng Province and North Pyongan Province and produces opium and heroin in Hamhu’ng and Nachin. In 2009, Office 39 was involved in the failed attempt to purchase and export to North Korea – through China – two Italian-made luxury yachts worth more than $15 million. Halted by Italian authorities, the attempted export of the yachts destined for late Kim Jong-il was in violation of United Nations sanctions against North Korea under UNSCR 1718, which specifically require Member States to prevent the supply, sale, or transfer of luxury goods to North Korea. Office 39 previously used Banco Delta Asia to launder illicit proceeds. Banco Delta Asia was identified by the Treasury Department in September 2005 as a ‘primary money laundering concern’ under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act because it represented an unacceptable risk of money laundering and other financial crimes.
Address: Segori-dong, Gyongheung St., Potonggang District, Pyongyang
Phone: 850 2 381 8221
Phone: 850 2 18111 ext. 8221
Fax: 850 2 381 4576
Address: Pulgan Gori Dong 1, Potonggang District, Pyongyang
Phone: 850 2 18111 ext. 8204/8208
Phone: 850 2 381 8208/4188
Fax: 850 2 381 4431/4432
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
(1) On 22 December 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/800/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea(1)(the ‘DPRK’) which, inter alia, implemented United Nations Security Council Resolution (‘UNSCR’) 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009).
(2) On 19 December 2011, the Council adopted Decision 2011/860/CFSP(2)which amended Decision 2010/800/CFSP.
(3) On 12 February 2013, the DPRK carried out a nuclear test, in violation of its international obligations under UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2087 (2013), and which represents a serious threat to regional and international peace and security.
(4) On 18 February 2013, the Council adopted Decision 2013/88/CFSP(3)which amended Decision 2010/800/CFSP and inter alia implemented UNSCR 2087 (2013).
(5) On 7 March 2013, the UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 2094 (2013), condemning in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 12 February 2013 in violation and flagrant disregard of the relevant UNSC Resolutions.
(6) In addition, UNSCR 2094 (2013) extends the obligation to prevent any transfers to the DPRK of technical training, advice, services or assistance as imposed in paragraph 8(c) of UNSCR 1718 (2006) to the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as referred to in paragraph 20 of UNSCR 2094 (2013) and to the items referred to in paragraph 22 of that Resolution, and notes that these measures also apply to brokering or intermediary services.
(7) UNSCR 2094 (2013) also extends the financial restrictions provided for by paragraph 8 (d) of UNSCR 1718 (2006) to additional persons and entities and to persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of designated persons and entities, and to entities owned or controlled by them.
(8) UNSCR 2094 (2013) also extends the travel restrictions provided for by paragraph 8 (e) of UNSCR 1718 (2006) to additional persons and to persons acting on behalf of, or at the direction of designated persons.
(9) In addition, UNSCR 2094 (2013) sets out that the travel restrictions provided for by paragraph 8 (e) of UNSCR 1718 (2006) shall also apply to persons whom a State determines are working on behalf of, or at the direction of a designated person or entity, or assisting the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013).
(10) UNSCR 2094 (2013) also determines that a DPRK national working on behalf of, or at the direction of a designated person or entity, or assisting the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013), shall be expelled.
(11) Furthermore, UNSCR 2094 (2013) decides that States shall prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer to, through or from their territories of any financial or other assets or resources, including bulk cash, in relation to activities that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013), or to the evasion of measures imposed by those Resolutions.
(12) UNSCR 2094 (2013) also calls upon States to take measures to prohibit in their territories the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of DPRK banks and to prohibit DPRK banks from establishing new joint ventures and from taking an ownership interest in, or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with banks in their jurisdiction. Equally, States should take measures to prohibit the opening of representative offices or subsidiaries or banking accounts in the DPRK by banks within their territories or under their jurisdiction.
(13) In addition, UNSCR 2094 (2013) prohibits the provision of public financial support for trade with the DPRK where such financial support could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013), or to the evasion of measures imposed by those Resolutions.
(14) UNSCR 2094 (2013) also imposes an obligation to inspect all cargo originating in the DPRK, or that is destined for the DPRK, or brokered or facilitated by the DPRK or its nationals, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf, where there are reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains prohibited items. Where a vessel refuses an inspection, it shall be denied entry.
(15) UNSCR 2094 (2013) also calls upon States to deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft contains prohibited items.
(16) UNSCR 2094 (2013) also extends the prohibition on the supply, sale or transfer of certain military items and technology as set out in paragraphs 8(a) and (b) of UNSCR 1718 (2006) to additional items and technology.
(17) Moreover, UNSCR 2094 (2013) also calls upon all States to prevent the supply, sale or transfer to or from the DPRK or its nationals of any item if the State determines that such item could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or to activities prohibited by UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013).
(18) UNSCR 2094 (2013) clarifies the term “luxury goods”.
(19) UNSCR 2094 (2013) also calls upon all States to exercise enhanced vigilance over DPRK diplomatic personnel.
(20) This Decision respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and in particular the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, the right to property and the right to the protection of personal data. This Decision should be applied in accordance with those rights and principles.
(21) This Decision also fully respects the obligations of Member States under the Charter of the United Nations and the legally binding nature of Security Council Resolutions
(22) For the sake of clarity, Decision 2010/800/CFSP should be repealed and replaced by a new Decision.
(23) Further action by the Union is needed in order to implement certain measures,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
1. The direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of the following items and technology, including software, to the DPRK by nationals of Member States or through or from the territories of Member States, or using the flag vessels or aircraft of Member States, shall be prohibited, whether or not originating in the territories of the Member States:
(a)
arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, with the exception of non-combat vehicles which have been manufactured or fitted with materials to provide ballistic protection, intended solely for protective use of personnel of the Union and its Member States in the DPRK;
(b)
all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as determined by the Security Council or the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 12 of UNSCR 1718 (2006) (the ‧Sanctions Committee‧) in accordance with paragraph 8(a)(ii) of UNSCR 1718 (2006), paragraph 5(b) of UNSCR 2087 (2013) and paragraph 20 of UNSCR 2094 (2013), which could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes;
(c)
certain other items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or which could contribute to its military activities, which shall include all dual-use goods and technology listed in Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items(4). The Union shall take the necessary measures in order to determine the relevant items to be covered by this provision;
(d)
certain key components for the ballistic-missile sector, such as certain types of aluminum used in ballistic-missile related systems. The Union shall take the necessary measures in order to determine the relevant items to be covered by this provision;
(e)
any other item that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, activities prohibited by UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013) or by this Decision, or to the evasion of measures imposed by these UNSC Resolutions or by this Decision. The Union shall take the necessary measures in order to determine the relevant items to be covered by this provision.
2. It shall also be prohibited to:
(a)
provide technical training, advice, services, assistance or brokering services, or other intermediary services, related to items and technology referred to in paragraph 1 or to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of those items, directly or indirectly to any person, entity or body in, or for use in, the DPRK;
(b)
provide financing or financial assistance related to items and technology referred to in paragraph 1, including, in particular, grants, loans and export credit insurance, as well as insurance and reinsurance, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of these items and technology, or for the provision of related technical training, advice, services, assistance, or brokering services, directly or indirectly to any person, entity or body in, or for use in, the DPRK;
(c)
to participate, knowingly or intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibition referred to in points (a) and (b).
3. The procurement from the DPRK by nationals of Member States, or using the flag vessels or aircraft of Member States, of items or technology referred to in paragraph 1, as well as the provision to nationals of Member States by the DPRK of technical training, advice, services, assistance, financing and financial assistance referred to in paragraph 2, shall also be prohibited, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK.

Article 2
The direct or indirect sale, purchase, transportation or brokering of gold and precious metals, as well as of diamonds, to, from or for the Government of the DPRK, its public bodies, corporations and agencies, the Central Bank of the DPRK, as well as to, from or for persons and entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them shall be prohibited. The Union shall take the necessary measures in order to determine the relevant items to be covered by this provision.

Article 3
The delivery of newly printed or minted or unissued DPRK denominated banknotes and coinage to or for the benefit of the Central Bank of the DPRK shall be prohibited.

Article 4
The direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of luxury goods to the DPRK by nationals of Member States or through or from the territories of Member States, or using the flag vessels or aircraft of Member States, shall be prohibited whether originating or not in the territories of Member States. The Union shall take the necessary measures in order to determine the relevant items to be covered by this provision.

Article 5
Member States shall not provide public financial support for trade with the DPRK, including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance, to their nationals or entities involved in such trade, where such financial support could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or activities, or other activities prohibited by UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013) or by this Decision, or to the evasion of measures imposed by those Resolutions or by this Decision.

Article 6
Member States shall not enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance or concessional loans to the DPRK, including through their participation in international financial institutions, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes directly addressing the need of the civilian population or the promotion of denuclearisation. Member States shall also exercise vigilance with a view to reducing current commitments and, if possible, putting an end to them.

Article 7
1. In order to prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer to, through, or from the territory of Member States, or to or by nationals of Member States or entities organised under their laws, or persons or financial institutions within their jurisdiction, of any financial or other assets or resources, including bulk cash, that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or activities, or other activities prohibited by UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013) or by this Decision, or to the evasion of measures imposed by those Resolutions or by this Decision, Member States shall exercise enhanced monitoring, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, of the activities of financial institutions within their jurisdiction with:
(a)
banks domiciled in the DPRK;
(b)
branches and subsidiaries within the jurisdiction of the Member States of banks domiciled in the DPRK, as listed in Annex IV;
(c)
branches and subsidiaries outside the jurisdiction of the Member States of banks domiciled in the DPRK, as listed in Annex V; and
(d)
financial entities that are neither domiciled in the DPRK nor within the jurisdiction of the Member States but are controlled by persons and entities domiciled in the DPRK, as listed in Annex V,
in order to avoid such activities contributing to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or activities.
2. For the above purpose, financial institutions shall be required, in their activities with banks and financial entities set out in paragraph 1, to:
(a)
exercise continuous monitoring over account activity, including through their programmes on customer due diligence and under their obligations relating to money-laundering and financing of terrorism;
(b)
require that all information fields of payment instructions which relate to the originator and beneficiary of the transaction in question be completed, and if that information is not supplied, refuse the transaction;
(c)
maintain all records of transactions for a period of five years and make them available to national authorities on request;
(d)
if they suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect that funds could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or activities, promptly report their suspicions to the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) or another competent authority designated by the Member State concerned. The FIU or such other competent authority shall have access, directly or indirectly, on a timely basis to the financial, administrative and law enforcement information that it requires to undertake this function properly, including the analysis of suspicious transaction reports.

Article 8
1. The opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of DPRK banks, including the Central Bank of DPRK, its branches and subsidiaries, and of other financial entities referred to in Article 7(1), in the territories of Member States shall be prohibited.
2. It shall be prohibited for DPRK banks, including the Central Bank of DPRK, its branches and subsidiaries, and for other financial entities referred to in Article 7(1):
(a)
to establish new joint ventures with banks under the jurisdiction of Member States;
(b)
to take an ownership interest in banks under the jurisdiction of Member States;
(c)
to establish correspondent banking relationships with banks under the jurisdiction of Member States;
(d)
to maintain correspondent banking relationships with banks under the jurisdiction of Member States if Member States have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that this could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missiles programmes or other activities prohibited by UNSC Resolutions 1718(2006), 1874(2009), 2087(2013) or 2094(2013) or by this Decision, or to the evasion of measures imposed by those UNSC Resolutions or by this Decision.
3. Financial institutions within the territories of Member States or under their jurisdiction shall be prohibited from opening representative offices, subsidiaries, branches or banking accounts in the DPRK.

Article 9
The direct or indirect sale or purchase of, or brokering or assistance in the issuance of DPRK public or public-guaranteed bonds issued after 18 February 2013 to and from the Government of the DPRK, its public bodies, corporations and agencies, the Central Bank of the DPRK, or banks domiciled in the DPRK, or branches and subsidiaries within and outside the jurisdiction of Member States of banks domiciled in the DPRK, or financial entities that are neither domiciled in the DPRK nor within the jurisdiction of the Member States, but are controlled by persons and entities domiciled in the DPRK as well as any persons and entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, shall be prohibited.

Article 10
1. Member States shall inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, all cargo to and from the DPRK in their territory, or transiting through their territory, or cargo brokered or facilitated by the DPRK or DPRK nationals, or persons or entities acting on their behalf, including at their airports and seaports, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items whose supply, sale, transfer or export is prohibited under UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013) or under this Decision.
2. Member States shall inspect vessels, with the consent of the flag State, on the high seas, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo of such vessels contains items whose supply, sale, transfer or export is prohibited under this Decision.
3. Member States shall cooperate, in accordance with their national legislation, with inspections pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2.
4. Aircrafts and vessels transporting cargo to and from the DPRK shall be subject to the requirement of additional pre-arrival or pre-departure information for all goods brought into or out of a Member State.
5. In cases where inspection referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 is undertaken, Member States shall seize and dispose of items whose supply, sale, transfer or export is prohibited under this Decision in accordance with paragraph 14 of UNSCR 1874 (2009) and paragraph 8 of UNSCR 2087 (2013).
6. Member States shall deny entry into their ports of any vessel that has refused to allow an inspection after such an inspection has been authorized by the vessel’s flag State, or if any DPRK-flagged vessel has refused to be inspected pursuant to paragraph 12 of UNSCR 1874 (2009).
7. Paragraph 6 shall not apply where entry is required for the purpose of an inspection, or in the case of an emergency or in the case of return to its port of origin.

Article 11
1. Member States shall deny permission to land in, take off from or overfly their territory to any aircraft, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items whose supply, sale, transfer or export is prohibited under UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013) or under this Decision.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply in the case of an emergency landing.

Article 12
The provision by nationals of Member States or from the territories of Member States of bunkering or ship supply services, or other servicing of vessels, to DPRK vessels shall be prohibited if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the vessels carry items whose supply, sale, transfer or export is prohibited under this Decision unless provision of such services is necessary for humanitarian purposes or until the cargo has been inspected, and seized and disposed of if necessary, in accordance with Article 10 (1), (2) and (5).

Article 13
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of:
(a)
the persons designated by the Sanctions Committee or by the Security Council as being responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, the DPRK’s policies in relation to its nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes, together with their family members, or persons acting on their behalf of or at their direction, as listed in Annex I;
(b)
the persons not covered by Annex I, as listed in Annex II:
(i)
who are responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or persons acting on their behalf, or at their direction,
(ii)
who provide financial services or the transfer to, through, or from the territory of Member States, or involving nationals of Member States or entities organised under their laws, or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes,
(iii)
who are involved in, including through the provision of financial services, the supply to or from the DPRK of arms and related material of all types, or the supply to the DPRK of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes;
(c)
the persons not covered by Annex I or Annex II working on behalf or at the direction of a person or entity listed in Annex I or Annex II or persons assisting the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013) or of this Decision, as listed in Annex III to this Decision.
2. Paragraph 1(a) shall not apply where the Sanctions Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Sanctions Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013).
3. Paragraph 1 shall not oblige a Member State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory.
4. Paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to cases where a Member State is bound by an obligation of international law, namely:
(a)
as a host country of an international intergovernmental organisation;
(b)
as a host country to an international conference convened by, or under the auspices of, the United Nations;
(c)
under a multilateral agreement conferring privileges and immunities;
(d)
under the 1929 Treaty of Conciliation (Lateran pact) concluded by the Holy See (State of the Vatican City) and Italy.
5. Paragraph 4 shall also be considered as applying in cases where a Member State is host country of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
6. The Council shall be duly informed in all cases where a Member State grants an exemption pursuant to paragraphs 4 or 5.
7. Member States may grant exemptions from the measures imposed in paragraph 1(b) where travel is justified on the grounds of urgent humanitarian need, or on grounds of attending intergovernmental meetings, including those promoted by the Union, or hosted by a Member State holding the Chairmanship in office of the OSCE, where a political dialogue is conducted that directly promotes democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the DPRK.
8. A Member State wishing to grant exemptions referred to in paragraph 7 shall notify the Council thereof in writing. The exemption shall be deemed to be granted unless one or more of the Council Members raises an objection in writing within two working days of receiving notification of the proposed exemption. Should one or more of the Council Members raise an objection, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide to grant the proposed exemption.
9. Paragraph 1(c) shall not apply in case of transit of representatives of the Government of the DPRK to the United Nations Headquarters to conduct United Nations business.
10. In cases where, pursuant to paragraphs 4, 5, 7 and 9 a Member State authorises the entry into, or transit through, its territory of persons listed in Annex I, II or III, the authorisation shall be limited to the purpose for which it is given and to the persons concerned thereby.
11. Member States shall exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into, or transit through their territories of individuals working on behalf or at the direction of a designated individual or entity as listed in Annex I.

Article 14
1. Member States shall expel DPRK nationals whom they determine are working on behalf of, or at the direction of a person or entity listed in Annex I or Annex II, or whom they determine are assisting the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of UNSC Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013) or of this Decision, from their territories for the purpose of repatriation to the DPRK, consistent with applicable national and international law.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where the presence of a person is required for fulfillment of a judicial process or exclusively for medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes.

Article 15
1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled, directly or indirectly, by:
(a)
the persons and entities designated by the Sanctions Committee or by the Security Council as being engaged in or providing support for, including through illicit means, the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missiles-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes, or persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, as listed in Annex I;
(b)
the persons and entities not covered by Annex I, as listed in Annex II:
(i)
that are responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means,
(ii)
that provide financial services or the transfer to, through, or from the territory of Member States, or involving nationals of Member States or entities organised under their laws, or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes, or persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them,
(iii)
that are involved, including through the provision of financial services, in the supply to or from the DPRK of arms and related material of all types, or the supply to the DPRK of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes;
(c)
the persons and entities not covered by Annex I or Annex II working on behalf or at the direction of a person or entity listed in Annex I or Annex II or persons assisting the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013) or of this Decision, as listed in Annex III to this Decision, shall be frozen.
2. No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of persons and entities referred to in paragraph 1.
3. Exemptions may be made for funds and economic resources which are:
(a)
necessary to satisfy basic needs, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;
(b)
intended exclusively for the payment of reasonable professional fees and the reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services; or
(c)
intended exclusively for the payment of fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for the routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds and economic resources,
after notification where appropriate by the Member State concerned to the Sanctions Committee of the intention to authorise access to such funds and economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Sanctions Committee within five working days of such notification.
4. Exemptions may also be made for funds and economic resources which are:
(a)
necessary for extraordinary expenses. Where appropriate, the Member State concerned shall first notify and get approval from the Sanctions Committee; or
(b)
the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment, in which case the funds and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgment, provided that the lien or judgment was entered prior to the date on which the person or entity referred to in paragraph 1 was designated by the Sanctions Committee, the Security Council or by the Council, and is not for the benefit of a person or entity referred to in paragraph 1. Where appropriate the Member State concerned shall first notify the Sanctions Committee.
5. Paragraph 2 shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of:
(a)
interest or other earnings on those accounts; or
(b)
payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose prior to 14 October 2006,
provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to paragraph 1.

Article 16
Member States shall take the necessary measures to exercise vigilance and prevent specialised teaching or training of DPRK nationals, within their territories or by their nationals, of disciplines which would contribute to the DPRK’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.

Article 17
Member States shall, in accordance with international law, exercise enhanced vigilance over DPRK diplomatic personnel so as to prevent such individuals from contributing to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013) or by this Decision, or to the evasion of measures imposed by those UNSC Resolutions or by this Decision.

Article 18
No claims, including for compensation or indemnification or any other claim of this kind, such as a claim of set-off, fines or a claim under a guarantee, claims for extension or payment of a bond, financial guarantee, including claims arising from letters of credit and similar instruments, in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which was affected, directly or indirectly, wholly or in part, by reason of measures decided on pursuant to UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013), including measures of the Union or any Member State in accordance with, as required by or in any connection with, the implementation of the relevant decisions of the Security Council or measures covered by this Decision, shall be granted to the designated persons or entities listed in Annexes I, II or III, or any other person or entity in the DPRK, including the Government of the DPRK, its public bodies, corporations and agencies, or any person or entity claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity.

Article 19
1. The Council shall adopt modifications to Annex I on the basis of the determinations made by the Security Council or by the Sanctions Committee.
2. The Council, acting by unanimity on a proposal from Member States or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall establish the lists in Annex II or III and adopt modifications thereto.

Article 20
1. Where the Security Council or the Sanctions Committee lists a person or entity, the Council shall include such person or entity in Annex I.
2. Where the Council decides to subject a person or entity to the measures referred to in points (b) and (c) of Article 13(1) and point (b) of Article 15(1), it shall amend Annex II or III accordingly.
3. The Council shall communicate its decision to the person or entity referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, including the grounds for listing, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing such person or entity an opportunity to present observations.
4. Where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review its decision and inform the person or entity accordingly.

Article 21
1. Annexes I, II and III shall include the grounds for listing of listed persons and entities, as provided by the Security Council or by the Sanctions Committee with regard to Annex I.
2. Annexes I, II and III shall also include, where available, information necessary to identify the persons or entities concerned, as provided by the Security Council or by the Sanctions Committee for Annex I. With regard to persons, such information may include names including aliases, date and place of birth, nationality, passport and ID card numbers, gender, address, if known, and function or profession. With regard to entities, such information may include names, place and date of registration, registration number and place of business. Annex I shall also include the date of designation by the Security Council or by the Sanctions Committee.

Article 22
1. This Decision shall be reviewed, and, if necessary, amended, in particular as regards the categories of persons, entities or items or additional persons, entities or items to be covered by the restrictive measures, or taking into account relevant Security Council Resolutions.
2. The measures referred to in points (b) and (c) of Article 13(1) and point (b) of 15(1) shall be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every 12 months. They shall cease to apply in respect of the persons and entities concerned if the Council determines, in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 19(2), that the conditions for their application are no longer met.

Article 23
Decision 2010/800/CFSP is hereby repealed.

Article 24
This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
(1) On 22 December 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/800/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea(1)(the ‘DPRK’) which, inter alia, implemented United Nations Security Council Resolution (‘UNSCR’) 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009).
(2) On 19 December 2011, the Council adopted Decision 2011/860/CFSP(2)which amended Decision 2010/800/CFSP.
(3) On 12 February 2013, the DPRK carried out a nuclear test, in violation of its international obligations under UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2087 (2013), and which represents a serious threat to regional and international peace and security.
(4) On 18 February 2013, the Council adopted Decision 2013/88/CFSP(3)which amended Decision 2010/800/CFSP and inter alia implemented UNSCR 2087 (2013).
(5) On 7 March 2013, the UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 2094 (2013), condemning in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 12 February 2013 in violation and flagrant disregard of the relevant UNSC Resolutions.
(6) In addition, UNSCR 2094 (2013) extends the obligation to prevent any transfers to the DPRK of technical training, advice, services or assistance as imposed in paragraph 8(c) of UNSCR 1718 (2006) to the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as referred to in paragraph 20 of UNSCR 2094 (2013) and to the items referred to in paragraph 22 of that Resolution, and notes that these measures also apply to brokering or intermediary services.
(7) UNSCR 2094 (2013) also extends the financial restrictions provided for by paragraph 8 (d) of UNSCR 1718 (2006) to additional persons and entities and to persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of designated persons and entities, and to entities owned or controlled by them.
(8) UNSCR 2094 (2013) also extends the travel restrictions provided for by paragraph 8 (e) of UNSCR 1718 (2006) to additional persons and to persons acting on behalf of, or at the direction of designated persons.
(9) In addition, UNSCR 2094 (2013) sets out that the travel restrictions provided for by paragraph 8 (e) of UNSCR 1718 (2006) shall also apply to persons whom a State determines are working on behalf of, or at the direction of a designated person or entity, or assisting the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013).
(10) UNSCR 2094 (2013) also determines that a DPRK national working on behalf of, or at the direction of a designated person or entity, or assisting the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013), shall be expelled.
(11) Furthermore, UNSCR 2094 (2013) decides that States shall prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer to, through or from their territories of any financial or other assets or resources, including bulk cash, in relation to activities that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013), or to the evasion of measures imposed by those Resolutions.
(12) UNSCR 2094 (2013) also calls upon States to take measures to prohibit in their territories the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of DPRK banks and to prohibit DPRK banks from establishing new joint ventures and from taking an ownership interest in, or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with banks in their jurisdiction. Equally, States should take measures to prohibit the opening of representative offices or subsidiaries or banking accounts in the DPRK by banks within their territories or under their jurisdiction.
(13) In addition, UNSCR 2094 (2013) prohibits the provision of public financial support for trade with the DPRK where such financial support could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013), or to the evasion of measures imposed by those Resolutions.
(14) UNSCR 2094 (2013) also imposes an obligation to inspect all cargo originating in the DPRK, or that is destined for the DPRK, or brokered or facilitated by the DPRK or its nationals, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf, where there are reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains prohibited items. Where a vessel refuses an inspection, it shall be denied entry.
(15) UNSCR 2094 (2013) also calls upon States to deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft contains prohibited items.
(16) UNSCR 2094 (2013) also extends the prohibition on the supply, sale or transfer of certain military items and technology as set out in paragraphs 8(a) and (b) of UNSCR 1718 (2006) to additional items and technology.
(17) Moreover, UNSCR 2094 (2013) also calls upon all States to prevent the supply, sale or transfer to or from the DPRK or its nationals of any item if the State determines that such item could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or to activities prohibited by UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013).
(18) UNSCR 2094 (2013) clarifies the term “luxury goods”.
(19) UNSCR 2094 (2013) also calls upon all States to exercise enhanced vigilance over DPRK diplomatic personnel.
(20) This Decision respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and in particular the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, the right to property and the right to the protection of personal data. This Decision should be applied in accordance with those rights and principles.
(21) This Decision also fully respects the obligations of Member States under the Charter of the United Nations and the legally binding nature of Security Council Resolutions
(22) For the sake of clarity, Decision 2010/800/CFSP should be repealed and replaced by a new Decision.
(23) Further action by the Union is needed in order to implement certain measures,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
1. The direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of the following items and technology, including software, to the DPRK by nationals of Member States or through or from the territories of Member States, or using the flag vessels or aircraft of Member States, shall be prohibited, whether or not originating in the territories of the Member States:
(a)
arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, with the exception of non-combat vehicles which have been manufactured or fitted with materials to provide ballistic protection, intended solely for protective use of personnel of the Union and its Member States in the DPRK;
(b)
all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as determined by the Security Council or the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 12 of UNSCR 1718 (2006) (the ‧Sanctions Committee‧) in accordance with paragraph 8(a)(ii) of UNSCR 1718 (2006), paragraph 5(b) of UNSCR 2087 (2013) and paragraph 20 of UNSCR 2094 (2013), which could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes;
(c)
certain other items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or which could contribute to its military activities, which shall include all dual-use goods and technology listed in Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items(4). The Union shall take the necessary measures in order to determine the relevant items to be covered by this provision;
(d)
certain key components for the ballistic-missile sector, such as certain types of aluminum used in ballistic-missile related systems. The Union shall take the necessary measures in order to determine the relevant items to be covered by this provision;
(e)
any other item that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, activities prohibited by UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013) or by this Decision, or to the evasion of measures imposed by these UNSC Resolutions or by this Decision. The Union shall take the necessary measures in order to determine the relevant items to be covered by this provision.
2. It shall also be prohibited to:
(a)
provide technical training, advice, services, assistance or brokering services, or other intermediary services, related to items and technology referred to in paragraph 1 or to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of those items, directly or indirectly to any person, entity or body in, or for use in, the DPRK;
(b)
provide financing or financial assistance related to items and technology referred to in paragraph 1, including, in particular, grants, loans and export credit insurance, as well as insurance and reinsurance, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of these items and technology, or for the provision of related technical training, advice, services, assistance, or brokering services, directly or indirectly to any person, entity or body in, or for use in, the DPRK;
(c)
to participate, knowingly or intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibition referred to in points (a) and (b).
3. The procurement from the DPRK by nationals of Member States, or using the flag vessels or aircraft of Member States, of items or technology referred to in paragraph 1, as well as the provision to nationals of Member States by the DPRK of technical training, advice, services, assistance, financing and financial assistance referred to in paragraph 2, shall also be prohibited, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK.
The direct or indirect sale, purchase, transportation or brokering of gold and precious metals, as well as of diamonds, to, from or for the Government of the DPRK, its public bodies, corporations and agencies, the Central Bank of the DPRK, as well as to, from or for persons and entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them shall be prohibited. The Union shall take the necessary measures in order to determine the relevant items to be covered by this provision.
The delivery of newly printed or minted or unissued DPRK denominated banknotes and coinage to or for the benefit of the Central Bank of the DPRK shall be prohibited.
The direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of luxury goods to the DPRK by nationals of Member States or through or from the territories of Member States, or using the flag vessels or aircraft of Member States, shall be prohibited whether originating or not in the territories of Member States. The Union shall take the necessary measures in order to determine the relevant items to be covered by this provision.
Member States shall not provide public financial support for trade with the DPRK, including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance, to their nationals or entities involved in such trade, where such financial support could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or activities, or other activities prohibited by UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013) or by this Decision, or to the evasion of measures imposed by those Resolutions or by this Decision.
Member States shall not enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance or concessional loans to the DPRK, including through their participation in international financial institutions, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes directly addressing the need of the civilian population or the promotion of denuclearisation. Member States shall also exercise vigilance with a view to reducing current commitments and, if possible, putting an end to them.
1. In order to prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer to, through, or from the territory of Member States, or to or by nationals of Member States or entities organised under their laws, or persons or financial institutions within their jurisdiction, of any financial or other assets or resources, including bulk cash, that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or activities, or other activities prohibited by UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013) or by this Decision, or to the evasion of measures imposed by those Resolutions or by this Decision, Member States shall exercise enhanced monitoring, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, of the activities of financial institutions within their jurisdiction with:
(a)
banks domiciled in the DPRK;
(b)
branches and subsidiaries within the jurisdiction of the Member States of banks domiciled in the DPRK, as listed in Annex IV;
(c)
branches and subsidiaries outside the jurisdiction of the Member States of banks domiciled in the DPRK, as listed in Annex V; and
(d)
financial entities that are neither domiciled in the DPRK nor within the jurisdiction of the Member States but are controlled by persons and entities domiciled in the DPRK, as listed in Annex V,
in order to avoid such activities contributing to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or activities.
2. For the above purpose, financial institutions shall be required, in their activities with banks and financial entities set out in paragraph 1, to:
(a)
exercise continuous monitoring over account activity, including through their programmes on customer due diligence and under their obligations relating to money-laundering and financing of terrorism;
(b)
require that all information fields of payment instructions which relate to the originator and beneficiary of the transaction in question be completed, and if that information is not supplied, refuse the transaction;
(c)
maintain all records of transactions for a period of five years and make them available to national authorities on request;
(d)
if they suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect that funds could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or activities, promptly report their suspicions to the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) or another competent authority designated by the Member State concerned. The FIU or such other competent authority shall have access, directly or indirectly, on a timely basis to the financial, administrative and law enforcement information that it requires to undertake this function properly, including the analysis of suspicious transaction reports.
1. The opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of DPRK banks, including the Central Bank of DPRK, its branches and subsidiaries, and of other financial entities referred to in Article 7(1), in the territories of Member States shall be prohibited.
2. It shall be prohibited for DPRK banks, including the Central Bank of DPRK, its branches and subsidiaries, and for other financial entities referred to in Article 7(1):
(a)
to establish new joint ventures with banks under the jurisdiction of Member States;
(b)
to take an ownership interest in banks under the jurisdiction of Member States;
(c)
to establish correspondent banking relationships with banks under the jurisdiction of Member States;
(d)
to maintain correspondent banking relationships with banks under the jurisdiction of Member States if Member States have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that this could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missiles programmes or other activities prohibited by UNSC Resolutions 1718(2006), 1874(2009), 2087(2013) or 2094(2013) or by this Decision, or to the evasion of measures imposed by those UNSC Resolutions or by this Decision.
3. Financial institutions within the territories of Member States or under their jurisdiction shall be prohibited from opening representative offices, subsidiaries, branches or banking accounts in the DPRK.
The direct or indirect sale or purchase of, or brokering or assistance in the issuance of DPRK public or public-guaranteed bonds issued after 18 February 2013 to and from the Government of the DPRK, its public bodies, corporations and agencies, the Central Bank of the DPRK, or banks domiciled in the DPRK, or branches and subsidiaries within and outside the jurisdiction of Member States of banks domiciled in the DPRK, or financial entities that are neither domiciled in the DPRK nor within the jurisdiction of the Member States, but are controlled by persons and entities domiciled in the DPRK as well as any persons and entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, shall be prohibited.
1. Member States shall inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, all cargo to and from the DPRK in their territory, or transiting through their territory, or cargo brokered or facilitated by the DPRK or DPRK nationals, or persons or entities acting on their behalf, including at their airports and seaports, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items whose supply, sale, transfer or export is prohibited under UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013) or under this Decision.
2. Member States shall inspect vessels, with the consent of the flag State, on the high seas, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo of such vessels contains items whose supply, sale, transfer or export is prohibited under this Decision.
3. Member States shall cooperate, in accordance with their national legislation, with inspections pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2.
4. Aircrafts and vessels transporting cargo to and from the DPRK shall be subject to the requirement of additional pre-arrival or pre-departure information for all goods brought into or out of a Member State.
5. In cases where inspection referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 is undertaken, Member States shall seize and dispose of items whose supply, sale, transfer or export is prohibited under this Decision in accordance with paragraph 14 of UNSCR 1874 (2009) and paragraph 8 of UNSCR 2087 (2013).
6. Member States shall deny entry into their ports of any vessel that has refused to allow an inspection after such an inspection has been authorized by the vessel’s flag State, or if any DPRK-flagged vessel has refused to be inspected pursuant to paragraph 12 of UNSCR 1874 (2009).
7. Paragraph 6 shall not apply where entry is required for the purpose of an inspection, or in the case of an emergency or in the case of return to its port of origin.
1. Member States shall deny permission to land in, take off from or overfly their territory to any aircraft, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items whose supply, sale, transfer or export is prohibited under UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013) or under this Decision.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply in the case of an emergency landing.
The provision by nationals of Member States or from the territories of Member States of bunkering or ship supply services, or other servicing of vessels, to DPRK vessels shall be prohibited if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the vessels carry items whose supply, sale, transfer or export is prohibited under this Decision unless provision of such services is necessary for humanitarian purposes or until the cargo has been inspected, and seized and disposed of if necessary, in accordance with Article 10 (1), (2) and (5).
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of:
(a)
the persons designated by the Sanctions Committee or by the Security Council as being responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, the DPRK’s policies in relation to its nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes, together with their family members, or persons acting on their behalf of or at their direction, as listed in Annex I;
(b)
the persons not covered by Annex I, as listed in Annex II:
(i)
who are responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or persons acting on their behalf, or at their direction,
(ii)
who provide financial services or the transfer to, through, or from the territory of Member States, or involving nationals of Member States or entities organised under their laws, or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes,
(iii)
who are involved in, including through the provision of financial services, the supply to or from the DPRK of arms and related material of all types, or the supply to the DPRK of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes;
(c)
the persons not covered by Annex I or Annex II working on behalf or at the direction of a person or entity listed in Annex I or Annex II or persons assisting the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013) or of this Decision, as listed in Annex III to this Decision.
2. Paragraph 1(a) shall not apply where the Sanctions Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Sanctions Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013).
3. Paragraph 1 shall not oblige a Member State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory.
4. Paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to cases where a Member State is bound by an obligation of international law, namely:
(a)
as a host country of an international intergovernmental organisation;
(b)
as a host country to an international conference convened by, or under the auspices of, the United Nations;
(c)
under a multilateral agreement conferring privileges and immunities;
(d)
under the 1929 Treaty of Conciliation (Lateran pact) concluded by the Holy See (State of the Vatican City) and Italy.
5. Paragraph 4 shall also be considered as applying in cases where a Member State is host country of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
6. The Council shall be duly informed in all cases where a Member State grants an exemption pursuant to paragraphs 4 or 5.
7. Member States may grant exemptions from the measures imposed in paragraph 1(b) where travel is justified on the grounds of urgent humanitarian need, or on grounds of attending intergovernmental meetings, including those promoted by the Union, or hosted by a Member State holding the Chairmanship in office of the OSCE, where a political dialogue is conducted that directly promotes democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the DPRK.
8. A Member State wishing to grant exemptions referred to in paragraph 7 shall notify the Council thereof in writing. The exemption shall be deemed to be granted unless one or more of the Council Members raises an objection in writing within two working days of receiving notification of the proposed exemption. Should one or more of the Council Members raise an objection, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide to grant the proposed exemption.
9. Paragraph 1(c) shall not apply in case of transit of representatives of the Government of the DPRK to the United Nations Headquarters to conduct United Nations business.
10. In cases where, pursuant to paragraphs 4, 5, 7 and 9 a Member State authorises the entry into, or transit through, its territory of persons listed in Annex I, II or III, the authorisation shall be limited to the purpose for which it is given and to the persons concerned thereby.
11. Member States shall exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into, or transit through their territories of individuals working on behalf or at the direction of a designated individual or entity as listed in Annex I.
1. Member States shall expel DPRK nationals whom they determine are working on behalf of, or at the direction of a person or entity listed in Annex I or Annex II, or whom they determine are assisting the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of UNSC Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013) or of this Decision, from their territories for the purpose of repatriation to the DPRK, consistent with applicable national and international law.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where the presence of a person is required for fulfillment of a judicial process or exclusively for medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes.
1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled, directly or indirectly, by:
(a)
the persons and entities designated by the Sanctions Committee or by the Security Council as being engaged in or providing support for, including through illicit means, the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missiles-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes, or persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, as listed in Annex I;
(b)
the persons and entities not covered by Annex I, as listed in Annex II:
(i)
that are responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means,
(ii)
that provide financial services or the transfer to, through, or from the territory of Member States, or involving nationals of Member States or entities organised under their laws, or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes, or persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them,
(iii)
that are involved, including through the provision of financial services, in the supply to or from the DPRK of arms and related material of all types, or the supply to the DPRK of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes;
(c)
the persons and entities not covered by Annex I or Annex II working on behalf or at the direction of a person or entity listed in Annex I or Annex II or persons assisting the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) or 2094 (2013) or of this Decision, as listed in Annex III to this Decision, shall be frozen.
2. No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of persons and entities referred to in paragraph 1.
3. Exemptions may be made for funds and economic resources which are:
(a)
necessary to satisfy basic needs, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;
(b)
intended exclusively for the payment of reasonable professional fees and the reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services; or
(c)
intended exclusively for the payment of fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for the routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds and economic resources,
after notification where appropriate by the Member State concerned to the Sanctions Committee of the intention to authorise access to such funds and economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Sanctions Committee within five working days of such notification.
4. Exemptions may also be made for funds and economic resources which are:
(a)
necessary for extraordinary expenses. Where appropriate, the Member State concerned shall first notify and get approval from the Sanctions Committee; or
(b)
the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment, in which case the funds and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgment, provided that the lien or judgment was entered prior to the date on which the person or entity referred to in paragraph 1 was designated by the Sanctions Committee, the Security Council or by the Council, and is not for the benefit of a person or entity referred to in paragraph 1. Where appropriate the Member State concerned shall first notify the Sanctions Committee.
5. Paragraph 2 shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of:
(a)
interest or other earnings on those accounts; or
(b)
payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose prior to 14 October 2006,
provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to paragraph 1.
Member States shall take the necessary measures to exercise vigilance and prevent specialised teaching or training of DPRK nationals, within their territories or by their nationals, of disciplines which would contribute to the DPRK’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
Member States shall, in accordance with international law, exercise enhanced vigilance over DPRK diplomatic personnel so as to prevent such individuals from contributing to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013) or by this Decision, or to the evasion of measures imposed by those UNSC Resolutions or by this Decision.
No claims, including for compensation or indemnification or any other claim of this kind, such as a claim of set-off, fines or a claim under a guarantee, claims for extension or payment of a bond, financial guarantee, including claims arising from letters of credit and similar instruments, in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which was affected, directly or indirectly, wholly or in part, by reason of measures decided on pursuant to UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013), including measures of the Union or any Member State in accordance with, as required by or in any connection with, the implementation of the relevant decisions of the Security Council or measures covered by this Decision, shall be granted to the designated persons or entities listed in Annexes I, II or III, or any other person or entity in the DPRK, including the Government of the DPRK, its public bodies, corporations and agencies, or any person or entity claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity.
1. The Council shall adopt modifications to Annex I on the basis of the determinations made by the Security Council or by the Sanctions Committee.
2. The Council, acting by unanimity on a proposal from Member States or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall establish the lists in Annex II or III and adopt modifications thereto.
1. Where the Security Council or the Sanctions Committee lists a person or entity, the Council shall include such person or entity in Annex I.
2. Where the Council decides to subject a person or entity to the measures referred to in points (b) and (c) of Article 13(1) and point (b) of Article 15(1), it shall amend Annex II or III accordingly.
3. The Council shall communicate its decision to the person or entity referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, including the grounds for listing, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing such person or entity an opportunity to present observations.
4. Where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review its decision and inform the person or entity accordingly.
1. Annexes I, II and III shall include the grounds for listing of listed persons and entities, as provided by the Security Council or by the Sanctions Committee with regard to Annex I.
2. Annexes I, II and III shall also include, where available, information necessary to identify the persons or entities concerned, as provided by the Security Council or by the Sanctions Committee for Annex I. With regard to persons, such information may include names including aliases, date and place of birth, nationality, passport and ID card numbers, gender, address, if known, and function or profession. With regard to entities, such information may include names, place and date of registration, registration number and place of business. Annex I shall also include the date of designation by the Security Council or by the Sanctions Committee.
1. This Decision shall be reviewed, and, if necessary, amended, in particular as regards the categories of persons, entities or items or additional persons, entities or items to be covered by the restrictive measures, or taking into account relevant Security Council Resolutions.
2. The measures referred to in points (b) and (c) of Article 13(1) and point (b) of 15(1) shall be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every 12 months. They shall cease to apply in respect of the persons and entities concerned if the Council determines, in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 19(2), that the conditions for their application are no longer met.
Decision 2010/800/CFSP is hereby repealed.
This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in theOfficial Journal of the European Union.

A.   List of persons referred to in Article 13(1)(a)

ANNEX I
| Name | Alias | Date of birth | Date of designation | Other information
1. | Yun Ho-jin | a.k.a. Yun Ho-chin | 13.10.1944 | 16.7.2009 | Director of Namchongang Trading Corporation; oversees the import of items needed for the uranium enrichment programme.
2. | Ri Je-son | a.k.a. Ri Che-son | 1938 | 16.7.2009 | Director of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (GBAE), chief agency directing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear programme; facilitates several nuclear endeavours including GBAE’s management of Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre and Namchongang Trading Corporation.
3. | Hwang Sok-hwa | | | 16.7.2009 | Director in the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (GBAE); involved in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear programme; as Chief of the Scientific Guidance Bureau in the GBAE, served on the Science Committee inside the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research.
4. | Ri Hong-sop | | 1940 | 16.7.2009 | Former director, Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre, oversaw three core facilities that assist in the production of weapons-grade plutonium: the Fuel Fabrication Facility, the Nuclear Reactor, and the Reprocessing Plant.
5. | Han Yu-ro | | | 16.7.2009 | Director of Korea Ryongaksan General Trading Corporation; involved in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s ballistic missile programme.
6. | Paek Chang-Ho | Pak Chang-Ho;Paek Ch’ang-Ho | Passport: 381420754;Passport Date of Issue: 7 December 2011;Passport Date of Expiration: 7 December 2016;D.O.B. 18 June 1964;P.O.B. Kaesong, DPRK | 22.1.2013 | Senior official and head of the satellite control center of Korean Committee for Space Technology.
7. | Chang Myong-Chin | Jang Myong-Jin | D.O.B. 1966;Alt. D.O.B. 1965 | 22.1.2013 | General Manager of the Sohae Satellite Launching Station and head of launch center at which the 13 April and 12 December 2012 launches took place.
8. | Ra Ky’ong-Su | | | 22.1.2013 | Ra Ky’ong-Su is a Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official. In this capacity he has facilitated transactions for TCB. Tanchon was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 as the main DPRK financial entity responsible for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons.
9. | Kim Kwang-il | | | 22.1.2013 | Kim Kwang-il is a Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official. In this capacity, he has facilitated transactions for TCB and the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). Tanchon was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 as the main DPRK financial entity responsible for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
10. | Yo’n Cho’ng Nam | | | 7.3.2013 | Chief Representative for the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). The KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
11. | Ko Ch’o’l-Chae | | | 7.3.2013 | Deputy Chief Representative for the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). The KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and mainexporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
12. | Mun Cho’ng-Ch’o’l | | | 7.3.2013 | Mun Cho’ng-Ch’o’l is a TCB official. In this capacity he has facilitated transactions for TCB. Tanchon was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons.
B. List of entities referred to in Article 15(1)(a)
| Name | Alias | Location | Date of designation | Other information
1. | Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation | a.k.a. CHANGGWANG SINYONG CORPORATION; a.k.a. EXTERNAL TECHNOLOGY GENERAL CORPORATION; a.k.a. DPRKN MINING DEVELOPMENT TRADING COOPERATION; a.k.a. ‘KOMID’ | Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK. | 24.4.2009 | Primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
2. | Korea Ryonbong General Corporation | a.k.a. KOREA YONBONG GENERAL CORPORATION; f.k.a. LYONGAKSAN GENERAL TRADING CORPORATION | Pot’onggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK; Rakwon- dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK. | 24.4.2009 | Defence conglomerate specialising in acquisition for DPRK defence industries and support to that country’s military-related sales.
3. | Tanchon Commercial Bank | f.k.a. CHANGGWANG CREDIT BANK; f.k.a., KOREA CHANGGWANG CREDIT BANK | Saemul 1-Dong Pyongchon District, Pyongyang, DPRK. | 24.4.2009 | Main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons.
4. | Namchongang Trading Corporation | a.k.a. NCG; a.k.a. NAMCHONGANG TRADING; a.k.a. NAM CHON GANG CORPORATION; a.k.a. NOMCHONGANG TRADING CO.; a.k.a. NAM CHONG GAN TRADING CORPORATION | Pyongyang, DPRK. | 16.7.2009 | Namchongang is a DPRK trading company subordinate to the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (GBAE). Namchongang has been involved in the procurement of Japanese-origin vacuum pumps that were identified at a DPRK nuclear facility, as well as nuclear-related procurement associated with a German individual. It has further been involved in the purchase ofaluminium tubes and other equipment specifically suitable for a uranium enrichment programme from the late 1990s. Its representative is a former diplomat who served as DPRK’s representative for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities in 2007. Namchongang’s proliferation activities are of grave concern given the DPRK’s past proliferation activities.
5. | Hong Kong Electronics | a.k.a. HONG KONG ELECTRONICS KISH CO | Sanaee St., Kish Island, Iran. | 16.7.2009 | Owned or controlled by, or acts or purports to act for or on behalf of Tanchon Commercial Bank and KOMID. Hong Kong Electronics has transferred millions of dollars of proliferation-related funds on behalf of Tanchon Commercial Bank and KOMID (both designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009) since 2007. Hong Kong Electronics has facilitated the movement of money from Iran to the DPRK on behalf of KOMID.
6. | Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation | a.k.a. KOREA HYOKSIN EXPORT AND IMPORT CORPORATION | Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK. | 16.7.2009 | A DPRK company based in Pyongyang that is subordinate to Korea Ryonbong General Corporation (designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009) and is involved in the development of weapons of mass destruction.
7. | General Bureau of Atomic Energy (GBAE) | a.k.a. General Department of Atomic Energy (GDAE) | Haeudong, Pyongchen District, Pyongyang, DPRK. | 16.7.2009 | The GBAE is responsible for the DPRK’s nuclear programme, which includes the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre and its 5 MWe (25 MWt) plutonium production research reactor, as well as its fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities. The GBAE has held nuclear-related meetings and discussions with the International Atomic Energy Agency. GBAE is the primary DPRK Government agency that oversees nuclear programmes, including the operation of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre.
8. | Korean Tangun Trading Corporation | | Pyongyang, DPRK. | 16.7.2009 | Korea Tangun Trading Corporation is subordinate to DPRK’s Second Academy of Natural Sciences and is primarily responsible for the procurement of commodities and technologies to support DPRK’s defence research and development programmes, including, but not limited to, weapons of mass destruction and delivery system programmes and procurement, including materials that are controlled or prohibited under relevant multilateral control regimes.
9. | Korean Committee for Space Technology | DPRK Committee for Space Technology; Department of Space Technology of the DPRK; Committee for Space Technology; KCST | Pyongyang, DPRK | 22.1.2013 | The Korean Committee for Space Technology (KCST) orchestrated the DPRK’s launches on 13 April 2012 and 12 December 2012 via the satellite control center and Sohae launch area.
10. | Bank of East Land | Dongbang Bank; Tongbang U’Nhaeng; Tongbang Bank | P.O. Box 32,BEL Building,Jonseung-Dung,Moranbong District, Pyongyang, DPRK | P.O. Box 32, | BEL Building, | Jonseung-Dung, | Moranbong District, Pyongyang, DPRK | 22.1.2013 | DPRK financial institution Bank of East Land facilitates weapons-related transactions for, and other support to, arms manufacturer and exporter Green Pine Associated Corporation (Green Pine). Bank of East Land has actively worked with Green Pine to transfer funds in a manner that circumvents sanctions. In 2007 and 2008, Bank of East Land facilitated transactions involving Green Pine and Iranian financial institutions, including Bank Melli and Bank Sepah. The Security Council designated Bank Sepah in Resolution 1747 (2007) for providing support to Iran’s ballistic missile program. Green Pine was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2012.
P.O. Box 32,
BEL Building,
Jonseung-Dung,
Moranbong District, Pyongyang, DPRK
11. | Korea Kumryong Trading Corporation | | | 22.1.2013 | Used as an alias by the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) to carry out procurement activities. KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporterof goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
12. | Tosong Technology Trading Corporation | | Pyongyang, DPRK | 22.1.2013 | The Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID) is the parent company of Tosong Technology Trading Corporation. KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
13. | Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation | Chosun Yunha Machinery Joint Operation Company; Korea Ryenha Machinery J/V Corporation; Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation | Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK; Mangungdae-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK; Mangyongdae District, Pyongyang, DPRK | 22.1.2013 | Korea Ryonbong General Corporation is the parent company of Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation. Korea Ryonbong General Corporation was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is a defence conglomerate specializing in acquisition for DPRK defence industries and support to that country’s military-related sales.
14. | Leader (Hong Kong) International | Leader International Trading Limited | Room 1610 Nan Fung Tower,173 Des Voeux Road,Hong Kong | Room 1610 Nan Fung Tower, | 173 Des Voeux Road, | Hong Kong | 22.1.2013 | Facilitates shipments on behalf of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.
Room 1610 Nan Fung Tower,
173 Des Voeux Road,
Hong Kong
15. | Green Pine Associated Corporation | Cho’ngsong United Trading Company; Chongsong Yonhap; Ch’o’ngsong Yo’nhap; Chosun Chawo’n Kaebal T’uja Hoesa; Jindallae; Ku’mhaeryong Company LTD; Natural Resources Development and Investment Corporation; Saeingp’il Company | c/o Reconnaissance General Bureau Headquarters, Hyongjesan-Guyok, Pyongyang, DPRK;Nungrado, Pyongyang, DPRK | 2.5.2012 | Green Pine Associated Corporation (“Green Pine”) has taken over many of the activities of the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID). KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.Green Pine is also responsible for approximately half of the armsand related materiel exported by the DPRK.Green Pine has been identified for sanctions for exporting arms or related material from North Korea. Green Pine specializes in the production of maritime military craft and armaments, such as submarines, military boats and missile systems, and has exported torpedoes and technical assistance to Iranian defence-related firms.
16. | Amroggang Development Banking Corporation | Amroggang Development Bank; Amnokkang Development Bank | Tongan-dong, Pyongyang, DPRK | 2.5.2012 | Amroggang, which was established in 2006, is a Tanchon Commercial Bank-related company managed by Tanchon officials. Tanchon plays a role in financing KOMID’s sales of ballistic missiles and has also been involved in ballistic missile transactions from KOMID to Iran’s Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG). Tanchon Commercial Bank was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. The Security Council designated SHIG in Resolution 1737 (2006) as an entity involved in Iran’s ballistic missile programme.
17. | Korea Heungjin Trading Company | Hunjin Trading Co.; Korea Henjin Trading Co.; Korea Hengjin Trading Company | Pyongyang, DPRK. | 2.5.2012 | The Korea Heungjin Trading Company is used by KOMID for trading purposes. It is suspected it has been involved in supplying missile-related goods to Iran’s Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG). Heungjin has been associated with KOMID, and, more specifically, KOMID’s procurement office. Heungjin has been used to procure an advanced digital controller with applications in missile design. KOMID was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is the DPRK’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. The SecurityCouncil designated SHIG in Resolution 1737 (2006) as an entity involved in Iran’s ballistic missile programme.
18. | Second Academy of Natural Sciences | 2nd Academy of Natural Sciences; Che 2 Chayon Kwahakwon; Academy of Natural Sciences; Chayon Kwahak-Won; National Defense Academy; Kukpang Kwahak-Won; Second Academy of Natural Sciences Research Institute; Sansri | Pyongyang, DPRK | 7.3.2013 | The Second Academy of Natural Sciences is a national-level organization responsible for research and development of the DPRK’s advanced weapons systems, including missiles and probably nuclear weapons. The Second Academy of Natural Sciences uses a number of subordinate organizations to obtain technology, equipment, and information from overseas, including Tangun Trading Corporation, for use in the DPRK’s missile and probably nuclear weapons programmes. Tangun Trading Corporation was designated by the Sanctions Committee in July 2009 and is primarily responsible for the procurement of commodities and technologies to support DPRK’s defence research and development programmes, including, but not limited to, weapons of mass destruction and delivery system programmes and procurement, including materials that are controlled or prohibited under relevant multilateral control regimes.
19. | Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation | | Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK | 7.3.2013 | Korea Ryonbong General Corporation is the parent company of Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation. Korea Ryonbong General Corporation was designated by the Sanctions Committee in April 2009 and is a defence conglomerate specializing in acquisition for DPRK defence industries and support to that country’s military-related sales.

List of persons referred to in Article 13(1)(b) and of persons and entities referred to in Article 15(1)(b)

ANNEX III. Persons and entities responsible for the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes or persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them.
A. Persons

| Name (and possible aliases) | Identifying information | Reasons
1. | CHANG Song-taek (alias JANG Song-Taek) | Date of birth: 2.2.1946 or 6.2.1946 or 23.2.1946 (North Hamgyong province)Passport number (as of 2006): PS 736420617 | Member of the National Defence Commission. Director of the Administrative Department of the Korean Workers’ Party.
2. | CHON Chi Bu | | Member of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy, former technical director of Yongbyon.
3. | CHU Kyu-Chang (alias JU Kyu-Chang) | Date of birth: between 1928 and 1933 | First Deputy Director of the Defence Industry Department (ballistics programme), Korean Workers’ Party, Member of the National Defence Commission.
4. | HYON Chol-hae | Year of birth: 1934 (Manchuria, China) | Deputy Director of the General Political Department of the People’s Armed Forces (military adviser to late Kim Jong-Il).
5. | JON Pyong-ho | Year of birth: 1926 | Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party, Head of the Central Committee’s Military Supplies Industry Department controlling the Second Economic Committee of the Central Committee, member of the National Defence Commission.
6. | KIM Yong-chun (alias Young-chun) | Date of birth: 4.3.1935Passport number: 554410660 | Deputy Chairman of the National Defence Commission, Minister for the People’s Armed Forces, special adviser to late Kim Jong-Il on nuclear strategy.
7. | O Kuk-Ryol | Year of birth: 1931 (Jilin Province, China) | Deputy Chairman of the National Defence Commission, supervising the acquisition abroad of advanced technology for nuclear and ballistic programmes.
8. | PAEK Se-bong | Year of birth: 1946 | Chairman of the Second Economic Committee (responsible for the ballistics programme) of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party. Member of the National Defence Commission.
9. | PAK Jae-gyong (alias Chae-Kyong) | Year of birth: 1933Passport number: 554410661 | Deputy Director of the General Political Department of the People’s Armed Forces and Deputy Director of the Logistics Bureau of the People’s Armed Forces (military adviser to late Kim Jong-II).
10. | PYON Yong Rip (alias Yong-Nip) | Date of birth: 20.9.1929Passport number: 645310121 (issued on 13.09.2005) | President of the Academy of Science, involved in WMD-related biological research.
11. | RYOM Yong | | Director of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (entity designated by the United Nations), in charge of international relations.
12. | SO Sang-kuk | Date of birth: between 1932 and 1938 | Head of the Department of Nuclear Physics, Kim Il Sung University.
13. | Lieutenant General Kim Yong Chol (alias: Kim Yong-Chol; Kim Young-Chol; Kim Young-Cheol; Kim Young-Chul) | Date of birth: 1946Location: Pyongan-Pukto, North Korea | Kim Yong Chol is the commander of Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB).
14. | Pak To-Chun | Date of birth: 9.3. 1944Place of birth: Jagang, Rangrim | Member of the National Security Council. He is in charge of the arms industry. It is reported that he commands the office for nuclear energy. This institution is decisive for DPRK’s nuclear and rocket launcher program.B. Entities

| Name (and possible aliases) | Identifying information | Reasons
1. | Korea Pugang mining and Machinery Corporation ltd | | Subsidiary of Korea Ryongbong General Corporation (entity designated by the United Nations, 24.4.2009); operates facilities for the production of aluminium powder, which can be used in missiles.
2. | Korea Taesong Trading Company | Location: Pyongyang | Pyongyang-based entity used by the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) for trading purposes (KOMID was designated by the United Nations, 24.4.2009). Korea Taesong Trading Company has acted on behalf of KOMID in dealings with Syria.
3. | Korean Ryengwang Trading Corporation | Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, North Korea | Subsidiary of Korea Ryongbong General Corporation (entity designated by the United Nations, 24.4.2009).
4. | Second Economic Committee | | The Second Economic Committee is involved in key aspects of North Korea’s missile program. The Second Economic Committee is responsible for overseeing the production of North Korea’s ballistic missiles. It also directs the activities of KOMID (KOMID was designated by the United Nations, 24.4.2009). It is a national-level organization responsible for research and development of North Korea’s advanced weapons systems, including missiles and probably nuclear weapons. It uses a number of subordinate organizations to obtain technology, equipment, and information from overseas, including Korea Tangun Trading Corporation, for use in North Korea’s missile and probably nuclear weapons programs.
5. | Sobaeku United Corp. (alias Sobaeksu United Corp.) | | State-owned company, involved in research into, and the acquisition, of sensitive products and equipment. It possesses several deposits of natural graphite, which provide raw material for two processing facilities, which, inter alia, produce graphite blocks that can be used in missiles.
6. | Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre | | Research centre which has taken part in the production of military-grade plutonium. Centre maintained by the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (entity designated by the United Nations, 16.7.2009).
7. | Hesong Trading Corporation | Pyongyang, DPRK | Controlled by Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID) (designated by UNSCR 1718 Sanctions Committee in April 2009): primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Involved in supplies with potential use in ballistic missile program.
8. | Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation | Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK | Controlled by Korea Ryonbong General Corporation (designated by the UNSCR 1718 Sanctions Committee in April 2009): defence conglomerate specialising in acquisition for DPRK defence industries and support to that country’s military-related sales
9. | Korea International Chemical Joint Venture Company (alias Choson International Chemicals Joint Operation Company; Chosun International Chemicals Joint Operation Company; International Chemical Joint Venture Corporation) | Hamhung, South Hamgyong Province, DPRK;Man gyongdae-kuyok, Pyongyang, DPRK;Mangyungdae-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK | Controlled by Korea Ryonbong General Corporation (designated by the UNSCR 1718 Sanctions Committee in April 2009): defence conglomerate specialising in acquisition for DPRK defence industries and support to that country’s military-related sales
10. | Korea Kwangsong Trading Corporation | Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK | Controlled by Korea Ryonbong General Corporation (designated by the UNSCR 1718 Sanctions Committee in April 2009): defence conglomerate specialising in acquisition for DPRK defence industries and support to that country’s military-related sales
11. | Munitions Industry Department (a.k.a.: Military Supplies Industry Department) | Pyongyang, DPRK | Responsible for overseeing activities of North Korea’s military industries, including the Second Economic Committee (SEC) and KOMID. This includes overseeing the development of North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear programmes.Until recently, it was headed by Jon Pyong Ho. Information suggests former Minitions Industry Department (MID) first vice director Chu Kyu-ch’ang (Ju Gyu-chang) is now director of the MID, which is publicly referred to as the Machine Building Industry Department. Chu served as the overall supervisor for North Korea’s missile development, including oversight of the April 5, 2009 Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) missile launch and the failed July 2006 TD-2 launch.
12. | Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) (a.k.a.: Chongch’al Ch’ongguk; RGB; KPA Unit 586) | Hyongjesan-Guyok, Pyongyang, North Korea;Nungrado, Pyongyang, North Korea. | The Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) is North Korea’s premiere intelligence organization, created in early 2009 by the merger of existing intelligence organizations from the Korean Workers’ Party, the Operations Department and Office 35, and the Reconnaissance Bureau of the Korean People’s Army. It falls under direct command of the Ministry of Defence and is primarily in charge of gathering military intelligence. RGB trades in conventional arms and controls the EU-designated North Korean conventional arms firm Green Pine Associated Corporation (Green Pine).II. Persons and entities providing financial services that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes
A. Persons

| Name (and possible aliases) | Identifying information | Reasons
1. | JON Il-chun | Date of birth: 24.8.1941 | In February of 2010 KIM Tong-un was discharged from his office as director of Office 39, which is, among other things, in charge of purchasing goods out of the DPRK diplomatic representations bypassing sanctions. He was replaced by JON Il-chun. JON Il-chun is also said to be one of the leading figures in the State Development Bank.
2. | KIM Tong-un | | Former director of “Office 39” of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party, which is involved in proliferation financing.
3. | Kim Tong-Myo’ng (a.k.a.: Kim Chin-so’k) | Date of birth: 1964,Nationality: North Korean. | Kim Tong-Myo’ng acts on behalf of Tanchon Commercial Bank (designated by the 1718 Sanctions Committee in April 2009). Kim Dong Myong has held various positions within Tanchon since at least 2002 and is currently Tanchon’s president. He has also played a role in managing Amroggang’s affairs (owned or controlled by Tanchon Commercial Bank) using the alias Kim Chin-so’k.B. Entities

| Name (and possible aliases) | Identifying information | Reasons
1. | Korea Daesong Bank (alias: Choson Taesong Unhaeng; Taesong Bank) | Address: Segori-dong, Gyongheung St., Potonggang District, PyongyangPhone: 850 2 381 8221Phone: 850 2 18111 ext. 8221Fax: 850 2 381 4576 | Address: Segori-dong, Gyongheung St., Potonggang District, Pyongyang | Phone: 850 2 381 8221 | Phone: 850 2 18111 ext. 8221 | Fax: 850 2 381 4576 | North Korean financial institution that is directly subordinated to Office 39 and is involved in facilitating North Korea’s proliferation financing projects.
Address: Segori-dong, Gyongheung St., Potonggang District, Pyongyang
Phone: 850 2 381 8221
Phone: 850 2 18111 ext. 8221
Fax: 850 2 381 4576
2. | Korea Daesong General Trading Corporation (alias: Daesong Trading; Daesong Trading Company; Korea Daesong Trading Company; Korea Daesong Trading Corporation) | Address: Pulgan Gori Dong 1, Potonggang District, PyongyangPhone: 850 2 18111 ext. 8204/8208Phone: 850 2 381 8208/4188Fax: 850 2 381 4431/4432 | Address: Pulgan Gori Dong 1, Potonggang District, Pyongyang | Phone: 850 2 18111 ext. 8204/8208 | Phone: 850 2 381 8208/4188 | Fax: 850 2 381 4431/4432 | Company that is subordinated to Office 39 and is used to facilitate foreign transactions on behalf of Office 39.Office 39’s Director of Office, Kim Tong-un is listed in Annex V of Council Regulation (EC) No 329/2007.’
Address: Pulgan Gori Dong 1, Potonggang District, Pyongyang
Phone: 850 2 18111 ext. 8204/8208
Phone: 850 2 381 8208/4188
Fax: 850 2 381 4431/4432
3. | Korea Kwangson Banking Corp. (KKBC) (a.k.a.: Korea Kwangson Banking Corp; KKBC) | Jungson-dong, Sungri Street, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK | A subordinate acting on behalf of or at the direction of, owned or controlled by the Korea Ryonbong General Corporation (designated by the UNSCR 1718 Sanctions Committee in April 2009). Provides financial services in support of both Tanchon Commercial Bank (designated by UNSCR1718 Sanctions Committee in April 2009) and Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation (designated by UNSCR1718 Sanctions Committee in July 2009). Since 2008, Tanchon has been utilizing KKBC to facilitate funds transfers likely amounting to millions of dollars, including transfers involving Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) (designated by UNSCR1718 Sanctions Committee in April 2009) related funds from Burma to China in 2009. Additionally, Hyoksin, which the UN described as being involved in the development of weapons of mass destruction, sought to use KKBC in connection with a purchase of dual-use equipment in 2008. KKBC has at least one overseas branch in Dandong, China.
4. | Office 39 of The Korean Workers’ Party (a.k.a.: Office #39; Office No. 39; Bureau 39; Central Committee; Third Floor Division 39.) | Second KWP Government Building (Korean: Ch’o’ngsa), Chungso’ng, Urban Tower (Korean’Dong), Chung Ward, Pyongyang, North Korea;Chung-Guyok (Central District), Sosong Street, Kyongrim-Dong, Pyongyang, North Korea;Changgwang Street, Pyongyang, North Korea. | Office 39 of the Korean Workers’ Party engages in illicit economic activity to support the North Korean government. It has branches throughout the nation that raise and manage funds and is responsible for earning foreign currency for North Korea’s Korean Workers’ Party senior leadership through illicit activities such as narcotics trafficking. Office 39 controls a number of entities inside North Korea and abroad through which it conducts numerous illicit activities including the production, smuggling, and distribution of narcotics. Office 39 has also been involved in the attempted procurement and transfer to North Korea of luxury goods. Office 39 figures among the most important organisations assigned with currency and merchandise acquisition. It is said to have been under the command of late Kim Jong-il. It controls several trading companies some of which are active in illicit activites, among them Daesong General Bureau, part of Daesong group, the largest company group of the country. Office 39 according to some sources entertains representation office in Rome, Beijing, Bangkok,Singapore, Hongkong and Dubai. To the outside office 39 changes name and appearance regularly. Director of office 39, JON il-chun is already listed on the EU sanction list.Office 39 produced methamphetamine in Sangwon, South Pyongan Province and was also involved in the distribution of methamphetamine to small-scale North Korean smugglers for distribution through China and South Korea. Office 39 also operates poppy farms in North Hamkyo’ng Province and North Pyongan Province and produces opium and heroin in Hamhu’ng and Nachin. In 2009, Office 39 was involved in the failed attempt to purchase and export to North Korea – through China – two Italian-made luxury yachts worth more than $15 million. Halted by Italian authorities, the attempted export of the yachts destined for late Kim Jong-il was in violation of United Nations sanctions against North Korea under UNSCR 1718, which specifically require Member States to prevent the supply, sale, or transfer of luxury goods to North Korea. Office 39 previously used Banco Delta Asia to launder illicit proceeds. Banco Delta Asia was identified by the Treasury Department in September 2005 as a ‘primary money laundering concern’ under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act because it represented an unacceptable risk of money laundering and other financial crimes.III. Persons and entities involved in the supply to or from the DPRK of arms and related material of all types, or of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes
A. Persons
…
B. Entities
…

List of persons referred to in point (c) of Article 13(1) and point (c) of Article 15(1)

ANNEX III…

List of branches and subsidiaries referred to in point (b) of Article 7(1)

ANNEX IV…

List of branches, subsidiaries and financial entities referred to in points (c) and (d) of Article 7(1)

ANNEX V…

Pending: 32011D0273

10.5.2011 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 121/11
(1) On 29 April 2011, the European Union expressed its grave concern about the situation unfolding in Syria and the deployment of military and security forces in a number of Syrian cities.
(2) The Union strongly condemned the violent repression, including through the use of live ammunition, of peaceful protest in various locations across Syria resulting in the death of several demonstrators, wounded persons and arbitrary detentions, and called on the Syrian security forces to exercise restraint instead of repression.
(3) In view of the seriousness of the situation, restrictive measures should be imposed against Syria and against persons responsible for the violent repression against the civilian population in Syria.
(4) Further action by the Union is needed in order to implement certain measures,
(a) provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering services or other services related to the items referred to in paragraph 1 or related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of such items, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in, or for use in, Syria;
(b) provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial assistance related to the items referred to in paragraph 1, including in particular grants, loans and export credit insurance, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of such items, or for the provision of related technical assistance, brokering services or other services to any natural or legal person, entity or body in, or for use in, Syria;
(c) participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities, the object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibitions referred to in points (a) or (b).
(a) supplies and technical assistance intended solely for the support of or use by the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF);
(b) the sale, supply, transfer or export of non-lethal military equipment or of equipment which might be used for internal repression, intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, or for institution building programmes of the United Nations (UN) and the European Union, or for European Union and UN crisis management operations;
(c) the sale, supply, transfer or export of non-combat vehicles which have been manufactured or fitted with materials to provide ballistic protection, intended solely for the protective use of personnel of the European Union and its Member States in Syria;
(d) the provision of technical assistance, brokering services and other services related to such equipment or to such programmes and operations;
(e) the provision of financing and financial assistance related to such equipment or to such programmes and operations;
(a) as a host country to an international intergovernmental organisation;
(b) as a host country to an international conference convened by, or under the auspices of, the UN;
(c) under a multilateral agreement conferring privileges and immunities; or
(d) under the 1929 Treaty of Conciliation (Lateran pact) concluded by the Holy See (State of the Vatican City) and Italy.
(a) necessary to satisfy the basic needs of the persons listed in the Annex and their dependent family members, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;
(b) intended exclusively for the payment of reasonable professional fees and the reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services;
(c) intended exclusively for the payment of fees or service charges for the routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or economic resources; or
(d) necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that the competent authority has notified the competent authority of the other Member States and the Commission of the grounds on which it considers that a specific authorisation should be granted, at least two weeks prior to the authorisation.
(a) the funds or economic resources are the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien established prior to the date on which the natural or legal person or entity referred to in Article 4(1) was included in the Annex, or of a judicial, administrative or arbitral judgment rendered prior to that date;
(b) the funds or economic resources will be used exclusively to satisfy claims secured by such a lien or recognised as valid in such a judgment, within the limits set by applicable laws and regulations governing the rights of persons having such claims;
(c) the lien or judgment is not for the benefit of a natural or legal person or entity listed in the Annex; and
(d) recognising the lien or judgement is not contrary to public policy in the Member State concerned.
(a) interest or other earnings on those accounts; or
(b) payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to this Decision,
Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing
1. Maher Al-Assad Born on 8 December 1967; diplomatic passport No 4138 Commander of the army's 4th Division, member of Baath Party Central Command, strongman of the Republican Guard; principal overseer of violence against demonstrators. 09.05.2011
2. Ali Mamlouk Born on 19 February 1946 in Damascus; diplomatic passport No 983 Head of General Intelligence Service; Head of Syrian Intelligence since 2005; involved in violence against demonstrators. 09.05.2011
3. Mohammad Ibrahim Al-Chaar Minister for the Interior in the government; involved in violence against demonstrators. 09.05.2011
4. Atef Najib Former Head of Political Security in Deraa; involved in violence against demonstrators. 09.05.2011
5. Hafez Makhlouf Born on 2 April 1971 in Damascus; diplomatic passport No 2246 Colonel and Head of Unit in General Intelligence Directorate, Damascus Branch; close to Maher al-Assad; involved in violence against demonstrators. 09.05.2011
6. Mohammed Dib Zeitoun Head of Political Security; involved in violence against demonstrators. 09.05.2011
7. Amjad Al-Abbas Head of Political Security in Banias, involved in violence against demonstrators in Baida. 09.05.2011
8. Rami Makhlouf Born on 10 July 1969 in Damascus, passport No 454224 Syrian businessman. Associate of Maher al-Assad; bankrolls the regime allowing violence against demonstrators. 09.05.2011
9. Abd Al-Fatah Qudsiyah Head of Syrian Military Intelligence and as such involved in the repression against the civilian population. 09.05.2011
10. Jamil Hassan Head of Syrian Air Force Intelligence and as such involved in the repression against the civilian population. 09.05.2011
11. Rustum Ghazali Head of Syrian Military Intelligence, Damascus Countryside Branch and as such involved in the repression against the civilian population. 09.05.2011
12. Fawwaz Al-Assad Involved in the repression against the civilian population as part of the Shabiha militia. 09.05.2011
13. Mundir Al-Assad Involved in the repression against the civilian population as part of the Shabiha militia. 09.05.2011
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
(1) On 29 April 2011, the European Union expressed its grave concern about the situation unfolding in Syria and the deployment of military and security forces in a number of Syrian cities.
(2) The Union strongly condemned the violent repression, including through the use of live ammunition, of peaceful protest in various locations across Syria resulting in the death of several demonstrators, wounded persons and arbitrary detentions, and called on the Syrian security forces to exercise restraint instead of repression.
(3) In view of the seriousness of the situation, restrictive measures should be imposed against Syria and against persons responsible for the violent repression against the civilian population in Syria.
(4) Further action by the Union is needed in order to implement certain measures,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
1. The sale, supply, transfer or export of arms and related matériel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, as well as equipment which might be used for internal repression, to Syria by nationals of Member States or from the territories of Member States or using their flag vessels or aircraft, shall be prohibited, whether originating or not in their territories.
2. It shall be prohibited to:
(a)
provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering services or other services related to the items referred to in paragraph 1 or related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of such items, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in, or for use in, Syria;
(b)
provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial assistance related to the items referred to in paragraph 1, including in particular grants, loans and export credit insurance, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of such items, or for the provision of related technical assistance, brokering services or other services to any natural or legal person, entity or body in, or for use in, Syria;
(c)
participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities, the object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibitions referred to in points (a) or (b).

Article 2
1. Article 1 shall not apply to:
(a)
supplies and technical assistance intended solely for the support of or use by the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF);
(b)
the sale, supply, transfer or export of non-lethal military equipment or of equipment which might be used for internal repression, intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, or for institution building programmes of the United Nations (UN) and the European Union, or for European Union and UN crisis management operations;
(c)
the sale, supply, transfer or export of non-combat vehicles which have been manufactured or fitted with materials to provide ballistic protection, intended solely for the protective use of personnel of the European Union and its Member States in Syria;
(d)
the provision of technical assistance, brokering services and other services related to such equipment or to such programmes and operations;
(e)
the provision of financing and financial assistance related to such equipment or to such programmes and operations;
on condition that such exports and assistance have been approved in advance by the relevant competent authority.
2. Article 1 shall not apply to protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to Syria by UN personnel, personnel of the European Union or its Member States, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel for their personal use only.

Article 3
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of the persons responsible for the violent repression against the civilian population in Syria, and persons associated with them, as listed in the Annex.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not oblige a Member State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory.
3. Paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to the cases where a Member State is bound by an obligation of international law, namely:
(a)
as a host country to an international intergovernmental organisation;
(b)
as a host country to an international conference convened by, or under the auspices of, the UN;
(c)
under a multilateral agreement conferring privileges and immunities; or
(d)
under the 1929 Treaty of Conciliation (Lateran pact) concluded by the Holy See (State of the Vatican City) and Italy.
4. Paragraph 3 shall be considered as also applying in cases where a Member State is host country to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
5. The Council shall be duly informed in all cases where a Member State grants an exemption pursuant to paragraphs 3 or 4.
6. Member States may grant exemptions from the measures imposed under paragraph 1 where travel is justified on the grounds of urgent humanitarian need, or on grounds of attending intergovernmental meetings, including those promoted by the Union, or hosted by a Member State holding the Chairmanship in office of the OSCE, where a political dialogue is conducted that directly promotes democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Syria.
7. A Member State wishing to grant exemptions referred to in paragraph 6 shall notify the Council in writing. The exemption shall be deemed to be granted unless one or more of the Council members raises an objection in writing within two working days of receiving notification of the proposed exemption. Should one or more of the Council members raise an objection, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide to grant the proposed exemption.
8. In cases where pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 6 and 7, a Member State authorises the entry into, or transit through, its territory of persons listed in the Annex, the authorisation shall be limited to the purpose for which it is given and to the persons concerned therewith.

Article 4
1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by persons responsible for the violent repression against the civilian population in Syria, and natural or legal persons, and entities associated with them, as listed in the Annex, shall be frozen.
2. No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of, natural or legal persons or entities listed in the Annex.
3. The competent authority of a Member State may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as it deems appropriate, after having determined that the funds or economic resources concerned are:
(a)
necessary to satisfy the basic needs of the persons listed in the Annex and their dependent family members, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;
(b)
intended exclusively for the payment of reasonable professional fees and the reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services;
(c)
intended exclusively for the payment of fees or service charges for the routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or economic resources; or
(d)
necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that the competent authority has notified the competent authority of the other Member States and the Commission of the grounds on which it considers that a specific authorisation should be granted, at least two weeks prior to the authorisation.
A Member State shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation it grants under this paragraph.
4. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities of a Member State may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, provided that the following conditions are met:
(a)
the funds or economic resources are the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien established prior to the date on which the natural or legal person or entity referred to in Article 4(1) was included in the Annex, or of a judicial, administrative or arbitral judgment rendered prior to that date;
(b)
the funds or economic resources will be used exclusively to satisfy claims secured by such a lien or recognised as valid in such a judgment, within the limits set by applicable laws and regulations governing the rights of persons having such claims;
(c)
the lien or judgment is not for the benefit of a natural or legal person or entity listed in the Annex; and
(d)
recognising the lien or judgement is not contrary to public policy in the Member State concerned.
A Member State shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under this paragraph.
5. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making a payment due under a contract entered into before the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant Member State has determined that the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity referred to in paragraph 1.
6. Paragraph 2 shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of:
(a)
interest or other earnings on those accounts; or
(b)
payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to this Decision,
provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments remain subject to paragraph 1.

Article 5
1. The Council, acting upon a proposal by a Member State or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall establish and amend the list in the Annex.
2. The Council shall communicate its decision, including the grounds for listing, to the person or entity concerned, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing such person or entity with an opportunity to present observations.
3. Where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review its decision and inform the person or entity concerned accordingly.

Article 6
1. The Annex shall include the grounds for listing the persons and entities concerned.
2. The Annex shall also contain, where available, the information necessary to identify the persons or entities concerned. With regard to persons, such information may include names, including aliases, date and place of birth, nationality, passport and identity card numbers, gender, address if known, and function or profession. With regard to entities, such information may include names, place and date of registration, registration number and place of business.

Article 7
In order to maximise the impact of the measures set out in this Decision, the Union shall encourage third States to adopt restrictive measures similar to those contained in this Decision.

Article 8
This Decision shall apply for a period of 12 months. It shall be kept under constant review. It shall be renewed, or amended as appropriate, if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met.

Article 9
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
(1) On 29 April 2011, the European Union expressed its grave concern about the situation unfolding in Syria and the deployment of military and security forces in a number of Syrian cities.
(2) The Union strongly condemned the violent repression, including through the use of live ammunition, of peaceful protest in various locations across Syria resulting in the death of several demonstrators, wounded persons and arbitrary detentions, and called on the Syrian security forces to exercise restraint instead of repression.
(3) In view of the seriousness of the situation, restrictive measures should be imposed against Syria and against persons responsible for the violent repression against the civilian population in Syria.
(4) Further action by the Union is needed in order to implement certain measures,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
1. The sale, supply, transfer or export of arms and related matériel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, as well as equipment which might be used for internal repression, to Syria by nationals of Member States or from the territories of Member States or using their flag vessels or aircraft, shall be prohibited, whether originating or not in their territories.
2. It shall be prohibited to:
(a)
provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering services or other services related to the items referred to in paragraph 1 or related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of such items, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in, or for use in, Syria;
(b)
provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial assistance related to the items referred to in paragraph 1, including in particular grants, loans and export credit insurance, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of such items, or for the provision of related technical assistance, brokering services or other services to any natural or legal person, entity or body in, or for use in, Syria;
(c)
participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities, the object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibitions referred to in points (a) or (b).
1. Article 1 shall not apply to:
(a)
supplies and technical assistance intended solely for the support of or use by the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF);
(b)
the sale, supply, transfer or export of non-lethal military equipment or of equipment which might be used for internal repression, intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, or for institution building programmes of the United Nations (UN) and the European Union, or for European Union and UN crisis management operations;
(c)
the sale, supply, transfer or export of non-combat vehicles which have been manufactured or fitted with materials to provide ballistic protection, intended solely for the protective use of personnel of the European Union and its Member States in Syria;
(d)
the provision of technical assistance, brokering services and other services related to such equipment or to such programmes and operations;
(e)
the provision of financing and financial assistance related to such equipment or to such programmes and operations;
on condition that such exports and assistance have been approved in advance by the relevant competent authority.
2. Article 1 shall not apply to protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to Syria by UN personnel, personnel of the European Union or its Member States, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel for their personal use only.
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of the persons responsible for the violent repression against the civilian population in Syria, and persons associated with them, as listed in the Annex.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not oblige a Member State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory.
3. Paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to the cases where a Member State is bound by an obligation of international law, namely:
(a)
as a host country to an international intergovernmental organisation;
(b)
as a host country to an international conference convened by, or under the auspices of, the UN;
(c)
under a multilateral agreement conferring privileges and immunities; or
(d)
under the 1929 Treaty of Conciliation (Lateran pact) concluded by the Holy See (State of the Vatican City) and Italy.
4. Paragraph 3 shall be considered as also applying in cases where a Member State is host country to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
5. The Council shall be duly informed in all cases where a Member State grants an exemption pursuant to paragraphs 3 or 4.
6. Member States may grant exemptions from the measures imposed under paragraph 1 where travel is justified on the grounds of urgent humanitarian need, or on grounds of attending intergovernmental meetings, including those promoted by the Union, or hosted by a Member State holding the Chairmanship in office of the OSCE, where a political dialogue is conducted that directly promotes democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Syria.
7. A Member State wishing to grant exemptions referred to in paragraph 6 shall notify the Council in writing. The exemption shall be deemed to be granted unless one or more of the Council members raises an objection in writing within two working days of receiving notification of the proposed exemption. Should one or more of the Council members raise an objection, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide to grant the proposed exemption.
8. In cases where pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 6 and 7, a Member State authorises the entry into, or transit through, its territory of persons listed in the Annex, the authorisation shall be limited to the purpose for which it is given and to the persons concerned therewith.
1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by persons responsible for the violent repression against the civilian population in Syria, and natural or legal persons, and entities associated with them, as listed in the Annex, shall be frozen.
2. No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of, natural or legal persons or entities listed in the Annex.
3. The competent authority of a Member State may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as it deems appropriate, after having determined that the funds or economic resources concerned are:
(a)
necessary to satisfy the basic needs of the persons listed in the Annex and their dependent family members, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;
(b)
intended exclusively for the payment of reasonable professional fees and the reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services;
(c)
intended exclusively for the payment of fees or service charges for the routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or economic resources; or
(d)
necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that the competent authority has notified the competent authority of the other Member States and the Commission of the grounds on which it considers that a specific authorisation should be granted, at least two weeks prior to the authorisation.
A Member State shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation it grants under this paragraph.
4. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities of a Member State may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, provided that the following conditions are met:
(a)
the funds or economic resources are the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien established prior to the date on which the natural or legal person or entity referred to in Article 4(1) was included in the Annex, or of a judicial, administrative or arbitral judgment rendered prior to that date;
(b)
the funds or economic resources will be used exclusively to satisfy claims secured by such a lien or recognised as valid in such a judgment, within the limits set by applicable laws and regulations governing the rights of persons having such claims;
(c)
the lien or judgment is not for the benefit of a natural or legal person or entity listed in the Annex; and
(d)
recognising the lien or judgement is not contrary to public policy in the Member State concerned.
A Member State shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under this paragraph.
5. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making a payment due under a contract entered into before the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant Member State has determined that the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity referred to in paragraph 1.
6. Paragraph 2 shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of:
(a)
interest or other earnings on those accounts; or
(b)
payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to this Decision,
provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments remain subject to paragraph 1.
1. The Council, acting upon a proposal by a Member State or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall establish and amend the list in the Annex.
2. The Council shall communicate its decision, including the grounds for listing, to the person or entity concerned, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing such person or entity with an opportunity to present observations.
3. Where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review its decision and inform the person or entity concerned accordingly.
1. The Annex shall include the grounds for listing the persons and entities concerned.
2. The Annex shall also contain, where available, the information necessary to identify the persons or entities concerned. With regard to persons, such information may include names, including aliases, date and place of birth, nationality, passport and identity card numbers, gender, address if known, and function or profession. With regard to entities, such information may include names, place and date of registration, registration number and place of business.
In order to maximise the impact of the measures set out in this Decision, the Union shall encourage third States to adopt restrictive measures similar to those contained in this Decision.
This Decision shall apply for a period of 12 months. It shall be kept under constant review. It shall be renewed, or amended as appropriate, if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

List of persons and entities referred to in Articles 3 and 4

ANNEX
Persons

| Name | Identifying information | Reasons | Date of listing
1. | Maher Al-Assad | Born on 8 December 1967; diplomatic passport No 4138 | Commander of the army’s 4th Division, member of Baath Party Central Command, strongman of the Republican Guard; principal overseer of violence against demonstrators. | 09.05.2011
2. | Ali Mamlouk | Born on 19 February 1946 in Damascus; diplomatic passport No 983 | Head of General Intelligence Service; Head of Syrian Intelligence since 2005; involved in violence against demonstrators. | 09.05.2011
3. | Mohammad Ibrahim Al-Chaar | | Minister for the Interior in the government; involved in violence against demonstrators. | 09.05.2011
4. | Atef Najib | | Former Head of Political Security in Deraa; involved in violence against demonstrators. | 09.05.2011
5. | Hafez Makhlouf | Born on 2 April 1971 in Damascus; diplomatic passport No 2246 | Colonel and Head of Unit in General Intelligence Directorate, Damascus Branch; close to Maher al-Assad; involved in violence against demonstrators. | 09.05.2011
6. | Mohammed Dib Zeitoun | | Head of Political Security; involved in violence against demonstrators. | 09.05.2011
7. | Amjad Al-Abbas | | Head of Political Security in Banias, involved in violence against demonstrators in Baida. | 09.05.2011
8. | Rami Makhlouf | Born on 10 July 1969 in Damascus, passport No 454224 | Syrian businessman. Associate of Maher al-Assad; bankrolls the regime allowing violence against demonstrators. | 09.05.2011
9. | Abd Al-Fatah Qudsiyah | | Head of Syrian Military Intelligence and as such involved in the repression against the civilian population. | 09.05.2011
10. | Jamil Hassan | | Head of Syrian Air Force Intelligence and as such involved in the repression against the civilian population. | 09.05.2011
11. | Rustum Ghazali | | Head of Syrian Military Intelligence, Damascus Countryside Branch and as such involved in the repression against the civilian population. | 09.05.2011
12. | Fawwaz Al-Assad | | Involved in the repression against the civilian population as part of the Shabiha militia. | 09.05.2011
13. | Mundir Al-Assad | | Involved in the repression against the civilian population as part of the Shabiha militia. | 09.05.2011

Pending: 32011D0163

17.3.2011 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 70/40
(1) Directive 96/23/EC lays down measures to monitor the substances and groups of residues listed in Annex I thereto. Pursuant to Directive 96/23/EC, the inclusion and retention on the lists of third countries from which Member States are authorised to import animals and animal products covered by that Directive are subject to the submission by the third countries concerned of a plan setting out the guarantees which they offer as regards the monitoring of the groups of residues and substances listed in that Annex. Those plans are to be updated at the request of the Commission, particularly when certain checks render it necessary.
(2) Commission Decision 2004/432/EC of 29 April 2004 on the approval of residue monitoring plans submitted by third countries in accordance with Council Directive 96/23/EC(2)approves the plans provided for in Article 29 of Directive 96/23/EC (the plans) submitted by certain third countries listed in the Annex thereto for the animals and animal products indicated in that list.
(3) In the light of the recent plans submitted by certain third countries and additional information obtained by the Commission, it is necessary to update the list of third countries from which Member States are authorised to import certain animals and animal products, as provided for in Directive 96/23/EC and currently listed in the Annex to Decision 2004/432/EC (the list).
(4) The United Arab Emirates has submitted a plan for camel milk to the Commission. That plan provides sufficient guarantees and should be approved. Therefore, camel milk should be included in the entry for the United Arab Emirates in the list.
(5) Brunei has submitted a plan for aquaculture to the Commission. That plan provides sufficient guarantees and should be approved. Therefore, Brunei should be included in the list as regards aquaculture.
(6) The Commission requested that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia provide information on the implementation of its plan for equidae for slaughter. In the absence of a reply from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia there are not sufficient guarantees for approval. The entry for that third country concerning equidae for slaughter should therefore be deleted from the list. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been informed accordingly.
(7) The entry for Malaysia in the list includes poultry but the plan provided by Malaysia and the additional information obtained by the Commission do not provide sufficient guarantees in respect of poultry. However, the only establishment processing such raw material currently approved in accordance with Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 854/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 laying down specific rules for the organisation of official controls on products of animal origin intended for human consumption(3)imports all its raw material from a Member State. In order to permit the continuation of that activity, the entry for Malaysia should include poultry but it should be restricted to raw material imported from other third countries included in the list for such material or from Member States. Malaysia has been informed accordingly. A footnote setting out this limitation should be included in the list for that third country.
(8) The Commission requested that Russia provide information on the implementation of its plan for equidae for slaughter. In the absence of a reply from Russia there are not sufficient guarantees for approval. The entry for that third country concerning equidae for slaughter should be deleted from the list. Russia has been informed accordingly.
(9) The Commission requested that Ukraine provide information on the implementation of its plan for equine animals and products. In the absence of a reply from Ukraine there are not sufficient guarantees for approval. The entry for that third country concerning equine animals and products should be deleted from the list. Ukraine has been informed accordingly.
(10) The United States has been asked to provide information on the implementation of its plan for equine animals and products. However, the United States did not provide the respective guarantees as the slaughter of equidae for export to the Union has ceased in that third country. The entry for that that third country concerning equine animals and products should therefore be deleted from the list. The United States has been informed accordingly.
(11) A Commission inspection to Uruguay has revealed serious shortcomings concerning the implementation of the plan for rabbit and farmed game. For rabbit, there was no residue monitoring plan in place and for farmed game, no sampling or testing was possible because of a cessation in production. The entries for Uruguay concerning rabbit and farmed game should therefore be deleted from the list. Uruguay has been informed accordingly.
(12) Certain third countries export animal products derived from raw material originating from Member States or from other third countries that comply with the provisions of Directive 96/23/EC for such materials and which are therefore included in the list. In order to ensure that animal products imported into the Union are covered by an approved plan, third countries that import such raw material for subsequent export to the Union should include a statement in their plan to that effect.
(13) In order to avoid any disruption to trade, a transitional period should be laid down to cover the relevant consignments from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Russia, Ukraine and Uruguay, which were dispatched to the Union before the date of application of this Decision.
(14) Decision 2004/432/EC has been amended several times. In the interests of clarity of Union legislation, it should be repealed and replaced by this Decision.
(15) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health,
Code ISO2 Country Bovine Ovine/caprine Porcine Equine Poultry Aqua-culture Milk Eggs Rabbit Wild game Farmed game Honey
AD Andorra X X X
AE United Arab Emirates X X(1)
AL Albania X X X
AR Argentina X X X X X X X X X X X
AU Australia X X X X X X X X
BA Bosnia and Herzegovina X
BD Bangladesh X
BN Brunei X
BR Brazil X X X X X
BW Botswana X X X
BY Belarus X(3) X X X
BZ Belize X X
CA Canada X X X X X X X X X X X X
CH Switzerland X X X X X X X X X X X X
CL Chile X X(4) X X X X X X
CM Cameroon X
CN China X X X X X
CO Colombia X
CR Costa Rica X
CU Cuba X X
CW Curaçao X(2)
EC Ecuador X
ET Ethiopia X
FK Falklands Islands X X
FO Faeroe Islands X
GL Greenland X X X
GT Guatemala X X
HK Hong Kong X(2) X(2)
HN Honduras X
HR Croatia X X X X(3) X X X X X X X X
ID Indonesia X
IL Israel X X X X X X
IN India X X
IS Iceland X X X X X X X(2)
IR Iran X
JM Jamaica X X
JP Japan X
KG Kyrgyzstan X
KR South Korea X
LK Sri Lanka X
MA Morocco X
MD Moldova X
ME Montenegro X X X X X X X
MG Madagascar X
MK former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia(5) X X X X X X X X X
MU Mauritius X(2) X
MX Mexico X X X X
MY Malaysia X(2) X
MZ Mozambique X
NA Namibia X X X X
NC New Caledonia X X X X X
NI Nicaragua X X
NZ New Zealand X X X X X X X X
PA Panama X
PE Peru X X
PF French Polynesia X
PH Philippines X
PN Pitcairn Islands X
PY Paraguay X
RS Serbia(6) X X X X(3) X X X X X X
RU Russia X X X X X X X(7) X
SA Saudi Arabia X
SG Singapore X(2) X(2) X(2) X(2) X(2) X(2)
SM San Marino X X X
SR Suriname X
SV El Salvador X
SX Sint Maarten X(2)
SZ Swaziland X
TH Thailand X X X
TN Tunisia X X X
TR Turkey X X X X
TW Taiwan X X
TZ Tanzania X X
UA Ukraine X X X X X
UG Uganda X X
US United States X X X X X X X X X X X
UY Uruguay X X X X X X X
VE Venezuela X
VN Vietnam X
YT Mayotte X
ZA South Africa X X
ZM Zambia X
ZW Zimbabwe X X
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Council Directive 96/23/EC of 29 April 1996 on measures to monitor certain substances and residues thereof in live animals and animal products and repealing Directives 85/358/EEC and 86/469/EEC and Decisions 89/187/EEC and 91/664/EEC(1), and in particular the fourth subparagraph of Article 29(1) and Article 29(2) thereof,
(1) Directive 96/23/EC lays down measures to monitor the substances and groups of residues listed in Annex I thereto. Pursuant to Directive 96/23/EC, the inclusion and retention on the lists of third countries from which Member States are authorised to import animals and animal products covered by that Directive are subject to the submission by the third countries concerned of a plan setting out the guarantees which they offer as regards the monitoring of the groups of residues and substances listed in that Annex. Those plans are to be updated at the request of the Commission, particularly when certain checks render it necessary.
(2) Commission Decision 2004/432/EC of 29 April 2004 on the approval of residue monitoring plans submitted by third countries in accordance with Council Directive 96/23/EC(2)approves the plans provided for in Article 29 of Directive 96/23/EC (the plans) submitted by certain third countries listed in the Annex thereto for the animals and animal products indicated in that list.
(3) In the light of the recent plans submitted by certain third countries and additional information obtained by the Commission, it is necessary to update the list of third countries from which Member States are authorised to import certain animals and animal products, as provided for in Directive 96/23/EC and currently listed in the Annex to Decision 2004/432/EC (the list).
(4) The United Arab Emirates has submitted a plan for camel milk to the Commission. That plan provides sufficient guarantees and should be approved. Therefore, camel milk should be included in the entry for the United Arab Emirates in the list.
(5) Brunei has submitted a plan for aquaculture to the Commission. That plan provides sufficient guarantees and should be approved. Therefore, Brunei should be included in the list as regards aquaculture.
(6) The Commission requested that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia provide information on the implementation of its plan for equidae for slaughter. In the absence of a reply from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia there are not sufficient guarantees for approval. The entry for that third country concerning equidae for slaughter should therefore be deleted from the list. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been informed accordingly.
(7) The entry for Malaysia in the list includes poultry but the plan provided by Malaysia and the additional information obtained by the Commission do not provide sufficient guarantees in respect of poultry. However, the only establishment processing such raw material currently approved in accordance with Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 854/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 laying down specific rules for the organisation of official controls on products of animal origin intended for human consumption(3)imports all its raw material from a Member State. In order to permit the continuation of that activity, the entry for Malaysia should include poultry but it should be restricted to raw material imported from other third countries included in the list for such material or from Member States. Malaysia has been informed accordingly. A footnote setting out this limitation should be included in the list for that third country.
(8) The Commission requested that Russia provide information on the implementation of its plan for equidae for slaughter. In the absence of a reply from Russia there are not sufficient guarantees for approval. The entry for that third country concerning equidae for slaughter should be deleted from the list. Russia has been informed accordingly.
(9) The Commission requested that Ukraine provide information on the implementation of its plan for equine animals and products. In the absence of a reply from Ukraine there are not sufficient guarantees for approval. The entry for that third country concerning equine animals and products should be deleted from the list. Ukraine has been informed accordingly.
(10) The United States has been asked to provide information on the implementation of its plan for equine animals and products. However, the United States did not provide the respective guarantees as the slaughter of equidae for export to the Union has ceased in that third country. The entry for that that third country concerning equine animals and products should therefore be deleted from the list. The United States has been informed accordingly.
(11) A Commission inspection to Uruguay has revealed serious shortcomings concerning the implementation of the plan for rabbit and farmed game. For rabbit, there was no residue monitoring plan in place and for farmed game, no sampling or testing was possible because of a cessation in production. The entries for Uruguay concerning rabbit and farmed game should therefore be deleted from the list. Uruguay has been informed accordingly.
(12) Certain third countries export animal products derived from raw material originating from Member States or from other third countries that comply with the provisions of Directive 96/23/EC for such materials and which are therefore included in the list. In order to ensure that animal products imported into the Union are covered by an approved plan, third countries that import such raw material for subsequent export to the Union should include a statement in their plan to that effect.
(13) In order to avoid any disruption to trade, a transitional period should be laid down to cover the relevant consignments from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Russia, Ukraine and Uruguay, which were dispatched to the Union before the date of application of this Decision.
(14) Decision 2004/432/EC has been amended several times. In the interests of clarity of Union legislation, it should be repealed and replaced by this Decision.
(15) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
The plans provided for in Article 29 of Directive 96/23/EC submitted to the Commission by the third countries listed in the table set out in the Annex are approved for the animals and animal products that are intended for human consumption and marked with an ‘X’ in that table.

Article 2
1. Third countries using raw material imported from other third countries approved for production of food of animal origin in accordance with this Decision or from Member States to be exported to the European Union and which are unable to provide a residue monitoring plan equivalent to that required by Article 7 of Directive 96/23/EC for such raw material shall complement the plan with the following statement:
‘The competent authority of [third country] ensures that animal products for human consumption exported to the European Union, in particular products produced from raw material imported into [third country], shall only come from establishments approved in accordance to Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 854/2004 and having reliable procedures in place to guarantee that raw material of animal origin used in such food originates only from Member States of the European Union or third countries listed for the respective raw material in the Annex to Commission Decision 2011/163/EU without a restrictive footnote as provided for in Article 2(2) of the Decision.’.
2. The entry in the Annex to this Decision of a third country exporting animal products for human consumption produced only with raw material of animal origin obtained from Member States of the Union or from third countries that provided a plan in accordance with Article 29 of Directive 96/23/EC shall be complemented with the following restrictive footnote:
‘Third countries using only raw material either from other third countries approved for imports of such raw material to the Union or from Member States, in accordance with Article 2.’.

Article 3
1. For a transitional period until 30 April 2011, Member States shall accept consignments from Uruguay of rabbit and farmed game and consignments of equine animal products from Ukraine provided that the importer can demonstrate that such consignments were certified and dispatched from Uruguay or Ukraine to the Union prior to 15 March 2011 in accordance with Decision 2004/432/EC.
2. For a transitional period until 25 March 2011, Member States shall accept consignments from former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Russia or Ukraine of equidae for slaughter provided that the importer of such animals can demonstrate that they were certified and dispatched from former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Russia and Ukraine to the Union prior to 15 March 2011 in accordance with Decision 2004/432/EC.

Article 4
Decision 2004/432/EC is repealed.

Article 5
This Decision is addressed to the Member States.
It shall apply from 15 March 2011.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Having regard to Council Directive 96/23/EC of 29 April 1996 on measures to monitor certain substances and residues thereof in live animals and animal products and repealing Directives 85/358/EEC and 86/469/EEC and Decisions 89/187/EEC and 91/664/EEC(1), and in particular the fourth subparagraph of Article 29(1) and Article 29(2) thereof,
(1) Directive 96/23/EC lays down measures to monitor the substances and groups of residues listed in Annex I thereto. Pursuant to Directive 96/23/EC, the inclusion and retention on the lists of third countries from which Member States are authorised to import animals and animal products covered by that Directive are subject to the submission by the third countries concerned of a plan setting out the guarantees which they offer as regards the monitoring of the groups of residues and substances listed in that Annex. Those plans are to be updated at the request of the Commission, particularly when certain checks render it necessary.
(2) Commission Decision 2004/432/EC of 29 April 2004 on the approval of residue monitoring plans submitted by third countries in accordance with Council Directive 96/23/EC(2)approves the plans provided for in Article 29 of Directive 96/23/EC (the plans) submitted by certain third countries listed in the Annex thereto for the animals and animal products indicated in that list.
(3) In the light of the recent plans submitted by certain third countries and additional information obtained by the Commission, it is necessary to update the list of third countries from which Member States are authorised to import certain animals and animal products, as provided for in Directive 96/23/EC and currently listed in the Annex to Decision 2004/432/EC (the list).
(4) The United Arab Emirates has submitted a plan for camel milk to the Commission. That plan provides sufficient guarantees and should be approved. Therefore, camel milk should be included in the entry for the United Arab Emirates in the list.
(5) Brunei has submitted a plan for aquaculture to the Commission. That plan provides sufficient guarantees and should be approved. Therefore, Brunei should be included in the list as regards aquaculture.
(6) The Commission requested that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia provide information on the implementation of its plan for equidae for slaughter. In the absence of a reply from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia there are not sufficient guarantees for approval. The entry for that third country concerning equidae for slaughter should therefore be deleted from the list. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been informed accordingly.
(7) The entry for Malaysia in the list includes poultry but the plan provided by Malaysia and the additional information obtained by the Commission do not provide sufficient guarantees in respect of poultry. However, the only establishment processing such raw material currently approved in accordance with Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 854/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 laying down specific rules for the organisation of official controls on products of animal origin intended for human consumption(3)imports all its raw material from a Member State. In order to permit the continuation of that activity, the entry for Malaysia should include poultry but it should be restricted to raw material imported from other third countries included in the list for such material or from Member States. Malaysia has been informed accordingly. A footnote setting out this limitation should be included in the list for that third country.
(8) The Commission requested that Russia provide information on the implementation of its plan for equidae for slaughter. In the absence of a reply from Russia there are not sufficient guarantees for approval. The entry for that third country concerning equidae for slaughter should be deleted from the list. Russia has been informed accordingly.
(9) The Commission requested that Ukraine provide information on the implementation of its plan for equine animals and products. In the absence of a reply from Ukraine there are not sufficient guarantees for approval. The entry for that third country concerning equine animals and products should be deleted from the list. Ukraine has been informed accordingly.
(10) The United States has been asked to provide information on the implementation of its plan for equine animals and products. However, the United States did not provide the respective guarantees as the slaughter of equidae for export to the Union has ceased in that third country. The entry for that that third country concerning equine animals and products should therefore be deleted from the list. The United States has been informed accordingly.
(11) A Commission inspection to Uruguay has revealed serious shortcomings concerning the implementation of the plan for rabbit and farmed game. For rabbit, there was no residue monitoring plan in place and for farmed game, no sampling or testing was possible because of a cessation in production. The entries for Uruguay concerning rabbit and farmed game should therefore be deleted from the list. Uruguay has been informed accordingly.
(12) Certain third countries export animal products derived from raw material originating from Member States or from other third countries that comply with the provisions of Directive 96/23/EC for such materials and which are therefore included in the list. In order to ensure that animal products imported into the Union are covered by an approved plan, third countries that import such raw material for subsequent export to the Union should include a statement in their plan to that effect.
(13) In order to avoid any disruption to trade, a transitional period should be laid down to cover the relevant consignments from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Russia, Ukraine and Uruguay, which were dispatched to the Union before the date of application of this Decision.
(14) Decision 2004/432/EC has been amended several times. In the interests of clarity of Union legislation, it should be repealed and replaced by this Decision.
(15) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The plans provided for in Article 29 of Directive 96/23/EC submitted to the Commission by the third countries listed in the table set out in the Annex are approved for the animals and animal products that are intended for human consumption and marked with an ‘X’ in that table.
1. Third countries using raw material imported from other third countries approved for production of food of animal origin in accordance with this Decision or from Member States to be exported to the European Union and which are unable to provide a residue monitoring plan equivalent to that required by Article 7 of Directive 96/23/EC for such raw material shall complement the plan with the following statement:
‘The competent authority of [third country] ensures that animal products for human consumption exported to the European Union, in particular products produced from raw material imported into [third country], shall only come from establishments approved in accordance to Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 854/2004 and having reliable procedures in place to guarantee that raw material of animal origin used in such food originates only from Member States of the European Union or third countries listed for the respective raw material in the Annex to Commission Decision 2011/163/EU without a restrictive footnote as provided for in Article 2(2) of the Decision.’.
2. The entry in the Annex to this Decision of a third country exporting animal products for human consumption produced only with raw material of animal origin obtained from Member States of the Union or from third countries that provided a plan in accordance with Article 29 of Directive 96/23/EC shall be complemented with the following restrictive footnote:
‘Third countries using only raw material either from other third countries approved for imports of such raw material to the Union or from Member States, in accordance with Article 2.’.
1. For a transitional period until 30 April 2011, Member States shall accept consignments from Uruguay of rabbit and farmed game and consignments of equine animal products from Ukraine provided that the importer can demonstrate that such consignments were certified and dispatched from Uruguay or Ukraine to the Union prior to 15 March 2011 in accordance with Decision 2004/432/EC.
2. For a transitional period until 25 March 2011, Member States shall accept consignments from former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Russia or Ukraine of equidae for slaughter provided that the importer of such animals can demonstrate that they were certified and dispatched from former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Russia and Ukraine to the Union prior to 15 March 2011 in accordance with Decision 2004/432/EC.
Decision 2004/432/EC is repealed.
This Decision is addressed to the Member States.
It shall apply from 15 March 2011.
ANNEX
Code ISO2 | Country | Bovine | Ovine/caprine | Porcine | Equine | Poultry | Aqua-culture | Milk | Eggs | Rabbit | Wild game | Farmed game | Honey
AD | Andorra | X | X | | X | | | | | | | |
AE | United Arab Emirates | | | | | | X | X(1) | | | | |
AL | Albania | | X | | | | X | | X | | | |
AR | Argentina | X | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X
AU | Australia | X | X | | X | | X | X | | | X | X | X
BA | Bosnia and Herzegovina | | | | | | X | | | | | |
BD | Bangladesh | | | | | | X | | | | | |
BN | Brunei | | | | | | X | | | | | |
BR | Brazil | X | | | X | X | X | | | | | | X
BW | Botswana | X | | | X | | | | | | | X |
BY | Belarus | | | | X(3) | | X | X | X | | | |
BZ | Belize | | | | | | X | | | | | | X
CA | Canada | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X
CH | Switzerland | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X
CL | Chile | X | X(4) | X | | X | X | X | | | X | | X
CM | Cameroon | | | | | | | | | | | | X
CN | China | | | | | X | X | | X | X | | | X
CO | Colombia | | | | | | X | | | | | |
CR | Costa Rica | | | | | | X | | | | | |
CU | Cuba | | | | | | X | | | | | | X
CW | Curaçao | | | | | | | X(2) | | | | |
EC | Ecuador | | | | | | X | | | | | |
ET | Ethiopia | | | | | | | | | | | | X
FK | Falklands Islands | X | X | | | | | | | | | |
FO | Faeroe Islands | | | | | | X | | | | | |
GL | Greenland | | X | | | | | | | | X | X |
GT | Guatemala | | | | | | X | | | | | | X
HK | Hong Kong | | | | | X(2) | X(2) | | | | | |
HN | Honduras | | | | | | X | | | | | |
HR | Croatia | X | X | X | X(3) | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X
ID | Indonesia | | | | | | X | | | | | |
IL | Israel | | | | | X | X | X | X | | | X | X
IN | India | | | | | | X | | X | | | |
IS | Iceland | X | X | X | X | | X | X | | | | X(2) |
IR | Iran | | | | | | X | | | | | |
JM | Jamaica | | | | | | X | | | | | | X
JP | Japan | | | | | | X | | | | | |
KG | Kyrgyzstan | | | | | | | | | | | | X
KR | South Korea | | | | | | X | | | | | |
LK | Sri Lanka | | | | | | X | | | | | |
MA | Morocco | | | | | | X | | | | | |
MD | Moldova | | | | | | | | | | | | X
ME | Montenegro | X | X | X | | X | X | | X | | | | X
MG | Madagascar | | | | | | X | | | | | |
MK | former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia(5) | X | X | X | | X | X | X | X | | X | | X
MU | Mauritius | | | | | X(2) | X | | | | | |
MX | Mexico | | | | X | | X | | X | | | | X
MY | Malaysia | | | | | X(2) | X | | | | | |
MZ | Mozambique | | | | | | X | | | | | |
NA | Namibia | X | X | | | | | | | | X | X |
NC | New Caledonia | X | | | | | X | | | | X | X | X
NI | Nicaragua | | | | | | X | | | | | | X
NZ | New Zealand | X | X | | X | | X | X | | | X | X | X
PA | Panama | | | | | | X | | | | | |
PE | Peru | | | | | X | X | | | | | |
PF | French Polynesia | | | | | | | | | | | | X
PH | Philippines | | | | | | X | | | | | |
PN | Pitcairn Islands | | | | | | | | | | | | X
PY | Paraguay | X | | | | | | | | | | |
RS | Serbia(6) | X | X | X | X(3) | X | X | X | X | | X | | X
RU | Russia | X | X | X | | X | | X | X | | | X(7) | X
SA | Saudi Arabia | | | | | | X | | | | | |
SG | Singapore | X(2) | X(2) | X(2) | | X(2) | X(2) | X(2) | | | | |
SM | San Marino | X | | X | | | | | | | | | X
SR | Suriname | | | | | | X | | | | | |
SV | El Salvador | | | | | | | | | | | | X
SX | Sint Maarten | | | | | | | X(2) | | | | |
SZ | Swaziland | X | | | | | | | | | | |
TH | Thailand | | | | | X | X | | | | | | X
TN | Tunisia | | | | | X | X | | | | X | |
TR | Turkey | | | | | X | X | X | | | | | X
TW | Taiwan | | | | | | X | | | | | | X
TZ | Tanzania | | | | | | X | | | | | | X
UA | Ukraine | | | | | X | X | X | X | | | | X
UG | Uganda | | | | | | X | | | | | | X
US | United States | X | X | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X
UY | Uruguay | X | X | | X | | X | X | | | X | | X
VE | Venezuela | | | | | | X | | | | | |
VN | Vietnam | | | | | | X | | | | | |
YT | Mayotte | | | | | | X | | | | | |
ZA | South Africa | | | | | | | | | | X | X |
ZM | Zambia | | | | | | | | | | | | X
ZW | Zimbabwe | | | | | | X | | | | | X |
(1) Camel milk only.
(2) Third countries using only raw material either from Member States or from other third countries approved for imports of such raw material to the Union, in accordance with Article 2.
(3) Export to the Union of live equidae for slaughter (food producing animals only).
(4) Only ovine animals.
(5) The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; the definitive nomenclature for this country will be agreed following current negotiations at UN level.
(6) Not including Kosovo which is at present under international administration pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999.
(7) Only for reindeer from the Murmansk and Yamalo-Nenets regions.

Pending: 32004D0004

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,Having regard to Council Directive 2000/29/EC of 8 May 2000 on protective measures against the introduction into the Community of organisms harmful to plants or plant products and against their spread within the Community(1), as last amended by Commission Directive 2003/47/EC(2), and in particular Article 16(3) thereof,Whereas:(1) Where a Member State considers that there is an imminent danger of the introduction into its territory of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith, the cause of brown rot, from a third country, it may temporarily take any additional measures necessary to protect itself from that danger.(2) In 1996, on the basis of continued interceptions of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith in potatoes originating in Egypt several Member States (France, Finland, Spain and Denmark) adopted measures to implement a ban on potatoes originating in Egypt, with a view to ensuring more efficient protection against the introduction of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith from Egypt into their respective territories.(3) The Commission responded by adopting Commission Decision 96/301/EC of 3 May 1996, authorising Member States temporarily to take additional measures against the dissemination of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith as regards Egypt(3), as last amended by Decision 2002/903/EC(4).(4) Decision 96/301/EC was strengthened by a series of amending decisions. The import into the Community of potatoes originating in Egypt was banned except where the potatoes originating in pest-free areas established in accordance with the FAO International standard for phytosanitary measures part 4: Pest surveillance – Requirements of the establishment of pest-free area.(5) During the 2002/03 import season, a number of interceptions of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith were recorded and Egypt itself decided to ban all exports of Egyptian potatoes to the Community as of 24 March 2003.(6) In the light of the above situation the Commission initiated a mission to Egypt which was carried out by a Member State’s expert team in August 2003 to technically audit the existing control and monitoring system for the production and marketing of potatoes destined for export to the Community.(7) The results of the mission were assessed. The Commission considered it appropriate to introduce a more rigorous visual inspection of consignments of potatoes immediately prior to export at the port of dispatch in Egypt.(8) Furthermore, the Commission considered it appropriate, upon the notification of a suspect finding of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith, to redefine the pest-free area related to the said suspect notification, rather than banning the export of potatoes originating in the entire pest-free area related to the said suspect notification. Hence, the identification of “area” should be modified and be based on, either a “sector” or “basin”.(9) In the light of the conclusions and recommendations of the audit report, it should be possible to permit, for the 2003/04 import season, the entry into the territory of the Community of tubers of Solanum tuberosum L. which originate in pest-free areas of Egypt approved in accordance with the said FAO International Standard.(10) In the interest of clarity and rationality, Decision 96/301/EC should therefore be repealed and replaced by this Decision.(11) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plant Health,HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:Article 1The entry into the territory of the Community of tubers of Solanum tuberosum L. which originate in Egypt, other than those already prohibited under the provisions laid down in Annex III, part A, point 10 to Directive 2000/29/EC, shall be prohibited.Article 21. By way of derogation from

Article 1
The entry into the territory of the Community of tubers of Solanum tuberosum L. which originate in Egypt, other than those already prohibited under the provisions laid down in Annex III, part A, point 10 to Directive 2000/29/EC, shall be prohibited.

Article 2
1. By way of derogation from Article 1, for the import season 2003/2004 the entry into the territory of the Community of tubers of Solanum tuberosum L. which originate in Egypt shall be permitted from the “pest-free areas” referred to in paragraph 2, provided that the measures applicable to tubers grown in these areas and laid down in the Annex to this Decision, are complied with.
2. The Commission shall establish whether “pest-free areas” have been approved in Egypt for the import season 2003/04 in accordance with the “FAO International Standard for Phytosanitary Measures Part 4: Pest Surveillance – Requirements for the Establishment of Pest-Free Areas”, in particular point 2.3 thereof, and shall compile a “list of approved pest-free areas”, including identification details of the fields located in the above “approved pest-free areas”. The Commission shall convey this list to the Committee and to the Member States.

Article 3
The provisions of Article 2 shall no longer apply as soon as the Commission has notified to the Member States that the sixth interception of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith has been confirmed in accordance with points 2 or 3 of the Annex to this Decision, in lots of potatoes introduced into the Community pursuant to this Decision during the 2003/04 import season, and that it has been found that interceptions indicate that the method for the identification of “pest-free areas” in Egypt or the procedures for official monitoring in Egypt have not been sufficient to prevent the risk of introduction of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith into the Community.

Article 4
The importing Member States shall provide the Commission and the other Member States, before 30 August 2004, with information on the amounts imported pursuant to this Decision and with a detailed technical report on the official examination referred to in point 2 of the Annex; copies of each plant health certificate shall be transmitted to the Commission. In cases of notification of a suspect or confirmed finding as referred to in point 4 of the Annex copies of the plant health certificates and their attached documents shall be transmitted with the said notification.

Article 5
The Member States shall adjust the measures which they have adopted with a view to protecting themselves against the introduction and spread of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith in such a manner that the measures comply with Articles 1, 2 and 3.

Article 6
Decision 96/301/EC is repealed.

Article 7
This Decision shall be reviewed by 30 September 2004 at the latest.

Article 8
This Decision is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Brussels, 22 December 2003.
For the Commission
David Byrne
Member of the Commission
(1) OJ L 169, 10.7.2000, p. 1.
(2) OJ L 138, 5.6.2003, p. 47.
(3) OJ L 115, 9.5.1996, p. 47.
(4) OJ L 312, 15.11.2002, p. 28.

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,Having regard to Council Directive 2000/29/EC of 8 May 2000 on protective measures against the introduction into the Community of organisms harmful to plants or plant products and against their spread within the Community(1), as last amended by Commission Directive 2003/47/EC(2), and in particular Article 16(3) thereof,Whereas:(1) Where a Member State considers that there is an imminent danger of the introduction into its territory of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith, the cause of brown rot, from a third country, it may temporarily take any additional measures necessary to protect itself from that danger.(2) In 1996, on the basis of continued interceptions of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith in potatoes originating in Egypt several Member States (France, Finland, Spain and Denmark) adopted measures to implement a ban on potatoes originating in Egypt, with a view to ensuring more efficient protection against the introduction of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith from Egypt into their respective territories.(3) The Commission responded by adopting Commission Decision 96/301/EC of 3 May 1996, authorising Member States temporarily to take additional measures against the dissemination of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith as regards Egypt(3), as last amended by Decision 2002/903/EC(4).(4) Decision 96/301/EC was strengthened by a series of amending decisions. The import into the Community of potatoes originating in Egypt was banned except where the potatoes originating in pest-free areas established in accordance with the FAO International standard for phytosanitary measures part 4: Pest surveillance – Requirements of the establishment of pest-free area.(5) During the 2002/03 import season, a number of interceptions of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith were recorded and Egypt itself decided to ban all exports of Egyptian potatoes to the Community as of 24 March 2003.(6) In the light of the above situation the Commission initiated a mission to Egypt which was carried out by a Member State’s expert team in August 2003 to technically audit the existing control and monitoring system for the production and marketing of potatoes destined for export to the Community.(7) The results of the mission were assessed. The Commission considered it appropriate to introduce a more rigorous visual inspection of consignments of potatoes immediately prior to export at the port of dispatch in Egypt.(8) Furthermore, the Commission considered it appropriate, upon the notification of a suspect finding of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith, to redefine the pest-free area related to the said suspect notification, rather than banning the export of potatoes originating in the entire pest-free area related to the said suspect notification. Hence, the identification of “area” should be modified and be based on, either a “sector” or “basin”.(9) In the light of the conclusions and recommendations of the audit report, it should be possible to permit, for the 2003/04 import season, the entry into the territory of the Community of tubers of Solanum tuberosum L. which originate in pest-free areas of Egypt approved in accordance with the said FAO International Standard.(10) In the interest of clarity and rationality, Decision 96/301/EC should therefore be repealed and replaced by this Decision.(11) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on Plant Health,HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:Article 1The entry into the territory of the Community of tubers of Solanum tuberosum L. which originate in Egypt, other than those already prohibited under the provisions laid down in Annex III, part A, point 10 to Directive 2000/29/EC, shall be prohibited.Article 21. By way of derogation from
The entry into the territory of the Community of tubers of Solanum tuberosum L. which originate in Egypt, other than those already prohibited under the provisions laid down in Annex III, part A, point 10 to Directive 2000/29/EC, shall be prohibited.
1. By way of derogation from Article 1, for the import season 2003/2004 the entry into the territory of the Community of tubers of Solanum tuberosum L. which originate in Egypt shall be permitted from the “pest-free areas” referred to in paragraph 2, provided that the measures applicable to tubers grown in these areas and laid down in the Annex to this Decision, are complied with.
2. The Commission shall establish whether “pest-free areas” have been approved in Egypt for the import season 2003/04 in accordance with the “FAO International Standard for Phytosanitary Measures Part 4: Pest Surveillance – Requirements for the Establishment of Pest-Free Areas”, in particular point 2.3 thereof, and shall compile a “list of approved pest-free areas”, including identification details of the fields located in the above “approved pest-free areas”. The Commission shall convey this list to the Committee and to the Member States.
The provisions of Article 2 shall no longer apply as soon as the Commission has notified to the Member States that the sixth interception of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith has been confirmed in accordance with points 2 or 3 of the Annex to this Decision, in lots of potatoes introduced into the Community pursuant to this Decision during the 2003/04 import season, and that it has been found that interceptions indicate that the method for the identification of “pest-free areas” in Egypt or the procedures for official monitoring in Egypt have not been sufficient to prevent the risk of introduction of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith into the Community.
The importing Member States shall provide the Commission and the other Member States, before 30 August 2004, with information on the amounts imported pursuant to this Decision and with a detailed technical report on the official examination referred to in point 2 of the Annex; copies of each plant health certificate shall be transmitted to the Commission. In cases of notification of a suspect or confirmed finding as referred to in point 4 of the Annex copies of the plant health certificates and their attached documents shall be transmitted with the said notification.
The Member States shall adjust the measures which they have adopted with a view to protecting themselves against the introduction and spread of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith in such a manner that the measures comply with Articles 1, 2 and 3.
Decision 96/301/EC is repealed.
This Decision shall be reviewed by 30 September 2004 at the latest.
This Decision is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Brussels, 22 December 2003.
For the Commission
David Byrne
Member of the Commission
(1) OJ L 169, 10.7.2000, p. 1.
(2) OJ L 138, 5.6.2003, p. 47.
(3) OJ L 115, 9.5.1996, p. 47.
(4) OJ L 312, 15.11.2002, p. 28.
For the purpose of the provisions of Article 2, the following emergency measures shall be complied with, in addition to the requirements for potatoes laid down in parts A and B of the Annexes I, II and IV to Directive 2000/29/EC, with the exception of those laid down in Annex IV, part A, section I, point 25.8:
1. (a) the potatoes destined for introduction into the Community shall have been produced in fields located in an approved “pest-free area” in Egypt as established by the Commission in accordance with Article 2 of this Decision; in respect of any such approved areas and for the purpose of this Decision, the identification of “area” shall be based on, either a “sector” (administrative unit already established which covers a group of “basins”) or “basin” (irrigation unit) and shall be identified by its individual official code number;
(b) the potatoes specified under (a) shall have been, in Egypt:
(i) grown from potatoes, either directly of Community origin or once grown from such potatoes, produced in an approved “pest-free area” as established under Article 2 of this Decision and which have been officially tested for latent infection, immediately prior to planting, in accordance with the Community test scheme as laid down in Council Directive 98/57/EC(1), and found free from Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith in such testing;
(ii) officially inspected in the field during the growing season for symptoms of potato brown rot caused by Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith and found free from such symptoms in these inspections and a sample taken of 500 tubers per five feddans (= 2,02 hectares) or 200 tubers per feddan (= 0,41 hectare) or part thereof for smaller fields of potatoes as close as possible to harvest for laboratory examination including an incubation test and visual inspection on cutting of the tubers for symptoms of potato brown rot caused by Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith and found free from such symptoms in these inspections;
(iii) transported to packing stations officially approved by the Egyptian authorities to handle only potatoes eligible for export to the Community during the 2003/04 export season and on arrival at such an approved packing station,
– accompanied by documents attached to each lorry load at the field of harvest stating the origin, by area as specified in (a), of the load. These documents shall be held at the packing station until after the completion of the export season,
– officially inspected on samples of cut tubers for symptoms of potato brown rot caused by Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith and found free from such symptoms in these inspections, at a sampling rate, for 70 kg sacks or equivalent, of 10 % of sacks of 40 tubers inspected per sack and, for 1 or 1,5 tonne sacks, at a sampling rate of 50 % of sacks and 40 tubers inspected per sack. The list of packing stations officially approved by the Egyptian authorities shall have been made available to the Commission prior to 1 January 2004;
(iv) after packing of sacks at the packing station, officially inspected on samples of tubers for symptoms of potato brown rot caused by Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith and found free from such symptoms in these inspections, at a sampling rate of 2 % of sacks per consignment and 30 tubers inspected per sack;
(v) immediately prior to export to the Community inspected at the port of dispatch by cutting 200 tubers from each pest-free area in a consignment drawn from at least five bags per pest-free area;
(vi) officially tested for latent infection on samples taken from each consignment; during the export season at least one sample per basin or sector and represented in the consignment must be taken, but in any case at least five samples must be taken and submitted for laboratory analysis in accordance with the Community test scheme as laid down in Directive 98/57/EC, and found free from Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith in such testing;
(vii) put on an official holding notice on further treatment in the process of preparation for their shipment to the Community from the relevant basin, if the inspections and/or testing as referred to in (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi) reveal suspected occurrence of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith, until the refutation of the suspected occurrence of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith. At the same moment of the imposition of the above holding notice a buffer zone shall be designated around the relevant basin related to the above suspect finding, unless there is a natural physical barrier (e.g. the desert in the case of pivots). No potatoes shall be exported from the relevant buffer zone until the refutation of the suspected occurrence. The extent of the buffer zone shall take into account the risk of further spreading of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith from that approved pest-free area. Information on the identification of the above basin and its buffer zone by their individual official code numbers shall be made available immediately to the Commission, as well as the final results of the examination of the suspected occurrence;
(viii) harvested, handled and bagged separately, including reasonably separate use of machinery, basin by basin, wherever possible, and in any case area by area as specified in (a);
(ix) prepared in lots, each of which shall be made up exclusively of potatoes which were harvested in one single area as specified in (a);
(x) clearly labelled on each bag, under the control of the competent Egyptian authorities, with an indelible indication of the relevant official code number as given in the list of “approved pest-free areas” compiled under Article 2 of this Decision, and of the relevant lot number;
(xi) accompanied by the official phytosanitary certificate required under Article 13(1)(ii) of Directive 2000/29/EC indicating the lot number(s) under the section “Distinguishing marks”, and the official code number(s), as referred to in (x) under the section “Additional declaration”; the lot number of the lot from which a sample has been taken for the purpose specified in (vi), as well as the official statement that the testing has been carried out, shall also be indicated in that section;
(xii) exported by an officially registered exporter, the name or trademark of which shall be indicated on each consignment. The list of officially registered exporters established by the competent Egyptian authorities shall have been made available to the Commission prior to 1 January 2004;
(c) the points of entry authorised for the introduction of relevant potatoes and the name and address of the responsible official body in charge of each point shall have been notified by the Member States to the Commission, which will inform the other Member States and Egypt thereof;
(d) the responsible official body in charge of the point of entry shall have been notified in advance of the likely time of arrival of consignments of potatoes as well as of the amount thereof;
2. At the point of entry, the potatoes shall be subjected to the inspections required pursuant to Article 13a(1)(b) of Directive 2000/29/EC, and such inspections, shall be done on cut tubers of samples of at least 200 tubers each, taken from each lot in a consignment, or if the lot exceeds 25 tonnes, from every 25 tonnes or part thereof in such a lot.
Each lot of the said consignment shall remain under official control and may not be marketed or used until it has been established that the presence of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith was not suspected or detected in those examinations. In addition, in cases where typical or suspect symptoms of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith are detected in a lot, all remaining lots in the said consignment and lots in other consignments which originate from the same area shall be held under official control until the presence of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith has been confirmed or refuted in the said lot.
If typical or suspect symptoms of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith are detected in the said examinations, the confirmation or refutation of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith shall be determined by testing in accordance with the said Community test scheme. If Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith is confirmed the lot from which the sample has been taken shall be subjected to one of the following measures, either:
(i) refusal or permission to send products to a destination outside the Community; or
(ii) destruction,
and all remaining lots in the consignment from the same area shall be tested in accordance with point 3.
3. In addition to the inspections referred to in point 2, testing for latent infection in accordance with the said Community test scheme shall be done on samples taken from each area as specified in point 1(a); during the export season at least one sample from each sector or basin per area as referred to in paragraph 1a shall be taken at a rate of 200 tubers per sample from a single lot. The sample selected for latent infection shall also be subjected to an inspection of the cut tubers. For each sample tested and confirmed positive there should be retention and appropriate conservation of any remaining potato extract.
Each lot from which the samples have been taken shall remain under official control and may not be marketed or used until it has been established that the presence of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith was not confirmed in the said testing. If Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith is confirmed the lot from which the sample has been taken shall be subjected to one of the following measures, either:
(i) refusal or permission to send products to a destination outside the Community; or
(ii) destruction.
4. In the case of both suspect and confirmed findings of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith the Member States shall notify the Commission and Egypt immediately thereof; the notification of a suspect finding shall be on the basis of a positive result in the rapid screening test(s) as specified in Annex II, section I, point 1 and section II or screening test(s) as specified in Annex II, section I, point 2 and section III of the said Community test scheme.
5. The Commission shall ensure that it receives information of the details and the results of visual inspections referred to in points 1(b)(ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) and of the testing referred to in paragraph 1(b)(vi). The list of approved pest-free areas shall be adjusted by the Commission according to these results and to the findings made under points 2 and 3; in relation to a suspect notification made under point 4 the list of “approved pest-free areas” shall be adjusted by means of the imposition of a holding notice on further exports to the Community of potatoes related to the above suspect notification originating in the basin in the relevant approved pest-free area until refutation of the suspect finding of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith.
On receipt of the notification made by the Commission of the above adjusted list of approved pest-free areas, a buffer zone shall be designated by the Egyptian authorities as referred to in point 1(b)(vii). Information on the identification of the above buffer zone by the individual official code number(s) shall be made available immediately to the Commission and the Member States. In absence of such information within three working days of the suspected occurrence, the Commission shall adjust the list of approved pest-free areas by excluding on any further exports for the remaining period of the import season 2003/04 from the entire sector in which the basin related to the above suspect notification is situated.
6. Member States shall lay down appropriate labelling requirements, including the Egyptian origin, with the aim of preventing the potatoes from being planted and appropriate measures for the disposal of waste after packaging or processing of the potatoes to prevent any spread of Pseudomonas solanacearum (Smith) Smith as a result of possible latent infection.
(1) OJ L 235, 21.8.1998, p. 1.

Pending: 32000D0609

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,Having regard to Council Directive 91/494/EEC of 26 June 1991 on animal health conditions governing intra-Comunity trade and imports from third countries of fresh poultrymeat(1), as last amended by Directive 1999/89/EC(2), and in particular Articles 9(1), 11(1), 12, 14(1) and 14a thereof,Having regard to Council Directive 92/118/EEC of 17 December 1992 laying down animal health and public health requirements governing trade in and imports into the Community of products not subject to the said requirements laid down in specific Community rules referred to in Annex A(1), to Directive 89/662/EEC and, as regards pathogens, to Directive 90/425/EEC(3), as last amended by Directive 97/79/EC(4), and in particular Article 10 thereof,Whereas:(1) Ratites are “poultry” according to Article 2 of Directive 91/494/EEC as well as “farmed game” according to Article 2 of Council Directive 91/495/EEC of 27 November 1990 concerning public health and animal health problems affecting the production and placing on the market of rabbit meat and farmed game meat(5).(2) Ratite meat can be imported from third countries if at least the animal health requirements of Chapter III of Directive 91/494/EEC and, according to Annex I Chapter 11 of Directive 92/118/EEC, the public health requirements of Chapter III of Directive 91/495/EEC are fulfilled.(3) By the effect of this Decision Article 17 of Directive 91/495/EEC will become obsolete for fresh meat of farmed ratites.(4) Neither Commission Decision 94/984/EC of 20 December 1994 laying down animal health conditions and veterinary certificates for the importation of fresh poultry meat from third countries(6), as last amended by Decision 2000/352/EEC(7), nor Commission Decision 97/219/EC of 28 February 1997 laying down animal and public health conditions and veterinary certification for imports of farmed game meat and rabbit meat from third countries(8), as amended by Commission Decision 2000/160/EC(9), are applicable to ratite meat because of these birds is excluded from the scopes of these Decisions.(5) It is necessary to lay down the animal and public health conditions and veterinary certification for import of farmed ratite meat into the Community accordingly.(6) Commission Decision 96/659/EC of 22 November 1996, concerning protective measures in relation to Crimean Congo haemorrhagic fever(10), as last amended by Decision 97/183/EC(11), authorises Member States to import ratite meat provided that extra guaranteees are given in relation to Crimean Congo haemorrhagic fever; these guarantees should be taken into consideration.(7) The Czech Republic, Israel and Switzerland are not free from Newcastle disease, however, they apply measures to control Newcastle disease which are at least equivalent to those laid down in Council Directive 92/66/EEC(12), as last amended by the Act of Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden.(8) It is appropriate on this basis to allow the importation of farmed ratite meat from the mentioned countries.(9) Some third countries are not free from Newcastle disease and do not apply measures, which are at least equivalent to those laid down in Directive 92/66/EEC. These countries, however, should have the possibility to export fresh ratite meat to the European Union provided that their measures to control the said disease offer animal health guarantees at least equivalent to those offered by Chapter II of Directive 91/494/EEC.(10) Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe have given the necessary guarantees referred to above to allow imports of farmed ratite meat under the conditions laid down in the certificate in Annex II, Part 2, Model B in this Decision and have submitted to the Commission a satisfactory statistically based sampling plan for surveillance for Newcastle disease on holdings from which farmed ratites will be sent for slaughter for export to the EU.(11) Council Directive 93/119/EC of 22 December 1993, laying down requirements on the protection of animals at the time of slaughter or killing(13), should be taken into consideration when establishing the import conditions for ratite meat from third countries.(12) Council Directive 96/22/EC of 29 April 1996 concerning the prohibition on the use in stockfarming of certain substances having a hormonal or thyrostatic action and of beta-agonists, and repealing Directives 81/602/EEC, 88/146/EEC and 88/299/EEC(14) and Council Directive 96/23/EC of 29 April 1996 on measures to monitor certain substances and residues thereof in live animals and animal products and repealing Directives 85/358/EEC and 86/469/EEC and Decisions 89/187/EEC and 91/664/EEC(15) have to be taken into consideration when public health requirements are established for the importation of ratite meat.(13) A list of third countries allowed to use the certificates for imports of ratite meat must be established to achieve complete harmonisation of the conditions for import of ratite meat.(14) This list must be based on the principal list of third countries from which Member States authorise imports of fresh poultry meat as it is drawn up by Commission Decision 94/85/EC(16), as last amended by Decision 96/2/EC(17).(15) Tunisia has given the necessary guarantees to be included in the list drawn up by Decision 94/85/EC.(16) The measures provided for in this Decision have followed the notification procedure of the Agreement on the Application of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) laid down within the framework of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).(17) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee,

Article 1
Member States shall authorise the importation of fresh meat of farmed ratites only from third countries or parts of third countries listed in Annex I, provided that it meets the requirements of the corresponding health certificate set out in Annex II and that it is accompanied by such a certificate, duly completed and signed. The certificate shall include the general part conforming to Annex II, Part 1, and one of the specific health attestations conforming to Annex II, Part 2, according to the required model (A or B) as specified in Annex I.

Article 2
In the Annex of Decision 94/85/EC the following new line is inserted in accordance with the alphabetic order of the ISO code:

Article 3
This Decision shall apply for consignments certified as from 1 October 2000.

Article 4
This Decision is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Brussels, 29 September 2000.
For the Commission
David Byrne
Member of the Commission
(1) OJ L 268, 24.9.1991, p. 35.
(2) OJ L 300, 23.11.1999, p. 17.
(3) OJ L 62, 15.3.1993, p. 49.
(4) OJ L 24, 30.1.1998, p. 31.
(5) OJ L 268, 24.9.1991, p. 41.
(6) OJ L 378, 31.12.1994, p. 11.
(7) OJ L 124, 25.5.2000, p. 64.
(8) OJ L 88, 3.4.1997, p. 45.
(9) OJ L 51, 24.2.2000, p. 37.
(10) OJ L 302, 26.11.1996, p. 27.
(11) OJ L 76, 18.3.1997, p. 32.
(12) OJ L 260, 5.9.1992, p. 1.
(13) OJ L 340, 31.12.1993, p. 21.
(14) OJ L 125, 23.5.1996, p. 3.
(15) OJ L 125, 23.5.1996, p. 10.

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,Having regard to Council Directive 91/494/EEC of 26 June 1991 on animal health conditions governing intra-Comunity trade and imports from third countries of fresh poultrymeat(1), as last amended by Directive 1999/89/EC(2), and in particular Articles 9(1), 11(1), 12, 14(1) and 14a thereof,Having regard to Council Directive 92/118/EEC of 17 December 1992 laying down animal health and public health requirements governing trade in and imports into the Community of products not subject to the said requirements laid down in specific Community rules referred to in Annex A(1), to Directive 89/662/EEC and, as regards pathogens, to Directive 90/425/EEC(3), as last amended by Directive 97/79/EC(4), and in particular Article 10 thereof,Whereas:(1) Ratites are “poultry” according to Article 2 of Directive 91/494/EEC as well as “farmed game” according to Article 2 of Council Directive 91/495/EEC of 27 November 1990 concerning public health and animal health problems affecting the production and placing on the market of rabbit meat and farmed game meat(5).(2) Ratite meat can be imported from third countries if at least the animal health requirements of Chapter III of Directive 91/494/EEC and, according to Annex I Chapter 11 of Directive 92/118/EEC, the public health requirements of Chapter III of Directive 91/495/EEC are fulfilled.(3) By the effect of this Decision Article 17 of Directive 91/495/EEC will become obsolete for fresh meat of farmed ratites.(4) Neither Commission Decision 94/984/EC of 20 December 1994 laying down animal health conditions and veterinary certificates for the importation of fresh poultry meat from third countries(6), as last amended by Decision 2000/352/EEC(7), nor Commission Decision 97/219/EC of 28 February 1997 laying down animal and public health conditions and veterinary certification for imports of farmed game meat and rabbit meat from third countries(8), as amended by Commission Decision 2000/160/EC(9), are applicable to ratite meat because of these birds is excluded from the scopes of these Decisions.(5) It is necessary to lay down the animal and public health conditions and veterinary certification for import of farmed ratite meat into the Community accordingly.(6) Commission Decision 96/659/EC of 22 November 1996, concerning protective measures in relation to Crimean Congo haemorrhagic fever(10), as last amended by Decision 97/183/EC(11), authorises Member States to import ratite meat provided that extra guaranteees are given in relation to Crimean Congo haemorrhagic fever; these guarantees should be taken into consideration.(7) The Czech Republic, Israel and Switzerland are not free from Newcastle disease, however, they apply measures to control Newcastle disease which are at least equivalent to those laid down in Council Directive 92/66/EEC(12), as last amended by the Act of Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden.(8) It is appropriate on this basis to allow the importation of farmed ratite meat from the mentioned countries.(9) Some third countries are not free from Newcastle disease and do not apply measures, which are at least equivalent to those laid down in Directive 92/66/EEC. These countries, however, should have the possibility to export fresh ratite meat to the European Union provided that their measures to control the said disease offer animal health guarantees at least equivalent to those offered by Chapter II of Directive 91/494/EEC.(10) Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe have given the necessary guarantees referred to above to allow imports of farmed ratite meat under the conditions laid down in the certificate in Annex II, Part 2, Model B in this Decision and have submitted to the Commission a satisfactory statistically based sampling plan for surveillance for Newcastle disease on holdings from which farmed ratites will be sent for slaughter for export to the EU.(11) Council Directive 93/119/EC of 22 December 1993, laying down requirements on the protection of animals at the time of slaughter or killing(13), should be taken into consideration when establishing the import conditions for ratite meat from third countries.(12) Council Directive 96/22/EC of 29 April 1996 concerning the prohibition on the use in stockfarming of certain substances having a hormonal or thyrostatic action and of beta-agonists, and repealing Directives 81/602/EEC, 88/146/EEC and 88/299/EEC(14) and Council Directive 96/23/EC of 29 April 1996 on measures to monitor certain substances and residues thereof in live animals and animal products and repealing Directives 85/358/EEC and 86/469/EEC and Decisions 89/187/EEC and 91/664/EEC(15) have to be taken into consideration when public health requirements are established for the importation of ratite meat.(13) A list of third countries allowed to use the certificates for imports of ratite meat must be established to achieve complete harmonisation of the conditions for import of ratite meat.(14) This list must be based on the principal list of third countries from which Member States authorise imports of fresh poultry meat as it is drawn up by Commission Decision 94/85/EC(16), as last amended by Decision 96/2/EC(17).(15) Tunisia has given the necessary guarantees to be included in the list drawn up by Decision 94/85/EC.(16) The measures provided for in this Decision have followed the notification procedure of the Agreement on the Application of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) laid down within the framework of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).(17) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee,
Member States shall authorise the importation of fresh meat of farmed ratites only from third countries or parts of third countries listed in Annex I, provided that it meets the requirements of the corresponding health certificate set out in Annex II and that it is accompanied by such a certificate, duly completed and signed. The certificate shall include the general part conforming to Annex II, Part 1, and one of the specific health attestations conforming to Annex II, Part 2, according to the required model (A or B) as specified in Annex I.
In the Annex of Decision 94/85/EC the following new line is inserted in accordance with the alphabetic order of the ISO code:
This Decision shall apply for consignments certified as from 1 October 2000.
This Decision is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Brussels, 29 September 2000.
For the Commission
David Byrne
Member of the Commission
(1) OJ L 268, 24.9.1991, p. 35.
(2) OJ L 300, 23.11.1999, p. 17.
(3) OJ L 62, 15.3.1993, p. 49.
(4) OJ L 24, 30.1.1998, p. 31.
(5) OJ L 268, 24.9.1991, p. 41.
(6) OJ L 378, 31.12.1994, p. 11.
(7) OJ L 124, 25.5.2000, p. 64.
(8) OJ L 88, 3.4.1997, p. 45.
(9) OJ L 51, 24.2.2000, p. 37.
(10) OJ L 302, 26.11.1996, p. 27.
(11) OJ L 76, 18.3.1997, p. 32.
(12) OJ L 260, 5.9.1992, p. 1.
(13) OJ L 340, 31.12.1993, p. 21.
(14) OJ L 125, 23.5.1996, p. 3.
(15) OJ L 125, 23.5.1996, p. 10.
List of third countries or parts of third countries which are allowed to export farmed ratite meat to the European Union
>PIC FILE= “L_2000258EN.005202.EPS”>
>PIC FILE= “L_2000258EN.005301.EPS”>
>PIC FILE= “L_2000258EN.005401.EPS”>
>PIC FILE= “L_2000258EN.005501.EPS”>
>PIC FILE= “L_2000258EN.005601.EPS”>

Pending: 31994D0085

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Directive 91/494/EEC of 26 June 1991 on animal health conditions governing intra-Community trade in and imports from third countries of fresh poultrymeat (1), as amended by Directive 92/116/EEC (2), and in particular Article 9 thereof, Whereas the countries listed in the Annex to this Decision which traditionally supply the Member States, have been requested to show, through the provision of written assurances supported by appropriate documentation or as a result of on-the-spot inspections, that they satisfy the requirements of the Community; Whereas these assurances shall be examined by the Standing Veterinary Committee; Whereas this list applies without prejudice to Commission Decision 93/342/EEC (3) which laid down the criteria to classify third countries with regard to avian influenza and Newcastle disease; Whereas it may also be necessary in certain cases to specify the parts of countries from which imports will be authorized; Whereas this list can be amended at any time to take into account new information or new situations; whereas the listing of any country shall be reviewed at any time when further information, in particular resulting from on-the-spot inspections, indicates that conditions in the third country concerned may have changed or that previously received information was incomplete, inexact or inaccurate; Whereas, although the list of third countries forms the basis of the Community arrangements applicable to imports from third countries laid down in Directive 91/494/EEC, other measures, particularly concerning specific animal health conditions, public health requirements, residue plans and certification will have to be taken into account in order to achieve complete harmonization of the conditions for importation of fresh poultrymeat; Whereas, pending the adoption by the Commission of the animal health certification for importation of fresh poultrymeat from the countries specified in this list, Member States may continue to apply, on importation, their animal health requirements in force on 1 January 1994; Whereas the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
The Member States shall authorize imports of fresh poultrymeat in accordance with the list in the Annex.

Article 2
This Decision shall apply from 1 July 1994.

Article 3
This Decision is addressed to all Member States.
Done at Brussels, 16 February 1994.
For the Commission
René STEICHEN
Member of the Commission
(1) OJ No L 268, 24. 9. 1991, p. 35.
(2) OJ No L 62, 15. 3. 1993, p. 1.
(3) OJ No L 137, 8. 6. 1993, p. 24.

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Directive 91/494/EEC of 26 June 1991 on animal health conditions governing intra-Community trade in and imports from third countries of fresh poultrymeat (1), as amended by Directive 92/116/EEC (2), and in particular Article 9 thereof, Whereas the countries listed in the Annex to this Decision which traditionally supply the Member States, have been requested to show, through the provision of written assurances supported by appropriate documentation or as a result of on-the-spot inspections, that they satisfy the requirements of the Community; Whereas these assurances shall be examined by the Standing Veterinary Committee; Whereas this list applies without prejudice to Commission Decision 93/342/EEC (3) which laid down the criteria to classify third countries with regard to avian influenza and Newcastle disease; Whereas it may also be necessary in certain cases to specify the parts of countries from which imports will be authorized; Whereas this list can be amended at any time to take into account new information or new situations; whereas the listing of any country shall be reviewed at any time when further information, in particular resulting from on-the-spot inspections, indicates that conditions in the third country concerned may have changed or that previously received information was incomplete, inexact or inaccurate; Whereas, although the list of third countries forms the basis of the Community arrangements applicable to imports from third countries laid down in Directive 91/494/EEC, other measures, particularly concerning specific animal health conditions, public health requirements, residue plans and certification will have to be taken into account in order to achieve complete harmonization of the conditions for importation of fresh poultrymeat; Whereas, pending the adoption by the Commission of the animal health certification for importation of fresh poultrymeat from the countries specified in this list, Member States may continue to apply, on importation, their animal health requirements in force on 1 January 1994; Whereas the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
The Member States shall authorize imports of fresh poultrymeat in accordance with the list in the Annex.
This Decision shall apply from 1 July 1994.
This Decision is addressed to all Member States.
Done at Brussels, 16 February 1994.
For the Commission
René STEICHEN
Member of the Commission
(1) OJ No L 268, 24. 9. 1991, p. 35.
(2) OJ No L 62, 15. 3. 1993, p. 1.
(3) OJ No L 137, 8. 6. 1993, p. 24.
“” ID=”1″>AR> ID=”2″>Argentina> ID=”3″>×”> ID=”1″>AT> ID=”2″>Austria> ID=”3″>×”> ID=”1″>AU> ID=”2″>Australia> ID=”3″>×”> ID=”1″>BG> ID=”2″>Bulgaria> ID=”3″>×”> ID=”1″>BR> ID=”2″>Brazil> ID=”3″>×”> ID=”1″>CA> ID=”2″>Canada> ID=”3″>×”> ID=”1″>CH> ID=”2″>Switzerland> ID=”3″>×”> ID=”1″>CL> ID=”2″>Chile> ID=”3″>×”> ID=”1″>CY> ID=”2″>Cyprus> ID=”3″>×”> ID=”1″>CZ> ID=”2″>Czech Republic> ID=”3″>×”> ID=”1″>FI> ID=”2″>Finland> ID=”3″>×”> ID=”1″>HU> ID=”2″>Hungary> ID=”3″>×”> ID=”1″>IL> ID=”2″>Israel> ID=”3″>×”> ID=”1″>MY> ID=”2″>Malaysia> ID=”3″>×> ID=”4″>Peninsular (Western) Malaysia only”> ID=”1″>NO> ID=”2″>Norway> ID=”3″>×”> ID=”1″>NZ> ID=”2″>New Zealand> ID=”3″>×”> ID=”1″>PL> ID=”2″>Poland> ID=”3″>×”> ID=”1″>RO> ID=”2″>Romania> ID=”3″>×”> ID=”1″>SE> ID=”2″>Sweden> ID=”3″>×”> ID=”1″>SK> ID=”2″>Slovakia> ID=”3″>×”> ID=”1″>TH> ID=”2″>Thailand> ID=”3″>×”> ID=”1″>US> ID=”2″>United States of America> ID=”3″>×”> ID=”1″>UY> ID=”2″>Uruguay> ID=”3″>×”> ID=”1″>ZA> ID=”2″>South Africa> ID=”3″>×”> ID=”1″>ZW> ID=”2″>Zimbabwe> ID=”3″>×”>

Pending: 31992D0471

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Directive 89/556/EEC of 25 September 1989 on animal health conditions governing intra-Community trade in and importation from third countries of embryos of domestic animals of the bovine species (1), as amended by Directive 90/425/EEC (2), and in particular Articles 9 and 10 thereof, Whereas the list of third countries from which Member States are permitted to import bovine embryos has been established by Commission Decision 91/270/EEC (3); Whereas Commission Decision 92/452/EEC (4) establishes the list of embryo collection teams for certain third countries; whereas Decision 92/452/EEC will be completed in due course with new information for other third countries; Whereas it is necessary to lay down the animal health conditions and veterinary certification required for imports of bovine embryos from third countries; Whereas the competent authorities of the third country in which the embryos intended for export to the Community were collected have undertaken to ensure that such embryos have been collected and processed by approved and supervised embryo collection teams, that they have been obtained from animals of satisfactory health status, that they have been stored and transported in accordance with the rules which preserve their health status and are accompanied during transport by an animal health certificate in order to ensure that this obligation has been fulfilled; Whereas the competent veterinary authorities of the third countries on the list have undertaken to notify the Commission and the Member States by telex or telefax within 24 hours of the confirmation of the occurrence of any of the following diseases: rinderpest, foot-and-mouth disease, contagious bovine pleuropneumonia, bluetongue, epizootic haemorrhagic disease, Rift Valley fever and contagious vesicular stomatitis or the adoption of vaccination against them; Whereas the animal health situation in the third countries on the list is satisfactory from the point of view of import of bovine embryos; whereas the veterinary services in these countries are well-structured and organized; Whereas the animal health certificate is adapted to cater for the animal health situation in individual third countries; Whereas the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
1. Member States shall authorize the importation of bovine embryos conforming to the guarantees laid down in the animal health certificate in accordance with Annex A, Part I. This certificate must accompany consignments of embryos coming from third countries or parts of third countries listed in Annex A, Part II.
2. Member States shall authorize the importation of bovine embryos conforming to the guarantees laid down in the animal health certificate in accordance with Annex B, Part I. This certificate must accompany consignments of embryos coming from third countries or parts of third countries listed in Annex B, Part II.

Article 2
This Decision is addressed to the Member States. Done at Brussels, 2 September 1992. For the Commission
Ray MAC SHARRY
Member of the Commission
(1) OJ No L 302, 19. 10. 1989, p. 1. (2) OJ No L 224, 18. 8. 1990, p. 29. (3) OJ No L 134, 29. 5. 1991, p. 56. (4) OJ No L 250, 29. 8. 1992, p. 40.

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Having regard to Council Directive 89/556/EEC of 25 September 1989 on animal health conditions governing intra-Community trade in and importation from third countries of embryos of domestic animals of the bovine species (1), as amended by Directive 90/425/EEC (2), and in particular Articles 9 and 10 thereof, Whereas the list of third countries from which Member States are permitted to import bovine embryos has been established by Commission Decision 91/270/EEC (3); Whereas Commission Decision 92/452/EEC (4) establishes the list of embryo collection teams for certain third countries; whereas Decision 92/452/EEC will be completed in due course with new information for other third countries; Whereas it is necessary to lay down the animal health conditions and veterinary certification required for imports of bovine embryos from third countries; Whereas the competent authorities of the third country in which the embryos intended for export to the Community were collected have undertaken to ensure that such embryos have been collected and processed by approved and supervised embryo collection teams, that they have been obtained from animals of satisfactory health status, that they have been stored and transported in accordance with the rules which preserve their health status and are accompanied during transport by an animal health certificate in order to ensure that this obligation has been fulfilled; Whereas the competent veterinary authorities of the third countries on the list have undertaken to notify the Commission and the Member States by telex or telefax within 24 hours of the confirmation of the occurrence of any of the following diseases: rinderpest, foot-and-mouth disease, contagious bovine pleuropneumonia, bluetongue, epizootic haemorrhagic disease, Rift Valley fever and contagious vesicular stomatitis or the adoption of vaccination against them; Whereas the animal health situation in the third countries on the list is satisfactory from the point of view of import of bovine embryos; whereas the veterinary services in these countries are well-structured and organized; Whereas the animal health certificate is adapted to cater for the animal health situation in individual third countries; Whereas the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
1. Member States shall authorize the importation of bovine embryos conforming to the guarantees laid down in the animal health certificate in accordance with Annex A, Part I. This certificate must accompany consignments of embryos coming from third countries or parts of third countries listed in Annex A, Part II.
2. Member States shall authorize the importation of bovine embryos conforming to the guarantees laid down in the animal health certificate in accordance with Annex B, Part I. This certificate must accompany consignments of embryos coming from third countries or parts of third countries listed in Annex B, Part II.
This Decision is addressed to the Member States. Done at Brussels, 2 September 1992. For the Commission
Ray MAC SHARRY
Member of the Commission
(1) OJ No L 302, 19. 10. 1989, p. 1. (2) OJ No L 224, 18. 8. 1990, p. 29. (3) OJ No L 134, 29. 5. 1991, p. 56. (4) OJ No L 250, 29. 8. 1992, p. 40.
1. Consignor (name and full address) ANIMAL HEALTH CERTIFICATE
No ORIGINAL
2. Third country of collection 3. Consignee (name and full address)
(a) A separate certificate must be issued for each consignment of embryos
(b) The original of this certificate must accompany the consignment to the
place of destination
6. Place of loading
8. Means of transport
9. Place and Member State of destination
11. Number and codemark of embryo containers
4. COMPETENT AUTHORITY
5. COMPETENT LOCAL AUTHORITY
7. Name and address of embryo collection team
10. Registration number of embryo collection team
12. Identification of consignment
(a) Number of embryos (b) Date(s) of collection (c) Breed
13. I, the undersigned official veterinarian of the Government of ,
(name of exporting third country)
certify that:
1. the embryo collection team identified above:
– is approved in Decision 92/452/EEC in accordance with Chapter I of Annex A to Directive 89/556/EEC,
– carried out the collection, processing, storing and transport of the embryos described above in accordance with Chapter II of Annex A to Directive 89/556/EEC,
– is subjected at least twice per year to inspection by an official veterinarian of the central veterinary authority of ;
(name of third country)
2. according to official findings
(name of exporting country)
(a) been free during 12 months immediately prior to collection of the embryos to be exported from rinderpest;
(b) either (1):
(i) been free from foot-and-mouth disease during the 12 months immediately prior to collection of the embryos to be exported and does not practise vaccination against it
(ii) has not been free from foot-and-mouth disease for the 12 months immediately prior to the collection of the embryos and/or practises vaccination against it and
– the donor animals come from a holding in which no animal has been vaccinated against foot-and-mouth disease during the 30 days prior to collection, and
– the embryos have been stored in approved conditions for a minimum period of 30 days immediately after collection;
(c) either (1):
(i) been free from bluetongue and epizootic haemorrhagic disease (EHD) for the 12 months immediately prior to collection of the embryos to be exported and does not practise vaccination against them
(ii) has not been free from bluetongue and epizootic haemorrhagic disease (EHD) for the 12 months immediately prior to collection of the embryos to be exported and/or practises vaccination against them and
– the embryos have been stored in approved conditions for a minimum period of 30 days immediately after collection, and
– the donor female was subjected with negative results to a competitive Elisa for bluetongue antibodies, an agar gel immuno diffusion test and a serum neutralization test for epizootic haemorrhagic disease antibodies on a blood sample taken not less than 21 days following collection;
3. (a) the premises on which the embryos were collected and processed was at the time of collection situated in the centre of an area of 20 km diameter on which according to official findings there had been no incidence of foot-and-mouth disease, bluetongue, epizootic haemorrhagic disease, contagious vesicular stomatitis, Rift Valley fever or contagious bovine pleuropneumonia for 30 days immediately prior to collection and in the case of embryos certified under 2 (b) (ii) and (c) (ii) for 30 days after collection;
(b) between the time of collection of the embryos to be exported and their dispatch, they were stored continuously in approved premises which were situated in the centre of an area of 20 km in diameter in which according to official findings there was no incidence of foot-and-mouth disease, contagious vesicular stomatitis or Rift Valley fever;
4. the donor females:
(a) during the 30 days immediately prior to collection of the embryos to be exported, were located in premises situated in the centre of an area of 20 km in diameter in which according to official findings there was no incidence of foot-and-mouth disease, blue tongue, epizootic haemorrhagic disease, contagious vesicular stomatitis, Rift Valley fever or contagious bovine pleuropneumonia;
(b) were artificially inseminated with semen from a bull which at the time of collection of the semen was standing at a semen collection centre officially approved under Council Directive 88/407/EEC (2) or any subsequent decision;
(c) showed no clinical sign of disease on the day of collection;
(d) have spent the six months immediately prior to collection in the territory of
in a maximum of two herds which are:
(name of exporting country)
– free from tuberculosis,
– free from brucellosis,
– free from enzootic bovine leukosis or a herd or herds which has/have shown no clinical signs of enzootic bovine leukosis during the previous three years,
– a herd or herds which has/have shown no clinical sign of infectious bovine rhinotracheitis/infectious pustular vulvo-vaginitis during the previous 12 months.
1. Consignor (name and full address) ANIMAL HEALTH CERTIFICATE
No ORIGINAL
2. Third country of collection 3. Consignee (name and full address)
(a) A separate certificate must be issued for each consignment of embryos
(b) The original of this certificate must accompany the consignment to the
place of destination
6. Place of loading
8. Means of transport
9. Place and Member State of destination
11. Number and codemark of embryo containers
4. COMPETENT AUTHORITY
5. COMPETENT LOCAL AUTHORITY
7. Name and address of embryo collection team
10. Registration number of embryo collection team
12. Identification of consignment
(a) Number of embryos (b) Date(s) of collection (c) Breed
13. I, the undersigned official veterinarian of the Government of ,
(name of exporting third country)
certify that:
1. the embryo collection team identified above:
– is approved in Decision 92/452/EEC in accordance with Chapter I of Annex A to Directive 89/556/EEC,
– carried out the collection, processing, storing and transport of the embryos described above in accordance with Chapter II of Annex A to Directive 89/556/EEC,
– is subjected at least twice per year to inspection by an official veterinarian of the central veterinary authority of ;
(name of third country)
2. according to official findings
(name of exporting country)
(a) been free during 12 months immediately prior to collection of the embryos to be exported from rinderpest;
(b) either (1):
(i) been free from foot-and-mouth disease during the 12 months immediately prior to collection of the embryos to be exported and does not practise vaccination against it
(ii) has not been free from foot-and-mouth disease for the 12 months immediately prior to the collection of the embryos and/or practises vaccination against it and
– the donor animals come from a holding in which no animal has been vaccinated against foot-and-mouth disease during the 30 days prior to collection, and
– the embryos have been stored in approved conditions for a minimum period of 30 days immediately after collection;
(c) either (1):
(i) been free from bluetongue and epizootic haemorrhagic disease (EHD) for the 12 months immediately prior to collection of the embryos to be exported and does not practise vaccination against them
(ii) has not been free from bluetongue and epizootic haemorrhagic disease (EHD) for the 12 months immediately prior to collection of the embryos to be exported and/or practises vaccination against them and
– the embryos have been stored in approved conditions for a minimum period of 30 days immediately after collection, and
– the donor female was subjected with negative results to a competitive Elisa for bluetongue antibodies, an agar gel immuno diffusion test and a serum neutralization test for epizootic haemorrhagic disease antibodies on a blood sample taken not less than 21 days following collection;
3. (a) the premises on which the embryos were collected and processed was at the time of collection situated in the centre of an area of 20 km diameter on which according to official findings there had been no incidence of foot-and-mouth disease, bluetongue, epizootic haemorrhagic disease, contagious vesicular stomatitis, Rift Valley fever or contagious bovine pleuropneumonia for 30 days immediately prior to collection and in the case of embryos certified under 2 (b) (ii) and (c) (ii) for 30 days after collection;
(b) between the time of collection of the embryos to be exported and their dispatch, they were stored continuously in approved premises which were situated in the centre of an area of 20 km in diameter in which according to official findings there was no incidence of foot-and-mouth disease, contagious vesicular stomatitis or Rift Valley fever;
4. the donor females:
(a) during the 30 days immediately prior to collection of the embryos to be exported, were located in premises situated in the centre of an area of 20 km in diameter in which according to official findings there was no incidence of foot-and-mouth disease, blue tongue, epizootic haemorrhagic disease, contagious vesicular stomatitis, Rift Valley fever or contagious bovine pleuropneumonia;
(b) were artificially inseminated with semen from a bull which at the time of collection of the semen was standing at a semen collection centre officially approved under Council Directive 88/407/EEC (2) or any subsequent decision;
(c) showed no clinical sign of disease on the day of collection;
(d) have spent the six months immediately prior to collection in the territory of
in a maximum of two herds which are:
(name of exporting country)
– free from tuberculosis,
– free from brucellosis,
– free from enzootic bovine leukosis or a herd or herds which has/have shown no clinical signs of enzootic bovine leukosis during the previous three years,
– a herd or herds which has/have shown no clinical sign of infectious bovine rhinotracheitis/infectious pustular vulvo-vaginitis during the previous 12 months.
1. Consignor (name and full address) ANIMAL HEALTH CERTIFICATE
No ORIGINAL
2. Third country of collection 3. Consignee (name and full address)
(a) A separate certificate must be issued for each consignment of embryos
(b) The original of this certificate must accompany the consignment to the
place of destination
6. Place of loading
8. Means of transport
9. Place and Member State of destination
11. Number and codemark of embryo containers
4. COMPETENT AUTHORITY
5. COMPETENT LOCAL AUTHORITY
7. Name and address of embryo collection team
10. Registration number of embryo collection team
12. Identification of consignment
(a) Number of embryos (b) Date(s) of collection (c) Breed
13. I, the undersigned official veterinarian of the Government of ,
(name of exporting third country)
certify that:
1. the embryo collection team identified above:
– is approved in Decision 92/452/EEC in accordance with Chapter I of Annex A to Directive 89/556/EEC,
– carried out the collection, processing, storing and transport of the embryos described above in accordance with Chapter II of Annex A to Directive 89/556/EEC,
– is subjected at least twice per year to inspection by an official veterinarian of the central veterinary authority of ;
(name of third country)
2. according to official findings
(name of exporting country)
(a) been free during 12 months immediately prior to collection of the embryos to be exported from rinderpest;
(b) either (1):
(i) been free from foot-and-mouth disease during the 12 months immediately prior to collection of the embryos to be exported and does not practise vaccination against it
(ii) has not been free from foot-and-mouth disease for the 12 months immediately prior to the collection of the embryos and/or practises vaccination against it and
– the donor animals come from a holding in which no animal has been vaccinated against foot-and-mouth disease during the 30 days prior to collection, and
– the embryos have been stored in approved conditions for a minimum period of 30 days immediately after collection;
(c) either (1):
(i) been free from bluetongue and epizootic haemorrhagic disease (EHD) for the 12 months immediately prior to collection of the embryos to be exported and does not practise vaccination against them
(ii) has not been free from bluetongue and epizootic haemorrhagic disease (EHD) for the 12 months immediately prior to collection of the embryos to be exported and/or practises vaccination against them and
– the embryos have been stored in approved conditions for a minimum period of 30 days immediately after collection, and
– the donor female was subjected with negative results to a competitive Elisa for bluetongue antibodies, an agar gel immuno diffusion test and a serum neutralization test for epizootic haemorrhagic disease antibodies on a blood sample taken not less than 21 days following collection;
3. (a) the premises on which the embryos were collected and processed was at the time of collection situated in the centre of an area of 20 km diameter on which according to official findings there had been no incidence of foot-and-mouth disease, bluetongue, epizootic haemorrhagic disease, contagious vesicular stomatitis, Rift Valley fever or contagious bovine pleuropneumonia for 30 days immediately prior to collection and in the case of embryos certified under 2 (b) (ii) and (c) (ii) for 30 days after collection;
(b) between the time of collection of the embryos to be exported and their dispatch, they were stored continuously in approved premises which were situated in the centre of an area of 20 km in diameter in which according to official findings there was no incidence of foot-and-mouth disease, contagious vesicular stomatitis or Rift Valley fever;
4. the donor females:
(a) during the 30 days immediately prior to collection of the embryos to be exported, were located in premises situated in the centre of an area of 20 km in diameter in which according to official findings there was no incidence of foot-and-mouth disease, blue tongue, epizootic haemorrhagic disease, contagious vesicular stomatitis, Rift Valley fever or contagious bovine pleuropneumonia;
(b) were artificially inseminated with semen from a bull which at the time of collection of the semen was standing at a semen collection centre officially approved under Council Directive 88/407/EEC (2) or any subsequent decision;
(c) showed no clinical sign of disease on the day of collection;
(d) have spent the six months immediately prior to collection in the territory of
in a maximum of two herds which are:
(name of exporting country)
– freefrom tuberculosis,
– free from brucellosis,
– free from enzootic bovine leukosis or a herd or herds which has/have shown no clinical signs of enzootic bovine leukosis during the previous three years,
– a herd or herds which has/have shown no clinical sign of infectious bovine rhinotracheitis/infectious pustular vulvo-vaginitis during the previous 12 months;

Pending: 32011D0137

3.3.2011 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 58/53
(1) On 23 February 2011, the European Union expressed its grave concern regarding the situation unfolding in Libya. The EU strongly condemned the violence and use of force against civilians and deplored the repression against peaceful demonstrators.
(2) The EU reiterated its call for an immediate end to the use of force and for steps to address the legitimate demands of the population.
(3) On 26 February 2011, the United Nations Security Council (‘the Security Council’) adopted Resolution 1970 (‘UNSCR 1970 (2011)’) which introduced restrictive measures against Libya and against persons and entities involved in serious human rights abuses against persons in Libya, including by being involved in attacks, in violation of international law, on civilian populations and facilities.
(4) In view of the seriousness of the situation in Libya, the EU considers it necessary to impose additional restrictive measures.
(5) In addition, further Union action is needed in order to implement certain measures.
(a) provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, training or other assistance, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel, related to military activities or to the provision, maintenance and use of items referred to in paragraph 1, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in, or for use in, Libya;
(b) provide, directly or indirectly, financial assistance related to military activities or to the provision, maintenance and use of items referred to in paragraph 1, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in, or for use in, Libya;
(c) participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities, the object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibitions referred to in points (a) or (b).
(a) the supply, sale or transfer of non-lethal military equipment or of equipment which might be used for internal repression, intended solely for humanitarian or protective use;
(b) other supply, sale or transfer of arms and related material;
(c) the provision of technical assistance, training or other assistance, including personnel, related to such equipment;
(d) the provision of financial assistance related to such equipment;
(a) persons listed in Annex I to UNSCR 1970 (2011), and additional persons designated by the Security Council or by the Committee in accordance with paragraph 22 of UNSCR 1970 (2011), as listed in Annex I;
(b) persons not covered by Annex I involved in or complicit in ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses against persons in Libya, including by being involved in or complicit in planning, commanding, ordering or conducting attacks, in violation of international law, including aerial bombardments, on civilian populations and facilities, or acting for or on their behalf or at their direction, as listed in Annex II.
(a) travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligation; or
(b) an exemption would further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation in Libya and stability in the region;
(a) entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process; or
(b) a Member State determines on a case-by-case basis that such entry or transit is required to advance peace and stability in Libya and the Member State subsequently notifies the Committee within forty-eight hours after making such a determination.
(a) as a host country to an international intergovernmental organisation;
(b) as a host country to an international conference convened by, or under the auspices of, the UN;
(c) under a multilateral agreement conferring privileges and immunities; or
(d) under the 1929 Treaty of Conciliation (Lateran pact) concluded by the Holy See (State of the Vatican City) and Italy.
(a) persons and entities listed in Annex II to UNSCR 1970 (2011), and additional persons and entities designated by the Security Council or by the Committee in accordance with paragraph 22 of UNSCR 1970 (2011), or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, as listed in Annex III;
(b) persons and entities not covered by Annex III involved in or complicit in ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses against persons in Libya, including by being involved in or complicit in planning, commanding, ordering or conducting attacks, in violation of international law, including aerial bombardments, on civilian populations and facilities, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, as listed in Annex IV,
(a) necessary for basic expenses, including payment of foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;
(b) intended exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services in accordance with national laws; or
(c) intended exclusively for payment of fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assistance and economic resources;
(a) necessary for extraordinary expenses, after notification by the Member State concerned to the Committee, where appropriate, and approval by the Committee; or
(b) the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgement, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgement provided that the lien or judgement was entered before the date of adoption of UNSCR 1970 (2011), and is not for the benefit of a person or entity referred to in paragraph 1, after notification by the Member State concerned to the Committee, where appropriate;
(a) interest or other earnings due on those accounts; or
(b) payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose before the date on which those accounts became subject to restrictive measures;
1 AL-BAGHDADI, Dr Abdulqader MohammedPassport number: B010574. Date of birth: 01.07.1950.Head of the Liaison Office of the Revolutionary Committees. Revolutionary Committees involved in violence against demonstrators.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
2. DIBRI, Abdulqader YusefDate of birth: 1946. Place of birth: Houn, Libya.Head of Muammar QADHAFI's personal security. Responsibility for regime security. History of directing violence against dissidents.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
3. DORDA, Abu Zayd UmarDirector, External Security Organisation. Regime loyalist. Head of external intelligence agency.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
4. JABIR, Major General Abu Bakr YunisDate of birth: 1952. Place of birth: Jalo, Libya.Defence Minister. Overall responsibility for actions of armed forces.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
5. MATUQ, Matuq MohammedDate of birth: 1956. Place of birth: Khoms.Secretary for Utilities. Senior member of regime. Involvement with Revolutionary Committees. Past history of involvement in suppression of dissent and violence.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
6. QADHAF AL-DAM, Sayyid MohammedDate of birth:1948. Place of birth: Sirte, Libya.Cousin of Muammar QADHAFI. In the 1980s, Sayyid was involved in the dissident assassination campaign and allegedly responsible for several deaths in Europe. He is also thought to have been involved in arms procurement.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
7. QADHAFI, Aisha MuammarDate of birth: 1978. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.Daughter of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
8. QADHAFI, Hannibal MuammarPassport number: B/002210. Date of birth: 20.09.1975. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
9. QADHAFI, Khamis MuammarDate of birth: 1978. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
10. QADHAFI, Mohammed MuammarDate of birth: 1970. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
11. QADHAFI, Muammar Mohammed Abu MinyarDate of birth: 1942. Place of birth: Sirte, Libya.Leader of the Revolution, Supreme Commander of Armed Forces. Responsibility for ordering repression of demonstrations, human rights abuses.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
12. QADHAFI, MutassimDate of birth: 1976. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.National Security Adviser. Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
13. QADHAFI, SaadiPassport number: 014797. Date of birth: 25.05.1973. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.Commander Special Forces. Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
14. QADHAFI, Saif al-ArabDate of birth: 1982. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
15. QADHAFI, Saif al-IslamPassport number: B014995. Date of birth: 25.06.1972. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.Director, Qadhafi Foundation. Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime. Inflammatory public statements encouraging violence against demonstrators.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
16. AL-SENUSSI, Colonel AbdullahDate of birth: 1949. Place of birth: Sudan.Director Military Intelligence. Military Intelligence involvement in suppression of demonstrations. Past history includes suspicion of involvement in Abu Selim prison massacre. Convicted in absentia for bombing of UTA flight. Brother-in-law of Muammar QADHAFI.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing
1. ABDULHAFIZ, Colonel Mas’ud Position: Armed Forces Commander 3rd in command of Armed Forces. Significant role in Military Intelligence. 28.2.2011
2. ABDUSSALAM, Abdussalam Mohammed Position: Head Counter-Terrorism, External Security OrganisationDate of Birth: 1952Place of Birth: Tripoli, Libya Prominent Revolutionary Committee member. Close associate of Muammar QADHAFI. 28.2.2011
3. ABU SHAARIYA Position: Deputy Head, External Security Organisation Prominent member of regime. Brother-in-law of Muammar QADHAFI. 28.2.2011
4. ASHKAL, Al-Barrani Position: Deputy Director, Military Intelligence Senior member of regime. 28.2.2011
5. ASHKAL, Omar Position: Head, Revolutionary Committees MovementPlace of Birth: Sirte, Libya Revolutionary Committees involved in violence against demonstrators. 28.2.2011
6. QADHAF AL-DAM, Ahmed Mohammed Date of Birth: 1952Place of Birth: Egypt Cousin of Muammar QADHAFI. Since 1995, he is believed to have had command of an elite army battalion in charge of Qadhafi's personal security and to have a key role in External Security Organisation. He has been involved in planning operations against Libyan dissidents abroad and was directly involved in terrorist activity. 28.2.2011
7. AL-BARASSI, Safia Farkash Date of birth: 1952Place of birth: Al Bayda, Libya Wife of Muammar QADHAFI.Closeness of association with regime. 28.2.2011
8. SALEH, Bachir Date of birth: 1946Place of birth: Traghen Head of Cabinet of the Leader.Closeness of association with regime. 28.2.2011
9. General TOHAMI, Khaled Date of birth: 1946Place of birth: Genzur Director of Internal Security Office.Closeness of association with regime. 28.2.2011
10. FARKASH, Mohammed Boucharaya Date of birth: 1 July 1949Place of birth: Al-Bayda Director of intelligence in External Security Office.Closeness of association with regime. 28.2.2011
1. QADHAFI, Aisha MuammarDate of birth: 1978. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.Daughter of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
2. QADHAFI, Hannibal MuammarPassport number: B/002210. Date of birth: 20.9.1975. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
3. QADHAFI, Khamis MuammarDate of birth: 1978. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
4. QADHAFI, Muammar Mohammed Abu MinyarDate of birth: 1942. Place of birth: Sirte, Libya.Leader of the Revolution, Supreme Commander of Armed Forces. Responsibility for ordering repression of demonstrations, human rights abuses.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
5. QADHAFI, MutassimDate of birth: 1976. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.National Security Adviser. Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
6. QADHAFI, Saif al-IslamDirector, Qadhafi Foundation. Passport number: B014995. Date of birth: 25.6.1972. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime. Inflammatory public statements encouraging violence against demonstrators.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing
1. ABDULHAFIZ, Colonel Mas'ud Position: Armed Forces Commander 3rd in command of Armed Forces. Significant role in Military Intelligence. 28.2.2011
2. ABDUSSALAM, Abdussalam Mohammed Position: Head Counter-Terrorism, External Security OrganisationDate of Birth: 1952Place of Birth: Tripoli, Libya Prominent Revolutionary Committee member. Close associate of Muammar QADHAFI. 28.2.2011
3. ABU SHAARIYA Position: Deputy Head, External Security Organisation Prominent member of regime. Brother-in-law of Muammar QADHAFI. 28.2.2011
4. ASHKAL, Al-Barrani Position: Deputy Director, Military Intelligence Senior member of regime. 28.2.2011
5. ASHKAL, Omar Position: Head, Revolutionary Committees MovementPlace of Birth: Sirte, Libya Revolutionary Committees involved in violence against demonstrators. 28.2.2011
6. AL-BAGHDADI, Dr Abdulqader Mohammed Position: Head of the Liaison Office of the Revolutionary CommitteesPasssport No: B010574Date of Birth: 01/07/1950 Revolutionary Committees involved in violence against demonstrators. 28.2.2011
7. DIBRI, Abdulqader Yusef Position: Head of Muammar QADHAFI's personal securityDate of Birth: 1946Place of Birth: Houn, Libya Responsibility for regime security. History of directing violence against dissidents. 28.2.2011
8. DORDA, Abu Zayd Umar Position: Director, External Security Organisation Regime loyalist. Head of external intelligence agency. 28.2.2011
9. JABIR, Major General Abu Bakr Yunis Position: Defence MinisterDate of Birth: 1952Place of Birth: Jalo, Libya Overall responsibility for actions of armed forces. 28.2.2011
10. MATUQ, Matuq Mohammed Position: Secretary for UtilitiesDate of Birth: 1956Place of Birth: Khoms Senior member of regime. Involvement with Revolutionay Committees. Past history of involvement in suppression of dissent and violence. 28.2.2011
11. QADHAF AL-DAM, Ahmed Mohammed Date of Birth: 1952Place of Birth: Egypt Cousin of Muammar QADHAFI. Since 1995, he is believed to have had command of an elite army battalion in charge of Qadhafi's personal security and to have a key role in External Security Organisation. He has been involved in planning operations against Libyan dissidents abroad and was directly involved in terrorist activity. 28.2.2011
12. QADHAF AL-DAM, Sayyid Mohammed Date of Birth: 1948Place of Birth: Sirte, Libya Cousin of Muammar QADHAFI. In the 1980s, Sayyid was involved in the dissident assassination campaign and allegedly responsible for several deaths in Europe. He is also thought to have been involved in arms procurement. 28.2.2011
13. QADHAFI, Mohammed Muammar Position: Chairman of Libya's General Post and Telecommunications CompanyDate of Birth: 1970Place of Birth: Tripoli, Libya Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime. 28.2.2011
14. QADHAFI, Saadi Position: Commander Special ForcesPassport No. 014797Date of Birth: 25/05/1973Place of Birth: Tripoli, Libya Position: Commander Special Forces Passport No. 014797 Date of Birth: 25/05/1973 Place of Birth: Tripoli, Libya Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations. 28.2.2011
Position: Commander Special Forces
Passport No. 014797
Date of Birth: 25/05/1973
Place of Birth: Tripoli, Libya
15. QADHAFI, Saif al-Arab Date of Birth: 1982Place of Birth: Tripoli, Libya Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime. 28.2.2011
16. AL-SENUSSI, Colonel Abdullah (Al-Megrahi) Position: Director Military IntelligenceDate of Birth: 1949Place of Birth: Sudan Military Intelligence involvement in suppression of demonstrations. Past history includes suspicion of involvement in Abu Selim prison massacre. Convicted in absentia for bomboing of UTA flight. Brother -in-law of Muammar QADHAFI. 28.2.2011
17. AL-BARASSI, Safia Farkash Date of birth: 1952Place of birth: Al Bayda, Libya Wife of Muammar QADHAFI.Closeness of association with regime. 28.2.2011
18. SALEH, Bachir Date of birth: 1946Place of birth: Traghen Head of Cabinet of the Leader.Closeness of association with regime. 28.2.2011
19. General TOHAMI, Khaled Date of birth: 1946Place of birth: Genzur Director of Internal Security Office.Closeness of association with regime. 28.2.2011
20. FARKASH, Mohammed Boucharaya Date of birth: 1 July 1949Place of birth: Al-Bayda Director of intelligence in External Security Office.Closeness of association with regime. 28.2.2011
Position: Commander Special Forces
Passport No. 014797
Date of Birth: 25/05/1973
Place of Birth: Tripoli, Libya
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
(1) On 23 February 2011, the European Union expressed its grave concern regarding the situation unfolding in Libya. The EU strongly condemned the violence and use of force against civilians and deplored the repression against peaceful demonstrators.
(2) The EU reiterated its call for an immediate end to the use of force and for steps to address the legitimate demands of the population.
(3) On 26 February 2011, the United Nations Security Council (‘the Security Council’) adopted Resolution 1970 (‘UNSCR 1970 (2011)’) which introduced restrictive measures against Libya and against persons and entities involved in serious human rights abuses against persons in Libya, including by being involved in attacks, in violation of international law, on civilian populations and facilities.
(4) In view of the seriousness of the situation in Libya, the EU considers it necessary to impose additional restrictive measures.
(5) In addition, further Union action is needed in order to implement certain measures.
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1
1. The direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of arms and related material of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, as well as equipment which might be used for internal repression, to Libya by nationals of Member States or from or through the territories of Member States or using their flag vessels or aircraft, shall be prohibited whether originating or not in their territories.
2. It shall be prohibited to:
(a)
provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, training or other assistance, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel, related to military activities or to the provision, maintenance and use of items referred to in paragraph 1, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in, or for use in, Libya;
(b)
provide, directly or indirectly, financial assistance related to military activities or to the provision, maintenance and use of items referred to in paragraph 1, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in, or for use in, Libya;
(c)
participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities, the object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibitions referred to in points (a) or (b).

Article 2
1. Article 1 shall not apply to:
(a)
the supply, sale or transfer of non-lethal military equipment or of equipment which might be used for internal repression, intended solely for humanitarian or protective use;
(b)
other supply, sale or transfer of arms and related material;
(c)
the provision of technical assistance, training or other assistance, including personnel, related to such equipment;
(d)
the provision of financial assistance related to such equipment;
as approved in advance, where appropriate, by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 of UNSCR 1970 (2011) (‘the Committee’):
2. Article 1 shall not apply to the supply, sale or transfer of protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to Libya by UN personnel, personnel of the European Union or its Member States, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel for their personal use only.

Article 3
The procurement by nationals of Member States, either using their flag vessels or aircraft, of the items referred to in Article 1(1) from Libya shall be prohibited, whether or not originating in the territory of Libya.

Article 4
1. Member States shall inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to and from Libya, in their territory, including their seaports and airports, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited under this Decision.
2. Member States shall, upon discovery, seize and dispose of (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) items whose supply, sale, transfer or export is prohibited under this Decision.
3. Member States shall cooperate, in accordance with their national legislation, with inspections and disposals undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2.
4. Aircrafts and vessels transporting cargo to and from Libya shall be subject to the requirement of additional pre-arrival or pre-departure information for all goods brought into or out of a Member State.

Article 5
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of:
(a)
persons listed in Annex I to UNSCR 1970 (2011), and additional persons designated by the Security Council or by the Committee in accordance with paragraph 22 of UNSCR 1970 (2011), as listed in Annex I;
(b)
persons not covered by Annex I involved in or complicit in ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses against persons in Libya, including by being involved in or complicit in planning, commanding, ordering or conducting attacks, in violation of international law, including aerial bombardments, on civilian populations and facilities, or acting for or on their behalf or at their direction, as listed in Annex II.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not oblige a Member State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory.
3. Paragraph 1(a) shall not apply where the Committee determines that:
(a)
travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligation; or
(b)
an exemption would further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation in Libya and stability in the region;
4. Paragraph 1(a) shall not apply where:
(a)
entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process; or
(b)
a Member State determines on a case-by-case basis that such entry or transit is required to advance peace and stability in Libya and the Member State subsequently notifies the Committee within forty-eight hours after making such a determination.
5. Paragraph 1(b) shall be without prejudice to the cases where a Member State is bound by an obligation of international law, namely:
(a)
as a host country to an international intergovernmental organisation;
(b)
as a host country to an international conference convened by, or under the auspices of, the UN;
(c)
under a multilateral agreement conferring privileges and immunities; or
(d)
under the 1929 Treaty of Conciliation (Lateran pact) concluded by the Holy See (State of the Vatican City) and Italy.
6. Paragraph 5 shall be considered as applying also in cases where a Member State is host country to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
7. The Council shall be duly informed in all cases where a Member State grants an exemption pursuant to paragraphs 5 or 6.
8. Member States may grant exemptions from the measures imposed under paragraph 1(b) where travel is justified on the grounds of urgent humanitarian need, or on grounds of attending intergovernmental meetings, including those promoted by the Union, or hosted by a Member State holding the Chairmanship in office of the OSCE, where a political dialogue is conducted that directly promotes democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Libya.
9. A Member State wishing to grant exemptions referred to in paragraph 8 shall notify the Council in writing. The exemption shall be deemed to be granted unless one or more Council members raise an objection in writing within two working days of receiving notification of the proposed exemption. Should one or more Council members raise an objection, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide to grant the proposed exemption.
10. In cases where, pursuant to paragraphs 5, 6, and 8, a Member State authorises the entry into, or transit through, its territory of persons listed in the Annex, the authorisation shall be limited to the purpose for which it is given and to the persons concerned thereby.

Article 6
1. All funds, other financial assets and economic resources, owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by:
(a)
persons and entities listed in Annex II to UNSCR 1970 (2011), and additional persons and entities designated by the Security Council or by the Committee in accordance with paragraph 22 of UNSCR 1970 (2011), or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, as listed in Annex III;
(b)
persons and entities not covered by Annex III involved in or complicit in ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses against persons in Libya, including by being involved in or complicit in planning, commanding, ordering or conducting attacks, in violation of international law, including aerial bombardments, on civilian populations and facilities, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, as listed in Annex IV,
shall be frozen.
2. No funds, other financial assets or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of, natural or legal persons or entities referred to in paragraph 1.
3. Exemptions may be made for funds, financial assets and economic resources which are:
(a)
necessary for basic expenses, including payment of foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;
(b)
intended exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services in accordance with national laws; or
(c)
intended exclusively for payment of fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assistance and economic resources;
after notification by the Member State concerned to the Committee, where appropriate, of the intention to authorise access to such funds, other financial assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such notification.
4. Exemptions may also be made for funds and economic resources which are:
(a)
necessary for extraordinary expenses, after notification by the Member State concerned to the Committee, where appropriate, and approval by the Committee; or
(b)
the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgement, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgement provided that the lien or judgement was entered before the date of adoption of UNSCR 1970 (2011), and is not for the benefit of a person or entity referred to in paragraph 1, after notification by the Member State concerned to the Committee, where appropriate;
5. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into before the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant Member State has determined that the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity referred to in paragraph 1 and after notification by the relevant Member State to the Committee, where appropriate, of the intention to make or receive such payments or to authorise the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, 10 working days prior to such authorisation.
6. Paragraph 2 shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of:
(a)
interest or other earnings due on those accounts; or
(b)
payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose before the date on which those accounts became subject to restrictive measures;
provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to paragraph 1.

Article 7
No claims, including for compensation or any other claim of this kind, such as a claim of set-off or a claim under a guarantee, in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which was affected, directly or indirectly, wholly or in part, by reason of measures decided upon pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011), including measures of the Union or any Member State in accordance with, as required by or in any connection with, the implementation of the relevant decisions of the Security Council or measures covered by this Decision, shall be granted to the designated persons or entities listed in Annexes I, II, III or IV, or any other person or entity in Libya, including the Government of Libya, or any person or entity claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity.

Article 8
1. The Council shall implement modifications to Annexes I and III on the basis of the determinations made by the Security Council or by the Committee.
2. The Council, acting on a proposal from Member States or from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall establish the lists in Annexes II and IV and adopt modifications thereto.

Article 9
1. Where the Security Council or the Committee lists a person or entity, the Council shall include such person or entity in Annexes I or III.
2. Where the Council decides to subject a person or entity to the measures referred to in Articles 5(1)(b) and 6(1)(b), it shall amend Annexes II and IV accordingly.
3. The Council shall communicate its decision to the person or entity referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, including the grounds for listing, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing such person or entity an opportunity to present observations.
4. Where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review its decision and inform the person or entity accordingly.

Article 10
1. Annexes I, II, III and IV shall include the grounds for listing of listed persons and entities concerned, as provided by the Security Council or by the Committee with regard to Annexes I and III.
2. Annexes I, II, III and IV shall also contain, where available, the information necessary to identify the persons or entities concerned, as provided by the Security Council or by the Committee with regard to Annexes I and III. With regard to persons, such information may include names, including aliases, date and place of birth, nationality, passport and ID card numbers, gender, address if known, and function or profession. With regard to entities, such information may include names, place and date of registration, registration number and place of business. Annexes I and III shall also include the date of designation by the Security Council or by the Committee.

Article 11
In order to maximise the impact of the measures laid down in this Decision , the Union shall encourage third States to adopt similar restrictive measures.

Article 12
1. This Decision shall be reviewed, amended or repealed as appropriate, notably in the light of relevant decisions by the Security Council.
2. The measures referred to in Articles 5(1)(b) and 6(1)(b) shall be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every 12 months. They shall cease to apply in respect of the persons and entities concerned if the Council determines, in accordance with the procedure referred in Article 8(2), that the conditions for their application are no longer met.

Article 13
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
(1) On 23 February 2011, the European Union expressed its grave concern regarding the situation unfolding in Libya. The EU strongly condemned the violence and use of force against civilians and deplored the repression against peaceful demonstrators.
(2) The EU reiterated its call for an immediate end to the use of force and for steps to address the legitimate demands of the population.
(3) On 26 February 2011, the United Nations Security Council (‘the Security Council’) adopted Resolution 1970 (‘UNSCR 1970 (2011)’) which introduced restrictive measures against Libya and against persons and entities involved in serious human rights abuses against persons in Libya, including by being involved in attacks, in violation of international law, on civilian populations and facilities.
(4) In view of the seriousness of the situation in Libya, the EU considers it necessary to impose additional restrictive measures.
(5) In addition, further Union action is needed in order to implement certain measures.
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
1. The direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of arms and related material of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, as well as equipment which might be used for internal repression, to Libya by nationals of Member States or from or through the territories of Member States or using their flag vessels or aircraft, shall be prohibited whether originating or not in their territories.
2. It shall be prohibited to:
(a)
provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, training or other assistance, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel, related to military activities or to the provision, maintenance and use of items referred to in paragraph 1, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in, or for use in, Libya;
(b)
provide, directly or indirectly, financial assistance related to military activities or to the provision, maintenance and use of items referred to in paragraph 1, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in, or for use in, Libya;
(c)
participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities, the object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibitions referred to in points (a) or (b).
1. Article 1 shall not apply to:
(a)
the supply, sale or transfer of non-lethal military equipment or of equipment which might be used for internal repression, intended solely for humanitarian or protective use;
(b)
other supply, sale or transfer of arms and related material;
(c)
the provision of technical assistance, training or other assistance, including personnel, related to such equipment;
(d)
the provision of financial assistance related to such equipment;
as approved in advance, where appropriate, by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 of UNSCR 1970 (2011) (‘the Committee’):
2. Article 1 shall not apply to the supply, sale or transfer of protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to Libya by UN personnel, personnel of the European Union or its Member States, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel for their personal use only.
The procurement by nationals of Member States, either using their flag vessels or aircraft, of the items referred to in Article 1(1) from Libya shall be prohibited, whether or not originating in the territory of Libya.
1. Member States shall inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to and from Libya, in their territory, including their seaports and airports, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited under this Decision.
2. Member States shall, upon discovery, seize and dispose of (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) items whose supply, sale, transfer or export is prohibited under this Decision.
3. Member States shall cooperate, in accordance with their national legislation, with inspections and disposals undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2.
4. Aircrafts and vessels transporting cargo to and from Libya shall be subject to the requirement of additional pre-arrival or pre-departure information for all goods brought into or out of a Member State.
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of:
(a)
persons listed in Annex I to UNSCR 1970 (2011), and additional persons designated by the Security Council or by the Committee in accordance with paragraph 22 of UNSCR 1970 (2011), as listed in Annex I;
(b)
persons not covered by Annex I involved in or complicit in ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses against persons in Libya, including by being involved in or complicit in planning, commanding, ordering or conducting attacks, in violation of international law, including aerial bombardments, on civilian populations and facilities, or acting for or on their behalf or at their direction, as listed in Annex II.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not oblige a Member State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory.
3. Paragraph 1(a) shall not apply where the Committee determines that:
(a)
travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligation; or
(b)
an exemption would further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation in Libya and stability in the region;
4. Paragraph 1(a) shall not apply where:
(a)
entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process; or
(b)
a Member State determines on a case-by-case basis that such entry or transit is required to advance peace and stability in Libya and the Member State subsequently notifies the Committee within forty-eight hours after making such a determination.
5. Paragraph 1(b) shall be without prejudice to the cases where a Member State is bound by an obligation of international law, namely:
(a)
as a host country to an international intergovernmental organisation;
(b)
as a host country to an international conference convened by, or under the auspices of, the UN;
(c)
under a multilateral agreement conferring privileges and immunities; or
(d)
under the 1929 Treaty of Conciliation (Lateran pact) concluded by the Holy See (State of the Vatican City) and Italy.
6. Paragraph 5 shall be considered as applying also in cases where a Member State is host country to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
7. The Council shall be duly informed in all cases where a Member State grants an exemption pursuant to paragraphs 5 or 6.
8. Member States may grant exemptions from the measures imposed under paragraph 1(b) where travel is justified on the grounds of urgent humanitarian need, or on grounds of attending intergovernmental meetings, including those promoted by the Union, or hosted by a Member State holding the Chairmanship in office of the OSCE, where a political dialogue is conducted that directly promotes democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Libya.
9. A Member State wishing to grant exemptions referred to in paragraph 8 shall notify the Council in writing. The exemption shall be deemed to be granted unless one or more Council members raise an objection in writing within two working days of receiving notification of the proposed exemption. Should one or more Council members raise an objection, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide to grant the proposed exemption.
10. In cases where, pursuant to paragraphs 5, 6, and 8, a Member State authorises the entry into, or transit through, its territory of persons listed in the Annex, the authorisation shall be limited to the purpose for which it is given and to the persons concerned thereby.
1. All funds, other financial assets and economic resources, owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by:
(a)
persons and entities listed in Annex II to UNSCR 1970 (2011), and additional persons and entities designated by the Security Council or by the Committee in accordance with paragraph 22 of UNSCR 1970 (2011), or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, as listed in Annex III;
(b)
persons and entities not covered by Annex III involved in or complicit in ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses against persons in Libya, including by being involved in or complicit in planning, commanding, ordering or conducting attacks, in violation of international law, including aerial bombardments, on civilian populations and facilities, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, as listed in Annex IV,
shall be frozen.
2. No funds, other financial assets or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of, natural or legal persons or entities referred to in paragraph 1.
3. Exemptions may be made for funds, financial assets and economic resources which are:
(a)
necessary for basic expenses, including payment of foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;
(b)
intended exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services in accordance with national laws; or
(c)
intended exclusively for payment of fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assistance and economic resources;
after notification by the Member State concerned to the Committee, where appropriate, of the intention to authorise access to such funds, other financial assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such notification.
4. Exemptions may also be made for funds and economic resources which are:
(a)
necessary for extraordinary expenses, after notification by the Member State concerned to the Committee, where appropriate, and approval by the Committee; or
(b)
the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgement, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgement provided that the lien or judgement was entered before the date of adoption of UNSCR 1970 (2011), and is not for the benefit of a person or entity referred to in paragraph 1, after notification by the Member State concerned to the Committee, where appropriate;
5. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into before the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant Member State has determined that the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity referred to in paragraph 1 and after notification by the relevant Member State to the Committee, where appropriate, of the intention to make or receive such payments or to authorise the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, 10 working days prior to such authorisation.
6. Paragraph 2 shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of:
(a)
interest or other earnings due on those accounts; or
(b)
payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose before the date on which those accounts became subject to restrictive measures;
provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to paragraph 1.
No claims, including for compensation or any other claim of this kind, such as a claim of set-off or a claim under a guarantee, in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which was affected, directly or indirectly, wholly or in part, by reason of measures decided upon pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011), including measures of the Union or any Member State in accordance with, as required by or in any connection with, the implementation of the relevant decisions of the Security Council or measures covered by this Decision, shall be granted to the designated persons or entities listed in Annexes I, II, III or IV, or any other person or entity in Libya, including the Government of Libya, or any person or entity claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity.
1. The Council shall implement modifications to Annexes I and III on the basis of the determinations made by the Security Council or by the Committee.
2. The Council, acting on a proposal from Member States or from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall establish the lists in Annexes II and IV and adopt modifications thereto.
1. Where the Security Council or the Committee lists a person or entity, the Council shall include such person or entity in Annexes I or III.
2. Where the Council decides to subject a person or entity to the measures referred to in Articles 5(1)(b) and 6(1)(b), it shall amend Annexes II and IV accordingly.
3. The Council shall communicate its decision to the person or entity referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, including the grounds for listing, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing such person or entity an opportunity to present observations.
4. Where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review its decision and inform the person or entity accordingly.
1. Annexes I, II, III and IV shall include the grounds for listing of listed persons and entities concerned, as provided by the Security Council or by the Committee with regard to Annexes I and III.
2. Annexes I, II, III and IV shall also contain, where available, the information necessary to identify the persons or entities concerned, as provided by the Security Council or by the Committee with regard to Annexes I and III. With regard to persons, such information may include names, including aliases, date and place of birth, nationality, passport and ID card numbers, gender, address if known, and function or profession. With regard to entities, such information may include names, place and date of registration, registration number and place of business. Annexes I and III shall also include the date of designation by the Security Council or by the Committee.
In order to maximise the impact of the measures laid down in this Decision , the Union shall encourage third States to adopt similar restrictive measures.
1. This Decision shall be reviewed, amended or repealed as appropriate, notably in the light of relevant decisions by the Security Council.
2. The measures referred to in Articles 5(1)(b) and 6(1)(b) shall be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every 12 months. They shall cease to apply in respect of the persons and entities concerned if the Council determines, in accordance with the procedure referred in Article 8(2), that the conditions for their application are no longer met.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

List of persons referred to in Articles 5(1)(a)

ANNEX I
1 | AL-BAGHDADI, Dr Abdulqader MohammedPassport number: B010574. Date of birth: 01.07.1950.Head of the Liaison Office of the Revolutionary Committees. Revolutionary Committees involved in violence against demonstrators.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
2. | DIBRI, Abdulqader YusefDate of birth: 1946. Place of birth: Houn, Libya.Head of Muammar QADHAFI’s personal security. Responsibility for regime security. History of directing violence against dissidents.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
3. | DORDA, Abu Zayd UmarDirector, External Security Organisation. Regime loyalist. Head of external intelligence agency.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
4. | JABIR, Major General Abu Bakr YunisDate of birth: 1952. Place of birth: Jalo, Libya.Defence Minister. Overall responsibility for actions of armed forces.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
5. | MATUQ, Matuq MohammedDate of birth: 1956. Place of birth: Khoms.Secretary for Utilities. Senior member of regime. Involvement with Revolutionary Committees. Past history of involvement in suppression of dissent and violence.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
6. | QADHAF AL-DAM, Sayyid MohammedDate of birth:1948. Place of birth: Sirte, Libya.Cousin of Muammar QADHAFI. In the 1980s, Sayyid was involved in the dissident assassination campaign and allegedly responsible for several deaths in Europe. He is also thought to have been involved in arms procurement.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
7. | QADHAFI, Aisha MuammarDate of birth: 1978. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.Daughter of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
8. | QADHAFI, Hannibal MuammarPassport number: B/002210. Date of birth: 20.09.1975. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
9. | QADHAFI, Khamis MuammarDate of birth: 1978. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
10. | QADHAFI, Mohammed MuammarDate of birth: 1970. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
11. | QADHAFI, Muammar Mohammed Abu MinyarDate of birth: 1942. Place of birth: Sirte, Libya.Leader of the Revolution, Supreme Commander of Armed Forces. Responsibility for ordering repression of demonstrations, human rights abuses.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
12. | QADHAFI, MutassimDate of birth: 1976. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.National Security Adviser. Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
13. | QADHAFI, SaadiPassport number: 014797. Date of birth: 25.05.1973. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.Commander Special Forces. Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
14. | QADHAFI, Saif al-ArabDate of birth: 1982. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
15. | QADHAFI, Saif al-IslamPassport number: B014995. Date of birth: 25.06.1972. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.Director, Qadhafi Foundation. Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime. Inflammatory public statements encouraging violence against demonstrators.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
16. | AL-SENUSSI, Colonel AbdullahDate of birth: 1949. Place of birth: Sudan.Director Military Intelligence. Military Intelligence involvement in suppression of demonstrations. Past history includes suspicion of involvement in Abu Selim prison massacre. Convicted in absentia for bombing of UTA flight. Brother-in-law of Muammar QADHAFI.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
ANNEX II
List of persons referred to in Articles 5(1)(b)
| Name | Identifying information | Reasons | Date of listing
1. | ABDULHAFIZ, Colonel Mas’ud | Position: Armed Forces Commander | 3rd in command of Armed Forces. Significant role in Military Intelligence. | 28.2.2011
2. | ABDUSSALAM, Abdussalam Mohammed | Position: Head Counter-Terrorism, External Security OrganisationDate of Birth: 1952Place of Birth: Tripoli, Libya | Prominent Revolutionary Committee member. Close associate of Muammar QADHAFI. | 28.2.2011
3. | ABU SHAARIYA | Position: Deputy Head, External Security Organisation | Prominent member of regime. Brother-in-law of Muammar QADHAFI. | 28.2.2011
4. | ASHKAL, Al-Barrani | Position: Deputy Director, Military Intelligence | Senior member of regime. | 28.2.2011
5. | ASHKAL, Omar | Position: Head, Revolutionary Committees MovementPlace of Birth: Sirte, Libya | Revolutionary Committees involved in violence against demonstrators. | 28.2.2011
6. | QADHAF AL-DAM, Ahmed Mohammed | Date of Birth: 1952Place of Birth: Egypt | Cousin of Muammar QADHAFI. Since 1995, he is believed to have had command of an elite army battalion in charge of Qadhafi’s personal security and to have a key role in External Security Organisation. He has been involved in planning operations against Libyan dissidents abroad and was directly involved in terrorist activity. | 28.2.2011
7. | AL-BARASSI, Safia Farkash | Date of birth: 1952Place of birth: Al Bayda, Libya | Wife of Muammar QADHAFI.Closeness of association with regime. | 28.2.2011
8. | SALEH, Bachir | Date of birth: 1946Place of birth: Traghen | Head of Cabinet of the Leader.Closeness of association with regime. | 28.2.2011
9. | General TOHAMI, Khaled | Date of birth: 1946Place of birth: Genzur | Director of Internal Security Office.Closeness of association with regime. | 28.2.2011
10. | FARKASH, Mohammed Boucharaya | Date of birth: 1 July 1949Place of birth: Al-Bayda | Director of intelligence in External Security Office.Closeness of association with regime. | 28.2.2011

List of persons and entities referred to in Articles 6(1)(a)

ANNEX III
1. | QADHAFI, Aisha MuammarDate of birth: 1978. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.Daughter of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
2. | QADHAFI, Hannibal MuammarPassport number: B/002210. Date of birth: 20.9.1975. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
3. | QADHAFI, Khamis MuammarDate of birth: 1978. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
4. | QADHAFI, Muammar Mohammed Abu MinyarDate of birth: 1942. Place of birth: Sirte, Libya.Leader of the Revolution, Supreme Commander of Armed Forces. Responsibility for ordering repression of demonstrations, human rights abuses.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
5. | QADHAFI, MutassimDate of birth: 1976. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.National Security Adviser. Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
6. | QADHAFI, Saif al-IslamDirector, Qadhafi Foundation. Passport number: B014995. Date of birth: 25.6.1972. Place of birth: Tripoli, Libya.Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime. Inflammatory public statements encouraging violence against demonstrators.Date of UN designation: 26.2.2011.
ANNEX IV
List of persons and entities referred to in Articles 6(1)(b)
| Name | Identifying information | Reasons | Date of listing
1. | ABDULHAFIZ, Colonel Mas’ud | Position: Armed Forces Commander | 3rd in command of Armed Forces. Significant role in Military Intelligence. | 28.2.2011
2. | ABDUSSALAM, Abdussalam Mohammed | Position: Head Counter-Terrorism, External Security OrganisationDate of Birth: 1952Place of Birth: Tripoli, Libya | Prominent Revolutionary Committee member. Close associate of Muammar QADHAFI. | 28.2.2011
3. | ABU SHAARIYA | Position: Deputy Head, External Security Organisation | Prominent member of regime. Brother-in-law of Muammar QADHAFI. | 28.2.2011
4. | ASHKAL, Al-Barrani | Position: Deputy Director, Military Intelligence | Senior member of regime. | 28.2.2011
5. | ASHKAL, Omar | Position: Head, Revolutionary Committees MovementPlace of Birth: Sirte, Libya | Revolutionary Committees involved in violence against demonstrators. | 28.2.2011
6. | AL-BAGHDADI, Dr Abdulqader Mohammed | Position: Head of the Liaison Office of the Revolutionary CommitteesPasssport No: B010574Date of Birth: 01/07/1950 | Revolutionary Committees involved in violence against demonstrators. | 28.2.2011
7. | DIBRI, Abdulqader Yusef | Position: Head of Muammar QADHAFI’s personal securityDate of Birth: 1946Place of Birth: Houn, Libya | Responsibility for regime security. History of directing violence against dissidents. | 28.2.2011
8. | DORDA, Abu Zayd Umar | Position: Director, External Security Organisation | Regime loyalist. Head of external intelligence agency. | 28.2.2011
9. | JABIR, Major General Abu Bakr Yunis | Position: Defence MinisterDate of Birth: 1952Place of Birth: Jalo, Libya | Overall responsibility for actions of armed forces. | 28.2.2011
10. | MATUQ, Matuq Mohammed | Position: Secretary for UtilitiesDate of Birth: 1956Place of Birth: Khoms | Senior member of regime. Involvement with Revolutionay Committees. Past history of involvement in suppression of dissent and violence. | 28.2.2011
11. | QADHAF AL-DAM, Ahmed Mohammed | Date of Birth: 1952Place of Birth: Egypt | Cousin of Muammar QADHAFI. Since 1995, he is believed to have had command of an elite army battalion in charge of Qadhafi’s personal security and to have a key role in External Security Organisation. He has been involved in planning operations against Libyan dissidents abroad and was directly involved in terrorist activity. | 28.2.2011
12. | QADHAF AL-DAM, Sayyid Mohammed | Date of Birth: 1948Place of Birth: Sirte, Libya | Cousin of Muammar QADHAFI. In the 1980s, Sayyid was involved in the dissident assassination campaign and allegedly responsible for several deaths in Europe. He is also thought to have been involved in arms procurement. | 28.2.2011
13. | QADHAFI, Mohammed Muammar | Position: Chairman of Libya’s General Post and Telecommunications CompanyDate of Birth: 1970Place of Birth: Tripoli, Libya | Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime. | 28.2.2011
14. | QADHAFI, Saadi | Position: Commander Special ForcesPassport No. 014797Date of Birth: 25/05/1973Place of Birth: Tripoli, Libya | Position: Commander Special Forces | Passport No. 014797 | Date of Birth: 25/05/1973 | Place of Birth: Tripoli, Libya | Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations. | 28.2.2011
Position: Commander Special Forces
Passport No. 014797
Date of Birth: 25/05/1973
Place of Birth: Tripoli, Libya
15. | QADHAFI, Saif al-Arab | Date of Birth: 1982Place of Birth: Tripoli, Libya | Son of Muammar QADHAFI. Closeness of association with regime. | 28.2.2011
16. | AL-SENUSSI, Colonel Abdullah (Al-Megrahi) | Position: Director Military IntelligenceDate of Birth: 1949Place of Birth: Sudan | Military Intelligence involvement in suppression of demonstrations. Past history includes suspicion of involvement in Abu Selim prison massacre. Convicted in absentia for bomboing of UTA flight. Brother -in-law of Muammar QADHAFI. | 28.2.2011
17. | AL-BARASSI, Safia Farkash | Date of birth: 1952Place of birth: Al Bayda, Libya | Wife of Muammar QADHAFI.Closeness of association with regime. | 28.2.2011
18. | SALEH, Bachir | Date of birth: 1946Place of birth: Traghen | Head of Cabinet of the Leader.Closeness of association with regime. | 28.2.2011
19. | General TOHAMI, Khaled | Date of birth: 1946Place of birth: Genzur | Director of Internal Security Office.Closeness of association with regime. | 28.2.2011
20. | FARKASH, Mohammed Boucharaya | Date of birth: 1 July 1949Place of birth: Al-Bayda | Director of intelligence in External Security Office.Closeness of association with regime. | 28.2.2011